All routes except GET / and GET /health require one of:
Authorization: Bearer <token>or:
X-Platform-Token: <token>Set the token with PLATFORM_API_TOKEN. The dev server refuses to start without it and never prints the token value.
Errors are returned as JSON:
{ "error": "Invalid JSON request body" }Unauthenticated API index for quick browser checks.
Unauthenticated health check.
{ "status": "ok" }Unauthenticated local Operator Console shell. The static shell loads without a token, but run data and mutations still require the local API token.
Lists local runs with their current progress summaries. This is the run picker contract for desktop and local web UI clients.
Creates an authorized run and initializes origin and goal facts.
{
"target": "https://app.example.com",
"goal": "Produce an evidence-backed report",
"scopePolicy": {
"allowedAssets": ["example.com", "*.example.com"],
"deniedAssets": ["admin.example.com"],
"allowedMethods": ["GET", "POST"],
"destructiveAllowed": false,
"credentialRules": { "allowVaultReferencesOnly": true },
"rateLimits": { "requestsPerMinute": 120 }
},
"workerPool": [
{ "name": "mock-worker", "type": "mock", "maxRunning": 1, "priority": 0, "timeoutMs": 60000 }
]
}The local Operator Console has Worker Pool presets for:
mock: deterministic local mock workercodex: Codex CLI Agent Workerclaude: Claude Code CLI Agent Workerclaude_codex: mixed Claude + Codex worker poolcustom: operator-edited JSON
The server remains the authority. It validates workerPool[].type, maxRunning, priority, optional command, args, env, and timeoutMs before creating the run. Secret-looking worker environment variables such as API keys, tokens, passwords, cookies, JWTs, and credentials are rejected; provide worker secrets through the local API process environment instead.
Imports a Bug Bounty, SRC, or enterprise authorization scope JSON and normalizes it into the platform ScopePolicy shape used by POST /runs.
{
"format": "hackerone",
"source": "program-scope.json",
"content": {
"in_scope": ["app.example.com", "*.example.com"],
"out_of_scope": ["admin.example.com"],
"allowedMethods": ["GET", "POST"],
"requestsPerMinute": 120
}
}Supported format values are hackerone, bugcrowd, src, enterprise, and generic_json. The parser accepts common fields such as in_scope, out_of_scope, allowedAssets, deniedAssets, targets, assets, and structured_scopes with asset_identifier-style entries.
Behavior:
- raw program JSON is not persisted
- the import record stores input SHA-256, counts, normalized
ScopePolicy, default target, and notes - imported methods default to
GET, POST - rate limit defaults to 120 requests/minute and clamps to
1..600 destructiveAlloweddefaults tofalse- vault-only credential references default to
true
Response:
{
"id": "program_scope_x",
"format": "hackerone",
"source": "program-scope.json",
"allowedAssetCount": 2,
"deniedAssetCount": 1,
"defaultTarget": "https://app.example.com",
"scopePolicy": {
"allowedAssets": ["*.example.com", "app.example.com"],
"deniedAssets": ["admin.example.com"],
"allowedMethods": ["GET", "POST"],
"destructiveAllowed": false,
"credentialRules": { "allowVaultReferencesOnly": true },
"rateLimits": { "requestsPerMinute": 120 }
}
}Lists the local scope imports, newest first. The Operator Console can apply any import back into the New Run form without re-uploading the original program content.
Returns the run, facts, intents, hints, evidence, and findings.
Returns the ordered run timeline. Desktop clients use this to show what the dispatcher, worker loop, tool gateway, evidence engine, and report generator have done.
Event details are redacted before storage and are intended for workflow visibility, not raw evidence storage.
Returns a compact progress summary for UI status bars and run dashboards.
{
"runId": "run_x",
"status": "active",
"phase": "queued",
"counts": {
"facts": 3,
"hints": 1,
"intents": { "total": 1, "open": 1, "claimed": 0, "released": 0, "concluded": 0 },
"evidence": 0,
"findings": 0,
"approvals": { "total": 0, "pending": 0, "approved": 0, "rejected": 0 },
"tools": { "total": 0, "allowed": 0, "blocked": 0, "approvalRequired": 0 },
"reports": 0
},
"lastEvent": { "type": "intent.created", "title": "Intent created" }
}Current phases are bootstrapping, reasoning, queued, exploring, awaiting_approval, completed, and stopped.
Establishes a WebSocket connection for real-time progress updates for a specific run. This is the live event stream for desktop clients, Operator Console dashboards, and CLI watchers.
ws://127.0.0.1:4317/ws/progress?runId=run_x
WebSocket connections require a valid runId query parameter and authentication via one of:
Browser clients, preferred: Sec-WebSocket-Protocol
const token = 'your-platform-api-token';
const encodedToken = btoa(unescape(encodeURIComponent(token)))
.replace(/\+/g, '-')
.replace(/\//g, '_')
.replace(/=+$/g, '');
const ws = new WebSocket('ws://127.0.0.1:4317/ws/progress?runId=run_x', [
'agentred-progress',
`agentred-token.${encodedToken}`,
]);The server selects only the fixed agentred-progress subprotocol during the handshake. The token-bearing subprotocol is used for authentication and is not echoed back as the selected protocol.
Node or CLI clients, preferred: authorization header
import WebSocket from 'ws';
const ws = new WebSocket('ws://127.0.0.1:4317/ws/progress?runId=run_x', {
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${process.env.PLATFORM_API_TOKEN}` },
});Query parameter, legacy compatibility only:
ws://127.0.0.1:4317/ws/progress?runId=run_x&token=<PLATFORM_API_TOKEN>
Avoid query-token authentication for new clients because URLs are commonly captured by logs, proxies, browser history, and error telemetry.
Example with wscat:
wscat -c "ws://127.0.0.1:4317/ws/progress?runId=run_x" -H "Authorization: Bearer $PLATFORM_API_TOKEN"Example with JavaScript:
const token = 'your-platform-api-token';
const encodedToken = btoa(unescape(encodeURIComponent(token)))
.replace(/\+/g, '-')
.replace(/\//g, '_')
.replace(/=+$/g, '');
const ws = new WebSocket('ws://127.0.0.1:4317/ws/progress?runId=run_x', [
'agentred-progress',
`agentred-token.${encodedToken}`,
]);
ws.onmessage = (event) => {
const update = JSON.parse(event.data);
console.log('Progress update:', update);
};To receive updates for a specific run, add the runId query parameter:
ws://127.0.0.1:4317/ws/progress?runId=run_x
The server sends JSON messages for every significant run state change:
{
"type": "progress",
"runId": "run_x",
"timestamp": "2026-06-05T12:34:56.789Z",
"data": {
"runId": "run_x",
"status": "active",
"phase": "exploring",
"counts": {
"facts": 5,
"hints": 2,
"intents": { "total": 3, "open": 1, "claimed": 1, "released": 0, "concluded": 1 },
"evidence": 2,
"findings": 1,
"approvals": { "total": 1, "pending": 1, "approved": 0, "rejected": 0 },
"tools": { "total": 3, "allowed": 2, "blocked": 0, "approvalRequired": 1 },
"reports": 0
},
"lastEvent": { "type": "tool.blocked", "title": "Tool execution blocked" }
}
}Progress events are sent when:
- A run is created
- A dispatcher tick completes
- An intent state changes (open → claimed → concluded/released)
- Evidence is added
- A finding is created or validated
- An approval is requested, approved, or rejected
- A tool is invoked, blocked, or requires approval
- A report is generated
- A run export is created
- The run phase changes
On connect:
The server immediately sends the current progress state for all matching runs (or the specific run if runId was provided).
During connection: The server pushes a progress update message every time run state changes.
Heartbeat: The server sends periodic ping frames. Clients should respond with pong frames to keep the connection alive.
On disconnect: The server cleans up the subscription. Clients can reconnect at any time and will receive the latest progress state.
If authentication fails, the server closes the connection with:
{
"type": "error",
"error": "Authentication required"
}WebSocket close codes:
1000: Normal closure1008: Policy violation (authentication failure)1011: Server error
CLI watcher:
# Watch specific run
wscat -c "ws://127.0.0.1:4317/ws/progress?runId=run_x" -H "Authorization: Bearer $PLATFORM_API_TOKEN"Desktop dashboard:
class ProgressMonitor {
constructor(token, runId) {
const url = new URL('ws://127.0.0.1:4317/ws/progress');
url.searchParams.set('runId', runId);
const encodedToken = btoa(unescape(encodeURIComponent(token)))
.replace(/\+/g, '-')
.replace(/\//g, '_')
.replace(/=+$/g, '');
this.ws = new WebSocket(url.toString(), [
'agentred-progress',
`agentred-token.${encodedToken}`,
]);
this.ws.onmessage = (event) => this.handleUpdate(JSON.parse(event.data));
this.ws.onerror = (error) => console.error('WebSocket error:', error);
this.ws.onclose = () => this.reconnect();
}
handleUpdate(update) {
if (update.type === 'progress') {
this.updateUI(update.data);
}
}
updateUI(progress) {
// Update dashboard with latest counts and phase
document.getElementById('phase').textContent = progress.phase;
document.getElementById('evidence-count').textContent = progress.counts.evidence;
document.getElementById('findings-count').textContent = progress.counts.findings;
}
reconnect() {
setTimeout(() => new ProgressMonitor(this.token, this.runId), 5000);
}
}
// Start monitoring
const monitor = new ProgressMonitor(PLATFORM_API_TOKEN, 'run_x');Operator Console integration:
The local Operator Console at http://127.0.0.1:4317/app uses this WebSocket endpoint to provide live run status updates without polling GET /runs/{id}/progress.
This endpoint is read-only. It does not dispatch Workers, execute tools, approve actions, mutate run state, or write evidence. It only broadcasts the current progress summary derived from existing run events and graph state.
Returns the run-level Mission Control read model. It is the commercial operator surface for "what is happening, why is this the next move, what is blocked, and what has to pass before delivery." It joins progress, Search Plan, Agent Workbench, Tool Ecosystem Workbench, Local Execution Node, Local Runner Workbench, Evidence Quality, Delivery Readiness, Agent Harness, and Reference Benchmark signals.
This endpoint is read-only. It does not dispatch Workers, invoke tools, approve actions, review evidence, validate findings, write evidence, mutate graph state, or grant permissions. Its actions point back to existing APIs such as Search Plan Advance, evidence review, finding validation, Tool Gateway previews, and report generation.
{
"mode": "assessment_mission_control",
"posture": "collecting_evidence",
"headline": "The run is still building its first evidence-backed branch.",
"currentReasoning": {
"phase": "queued",
"selectedNextAction": "Dispatch Worker for: Capture baseline HTTP response",
"topSearchItem": {
"title": "Dispatch queued intent",
"automation": "dispatch",
"riskLevel": "R1",
"score": 90
}
},
"progress": {
"facts": 2,
"intents": 1,
"evidence": 0,
"pendingApprovals": 0,
"healthyWorkers": 1,
"deliveryStatus": "needs_review"
},
"lanes": [{ "id": "search_and_reasoning", "status": "queued" }],
"operatorNextActions": [{ "label": "Dispatch Worker for: Capture baseline HTTP response", "actionKind": "dispatch" }],
"acceptanceGates": [{ "id": "scope_policy", "status": "pass" }]
}Returns a run-level stuck-loop supervisor report. It detects expired Worker leases, pending approvals, repeated blocked tool patterns, Worker timeout/error loops, and runs with no evidence and no queued work.
This endpoint is read-only. It does not dispatch Workers, invoke tools, approve actions, mutate the graph, or release leases.
{
"mode": "run_supervisor",
"posture": "stuck",
"summary": "1 expired lease(s), 0 pending approval(s), 1 timeout(s), 1 worker error(s), 2 repeated blocked tool call(s).",
"counts": {
"expiredClaimedIntents": 1,
"pendingApprovals": 0,
"repeatedBlockedTools": 2,
"workerTimeouts": 1,
"workerErrors": 1
},
"signals": [{ "id": "expired_leases", "severity": "critical" }],
"actions": [
{
"kind": "release_expired_leases",
"endpoint": "/runs/{id}/supervisor/tick",
"safeToAutomate": true
}
],
"audit": {
"readOnly": true,
"dispatchesWorkers": false,
"invokesTools": false,
"releasesExpiredLeases": false
}
}Runs one safe supervisor recovery tick. It only releases expired claimed intent leases by calling the graph lease recovery path, then returns the before/after supervisor counts. It does not dispatch the released work, run tools, approve actions, or mutate anything else.
{
"mode": "run_supervisor_tick",
"releasedExpiredIntents": [{ "id": "intent_x", "releaseReason": "Lease expired for worker" }],
"audit": {
"dispatchesWorkers": false,
"invokesTools": false,
"approvesActions": false,
"releasesExpiredLeases": true
}
}Returns the run-level Runtime Operations Workbench. This is the Z3r0-inspired operator surface for runtime event projection, session/resume posture, interrupt-safe gates, sandbox/local-surface binding, background-job readiness, and frontend-safe activity feeds.
This endpoint is read-only. It does not open live streams, dispatch Workers, start sandboxes, run shell commands, mutate session state, write graph objects, or read raw evidence blobs. It maps Z3r0's event-contract/runtime visibility ideas onto this platform's Dispatcher-owned intent model and deliberately does not introduce Worker-to-Worker subagent messaging.
