diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index d327af12..7577ee89 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -16,6 +16,12 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
   The schema is force-included in the wheel alongside the catalog entry schema, and `scripts/verify_python_distribution.py` checks both resolve to a file inside the installed distribution, so a wheel that drops one fails the release smoke test rather than a verifier at runtime. A unit test asserts the force-include mapping, since that line is the only thing putting these files next to the code.
 
   `previous_record_hash` on the first record in a chain is the all-zero digest, `sha256:` followed by 64 zeros, stated in both the schema and the spec doc. It validated against the digest pattern before and meant nothing, which is the worst combination: representable and unspecified.
+- **`cmcp verify` could not authenticate a TPM attestation-key certificate chain.** The
+  verifier library already required a caller-supplied `trusted_tpm_ca_pem`, but the CLI
+  had no way to provide it, so otherwise complete TPM 2.0 evidence remained partially
+  verified. `--trusted-tpm-ca` now accepts a verifier-owned PEM certificate bundle,
+  validates it before verification, and passes it only to the TPM trust input. It does
+  not configure AMD SEV-SNP or Intel TDX trust anchors.
 
 - **A single trusted reviewer key could approve any catalog change, under any policy (#517, follow-up to #519).** `verify_catalog_change` read `threshold`, `distinct_principals`, and `distinct_roles` out of the record it was verifying, and checked `policy_hash` for digest shape only: never recomputed over the policy body, never compared to anything. A record declaring `threshold: 1` with arbitrary bytes in `policy_hash` verified on one signature, so the M-of-N property the module advertises was unenforced. This is the failure the spec doc already forbids for keys, "no record-embedded key can bootstrap trust", applied to the policy instead. M is only meaningful when it comes from verifier-side configuration.
 
@@ -26,7 +32,6 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
   The distinctness rules did not close the property on their own, because nothing bound approvals to distinct keys. A threshold of three under a policy that does not require distinct principals was satisfied by one key signing the identical approval three times, and a threshold of two under a policy that does require distinct roles was satisfied by one key signing twice as two different roles, since a `TrustedReviewer` carrying no role lets the record assert whichever role it likes. A reviewer key now counts once per record whatever the policy says: a repeated signature is one approval presented N times, not N approvals. The check runs after the principal and role rules so those keep reporting the more specific cause.
 
   The four tests that shipped with #519 passed whether or not any of these checks existed. The suite is now 31 tests, each guard verified by deleting it and confirming a test fails. One is xfailed on purpose: the schema sets a minimum of zero on the approval timestamps and the verifier does not, which is left failing until the schema-wiring decision lands.
-
 - **The catalog-approval signing input was not the JCS it claims to be (#517).** `canonical_json` is documented as RFC 8785 compatible and serialized with `ensure_ascii=True`, which is the one thing JCS does not do: it emits an ASCII escape where the standard emits UTF-8. Any record carrying a non-ASCII `principal_id`, `issuer`, `role`, `catalog_id`, or `policy_id` was signed over different bytes than a conforming producer signs, so a record produced anywhere but here failed with an invalid-signature error that points nowhere near the encoding. `sort_keys` was the second divergence, ordering members by code point where JCS orders by UTF-16 code unit. The two disagree for any key outside the BMP, since a surrogate pair leads with `0xD800` and sorts below a BMP character above `0xE000`.
 
   Members are now ordered on their UTF-16BE bytes and the output is UTF-8. Values JCS cannot pin down are refused rather than serialized into a signing input that two implementations would read differently: floating point numbers, integers beyond `2**53 - 1`, non-string keys, and unpaired surrogates, each as `CatalogApprovalError` rather than as an escaping `UnicodeEncodeError` or `TypeError`. Approval records carry none of those, so refusing them only closes a door.
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 870f0a90..5380962d 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ Environment variables:
 | `cmcp start` | `--config PATH` (required) | Start the gateway |
 | `cmcp validate-config` | `--config PATH` (required) | Validate `cmcp-config.yaml` without starting |
 | `cmcp validate-bundle` | `--bundle-path PATH` (required), `--expected-hash sha256:<hex>` (required) | Verify a Cedar bundle hash before deployment |
-| `cmcp verify` | `CLAIM_FILE` (required); `--policy-hash`, `--catalog-hash`, `--max-age`, `--trusted-key`, `--audit-bundle`, `--agent-manifest`, `--agent-manifest-trust-anchor` | Verify a signed TRACE Claim (signature, schema, freshness, audit chain, and pinned hashes) |
+| `cmcp verify` | `CLAIM_FILE` (required); `--policy-hash`, `--catalog-hash`, `--max-age`, `--trusted-key`, `--trusted-tpm-ca`, `--audit-bundle`, `--agent-manifest`, `--agent-manifest-trust-anchor` | Verify a signed TRACE Claim (signature, schema, freshness, audit chain, pinned hashes, and trust anchors) |
 
