diff --git a/.github/workflows/test.yml b/.github/workflows/test.yml index 24784d681..884c9bac3 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/test.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/test.yml @@ -142,7 +142,11 @@ jobs: go-version-file: 'go.mod' - name: Run tests with race detector - run: go test -tags dev -race -v ./... + # 20 minutes, not Go's default 10 per package. internal/connector runs + # real sockets, real processes and the recovery harness; under -race it + # takes about five minutes on a fast box and roughly twice that on a + # runner. The default was not a hung test, it was the budget. + run: go test -tags dev -race -v -timeout 20m ./... integration: name: Integration Tests diff --git a/.naming-allowlist b/.naming-allowlist index ac58d4a91..47a35f827 100644 --- a/.naming-allowlist +++ b/.naming-allowlist @@ -21,3 +21,5 @@ keyring(bcq legacy bcq # RELEASING.md — actual GitHub App name bcq-release-bot +# npm integrity hashes are base64 and can contain any letters +./internal/connector/driver/acp/adapters/package-lock.json diff --git a/.surface b/.surface index 514cca239..e3f8c2835 100644 --- a/.surface +++ b/.surface @@ -130,6 +130,9 @@ ARG basecamp config set 01 ARG basecamp config trust 00 [path] ARG basecamp config unset 00 ARG basecamp config untrust 00 [path] +ARG basecamp connect discard 00 +ARG basecamp connect import 00 +ARG basecamp connect redispatch 00 ARG basecamp docs archive 00 ARG basecamp docs doc create 00 ARG basecamp docs doc create 01 [content] @@ -669,8 +672,19 @@ CMD basecamp config trust CMD basecamp config unset CMD basecamp config untrust CMD basecamp connect +CMD basecamp connect discard +CMD basecamp connect doctor +CMD basecamp connect import +CMD basecamp connect redispatch +CMD basecamp connect release CMD basecamp connect setup +CMD basecamp connect shadow +CMD basecamp connect shadow promote CMD basecamp connect show +CMD basecamp connect status +CMD basecamp connect worktrees +CMD basecamp connect worktrees list +CMD basecamp connect worktrees prune CMD basecamp docs CMD basecamp docs archive CMD basecamp docs doc @@ -5345,11 +5359,14 @@ FLAG basecamp config untrust --styled type=bool FLAG basecamp config untrust --todolist type=string FLAG basecamp config untrust --verbose type=count FLAG basecamp connect --account type=string +FLAG basecamp connect --acp-adapters type=string FLAG basecamp connect --agent type=bool FLAG basecamp connect --cache-dir type=string FLAG basecamp connect --count type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect --driver type=string FLAG basecamp connect --help type=bool FLAG basecamp connect --hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect --hold type=bool FLAG basecamp connect --ids-only type=bool FLAG basecamp connect --in type=string FLAG basecamp connect --jq type=string @@ -5361,10 +5378,117 @@ FLAG basecamp connect --no-stats type=bool FLAG basecamp connect --profile type=string FLAG basecamp connect --project type=string FLAG basecamp connect --quiet type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect --shadow type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect --since type=int64 FLAG basecamp connect --stats type=bool FLAG basecamp connect --styled type=bool FLAG basecamp connect --todolist type=string FLAG basecamp connect --verbose type=count +FLAG basecamp connect discard --account type=string +FLAG basecamp connect discard --agent type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect discard --cache-dir type=string +FLAG basecamp connect discard --count type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect discard --help type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect discard --hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect discard --ids-only type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect discard --in type=string +FLAG basecamp connect discard --jq type=string +FLAG basecamp connect discard --json type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect discard --markdown type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect discard --md type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect discard --no-hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect discard --no-stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect discard --profile type=string +FLAG basecamp connect discard --project type=string +FLAG basecamp connect discard --quiet type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect discard --stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect discard --styled type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect discard --todolist type=string +FLAG basecamp connect discard --verbose type=count +FLAG basecamp connect doctor --account type=string +FLAG basecamp connect doctor --agent type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect doctor --cache-dir type=string +FLAG basecamp connect doctor --count type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect doctor --help type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect doctor --hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect doctor --ids-only type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect doctor --in type=string +FLAG basecamp connect doctor --jq type=string +FLAG basecamp connect doctor --json type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect doctor --markdown type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect doctor --md type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect doctor --no-hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect doctor --no-stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect doctor --profile type=string +FLAG basecamp connect doctor --project type=string +FLAG basecamp connect doctor --quiet type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect doctor --stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect doctor --styled type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect doctor --todolist type=string +FLAG basecamp connect doctor --verbose type=count +FLAG basecamp connect import --account type=string +FLAG basecamp connect import --agent type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect import --cache-dir type=string +FLAG basecamp connect import --count type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect import --help type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect import --hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect import --ids-only type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect import --in type=string +FLAG basecamp connect import --jq type=string +FLAG basecamp connect import --json type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect import --markdown type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect import --md type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect import --no-hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect import --no-stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect import --profile type=string +FLAG basecamp connect import --project type=string +FLAG basecamp connect import --quiet type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect import --stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect import --styled type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect import --todolist type=string +FLAG basecamp connect import --verbose type=count +FLAG basecamp connect redispatch --account type=string +FLAG basecamp connect redispatch --agent type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect redispatch --cache-dir type=string +FLAG basecamp connect redispatch --count type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect redispatch --help type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect redispatch --hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect redispatch --ids-only type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect redispatch --in type=string +FLAG basecamp connect redispatch --jq type=string +FLAG basecamp connect redispatch --json type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect redispatch --markdown type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect redispatch --md type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect redispatch --no-hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect redispatch --no-stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect redispatch --profile type=string +FLAG basecamp connect redispatch --project type=string +FLAG basecamp connect redispatch --quiet type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect redispatch --stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect redispatch --styled type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect redispatch --todolist type=string +FLAG basecamp connect redispatch --verbose type=count +FLAG basecamp connect release --account type=string +FLAG basecamp connect release --agent type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect release --cache-dir type=string +FLAG basecamp connect release --count type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect release --help type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect release --hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect release --ids-only type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect release --in type=string +FLAG basecamp connect release --jq type=string +FLAG basecamp connect release --json type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect release --markdown type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect release --md type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect release --no-hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect release --no-stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect release --profile type=string +FLAG basecamp connect release --project type=string +FLAG basecamp connect release --quiet type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect release --stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect release --styled type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect release --todolist type=string +FLAG basecamp connect release --verbose type=count FLAG basecamp connect setup --account type=string FLAG basecamp connect setup --agent type=bool FLAG basecamp connect setup --allow type=stringArray @@ -5399,7 +5523,50 @@ FLAG basecamp connect setup --todolist type=string FLAG basecamp connect setup --trust type=string FLAG basecamp connect setup --verbose type=count FLAG basecamp connect setup --watch-completions type=stringArray +FLAG basecamp connect setup --worker type=string FLAG basecamp connect setup --worktrees type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow --account type=string +FLAG basecamp connect shadow --agent type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow --cache-dir type=string +FLAG basecamp connect shadow --count type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow --help type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow --hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow --ids-only type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow --in type=string +FLAG basecamp connect shadow --jq type=string +FLAG basecamp connect shadow --json type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow --markdown type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow --md type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow --no-hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow --no-stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow --profile type=string +FLAG basecamp connect shadow --project type=string +FLAG basecamp connect shadow --quiet type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow --stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow --styled type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow --todolist type=string +FLAG basecamp connect shadow --verbose type=count +FLAG basecamp connect shadow promote --account type=string +FLAG basecamp connect shadow promote --agent type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow promote --cache-dir type=string +FLAG basecamp connect shadow promote --count type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow promote --help type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow promote --hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow promote --ids-only type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow promote --in type=string +FLAG basecamp connect shadow promote --jq type=string +FLAG basecamp connect shadow promote --json type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow promote --markdown type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow promote --md type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow promote --no-hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow promote --no-stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow promote --profile type=string +FLAG basecamp connect shadow promote --project type=string +FLAG basecamp connect shadow promote --quiet type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow promote --stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow promote --styled type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect shadow promote --todolist type=string +FLAG basecamp connect shadow promote --verbose type=count FLAG basecamp connect show --account type=string FLAG basecamp connect show --agent type=bool FLAG basecamp connect show --cache-dir type=string @@ -5421,6 +5588,94 @@ FLAG basecamp connect show --stats type=bool FLAG basecamp connect show --styled type=bool FLAG basecamp connect show --todolist type=string FLAG basecamp connect show --verbose type=count +FLAG basecamp connect status --account type=string +FLAG basecamp connect status --agent type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect status --cache-dir type=string +FLAG basecamp connect status --count type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect status --help type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect status --hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect status --ids-only type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect status --in type=string +FLAG basecamp connect status --jq type=string +FLAG basecamp connect status --json type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect status --markdown type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect status --md type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect status --no-hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect status --no-stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect status --profile type=string +FLAG basecamp connect status --project type=string +FLAG basecamp connect status --quiet type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect status --shadow type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect status --stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect status --styled type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect status --todolist type=string +FLAG basecamp connect status --verbose type=count +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees --account type=string +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees --agent type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees --cache-dir type=string +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees --count type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees --help type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees --hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees --ids-only type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees --in type=string +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees --jq type=string +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees --json type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees --markdown type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees --md type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees --no-hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees --no-stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees --profile type=string +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees --project type=string +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees --quiet type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees --stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees --styled type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees --todolist type=string +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees --verbose type=count +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --account type=string +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --agent type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --cache-dir type=string +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --count type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --help type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --ids-only type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --in type=string +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --jq type=string +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --json type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --markdown type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --md type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --no-hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --no-stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --profile type=string +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --project type=string +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --quiet type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --shadow type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --styled type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --todolist type=string +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees list --verbose type=count +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --account type=string +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --agent type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --cache-dir type=string +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --count type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --force type=stringArray +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --help type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --ids-only type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --in type=string +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --jq type=string +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --json type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --markdown type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --md type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --no-hints type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --no-stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --profile type=string +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --project type=string +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --quiet type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --shadow type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --stats type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --styled type=bool +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --todolist type=string +FLAG basecamp connect worktrees prune --verbose type=count FLAG basecamp docs --account type=string FLAG basecamp docs --agent type=bool FLAG basecamp docs --cache-dir type=string @@ -18600,8 +18855,19 @@ SUB basecamp config trust SUB basecamp config unset SUB basecamp config untrust SUB basecamp connect +SUB basecamp connect discard +SUB basecamp connect doctor +SUB basecamp connect import +SUB basecamp connect redispatch +SUB basecamp connect release SUB basecamp connect setup +SUB basecamp connect shadow +SUB basecamp connect shadow promote SUB basecamp connect show +SUB basecamp connect status +SUB basecamp connect worktrees +SUB basecamp connect worktrees list +SUB basecamp connect worktrees prune SUB basecamp docs SUB basecamp docs archive SUB basecamp docs doc diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 1636023cf..965be15a7 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -130,6 +130,33 @@ qa-report: echo ""; \ fi +# The connector's acp driver runs pinned ACP adapters, installed here once by +# an operator and never downloaded at dispatch time. +# Where basecamp connect looks by default: an absolute $XDG_DATA_HOME, else +# ~/.local/share (a relative XDG_DATA_HOME is ignored there too). +ACP_ADAPTERS_DIR ?