{
"mode": "runtime_operations_workbench",
"posture": "usable",
"summary": "12 normalized runtime event(s), 4 trace span(s), 1 healthy Worker(s), 2 active local session(s).",
"counts": {
"runEvents": 8,
"normalizedEvents": 12,
"traceSpans": 4,
"workerSpans": 2,
"toolSpans": 2,
"activeIntents": 0,
"releasedIntents": 1,
"openIntents": 1,
"pendingApprovals": 0,
"activeBrowserSessions": 1,
"activeProxySessions": 1,
"activeOastSessions": 0,
"healthyWorkers": 1,
"evidence": 3
},
"lanes": [
{
"id": "runtime.event_contract",
"title": "Stable runtime event contract",
"status": "active",
"signals": ["normalized=12", "traceSpans=4"]
}
],
"eventContract": [
{
"kind": "run_event",
"status": "implemented",
"source": "RunEventService",
"payloadShape": ["id", "type", "title", "detail", "level", "entityId", "createdAt"]
},
{
"kind": "subagent_task",
"status": "deliberately_avoided",
"source": "Dispatcher intents / future background jobs"
}
],
"normalizedEvents": [
{ "kind": "worker_task", "title": "Intent claimed", "level": "info", "source": "intent.claimed" }
],
"operatorNextActions": ["Use normalized events as the future WebSocket/SSE contract for live operator progress."],
"audit": {
"readOnly": true,
"opensStreams": false,
"dispatchesWorkers": false,
"startsSandbox": false,
"runsCommands": false,
"mutatesSessionState": false,
"readsRawEvidence": false
}
}Returns the Agent Workbench read model for one run. It combines progress, graph state, assessment flow, strategy recommendations, attack-surface frontier, Tool Gateway blockers, evidence review state, finding validation state, and recent events into one operator-facing view.
This endpoint is read-only. It does not dispatch Workers, execute tools, approve actions, change scope, validate findings, generate reports, or read raw evidence blobs. Its nextActions point back to existing Dispatcher, Autopilot, Tool Gateway, evidence review, finding validation, and report APIs.
{
"runId": "run_x",
"phase": "queued",
"summary": "Phase: queued. 1 queued intent(s), 0 active intent(s). 2 evidence item(s), 1 awaiting review.",
"counts": {
"workers": 2,
"openIntents": 1,
"claimedIntents": 0,
"unreviewedEvidence": 1,
"pendingApprovals": 0,
"blockedTools": 0,
"strategyRecommendations": 3,
"surfaceFrontier": 4
},
"lanes": [
{
"id": "worker_loop",
"title": "Worker Loop",
"status": "queued",
"items": [{ "kind": "intent", "title": "Intent: open", "status": "queued" }]
}
],
"nextActions": [{ "label": "Review http_exchange evidence", "kind": "evidence_review" }],
"blockers": []
}Returns an operator-facing assessment flow brief. This is a read model over the graph and audit state; it does not create stages, assign workers, or allow workers to write protocol state.
{
"runId": "run_x",
"target": "https://app.example.com",
"goal": "Produce an evidence-backed report",
"phase": "reasoning",
"summary": "Goal: Produce an evidence-backed report Current phase: reasoning 4 facts, 1 intents, 1 evidence items, 1 findings.",
"steps": [
{
"kind": "intent",
"title": "Intent proposed",
"detail": "Check profile endpoint for evidence-backed exposure",
"status": "done",
"riskLevel": "R1",
"evidenceIds": ["evidence_x"]
}
],
"nextActions": ["Generate a report bundle for the candidate findings."],
"riskNotes": []
}The Operator Console uses this endpoint for the Assessment Flow panel so a human can see the current reasoning path without reading raw evidence blobs.
Returns an autonomy strategy brief for the current run. It gives the operator and future Agent Workers a small set of recommended high-level tool requests, rationale, risk levels, and Worker hints.
{
"runId": "run_x",
"mode": "dispatcher_controlled_agent_worker",
"summary": "0 evidence item(s), 0 active finding(s), 0 pending approval(s), 0 blocked tool call(s).",
"recommendations": [
{
"id": "web.baseline_http",
"title": "Capture baseline HTTP response",
"riskLevel": "R1",
"toolRequest": {
"tool": "http.request",
"target": "https://app.example.com",
"method": "GET",
"riskLevel": "R1"
}
}
],
"workerHints": ["Prefer low-risk evidence capture before proposing findings."]
}Returns a ranked state-space search plan for the current run. The plan merges pending approvals, active/queued Worker intents, evidence review needs, candidate finding validation, blocked tool calls, Strategy recommendations, Attack Surface frontier items, and report readiness into one priority queue.
This endpoint is read-only. automation describes which existing path could handle the item, such as Dispatcher, Strategy queueing, Tool Gateway, operator review, or reporting. It does not grant permission, dispatch Workers, invoke tools, approve actions, or create findings.
{
"mode": "dispatcher_state_space_search",
"summary": "6 search item(s): 0 blocked, 0 active, 4 ready/queued, 2 review item(s).",
"topItem": {
"source": "worker_intent",
"title": "Dispatch queued intent",
"status": "queued",
"automation": "dispatch",
"score": 89,
"riskLevel": "R1"
},
"counts": {
"total": 6,
"blocked": 0,
"active": 0,
"ready": 4,
"review": 2,
"automatable": 4
}
}Advances the current Search Plan by one controlled step for an active run.
The endpoint reads the highest-priority item from GET /runs/{id}/search-plan and only automates items mapped to Dispatcher-owned paths:
- queued Worker intents are dispatched once through the Dispatcher
- Strategy recommendations and Attack Surface frontier items are queued as normal intents, then dispatched once
- active Worker leases return
waiting_worker - approvals, evidence review, finding validation, blocked tool calls, and reporting return
operator_review_required
It never invokes raw tools directly, approves actions, validates findings, generates reports, or lets Workers write graph state.
{
"runId": "run_x",
"status": "queued_and_dispatched",
"item": {
"source": "surface_frontier",
"title": "Map links and forms",
"automation": "tool_gateway",
"riskLevel": "R1"
},
"intentId": "intent_x",
"dispatch": {
"status": "dispatched",
"intentId": "intent_x",
"worker": "mock-worker"
}
}Returns a read-only attack surface map for the current run. It is derived from graph state, evidence metadata, browser/HAR captures, scanner-template outputs, Android/SARIF/Cloud IAM/Identity imports, connector mappings, approvals, and strategy recommendations.
It does not execute tools, read raw evidence content into the response, create approvals, create findings, queue intents, or allow Agent Workers to write state. Evidence is referenced by id only.
{
"runId": "run_x",
"target": "https://app.example.com/",
"summary": "https://app.example.com/ has 3 asset(s) and 6 observed endpoint(s).",
"assets": [
{
"kind": "url",
"label": "https://app.example.com/login",
"riskLevel": "R1",
"evidenceIds": ["evidence_x"],
"signals": ["Observed via scanner_template"]
}
],
"endpoints": [
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "https://app.example.com/login",
"source": "scanner_template",
"evidenceIds": ["evidence_x"]
}
],
"technologies": ["server: nginx"],
"blockers": ["Pending approval for oast.record_callback R3 on https://app.example.com/."],
"frontier": [
{
"title": "Map links and forms",
"rationale": "Only the target entrypoint is visible; collect a bounded link/form map before deeper validation.",
"priority": "high",
"riskLevel": "R1",
"source": "evidence_gap",
"suggestedTool": "scanner.run_template",
"suggestedTemplate": "web.link_form_map"
}
]
}Previews the Tool Gateway decision for an executable Attack Surface frontier item. This is read-only and has the same no-side-effect guarantees as POST /runs/{id}/tools/plan: no tool execution, no approvals, no rate-limit consumption, no evidence writes.
Only frontier items with a mapped high-level suggestion are executable, such as:
scanner.run_templatewith a suggested templatehttp.requestfinding.proposewith related evidence ids
Frontier items without a mapped tool should be queued as Worker intent instead.
Queues a Search Frontier item as a normal open Intent created by the first-party Surface service.
The Worker still receives the task through the Dispatcher, and any tool requests it returns still pass through the Tool Gateway. If the frontier contains a mapped high-level tool request, the platform records it as an operator hint for the run; the Worker still does not get direct execution authority.
Invokes an executable Search Frontier item through the Tool Gateway.
This is the direct operator action from the Attack Surface panel. It is not a shortcut around scope, approval, rate limit, audit, redaction, evidence, or finding validation. Unsupported frontier tool mappings return 400.
Previews the Tool Gateway decision for an executable strategy recommendation. This uses the same read-only response shape as POST /runs/{id}/tools/plan, but derives the tool request from the selected Autonomy Plan recommendation.
GET /runs/run_x/strategy/recommendations/scanner.web.security_headers/planUse this before invoke when an operator wants to see whether a recommendation would be executable, approval-gated, rate-limited, or blocked by toolbox policy. Non-executable recommendations return 400.
Invokes an executable strategy recommendation through the Tool Gateway. This is the one-click path from the Operator Console's Autonomy Plan panel. The request still enforces scope, risk, approval, rate-limit, audit, redaction, and evidence rules.
Non-executable recommendations return 400.
Queues a strategy recommendation as an open intent for the Dispatcher/Agent Worker loop. If the recommendation contains a tool request, the platform also records a human-readable hint with that request so the Worker can see the operator-selected direction in the graph.
Runs one controlled autopilot step for an active run.
The endpoint never executes raw tools directly. It first stops for pending approvals or an active Worker lease. If a claimable intent exists, it dispatches one Dispatcher cycle. If no claimable intent exists, it selects the next automatable Strategy recommendation, queues it as an intent, and then dispatches one cycle. Non-automatable recommendations, such as human finding validation or report review, return operator_review_required.
{
"runId": "run_x",
"status": "queued_and_dispatched",
"recommendationId": "web.baseline_http",
"recommendationTitle": "Capture baseline HTTP response",
"intentId": "intent_x",
"dispatch": { "status": "dispatched", "task": "explore", "worker": "mock-worker" }
}Returns the static Domain Skill registry. These are narrow expert modules, not generic pentest flow stages. The registry now includes aggressive enterprise assessment modules for high-risk web triage, browser/proxy runner workflow, API authorization, GraphQL/OAuth, cloud/Kubernetes/container posture, supply chain/secrets, external surface baseline, AI-agent infrastructure security, mobile, SAST, identity, and reporting.
[
{
"id": "web.high-risk-triage",
"name": "Aggressive Web High-Risk Triage",
"category": "web",
"status": "ready",
"recommendedTools": ["http.request", "browser.navigate", "scanner.run_template", "access.compare_evidence"],
"requiredToolboxProfiles": ["builtin.web"]
}
]Returns the registry with run-specific enablement state.
Returns the read-only Domain Skill Workbench for a run. It joins enabled Skills, imported artifacts, evidence review state, candidate/confirmed findings, report bundles, and credential placeholders into per-domain readiness cards.
This endpoint does not enable Skills, import artifacts, run tools, approve actions, read raw evidence blobs, or create findings. It exists so the operator can see whether a rigid Skill has real inputs before exposing it to Agent Workers.
{
"mode": "domain_skill_readiness",
"posture": "usable",
"counts": {
"skills": 15,
"enabledSkills": 1,
"domainArtifacts": 2,
"domainEvidence": 3,
"reviewedEvidence": 1
},
"domains": [
{
"skillId": "mobile.android-apk",
"posture": "ready",
"enabled": true,
"inputs": [
{ "id": "android.manifest", "status": "present", "count": 1 }
],
"workerHandoff": ["Included in future Agent Worker envelopes as narrow domain context."]
}
]
}Enables a Domain Skill for a run. The platform records a run skill binding, writes an operator-visible hint, emits a skill.enabled event, and includes the enabled skill context in future Agent Worker protocol envelopes.
Enabling a skill does not grant new tool permissions. Worker requests still pass through scope policy, risk gates, approval checks, rate limits, audit logging, evidence handling, and finding validation.
Returns the curated PoC/template registry. Templates describe vulnerability classes, required evidence, recommended high-level tools, Worker hints, safety notes, references, and tags.
These templates are not a generic pentest knowledge base and they are not RAG. They are a bounded library of evidence requirements and safety constraints for specific checks such as multi-tenant authorization bypass, GraphQL field authorization, OAuth/OIDC flow review, SSRF impact triage, RCE/deserialization triage, injection impact triage, file upload/path traversal, secrets exposure, cloud storage exposure, Kubernetes/container risk, SBOM vulnerable components, exposed services, AI prompt/tool injection, role-diff IDOR review, OAST callback validation, SAST triage, and Android manifest review.
[
{
"id": "auth.role-diff.idor",
"name": "Role Differential IDOR Review",
"category": "auth",
"status": "ready",
"vulnerabilityClasses": ["CWE-639", "CWE-862", "IDOR", "Broken Access Control"],
"requiredEvidence": ["http_exchange", "command_output"],
"recommendedTools": ["credential.use_placeholder", "browser.navigate", "access.compare_evidence", "finding.propose"]
}
]Returns the registry with run-specific enabled state and binding metadata.