 ---
 
diff --git a/docs/quickstart.md b/docs/quickstart.md
index c5e58fa1..014015b9 100644
--- a/docs/quickstart.md
+++ b/docs/quickstart.md
@@ -387,7 +387,16 @@ cmcp verify claim.json \
   --catalog-hash "$(python3 -c "import json; print(json.load(open('claim.json'))['gateway']['catalog']['hash'])")"
 ```
 
-On a real TEE host the `hardware_attestation` check passes and the overall result becomes `verified`.
+On a real TPM 2.0 host, pass a verifier-owned CA certificate bundle to authenticate the
+attestation-key chain:
+
+```bash
+cmcp verify claim.json --trusted-tpm-ca /etc/cmcp/trust/tpm-ca-roots.pem
+```
+
+The TPM trust bundle is necessary but not sufficient: the claim must also carry a valid
+signed quote and attestation-key evidence. This option is TPM-only; it does not configure
+AMD SEV-SNP or Intel TDX trust anchors.
 
 The `cmcp_verify` Python library is also available for programmatic checks (`from cmcp_verify import verify_trace_claim, ApprovedHashes`).
 
diff --git a/docs/tutorials/verifying-a-trace-claim.md b/docs/tutorials/verifying-a-trace-claim.md
index daa33b4a..b38306f8 100644
--- a/docs/tutorials/verifying-a-trace-claim.md
+++ b/docs/tutorials/verifying-a-trace-claim.md
@@ -81,6 +81,29 @@ result = verify_trace_claim(
 
 ---
 
+## Verify a TPM claim from the CLI
+
+For a TPM 2.0 claim, supply the attestation-key CA certificates your verifier trusts:
+
+```bash
+cmcp verify claim.json \
+  --policy-hash sha256:abc123... \
+  --catalog-hash sha256:def456... \
+  --trusted-tpm-ca /etc/cmcp/trust/tpm-ca-roots.pem
+```
+
+The PEM file may contain one or more verifier-approved CA certificates. Keep it in a
+verifier-controlled trust store; do not obtain the trust bundle from the claim or the
+runtime that produced the claim. A valid CA bundle is one input to TPM verification,
+not a substitute for the signed quote and attestation-key evidence carried by the
+claim.
+
+`--trusted-tpm-ca` is deliberately TPM-only. It does not configure AMD SEV-SNP or
+Intel TDX trust anchors, and it does not change how claims from those platforms are
+evaluated.
+
+---
+
 ## Read the VerificationResult
 
 `VerificationResult` has these fields:
diff --git a/src/cmcp_runtime/cli.py b/src/cmcp_runtime/cli.py
index f0e2ab28..ab1f1d87 100644
--- a/src/cmcp_runtime/cli.py
+++ b/src/cmcp_runtime/cli.py
@@ -88,6 +88,33 @@ def build_server(ctx: RuntimeContext) -> MCPServer:
     )
 
 
+def _load_tpm_ca_bundle(path: str | None) -> bytes | None:
+    """Load and parse-check a caller-pinned TPM CA certificate bundle."""
+    if path is None:
+        return None
+
+    from cryptography import x509
+
+    try:
+        with open(path, "rb") as bundle_file:
+            bundle = bundle_file.read()
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise click.ClickException(f"Could not read TPM CA bundle {path!r}: {exc}") from exc
+
+    try:
+        certificates = x509.load_pem_x509_certificates(bundle)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise click.ClickException(
+            "TPM CA bundle must contain PEM-encoded X.509 certificates"
+        ) from exc
+    if not certificates:
+        raise click.ClickException(
+            "TPM CA bundle must contain PEM-encoded X.509 certificates"
+        )
+
+    return bundle
+
+
 @click.group()
 @click.version_option(__version__, prog_name="cmcp")
 def main() -> None:
@@ -166,6 +193,12 @@ def client_bridge(gateway_url: str, token_env: str) -> None:
               help="Signed Agent Manifest to cross-check against the Trust Record.")
 @click.option("--agent-manifest-trust-anchor", default=None, type=click.Path(exists=True),
               help="JSON issuer public key trust anchor for --agent-manifest.")
+@click.option(
+    "--trusted-tpm-ca",
+    default=None,
+    type=click.Path(exists=True, dir_okay=False, readable=True),