= $(if $(filter /%,$(XDG_DATA_HOME)),$(XDG_DATA_HOME),$(HOME)/.local/share)/basecamp/acp-adapters + +# Install the pinned ACP adapters (internal/connector/driver/acp/adapters). +# --engine-strict: an adapter whose Node version requirement this machine does +# not meet fails the install, not the first dispatch. +.PHONY: acp-adapters +acp-adapters: + @mkdir -p "$(ACP_ADAPTERS_DIR)" + cp internal/connector/driver/acp/adapters/package.json internal/connector/driver/acp/adapters/package-lock.json "$(ACP_ADAPTERS_DIR)/" + npm ci --prefix "$(ACP_ADAPTERS_DIR)" --ignore-scripts --no-audit --no-fund --engine-strict + +# The ACP adapter-compatibility test: eight checks through the acp driver +# against each installed adapter (the spike's four, the worker shell's +# environment, a decoy MCP server in the working directory, the task +# token's bridge, and what an adapter does when a session's MCP server dies +# mid-session). Sends real prompts (model quota); skipped +# for an adapter that is not installed. ACP_TRANSCRIPTS=<dir> keeps redacted +# JSON-RPC transcripts. +.PHONY: test-acp-compat +test-acp-compat: check-toolchain + BASECAMP_ACP_ADAPTERS_DIR="$(ACP_ADAPTERS_DIR)" BASECAMP_ACP_TRANSCRIPTS="$(ACP_TRANSCRIPTS)" \ + $(GOTEST) -tags acpcompat -run TestAdapterCompat -count=1 -timeout 30m -v ./internal/connector/driver/acp/ + # Run tests with race detector .PHONY: race-test race-test: check-toolchain @@ -294,6 +321,9 @@ provenance-check: .PHONY: vet vet: check-toolchain $(GOVET) $(BUILD_TAGS) ./... + @# The adapter-compatibility test builds only with its own tag, so + @# nothing else would notice it rotting. + $(GOVET) -tags acpcompat ./internal/connector/driver/acp/ # Format code .PHONY: fmt diff --git a/STYLE.md b/STYLE.md index 451376104..093b43d12 100644 --- a/STYLE.md +++ b/STYLE.md @@ -50,6 +50,12 @@ recording's change history and predates the account-wide event feed that rather than becoming a group: turning it into one would break every existing `basecamp events <id>` invocation to gain nothing. +`connect` is the other exception. The spec names the connector's run as the bare +`basecamp connect -P <agent>`, a long-running foreground command in the grain of +`basecamp mcp`, with `setup` beside it as the one-off that prepares it. Making the +run a `connect run` subcommand would put a verb under a command that is already +the verb. + `scripts/check-bare-groups.sh` enforces this with an allowlist; a command added there belongs in this section too, with the reason it is an exception. diff --git a/e2e/smoke/smoke_lifecycle.bats b/e2e/smoke/smoke_lifecycle.bats index df00a6567..f0cbdb5f5 100644 --- a/e2e/smoke/smoke_lifecycle.bats +++ b/e2e/smoke/smoke_lifecycle.bats @@ -24,6 +24,42 @@ load smoke_helper mark_out_of_scope "Reads the connector policy a connected profile's setup wrote — covered by Go tests in internal/commands" } +@test "connect status is out of scope" { + mark_out_of_scope "Reads a local connector ledger the smoke account does not have — covered by Go tests in internal/commands and internal/connector" +} + +@test "connect doctor is out of scope" { + mark_out_of_scope "Needs a set-up connector profile and starts its MCP server — covered by Go tests in internal/commands" +} + +@test "connect redispatch is out of scope" { + mark_out_of_scope "Decides a record in a local connector ledger — covered by Go tests in internal/commands and internal/connector" +} + +@test "connect discard is out of scope" { + mark_out_of_scope "Decides a record in a local connector ledger — covered by Go tests in internal/commands and internal/connector" +} + +@test "connect release is out of scope" { + mark_out_of_scope "Clears the hold in a local connector ledger — covered by Go tests in internal/commands and internal/connector" +} + +@test "connect shadow promote is out of scope" { + mark_out_of_scope "Moves a local shadow ledger — covered by Go tests, including a process killed at every step, in internal/connector" +} + +@test "connect import is out of scope" { + mark_out_of_scope "Applies a reconciliation file to a local connector ledger — covered by Go tests in internal/commands and internal/connector" +} + +@test "connect worktrees list is out of scope" { + mark_out_of_scope "Reads a local connector's ledger — covered by Go tests in internal/commands and internal/connector" +} + +@test "connect worktrees prune is out of scope" { + mark_out_of_scope "Removes local git worktrees a connector kept — covered by Go tests in internal/commands and internal/connector" +} + @test "auth refresh is out of scope" { mark_out_of_scope "Requires OAuth credentials" } diff --git a/internal/commands/commands.go b/internal/commands/commands.go index 8c2c75b7a..bf7ea0626 100644 --- a/internal/commands/commands.go +++ b/internal/commands/commands.go @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ func CommandCategories() []CommandCategory { {Name: "bonfire", Category: "additional", Description: "Multi-chat orchestration", Actions: []string{"split", "layout"}, Experimental: true, DevOnly: true}, {Name: "api", Category: "additional", Description: "Raw API access"}, {Name: "mcp", Category: "additional", Description: "Serve Basecamp to MCP clients over stdio"}, - {Name: "connect", Category: "additional", Description: "Set up a local agent connector for a Basecamp agent", Actions: []string{"setup", "show"}}, + {Name: "connect", Category: "additional", Description: "Run a local agent connector for a Basecamp agent, and see and decide what it runs", Actions: []string{"setup", "show", "status", "doctor", "redispatch", "discard", "release", "shadow", "import", "worktrees"}}, {Name: "help", Category: "additional", Description: "Show help"}, {Name: "version", Category: "additional", Description: "Show version"}, }, diff --git a/internal/commands/connect.go b/internal/commands/connect.go index e48507027..138c64cec 100644 --- a/internal/commands/connect.go +++ b/internal/commands/connect.go @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import ( "os" "path/filepath" "runtime" + "slices" "strconv" "strings" "time" @@ -29,9 +30,10 @@ import ( // NewConnectCmd is the local agent connector's command group. func NewConnectCmd() *cobra.Command { + var run connectRunFlags cmd := &cobra.Command{ Use: "connect", - Short: "Set up a local agent connector for a Basecamp agent", + Short: "Run a local agent connector for a Basecamp agent", Long: `Run a local agent connector: it listens to the account event feed as a Basecamp agent, admits what a trusted person asks of that agent, and hands the work to a local coding agent that replies in Basecamp as the agent. @@ -39,10 +41,42 @@ the work to a local coding agent that replies in Basecamp as the agent. Connect the agent to a profile first (basecamp auth agent connect -P <profile>), then run setup on that profile: it records who may drive the agent, maps projects to the directories their work runs in, and checks the connector is -ready. Show prints what setup recorded.`, +ready. Show prints what setup recorded. Then run the connector on it: + + basecamp connect -P <profile> [--project <id>]... [--shadow] + +It runs in the foreground until interrupted. Stdout is a wire of one JSON +object per line (events seen, verdicts, dispatches, lifecycle messages; +never content), and logs +go to stderr. SIGINT and SIGTERM cancel live workers with stop reason +shutdown, settle them, and exit 130 and 143. --shadow admits and logs in an +isolated state directory and dispatches nothing. --hold sets a durable hold: +intake and admission run, nothing dispatches or posts, and earlier records +wait for review, until basecamp connect release. Linux only. + + basecamp connect status what it heard, holds and ran + basecamp connect doctor what it needs to run + basecamp connect redispatch <id> authorize a record to run + basecamp connect discard <id> close a record without running it + basecamp connect release clear the hold + basecamp connect shadow promote make the shadow ledger the connector's, held + basecamp connect import <file> apply a cutover reconciliation file`, + Example: ` basecamp connect setup -P agent --operator-profile me --route 12345=/src/app + basecamp connect -P agent + basecamp connect -P agent --project 12345 --shadow`, + Args: cobra.NoArgs, + Annotations: map[string]string{ + "agent_notes": "Long-running; stdout is NDJSON pointer lines, logs on stderr. Not for interactive use.", + "stdout_wire": "connect", + }, + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error { + return runConnect(cmd, &run) + }, } - cmd.AddCommand(newConnectSetupCmd()) - cmd.AddCommand(newConnectShowCmd()) + addConnectRunFlags(cmd, &run) + cmd.AddCommand(newConnectSetupCmd(), newConnectWorkerMCPCmd(), newConnectShowCmd(), newConnectStatusCmd(), newConnectDoctorCmd(), + newConnectRedispatchCmd(), newConnectDiscardCmd(), newConnectReleaseCmd(), newConnectShadowCmd(), newConnectImportCmd(), + newConnectWorktreesCmd()) return cmd } @@ -157,7 +191,11 @@ func connectShowDisplay(path string, f setup.File, markdown bool) map[string]any "agent": agent, "operator": fmt.Sprintf("person %d", f.Trust.OperatorID), "trust": trust, - "workers": fmt.Sprintf("%s, concurrency %d, deadline %s, worktrees %s", f.Driver, f.Concurrency, time.Duration(f.Deadline), worktrees), + // The worker as well as the driver: the file records which coding + // agent the driver runs, and a file written before that field + // existed still means the default, which is what a person reading + // show needs to see. + "workers": fmt.Sprintf("%s running %s, concurrency %d, deadline %s, worktrees %s", f.Driver, f.WorkerName(), f.Concurrency, time.Duration(f.Deadline), worktrees), "projects": strconv.Itoa(len(f.Projects)) + " routed", } for id, r := range f.Projects { @@ -233,6 +271,7 @@ type connectSetupFlags struct { unwatch []string unroute []string driver string + worker string parallel int deadline time.Duration worktrees bool @@ -315,6 +354,7 @@ Examples: fl.StringArrayVar(&f.watch, "watch-completions", nil, "Admit every trusted completion in a routed project (repeatable)") fl.StringArrayVar(&f.unwatch, "no-watch-completions", nil, "Stop watching a project's completions (repeatable)") fl.StringVar(&f.driver, "driver", "", "How workers are run: spawn or acp (default spawn)") + fl.StringVar(&f.worker, "worker", "", fmt.Sprintf("The coding agent workers run: %s (default %s)", strings.Join(setup.Workers, ", "), setup.DefaultWorker)) fl.IntVar(&f.parallel, "concurrency", 0, fmt.Sprintf("Workers at once (default %d)", setup.DefaultConcurrency)) fl.DurationVar(&f.deadline, "deadline", 0, fmt.Sprintf("Deadline per task (default %s)", setup.DefaultDeadline)) fl.BoolVar(&f.worktrees, "worktrees", false, "Give each task its own git worktree") @@ -749,6 +789,10 @@ func (f *connectSetupFlags) changes(cmd *cobra.Command) (setup.Changes, error) { default: return ch, output.ErrUsage(fmt.Sprintf("Invalid --driver %q: use spawn or acp", f.driver)) } + if f.worker != "" && !slices.Contains(setup.Workers, f.worker) { + return ch, output.ErrUsage(fmt.Sprintf("Invalid --worker %q: use %s", f.worker, strings.Join(setup.Workers, ", "))) + } + ch.Worker = f.worker // A typed zero is out of range, not a request for the default: the flags // are read as typed, not as their zero values. if cmd.Flags().Changed("concurrency") { diff --git a/internal/commands/connect_doctor.go b/internal/commands/connect_doctor.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..490b5a72e --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/commands/connect_doctor.go @@ -0,0 +1,278 @@ +package commands + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "os" + "os/exec" + "path/filepath" + "runtime" + "strconv" + "time" + + "github.com/spf13/cobra" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-sdk/go/pkg/basecamp" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver/acp" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/setup" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/output" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/richtext" +) + +// mcpHandshakeTimeout bounds doctor's MCP handshake. A var so a test can +// shorten it; production only reads it, and a test that changes it must not +// run in parallel. +var mcpHandshakeTimeout = 30 * time.Second + +func newConnectDoctorCmd() *cobra.Command { + return &cobra.Command{ + Use: "doctor", + Short: "Check what the connector needs to run", + Long: `Check the connector for a set-up profile: connect.json, the token, the agent's +identity, the stream ticket mint, the account feed, the ledger (its gaps, open +losses, hold, the worktrees it kept and messages waiting for a person), the +worker the driver runs — the worker's own CLI on PATH under the spawn driver, +the pinned ACP adapter in the connector's adapters directory under the acp +driver — and a handshake with the agent's Basecamp MCP server, started with a +worker's environment (without the basecamp_connect domain, which only a +dispatched task's token opens). + +It writes nothing to the connector's ledger and posts nothing to Basecamp. +Renewing the profile's own credential, which every command does when its token +is due, may still write the credential store.`, + Example: ` basecamp connect doctor -P agent`, + Args: cobra.NoArgs, + RunE: runConnectDoctor, + } +} + +func runConnectDoctor(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error { + ctx := cmd.Context() + if os.Getenv("BASECAMP_TOKEN") != "" { + return errEnvTokenShadows("doctor checks the agent its profile holds, and BASECAMP_TOKEN would override it") + } + p, err := loadConnectProfile(cmd) + if err != nil { + return err + } + checks := []setup.Check{{Name: "connect.json", Status: setup.StatusPass, + Message: fmt.Sprintf("Agent person %d in account %s, driver %s, worker %s", p.file.Agent.PersonID, p.file.AccountID, p.file.Driver, p.file.WorkerName())}} + checks = append(checks, driverChecks(p)...) + + agent, agentErr := verifiedConnectAgent(ctx, p) + if agentErr != nil { + checks = append(checks, setup.Check{Name: "Token and identity", Status: setup.StatusFail, Message: errorMessage(agentErr), + Hint: "Reconnect the agent's profile, then run basecamp connect setup again."}) + } else { + checks = append(checks, + setup.Check{Name: "Token", Status: setup.StatusPass, Message: "The profile's credential yields a token"}, + setup.Check{Name: "Identity", Status: setup.StatusPass, Message: fmt.Sprintf("Person %d, as connect.json names", agent.personID)}, + setup.TicketCheck(ctx, agent.reader, agent.kind), + feedCheck(ctx, agent.client.ForAccount(agent.account)), + ) + } + checks = append(checks, ledgerChecks(ctx, p)...) + checks = append(checks, workerBinaryChecks(p.file)...) + checks = append(checks, mcpHandshakeCheck(ctx, p.name)) + + result := summarizeChecks(asDoctorChecks(checks)) + title := "Connector doctor for profile " + strconv.Quote(p.name) + if p.app.Output.EffectiveFormat() == output.FormatStyled { + renderChecksStyled(cmd.OutOrStdout(), title, result) + if result.Failed > 0 { + return doctorNotReady(checks) + } + return nil + } + if result.Failed > 0 { + return doctorNotReady(checks) + } + return p.app.OK(result, output.WithSummary(result.Summary())) +} + +func errorMessage(err error) string { + var apiErr *output.Error + if errors.As(err, &apiErr) { + return apiErr.Message + } + return richtext.SanitizeSingleLine(err.Error()) +} + +func doctorNotReady(checks []setup.Check) error { + report := &setup.Report{} + report.Add(checks...) + failures := report.Failed() + msg := "The connector is not ready:" + hint := "" + for _, c := range failures { + msg += " " + c.Name + ": " + c.Message + ";" + if hint == "" { + hint = c.Hint + } + } + return &output.Error{Code: codeNotReady, Message: msg[:len(msg)-1], Hint: hint} +} + +// feedCheck polls one page of the account feed at the present, as the +// connector's poll lane does. The page is dropped; its position is a resumable +// token and is never shown. +func feedCheck(ctx context.Context, account *basecamp.AccountClient) setup.Check { + c := setup.Check{Name: "Account feed"} + _, err := account.EventFeed().PollEvents(ctx, &basecamp.PollEventsOptions{Since: "now", ActorTypes: []string{"person"}}) + if err != nil { + c.Status, c.Message = setup.StatusFail, "Polling the account feed failed: "+setup.ErrorText(err) + c.Hint = "The account event feed has to be enabled for this account and the agent." + return c + } + c.Status, c.Message = setup.StatusPass, "The agent can poll the account feed" + return c +} + +// ledgerChecks reports what the ledger records that a person should know: +// gaps with their epoch ids, losses, the hold, and lifecycle messages that +// wait for a decision. It reads the ledger read-only. +func ledgerChecks(ctx context.Context, p connectProfile) []setup.Check { + dir, err := connectStatePath(p.file, false) + if err != nil { + return []setup.Check{{Name: "Ledger", Status: setup.StatusFail, Message: errorMessage(err)}} + } + ledger, err := connector.OpenLedgerReadOnly(ctx, filepath.Join(dir, connector.LedgerFile)) + if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + return []setup.Check{{Name: "Ledger", Status: setup.StatusSkip, Message: "No ledger yet: the connector has not run"}} + } + if err != nil { + return []setup.Check{{Name: "Ledger", Status: setup.StatusFail, Message: errorMessage(err)}} + } + defer func() { _ = ledger.Close() }() + s, err := ledger.Status(ctx, ledger.RetainedWorktreeStatus) + if err != nil { + return []setup.Check{{Name: "Ledger", Status: setup.StatusFail, Message: errorMessage(err)}} + } + checks := []setup.Check{{Name: "Ledger", Status: setup.StatusPass, Message: fmt.Sprintf("Schema %d, private, readable", s.SchemaVersion)}} + for _, g := range s.Gaps { + msg := fmt.Sprintf("A %s gap was recorded at %s", g.Class, g.DetectedAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)) + if g.EpochAfterID != nil { + msg += fmt.Sprintf("; history at or below event %d is gone", *g.EpochAfterID) + } + checks = append(checks, setup.Check{Name: fmt.Sprintf("Gap %d", g.ID), Status: setup.StatusWarn, Message: msg}) + } + if len(s.Losses) > 0 || s.Unrecovered > 0 { + checks = append(checks, setup.Check{Name: "Losses", Status: setup.StatusWarn, + Message: fmt.Sprintf("%d overflow losses open, %d event ids unrecovered", len(s.Losses), s.Unrecovered)}) + } + if s.Hold != nil { + checks = append(checks, setup.Check{Name: "Hold", Status: setup.StatusWarn, + Message: fmt.Sprintf("Held since %s by %s: nothing dispatches or posts", s.Hold.HeldAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339), richtext.SanitizeSingleLine(s.Hold.HeldBy)), + Hint: "Review held records in basecamp connect status, then basecamp connect release -P " + shellQuote(p.name)}) + } + if len(s.Indeterminate) > 0 { + checks = append(checks, setup.Check{Name: "Lifecycle messages", Status: setup.StatusWarn, + Message: fmt.Sprintf("%d messages may or may not have been posted and wait for a person", len(s.Indeterminate))}) + } + switch { + case !s.WorktreesKnown: + checks = append(checks, setup.Check{Name: "Worktrees", Status: setup.StatusWarn, + Message: "The worktrees the connector kept could not be listed: " + richtext.SanitizeSingleLine(s.WorktreesUnavailable), + Hint: "basecamp connect worktrees list -P " + shellQuote(p.name)}) + case len(s.Worktrees) > 0: + checks = append(checks, setup.Check{Name: "Worktrees", Status: setup.StatusWarn, + Message: fmt.Sprintf("%d worktree(s) kept for you to deal with; the connector removes none of its own accord", len(s.Worktrees)), + Hint: "basecamp connect worktrees list -P " + shellQuote(p.name) + ", then prune"}) + } + return checks +} + +// workerBinaries are the executables the spawn driver runs for the +// configured worker. The acp driver runs a pinned adapter instead, which +// acpAdapterCheck names and locates. +func workerBinaries(file setup.File) []string { + return []string{file.WorkerName()} +} + +// workerBinaryChecks looks for the worker where the driver that runs it +// looks. The spawn driver runs the worker's own CLI, which is on PATH. The +// acp driver runs a pinned adapter out of the connector's own npm prefix +// (`make acp-adapters`), which is not on PATH and is not meant to be: it is +// found and version-checked with acp.Locate, the driver's own locator, so +// doctor passes the adapter the connector would start and no other. PATH +// would both fail a correct install and pass an unpinned build that happens +// to be on it. +func workerBinaryChecks(file setup.File) []setup.Check { + if file.Driver == setup.DriverACP { + return []setup.Check{acpAdapterCheck(file.WorkerName())} + } + bins := workerBinaries(file) + checks := make([]setup.Check, 0, len(bins)) + for _, bin := range bins { + c := setup.Check{Name: "Worker " + bin} + path, err := exec.LookPath(bin) + if err != nil { + c.Status, c.Message = setup.StatusFail, fmt.Sprintf("%s is not on PATH", bin) + c.Hint = "Install it, or put it on the PATH the connector starts with." + } else { + c.Status, c.Message = setup.StatusPass, richtext.SanitizeSingleLine(path) + } + checks = append(checks, c) + } + return checks +} + +// acpAdapterCheck resolves the configured worker's pinned adapter where the +// acp driver would, in the default adapters directory. A connector started +// with --acp-adapters elsewhere is not what this checks; doctor has no such +// flag, and the message says where it looked. +func acpAdapterCheck(worker string) setup.Check { + a, ok := acp.AdapterForWorker(worker) + if !ok { + return setup.Check{Name: "Worker " + worker, Status: setup.StatusFail, + Message: fmt.Sprintf("The acp driver has no adapter for worker %q", worker), + Hint: "basecamp connect setup --driver spawn, or pick a worker the acp driver runs."} + } + c := setup.Check{Name: "Adapter " + a.Name} + dir, err := acp.DefaultAdaptersDir(nil) + if err != nil { + c.Status, c.Message = setup.StatusFail, errorMessage(err) + c.Hint = "Set XDG_DATA_HOME or HOME to an absolute path, then run make acp-adapters." + return c + } + bin, err := acp.Locate(dir, a) + if err != nil { + c.Status, c.Message = setup.StatusFail, errorMessage(err) + c.Hint = "Install the pinned adapters: make acp-adapters" + return c + } + c.Status = setup.StatusPass + c.Message = fmt.Sprintf("%s@%s at %s", a.Package, a.Version, richtext.SanitizeSingleLine(bin)) + return c +} + +// connectUnsupportedOSCheck is the Platform check on a GOOS the connector +// does not run on. It gives the constraint that actually applies +// (connectSupportedOS, and #736): the task token reaches a worker's MCP +// server over an inherited descriptor, and Linux alone seals the descriptors +// a process passes on. Reading a process's start time is the half macOS has, +// so naming that here told a Mac reader the connector could run there and +// then refused it anyway. +func connectUnsupportedOSCheck(goos string) setup.Check { + return setup.Check{Name: "Platform", Status: setup.StatusFail, + Message: fmt.Sprintf("The connector does not run on %s: %s", goos, connectLinuxOnlyReason), + Hint: "Run the connector on Linux; the rest of the CLI runs here."} +} + +// driverChecks refuses what the run command refuses: doctor never calls a +// connector ready that would not start. +func driverChecks(p connectProfile) []setup.Check { + var checks []setup.Check + if !connectSupportedOS(runtime.GOOS) { + checks = append(checks, connectUnsupportedOSCheck(runtime.GOOS)) + } + if p.file.Driver != setup.DriverSpawn && p.file.Driver != setup.DriverACP { + checks = append(checks, setup.Check{Name: "Driver", Status: setup.StatusFail, + Message: fmt.Sprintf("Driver %q is not %q or %q, and the connector refuses to start on it", p.file.Driver, setup.DriverSpawn, setup.DriverACP), + Hint: "basecamp connect setup -P " + shellQuote(p.name) + " --driver spawn"}) + } + return checks +} diff --git a/internal/commands/connect_doctor_mcp_other.go b/internal/commands/connect_doctor_mcp_other.