Enables a PoC template for a run. The platform records a run binding, writes a graph hint, emits a poc.template.enabled event, includes the template in future Agent Worker protocol envelopes, and surfaces the hints through GET /runs/{id}/strategy.
Enabling a template does not grant new tool permissions, approve risky actions, add new tools, or let Workers bypass evidence requirements. It only narrows what evidence should be collected and what safety constraints should be followed.
When a template is enabled, GET /runs/{id}/strategy may also return template-driven recommendations. Examples:
- role-diff templates recommend adding role credential references, collecting comparable evidence, and then using
access.compare_evidence - OAST templates recommend starting a local callback inbox before any approval-gated live payload validation
- scanner-backed templates recommend
scanner.run_templaterequests while still relying on Tool Gateway scope, profile readiness, and approval gates
Returns the configured Agent Worker pool with runtime health. Desktop clients use this to show whether Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, Kimi, mock, or custom CLI workers are ready before dispatch.
[
{
"name": "mock-worker",
"type": "mock",
"maxRunning": 1,
"priority": 0,
"commandConfigured": true,
"healthy": true,
"status": "healthy",
"checkedAt": "2026-05-30T00:00:00.000Z"
},
{
"name": "codex-worker",
"type": "codex",
"maxRunning": 1,
"priority": 1,
"commandConfigured": false,
"healthy": false,
"status": "unhealthy",
"reason": "command is not configured"
}
]This endpoint is an observability/readiness view. It does not let workers write graph state or claim intents.
Returns a read-only Worker selection policy preview for the run. The report infers the next Dispatcher task (bootstrap, reason, or explore), identifies the claimable intent when applicable, ranks the configured Worker pool, and explains why one Worker is recommended. The Dispatcher consumes the same policy for Worker ordering during POST /runs/{id}/dispatch; if the policy cannot be computed, it falls back to the original worker-pool order.
The rank uses runtime health, command configuration, run priority, cross-run Worker Leaderboard score, current-run task outcomes, evidence contribution, finding influence, timeout/error rate, and task/risk fit. It does not execute a Worker, claim an intent, invoke tools, approve actions, read raw evidence, or let Workers self-score.
{
"mode": "dispatcher_worker_selection_preview",
"task": "explore",
"intent": {
"id": "intent_x",
"riskLevel": "R2",
"status": "open"
},
"selectedWorker": {
"worker": "codex-worker",
"type": "codex",
"decision": "recommended",
"selectionScore": 73,
"leaderboardScore": 64,
"successRate": 80,
"evidenceContributed": 3,
"findingsInfluenced": 1
},
"counts": {
"configuredWorkers": 2,
"healthyWorkers": 2,
"eligibleWorkers": 2,
"blockedWorkers": 0,
"evidenceProducingWorkers": 1
},
"policy": {
"safetyNotes": [
"Read-only preview: no Worker execution, no intent claim, no graph write, no approval decision, and no tool invocation."
]
}
}Returns a read-only CAI/Apex-style Agent Worker evaluation plan for the current run. It measures whether configured Workers have comparable bootstrap, reason, and explore trace cells, whether they produce evidence-linked facts, whether they influence findings, and what same-scope bakeoff experiments should be run next.
The endpoint does not execute Workers, claim intents, call tools, approve actions, read raw evidence blobs, or let Workers self-score.
{
"mode": "agent_worker_evaluation_plan",
"readiness": "needs_warmup",
"counts": {
"configuredWorkers": 2,
"coveredTaskCells": 3,
"totalTaskCells": 6,
"evidenceProducingWorkers": 1
},
"workers": [
{
"worker": "codex-worker",
"readiness": "needs_warmup",
"score": 62,
"tasksByKind": { "bootstrap": 1, "reason": 1, "explore": 0 }
}
],
"experiments": [
{
"id": "same_scope_low_risk_bakeoff",
"status": "ready",
"task": "mixed"
}
]
}Returns the local-first execution node readiness view for a run. It aggregates Worker runtime health, Toolbox profiles, Toolbox Doctor adapter status, browser/proxy/OAST sessions, enabled bundles/connectors, fail-closed external execution policy, safety gates, and operator actions.
This endpoint is read-only. It does not start sessions, execute tools, pull containers, change environment policy, approve actions, dispatch Workers, or grant any new Worker permissions.
{
"nodeId": "local.execution.node",
"mode": "local_first_control_plane",
"status": "partial",
"summary": "1/1 Worker runtime(s), 19/28 runnable scanner template(s), 2 active local session(s).",
"counts": {
"profiles": 5,
"availableProfiles": 2,
"adapters": 9,
"readyAdapters": 1,
"scannerTemplates": 28,
"runnableScannerTemplates": 10,
"workers": 1,
"healthyWorkers": 1,
"activeBrowserSessions": 1,
"activeProxySessions": 1,
"activeOastSessions": 0
},
"gates": [
{
"id": "tool_gateway_only",
"status": "pass",
"detail": "Workers can request high-level tools, but all execution still goes through scope, approval, audit, redaction, and evidence gates."
}
],
"recommendedActions": [
"Start an OAST inbox only for approved out-of-band validation scenarios."
]
}Returns the desktop productization readiness view for a run. It turns the AIDA/WonderSuite-style app gap into concrete components: Web Console, Tauri shell, Rust local daemon, browser controller, MITM proxy/local CA, credential vault bridge, toolbox runtime manager, evidence viewer/replay, redacted cloud sync, and remote worker nodes.
This endpoint is read-only. It does not scaffold Tauri, install certificates, start browsers, start proxies, execute tools, resolve secrets, sync evidence, dispatch Workers, or grant permissions.
{
"mode": "desktop_runner_readiness",
"status": "partial",
"summary": "2 ready, 3 partial, 5 planned desktop component(s). 1 active local session(s), 19 runnable scanner template(s), 4 evidence item(s).",
"counts": {
"components": 10,
"ready": 2,
"partial": 3,
"planned": 5,
"activeLocalSessions": 1,
"evidenceItems": 4,
"credentialReferences": 2,
"runnableScannerTemplates": 0,
"healthyWorkers": 1,
"commercialDesktopGaps": 5
},
"components": [
{
"id": "desktop.mitm_proxy",
"name": "MITM Proxy and Local CA",
"status": "planned",
"ownerSurface": "Proxy Session Service / Rust Daemon",
"missingPieces": ["local CA generation", "certificate trust workflow", "TLS interception"],
"securityGates": ["operator approval before CA install", "scope match before storing traffic", "raw traffic local-only by default"]
}
],
"handoffContracts": [
{
"id": "contract.proxy_evidence",
"name": "MITM proxy -> Evidence Engine",
"producer": "Scoped Proxy",
"consumer": "Evidence Engine",
"contract": ["request/response metadata", "redaction state", "scope decision"],
"mustNotDo": ["capture denied assets", "install a CA without operator consent", "sync raw traffic by default"]
}
]
}Returns the run-scoped local Runner workbench. It is the operator-facing layer over capture profiles, browser sessions, proxy sessions, OAST inboxes, capture imports, evidence review, credential references, and proxy setup guidance. It is designed for the commercial desktop/web console flow: the operator can see which capture mode is usable, which headers/proxy settings are required, which evidence still needs review, and what action should happen next.
This endpoint is read-only. It does not start sessions, execute tools, forward proxy traffic, import HAR files, review evidence, validate findings, install certificates, generate PAC files, sync evidence, or grant Worker permissions. Use POST /runs/{id}/local-runner-workbench/prepare when the operator wants to create the low-risk local browser/proxy session records from the same panel.
{
"mode": "local_runner_workbench",
"status": "partial",
"summary": "1 active browser session(s), 1 active proxy session(s), 4 evidence item(s), 2/4 reviewed.",
"counts": {
"activeBrowserSessions": 1,
"activeProxySessions": 1,
"activeOastSessions": 0,
"browserSnapshots": 1,
"captureImports": 1,
"httpExchangeEvidence": 3,
"screenshotEvidence": 1,
"totalEvidence": 4,
"reviewedEvidence": 2,
"usefulEvidence": 1,
"rawLocalOnlyEvidence": 1,
"cloudSafeEvidence": 3,
"activeCredentialReferences": 2
},
"proxySetup": {
"status": "active",
"proxyUrl": "http://127.0.0.1:4317",
"requiredHeaders": {
"X-Capture-Run-Id": "run_x",
"X-Platform-Token": "<local token>"
},
"pac": {
"status": "planned",
"detail": "PAC generation and automatic browser proxy profile switching are planned for the desktop shell."
}
},
"captureProfiles": [
{
"id": "capture.header_proxy_http",
"title": "Header-capable HTTP proxy capture",
"status": "ready",
"riskLevel": "R1",
"entrypoints": [
"POST /runs/{id}/local-runner-workbench/prepare",
"HTTP proxy absolute-form request with X-Capture-Run-Id"
],
"safetyGates": ["active proxy session", "ScopePolicy target check before forwarding"]
}
],
"captureGates": [
{
"id": "gate.evidence_review",
"title": "Human evidence review",
"status": "pass",
"detail": "2/4 evidence item(s) reviewed; 1 useful."
}
],
"recentEvidence": [
{
"id": "evidence_x",
"kind": "http_exchange",
"reviewStatus": "useful",
"source": "proxy",
"target": "https://app.example.com/profile"
}
]
}Prepares the run-local capture workspace by creating a browser session and proxy session when they are missing. By default it does not start OAST, does not navigate the browser, does not forward traffic, does not execute tools, and does not grant Worker permissions. It is meant to make the AIDA/WonderSuite-style workbench usable while keeping active testing behind the existing capture and Tool Gateway APIs.
Optional request body:
{
"includeBrowser": true,
"includeProxy": true,
"includeOast": false
}Example response:
{
"status": "prepared",
"runId": "run_x",
"created": {
"browserSessionId": "browsersession_x",
"proxySessionId": "proxysession_x"
},
"skipped": [
"OAST session not started by Prepare Runner; use it only for approved out-of-band validation."
],
"workbench": {
"mode": "local_runner_workbench",
"counts": {
"activeBrowserSessions": 1,
"activeProxySessions": 1
}
}
}Returns the exact agent-worker.v1 protocol envelope that would be sent to an Agent Worker for a run. The optional task query parameter accepts auto, bootstrap, reason, or explore; auto follows the Dispatcher task-selection shape without performing a healthcheck, claiming an intent, executing a Worker, or writing state.
GET /runs/run_x/worker-envelope/preview?task=autoExample response:
{
"task": "explore",
"selectedBy": "auto",
"selectionSource": "policy",
"selectedWorker": {
"name": "codex-worker",
"type": "codex",
"commandConfigured": true
},
"intentId": "intent_x",
"claimWouldOccur": true,
"contextCounts": {
"domainSkills": 1,
"credentialReferences": 2,
"pocTemplates": 1,
"toolboxBundles": 1,
"connectors": 1,
"toolSurface": 9,
"strategyHints": 12,
"strategyRecommendations": 1
},
"safety": {
"rawSecretsIncluded": false,
"rawEvidenceContentIncluded": false,
"writesState": false,
"executesWorker": false
},
"envelope": {
"protocolVersion": "agent-worker.v1",
"role": "agentred-worker"
}
}Use this endpoint for framework debugging, desktop explainability, Worker runtime comparison, and operator review of the actual tool/Skill/PoC/Bundle context before a dispatch.
Returns the read-only framework capability model used by the Operator Console. It describes the kernel, Worker adapter contract, extension points, safety invariants, and operator views that make the platform an extensible Agent Worker framework rather than a fixed multi-agent script.
It does not dispatch workers, execute tools, create approvals, read raw evidence, or mutate run state.
{
"kernel": {
"schedulingUnit": "Agent Worker",
"orchestration": "Dispatcher-controlled state-space search; no worker-to-worker protocol.",
"protocolVersion": "agent-worker.v1",
"stateModel": ["Run", "Fact", "Intent", "Evidence", "Finding"]
},
"counts": {
"workerAdapters": 5,
"highLevelTools": 9,
"scannerTemplates": 28,
"domainSkills": 7,
"pocTemplates": 7
},
"extensionPoints": [
{
"id": "worker.adapter",
"name": "Agent Worker Adapter",
"status": "ready",
"executionAuthority": "No direct graph writes; Dispatcher owns claims, conclusions, and validation."
}
]
}Returns a run-scoped Agent Harness readiness report inspired by ai-engineering-from-scratch-style agent engineering. It scores the platform as an agent framework over agent loop contract, tool registry/schema gates, sandbox runner, observation budget, eval harness, workbench handoff, and evidence delivery.
This endpoint is read-only. It does not dispatch Workers, invoke tools, approve actions, change scope, read raw evidence, or grant runtime authority.
{
"mode": "agent_harness_readiness",
"posture": "usable",
"score": 68,
"counts": {
"cells": 7,
"highLevelTools": 9,
"scannerTemplates": 28,
"toolPacks": 4,
"workerSpans": 3,
"evidence": 2,
"evaluations": 1
},
"cells": [
{
"id": "tool_registry_schema",
"title": "Tool registry and schema gates",
"status": "ready",
"score": 90,
"referencePrinciple": "Tools should be registered, schema-shaped, and observable instead of passed as ad hoc functions.",
"nextAction": "Convert top external ecosystem gaps into scanner templates or Tool Packs with explicit policy records."