+    help="TPM 2.0 claims only: verifier-pinned CA certificate bundle (PEM).",
+)
 def verify(
     claim_file: str,
     policy_hash: str | None,
@@ -175,6 +208,7 @@ def verify(
     audit_bundle: str | None,
     agent_manifest: str | None,
     agent_manifest_trust_anchor: str | None,
+    trusted_tpm_ca: str | None,
 ) -> None:
     """Verify a signed TRACE Claim (and optionally its audit bundle).
 
@@ -218,6 +252,7 @@ def verify(
         )
         raise SystemExit(1)
 
+    tpm_ca_bundle = _load_tpm_ca_bundle(trusted_tpm_ca)
     result = verify_trace_claim(
         claim,
         approved,
@@ -225,6 +260,7 @@ def verify(
         trusted_public_key_hex=trusted_key,
         agent_manifest=manifest_json,
         trusted_agent_manifest_keys=manifest_keys,
+        trusted_tpm_ca_pem=tpm_ca_bundle,
     )
 
     def _line(name: str, ok: bool, note: str = "") -> None:
diff --git a/tests/unit/test_verify_command.py b/tests/unit/test_verify_command.py
index 74ae1274..62f18204 100644
--- a/tests/unit/test_verify_command.py
+++ b/tests/unit/test_verify_command.py
@@ -10,11 +10,13 @@
 from click.testing import CliRunner
 from starlette.testclient import TestClient
 
+import cmcp_verify
 from cmcp_runtime.audit.keys import SigningKey
 from cmcp_runtime.cli import build_server, main
 from cmcp_runtime.config import AttestationConfig, Config
 from cmcp_runtime.policy.bundle import PolicyStore
 from cmcp_runtime.startup import RuntimeContext
+from cmcp_verify.tpm_roots import AZURE_VTPM_ROOT_2023_PEM
 
 
 @pytest.fixture
@@ -135,3 +137,58 @@ def test_verify_fails_on_tampered_audit_bundle(claim_and_bundle, tmp_path):
     ])
     assert result.exit_code == 1
     assert "RESULT: FAIL" in result.output
+
+
+def test_verify_threads_only_the_tpm_ca_bundle(claim_and_bundle, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    claim_file, _, _, _ = claim_and_bundle
+    ca_path = tmp_path / "tpm-ca.pem"
+    ca_path.write_bytes(AZURE_VTPM_ROOT_2023_PEM)
+
+    captured: dict[str, object] = {}
+    real_verify = cmcp_verify.verify_trace_claim
+
+    def capture_verify(*args, **kwargs):
+        captured.update(kwargs)
+        return real_verify(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(cmcp_verify, "verify_trace_claim", capture_verify)
+
+    result = CliRunner().invoke(
+        main,
+        ["verify", str(claim_file), "--trusted-tpm-ca", str(ca_path)],
+    )
+
+    assert result.exit_code == 1, result.output
+    assert result.output.endswith("RESULT: FAIL (partially_verified)\n")
+    assert captured["trusted_tpm_ca_pem"] == AZURE_VTPM_ROOT_2023_PEM
+    assert "trusted_ark_pem" not in captured
+    assert "trusted_intel_root_pem" not in captured
+
+
+def test_verify_rejects_invalid_tpm_ca_bundle(claim_and_bundle, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    claim_file, _, _, _ = claim_and_bundle
+    ca_path = tmp_path / "not-a-certificate.pem"
+    ca_path.write_text("this is not a PEM certificate")
+
+    def must_not_verify(*args, **kwargs):
+        pytest.fail("verify_trace_claim must not run with an invalid TPM CA bundle")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(cmcp_verify, "verify_trace_claim", must_not_verify)
+
+    result = CliRunner().invoke(
+        main,
+        ["verify", str(claim_file), "--trusted-tpm-ca", str(ca_path)],
+    )
+
+    assert result.exit_code == 1, result.output
+    assert "TPM CA bundle must contain PEM-encoded X.509 certificates" in result.output
+
+
+def test_verify_help_keeps_the_new_trust_anchor_tpm_only():
+    result = CliRunner().invoke(main, ["verify", "--help"])
+
+    assert result.exit_code == 0, result.output
+    assert "--trusted-tpm-ca" in result.output
+    assert "TPM 2.0 claims only" in result.output
+    assert "--trusted-amd" not in result.output
+    assert "--trusted-intel" not in result.output