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d7900f751 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/commands/connect_doctor_mcp_other.go @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +//go:build !unix + +package commands + +import ( + "context" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/setup" +) + +func mcpHandshakeCheck(context.Context, string) setup.Check { + return setup.Check{Name: "MCP handshake", Status: setup.StatusSkip, Message: "The connector runs on macOS and Linux only"} +} diff --git a/internal/commands/connect_doctor_mcp_unix.go b/internal/commands/connect_doctor_mcp_unix.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6659fbc93 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/commands/connect_doctor_mcp_unix.go @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +//go:build unix + +package commands + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + "os" + "os/exec" + "syscall" + + "github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/setup" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/version" +) + +// mcpServerCommand is the agent's MCP server as a worker's is started: this +// binary's mcp command on the profile. A test seam. +var mcpServerCommand = func(profile string) (string, []string, error) { + exe, err := os.Executable() + return exe, []string{"mcp", "--profile", profile}, err +} + +// mcpHandshakeCheck starts the agent's Basecamp MCP server with the +// environment and process group the dispatcher gives a worker's, through this +// binary's ordinary mcp command rather than the worker subcommand, completes the MCP +// handshake and lists its tools, then ends the group it started. It does not +// serve the basecamp_connect domain: that needs a live task's token, which +// only a dispatch mints, and doctor starts no task. The connector's ledger, +// which that domain reads, is checked on its own. +func mcpHandshakeCheck(ctx context.Context, profile string) setup.Check { + c := setup.Check{Name: "MCP handshake"} + exe, args, err := mcpServerCommand(profile) + if err != nil { + c.Status, c.Message = setup.StatusFail, "Cannot locate this binary: "+err.Error() + return c + } + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, mcpHandshakeTimeout) + defer cancel() + + cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, exe, args...) //nolint:gosec // this binary, with a validated profile name + cmd.Env = driver.BuildEnv(append(append([]string{}, driver.BaseEnv...), connector.MCPServerEnv...), os.LookupEnv, nil) + cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setpgid: true} + // The context bounds the MCP calls, not the process: this function alone + // ends the process and alone waits on it, so its group is always signaled + // while the leader is unreaped and the group id is still this command's. + cmd.Cancel = func() error { return nil } + stdin, err := cmd.StdinPipe() + if err != nil { + c.Status, c.Message = setup.StatusFail, "Cannot start the agent's MCP server: "+setup.ErrorText(err) + return c + } + stdout, err := cmd.StdoutPipe() + if err != nil { + c.Status, c.Message = setup.StatusFail, "Cannot start the agent's MCP server: "+setup.ErrorText(err) + return c + } + if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil { + c.Status, c.Message = setup.StatusFail, "Cannot start the agent's MCP server: "+setup.ErrorText(err) + return c + } + leader := cmd.Process.Pid + var session *mcp.ClientSession + defer func() { + if session != nil { + _ = session.Close() + } + // The group, then the leader: nothing else waits on it, so it is not + // reaped before this signal, and a descendant goes with it. + if leader > 1 { + _ = syscall.Kill(-leader, syscall.SIGKILL) + } + _ = stdin.Close() + _ = stdout.Close() + _ = cmd.Wait() + }() + + client := mcp.NewClient(&mcp.Implementation{Name: "basecamp-connect-doctor", Version: version.Version}, nil) + session, err = client.Connect(ctx, &mcp.IOTransport{Reader: stdout, Writer: stdin}, nil) + if err != nil { + session = nil + c.Status, c.Message = setup.StatusFail, "The agent's MCP server did not complete the handshake: "+setup.ErrorText(err) + c.Hint = "Run basecamp mcp -P " + shellQuote(profile) + " and read its stderr." + return c + } + tools := 0 + for _, err := range session.Tools(ctx, nil) { + if err != nil { + c.Status, c.Message = setup.StatusFail, "The agent's MCP server did not list its tools: "+setup.ErrorText(err) + return c + } + tools++ + } + if tools == 0 { + c.Status, c.Message = setup.StatusFail, "The agent's MCP server lists no tools" + return c + } + c.Status, c.Message = setup.StatusPass, fmt.Sprintf("The agent's MCP server (basecamp mcp -P %s) answered with %d tools; the basecamp_connect domain is served only to a dispatched worker", shellQuote(profile), tools) + return c +} diff --git a/internal/commands/connect_operator.go b/internal/commands/connect_operator.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e5f950fb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/commands/connect_operator.go @@ -0,0 +1,797 @@ +package commands + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "os" + "os/user" + "path/filepath" + "strconv" + "strings" + "time" + + "github.com/spf13/cobra" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-sdk/go/pkg/basecamp" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/appctx" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/config" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/admission" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/setup" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/output" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/richtext" +) + +// The operator's commands on a connector's ledger: status, redispatch, +// discard, release, shadow promote and import. doctor is in connect_doctor.go. +// Each resolves the connector from the profile's connect.json, locally. + +// connectProfile is a set-up profile, read without the network. +type connectProfile struct { + app *appctx.App + name string + file setup.File +} + +func loadConnectProfile(cmd *cobra.Command) (connectProfile, error) { + app := appctx.FromContext(cmd.Context()) + if app == nil { + return connectProfile{}, errors.New("app not initialized") + } + name := app.Config.ActiveProfile + if name == "" { + return connectProfile{}, output.ErrUsageHint("This needs the agent's profile", "Pass -P/--profile <name>, a profile set up with `basecamp connect setup`.") + } + if !isValidProfileName(name) { + return connectProfile{}, output.ErrUsage(fmt.Sprintf("Invalid profile name %q", name)) + } + path, err := setup.Path(config.GlobalConfigDir(), name) + if err != nil { + return connectProfile{}, output.ErrUsage(err.Error()) + } + file, err := setup.Load(path) + switch { + case errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist): + return connectProfile{}, output.ErrUsageHint(fmt.Sprintf("Profile %q is not set up as a connector", name), "Run: basecamp connect setup -P "+shellQuote(name)) + case err != nil: + return connectProfile{}, output.ErrUsage("connect.json cannot be used: " + err.Error()) + } + return connectProfile{app: app, name: name, file: file}, nil +} + +// operatorName is who a decision is recorded as: the local user who ran it. +func operatorName() string { + name := "" + if u, err := user.Current(); err == nil { + name = u.Username + } + if name == "" { + name = os.Getenv("USER") + } + if name == "" { + name = "unknown" + } + return "local:" + richtext.SanitizeSingleLine(name) +} + +func parseEventIDArg(raw string) (int64, error) { + id, err := strconv.ParseInt(strings.TrimSpace(raw), 10, 64) + if err != nil || id <= 0 { + return 0, output.ErrUsage(fmt.Sprintf("Invalid event id %q: expected a positive number", raw)) + } + return id, nil +} + +// openConnectLedger opens the connector's ledger for a decision. It must +// already exist: a decision is about records the connector wrote. The returned +// func releases whatever the open holds, and is never nil. +// +// requireStopped takes the instance lock for the whole command, for the work +// that cannot run beside a connector (an import). Otherwise the lock is taken +// only when the ledger is older than this build, because opening it then +// migrates it, and a connector running on the older schema must not have its +// triggers replaced underneath it. Either way the lock is the authority: the +// metadata beside it is written best-effort and says nothing on its own. +func openConnectLedger(ctx context.Context, p connectProfile, requireStopped bool) (*connector.Ledger, func(), error) { + done := func() {} + dir, err := connectStatePath(p.file, false) + if err != nil { + return nil, done, err + } + path := filepath.Join(dir, connector.LedgerFile) + if _, err := os.Lstat(path); errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + return nil, done, output.ErrUsageHint(fmt.Sprintf("Profile %q's connector has no ledger yet", p.name), "Run the connector first: basecamp connect -P "+shellQuote(p.name)) + } + // Opening for a decision migrates the ledger, and a connector running on + // an older binary's schema must not have its triggers replaced under it. + // The instance lock is what says no connector is running — the metadata + // beside it is diagnostic — so it is taken before the migration and held + // until the ledger is closed. + outOfDate := false + if reader, err := connector.OpenLedgerReadOnly(ctx, path); err == nil { + _ = reader.Close() + } else if errors.Is(err, connector.ErrLedgerOutOfDate) { + outOfDate = true + } else if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + return nil, done, err + } + if requireStopped || outOfDate { + lock, lockErr := connector.AcquireInstanceLock(dir, p.file.AccountID, p.file.Agent.PersonID, time.Now()) + switch { + case errors.Is(lockErr, connector.ErrAlreadyRunning) && outOfDate: + return nil, done, output.ErrUsageHint( + "The connector is running on a ledger older than this build, and this command would migrate it underneath it: "+lockErr.Error(), + "Stop the connector, run this command, and start it again.") + case errors.Is(lockErr, connector.ErrAlreadyRunning): + return nil, done, &output.Error{Code: output.CodeLockUnavailable, Message: lockErr.Error(), + Hint: "Stop the connector before this command."} + case lockErr != nil: + return nil, done, lockErr + } + done = func() { _ = lock.Release() } + } + ledger, err := connector.OpenLedger(path) //nolint:contextcheck // OpenLedger migrates on its own context + if err != nil { + done() + return nil, func() {}, err + } + // A verdict a redispatch writes calls for the lifecycle messages a running + // connector's verdict would: the same intents, which the connector's outbox + // sends. + ledger.SetHooks(connector.LifecycleHooks(ledger, connector.LifecycleOptions{})) + return ledger, func() { + _ = ledger.Close() + done() + }, nil +} + +func decisionError(err error) error { + if errors.Is(err, connector.ErrDecisionRefused) || errors.Is(err, connector.ErrNoSuchRecord) { + msg := strings.TrimPrefix(err.Error(), "connector: ") + return output.ErrUsage(strings.TrimSuffix(msg, ": "+connector.ErrDecisionRefused.Error())) + } + return err +} + +// --- status --------------------------------------------------------------- + +func newConnectStatusCmd() *cobra.Command { + var shadow bool + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "status", + Short: "Show what the connector heard, holds and ran", + Long: `Show the connector's ledger: what its instance lock file says, the hold, the +feed position (whether one is held, never the position), the last poll-served id, +gaps and losses, queue depths, live tasks, retained worktrees, lifecycle +messages waiting for a person, held records, and the last 20 dispatches with +their outcomes. + +It reads the ledger read-only and takes no lock, so it works while the +connector runs. It shows no content, no feed position and no token; a held +record's recording URL is shown so a person can open what was asked.`, + Example: ` basecamp connect status -P agent + basecamp connect status -P agent --shadow --json`, + Args: cobra.NoArgs, + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error { + return runConnectStatus(cmd, shadow) + }, + } + cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&shadow, "shadow", false, "Show the shadow run's ledger") + return cmd +} + +// connectStatusReport is status's output. +type connectStatusReport struct { + Profile string `json:"profile"` + Shadow bool `json:"shadow"` + LockHolder *connectLockHolder `json:"lock_holder,omitempty"` + Status connector.Status `json:"status"` +} + +// connectLockHolder is what a connector wrote beside its instance lock. It is +// diagnostic, not an answer: the metadata is written best effort after the +// lock is taken, it stays behind after a crash, and a pid may since belong to +// another process. Status never takes the lock, so it cannot say more. +type connectLockHolder struct { + PID int `json:"pid"` + StartedAt string `json:"started_at"` + // PID is present, absent or unknown — signal 0's answer, where the + // platform can give one. Present says a process has that pid, not that it + // is that connector. + PIDStatus string `json:"pid_status"` +} + +func runConnectStatus(cmd *cobra.Command, shadow bool) error { + p, err := loadConnectProfile(cmd) + if err != nil { + return err + } + dir, err := connectStatePath(p.file, shadow) + if err != nil { + return err + } + ledger, err := connector.OpenLedgerReadOnly(cmd.Context(), filepath.Join(dir, connector.LedgerFile)) + if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + if shadow { + return output.ErrUsageHint(fmt.Sprintf("Profile %q has no shadow ledger", p.name), "Run the shadow connector first: basecamp connect -P "+shellQuote(p.name)+" --shadow") + } + return output.ErrUsageHint(fmt.Sprintf("Profile %q's connector has no ledger yet", p.name), "Run the connector first: basecamp connect -P "+shellQuote(p.name)) + } + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer func() { _ = ledger.Close() }() + status, err := ledger.Status(cmd.Context(), ledger.RetainedWorktreeStatus) + if err != nil { + return err + } + for i, t := range status.Tasks { + status.Tasks[i].Worker = recordedWorkerState(t) + status.Tasks[i].Taker = recordedTakerState(t) + } + report := connectStatusReport{Profile: p.name, Shadow: shadow, Status: status} + if holder, ok := connector.InstanceHolder(dir, p.file.AccountID, p.file.Agent.PersonID); ok { + report.LockHolder = &connectLockHolder{PID: holder.PID, StartedAt: holder.StartedAt, PIDStatus: processPresence(holder.PID)} + } + if p.app.Output.EffectiveFormat() == output.FormatStyled { + renderConnectStatus(cmd.OutOrStdout(), report) + return nil + } + return p.app.OK(report, output.WithSummary(connectStatusSummary(report))) +} + +// worktreesUnavailable is why status cannot say whether any worktrees are +// retained. It never reads as none. +func worktreesUnavailable(s connector.Status) string { + if s.WorktreesUnavailable != "" { + return s.WorktreesUnavailable + } + return "nothing listed them for this status" +} + +func connectStatusSummary(r connectStatusReport) string { + parts := []string{} + if r.Status.Hold != nil { + parts = append(parts, "held") + } + parts = append(parts, + fmt.Sprintf("%d live tasks", len(r.Status.Tasks)), + fmt.Sprintf("%d held records", len(r.Status.Held)), + fmt.Sprintf("%d indeterminate messages", len(r.Status.Indeterminate))) + return strings.Join(parts, ", ") +} + +func renderConnectStatus(w io.Writer, r connectStatusReport) { + s := r.Status + clean := richtext.SanitizeSingleLine + stamp := func(t time.Time) string { return t.UTC().Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05Z") } + title := "Connector status for profile " + strconv.Quote(r.name()) + if r.Shadow { + title += " (shadow)" + } + fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s\n\n", title) + + switch { + case r.LockHolder == nil: + fmt.Fprintf(w, " Lock file none beside the ledger\n") + case r.LockHolder.PIDStatus == pidPresent: + fmt.Fprintf(w, " Lock file pid %d since %s, and a process with that pid is there (diagnostic: status takes no lock)\n", + r.LockHolder.PID, clean(r.LockHolder.StartedAt)) + case r.LockHolder.PIDStatus == pidAbsent: + fmt.Fprintf(w, " Lock file pid %d since %s, and no process has that pid (left behind by a crash, or ended)\n", + r.LockHolder.PID, clean(r.LockHolder.StartedAt)) + default: + fmt.Fprintf(w, " Lock file pid %d since %s; whether that process exists cannot be said here\n", + r.LockHolder.PID, clean(r.LockHolder.StartedAt)) + } + if s.Connection != nil { + fmt.Fprintf(w, " Last run %s at %s", clean(s.Connection.State), stamp(s.Connection.ChangedAt)) + if s.Connection.Detail != "" { + fmt.Fprintf(w, " (%s)", clean(s.Connection.Detail)) + } + fmt.Fprintln(w) + } + if s.Hold != nil { + fmt.Fprintf(w, " Hold set by %s at %s (%s, generation %d): nothing dispatches or posts until release\n", + clean(s.Hold.HeldBy), stamp(s.Hold.HeldAt), clean(s.Hold.Cause), s.Hold.Generation) + } else { + fmt.Fprintf(w, " Hold none\n") + } + for _, pos := range s.Positions { + held := "no position" + if pos.HasPosition { + held = "position held" + } + fmt.Fprintf(w, " Feed %s; last poll-served id %d; updated %s\n", held, pos.LastPollServedID, stamp(pos.UpdatedAt)) + } + for _, g := range s.Gaps { + epoch := "" + if g.EpochAfterID != nil { + epoch = fmt.Sprintf(", epoch after %d", *g.EpochAfterID) + } + fmt.Fprintf(w, " Gap %s at %s%s\n", clean(g.Class), stamp(g.DetectedAt), epoch) + } + for _, l := range s.Losses { + fmt.Fprintf(w, " Loss %d dropped, %d still missing, window ends %s\n", l.Dropped, l.Missing, stamp(l.DeadlineAt)) + } + if s.Unrecovered > 0 { + fmt.Fprintf(w, " Unrecovered %d event ids\n", s.Unrecovered) + } + + fmt.Fprintf(w, "\n Queues ") + for _, state := range []string{"seen", "admitted", "queued", "blocked", "dispatched", "held"} { + fmt.Fprintf(w, " %s %d", state, s.Queues[state]) + } + fmt.Fprintln(w) + for reason, n := range s.Blocked { + fmt.Fprintf(w, " Blocked %s: %d\n", clean(reason), n) + } + if s.Review > 0 || s.AuthorizedBlocked > 0 || s.RedispatchPending > 0 { + fmt.Fprintf(w, " Review %d tagged, %d authorized and blocked, %d redispatches waiting for their task\n", s.Review, s.AuthorizedBlocked, s.RedispatchPending) + } + + fmt.Fprintf(w, "\n Live tasks %d\n", len(s.Tasks)) + for _, t := range s.Tasks { + fmt.Fprintf(w, " task %d %s %s pid %d (%s) token taker pid %d (%s) since %s events %v in %s\n", + t.TaskID, clean(t.AttemptID), clean(t.State), t.PID, clean(t.Worker), t.TakerPID, clean(t.Taker), stamp(t.LaunchedAt), t.EventIDs, clean(t.WorkDir)) + } + if !s.WorktreesKnown { + fmt.Fprintf(w, " Worktrees unavailable: %s\n", clean(worktreesUnavailable(s))) + } else { + fmt.Fprintf(w, " Worktrees %d retained\n", len(s.Worktrees)) + for _, wt := range s.Worktrees { + fmt.Fprintf(w, " %s %s\n", clean(wt.Path), clean(wt.Reason)) + } + } + fmt.Fprintf(w, " Indeterminate %d lifecycle messages wait for a person\n", len(s.Indeterminate)) + for _, in := range s.Indeterminate { + fmt.Fprintf(w, " intent %d %s event %d %s on %d\n", in.ID, clean(in.Kind), in.EventID, clean(in.MessageKind), in.RecordingID) + } + fmt.Fprintf(w, " Held records %d (redispatch or discard each)\n", len(s.Held)) + for _, h := range s.Held { + fmt.Fprintf(w, " event %d %s %s %s\n", h.EventID, clean(h.EventType), clean(h.Trigger), clean(h.RecordingURL)) + } + + fmt.Fprintf(w, "\n Last dispatches\n") + if len(s.Dispatches) == 0 { + fmt.Fprintf(w, " none\n") + } + for _, d := range s.Dispatches { + outcomes := make([]string, 0, len(d.Events)) + for _, e := range d.Events { + o := e.Outcome + if o == "" { + o = e.Delivery + } + if e.Withdrawn { + o = "withdrawn" + } + outcomes = append(outcomes, fmt.Sprintf("%d:%s", e.EventID, clean(o))) + } + fmt.Fprintf(w, " %s task %d %s %s %s\n", stamp(d.LaunchedAt), d.TaskID, clean(d.State), clean(d.StopReason), strings.Join(outcomes, " ")) + } + fmt.Fprintln(w) +} + +func (r connectStatusReport) name() string { return r.Profile } + +// --- redispatch ----------------------------------------------------------- + +func newConnectRedispatchCmd() *cobra.Command { + return &cobra.Command{ + Use: "redispatch <event_id>", + Short: "Authorize a record to run again, or for the first time", + Long: `Authorize a record the connector will not run on its own. + +Accepted for a completed record whose outcome is unknown or failed, every +blocked record, and a held one. Refused for a success, a discarded record, and +anything live. The replaced task's token is retired, its worker is stopped, +and who authorized it is recorded. + +A completed or held record is admitted at once (a completed one whose task is +still running, when that task ends). A blocked record keeps its state and +runs what blocked it again — the read, the events lookup, the route check — +and is admitted the moment that succeeds; if it blocks again, the record stays +blocked with the authorization, and redispatch runs it again. While the hold +stands the record is authorized and nothing launches until release. + +It works on the ledger's transactions, so it is safe while the connector runs; +the running connector dispatches what it admits.