}
],
"evalPlan": {
"mode": "agent_harness_eval_plan",
"summary": "4/7 harness fixture(s) are ready; 2 waiting for run data, 1 need setup, 0 blocked.",
"counts": {
"fixtures": 7,
"ready": 4,
"acceptanceCriteria": 21,
"safetyGates": 15
}
}
}Returns the no-side-effect Agent Harness evaluation plan. This converts the rohitg00/ai-engineering-from-scratch lessons into platform fixture tasks: agent loop trace, tool registry schema validation, sandbox fail-closed boundary, observation budget, Worker evaluation, workbench handoff/resume, and evidence delivery.
The plan is read-only. It does not dispatch Workers, invoke tools, create approvals, mutate scope, activate toolbox profiles, or read raw evidence content.
{
"mode": "agent_harness_eval_plan",
"posture": "usable",
"counts": {
"fixtures": 7,
"ready": 4,
"waitingForData": 2,
"needsSetup": 1,
"blocked": 0
},
"observationBudget": {
"maxAutomaticRisk": "R2",
"manualApprovalRisk": "R3",
"forbiddenRisk": "R4",
"requestsPerMinute": 120
},
"fixtures": [
{
"id": "agent_loop_low_risk_trace",
"title": "Low-risk agent loop trace",
"riskLevel": "R1",
"status": "waiting_for_data",
"expectedArtifacts": ["worker trace spans", "run events", "fact/intent graph updates"]
}
],
"acceptanceGates": [
"Scope violation must remain zero.",
"Finding creation requires same-run evidence."
],
"readOnlyGuarantees": [
"GET /runs/{id}/agent-harness/plan does not dispatch Workers."
]
}Returns a cross-run Agent Worker leaderboard. The report compares configured Worker runtimes by platform evidence: worker trace spans, cost ledger entries, graph facts, evidence ids attached to those facts, and findings influenced by that evidence.
This endpoint is read-only. It does not dispatch Workers, change priorities, approve actions, read raw prompts, read raw evidence blobs, or let Workers self-report quality.
{
"mode": "cross_run_agent_worker_eval",
"summary": "2/3 configured Worker slot(s) have runtime evidence across 4 run(s). 12 worker task(s), 5 evidence link(s), 1 influenced finding(s).",
"counts": {
"runs": 4,
"configuredWorkers": 3,
"exercisedWorkers": 2,
"workerTasks": 12,
"evidenceContributed": 5,
"findingsInfluenced": 1
},
"workers": [
{
"worker": "codex-worker",
"type": "codex",
"successRate": 83,
"timeoutRate": 0,
"evidenceContributed": 4,
"findingsInfluenced": 1,
"score": 76,
"recommendation": "promote"
}
],
"safetyNotes": [
"Leaderboard recommendations do not bypass Dispatcher selection, scope policy, approvals, Tool Gateway checks, or evidence requirements."
]
}Returns trace spans, local runtime/cost ledger entries, and the latest run-quality evaluation.
{
"runId": "run_x",
"counts": { "spans": 4, "errors": 0, "blocked": 0, "approvalRequired": 0 },
"duration": { "totalMs": 1240 },
"cost": { "totalEstimatedUsd": 0, "localRuntimeMs": 1240 },
"latestEvaluation": {
"score": 100,
"grade": "A"
}
}The first commercial version uses local runtime and request counts as a cost ledger. Real model token/cost adapters can extend this without changing the worker protocol.
Returns a run-level capability posture for commercial operation and Worker scheduling decisions. The radar merges current run state across scope safety, evidence depth, autonomous progress, Worker performance, Tool Gateway usage, rigid domain depth, delivery readiness, and trace/cost observability.
This endpoint is read-only. It does not queue intents, dispatch Workers, invoke tools, approve actions, review evidence, validate findings, or generate reports.
{
"runId": "run_x",
"overallScore": 64,
"posture": "usable",
"summary": {
"workersConfigured": 2,
"workerTasks": 4,
"toolCalls": 6,
"blockedToolCalls": 1,
"evidence": 5,
"findings": 1,
"confirmedFindings": 0,
"pendingApprovals": 0,
"enabledDomainSkills": 1,
"enabledPocTemplates": 2,
"traceSpans": 11
},
"dimensions": [
{
"id": "evidence_depth",
"title": "Evidence depth",
"score": 72,
"status": "usable",
"detail": "5 evidence item(s), 4 reviewed, 3 marked useful."
}
],
"schedulingHints": [
"Next capability investment: Delivery readiness."
]
}Returns a product-facing scorecard derived from the observability ledger, tool audit, evidence, findings, approvals, and latest evaluation. This is the API for CAI-style model/tool comparison without exposing raw prompts or tool output.
Returns a read-only commercial evidence-quality index. It scores local evidence metadata across blob integrity, operator review, safe replay/reproduction support, redaction readiness, finding linkage, and confirmed-finding delivery gates.
This endpoint does not read or return raw evidence content, replay traffic, mark reviews, validate findings, generate reports, or mutate run state.
{
"runId": "run_x",
"mode": "evidence_quality_index",
"score": 76,
"posture": "usable",
"counts": {
"evidence": 5,
"usefulEvidence": 3,
"replayableEvidence": 2,
"redactionReadyEvidence": 4,
"confirmedFindings": 1,
"confirmedDeliveryReadyFindings": 1
},
"dimensions": [
{
"id": "reproduction",
"title": "Replay and reproduction",
"score": 80,
"status": "pass"
}
],
"findingGates": [
{
"findingId": "finding_x",
"deliveryReady": true,
"usefulEvidence": 2,
"reproductionEvidence": 1
}
]
}Returns a commercial handoff readiness view derived from existing local state. It checks whether approvals are cleared, evidence has been triaged, confirmed findings satisfy the useful-evidence gate, the latest report uses a customer-safe scope, and blocked tool calls have been reviewed.
The response is a read model only. It does not create findings, approve actions, change report scope, or mutate Worker state.
{
"runId": "run_x",
"quality": { "score": 75, "grade": "B", "source": "latest_evaluation" },
"summary": {
"evidence": 3,
"findings": 1,
"toolCalls": 5,
"blockedToolCalls": 1,
"totalRuntimeMs": 1200
},
"workerCards": [{ "worker": "mock-worker", "tasks": 3, "ok": 3, "avgRuntimeMs": 24 }],
"workerComparisons": [
{
"worker": "codex-worker",
"type": "codex",
"configured": true,
"tasks": 4,
"successRate": 75,
"evidenceContributed": 2,
"findingsInfluenced": 1,
"recommendation": "Keep in the active pool for evidence-producing work."
}
],
"toolCards": [{ "tool": "browser.navigate", "calls": 1, "allowed": 1, "evidenceProduced": 1 }],
"recommendations": ["Inspect blocked tool calls to tune scope, profile readiness, or approval policy."]
}workerComparisons are derived from worker trace spans, local cost ledger entries, graph facts, evidence links, and findings. They let the operator compare Agent Worker usefulness without reading raw prompts or letting workers self-report quality.
Returns a read-only fixed-scenario scorer for aggressive enterprise pentest readiness. It evaluates whether a run is prepared to identify high-risk vulnerabilities across scope safety, high-risk template bias, typed tool governance, browser/proxy runner readiness, evidence quality, authorization depth, OAST readiness, external scanner adapter governance, vulnerability lifecycle, AI-agent security, and stuck-loop supervision.
The scorer does not invoke tools, dispatch Workers, approve actions, mutate run state, or read raw evidence blobs. Blocked raw-tool attempts are counted as governance evidence; confirmed high/critical findings still require useful-reviewed same-run evidence.
{
"mode": "enterprise_pentest_scorer",
"posture": "usable",
"score": 72,
"summary": "6/11 enterprise pentest scenario(s) pass; 6 high-risk template(s), 8 high-risk recommendation(s), 1 confirmed high/critical finding(s).",
"counts": {
"enabledHighRiskTemplates": 6,
"highRiskRecommendations": 8,
"usefulEvidence": 4,
"confirmedHighOrCriticalFindings": 1,
"blockedUnsafeTools": 1
},
"scenarios": [
{
"id": "authz_depth",
"status": "pass",
"objective": "Verify enterprise-critical broken access control with at least two role contexts and comparable evidence.",
"gaps": []
}
],
"audit": {
"readOnly": true,
"invokesTools": false,
"createsApprovals": false,
"mutatesRunState": false,
"readsRawEvidence": false
}
}Returns a read-only vulnerability lifecycle view for enterprise pentest delivery. It joins findings, evidence-quality gates, duplicate detection, report bundles, and run exports so operators can see whether high/critical issues have moved from candidate intake to validation, confirmed-only delivery, and retest readiness.
The lifecycle view does not confirm findings, reject findings, read raw evidence blobs, invoke tools, generate reports, or generate exports. It only reports what the existing evidence, finding, report, and export records already prove.
{
"mode": "vulnerability_lifecycle",
"posture": "triage",
"score": 72,
"summary": "1/2 high/critical finding(s) confirmed; 1 high/critical finding(s) delivery-ready; 1 report bundle(s), 0 export(s), 1 duplicate group(s).",
"counts": {
"findings": 3,
"candidate": 1,
"confirmed": 1,
"highOrCritical": 2,
"confirmedHighOrCritical": 1,
"confirmedHighOrCriticalDeliveryReady": 1,
"duplicateGroups": 1,
"reportBundles": 1,
"confirmedOnlyExports": 0
},
"lanes": [
{
"id": "delivery",
"title": "Report and export delivery",
"status": "warn",
"detail": "1/1 confirmed finding(s) delivery-ready; 1 report bundle(s), 0 confirmed-only export(s)."
}
],
"findings": [
{
"findingId": "finding_x",
"severity": "critical",
"phase": "delivery",
"deliveryReady": true,
"usefulEvidence": 1,
"reproductionEvidence": 1
}
],
"audit": {
"readOnly": true,
"mutatesFindings": false,
"validatesFindings": false,
"generatesReports": false,
"invokesTools": false,
"readsRawEvidence": false
}
}Returns a read-only benchmark view that compares the current platform/run capability against the reference projects used for product direction: Cairn, HexStrike/AutoRedTeam, ZAP/Burp/Playwright, Nuclei/Semgrep/Prowler/MobSF, CAI/Apex, LangGraph/OpenAI Agents SDK/PyRIT, AIDA/CyberStrike/WonderSuite, DefectDojo/Faraday/Dradis, DragonJAR Android Skill, pentest-agents, and rohitg00/ai-engineering-from-scratch.
The response is a product roadmap gate, not an execution path. It shows copied principles, deliberately avoided patterns, remaining gaps, commercial blockers, and next build actions.
{
"mode": "reference_project_benchmark",
"summary": "8/14 benchmark dimension(s) are commercially usable or better; 5 partial and 1 gap dimension(s) remain against the reference projects.",
"counts": {
"referenceProjects": 11,
"dimensions": 14,
"matched": 2,
"usable": 6,
"partial": 5,
"gaps": 1,
"commercialBlockers": 6
},
"dimensions": [
{
"id": "browser_proxy_dast",
"title": "Browser, proxy, and DAST workflow",
"status": "partial",
"score": 48,
"referenceProjects": ["OWASP ZAP", "Burp Suite", "Playwright"],
"ours": "1 browser session(s), 1 proxy session(s), 2 HTTP exchange evidence item(s), 1 browser snapshot(s).",
"adopted": ["Scope-gated HTTP capture", "HAR import boundary", "Proxy session records", "Browser snapshot evidence"],
"gaps": ["No true browser DOM/JavaScript automation, authenticated context manager, active spider, or TLS MITM local CA lifecycle yet."],
"nextActions": ["Promote browser/proxy capture into a Playwright-backed local runner with ZAP/Burp-style session and proxy controls."]
}
],
"projects": [
{
"id": "defectdojo_faraday_dradis",
"name": "OWASP DefectDojo / Faraday / Dradis",
"referenceRole": "Vulnerability management, collaboration, retest, and customer reporting lifecycle.",
"copiedPrinciples": ["Findings need evidence and validation state", "Reports are delivery artifacts, not raw logs"],
"deliberatelyAvoided": ["Treating every scanner observation as a customer-facing vulnerability"],
"currentFit": "partial",
"remainingGap": "No mature deduplication, retest workflow, SLA tracking, customer engagement model, or editable report template library yet."
}
],
"nextActions": ["Split the snapshot store into explicit relational tables and migrations before introducing multi-user collaboration or cloud sync."]
}This endpoint does not browse GitHub, invoke reference projects, execute tools, register templates, change policy, or grant Worker permissions.
Returns the governed high-level tool surface exposed by the local kernel. This is intentionally smaller than a raw MCP tool dump; Agent Workers and UI clients see categories, risk level, evidence behavior, and scanner templates, while concrete engines stay behind the Tool Gateway.
[
{
"name": "scanner.run_template",
"category": "scanner",
"defaultRiskLevel": "R2",
"producesEvidence": true,
"templates": [
{
"id": "web.security_headers",
"name": "Web Security Headers",
"defaultRiskLevel": "R2",
"evidenceKind": "command_output"
},
{
"id": "web.endpoint_discovery",
"name": "Web Endpoint Discovery",
"defaultRiskLevel": "R2",
"evidenceKind": "command_output"
},
{
"id": "web.technology_fingerprint",
"name": "Web Technology Fingerprint",
"engine": "builtin",
"profileId": "builtin.web",
"adapterStatus": "available",
"defaultRiskLevel": "R1",
"evidenceKind": "command_output"
},
{
"id": "web.nuclei.safe_templates",
"name": "Nuclei Safe Templates",
"engine": "nuclei",
"profileId": "container.web-recon",
"adapterStatus": "planned",
"defaultRiskLevel": "R2",
"evidenceKind": "command_output"
}
]
}
]Returns governed evidence collection packs. A pack is not a new Agent role and not a raw tool dump; it is a small ordered set of high-level Tool Gateway requests with operator-facing safety notes and commercial use cases.
Built-in packs:
pack.web.baseline: technology fingerprint, cookie flags, link/form map, security headers, and well-known endpoint discoverypack.web.client-surface: CORS policy, CSP/browser-policy analysis, and JavaScript asset inventory without executing JavaScript or downloading source mapspack.web.modern-surface: security.txt policy, cookie scope analysis, WebSocket discovery planning, and source-map exposure planning without WebSocket connections or source-map body downloadspack.web.api-auth-surface: OpenAPI discovery, OAuth/OIDC metadata, GraphQL introspection planning, redirect policy, and cache policy without API operation execution, token exchange, or GraphQL introspection queriespack.network.baseline: passive DNS records and one TLS certificate metadata handshake
[
{
"id": "pack.web.baseline",
"name": "Web Baseline Evidence Pack",
"category": "web",
"requests": [
{
"id": "web.technology_fingerprint",
"tool": "scanner.run_template",
"riskLevel": "R1",
"args": { "template": "web.technology_fingerprint", "timeoutMs": 10000 }
}
],
"safetyNotes": ["Every step is a high-level Tool Gateway request."]
}
]Previews every step in a Tool Pack by calling the same ToolGateway.preview path used by individual tool previews. This route has no side effects: it does not create invocations, approvals, rate-limit entries, or evidence.
{
"target": "https://app.example.com"
}Response:
{
"runId": "run_x",
"pack": { "id": "pack.web.baseline", "name": "Web Baseline Evidence Pack" },
"summary": { "total": 5, "executable": 5, "blocked": 0, "approvalRequired": 0 },
"audit": { "previewWritesState": false, "invokesTools": false, "writesEvidence": false },
"items": [
{
"request": { "id": "web.security_headers", "riskLevel": "R2" },
"preview": { "status": "executable", "gates": [] }
}
]
}Runs every step in the pack through ToolGateway.invoke. Each step is still independently scope-checked, rate-limited, approval-gated, audited, redacted, and evidence-gated. A pack run stores a ToolPackRun summary for review.
{
"target": "https://app.example.com"
}Response:
{
"pack": { "id": "pack.web.baseline" },
"runRecord": {
"id": "toolpack_run_x",
"status": "completed",
"total": 5,
"allowed": 5,
"blocked": 0,
"approvalRequired": 0,
"evidenceIds": ["evidence_x"],
"items": [
{ "requestId": "web.security_headers", "status": "allowed", "evidenceId": "evidence_x" }
]
}
}Lists persisted Tool Pack runs for the run, newest first. The same records are included in GET /runs/{id}/review for the Operator Console.
Returns the governance policy for every scanner template. This is the contract used by the Tool Gateway and Toolbox Runner to keep template execution bounded.
[
{
"templateId": "web.security_headers",
"defaultRiskLevel": "R2",
"allowedRiskLevels": ["R2", "R3"],
"requiresApproval": false,
"maxTimeoutMs": 10000,
"executionMode": "builtin",
"profileId": "builtin.web",
"engine": "builtin",
"externalExecutionFailClosed": false,
"inputPolicy": ["Target URL host must match ScopePolicy."],
"executionControls": ["Tool Gateway enforces scope, method, risk, approval, rate-limit, audit, redaction, and evidence gates."],
"evidencePolicy": ["Evidence kind: command_output."]
}
]If a request uses a risk level outside allowedRiskLevels, scanner.run_template is blocked before execution. Requested timeouts are capped to maxTimeoutMs in the execution plan.
Returns the local external-tool execution policy. This is the operator-visible gate between registered tool ecosystems and actual execution.
{
"externalExecutionEnabled": false,
"allowAllExternalTemplates": false,
"allowedExternalTemplates": [],
"containerProfileProbeEnabled": false,
"localSastProbeEnabled": false,
"androidToolboxProbeEnabled": false,
"safetyControls": [
"External execution requires PLATFORM_ALLOW_EXTERNAL_TOOLBOX=1.",
"External scanner templates require PLATFORM_ALLOWED_SCANNER_TEMPLATES allowlist membership."
]
}External scanner templates require both:
PLATFORM_ALLOW_EXTERNAL_TOOLBOX=1PLATFORM_ALLOWED_SCANNER_TEMPLATES=<template ids>or*
Example:
PLATFORM_ALLOWED_SCANNER_TEMPLATES=web.nuclei.safe_templates,web.httpx.fingerprintReturns a read-only readiness report for the governed toolbox ecosystem. It groups scanner templates by engine, shows runnable and blocked template ids, maps policy/profile blockers, summarizes bundle readiness, and suggests operator actions.
This is a diagnostic view only. It does not execute commands, start containers, pull images, create approvals, change allowlists, grant Worker permissions, or bypass scope and evidence gates.
{
"summary": "2 ready adapter(s), 1 partial, 7 blocked/planned. 19/28 scanner template(s) are currently runnable.",
"counts": {
"adapters": 10,
"ready": 2,
"partial": 1,
"policyBlocked": 6,
"profileBlocked": 1,
"planned": 0,
"templates": 18,
"runnableTemplates": 8,
"blockedTemplates": 10
},
"adapters": [
{
"engine": "nuclei",
"status": "policy_blocked",
"templateIds": ["web.nuclei.safe_templates"],
"runnableTemplateIds": [],
"blockedReasons": ["External toolbox execution is disabled by policy."]
}
],
"safetyNotes": ["Toolbox Doctor is a read-only diagnostic view."]
}Returns a read-only activation sequence for making governed external tool runtimes usable. It converts Toolbox Doctor policy/profile blockers into operator-facing steps for external execution policy, runtime profiles, scanner-template allowlists, run-level Toolbox Bundle context, validation, and safety invariants.
The endpoint does not set environment variables, install tools, pull containers, enable bundles, allowlist templates, execute tools, approve risk, or grant Worker permissions.
{
"mode": "governed_runtime_activation_plan",
"summary": "19/28 scanner template(s) runnable. 2/10 adapter(s) ready; 5 operator action(s), 1 blocked step(s).",
"counts": {
"profiles": 6,
"availableProfiles": 2,
"adapters": 10,
"readyAdapters": 2,
"policyBlockedAdapters": 6,
"profileBlockedAdapters": 1,
"templates": 18,
"runnableTemplates": 7,
"blockedTemplates": 11,
"activationSteps": 9,
"operatorActions": 5,
"blockedSteps": 1,
"enabledBundles": 0
},
"steps": [
{
"kind": "policy",
"status": "operator_action",
"title": "Decide external toolbox execution policy",
"environment": { "PLATFORM_ALLOW_EXTERNAL_TOOLBOX": "0 -> 1 on trusted local runners only" },
"acceptanceCriteria": ["Operator explicitly decides whether this local runner is allowed to execute external tools."],
"safetyControls": ["trusted local runner only", "Tool Gateway remains mandatory"]
}
],
"recommendedOrder": [
"Decide external toolbox execution policy",
"Make runtime profile container.web-recon available",
"Allowlist nuclei scanner templates"
]
}Returns productized toolbox manifests. A bundle groups profiles, engines, scanner templates, risk levels, safety notes, installation notes, and commercial use cases. This is the HexStrike/AutoRedTeam-style tool-pack layer, but it remains a read model: it does not grant execution permission, approve risk, change scope, or expose raw executables to Agent Workers.
[
{
"id": "bundle.container-web-recon",
"name": "Container Web Recon Bundle",
"version": "0.1.0",
"source": "container_image",
"status": "planned",
"runtimeStatus": "planned",
"available": false,
"profileIds": ["container.web-recon"],
"engines": ["nuclei", "httpx", "ffuf", "sqlmap"],
"templateIds": [
"web.nuclei.safe_templates",
"web.httpx.fingerprint",
"web.ffuf.content_discovery",
"web.sqlmap.verify"
],
"riskLevels": ["R2", "R3"],
"templateCount": 4,
"runnableTemplateCount": 0,
"blockedReasons": ["External toolbox execution is disabled by policy."]
}
]Current built-in bundles:
bundle.builtin-web-kernelbundle.builtin-network-kernelbundle.container-web-reconbundle.container-network-reconbundle.local-sastbundle.android-analysis
Bundle runtime status is derived from profile readiness, external-execution policy, and template availability. Execution still happens only through POST /runs/{id}/tools and scanner.run_template.
Registers or updates a local custom toolbox manifest. Custom bundle ids must start with bundle.custom.. The manifest is persisted in local state and returned by future GET /toolbox-bundles calls with a manifest SHA-256 in its safety notes.
{
"id": "bundle.custom.web-recon-lab",
"name": "Custom Web Recon Lab",
"version": "0.1.0",
"profileIds": ["container.web-recon"],
"engines": ["nuclei", "httpx"],
"templateIds": ["web.nuclei.safe_templates", "web.httpx.fingerprint"],
"riskLevels": ["R2"],
"safetyNotes": ["Registered manifest only; execution still requires Tool Gateway policy and profile readiness."],
"installationNotes": ["Provide the matching local container image and enable container toolbox policy."],
"commercialUseCases": ["Organization-specific web recon pack"]
}Forbidden fields are rejected:
commandcommandsargspayloadpayloadsrawTools
Registration does not make templates executable. Execution still depends on Tool Gateway allowlisting, scope, rate limits, risk approval, external toolbox policy, profile readiness, and evidence handling.
Returns toolbox bundles with run-specific enablement state.
[
{
"id": "bundle.container-web-recon",
"name": "Container Web Recon Bundle",
"enabled": true,
"binding": {
"id": "run_bundle_x",
"runId": "run_x",
"bundleId": "bundle.container-web-recon",
"enabledBy": "operator"
}
}
]Enables a toolbox bundle as run-local Agent Worker context. The platform writes a graph hint, emits a toolbox.bundle.enabled timeline event, and includes the bundle in future agent-worker.v1 envelopes.
Enablement does not grant execution permission. Workers can use it to prefer relevant governed scanner templates, but every tool request still goes through Tool Gateway scope checks, risk gates, profile readiness, approval, audit, redaction, and evidence rules.
Returns governed external connector manifests for MCP, CLI, HTTP API, and container integrations. This is the bridge for HexStrike/AutoRedTeam-style ecosystems, but it is only a metadata registry. Listing a connector does not start an MCP server, call a CLI, send an HTTP request, start a container, or grant execution permission.
Built-in presets cover broad ecosystem lanes without exposing raw tools: HexStrike-style MCP, AutoRedTeam-style MCP, Nuclei CLI, web recon containers, network recon containers, SAST/supply-chain CLI tools, Android/mobile analysis, cloud/identity audit, bug bounty platform APIs, and CAI/Apex-style evaluation metadata.
[
{
"id": "connector.mcp.hexstrike-compatible",
"name": "HexStrike-style MCP Connector",
"version": "0.1.0",
"source": "built_in",
"kind": "mcp",
"status": "planned",
"toolNames": ["nuclei", "httpx", "ffuf"],
"riskLevels": ["R1", "R2", "R3"],
"inputKinds": ["target_url", "domain"],
"evidenceKinds": ["command_output", "http_exchange"],
"requiredEnv": ["PLATFORM_CONNECTOR_HEXSTRIKE_MCP"],
"capabilityMapping": {
"highLevelTools": ["http.request", "scanner.run_template"],
"templateIds": ["web.nuclei.safe_templates", "web.httpx.fingerprint"],
"toolPackIds": ["pack.web.baseline"],
"mappedToolNames": ["httpx", "nuclei"],
"unmappedToolNames": ["katana"],
"coveragePercent": 67,
"notes": ["Mapped capabilities are suggestions for governed Tool Gateway requests, not connector execution grants."]
}
}
]Registers or updates a local custom connector manifest. Custom connector ids must start with connector.custom.. The manifest is persisted locally and hashed, but only metadata is accepted.
{
"id": "connector.custom.hexstrike-lab",
"name": "Custom HexStrike Lab Connector",
"version": "0.1.0",
"kind": "mcp",
"status": "planned",
"toolNames": ["nuclei", "httpx", "ffuf"],
"riskLevels": ["R1", "R2"],
"inputKinds": ["target_url", "domain"],
"evidenceKinds": ["command_output", "http_exchange"],
"requiredEnv": ["PLATFORM_CONNECTOR_HEXSTRIKE_MCP"],
"safetyNotes": ["Connector metadata only; execution must stay behind Tool Gateway requests and approvals."],
"installationNotes": ["Map external connector capabilities into governed scanner templates before use."],
"commercialUseCases": ["Governed external tool ecosystem import"]
}Forbidden manifest fields include raw commands, args, payloads, direct credentials, tokens, headers, endpoints, and raw tool definitions. Registration does not make any external connector executable.