`, + Example: ` basecamp connect redispatch -P agent 9876543210`, + Args: cobra.ExactArgs(1), + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + return runConnectRedispatch(cmd, args[0]) + }, + } +} + +// connectRedispatchReport is redispatch's output. +type connectRedispatchReport struct { + connector.RedispatchResult + // WorkerSignaled says a signal was sent to the replaced worker's recorded + // process group; WorkerState says whether it is gone. + WorkerSignaled bool `json:"worker_signaled,omitempty"` + // WorkerState is what became of it: stopped, gone, held (its group still + // runs and was not proven this task's to signal), unverified, or + // not_recorded (the attempt had no worker process recorded yet). + WorkerState string `json:"worker_state,omitempty"` + WorkerNote string `json:"worker_note,omitempty"` + // Verdict is what running the prerequisite again decided. + Verdict string `json:"verdict,omitempty"` + VerdictNote string `json:"verdict_reason,omitempty"` + RerunSkipped string `json:"rerun_skipped,omitempty"` +} + +func runConnectRedispatch(cmd *cobra.Command, raw string) error { + ctx := cmd.Context() + id, err := parseEventIDArg(raw) + if err != nil { + return err + } + // Before the ledger is opened, let alone written: a redispatch may run the + // record's prerequisite as the agent, and a token in the environment would + // decide that as somebody else. + if os.Getenv("BASECAMP_TOKEN") != "" { + return errEnvTokenShadows("a redispatch runs a record's prerequisite as the agent its profile holds, and BASECAMP_TOKEN would override it") + } + p, err := loadConnectProfile(cmd) + if err != nil { + return err + } + ledger, done, err := openConnectLedger(cmd.Context(), p, false) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer done() + + res, err := ledger.Redispatch(ctx, id, operatorName()) + if err != nil { + return decisionError(err) + } + report := connectRedispatchReport{RedispatchResult: res} + if res.Worker != nil { + // The ledger's own identity, not one assembled here: without + // StartedExact the one-owner rule cannot tell the recorded worker + // from a later process that reused its pid, and a redispatch would + // leave the worker it replaces running. + stop := stopReplacedWorker(res.Worker.Identity(), driver.DefaultGrace) + report.WorkerSignaled, report.WorkerState, report.WorkerNote = stop.signaled, stop.state, stop.note + } + if res.Rerun { + verdict, reason, err := rerunPrerequisite(ctx, p, ledger, id) + if err != nil { + report.RerunSkipped = errorMessage(err) + } else { + report.Verdict, report.VerdictNote = verdict, reason + } + } + return p.app.OK(report, output.WithSummary(redispatchSummary(report))) +} + +func redispatchSummary(r connectRedispatchReport) string { + var s string + switch { + case r.Pending && r.SupersededTaskID > 0: + s = fmt.Sprintf("Event %d authorized; admitted when its task %d ends", r.EventID, r.SupersededTaskID) + case r.Pending: + s = fmt.Sprintf("Event %d authorized; admitted when the task it is on ends", r.EventID) + case r.Admitted: + s = fmt.Sprintf("Event %d admitted", r.EventID) + case r.Verdict != "": + s = fmt.Sprintf("Event %d authorized; its prerequisite ran again: %s", r.EventID, r.Verdict) + if r.VerdictNote != "" { + s += " (" + r.VerdictNote + ")" + } + case r.RerunSkipped != "": + s = fmt.Sprintf("Event %d authorized; its prerequisite did not run here (%s). Read basecamp connect status before redispatching it again: something else may have decided it", r.EventID, r.RerunSkipped) + default: + s = fmt.Sprintf("Event %d authorized", r.EventID) + } + if r.Held { + s += "; the hold stands, so nothing launches until release" + } + return s +} + +// rerunPrerequisite decides a blocked record again, as the agent, exactly as +// the connector's admission would: the verdict is revision-guarded, so a +// running connector deciding it at the same time is not a second verdict. +func rerunPrerequisite(ctx context.Context, p connectProfile, ledger *connector.Ledger, id int64) (string, string, error) { + agent, err := verifiedConnectAgent(ctx, p) + if err != nil { + return "", "", err + } + policy, err := p.file.Policy(agent.personID) + if err != nil { + return "", "", err + } + reads := admission.NewSDKReads(&basecamp.Config{BaseURL: p.app.Config.BaseURL}, agent.tokens, agent.account, connectSDKOptions()...) + admitter, err := admission.NewAdmitter(policy, reads) + if err != nil { + return "", "", err + } + records := ledger.Admission() + ev, ok, err := records.LoadUndecided(ctx, id) + if err != nil { + return "", "", err + } + if !ok { + return "", "", errors.New("the record is no longer blocked; something else decided it") + } + v, err := admitter.Decide(ctx, ev) + if err != nil { + return "", "", err + } + v, err = admission.NewCommitter(records).Commit(ctx, v) + if errors.Is(err, admission.ErrAlreadyDecided) { + return "", "", errors.New("the running connector decided it first") + } + if err != nil { + return "", "", err + } + return string(v.State), string(v.Reason), nil +} + +// connectAgent is the agent a profile's credential proved to be, checked +// against connect.json. +type connectAgent struct { + account string + personID int64 + tokens basecamp.TokenProvider + client *basecamp.Client + reader setup.SDKReader + kind string +} + +func verifiedConnectAgent(ctx context.Context, p connectProfile) (connectAgent, error) { + app := p.app + if os.Getenv("BASECAMP_TOKEN") != "" { + return connectAgent{}, errEnvTokenShadows("the connector acts only as the agent its profile holds, and BASECAMP_TOKEN would override it") + } + account, err := connectAccount(app, p.name) + if err != nil { + return connectAgent{}, err + } + if !accountIDsEqual(account, p.file.AccountID) { + return connectAgent{}, output.ErrUsage(fmt.Sprintf("connect.json was set up in account %s, and profile %q is bound to account %s", p.file.AccountID, p.name, account)) + } + kind, err := connectCredentialKind(ctx, app) + if err != nil { + return connectAgent{}, err + } + if kind == "" { + return connectAgent{}, output.ErrAuth(fmt.Sprintf("Profile %q holds no credential", p.name)) + } + creds, err := app.Auth.GetStore().LoadContext(ctx, app.Auth.CredentialKey()) + if err != nil { + return connectAgent{}, output.ErrAuth("The stored credential could not be read: " + setup.ErrorText(err)) + } + tokens := &managerTokens{mgr: app.Auth} + client := connectSDKClient(app, tokens) + reader := setup.SDKReader{Client: client.ForAccount(account)} + me, err := reader.Me(ctx) + if err != nil { + return connectAgent{}, output.ErrAuth(fmt.Sprintf("Could not read who profile %q is: %s", p.name, setup.ErrorText(err))) + } + if _, err := checkConnectIdentity(ctx, app, client, kind, creds.OAuthType, me, p.file.Agent.IdentityID); err != nil { + return connectAgent{}, err + } + if err := p.file.VerifyAgent(kind, me.ID, p.file.Agent.IdentityID); err != nil { + return connectAgent{}, output.ErrAuth(err.Error()) + } + return connectAgent{account: account, personID: me.ID, tokens: tokens, client: client, reader: reader, kind: kind}, nil +} + +// --- discard -------------------------------------------------------------- + +func newConnectDiscardCmd() *cobra.Command { + return &cobra.Command{ + Use: "discard <event_id>", + Short: "Close a held, blocked or unknown record without running it", + Long: `Close a record without running it, as discarded(by_operator), and record who +decided. Accepted for a held record, a blocked one, and a completed one whose +outcome is unknown. A lifecycle message still pending for it is not sent.`, + Example: ` basecamp connect discard -P agent 9876543210`, + Args: cobra.ExactArgs(1), + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + id, err := parseEventIDArg(args[0]) + if err != nil { + return err + } + p, err := loadConnectProfile(cmd) + if err != nil { + return err + } + ledger, done, err := openConnectLedger(cmd.Context(), p, false) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer done() + res, err := ledger.Discard(cmd.Context(), id, operatorName()) + if err != nil { + return decisionError(err) + } + summary := fmt.Sprintf("Event %d discarded", id) + if res.Already { + summary = fmt.Sprintf("Event %d was already discarded by a person", id) + } + return p.app.OK(res, output.WithSummary(summary)) + }, + } +} + +// --- release -------------------------------------------------------------- + +func newConnectReleaseCmd() *cobra.Command { + return &cobra.Command{ + Use: "release", + Short: "Clear the hold: dispatch and posting resume", + Long: `Clear the durable hold that basecamp connect --hold or shadow promote set. +Records a person authorized, and records that arrived after the hold, dispatch; +held records stay held until each is redispatched or discarded.`, + Example: ` basecamp connect release -P agent`, + Args: cobra.NoArgs, + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error { + p, err := loadConnectProfile(cmd) + if err != nil { + return err + } + ledger, done, err := openConnectLedger(cmd.Context(), p, false) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer done() + res, err := ledger.Release(cmd.Context(), operatorName()) + if err != nil { + return err + } + summary := "No hold stood" + if res.Released { + summary = fmt.Sprintf("Released; %d held records stay held", res.StillHeld) + } + return p.app.OK(res, output.WithSummary(summary)) + }, + } +} + +// --- shadow promote ------------------------------------------------------- + +func newConnectShadowCmd() *cobra.Command { + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "shadow", + Short: "Work with a shadow run's state", + } + cmd.AddCommand(&cobra.Command{ + Use: "promote", + Short: "Make the shadow ledger the connector's, held", + Long: `Turn the shadow run's ledger into the connector's under the hold. + +Both the shadow connector and the connector must be stopped: promote takes +both instance locks. In one transaction it sets the hold and tags every +non-terminal shadow record for review, then moves the ledger into the +connector's state directory. A crash at any point leaves either the untouched +shadow or a held ledger; run promote again to finish. + +Start the connector afterwards: intake continues from the promoted position, +nothing dispatches until basecamp connect release, and held records wait for +redispatch or discard.`, + Example: ` basecamp connect shadow promote -P agent`, + Args: cobra.NoArgs, + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error { + p, err := loadConnectProfile(cmd) + if err != nil { + return err + } + shadowDir, err := connectStatePath(p.file, true) + if err != nil { + return err + } + stateHome, err := connectStateHome() + if err != nil { + return err + } + parent, err := ensurePrivateChain(stateHome, "basecamp", "connect") + if err != nil { + return output.ErrUsage("The connector's state directory cannot be used: " + err.Error()) + } + res, err := connector.PromoteShadow(cmd.Context(), connector.PromoteOptions{ + ShadowDir: shadowDir, + StateDir: filepath.Join(parent, connector.StateDirName(p.file.AccountID, p.file.Agent.PersonID)), + AccountID: p.file.AccountID, + AgentID: p.file.Agent.PersonID, + By: operatorName(), + }) + switch { + case errors.Is(err, connector.ErrAlreadyRunning): + return &output.Error{Code: output.CodeLockUnavailable, Message: err.Error(), + Hint: "Stop the shadow connector and the connector first; promote never stops a process itself."} + case errors.Is(err, connector.ErrNoShadowLedger), errors.Is(err, connector.ErrLedgerExists): + return output.ErrUsage(strings.TrimPrefix(err.Error(), "connector: ")) + case err != nil: + return err + } + summary := fmt.Sprintf("Promoted under the hold: %d records tagged for review, %d held", res.Tagged, res.Held) + if res.Already { + summary = "Already promoted; the ledger is held" + } + return p.app.OK(res, output.WithSummary(summary)) + }, + }) + return cmd +} + +// --- import --------------------------------------------------------------- + +// maxReconciliationBytes bounds a reconciliation file. +const maxReconciliationBytes = 16 << 20 + +func newConnectImportCmd() *cobra.Command { + return &cobra.Command{ + Use: "import <file>", + Short: "Apply a cutover reconciliation file to the ledger", + Long: `Apply a reconciliation file in one transaction: a tombstone for every entry +decided done, and the review tag on every other non-terminal record, each +keeping its state and blocking reason. A file with an entry that cannot be +applied changes nothing. The connector must be stopped. + +The file is JSON: + {"version": 1, "entries": [{"event_id": 123, "decision": "done"}, + {"event_id": 456, "decision": "held"}]}`, + Example: ` basecamp connect import -P agent reconciliation.json`, + Args: cobra.ExactArgs(1), + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + p, err := loadConnectProfile(cmd) + if err != nil { + return err + } + data, err := readReconciliation(args[0]) + if err != nil { + return err + } + r, err := connector.ParseReconciliation(data) + if err != nil { + return output.ErrUsage(strings.TrimPrefix(err.Error(), "connector: ")) + } + dir, err := connectStatePath(p.file, false) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := os.Lstat(filepath.Join(dir, connector.LedgerFile)); errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + return output.ErrUsageHint(fmt.Sprintf("Profile %q's connector has no ledger yet", p.name), "Promote the shadow first: basecamp connect shadow promote -P "+shellQuote(p.name)) + } + // The connector must be stopped: the open takes the instance lock + // and holds it for the import. + ledger, done, err := openConnectLedger(cmd.Context(), p, true) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer done() + res, err := ledger.Import(cmd.Context(), r, operatorName()) + if err != nil { + return decisionError(err) + } + return p.app.OK(res, output.WithSummary(fmt.Sprintf("Imported %d entries: %d tombstoned, %d tombstones added, %d records tagged for review", + len(r.Entries), res.Tombstoned, res.Inserted, res.Tagged))) + }, + } +} + +func readReconciliation(path string) ([]byte, error) { + f, err := os.Open(path) + if err != nil { + return nil, output.ErrUsage(fmt.Sprintf("Cannot read %s: %v", richtext.SanitizeSingleLine(path), err)) + } + defer f.Close() + data, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(f, maxReconciliationBytes+1)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if len(data) > maxReconciliationBytes { + return nil, output.ErrUsage("The reconciliation file is larger than 16 MB") + } + return data, nil +} diff --git a/internal/commands/connect_operator_test.go b/internal/commands/connect_operator_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bf4a17461 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/commands/connect_operator_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,586 @@ +//go:build unix + +package commands + +import ( + "bytes" + "context" + "database/sql" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "flag" + "fmt" + "os" + "os/exec" + "path/filepath" + "strconv" + "strings" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + _ "modernc.org/sqlite" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-sdk/go/pkg/basecamp/eventfeed" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/appctx" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/admission" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver/acp" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/setup" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/output" +) + +const operatorSecretContent = "please-look-secret-instruction" + +// operatorFixture is a set-up "agent" profile with its state under a temp +// XDG_STATE_HOME. +type operatorFixture struct { + s *connectSetupServer + file setup.File +} + +func newOperatorFixture(t *testing.T) operatorFixture { + t.Helper() + s := startConnectSetupServer(t) + firstSetup(t, s) + state := t.TempDir() + require.NoError(t, os.Chmod(state, 0o700)) + t.Setenv("XDG_STATE_HOME", state) + file, err := setup.Load(connectSetupPath(t, "agent")) + require.NoError(t, err) + return operatorFixture{s: s, file: file} +} + +// ledger creates the connector's (or the shadow's) ledger with an admitted +// record 1 and a blocked record 2, and returns it open. +func (f operatorFixture) ledger(t *testing.T, shadow bool) *connector.Ledger { + t.Helper() + dir, err := connectStateDir(f.file, shadow) + require.NoError(t, err) + l, err := connector.OpenLedger(filepath.Join(dir, connector.LedgerFile)) + require.NoError(t, err) + ctx := context.Background() + for _, id := range []int64{1, 2} { + _, err := l.RecordSeen(ctx, eventfeed.Event{ID: id, Kind: "comment_created", EventType: "comment.created", Action: "created", + CreatedAt: time.Now(), BucketID: setupProject, CreatorID: setupOperatorPerson, RecordingID: 77}, connector.LanePoll) + require.NoError(t, err) + } + _, err = l.Admission().Commit(ctx, admission.Verdict{ + EventID: 1, EventType: "comment.created", BucketID: setupProject, RecordingID: 77, RequesterID: setupOperatorPerson, + State: admission.StateAdmitted, Trigger: admission.TriggerMentioned, Acknowledge: true, ConversationKey: "recording:70", + Reply: &admission.ReplyDestination{Kind: admission.ReplyComment, RecordingID: 70}, Routed: true, Route: "/work/app", + RecordingURL: "https://app.basecamp.com/999/buckets/1/recordings/77", + Snapshot: &admission.Snapshot{Type: "Comment", Content: operatorSecretContent, UpdatedAt: time.Now()}, + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.Admission().Commit(ctx, admission.Verdict{ + EventID: 2, EventType: "comment.created", BucketID: setupProject, RecordingID: 77, RequesterID: setupOperatorPerson, + State: admission.StateBlocked, Reason: admission.ReasonUnroutable, + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + return l +} + +func (f operatorFixture) run(t *testing.T, format output.Format, args ...string) (string, error) { + t.Helper() + app := newConnectSetupApp(t, f.s, "agent") + var buf bytes.Buffer + app.Output = output.New(output.Options{Format: format, Writer: &buf}) + cmd := NewConnectCmd() + cmd.SetArgs(args) + cmd.SetContext(appctx.WithApp(context.Background(), app)) + cmd.SetOut(&buf) + cmd.SetErr(&buf) + cmd.SilenceErrors, cmd.SilenceUsage = true, true + err := cmd.Execute() + return buf.String(), err +} + +func usageError(t *testing.T, err error) *output.Error { + t.Helper() + var e *output.Error + require.True(t, errors.As(err, &e), "an output error, got %v", err) + return e +} + +func TestConnectStatusReadsWithoutWritingAndShowsNoContent(t *testing.T) { + f := newOperatorFixture(t) + + _, err := f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, "status") + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, output.CodeUsage, usageError(t, err).Code) + state, _ := connectStateHome() + _, statErr := os.Lstat(filepath.Join(state, "basecamp")) + assert.ErrorIs(t, statErr, os.ErrNotExist, "status on no ledger creates nothing") + + l := f.ledger(t, false) + _, err = l.SetHold(context.Background(), "local:tester", connector.HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, l.Close()) + + out, err := f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, "status") + require.NoError(t, err, out) + assert.NotContains(t, out, operatorSecretContent) + var envelope struct { + Data connectStatusReport `json:"data"` + } + require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(out), &envelope), out) + require.NotNil(t, envelope.Data.Status.Hold) + require.Len(t, envelope.Data.Status.Held, 1) + assert.Equal(t, int64(1), envelope.Data.Status.Held[0].EventID) + + styled, err := f.run(t, output.FormatStyled, "status") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, styled, "Held records 1") + assert.NotContains(t, styled, operatorSecretContent) +} + +func TestConnectRedispatchDiscardAndRelease(t *testing.T) { + f := newOperatorFixture(t) + l := f.ledger(t, false) + ctx := context.Background() + _, err := l.SetHold(ctx, "local:tester", connector.HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, l.Close()) + + out, err := f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, "redispatch", "1") + require.NoError(t, err, out) + assert.Contains(t, out, "admitted") + assert.Contains(t, out, "nothing launches until release") + + out, err = f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, "redispatch", "1") + require.Error(t, err, out) + assert.Equal(t, output.CodeUsage, usageError(t, err).Code, "an admitted record is live") + + out, err = f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, "discard", "2") + require.NoError(t, err, out) + out, err = f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, "redispatch", "2") + require.Error(t, err, out) + + _, err = f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, "redispatch", "nope") + require.Error(t, err) + + out, err = f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, "release") + require.NoError(t, err, out) + assert.Contains(t, out, "Released") + + dir, err := connectStatePath(f.file, false) + require.NoError(t, err) + l, err = connector.OpenLedgerReadOnly(context.Background(), filepath.Join(dir, connector.LedgerFile)) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer func() { _ = l.Close() }() + held, err := l.Held(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.False(t, held) + one, _, err := l.Get(ctx, 1) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, connector.StateAdmitted, one.State) + two, _, err := l.Get(ctx, 2) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, connector.StateDiscarded, two.State) + assert.Equal(t, connector.ReasonByOperator, two.Reason) +} + +func TestConnectShadowPromoteAndImport(t *testing.T) { + f := newOperatorFixture(t) + require.NoError(t, f.ledger(t, true).Close()) + + out, err := f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, "import", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "missing.json")) + require.Error(t, err, out) + + out, err = f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, "shadow", "promote") + require.NoError(t, err, out) + assert.Contains(t, out, "Promoted under the hold") + out, err = f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, "shadow", "promote") + require.NoError(t, err, out) + assert.Contains(t, out, "Already promoted") + + bad := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "bad.json") + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(bad, []byte(`{"version":1,"entries":[{"event_id":2,"decision":"maybe"}]}`), 0o600)) + _, err = f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, "import", bad) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, output.CodeUsage, usageError(t, err).Code) + + dir, err := connectStatePath(f.file, false) + require.NoError(t, err) + lock, err := connector.AcquireInstanceLock(dir, f.file.AccountID, f.file.Agent.PersonID, time.Now()) + require.NoError(t, err) + good := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "good.json") + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(good, []byte(`{"version":1,"entries":[{"event_id":2,"decision":"done"}]}`), 0o600)) + _, err = f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, "import", good) + require.Error(t, err, "a running connector refuses the import") + assert.Equal(t, output.CodeLockUnavailable, usageError(t, err).Code) + require.NoError(t, lock.Release()) + + out, err = f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, "import", good) + require.NoError(t, err, out) + l, err := connector.OpenLedgerReadOnly(context.Background(), filepath.Join(dir, connector.LedgerFile)) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer func() { _ = l.Close() }() + two, _, err := l.Get(context.Background(), 2) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, connector.StateDiscarded, two.State) + one, _, err := l.Get(context.Background(), 1) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, connector.StateHeld, one.State) +} + +func TestConnectHoldFlagIsOnTheRunCommand(t *testing.T) { + cmd := NewConnectCmd() + require.NoError(t, cmd.Flags().Parse([]string{"--hold"})) + v, err := cmd.Flags().GetBool("hold") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, v) +} + +// doctor refuses what the run command refuses, and nothing the run command +// runs. Both the acp driver and worktrees are on the run command now, so +// neither is a failing check any more. +func TestConnectDoctorRefusesOnlyWhatTheRunCommandRefuses(t *testing.T) { + file := setup.New("agent") + assert.Empty(t, driverChecks(connectProfile{name: "agent", file: file})) + + acpFile := setup.New("agent") + acpFile.Driver = setup.DriverACP + assert.Empty(t, driverChecks(connectProfile{name: "agent", file: acpFile}), + "the acp driver is a driver the connector starts on") + + worktrees := setup.New("agent") + worktrees.Worktrees = true + assert.Empty(t, driverChecks(connectProfile{name: "agent", file: worktrees}), + "the connector starts with worktrees on") + + unknown := setup.New("agent") + unknown.Driver = "someday" + checks := driverChecks(connectProfile{name: "agent", file: unknown}) + require.Len(t, checks, 1) + assert.Equal(t, "Driver", checks[0].Name) + assert.Equal(t, setup.StatusFail, checks[0].Status) +} + +// Copilot, on #748: on macOS the Platform check said the connector cannot run +// there and then named a capability macOS has, so the failure contradicted +// itself and sent a Mac reader after the wrong thing. The constraint that +// actually applies is #736's: the task token reaches a worker's MCP server +// over an inherited descriptor, and Linux alone seals the descriptors a +// process passes on. Reading a process's start time is the half macOS has. +// +// The check and the run command's refusal say the one reason, so a person +// cannot be told two different things about the same platform. +func TestConnectDoctorPlatformCheckNamesTheConstraintThatApplies(t *testing.T) { + c := connectUnsupportedOSCheck("darwin") + assert.Equal(t, "Platform", c.Name) + assert.Equal(t, setup.StatusFail, c.Status) + assert.Contains(t, c.Message, "darwin", "it names the platform it refuses") + assert.Contains(t, c.Message, connectLinuxOnlyReason, "it gives the reason the run command gives") + assert.NotContains(t, c.Message, "macOS", + "a refusal must not name a capability the platform it refuses actually has") + + err := connectUnsupportedOSError("darwin") + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), connectLinuxOnlyReason, "doctor and the run command give the one reason") + assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), "macOS") +} + +// The acp driver runs a pinned adapter out of the connector's own npm +// prefix, never one on PATH: doctor resolves it the way the driver does, so +// a documented install passes and an unpinned build on PATH does not. +func TestConnectDoctorFindsTheACPAdapterWhereTheDriverDoes(t *testing.T) { + data := t.TempDir() + t.Setenv("XDG_DATA_HOME", data) + + // A decoy on PATH, which is not what the acp driver would run. + decoy := t.TempDir() + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(decoy, "claude-agent-acp"), []byte("#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n"), 0o700)) + t.Setenv("PATH", decoy) + + file := setup.New("agent") + file.Driver = setup.DriverACP + checks := workerBinaryChecks(file) + require.Len(t, checks, 1) + assert.Equal(t, setup.StatusFail, checks[0].Status, + "an unpinned executable that happens to be on PATH is not the pinned adapter") + assert.Contains(t, checks[0].Hint, "make acp-adapters") + + // The adapters directory make acp-adapters writes. + adapter, ok := acp.AdapterForWorker(setup.WorkerClaude) + require.True(t, ok) + prefix := filepath.Join(data, "basecamp", "acp-adapters") + pkgDir := filepath.Join(prefix, "node_modules", filepath.FromSlash(adapter.Package)) + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(pkgDir, 0o755)) + manifest := fmt.Sprintf(`{"name":%q,"version":%q}`, adapter.Package, adapter.Version) + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(pkgDir, "package.json"), []byte(manifest), 0o600)) + binDir := filepath.Join(prefix, "node_modules", ".bin") + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(binDir, 0o755)) + bin := filepath.Join(binDir, adapter.Name) + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(bin, []byte("#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n"), 0o700)) + + checks = workerBinaryChecks(file) + require.Len(t, checks, 1) + assert.Equal(t, setup.StatusPass, checks[0].Status, "the adapter make acp-adapters installed is the one doctor finds") + assert.Contains(t, checks[0].Message, bin) + assert.Contains(t, checks[0].Message, adapter.Version) + + // A version other than the pin is not the adapter the driver would run. + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(pkgDir, "package.json"), + []byte(fmt.Sprintf(`{"name":%q,"version":"0.0.1-not-the-pin"}`, adapter.Package)), 0o600)) + checks = workerBinaryChecks(file) + require.Len(t, checks, 1) + assert.Equal(t, setup.StatusFail, checks[0].Status, "an adapter off the pin is not ready") +} + +func TestConnectDoctorReportsLedgerGapsAndTheHold(t *testing.T) { + f := newOperatorFixture(t) + l := f.ledger(t, false) + epoch := int64(500) + _, err := l.RecordGap(context.Background(), connector.Gap{DetectedAt: time.Now(), Class: connector.GapEpoch, EpochAfterID: &epoch, EntryClass: connector.EntryPresent}) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.SetHold(context.Background(), "local:tester", connector.HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, l.Close()) + + checks := ledgerChecks(context.Background(), connectProfile{name: "agent", file: f.file}) + byName := map[string]setup.Check{} + for _, c := range checks { + byName[c.Name] = c + } + assert.Equal(t, setup.StatusPass, byName["Ledger"].Status) + assert.Contains(t, byName["Gap 1"].Message, "500") + assert.Equal(t, setup.StatusWarn, byName["Hold"].Status) +} + +// doctor reads card 19's worktree ledger too: worktrees the connector kept +// are a person's to deal with, and doctor is where a person finds out. +func TestConnectDoctorReportsTheWorktreesTheConnectorKept(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + f := newOperatorFixture(t) + l := f.ledger(t, false) + id, err := l.BeginWorktree(ctx, connector.Worktree{ + Path: "/w/one", WorkDir: "/w/one/app", Route: "app", + Repository: "/repo", Branch: "basecamp-connect/1-a1b2c3", BaseCommit: "abc", + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, l.MoveWorktree(ctx, id, connector.WorktreeLive, connector.WorktreeCreating)) + require.NoError(t, l.RetainWorktree(ctx, id, connector.RetainedDirty, connector.WorktreeLive)) + require.NoError(t, l.Close()) + + byName := map[string]setup.Check{} + for _, c := range ledgerChecks(ctx, connectProfile{name: "agent", file: f.file}) { + byName[c.Name] = c + } + require.Contains(t, byName, "Worktrees") + assert.Equal(t, setup.StatusWarn, byName["Worktrees"].Status) + assert.Contains(t, byName["Worktrees"].Message, "1 worktree(s) kept") + assert.Contains(t, byName["Worktrees"].Hint, "basecamp connect worktrees list") +} + +// fakeMCPServerArg marks a test binary run as the doctor's MCP server. +const fakeMCPServerArg = "fake-basecamp-mcp" + +// TestFakeMCPServer is not a test: doctor's handshake starts it. It lists one +// tool when its environment is the allowlist, and a second when a variable +// the allowlist excludes reached it. +func TestFakeMCPServer(t *testing.T) { + if !strings.Contains(strings.Join(flag.Args(), " "), fakeMCPServerArg) { + t.Skip("started by the doctor's handshake test") + } + for _, arg := range flag.Args() { + if pidFile, ok := strings.CutPrefix(arg, "spawn-child="); ok { + // A server that starts a descendant in its group and then hangs + // without ever answering the handshake. + child := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "/bin/sleep", "300") + if err := child.Start(); err != nil { + os.Exit(2) + } + _ = os.WriteFile(pidFile, []byte(strconv.Itoa(child.Process.Pid)), 0o600) + select {} + } + } + server := mcp.NewServer(&mcp.Implementation{Name: "fake", Version: "0"}, nil) + type none struct{} + handler := func(context.Context, *mcp.CallToolRequest, none) (*mcp.CallToolResult, none, error) { + return &mcp.CallToolResult{}, none{}, nil + } + mcp.AddTool(server, &mcp.Tool{Name: "ok"}, handler) + if os.Getenv("CONNECT_DOCTOR_LEAK_CHECK") != "" { + mcp.AddTool(server, &mcp.Tool{Name: "leaked"}, handler) + } + _ = server.Run(context.Background(), &mcp.StdioTransport{}) + os.Exit(0) +} + +func TestConnectDoctorMCPHandshakeRunsTheServerWithAnAllowlistedEnvironment(t *testing.T) { + t.Setenv("CONNECT_DOCTOR_LEAK_CHECK", "not-a-real-secret") + orig := mcpServerCommand + mcpServerCommand = func(string) (string, []string, error) { + return os.Args[0], []string{"-test.run=^TestFakeMCPServer$", "--", fakeMCPServerArg}, nil + } + t.Cleanup(func() { mcpServerCommand = orig }) + + c := mcpHandshakeCheck(context.Background(), "agent") + assert.Equal(t, setup.StatusPass, c.Status, c.Message) + assert.Contains(t, c.Message, "1 tools", "only the allowlisted environment reached the server") +} + +func TestOperatorCommandsDoNotMigrateUnderARunningConnector(t *testing.T) { + f := newOperatorFixture(t) + require.NoError(t, f.ledger(t, false).Close()) + dir, err := connectStatePath(f.file, false) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // A ledger an older binary wrote: its last migration is not recorded. + db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", filepath.Join(dir, connector.LedgerFile)) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `DELETE FROM schema_migrations WHERE version = (SELECT MAX(version) FROM schema_migrations)`) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, db.Close()) + + lock, err := connector.AcquireInstanceLock(dir, f.file.AccountID, f.file.Agent.PersonID, time.Now()) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer func() { _ = lock.Release() }() + + _, err = f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, "release") + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, usageError(t, err).Message, "older than this build") +} + +// The migration guard is the lock itself, not the metadata beside it: a +// connector whose lock file carries nothing still stops the migration. +func TestTheMigrationGuardIsTheLockNotItsMetadata(t *testing.T) { + f := newOperatorFixture(t) + require.NoError(t, f.ledger(t, false).Close()) + dir, err := connectStatePath(f.file, false) + require.NoError(t, err) + db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", filepath.Join(dir, connector.LedgerFile)) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `DELETE FROM schema_migrations WHERE version = (SELECT MAX(version) FROM schema_migrations)`) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, db.Close()) + + lock, err := connector.AcquireInstanceLock(dir, f.file.AccountID, f.file.Agent.PersonID, time.Now()) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer func() { _ = lock.Release() }() + require.NoError(t, os.Remove(lock.Path()+".json"), "the holder's metadata is best-effort and may be missing") + + _, err = f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, "release") + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, usageError(t, err).Message, "older than this build") +} + +// Import takes the instance lock itself, so it does not refuse its own hold on +// a ledger older than this build — the cutover's whole reason to run. +func TestImportRunsOnALedgerOlderThanTheBuild(t *testing.T) { + f := newOperatorFixture(t) + require.NoError(t, f.ledger(t, false).Close()) + dir, err := connectStatePath(f.file, false) + require.NoError(t, err) + db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", filepath.Join(dir, connector.LedgerFile)) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `DELETE FROM schema_migrations WHERE version = (SELECT MAX(version) FROM schema_migrations)`) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, db.Close()) + + file := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "reconciliation.json") + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(file, []byte(`{"version":1,"entries":[{"event_id":2,"decision":"done"}]}`), 0o600)) + // The fabricated ledger cannot actually migrate (its tables are already + // there), so the migration's own error is the end of this run. What + // matters is what it is not: import must never refuse itself over the + // lock it holds. + _, err = f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, "import", file) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), "already holds this account") + assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), "Stop the connector") +} + +func TestConnectStatusOnAMissingShadowLedgerPointsAtTheShadowRun(t *testing.T) { + f := newOperatorFixture(t) + _, err := f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, "status", "--shadow") + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, usageError(t, err).Hint, "--shadow") +} + +// A token in the environment would decide a record's prerequisite as somebody +// other than the agent, so redispatch and doctor refuse before the ledger is +// touched. +func TestRedispatchAndDoctorRefuseAShadowingToken(t *testing.T) { + f := newOperatorFixture(t) + l := f.ledger(t, false) + require.NoError(t, l.Close()) + t.Setenv("BASECAMP_TOKEN", "not-a-real-token") + + for _, args := range [][]string{{"redispatch", "2"}, {"doctor"}} { + _, err := f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, args...) + require.Error(t, err, args[0]) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "BASECAMP_TOKEN", args[0]) + } + dir, err := connectStatePath(f.file, false) + require.NoError(t, err) + db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", filepath.Join(dir, connector.LedgerFile)) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer func() { _ = db.Close() }() + var decisions int + require.NoError(t, db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM decisions`).Scan(&decisions)) + assert.Zero(t, decisions, "nothing was decided") +} + +// The decision commands' JSON is the CLI's snake_case, as status's is. +func TestTheDecisionCommandsSpeakSnakeCase(t *testing.T) { + f := newOperatorFixture(t) + l := f.ledger(t, false) + _, err := l.SetHold(context.Background(), "local:tester", connector.HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, l.Close()) + + out, err := f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, "redispatch", "1") + require.NoError(t, err, out) + assert.Contains(t, out, `"event_id"`) + assert.NotContains(t, out, `"EventID"`) + + out, err = f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, "release") + require.NoError(t, err, out) + assert.Contains(t, out, `"still_held"`) + assert.NotContains(t, out, `"StillHeld"`) +} + +// Status reads card 19's worktree ledger: the worktrees the connector kept +// are what it reports, with why each is kept. +func TestStatusReportsTheWorktreesTheConnectorKept(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + f := newOperatorFixture(t) + l := f.ledger(t, false) + id, err := l.BeginWorktree(ctx, connector.Worktree{ + Path: "/w/one", WorkDir: "/w/one/app", Route: "app", + Repository: "/repo", Branch: "basecamp-connect/1-a1b2c3", BaseCommit: "abc", + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, l.MoveWorktree(ctx, id, connector.WorktreeLive, connector.WorktreeCreating)) + require.NoError(t, l.RetainWorktree(ctx, id, connector.RetainedDirty, connector.WorktreeLive)) + require.NoError(t, l.Close()) + + styled, err := f.run(t, output.FormatStyled, "status") + require.NoError(t, err, styled) + assert.Contains(t, styled, "Worktrees 1 retained") + assert.Contains(t, styled, "/w/one dirty") + assert.NotContains(t, styled, "Worktrees unavailable") + + out, err := f.run(t, output.FormatJSON, "status") + require.NoError(t, err, out) + assert.Contains(t, out, `"worktrees_known": true`) + assert.Contains(t, out, `"reason": "dirty"`) +} + +// A listing that could not be read is unavailable, never none: the +// distinction the nil lister carried is now what a failed listing carries. +func TestStatusSaysWorktreesAreUnavailableNotNone(t *testing.T) { + var buf bytes.Buffer + renderConnectStatus(&buf, connectStatusReport{Profile: "agent", Status: connector.Status{ + Queues: map[string]int{}, Blocked: map[string]int{}, + WorktreesUnavailable: "the worktrees table cannot be read", + }}) + assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), "Worktrees unavailable: the worktrees table cannot be read") + assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), "0 retained") +} diff --git a/internal/commands/connect_process_other.go b/internal/commands/connect_process_other.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e841797c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/commands/connect_process_other.go @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +//go:build !unix + +package commands + +// Process presence, as much as a reader can say without taking a lock. +const ( + pidPresent = "present" + pidAbsent = "absent" + pidUnknown = "unknown" +) + +// processPresence cannot be answered here — the connector runs on macOS and +// Linux — so it says so rather than calling a pid absent. +func processPresence(int) string { return pidUnknown } diff --git a/internal/commands/connect_process_unix.go b/internal/commands/connect_process_unix.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3078e3879 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/commands/connect_process_unix.go @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +//go:build unix + +package commands + +import ( + "errors" + "syscall" +) + +// Process presence, as much as a reader can say without taking a lock. +const ( + pidPresent = "present" + pidAbsent = "absent" + pidUnknown = "unknown" +) + +// processPresence reports whether a process with pid exists. It signals +// nothing: signal 0 only asks. A pid that exists is not proof it is the same +// process that wrote the pid down. +func processPresence(pid int) string { + if pid <= 1 { + return pidUnknown + } + switch err := syscall.Kill(pid, 0); { + case err == nil, errors.Is(err, syscall.EPERM): + return pidPresent + case errors.Is(err, syscall.ESRCH): + return pidAbsent + default: + return pidUnknown + } +} diff --git a/internal/commands/connect_run.go b/internal/commands/connect_run.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..22eb16f48 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/commands/connect_run.go @@ -0,0 +1,690 @@ +package commands + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "log/slog" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "runtime" + "slices" + "strconv" + "strings" + "sync" + "syscall" + "time" + + "github.com/spf13/cobra" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-sdk/go/pkg/basecamp" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-sdk/go/pkg/basecamp/eventfeed" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/appctx" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/config" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/admission" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver/acp" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver/spawn" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/ndjson" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/setup" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/output" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/richtext" +) + +// connectRunFlags are the run's flags. +type connectRunFlags struct { + projects []string + shadow bool + since int64 + driver string + adapters string + hold bool +} + +func addConnectRunFlags(cmd *cobra.Command, f *connectRunFlags) { + fl := cmd.Flags() + // --project shadows the global flag of the same name and keeps its type, + // so the flag reads the same everywhere; here it may be repeated. + fl.Var((*repeatedString)(&f.projects), "project", "Only hear events in this project id (repeatable; default every project the agent can see)") + fl.BoolVar(&f.shadow, "shadow", false, "Admit and log in an isolated state directory; dispatch and post nothing") + fl.Int64Var(&f.since, "since", 0, "Enter the feed just after this event id, whatever the ledger holds") + fl.StringVar(&f.driver, "driver", "", "Override connect.json's driver (spawn or acp)") + fl.StringVar(&f.adapters, "acp-adapters", "", "Where the pinned ACP adapters are installed, for --driver acp (default $XDG_DATA_HOME/basecamp/acp-adapters)") + fl.BoolVar(&f.hold, "hold", false, "Set the durable hold: intake and admission run, nothing is dispatched or posted until the hold is released, and earlier records wait for review") +} + +// connectStateHome is the directory holding the connector's state root, from +// connector.StateRoot so the connector and the worker's MCP server agree on +// one place. +func connectStateHome() (string, error) { + root, err := connector.StateRoot() + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + // StateRoot is <home>/basecamp/connect; the chain is created from its + // grandparent so each directory is made owner-only. + return filepath.Dir(filepath.Dir(root)), nil +} + +// ensurePrivateChain creates each missing directory from root down to dir +// owner-only, and refuses any that someone else could change. +func ensurePrivateChain(root string, parts ...string) (string, error) { + dir := root + if err := os.MkdirAll(root, 0o700); err != nil { + return "", err + } + for _, p := range parts { + dir = filepath.Join(dir, p) + if err := setup.EnsurePrivateDir(dir); err != nil { + return "", err + } + } + return dir, nil +} + +// connectStateDir is the connector's state directory for a set-up profile, +// created owner-only: $XDG_STATE_HOME/basecamp/connect/<account>-<agent>, or +// connect-shadow for a shadow run. Everything that reads the connector's +// state (worktrees prune, status) resolves it here. +func connectStateDir(file setup.File, shadow bool) (string, error) { + stateHome, err := connectStateHome() + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + return ensurePrivateChain(stateHome, connectStateParts(file, shadow)...) +} + +// connectStatePath is connectStateDir's path, created nothing: for commands +// that only read the connector's state, and must not make a directory to do +// it. +func connectStatePath(file setup.File, shadow bool) (string, error) { + stateHome, err := connectStateHome() + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + return filepath.Join(append([]string{stateHome}, connectStateParts(file, shadow)...)