The response includes a derived capabilityMapping block. It shows which connector tool names can already be represented as governed high-level tools, scanner templates, or Tool Packs, and which names remain unmapped product gaps.
Returns connector manifests with run-specific enablement state.
Returns a governed ecosystem coverage map for a run. It aggregates Connector mappings, Toolbox Bundles, scanner templates, Tool Packs, capability areas, and unmapped connector tool names into one product planning view.
This endpoint is read-only. It does not invoke MCP/CLI/HTTP/container connectors, execute tools, register templates, enable bundles, approve actions, or change Worker permissions.
{
"mode": "governed_tool_ecosystem_mapping",
"summary": "Mapped connector tools are governed capability hints; unmapped tools become scanner templates, Tool Packs, Domain Skills, services, or runtime-profile work.",
"counts": {
"connectors": 10,
"enabledConnectors": 1,
"connectorTools": 44,
"mappedConnectorTools": 24,
"unmappedConnectorTools": 20,
"averageConnectorCoverage": 55,
"scannerTemplates": 28,
"toolPacks": 4
},
"gaps": [
{
"toolName": "sqlmap",
"proposedTarget": "scanner_template",
"rationale": "sqlmap should be represented as one or more governed scanner templates with risk, timeout, profile, approval, and evidence policy."
}
],
"safetyNotes": [
"Connector tool names are metadata, not executable tool grants."
]
}Returns a ranked governed integration backlog for external tool ecosystems. It turns unmapped connector tools, blocked external scanner profiles, and capability-matrix gaps into concrete platform work: scanner templates, Tool Packs, rigid Domain Skills, first-party services, runtime profiles, or manual mapping review.
This endpoint is read-only. It does not register templates, create bundles, start connectors, execute commands, approve risk, change scope, or grant Worker permissions.
{
"mode": "governed_tool_integration_backlog",
"summary": "12 governed integration backlog item(s): 4 scanner template, 1 tool pack, 2 domain skill, 3 runtime profile, 2 manual review.",
"counts": {
"items": 12,
"high": 4,
"scannerTemplateCandidates": 4,
"runtimeProfileCandidates": 3,
"domainSkillCandidates": 2
},
"items": [
{
"title": "Map sqlmap into governed scanner_template",
"priority": "high",
"status": "ready_to_map",
"proposedArtifact": {
"type": "scanner_template",
"id": "scanner.custom.sqlmap.safe",
"ownerSurface": "Tool Gateway / Toolbox Runner"
},
"suggestedRiskLevel": "R2",
"acceptanceCriteria": [
"Template has explicit risk level, timeout, input policy, profile id, evidence policy, and approval behavior."
]
}
],
"safetyNotes": [
"Backlog items are product planning records only; they do not register tools, execute commands, start connectors, or grant Worker permissions."
]
}Returns the commercial tool ecosystem workbench for a run. It joins Tool Gateway catalog entries, scanner-template policies, Tool Packs, Connector Coverage, Tool Integration Backlog, Toolbox Doctor, Runtime Activation Plan, Local Execution Node status, tool invocation records, evidence metadata, and finding metadata into one readiness view.
This endpoint is read-only. It does not run tools, invoke connectors, enable bundles, change allowlists, create approvals, write evidence, or expose raw commands to Agent Workers. Recommended packs are based on Tool Gateway preview decisions and still require normal operator execution.
{
"mode": "commercial_tool_ecosystem_workbench",
"posture": "usable",
"counts": {
"highLevelTools": 10,
"scannerTemplates": 28,
"runnableTemplates": 16,
"toolPacks": 5,
"connectors": 10,
"enabledConnectors": 1,
"mappedConnectorTools": 24,
"connectorTools": 44,
"runtimeProfiles": 5,
"availableRuntimeProfiles": 2,
"toolInvocations": 3,
"evidenceProducingInvocations": 2
},
"lanes": [
{
"title": "Scanner template library",
"status": "usable",
"summary": "16/28 template(s) runnable; 12 blocked by policy/profile/planned adapters."
}
],
"recommendedPacks": [
{
"id": "pack.web.baseline",
"status": "ready",
"entrypoint": "POST /runs/{id}/tool-packs/pack.web.baseline/invoke",
"executable": 5,
"total": 5
}
],
"ecosystemGates": [
{
"id": "tool_gateway_only",
"status": "pass",
"detail": "All executable capability is represented as high-level Tool Gateway routes or scanner templates."
}
],
"audit": {
"readOnly": true,
"invokesTools": false,
"invokesConnectors": false,
"writesEvidence": false
}
}Enables a connector as run-local Agent Worker context. The platform writes a graph hint, emits a connector.enabled timeline event, and includes safe connector metadata in future agent-worker.v1 envelopes.
Enablement does not grant execution permission. Workers can use connector metadata to understand what governed integration exists, but they must still request high-level Tool Gateway tools. External MCP, CLI, HTTP API, and container calls remain fail-closed; even mapped capabilities execute only through explicit governed templates, tools, or Tool Packs.
Returns prior Connector-backed template runs for a run. These are audit records over first-party Tool Gateway requests, not raw connector execution logs.
Previews every mapped scanner template for a connector against the run target or an optional request body target. The preview is read-only: it does not invoke the connector, does not execute tools, does not write evidence, and does not consume rate-limit budget.
{
"target": "https://app.example.com"
}The response includes the connector, the template preview items, executable/blocked/approval counts, and audit flags:
{
"connector": { "id": "connector.mcp.hexstrike-compatible" },
"summary": { "total": 8, "executable": 5, "blocked": 3, "approvalRequired": 0 },
"audit": {
"previewWritesState": false,
"invokesConnector": false,
"invokesTools": false,
"writesEvidence": false
}
}Runs every mapped scanner template for a connector through scanner.run_template and the normal Tool Gateway path. The connector itself is not called. Each item still passes through scope, risk, approval, rate-limit, toolbox profile, audit, redaction, and evidence gates.
Returns an operator-facing capability matrix. This is the product view over the Tool Catalog, scanner templates, toolbox profiles, evidence kinds, risk levels, safety controls, and known gaps.
It is meant for platform visibility and commercial planning, not for giving Agent Workers a raw exploit menu.
[
{
"area": "network",
"name": "Network and protocol reconnaissance",
"status": "partial",
"highLevelTools": ["scanner.run_template"],
"scannerTemplates": ["network.dns_records", "network.tls_certificate", "network.nmap.safe_top_ports"],
"profiles": ["builtin.network", "container.network-recon"],
"engines": ["builtin", "nmap", "tlsx"],
"evidenceKinds": ["command_output"],
"riskLevels": ["R0", "R1", "R2"],
"safetyControls": ["scope policy", "R2 scan gate"],
"gaps": ["containerized nmap/naabu/httpx execution"]
}
]Returns the governed execution backends used by scanner templates, including runtime readiness.
[
{
"id": "builtin.web",
"name": "Built-in Web Checks",
"kind": "builtin",
"status": "available",
"available": true,
"runtimeStatus": "available",
"runner": "builtin",
"isolation": "process",
"commands": []
},
{
"id": "container.web-recon",
"name": "Container Web Recon Toolbox",
"kind": "container",
"status": "planned",
"available": false,
"runtimeStatus": "planned",
"runner": "none",
"reason": "Set PLATFORM_ENABLE_CONTAINER_TOOLBOX=1 to enable Docker/Podman profile probing.",
"image": "ghcr.io/coff0xc/ai-pentest-toolbox:web-recon",
"commands": ["nuclei", "ffuf", "httpx", "sqlmap"]
}
]Templates whose profile is planned or unavailable are visible for roadmap and prompt-shaping, but execution is blocked with an audit record instead of falling through to a raw command.
External toolbox probing and planning is controlled by:
PLATFORM_ALLOW_EXTERNAL_TOOLBOX=1
PLATFORM_ALLOWED_SCANNER_TEMPLATES=web.nuclei.safe_templates,web.httpx.fingerprint
PLATFORM_ENABLE_CONTAINER_TOOLBOX=1
PLATFORM_CONTAINER_RUNTIME=docker|podman
PLATFORM_WEB_RECON_IMAGE=ghcr.io/coff0xc/ai-pentest-toolbox:web-recon
PLATFORM_NETWORK_RECON_IMAGE=ghcr.io/coff0xc/ai-pentest-toolbox:network-recon
PLATFORM_ENABLE_LOCAL_SAST=1
PLATFORM_ENABLE_ANDROID_TOOLBOX=1When PLATFORM_ALLOW_EXTERNAL_TOOLBOX=1, the selected template is allowlisted, and the selected profile is available, scanner.run_template executes the planned command without a shell in .local/tool-runs/{toolCallId}. Stdout and stderr are redacted, bounded, and stored as command_output evidence. Exit code and timeout are written back to the tool invocation for review.
Returns the desktop review bundle for one run:
progressapprovalstoolInvocationsevidencefindingsreportsrunExportsbrowserSessionsproxySessionsoastSessionsoastCallbackscredentialReferencesaccessReviewscaptureImports,browserSnapshots,sarifImports,scannerResultImports,androidManifestImports,cloudIamImports,identityGraphImports,toolPackRuns, andconnectorRunsobservability
This endpoint is a read model for the Operator Console and future Tauri desktop shell. It keeps review screens from making many separate calls.
Credential References are run-local role and vault placeholders. They let an operator model authenticated testing context without storing raw secrets in the graph, audit log, Worker prompt, or cloud-ready evidence.
GET /runs/{id}/credentials
POST /runs/{id}/credentials
POST /credentials/{id}/revokeCreate a reference:
{
"label": "Viewer token",
"role": "viewer",
"kind": "vault_reference",
"placeholder": "vault://bugbounty/viewer-token",
"allowedUse": ["browser.navigate", "http.request", "role-diff"]
}Supported kind values:
vault_reference: must usevault://,op://,keychain://,aws-sm://,gcp-sm://, orazure-kv://.header_placeholder: must use a named placeholder such as{{VIEWER_TOKEN}}.cookie_placeholder: must use a named placeholder such as{{VIEWER_COOKIE}}.account_note: a short non-secret account marker.
If the run ScopePolicy.credentialRules.allowVaultReferencesOnly flag is true, only vault_reference is accepted. Inputs that look like bearer tokens, JWTs, passwords, API keys, or long raw secret strings are rejected.
Access Reviews compare two same-run evidence items, usually captured with different authenticated roles, and generate a redacted diff artifact. They are designed for IDOR, role-difference, and authorization review without giving Workers direct access to credentials.
GET /runs/{id}/access-reviews
POST /runs/{id}/access-reviews
POST /runs/{id}/access-reviews/compare
POST /access-reviews/{id}/evidenceCreate and compare in one call:
{
"title": "Viewer versus admin profile response",
"target": "https://app.example.com/profile",
"method": "GET",
"baselineCredentialId": "credential_viewer",
"comparisonCredentialId": "credential_admin",
"baselineEvidenceId": "evidence_viewer",
"comparisonEvidenceId": "evidence_admin"
}Response:
{
"review": {
"id": "access_review_x",
"status": "differential_observed",
"summary": "Observed 2 access difference signal(s). Human review should confirm authorization impact.",
"diffEvidenceId": "evidence_diff"
},
"diffEvidenceId": "evidence_diff"
}The diff evidence stores response status, redacted body-preview hash, preview length, header-key differences, and a requiresHumanReview decision. It does not confirm impact by itself; a reportable issue still needs an evidence-backed Finding and human validation.
SARIF Imports let the platform ingest local SAST or CI results without turning static alerts into confirmed vulnerabilities.
GET /runs/{id}/sarif-imports
POST /runs/{id}/sarif-importsImport request:
{
"source": "ci-semgrep.sarif",
"createFindings": true,
"content": {
"version": "2.1.0",
"runs": []
}
}The import service:
- hashes the raw SARIF input
- stores a normalized
command_outputevidence artifact - extracts bounded rule, message, location, severity, and remediation metadata
- optionally creates up to 25 evidence-backed candidate Findings
- leaves validation to human review before reporting
This is the first AutoRedTeam-style CI/SARIF ingestion path. It does not upload source code and it does not treat static-analysis results as confirmed impact.
Scanner Result Imports are typed adapter parsers for external scanner output. They let a local runner or operator import normalized Nuclei JSONL, Semgrep JSON, or generic scanner JSON without giving the agent raw scanner authority.
GET /runs/{id}/scanner-result-imports
POST /runs/{id}/scanner-result-importsImport request:
{
"source": "nuclei.jsonl",
"engine": "nuclei",
"createFindings": true,
"content": "{\"template-id\":\"cves/example\",\"matched-at\":\"https://app.example.com\",\"info\":{\"name\":\"Example\",\"severity\":\"high\"}}\n"
}Supported engine values:
nuclei: JSONL output with template id, matched target,info.name,info.severity, classification, and remediation fields.semgrep: Semgrep JSON output withresults[],check_id, path/start location, severity, message, and metadata fix fields.generic: JSON object or array withresults,findings, orissuescontaining title/name, severity/risk, target/url/asset/location, description/message, and remediation/fix fields.
The import service hashes the raw scanner output, redacts sensitive values, stores a bounded command_output evidence artifact, records high/critical counts, and optionally creates up to 25 evidence-backed candidate Findings. Imported scanner findings are never marked confirmed automatically; human validation and delivery gates still apply before report/export.
Android Manifest Imports give the mobile.android-apk Domain Skill a concrete static-analysis input without requiring apktool or a lab device. The route accepts AndroidManifest.xml text, hashes the raw input, stores normalized mobile evidence, and can create evidence-backed candidate Findings for human validation.
GET /runs/{id}/android-manifest-imports
POST /runs/{id}/android-manifest-importsImport request:
{
"source": "release/AndroidManifest.xml",
"createFindings": true,
"content": "<manifest package=\"com.example.app\">...</manifest>"
}The import service extracts:
- package name,
minSdkVersion, andtargetSdkVersion - application flags such as
debuggable,allowBackup, andusesCleartextTraffic - declared permissions and risk-sensitive permission signals
- exported activities, services, receivers, and providers
- up to 25 candidate Findings backed by the normalized manifest evidence
The original XML is not stored as raw evidence by this route. The evidence record stores the input SHA-256, bounded normalized fields, risk signals, and candidate Finding links. This keeps Android support as a rigid domain Skill rather than a generic mobile pentest playbook.
Imports local evidence into the Evidence Engine. This is the adapter point for future browser, proxy, OAST, and toolbox captures.
{
"kind": "http_exchange",
"redactionState": "redacted",
"content": {
"request": { "method": "GET", "target": "https://app.example.com/profile" },
"response": { "status": 200, "bodyPreview": "redacted response preview" }
}
}content can be a string or structured JSON. Structured content is serialized before hashing and storage.
Captures one browser, proxy, or manual HTTP exchange as redacted http_exchange evidence. This is the stricter adapter contract for future MITM proxy and browser-controller integrations.
The server checks the request target and method against the run ScopePolicy before storage. Out-of-scope captures return 403 and do not create evidence.
{
"source": "proxy",
"request": {
"method": "GET",
"target": "https://app.example.com/profile?token=secret",
"headers": {
"authorization": "Bearer secret"
},
"bodyPreview": "access_token=secret"
},
"response": {
"status": 200,
"statusText": "OK",
"headers": {
"content-type": "application/json"
},
"bodyPreview": "{\"ok\":true,\"secret\":\"secret\"}"
}
}Response:
{
"id": "evidence_x",
"kind": "http_exchange",
"redactionState": "redacted",
"sha256": "..."
}Sensitive headers, query parameters, bearer tokens, and common token/password/secret fields are redacted before hashing and storage. Body previews are bounded and are still only previews; full raw traffic remains a future local-only evidence path.
Imports a standard HAR file as browser/proxy capture evidence. This is the batch adapter for Burp, browser DevTools, Playwright, or a future desktop MITM proxy export.
{
"source": "browser.har",
"maxEntries": 100,
"content": {
"log": {
"entries": [
{
"request": {
"method": "GET",
"url": "https://app.example.com/profile?token=secret",
"headers": [{ "name": "Authorization", "value": "Bearer secret" }]
},
"response": {
"status": 200,
"headers": [{ "name": "Content-Type", "value": "application/json" }],
"content": { "mimeType": "application/json", "text": "{\"access_token\":\"secret\"}" }
}
}
]
}
}
}Behavior:
- each entry is checked against the run
ScopePolicyas anR1browser/HTTP action - out-of-scope or malformed entries are skipped, not stored
- request URLs, headers, request bodies, response headers, and response bodies are redacted before storage
- request and response body previews are bounded to 4096 characters per entry
maxEntriesis clamped to1..200; entries over the limit are counted as truncated- each imported entry becomes one redacted
http_exchangeevidence item - the import itself is persisted as a
CaptureImportrecord for review, audit, skipped-entry analysis, and evidence reuse
Response:
{
"runId": "run_x",
"source": "browser.har",
"totalEntries": 2,
"processedEntries": 2,
"imported": 1,
"skipped": 1,
"truncatedEntries": 0,
"evidenceIds": ["evidence_x"],
"skippedEntries": [
{ "index": 1, "target": "https://out.example/", "reason": "Target is not in allowed scope" }
],
"importRecord": {
"id": "capture_import_x",
"kind": "har",
"status": "imported",
"inputSha256": "..."
}
}Lists persisted capture import records for the run, newest first. The same records are included in GET /runs/{id}/review so the Operator Console can show browser/proxy import progress beside the Evidence Inbox.
Imports AWS or generic cloud IAM policy JSON as normalized command_output evidence and optional candidate Findings. This is a rigid Cloud IAM domain Skill path, not a generic cloud exploitation workflow.
{
"provider": "aws",
"source": "iam-policy.json",
"createFindings": true,
"content": {
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{ "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "*", "Resource": "*" }
]
}
}Behavior:
- raw policy input is hashed but not stored as raw evidence
- normalized statements, counts, and risk signals are stored as redacted
command_outputevidence - risk signals include wildcard admin,
AllowwithNotAction/NotResource, wildcardiam:PassRole, wildcardsts:AssumeRole, IAM policy mutation actions, and broad wildcard resources without conditions - at most 25 candidate Findings are created when
createFindingsis true - Findings remain candidates until human evidence review and validation
Lists Cloud IAM import records for the run, newest first. The same records are included in GET /runs/{id}/review.
Imports BloodHound-style or generic identity graph JSON as normalized command_output evidence and optional candidate Findings. This is a rigid Identity/AD domain Skill path for read-only graph review; it does not execute lateral movement, credential attacks, or live AD actions.
{
"provider": "bloodhound",
"source": "identity-graph.json",
"createFindings": true,
"content": {
"nodes": [
{ "id": "u1", "name": "svc-web", "type": "User", "properties": { "hasspn": true } },
{ "id": "g1", "name": "Domain Admins", "type": "Group", "highvalue": true }
],
"edges": [
{ "source": "u1", "target": "g1", "type": "GenericAll" }
]
}
}Behavior:
- raw graph input is hashed but not stored as raw evidence
- normalized node/edge summaries and risk signals are stored as redacted
command_outputevidence - risk signals include high-value privilege edges, DCSync-like privileges, admin-group control edges, Kerberoastable identities, AS-REP roastable identities, unconstrained delegation, and AdminCount review signals
- at most 25 candidate Findings are created when
createFindingsis true - Findings remain candidates until human evidence review and validation
Lists identity graph import records for the run, newest first. The same records are included in GET /runs/{id}/review.
Captures a browser, desktop, or manual page snapshot as reviewable evidence. This endpoint is the adapter boundary for a future Tauri/Playwright browser controller: it validates scope before storing anything, keeps screenshots local-only, and stores bounded redacted text/DOM previews separately.
{
"source": "browser",
"target": "https://app.example.com/profile?token=secret",
"title": "Profile page rendered",
"screenshotBase64": "...",
"textPreview": "Visible page text with access_token=secret"
}Behavior:
targetis checked against the runScopePolicyas anR1browser action before any evidence is storedsourcemust bebrowser,desktop, ormanual- screenshots accept base64 or image data URLs and are capped at 2 MB
- screenshot evidence is stored as
screenshotwithredactionState: "raw_local_only" textPreview,domText, ordomPreviewis redacted and bounded to 20000 characters ascommand_outputevidence- at least one screenshot or text preview is required
- a persisted
BrowserSnapshotrecord links the produced evidence IDs for review and report reuse
Response:
{
"id": "browser_snapshot_x",
"source": "browser",
"target": "https://app.example.com/profile?token=%5Bredacted%5D",
"screenshotEvidenceId": "evidence_screen",
"textEvidenceId": "evidence_text",
"evidenceIds": ["evidence_screen", "evidence_text"],
"textPreviewTruncated": false
}Lists persisted page snapshot records for the run, newest first. The same records are included in GET /runs/{id}/review for the Operator Console Browser Snapshots panel.
Browser sessions are the local browser-controller contract for the current Web Console and a future Tauri/Playwright/MITM desktop shell. The default implementation is local_fetch_controller: it captures navigation as an in-scope HTTP exchange without JavaScript execution. When Playwright is installed locally and PLATFORM_ENABLE_PLAYWRIGHT_RUNNER=1 is set, the same API uses playwright_controller for JavaScript execution, rendered screenshots, visible text, console summaries, and network summaries. TLS interception and local CA management are still separate desktop Runner capabilities.
POST /runs/{id}/browser-sessions
GET /runs/{id}/browser-sessions
POST /browser-sessions/{id}/navigate
POST /browser-sessions/{id}/closePOST /browser-sessions/{id}/navigate accepts:
{
"target": "https://app.example.com/profile",
"method": "GET",
"headers": {},
"timeoutMs": 10000
}Navigation is scope-checked as an R1 browser action and stores a redacted http_exchange evidence item. In playwright_controller mode, renderer subrequests are blocked when they fall outside ScopePolicy, the final URL is checked before evidence is stored, screenshots are stored as raw_local_only, and DOM/console/network summaries are redacted before persistence.
The same capability is available through the Tool Gateway as browser.navigate:
{
"tool": "browser.navigate",
"target": "https://app.example.com/profile",
"method": "GET",
"riskLevel": "R1",
"args": { "timeoutMs": 10000 }
}The OAST inbox is the contract for out-of-band validation evidence. The default backend is local HTTP. An explicitly configured interactsh-compatible backend can generate https://<token>.<server> callback URLs for public HTTP/DNS validation, but the platform still records only callbacks that are delivered to it and does not poll the public relay in this version.
POST /runs/{id}/oast-sessions
GET /runs/{id}/oast-sessions
POST /oast-sessions/{id}/close
GET|POST /oast/{token}When /oast/{token} receives a callback, the platform stores a redacted oast_callback evidence item and adds the callback to the run review bundle. Callback routes are token-addressed and intentionally do not require the local API token, because real target systems cannot know the operator token.
The same capability is available through the Tool Gateway as oast.start_session and oast.record_callback. Creating OAST payloads for live targets should still be treated as approval-gated validation work.
The API process can also accept explicit HTTP proxy requests where the request line contains an absolute target URL. This is the first local proxy adapter layer for tools and future browser-controller handoff.
Start a proxy capture session first:
POST /runs/{id}/proxy-sessionsResponse:
{
"id": "proxysession_x",
"runId": "run_x",
"status": "active",
"proxyUrl": "http://127.0.0.1:4317",
"requiredHeaders": {
"X-Capture-Run-Id": "run_x",
"X-Platform-Token": "<local token>"
},
"limitations": ["HTTP absolute-form only", "CONNECT/TLS interception is not implemented"]
}List sessions:
GET /runs/{id}/proxy-sessionsClose a session:
POST /proxy-sessions/{id}/closeRequired headers:
X-Capture-Run-Id: run_x
X-Platform-Token: <local token>Proxy-Authorization: Bearer <local token> is also accepted. The target application's own Authorization header is forwarded to the target and is not used for platform authentication.
Example with curl:
curl -x http://127.0.0.1:4317 \
-H "X-Capture-Run-Id: run_x" \
-H "X-Platform-Token: $PLATFORM_API_TOKEN" \
http://127.0.0.1:8080/profileBehavior:
- requires an active proxy capture session for the run
- checks
ScopePolicybefore forwarding - strips local proxy control headers before the target request
- forwards the target response to the client
- stores a redacted
http_exchangeevidence item - returns
407when proxy authentication is missing - returns
403for out-of-scope targets
CONNECT is intentionally not implemented in the kernel. TLS interception, local CA management, and browser certificate trust belong to the later desktop proxy layer.
Proposes an evidence-backed finding for human review. The API rejects findings that do not reference evidence.
{
"title": "Profile metadata exposure",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "likely",
"affectedAssets": ["https://app.example.com/profile"],
"evidenceIds": ["evidence_x"],
"reproSteps": ["Replay the referenced HTTP exchange"],
"impact": "Low privilege users can observe profile metadata.",
"remediation": "Filter the response by caller role."
}Updates the human review state for an evidence-backed finding.
{
"validationState": "confirmed",
"reviewer": "operator",
"note": "Impact confirmed after replaying reviewed evidence."
}Supported states:
candidateconfirmedrejected
Rejected findings remain in the local review bundle for auditability, but report generation excludes them.
Confirming a finding requires every referenced evidence item to have an operator Evidence Review with status useful. This keeps confirmed findings tied to human-reviewed, reproducible evidence instead of raw Worker output.
Adds human judgment to the graph.
{ "text": "Focus authenticated profile traffic first" }Runs exactly one dispatcher tick. This is useful for desktop buttons, CLI loops, tests, and future job queues.
Worker selection is policy-aware. The dispatcher first asks the Worker Selection Policy to rank the run pool using runtime health, configured command, priority, cross-run Worker Leaderboard score, current-run outcomes, evidence contribution, finding influence, and timeout/error pressure. If that read model is unavailable, the dispatcher falls back to the run's original worker-pool order.