...), nil +} + +func connectStateParts(file setup.File, shadow bool) []string { + group := "connect" + if shadow { + // An isolated ledger, lock and checkpoint: a shadow never shares a + // position or a record with the connector it watches beside. + group = "connect-shadow" + } + return []string{"basecamp", group, connector.StateDirName(file.AccountID, file.Agent.PersonID)} +} + +// connectSessionsDir is where a session's short-lived files go — the MCP +// configuration, and the socket that hands over a task token. Never +// under the state directory or a working directory, which outlive the session +// and which other tools read: under $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR, the per-user, +// memory-backed directory made for exactly this, or /tmp where there is none. +// Not the platform's temporary directory: on macOS that path is too long for +// a unix socket inside it. Owner-only, and swept when the connector starts. +func connectSessionsDir(file setup.File) (string, error) { + dir := connectSessionsPath(file) + if err := setup.EnsurePrivateDir(dir); err != nil { + return "", fmt.Errorf("the connector's session directory cannot be used: %w", err) + } + return dir, nil +} + +// connectSessionsPath is where a run's session directories go, without making +// anything: the per-user runtime directory, which is short and cleared when +// the user logs out, and /tmp where there is none. +func connectSessionsPath(file setup.File) string { + base := os.Getenv("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR") + if info, err := os.Stat(base); base == "" || !filepath.IsAbs(base) || err != nil || !info.IsDir() { + base = "/tmp" + } + return filepath.Join(base, "bcc-"+connector.StateDirName(file.AccountID, file.Agent.PersonID)) +} + +// connectShutdownFlush bounds how long a stopping connector spends posting +// the completion notices of the attempts it stopped. What it cannot post in +// time stays pending in the outbox and goes out on the next start. +const connectShutdownFlush = 15 * time.Second + +// connectStartBound bounds how long a starting connector spends settling the +// lifecycle messages a previous process left, before intake and dispatch run. +const connectStartBound = 2 * time.Minute + +// connectDriver is the driver connect.json (or --driver) names for its +// worker. The acp driver runs the worker's pinned ACP adapter, found where it +// was installed; nothing is downloaded here. +func connectDriver(name, worker, adaptersDir string) (driver.Driver, error) { + if name != setup.DriverACP { + return spawn.New(worker, spawn.Options{}) + } + if adaptersDir != "" && !filepath.IsAbs(adaptersDir) { + abs, err := filepath.Abs(adaptersDir) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + adaptersDir = abs + } + return acp.ForWorker(worker, adaptersDir, nil) +} + +func runConnect(cmd *cobra.Command, f *connectRunFlags) error { + if !connectSupportedOS(runtime.GOOS) { + return connectUnsupportedOSError(runtime.GOOS) + } + app := appctx.FromContext(cmd.Context()) + ctx := cmd.Context() + + name := app.Config.ActiveProfile + if name == "" { + return output.ErrUsageHint("The connector needs the agent's profile", "Pass -P/--profile <name>, a profile set up with `basecamp connect setup`.") + } + if !isValidProfileName(name) { + return output.ErrUsage(fmt.Sprintf("Invalid profile name %q", name)) + } + if os.Getenv("BASECAMP_TOKEN") != "" { + return errEnvTokenShadows("the connector acts only as the agent its profile holds, and BASECAMP_TOKEN would override it") + } + buckets, err := parseProjectIDs(f.projects) + if err != nil { + return err + } + // Before the account is read or the feed is touched: a flag that cannot + // mean anything is a mistake to say so about, not one to act around. + since, err := connectSinceOverride(f.since) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + path, err := setup.Path(config.GlobalConfigDir(), name) + if err != nil { + return output.ErrUsage(err.Error()) + } + file, err := setup.Load(path) + switch { + case errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist): + return output.ErrUsageHint(fmt.Sprintf("Profile %q is not set up as a connector", name), "Run: basecamp connect setup -P "+shellQuote(name)) + case err != nil: + return output.ErrUsage("connect.json cannot be used: " + err.Error()) + } + driverName := file.Driver + if f.driver != "" { + driverName = f.driver + } + if !f.shadow && driverName != setup.DriverSpawn && driverName != setup.DriverACP { + return output.ErrUsage(fmt.Sprintf("driver %q is not %q or %q", driverName, setup.DriverSpawn, setup.DriverACP)) + } + + account, err := connectAccount(app, name) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if !accountIDsEqual(account, file.AccountID) { + return output.ErrUsage(fmt.Sprintf("connect.json was set up in account %s, and profile %q is bound to account %s", file.AccountID, name, account)) + } + kind, err := connectCredentialKind(ctx, app) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if kind == "" { + return output.ErrAuth(fmt.Sprintf("Profile %q holds no credential", name)) + } + creds, err := app.Auth.GetStore().LoadContext(ctx, app.Auth.CredentialKey()) + if err != nil { + return output.ErrAuth("The stored credential could not be read: " + setup.ErrorText(err)) + } + tokens := &managerTokens{mgr: app.Auth} + client := connectSDKClient(app, tokens) + accountClient := client.ForAccount(account) + me, err := (setup.SDKReader{Client: accountClient}).Me(ctx) + if err != nil { + return output.ErrAuth(fmt.Sprintf("Could not read who profile %q is: %s", name, setup.ErrorText(err))) + } + if _, err := checkConnectIdentity(ctx, app, client, kind, creds.OAuthType, me, file.Agent.IdentityID); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := file.VerifyAgent(kind, me.ID, file.Agent.IdentityID); err != nil { + return output.ErrAuth(err.Error()) + } + agentID := me.ID + + policy, err := file.Policy(agentID) + if err != nil { + return output.ErrUsage(err.Error()) + } + policy.Buckets = buckets + + stateDir, err := connectStateDir(file, f.shadow) + if err != nil { + return output.ErrUsage("The connector's state directory cannot be used: " + err.Error()) + } + lock, err := connector.AcquireInstanceLock(stateDir, account, agentID, time.Now()) + if err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, connector.ErrAlreadyRunning) { + return &output.Error{Code: output.CodeLockUnavailable, Message: err.Error()} + } + return err + } + defer func() { _ = lock.Release() }() + + ledger, err := connector.OpenLedger(filepath.Join(stateDir, connector.LedgerFile)) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer func() { _ = ledger.Close() }() + + logger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(cmd.ErrOrStderr(), nil)) + if f.hold { + // Before intake starts: nothing this run admits may dispatch ahead of + // the marker. + held, err := ledger.SetHold(ctx, operatorName(), connector.HoldByOperator) + if err != nil { + return err + } + logger.Info("connector: held", "generation", held.Hold.Generation, "tagged_for_review", held.Tagged, "held", held.Held) + } + if hold, ok, err := ledger.HoldMarker(ctx); err != nil { + return err + } else if ok { + logger.Warn("connector: the hold stands; nothing is dispatched or posted until `basecamp connect release`", + "since", hold.HeldAt, "by", richtext.SanitizeSingleLine(hold.HeldBy)) + } + lines := ndjson.NewWriter(cmd.OutOrStdout()) + + queue, err := connector.NewQueue(connector.DefaultBacklogWarn, connector.DefaultBacklogPause) + if err != nil { + return err + } + live, err := eventfeed.NewLive(&basecamp.Config{BaseURL: app.Config.BaseURL}, tokens, account, eventfeed.AccountLane, connectSDKOptions()...) + if err != nil { + return err + } + intakeOpts := connector.LiveOptions(live) + intakeOpts.AccountID = account + intakeOpts.ConsumerNamespace = connectConsumerNamespace(agentID, f.shadow) + intakeOpts.Filters = eventfeed.Filters{Buckets: buckets, ExcludePerformers: []int64{agentID}, ActorTypes: []string{"person"}} + intakeOpts.SinceEventID = since + intakeOpts.Ledger = ledger + intakeOpts.Queue = queue + intakeOpts.Lines = lines + intakeOpts.Logger = logger + intakeOpts.Membership = connector.SDKMembership{Client: accountClient} + intake, err := connector.New(intakeOpts) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + reads := admission.NewSDKReads(&basecamp.Config{BaseURL: app.Config.BaseURL}, tokens, account, connectSDKOptions()...) + admitter, err := admission.NewAdmitter(policy, reads) + if err != nil { + return output.ErrUsage(err.Error()) + } + + var ( + dispatcher *connector.Dispatcher + outbox *connector.Outbox + ) + if !f.shadow { + // Lifecycle messages: the hooks write each intent in its transition's + // transaction, so they are installed before anything transitions. A + // shadow run installs none: it posts nothing, and a shadow ledger + // promoted later must carry nothing to send. + ledger.SetHooks(connector.LifecycleHooks(ledger, connector.LifecycleOptions{})) + poster, err := connector.NewBasecampPoster(accountClient, agentID) + if err != nil { + return err + } + outbox, err = connector.NewOutbox(connector.OutboxOptions{Ledger: ledger, Poster: poster, Paused: ledger.Held, Lines: lines, Logger: logger}) + if err != nil { + return err + } + exe, err := os.Executable() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("locate this binary for the worker's MCP server: %w", err) + } + sessions, err := connectSessionsDir(file) + if err != nil { + return err + } + routes := newConnectRoutes(path, file, logger) + worker, err := connectDriver(driverName, file.WorkerName(), f.adapters) + if err != nil { + return output.ErrUsage(err.Error()) + } + // Built with worktrees off too, so the ones made while they were on + // are still settled and recovered. + worktreesRoot, err := ensurePrivateChain(stateDir, connectWorktreesDir) + if err != nil { + return err + } + workspaces, err := connector.NewWorktrees(connector.WorktreesOptions{ + Ledger: ledger, Root: worktreesRoot, Logger: logger, Off: !file.Worktrees, + Redaction: driver.Redaction{Dirs: []string{stateDir}}, + }) + if err != nil { + return err + } + options := connectDispatcherOptions(connectDispatch{ + File: file, Buckets: buckets, Ledger: ledger, Driver: worker, Routes: routes.Current, + Profile: name, Executable: exe, StateDir: stateDir, SessionsDir: sessions, + // Replies are listed with their words, so the connector's own + // notices are left out even before their receipts are known, and + // no reply is ever adopted from one. That is the whole filter: + // an id-only predicate beside it would ask the ledger again for + // every reply, outside the adoption budget, for nothing. + Replies: connector.LifecycleFilteredReplies{Lister: poster, Ledger: ledger}, + Lines: lines, Logger: logger, + }) + options.Workspaces = workspaces + dispatcher, err = connector.NewDispatcher(options) + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + + signals, stopSignals := connector.NotifyShutdown() + defer stopSignals() + runCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx) + defer cancel() + var ( + received os.Signal + mu sync.Mutex + ) + go func() { + select { + case sig := <-signals: + mu.Lock() + received = sig + mu.Unlock() + logger.Info("connector: shutting down; workers are being canceled and settled", "signal", sig.String()) + cancel() + case <-runCtx.Done(): + return + } + // A second signal is a person who has waited long enough: the + // settlement each live attempt is in the middle of may be waiting on + // Basecamp, and this leaves it for the next start to recover rather + // than making them wait. + sig := <-signals + logger.Error("connector: stopping now; live attempts are left for the next start to settle", "signal", sig.String()) + os.Exit(connector.ExitCodeForSignal(sig)) + }() + + defer func() { + // Whatever ended the run, status says it is not running any more. + _ = ledger.NoteConnection(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), connector.ConnectionStopped, "") + }() + logger.Info("connector: running", "profile", richtext.SanitizeSingleLine(name), "account", account, + "agent_person_id", agentID, "shadow", f.shadow, "projects", len(buckets), "state", richtext.SanitizeSingleLine(stateDir)) + + var ( + wg sync.WaitGroup + errOnce sync.Once + firstErr error + ) + runPart := func(part string, fn func(context.Context) error) { + wg.Go(func() { + err := fn(runCtx) + if runCtx.Err() == nil { + // Whether it failed or simply returned, this part has stopped + // while the rest were still running: the connector is not + // doing its job, and must not exit as though it were. + errOnce.Do(func() { + if err == nil { + err = errors.New("stopped on its own") + } + firstErr = fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", part, err) + }) + } + // One part ending ends the connector: intake without admission, + // or dispatch without intake, is a connector silently doing half + // its job. + cancel() + }) + } + if outbox != nil { + // On start, before anything transitions: settle what a previous + // process left sending and send what is due, so no stale notice + // waits behind new work. Bounded, so a slow Basecamp delays the + // connector's start rather than stopping it; what is left, Run + // carries on with. A ledger that cannot settle an intent stops the + // start. + startCtx, stopStart := context.WithTimeout(runCtx, connectStartBound) + err := outbox.Start(startCtx) + stopStart() + if err != nil && runCtx.Err() == nil { + return err + } + } + if err := ledger.NoteConnection(ctx, connector.ConnectionRunning, ""); err != nil { + logger.Warn("connector: could not record that it runs, for status", "error", err) + } + runPart("intake", intake.Run) + runPart("admission", func(ctx context.Context) error { + return connector.RunAdmission(ctx, connector.AdmissionOptions{Ledger: ledger, Queue: queue, Admitter: admitter, Lines: lines, Logger: logger}) + }) + if dispatcher != nil { + runPart("dispatch", dispatcher.Run) + } + if outbox != nil { + runPart("outbox", outbox.Run) + } + wg.Wait() + if outbox != nil { + // The dispatcher has settled every attempt it stopped; their + // completion notices go out now, within a bound. + flushCtx, stopFlush := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), connectShutdownFlush) + if err := outbox.Flush(flushCtx); err != nil { + logger.Warn("connector: posting lifecycle messages on the way out", "error", err) + } + stopFlush() + } + + mu.Lock() + sig := received + mu.Unlock() + switch { + case sig == os.Interrupt || sig == syscall.SIGINT: + return output.ErrInterrupted("connector interrupted") + case sig == syscall.SIGTERM: + return output.ErrTerminated("connector terminated") + case firstErr != nil: + return firstErr + case ctx.Err() != nil: + return ctx.Err() + } + return nil +} + +// connectSinceOverride is the feed position --since asks for. Zero is the +// default and means "resume from the ledger"; intake takes only a positive +// value as an override (connector.Options.SinceEventID), so a negative one +// would be accepted here and then quietly ignored there — the run would +// resume from the ledger while the person who typed it believes they moved +// the position. +func connectSinceOverride(since int64) (int64, error) { + if since < 0 { + return 0, output.ErrUsage("--since takes the event id to enter the feed just after; the default, 0, resumes from the ledger") + } + return since, nil +} + +// connectConsumerNamespace names a run's checkpoint lineage. A shadow run +// gets its own: it has its own state directory, ledger, lock and checkpoint +// already (connectStateDir), and intake's contract is that two connectors in +// one account never share a lineage (connector.Options.ConsumerNamespace) — +// a shadow running beside the connector it watches is two. +func connectConsumerNamespace(agentID int64, shadow bool) string { + name := "basecamp-connect-" + strconv.FormatInt(agentID, 10) + if shadow { + return name + "-shadow" + } + return name +} + +// connectSupportedOS is where the connector runs: Linux, and for now only +// Linux. +// +// Two things have to hold, and macOS has only one of them. The driver must +// be able to read process start times, so a recorded worker group is never +// signaled after its pid was reused — macOS can. And the task token has to +// reach the worker's MCP server, which it does on an inherited descriptor: +// `connect worker-mcp` execs `basecamp mcp --connect-token-fd`, and that +// hand-over is accepted only where the descriptors this process inherited +// are sealed against everything it starts, which is Linux alone +// (mcp_token_linux.go, and #736, which gated it deliberately). On macOS +// every non-shadow dispatch would start a worker whose Basecamp tools fail +// at the handshake, so the connector says so here rather than at the far +// end of each task. +func connectSupportedOS(goos string) bool { + return goos == "linux" +} + +// connectLinuxOnlyReason is why, in one place: the run command's refusal and +// doctor's Platform check say the same thing, so a person who meets one and +// then the other is not told two different stories about their machine. +const connectLinuxOnlyReason = "the task token reaches a worker's MCP server over an inherited descriptor, and Linux is the only platform that seals the descriptors a process inherits" + +// connectUnsupportedOSError is the run command's refusal on a platform the +// connector does not run on. +func connectUnsupportedOSError(goos string) error { + return output.ErrUsage(fmt.Sprintf("basecamp connect runs on Linux only, not %s: %s", goos, connectLinuxOnlyReason)) +} + +// connectRoutes is connect.json's routes as they are now, not as they were at +// start: a route removed by `connect setup --unroute` stops authorizing +// dispatch without a restart. A file that no longer loads, or that now names +// another agent or account, authorizes nothing. +type connectRoutes struct { + path string + agent setup.Agent + account string + log *slog.Logger + now func() time.Time + mu sync.Mutex + loadedAt time.Time + routes map[int64]admission.Route + failing bool +} + +// connectRoutesTTL is how long a read of connect.json is reused. +const connectRoutesTTL = 2 * time.Second + +func newConnectRoutes(path string, file setup.File, log *slog.Logger) *connectRoutes { + return &connectRoutes{path: path, agent: file.Agent, account: file.AccountID, log: log, now: time.Now} +} + +// Current returns a copy of the routes connect.json approves now. +func (r *connectRoutes) Current() map[int64]admission.Route { + r.mu.Lock() + defer r.mu.Unlock() + if r.routes == nil || r.now().Sub(r.loadedAt) >= connectRoutesTTL { + r.reload() + } + out := make(map[int64]admission.Route, len(r.routes)) + for k, v := range r.routes { + out[k] = v + } + return out +} + +func (r *connectRoutes) reload() { + r.loadedAt = r.now() + file, err := setup.Load(r.path) + switch { + case err != nil: + err = fmt.Errorf("connect.json cannot be read: %w", err) + case file.Agent != r.agent || file.AccountID != r.account: + err = errors.New("connect.json now names another agent or account") + } + if err != nil { + if !r.failing { + r.log.Error("connector: dispatching nothing until connect.json is usable again", "error", err) + } + r.failing = true + r.routes = map[int64]admission.Route{} + return + } + if r.failing { + r.log.Info("connector: connect.json is usable again") + } + r.failing = false + r.routes = make(map[int64]admission.Route, len(file.Projects)) + for bucket, route := range file.Projects { + r.routes[bucket] = route + } +} + +// connectDispatch is what the run knows when it builds the dispatcher. +type connectDispatch struct { + File setup.File + Buckets []int64 + Ledger *connector.Ledger + Driver driver.Driver + Routes func() map[int64]admission.Route + + Profile string + Executable string + StateDir string + SessionsDir string + + Replies connector.ReplyLister + IsLifecycleMessage func(id int64) bool + Lines *ndjson.Writer + Logger *slog.Logger +} + +// connectDispatcherOptions is the dispatcher the run starts: connect.json's +// concurrency and deadline, the projects this run hears, and the worker's own +// MCP server. Built here so what the command wires is what a test can read. +func connectDispatcherOptions(d connectDispatch) connector.DispatcherOptions { + return connector.DispatcherOptions{ + Ledger: d.Ledger, + Driver: d.Driver, + Routes: d.Routes, + Concurrency: d.File.Concurrency, + Deadline: time.Duration(d.File.Deadline), + Buckets: d.Buckets, + MCP: connector.WorkerMCP{Command: d.Executable, Profile: d.Profile, StateDir: d.StateDir}, + PrivateDir: d.SessionsDir, + Replies: d.Replies, + IsLifecycleMessage: d.IsLifecycleMessage, + Lines: d.Lines, + Logger: d.Logger, + StillRunning: connector.DefaultStillRunning, + } +} + +func parseProjectIDs(raw []string) ([]int64, error) { + var out []int64 + for _, r := range raw { + id, err := parsePositiveID("--project", r) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if id == 0 { + return nil, output.ErrUsage("Invalid --project \"\": expected a numeric id") + } + if !slices.Contains(out, id) { + out = append(out, id) + } + } + slices.Sort(out) + return out, nil +} + +// repeatedString is a string flag that may be given more than once, or as a +// comma-separated list. +type repeatedString []string + +func (r *repeatedString) String() string { return strings.Join(*r, ",") } + +func (r *repeatedString) Set(v string) error { + for _, part := range strings.Split(v, ",") { + *r = append(*r, strings.TrimSpace(part)) + } + return nil +} + +func (r *repeatedString) Type() string { return "string" } diff --git a/internal/commands/connect_run_test.go b/internal/commands/connect_run_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d5ada8d80 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/commands/connect_run_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,258 @@ +package commands + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "log/slog" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "strings" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/appctx" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/config" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/admission" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver/acp" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/setup" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/output" +) + +func TestConnectProjectFlagRepeatsAndRefusesNonIDs(t *testing.T) { + cmd := NewConnectCmd() + require.NoError(t, cmd.Flags().Parse([]string{"--project", "12", "--project", "34,12"})) + flag := cmd.Flags().Lookup("project") + assert.Equal(t, "string", flag.Value.Type(), "the global flag's type is kept") + ids, err := parseProjectIDs(*flag.Value.(*repeatedString)) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, []int64{12, 34}, ids) + + _, err = parseProjectIDs([]string{"abc"}) + assert.Error(t, err) + _, err = parseProjectIDs([]string{""}) + assert.Error(t, err) +} + +func TestConnectStateLivesUnderXDGStateHome(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + t.Setenv("XDG_STATE_HOME", dir) + home, err := connectStateHome() + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, dir, home) + got, err := ensurePrivateChain(home, "basecamp", "connect", "2914079-1") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.DirExists(t, got) +} + +// Copilot on #738: macOS passed this check and then failed every non-shadow +// dispatch at the worker's MCP handshake, because the token hand-over onto +// an inherited descriptor is accepted only where those descriptors are +// sealed — Linux (#736). +func TestConnectRunsOnLinuxOnly(t *testing.T) { + assert.True(t, connectSupportedOS("linux")) + for _, goos := range []string{"darwin", "freebsd", "openbsd", "windows"} { + assert.False(t, connectSupportedOS(goos), goos) + } +} + +// Copilot: dispatch authorization follows connect.json as it is now. +func TestConnectRoutesFollowConnectJSON(t *testing.T) { + dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "connect") + require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(dir, 0o700)) + path := filepath.Join(dir, "connect.json") + file := setup.New("agent") + file.AccountID = "2914079" + file.Agent = setup.Agent{PersonID: 52007412, Kind: setup.KindAgent} + file.Trust.OperatorID = 26909558 + file.Projects = map[int64]admission.Route{48929974: {Path: "/work/repo"}} + write := func(f setup.File) { + data, err := json.Marshal(f) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, data, 0o600)) + } + write(file) + + clock := time.Date(2026, 9, 17, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC) + routes := newConnectRoutes(path, file, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)) + routes.now = func() time.Time { return clock } + assert.Equal(t, "/work/repo", routes.Current()[48929974].Path) + + unrouted := file + unrouted.Projects = map[int64]admission.Route{} + write(unrouted) + clock = clock.Add(connectRoutesTTL) + assert.Empty(t, routes.Current(), "an unrouted project stops authorizing dispatch without a restart") + + other := file + other.Agent.PersonID = 1 + write(other) + clock = clock.Add(connectRoutesTTL) + assert.Empty(t, routes.Current(), "a file naming another agent authorizes nothing") + + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("{not json"), 0o600)) + clock = clock.Add(connectRoutesTTL) + assert.Empty(t, routes.Current(), "a file that no longer loads authorizes nothing") +} + +// Copilot and review r2: the run's --project scope reaches the dispatcher. +func TestConnectDispatcherGetsTheRunsScopeAndSettings(t *testing.T) { + file := setup.New("agent") + file.Concurrency = 3 + file.Deadline = setup.Duration(90 * time.Minute) + opts := connectDispatcherOptions(connectDispatch{ + File: file, Buckets: []int64{48929974}, Profile: "agent", + Executable: "/usr/local/bin/basecamp", StateDir: "/state/2914079-1", SessionsDir: "/state/2914079-1/sessions", + }) + assert.Equal(t, []int64{48929974}, opts.Buckets, "the projects this run hears are the projects it dispatches") + assert.Equal(t, 3, opts.Concurrency) + assert.Equal(t, 90*time.Minute, opts.Deadline) + assert.Equal(t, "agent", opts.MCP.Profile) + assert.Equal(t, "/state/2914079-1", opts.MCP.StateDir) + assert.Equal(t, "/state/2914079-1/sessions", opts.PrivateDir) +} + +// The credential rule: a file that carries a task token lives outside the +// state directory and every working directory. +func TestConnectSessionFilesLiveOutsideTheStateDirectory(t *testing.T) { + runtime := t.TempDir() + state := t.TempDir() + t.Setenv("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR", runtime) + t.Setenv("XDG_STATE_HOME", state) + file := setup.New("agent") + file.AccountID = "2914079" + file.Agent = setup.Agent{PersonID: 52007412, Kind: setup.KindAgent} + + dir, err := connectSessionsDir(file) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(dir, runtime+string(filepath.Separator))) + stateDir, err := connectStateDir(file, false) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.False(t, strings.HasPrefix(dir, stateDir), "not under the state directory") + info, err := os.Stat(dir) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, os.FileMode(0o700), info.Mode().Perm()) +} + +// Card 22's review: a unix socket path is 103 bytes at most, and doctor says +// so before a dispatch discovers it. +func TestDoctorWarnsWhenSessionPathsCannotTakeASocket(t *testing.T) { + file := setup.New("agent") + file.AccountID = "2914079" + file.Agent = setup.Agent{PersonID: 52007412, Kind: setup.KindAgent} + + t.Setenv("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR", "/run/user/1000") + sessions := connectSessionsPath(file) + assert.True(t, connector.TokenSocketFits(filepath.Join(sessions, strings.Repeat("a", connector.AttemptIDLength))), + "a per-user runtime directory takes one") + + deep, err := os.MkdirTemp("/tmp", "bcc-doctor-") + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(deep) }) + deep = filepath.Join(deep, strings.Repeat("d", 40), strings.Repeat("e", 40)) + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(deep, 0o700)) + t.Setenv("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR", deep) + sessions = connectSessionsPath(file) + assert.False(t, connector.TokenSocketFits(filepath.Join(sessions, strings.Repeat("a", connector.AttemptIDLength))), + "and a deep one does not, which is what doctor warns about") +} + +// The check doctor actually runs, not only the paths behind it. +func TestTheDoctorCheckReadsTheProfilesConnectorLayout(t *testing.T) { + app := &appctx.App{Config: &config.Config{}} + assert.Nil(t, checkConnectorSessionPaths(app), "no profile, nothing to say") + + // A config home of this test's own: the check must never read the + // person's real one. + t.Setenv("XDG_CONFIG_HOME", t.TempDir()) + app.Config.ActiveProfile = "agent" + assert.Nil(t, checkConnectorSessionPaths(app), "a profile with no connect.json is not a connector") + + file := setup.New("agent") + file.AccountID = "2914079" + file.Agent = setup.Agent{PersonID: 52007412, Kind: setup.KindAgent} + file.Trust.OperatorID = 26909558 + file.Projects = map[int64]admission.Route{48929974: {Path: "/work/repo"}} + path, err := setup.Path(config.GlobalConfigDir(), "agent") + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o700)) + data, err := json.Marshal(file) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, data, 0o600)) + + t.Setenv("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR", "/run/user/1000") + check := checkConnectorSessionPaths(app) + require.NotNil(t, check) + assert.Equal(t, "pass", check.Status, check.Message) + + deep, err := os.MkdirTemp("/tmp", "bcc-doctor-") + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(deep) }) + deep = filepath.Join(deep, strings.Repeat("d", 40), strings.Repeat("e", 40)) + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(deep, 0o700)) + t.Setenv("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR", deep) + check = checkConnectorSessionPaths(app) + require.NotNil(t, check) + assert.Equal(t, "warn", check.Status) + assert.Contains(t, check.Hint, "XDG_RUNTIME_DIR", "and says what to do about it") +} + +func TestConnectDriverRunsTheWorkersPinnedACPAdapterFromWhereItWasInstalled(t *testing.T) { + d, err := connectDriver(setup.DriverSpawn, setup.WorkerClaude, "") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, setup.WorkerClaude, d.Name()) + + dir := t.TempDir() + _, err = connectDriver(setup.DriverACP, setup.WorkerClaude, dir) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, acp.ErrAdapterMissing, "an adapter that is not installed is never fetched") + + pkg := filepath.Join(dir, "node_modules", filepath.FromSlash(acp.ClaudeAgentACP.Package)) + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(pkg, 0o755)) + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(pkg, "package.json"), + []byte(`{"name":"`+acp.ClaudeAgentACP.Package+`","version":"`+acp.ClaudeAgentACP.Version+`"}`), 0o600)) + bin := filepath.Join(dir, "node_modules", ".bin") + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(bin, 0o755)) + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(bin, acp.ClaudeAgentACP.Name), []byte("#!/bin/sh\n"), 0o700)) + d, err = connectDriver(setup.DriverACP, setup.WorkerClaude, dir) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, acp.Name, d.Name()) + + // A relative directory is the operator's, from where they run the command. + t.Chdir(filepath.Dir(dir)) + d, err = connectDriver(setup.DriverACP, setup.WorkerClaude, filepath.Base(dir)) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, acp.Name, d.Name()) + + _, err = connectDriver(setup.DriverACP, "nobody", dir) + assert.Error(t, err) +} + +// Copilot on #738: intake takes only a positive --since as an override, so a +// negative one was accepted here and then quietly ignored there — the run +// resumed from the ledger while the person who typed it believed otherwise. +func TestANegativeSinceIsRefusedRatherThanIgnored(t *testing.T) { + zero, err := connectSinceOverride(0) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Zero(t, zero, "the default still means: resume from the ledger") + + at, err := connectSinceOverride(1234) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, int64(1234), at) + + _, err = connectSinceOverride(-1) + require.Error(t, err) + var usage *output.Error + require.ErrorAs(t, err, &usage) + assert.Equal(t, output.CodeUsage, usage.Code) +} + +// Copilot on #738: a shadow keeps its own ledger, lock and checkpoint, and +// intake's contract is that two connectors in one account never share a +// checkpoint lineage. A shadow beside the connector it watches is two. +func TestAShadowRunHasACheckpointLineageOfItsOwn(t *testing.T) { + assert.Equal(t, "basecamp-connect-52007412", connectConsumerNamespace(52007412, false), + "and the connector's own lineage does not move") + assert.NotEqual(t, connectConsumerNamespace(52007412, false), connectConsumerNamespace(52007412, true)) +} diff --git a/internal/commands/connect_setup_test.go b/internal/commands/connect_setup_test.go index 18ce4799d..b971d9605 100644 --- a/internal/commands/connect_setup_test.go +++ b/internal/commands/connect_setup_test.go @@ -1450,3 +1450,17 @@ func TestMarkdownCodeKeepsBackticksInside(t *testing.T) { assert.Equal(t, "` /a/b `", markdownCode("/a/b")) assert.Equal(t, "``` /a``b ```", markdownCode("/a``b")) } + +// Copilot on #738: show formatted the workers line from the driver alone, so +// the worker connect.json records was invisible — including the default a +// file written before the field existed still means. +func TestConnectShowNamesTheWorkerTheDriverRuns(t *testing.T) { + f := setup.New("agent") + f.AccountID = "999" + f.Agent = setup.Agent{PersonID: 4001, Kind: setup.KindAgent} + assert.Contains(t, connectShowDisplay("/x/connect.json", f, false)["workers"].(string), setup.DefaultWorker) + + f.Worker = "" + assert.Contains(t, connectShowDisplay("/x/connect.json", f, false)["workers"].(string), setup.DefaultWorker, + "a legacy file with no worker shows the default it means") +} diff --git a/internal/commands/connect_worker.go b/internal/commands/connect_worker.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..491f29fcd --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/commands/connect_worker.go @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +//go:build unix + +package commands + +import ( + "errors" + "time" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/richtext" +) + +// The operator commands act on a recorded worker only through the driver's +// one-owner rule (driver/worker.go): a pid is not an identity, so every +// question about a recorded worker is driver.OwnsWorker's, and nothing here +// tests a pid of its own. + +// Worker states the operator commands report. +const ( + workerRunning = "running" + workerStopped = "stopped" + workerGone = "gone" + workerHeld = "held" + workerUnverified = "unverified" + workerNotRecorded = "not_recorded" + // workerUnaccounted is the task token's holder alone: it was delivered + // and the connector cannot name who has it (connector.TokenHolder). + workerUnaccounted = "unaccounted" +) + +// workerOps are the driver's one-owner functions stopReplacedWorker uses. A +// test seam, so the branches that must not signal can be exercised without a +// real process group whose id nothing reserves. Production only reads it; a +// test that replaces it must not run in parallel. +var workerOps = struct { + owns func(driver.Process) (bool, error) + terminate func(driver.Process, time.Duration) (bool, error) + confirm func(driver.Process, time.Duration) error +}{driver.OwnsWorker, driver.TerminateRecorded, driver.ConfirmGroupGone} + +// workerStop is what stopping a replaced worker did. +type workerStop struct { + signaled bool + state string + note string +} + +// stopReplacedWorker ends the worker a redispatch replaced, first, as the +// spec asks: only while OwnsWorker says the recorded process is still that +// worker, and then confirms its group is gone. A group that outlived its +// leader, or an identity that cannot be established, is left alone and said +// so: the task's end — which admits the redispatched record — waits for the +// owner to confirm the group gone, so nothing runs twice meanwhile. +func stopReplacedWorker(p driver.Process, grace time.Duration) workerStop { + if p.PID <= 0 || p.PGID <= 0 || p.StartedAt.IsZero() { + // A worker still launching has no recorded process yet: there is + // nothing this command can prove is it, so nothing is signaled. + return workerStop{state: workerNotRecorded, + note: "the replaced attempt had not recorded its worker process yet, so nothing was signaled; its token is retired, and the redispatch waits until that task ends"} + } + switch owns, err := workerOps.owns(p); { + case errors.Is(err, driver.ErrGroupOutlivedLeader): + return workerStop{state: workerHeld, + note: "its leader is gone but its process group still runs, so it was not signaled; its token is retired, and the redispatch waits until that group is gone"} + case err != nil: + return workerStop{state: workerUnverified, + note: "the recorded worker's identity could not be established, so nothing was signaled; its token is retired: " + richtext.SanitizeSingleLine(err.Error())} + case !owns: + return workerStop{state: workerGone, note: "the recorded worker had already gone; nothing was signaled, and its token is retired"} + } + signaled, err := workerOps.terminate(p, grace) + if err != nil { + return workerStop{state: workerUnverified, + note: "the recorded worker could not be signaled; its token is retired: " + richtext.SanitizeSingleLine(err.Error())} + } + if err := workerOps.confirm(p, grace); err != nil { + return workerStop{signaled: signaled, state: workerHeld, + note: "the worker was signaled but its process group did not go; the redispatch waits until it has"} + } + // The group is gone, but "stopped" is only said of the worker itself. + if owns, err := workerOps.owns(p); owns || err != nil { + return workerStop{signaled: signaled, state: workerUnverified, + note: "the recorded worker is still running outside its recorded process group, so it was not stopped; its token is retired, and the redispatch waits until that task ends"} + } + return workerStop{signaled: signaled, state: workerStopped} +} + +// recordedWorkerState is status's answer for a live attempt's worker. It +// signals nothing. +func recordedWorkerState(t connector.TaskStatus) string { + return recordedProcessState(t.WorkerIdentity()) +} + +// recordedTakerState is the same answer for the process the task token went +// to — a worker's MCP server, which lives in a group of its own, so it can +// outlive the worker that started it and still hold the task's token. +// +// A holder the connector could not account for is answered before the kernel +// is asked anything: there is no pid to ask about, and "not recorded" would +// read as nothing having taken the token, which is the opposite of what +// happened. It is the same distinction the release point acts on +// (connector.TokenHolder), and this is where the person who must settle the +// held attempt reads it. +func recordedTakerState(t connector.TaskStatus) string { + if t.TakerUnaccounted { + return workerUnaccounted + } + return recordedProcessState(t.TakerIdentity()) +} + +// recordedProcessState asks the one-owner rule about a process the ledger +// recorded. It takes the identity the ledger builds (TaskStatus's own +// WorkerIdentity and TakerIdentity) rather than assembling one from parts: +// a driver.Process put together here would have no StartedExact, and the +// rule answers ErrIdentityUnknown to that — every live worker would read as +// "unverified". +func recordedProcessState(p driver.Process) string { + if p.PID <= 0 || p.PGID <= 0 || p.StartedAt.IsZero() { + return workerNotRecorded + } + switch owns, err := driver.OwnsWorker(p); { + case errors.Is(err, driver.ErrGroupOutlivedLeader): + return workerHeld + case err != nil: + return workerUnverified + case owns: + return workerRunning + default: + return workerGone + } +} diff --git a/internal/commands/connect_worker_mcp.go b/internal/commands/connect_worker_mcp.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b456d6d09 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/commands/connect_worker_mcp.go @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +package commands + +import ( + "bufio" + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "net" + "os" + "strconv" + "strings" + "time" + + "github.com/spf13/cobra" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/appctx" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/output" +) + +// connectWorkerMCPDial bounds the bridge's wait for the connector's socket. +const connectWorkerMCPDial = 30 * time.Second + +// newConnectWorkerMCPCmd is the MCP server command the connector hands an +// agent for a worker: the bridge that takes the task token from the +// connector's socket (see connector's "The task token's carriage") and +// becomes `basecamp mcp` with the token on a pipe. +// +// Hidden: nobody runs it by hand. It exists because an agent starts its MCP +// servers itself and can hand them only standard I/O. +// +// # A restart takes the token again +// +// An MCP host that restarts a stdio server re-runs its command, and a pipe is +// read once, so the bridge fetches the token from the socket on EVERY start. +// The connector serves one handoff per start, each a fresh accept with the +// same peer checks and its own window, up to connector.MaxTokenHandoffs — a +// crash-looping host is cut off rather than served forever, and a server +// restarted after its task ended gets a token the ledger refuses (a +// superseded task has no valid token) rather than tools it should not have. +// A bridge that cannot get a token says so and exits, so the host sees a +// server that failed to start rather than one with no Basecamp tools. +func newConnectWorkerMCPCmd() *cobra.Command { + var socket, state string + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "worker-mcp", + Short: "The MCP server a connector-started worker runs (internal)", + Hidden: true, + Args: cobra.NoArgs, + Annotations: map[string]string{ + "stdout_wire": "mcp", + }, + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error { + app := appctx.FromContext(cmd.Context()) + if socket == "" || state == "" { + return output.ErrUsage("worker-mcp needs --socket and --connect-state; the connector passes both") + } + profile := app.Config.ActiveProfile + if profile == "" { + return output.ErrUsage("worker-mcp needs the agent's profile (-P)") + } + token, err := receiveTaskToken(socket, connectWorkerMCPDial) + if err != nil { + return err + } + exe, err := os.Executable() + if err != nil { + return err + } + return execWorkerMCP(exe, profile, state, token) + }, + } + cmd.Flags().StringVar(&socket, "socket", "", "The connector's token socket for this attempt") + cmd.Flags().StringVar(&state, "connect-state", "", "The connector's state directory") + return cmd +} + +// receiveTaskToken takes the token from the connector's socket. A socket that +// hands over nothing — this process is not the worker's, or the socket was +// already used — is a refusal, not an empty token. +// +// Only a whole line is a token. A handoff the connector completed is one +// newline-terminated line, so ReadString finds its delimiter and reports no +// error; every error it can report — a deadline, a reset, an EOF part way +// through — comes with the bytes that did arrive, and those bytes are a +// prefix of the token, not the token. Accepting them would start +// `basecamp mcp` with a credential that cannot authenticate and no way to +// say why, so the error is the answer (Copilot on #738). +func receiveTaskToken(path string, timeout time.Duration) (string, error) { + dialer := net.Dialer{Timeout: timeout} + conn, err := dialer.DialContext(context.Background(), "unix", path) + if err != nil { + return "", fmt.Errorf("worker-mcp: the connector's token socket: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = conn.Close() }() + _ = conn.