Agent Workers may return toolRequests during explore. The dispatcher executes those requests through the Tool Gateway, not directly from the Worker process. Evidence-producing tool results are attached to the fact created when the intent is concluded. If a requested tool is blocked or requires approval, the intent is released with an audit-visible reason.
CLI-backed Workers receive an agent-worker.v1 protocol envelope, not a bare graph dump. The envelope includes hard rules, the governed tool surface, output schema, and examples for toolRequests and $produced evidence references.
When a Worker-requested tool is blocked or needs approval, the response can be:
{
"status": "blocked",
"task": "explore",
"worker": "codex-worker",
"selection": {
"source": "policy",
"worker": "codex-worker",
"score": 74,
"decision": "recommended"
},
"reason": "Worker tool request requires approval: R3 action requires approval",
"approvalId": "approval_x",
"invocationId": "toolcall_x"
}Extends an active intent lease. Worker runners use this for long-running sessions.
{
"leaseId": "lease_x",
"leaseMs": 300000
}leaseMs is optional and capped at 30 minutes.
Previews a high-level tool request through the same Tool Gateway gates used by execution. This endpoint is read-only: it does not execute tools, write tool invocations, create approvals, consume rate-limit budget, or add evidence.
{
"tool": "scanner.run_template",
"target": "https://app.example.com",
"method": "GET",
"riskLevel": "R2",
"args": {
"template": "web.nuclei.safe_templates",
"timeoutMs": 10000
}
}Example response:
{
"status": "blocked",
"executable": false,
"reason": "External toolbox execution is disabled by policy for profile container.web-recon",
"gates": [
{ "gate": "tool.support", "status": "pass", "reason": "High-level tool is registered in the Tool Gateway" },
{ "gate": "scope.policy", "status": "pass", "reason": "Allowed by scope policy" },
{ "gate": "scanner.template", "status": "pass", "reason": "Scanner template is registered: web.nuclei.safe_templates" },
{ "gate": "toolbox.plan", "status": "blocked", "reason": "External toolbox execution is disabled by policy for profile container.web-recon" }
],
"scanner": {
"toolboxDecision": { "allowed": false },
"plan": {
"engine": "nuclei",
"runner": "none",
"command": "nuclei",
"args": ["https://app.example.com/"]
}
},
"audit": {
"previewWritesState": false,
"wouldCreateApprovalRequest": false,
"wouldExecuteExternalProcess": false,
"wouldWriteEvidence": false
}
}Use this endpoint for desktop approval panels, strategy recommendation previews, and operator explainability. A preview is not a permission grant; execution still requires POST /runs/{id}/tools.
Invokes a high-level tool through the Tool Gateway. The gateway enforces scope, method policy, risk gates, rate limits, and tool allowlisting before execution. R4 requests are denied by default; break-glass R4 execution requires an in-scope target, a matching r4AuthorizationToken in the request, and an approved approval id for the same run, tool, target, and risk level. The break-glass token is internal-only after validation and is redacted from run, graph, review, Worker envelope, and export responses.
{
"tool": "http.request",
"target": "https://app.example.com/profile",
"method": "GET",
"riskLevel": "R1",
"args": {
"headers": {
"authorization": "Bearer vault-placeholder"
},
"timeoutMs": 10000
}
}Successful low-risk http.request calls return an evidenceId for the generated redacted HTTP exchange.
Scanner template invocation:
{
"tool": "scanner.run_template",
"target": "https://app.example.com",
"method": "GET",
"riskLevel": "R2",
"args": {
"template": "web.security_headers",
"timeoutMs": 10000
}
}Current built-in templates:
web.security_headers: fetches the target, checks common browser security headers, and stores a redactedcommand_outputevidence item.web.endpoint_discovery: checksrobots.txt,security.txt, andsitemap.xmlon the target origin and stores bounded previews.web.technology_fingerprint: collects response headers and bounded HTML signals for framework/platform hints.web.cookie_flags: inspects cookie metadata for Secure, HttpOnly, and SameSite coverage without storing cookie values.web.link_form_map: extracts bounded same-origin links and form actions from one HTML response without submitting forms.web.cors_policy: sends one in-scope GET with a synthetic Origin header and records CORS policy signals without sending credentials.web.csp_analysis: summarizes CSP, frame, MIME, referrer, and permissions-policy hardening signals from one response.web.js_asset_inventory: extracts bounded script asset URLs, inline script counts, and source-map hints from one HTML response without fetching JavaScript files.web.cookie_scope_analysis: inspects cookie domain, path, prefix, lifetime, SameSite, Secure, HttpOnly, and partitioning metadata without storing cookie values.web.security_txt_policy: checks/.well-known/security.txtand/security.txtand summarizes contact, policy, encryption, acknowledgments, and expiry metadata without fetching external contact URLs.web.websocket_discovery_plan: extracts WebSocket and realtime endpoint hints from one HTML response and produces a safe validation plan without opening WebSocket handshakes or sending messages.web.sourcemap_exposure_plan: checks bounded source-map candidates with same-originHEADrequests and produces a review plan without downloading map bodies or fetching JavaScript files.web.redirect_policy: fetches one target with redirects disabled and records redacted Location, HSTS, and canonical redirect signals.web.cache_policy: summarizes cache-control, validator, Vary, CDN cache, and sensitive-response caching signals without storing the body.web.openapi_discovery: checks bounded same-origin OpenAPI/Swagger metadata paths and stores redacted spec previews without executing API operations.web.oauth_oidc_metadata: checks OAuth/OIDC well-known metadata without credential material, authorization flows, token requests, refresh, or revocation calls.web.graphql_introspection_plan: probes bounded GraphQL endpoint hints and produces an approval-aware plan without sending introspection queries or mutations.web.auth_endpoint_discovery: checks common login, SSO, SAML, OAuth, and auth API paths with boundedHEADrequests.web.api_version_discovery: checks common API version paths such as/v1,/api/v2, and/rest/v1.web.host_header_probe: compares baseline and synthetic Host-header responses for host-reflection and differential signals.web.param_probe: mutates existing query parameters with bounded marker, quote, and timing-hint values and stores redacted reflection, error, status, length, and timing differential signals.network.dns_records: resolves bounded public DNS record types for the in-scope host without zone transfer.network.tls_certificate: performs one TLS handshake and stores certificate metadata without sending HTTP data or intercepting TLS.
Planned external templates are already registered for nuclei, ffuf, httpx, sqlmap, nmap, tlsx, semgrep, apktool, and Frida. They remain blocked until the matching toolbox profile is implemented and policy-enabled.
Sandboxed shell invocation:
{
"tool": "shell.run_sandboxed",
"target": "https://app.example.com",
"method": "POST",
"riskLevel": "R2",
"args": {
"command": "node",
"args": ["-e", "console.log('tool output')"],
"timeoutMs": 10000
}
}Allowed shell commands are intentionally narrow in the kernel: Node/npm/npx and Python command names. Containerized toolbox profiles should replace this local guard for production toolchains.
Finding proposal invocation:
{
"tool": "finding.propose",
"target": "https://app.example.com/profile",
"method": "POST",
"riskLevel": "R0",
"args": {
"title": "Profile metadata exposure",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "likely",
"affectedAssets": ["https://app.example.com/profile"],
"evidenceIds": ["evidence_x"],
"reproSteps": ["Replay the referenced HTTP exchange"],
"impact": "Profile metadata can be reviewed from evidence.",
"remediation": "Limit profile metadata by role."
}
}finding.propose returns a findingId only after the Finding Service confirms the referenced evidence exists in the same run.
Credential placeholder invocation:
{
"tool": "credential.use_placeholder",
"target": "https://app.example.com",
"method": "POST",
"riskLevel": "R0",
"args": {
"credentialId": "credential_x",
"usedFor": "browser.navigate"
}
}credential.use_placeholder produces a redacted command_output evidence record containing the credential reference id, role, placeholder reference, allowed use list, and secretMaterialStored: false. It does not resolve the real secret or inject it into HTTP requests yet. Future vault-backed request injection should build on this contract.
Access evidence comparison invocation:
{
"tool": "access.compare_evidence",
"target": "https://app.example.com/profile",
"method": "GET",
"riskLevel": "R0",
"args": {
"title": "Viewer versus admin profile response",
"baselineCredentialId": "credential_viewer",
"comparisonCredentialId": "credential_admin",
"baselineEvidenceId": "evidence_viewer",
"comparisonEvidenceId": "evidence_admin"
}
}access.compare_evidence returns an evidenceId for the generated diff artifact. The Strategy service recommends this tool when a run has at least two active Credential References and at least two evidence items.
For Worker-originated toolRequests, finding.propose can reference evidence produced earlier in the same explore result with:
"evidenceIds": ["$produced"]The dispatcher expands $produced before invoking the Tool Gateway.
Lists approval requests for a run. Desktop and CLI runners use this to render the human review queue.
Lists allowed, blocked, and approval-required tool audit records for a run.
Reads local evidence blob content only after the evidence has crossed the redaction boundary. This endpoint is local-runner only and requires the API token. Evidence marked raw_local_only returns 403 and must stay behind the local runner/evidence viewer boundary.
The Operator Console uses this endpoint in the Evidence Viewer panel so a human reviewer can inspect a bounded local preview, encoding, size, SHA-256 hash, and redaction state before attaching evidence to a Finding or Access Review.
Lists evidence replay readiness for every evidence item in a run.
Only http_exchange evidence with an in-scope GET or HEAD request is marked replayable. Non-HTTP evidence, malformed exchange JSON, out-of-scope URLs, and non-idempotent methods are marked blocked with a reason.
[
{
"evidenceId": "evidence_x",
"replayable": true,
"status": "ready",
"method": "GET",
"target": "https://app.example.com/profile",
"originalStatus": 200,
"reason": "Safe HTTP evidence replay is available."
}
]Replays one safe http_exchange evidence item and stores the new response as fresh redacted http_exchange evidence.
This route is deliberately narrow: it supports only GET and HEAD, strips sensitive replay headers, reruns scope checks as R1, caps timeout to 30 seconds, and never replays request bodies. State-changing methods must go through explicit Tool Gateway paths and approval policy instead.
{ "timeoutMs": 10000 }Response:
{
"status": "replayed",
"sourceEvidenceId": "evidence_x",
"replayEvidenceId": "evidence_y",
"method": "GET",
"replayStatus": 200,
"statusChanged": false,
"sha256": "..."
}Lists operator triage decisions for evidence in a run.
Records or updates the current operator review state for one evidence item.
{
"status": "useful",
"note": "Supports the candidate finding.",
"reviewer": "operator"
}Allowed status values are useful, needs_more_context, and not_relevant. This does not confirm a vulnerability by itself; it only records human evidence triage before a Finding or Access Review consumes that evidence.
Creates an evidence-backed candidate Finding from one evidence item, but only after that evidence has been reviewed as useful.
{
"severity": "medium",
"title": "Human-reviewed evidence requires validation"
}All fields are optional. Defaults keep the Finding in candidate validation state with needs_dynamic_confirmation confidence. This is the Operator Console path from reviewed evidence to a reportable candidate without letting Agent Workers directly bypass human triage.
Approves or rejects an R3 action.
{ "status": "approved" }Lists evidence-backed findings. If runId is omitted, lists all findings in local state.
Runs the built-in quality evaluation for a run and stores the result.
Current checks:
- scope and destructive-action controls
- evidence-backed findings
- human validation coverage
- report safety and redaction
- trace and cost observability
Generates a Markdown report.
{ "runId": "run_x", "format": "hackerone", "findingScope": "confirmed_only" }The response includes the rendered markdown plus a replay-bundle evidenceId and sha256 for the stored report artifact.
findingScope defaults to confirmed_only for conservative commercial reporting. Use candidate_and_confirmed when exporting a triage report that intentionally includes unconfirmed candidate findings. Findings marked rejected are always excluded so reviewed false positives do not leak into customer-facing deliverables.
Supported formats:
hackeronebugcrowdsrcenterprise
Supported finding scopes:
confirmed_onlycandidate_and_confirmed
Generates a local run export bundle for team handoff, customer evidence review, or cloud-control-plane sync. The export is stored as redacted replay_bundle evidence and a separate RunExport review record.
{
"findingScope": "candidate_and_confirmed",
"includeEvidenceContent": false
}Behavior:
- includes run metadata, scope, facts, intents, hints, findings, evidence metadata, evidence reviews, reports, approvals, tool audit, sessions, imports, access reviews, and tool-pack runs
findingScopedefaults toconfirmed_only; rejected findings are always excluded- evidence content embedding is disabled for HTTP API exports; exports carry evidence ids, metadata, hashes, reviews, and report references
raw_local_onlyevidence content is never included; the export records how many such items were omitted- the generated bundle itself is hashable evidence with a returned
evidenceIdandsha256
Response:
{
"id": "run_export_x",
"status": "generated",
"evidenceId": "evidence_export",
"sha256": "...",
"findingScope": "candidate_and_confirmed",
"includeEvidenceContent": false,
"includedEvidenceContent": 0,
"omittedRawLocalOnly": 1
}Lists generated run export records for the run, newest first. The same records are included in GET /runs/{id}/review.