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(timeout)) + line, err := bufio.NewReaderSize(conn, 256).ReadString('\n') + if err == nil && strings.TrimSpace(line) == "" { + err = errors.New("empty") + } + if err != nil { + return "", fmt.Errorf("worker-mcp: the connector handed over no token: %w", err) + } + return strings.TrimSpace(line), nil +} + +// workerMCPArgs is what the bridge becomes. The token is on descriptor fd, +// never in argv. +func workerMCPArgs(exe, profile, state string, fd int) []string { + return []string{exe, "mcp", "--profile", profile, "--connect-state", state, "--connect-token-fd", strconv.Itoa(fd)} +} + +// workerMCPEnv is the environment the bridge hands `basecamp mcp`: what the +// connector declared for its server, and nothing an agent added to it. +// +// The bridge reads its own environment to build it, and an agent hands its +// MCP servers the agent's whole environment, so a name the CONNECTOR does not +// set would keep the agent's value — and one of them, BASECAMP_BASE_URL, is +// where the agent's Basecamp credential would be sent. The connector pins +// every such name (connector.MCPServerEnv, set explicitly in the server's +// declared environment), so what survives here is the connector's value or +// nothing at all. Pinning is what closes it, not policy. +func workerMCPEnv() []string { + return driver.BuildEnv(append(append([]string{}, driver.BaseEnv...), connector.MCPServerEnv...), os.LookupEnv, nil) +} diff --git a/internal/commands/connect_worker_mcp_other.go b/internal/commands/connect_worker_mcp_other.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0ca35b9e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/commands/connect_worker_mcp_other.go @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +//go:build !unix + +package commands + +import "errors" + +func execWorkerMCP(string, string, string, string) error { + return errors.New("worker-mcp runs on Linux only") +} diff --git a/internal/commands/connect_worker_mcp_test.go b/internal/commands/connect_worker_mcp_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d5c2e36c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/commands/connect_worker_mcp_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +package commands + +import ( + "strings" + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" +) + +// Copilot: Claude Code hands its MCP servers its own whole environment, so +// what the connector declared is a floor, not a ceiling. The bridge execs +// `basecamp mcp` with the declared environment alone, which is where the +// agent's own credentials stop. +func TestTheBridgeHandsOnOnlyTheEnvironmentTheConnectorDeclared(t *testing.T) { + t.Setenv("HOME", "/home/agent") + t.Setenv("BASECAMP_NO_KEYRING", "1") + t.Setenv("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "test-key-not-real") + t.Setenv("CLAUDE_CODE_MESSAGING_TOKEN", "test-token-not-real") + t.Setenv("BASECAMP_CONNECT_TASK_TOKEN", "test-token-not-real") + + env := strings.Join(workerMCPEnv(), "\n") + assert.NotContains(t, env, "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "the agent's own credential stops at the bridge") + assert.NotContains(t, env, "CLAUDE_CODE_MESSAGING_TOKEN") + assert.NotContains(t, env, "BASECAMP_CONNECT_TASK_TOKEN", "the token travels on a descriptor, not in an environment") + assert.Contains(t, env, "HOME=/home/agent", "what the connector declared is kept") + assert.Contains(t, env, "BASECAMP_NO_KEYRING=1") +} diff --git a/internal/commands/connect_worker_mcp_token_unix_test.go b/internal/commands/connect_worker_mcp_token_unix_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..377a1d46c --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/commands/connect_worker_mcp_token_unix_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +//go:build unix + +package commands + +import ( + "net" + "path/filepath" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +// serveOnce answers one connection on a unix socket with reply, closing the +// connection afterwards, and returns the socket's path. +func serveOnce(t *testing.T, reply string) string { + t.Helper() + path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "t.sock") + var lc net.ListenConfig + l, err := lc.Listen(t.Context(), "unix", path) + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = l.Close() }) + go func() { + conn, err := l.Accept() + if err != nil { + return + } + _, _ = conn.Write([]byte(reply)) + _ = conn.Close() + }() + return path +} + +// Copilot on #738: a socket handoff that succeeded is one newline-terminated +// line, so anything ReadString reports an error on is a partial answer. A +// truncated token is not a token: the bridge refuses it rather than starting +// `basecamp mcp` with a credential that will not authenticate. +func TestTheBridgeRefusesATokenTheSocketDidNotFinishHandingOver(t *testing.T) { + token, err := receiveTaskToken(serveOnce(t, "test-token-not-re"), 2*time.Second) + assert.Empty(t, token, "a partial line is not a token") + require.Error(t, err, "a read that did not finish is a refusal, not a token") + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "no token") +} + +// And a whole handoff is still taken. +func TestTheBridgeTakesAWholeToken(t *testing.T) { + token, err := receiveTaskToken(serveOnce(t, "test-token-not-real\n"), 2*time.Second) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "test-token-not-real", token) +} diff --git a/internal/commands/connect_worker_mcp_unix.go b/internal/commands/connect_worker_mcp_unix.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..127c20a82 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/commands/connect_worker_mcp_unix.go @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +//go:build unix + +package commands + +import ( + "fmt" + "math" + "os" + "runtime" + "syscall" + + "golang.org/x/sys/unix" +) + +// execWorkerMCP puts the token on a pipe the next program inherits and +// replaces this process with `basecamp mcp`, which reads it and closes the +// descriptor before it authenticates. +func execWorkerMCP(exe, profile, state, token string) error { + read, write, err := os.Pipe() + if err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := write.WriteString(token); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := write.Close(); err != nil { + return err + } + // os.Pipe marks its descriptors close-on-exec; this one must survive the + // exec, and only this one. FcntlInt takes the descriptor as the uintptr + // Fd already is, so nothing is converted to reach it. + if _, err := unix.FcntlInt(read.Fd(), unix.F_SETFD, 0); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("worker-mcp: keep the token descriptor across exec: %w", err) + } + // The number the next program is told to read. A descriptor is a small + // non-negative index the kernel handed out, but it arrives as a uintptr, + // so the range is checked rather than assumed. + raw := read.Fd() + if raw > math.MaxInt32 { + return fmt.Errorf("worker-mcp: the token descriptor (%d) is not a number a process can be told", raw) + } + fd := int(int32(raw)) + err = syscall.Exec(exe, workerMCPArgs(exe, profile, state, fd), workerMCPEnv()) //nolint:gosec // G204: this binary, re-executed as `mcp`; no argument is a secret or content + runtime.KeepAlive(read) + return fmt.Errorf("worker-mcp: exec basecamp mcp: %w", err) +} diff --git a/internal/commands/connect_worker_other.go b/internal/commands/connect_worker_other.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f15eee773 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/commands/connect_worker_other.go @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +//go:build !unix + +package commands + +import ( + "time" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" +) + +// The one-owner rule is Unix's: process groups, and a start time that makes a +// pid an identity, are what it rests on. Elsewhere the connector does not run +// (the run command refuses), and nothing here can say whether a recorded +// worker is still itself — so nothing is signaled and nothing is claimed. + +const ( + workerStopped = "stopped" + workerHeld = "held" + workerUnverified = "unverified" + workerNotRecorded = "not_recorded" + workerUnaccounted = "unaccounted" +) + +type workerStop struct { + signaled bool + state string + note string +} + +func stopReplacedWorker(driver.Process, time.Duration) workerStop { + return workerStop{state: workerUnverified, + note: "this platform cannot establish a recorded worker's identity, so nothing was signaled; its token is retired"} +} + +func recordedWorkerState(connector.TaskStatus) string { return workerUnverified } + +func recordedTakerState(t connector.TaskStatus) string { + if t.TakerUnaccounted { + return workerUnaccounted + } + return workerUnverified +} diff --git a/internal/commands/connect_worker_unix_test.go b/internal/commands/connect_worker_unix_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2f8d780f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/commands/connect_worker_unix_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@ +//go:build unix + +package commands + +import ( + "context" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "strconv" + "strings" + "syscall" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver/drivertest" +) + +func taskOf(p driver.Process) connector.TaskStatus { + started := p.StartedAt + return connector.TaskStatus{PID: p.PID, PGID: p.PGID, ProcessStartedAt: &started} +} + +// runningTree starts a worker whose leader keeps running beside a child in +// its group, and returns it and the child's pid. +func runningTree(t *testing.T) (*driver.Worker, int) { + t.Helper() + pidFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "child") + worker, err := driver.StartWorker(context.Background(), nil, driver.Scope{WorkDir: t.TempDir()}, + driver.Command{Path: "/bin/sh", Args: []string{"-c", "sleep 300 & echo $! > " + pidFile + "; wait"}, Env: []string{"PATH=/bin:/usr/bin"}}) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("start a worker: %v", err) + } + t.Cleanup(func() { worker.Terminate(time.Second) }) + var child int + deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second) + for child == 0 { + if data, err := os.ReadFile(pidFile); err == nil { + child, _ = strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(string(data))) + } + if time.Now().After(deadline) { + t.Fatal("the worker's child never started") + } + time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond) + } + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = syscall.Kill(child, syscall.SIGKILL) }) + return worker, child +} + +// A redispatch stops the worker it replaces, its whole tree, and says so. +func TestRedispatchStopsTheReplacedWorkersTree(t *testing.T) { + worker, grandchild := runningTree(t) + p := worker.Process() + assert.Equal(t, workerRunning, recordedWorkerState(taskOf(p))) + + got := stopReplacedWorker(p, 2*time.Second) + assert.Equal(t, workerStopped, got.state, got.note) + assert.True(t, got.signaled) + assert.Eventually(t, func() bool { return !drivertest.Alive(grandchild) }, 5*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond, "the grandchild went with its group") + assert.Equal(t, workerGone, recordedWorkerState(taskOf(p))) +} + +// A tree that outlived its leader is not proven this task's to signal: it is +// held, left running, and reported. +func TestRedispatchLeavesATreeThatOutlivedItsLeaderHeld(t *testing.T) { + p, grandchild := drivertest.SurvivingWorker(t, t.TempDir()) + assert.Equal(t, workerHeld, recordedWorkerState(taskOf(p))) + + got := stopReplacedWorker(p, time.Second) + assert.Equal(t, workerHeld, got.state) + assert.False(t, got.signaled) + assert.True(t, drivertest.Alive(grandchild), "nothing was signaled") + drivertest.RequireGroupHeld(t, p) +} + +// A recorded start time that is not the process's own is not this worker, +// whatever the pid says. +func TestAPidAloneIsNotTheWorker(t *testing.T) { + worker, grandchild := runningTree(t) + p := worker.Process() + p.StartedAt = p.StartedAt.Add(-time.Hour) + + assert.NotEqual(t, workerRunning, recordedWorkerState(taskOf(p))) + got := stopReplacedWorker(p, time.Second) + assert.False(t, got.signaled) + assert.True(t, drivertest.Alive(grandchild)) +} + +// A worker still launching has recorded no process: nothing is signaled, and +// it is not called gone. +func TestRedispatchDoesNotCallAnUnrecordedWorkerGone(t *testing.T) { + got := stopReplacedWorker(driver.Process{}, time.Second) + assert.Equal(t, workerNotRecorded, got.state) + assert.False(t, got.signaled) +} + +// A worker whose recorded group holds nothing is not called stopped while it +// still runs. Faked: a real member-less group id is not one a test can hold +// reserved, and signaling a freed id could reach someone else's group. +func TestRedispatchDoesNotCallAWorkerOutsideItsGroupStopped(t *testing.T) { + orig := workerOps + t.Cleanup(func() { workerOps = orig }) + var signaled bool + workerOps.owns = func(driver.Process) (bool, error) { return true, nil } // the leader runs on + workerOps.terminate = func(driver.Process, time.Duration) (bool, error) { signaled = true; return false, nil } + workerOps.confirm = func(driver.Process, time.Duration) error { return nil } // its group is empty + + got := stopReplacedWorker(driver.Process{PID: 4242, PGID: 4243, StartedAt: time.Now()}, time.Second) + assert.True(t, signaled) + assert.Equal(t, workerUnverified, got.state, got.note) +} + +// A handshake that never completes ends the server's whole group, a +// descendant it started included, before doctor returns. +func TestDoctorsFailedHandshakeLeavesNoDescendant(t *testing.T) { + pidFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "child") + orig, origTimeout := mcpServerCommand, mcpHandshakeTimeout + mcpServerCommand = func(string) (string, []string, error) { + return os.Args[0], []string{"-test.run=^TestFakeMCPServer$", "--", fakeMCPServerArg, "spawn-child=" + pidFile}, nil + } + mcpHandshakeTimeout = 2 * time.Second + t.Cleanup(func() { mcpServerCommand, mcpHandshakeTimeout = orig, origTimeout }) + + c := mcpHandshakeCheck(context.Background(), "agent") + assert.Equal(t, "fail", c.Status) + data, err := os.ReadFile(pidFile) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("the fake server never started its child: %v", err) + } + child, _ := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(string(data))) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = syscall.Kill(child, syscall.SIGKILL) }) + assert.Eventually(t, func() bool { return !drivertest.Alive(child) }, 3*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond, "the descendant went with its group") +} + +// Status reports the process the task token went to as it reports the worker: +// a taker that outlived its worker is the same "one owner" story, seen from +// the operator's side. +func TestStatusReportsATakerThatOutlivedItsWorker(t *testing.T) { + worker, _ := runningTree(t) + live := worker.Process() + taker, _ := drivertest.SurvivingWorker(t, t.TempDir()) + started, takerStarted := live.StartedAt, taker.StartedAt + task := connector.TaskStatus{ + PID: live.PID, PGID: live.PGID, ProcessStartedAt: &started, + TakerPID: taker.PID, TakerPGID: taker.PGID, TakerStartedAt: &takerStarted, + } + + assert.Equal(t, workerRunning, recordedWorkerState(task)) + assert.Equal(t, workerHeld, recordedTakerState(task), "its leader is gone and its group still runs") + assert.Equal(t, workerNotRecorded, recordedTakerState(connector.TaskStatus{PID: live.PID, PGID: live.PGID, ProcessStartedAt: &started})) +} + +// A token delivered to a process the connector could not name is the one +// case the zero taker cannot express, and status is where the person who +// must settle the held attempt reads it. "Nothing took the token" and "the +// token is out and nobody can say who has it" are opposite facts; the same +// conflation the dispatcher stopped making (TokenHolder.Unaccounted) must +// not survive on the operator's side of it. +func TestStatusSaysWhenATokenHolderCannotBeAccountedFor(t *testing.T) { + assert.Equal(t, workerUnaccounted, + recordedTakerState(connector.TaskStatus{TakerUnaccounted: true}), + "a delivery whose holder could not be named never reads as no delivery") + assert.Equal(t, workerNotRecorded, recordedTakerState(connector.TaskStatus{}), + "and nothing taking the token still reads as nothing") +} diff --git a/internal/commands/connect_worktrees.go b/internal/commands/connect_worktrees.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..06e4d8ce5 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/commands/connect_worktrees.go @@ -0,0 +1,332 @@ +package commands + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "log/slog" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "time" + + "github.com/spf13/cobra" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/appctx" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/config" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/setup" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/output" +) + +// connectWorktreesDir is where a connector's task worktrees live, under its +// state directory. +const connectWorktreesDir = "worktrees" + +func newConnectWorktreesCmd() *cobra.Command { + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "worktrees", + Short: "List and prune the git worktrees the connector kept", + Long: `With worktrees on (connect setup --worktrees), each task works in a git +worktree of its own, on a basecamp-connect/ branch. The connector never +removes one: when the task ends its worktree is kept and listed here, with +the task it was for and what it takes up on disk. You remove them with prune, +which goes by what could be lost — nothing on the disk but the files git +tracks, unchanged, no merge or rebase in progress, not locked, and every +commit it reaches held elsewhere — and keeps what could. + +They add up: every task leaves one, so prune is part of running a connector +with worktrees on. A Codex worker cannot commit — a worktree's git data is +outside the directory its sandbox may write — so with Codex every task that +edits anything leaves a worktree with work in it.`, + } + cmd.AddCommand(newConnectWorktreesListCmd(), newConnectWorktreesPruneCmd()) + return cmd +} + +func newConnectWorktreesListCmd() *cobra.Command { + var shadow bool + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "list", + Short: "List the worktrees kept for you to deal with", + Long: `List the worktrees the connector kept, with the task each was for, its size +on disk, git's record of it, and why it is kept: finished (its task ended — +the connector removes no worktree of its own accord), dirty (uncommitted +work), unpushed (commits nothing else holds), locked, moved (no longer where +the connector left it), orphaned (its directory is gone, while git's record +of it and the task branch are still there), or unverified (their state could +not be read). A prune says which of these a worktree turns out to be.`, + Example: ` basecamp connect worktrees list -P agent`, + Args: cobra.NoArgs, + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error { + app := appctx.FromContext(cmd.Context()) + wt, closeLedger, err := openConnectWorktrees(app, shadow) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer closeLedger() + retained, err := wt.Retained(cmd.Context()) + if err != nil { + return err + } + out := make([]worktreeView, 0, len(retained)) + for _, r := range retained { + out = append(out, viewWorktree(r)) + } + return app.OK(out, output.WithSummary(fmt.Sprintf("%d worktree(s) kept", len(out)))) + }, + } + cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&shadow, "shadow", false, "Read the shadow connector's state instead") + return cmd +} + +func newConnectWorktreesPruneCmd() *cobra.Command { + var ( + force []string + shadow bool + ) + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "prune", + Short: "Remove the kept worktrees you have dealt with", + Long: `Remove every kept worktree that holds no work: clean, with every commit it +reaches held elsewhere. This is the only thing that removes a worktree. One +that still holds work is kept and listed with why. + +--force <path> removes that worktree even with work in it; name each one, and +it tells you what goes. +Every commit it reaches that nothing else holds is first kept under +refs/basecamp-connect/retained/ (retained_refs), so a force on a worktree that +is still on disk discards files, never commits. A worktree holding a submodule's own git data, or a lock, is +never forced; neither is one that is no longer where it was (reason "moved"): +move it back, or remove it yourself and prune again. A force that could not go +through is reported as kept with force_refused. Worktrees of tasks still +running are never touched. + +A worktree whose directory something else removed (reason "orphaned") is left +exactly as it is — git's record of it and the task branch, whatever they reach +— and a plain prune leaves it alone. A force on its path deletes the task +branch and nothing else, leaving git's record for ` + "`git worktree prune`" + `: +commits only that branch or that record reached go when you do that, and +nothing here works out which those are. Move the directory back, or keep the +branch, if you want them. A worktree whose state could not be read +(reason "unverified") is kept; forcing it keeps every commit that could be +found, which in a repository that keeps no reflogs may not be all of them.`, + Example: ` basecamp connect worktrees prune -P agent + basecamp connect worktrees prune -P agent --force ~/.local/state/basecamp/connect/2914079-52007412/worktrees/app-1a2b3c4d/17-a1b2c3`, + Args: cobra.NoArgs, + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error { + app := appctx.FromContext(cmd.Context()) + for i, p := range force { + if !filepath.IsAbs(p) { + return output.ErrUsage(fmt.Sprintf("--force %q: name the worktree by its absolute path, as worktrees list shows it", p)) + } + force[i] = filepath.Clean(p) + } + wt, closeLedger, err := openConnectWorktrees(app, shadow) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer closeLedger() + results, err := wt.Prune(cmd.Context(), force) + if errors.Is(err, connector.ErrNotRetained) { + return output.ErrUsageHint("Nothing was pruned: "+err.Error(), "--force takes a path from `basecamp connect worktrees list`.") + } + if err != nil { + return err + } + out := make([]pruneView, 0, len(results)) + removed, kept := 0, 0 + for _, r := range results { + out = append(out, pruneView{ + worktreeView: viewWorktree(r.Worktree), Action: string(r.Action), ForceRefused: r.ForceRefused, + RetainedRefs: r.RetainedRefs, BranchDeletedAt: r.BranchDeletedAt, + }) + if r.Action == connector.PruneKept { + kept++ + } else { + removed++ + } + } + return app.OK(out, output.WithSummary(fmt.Sprintf("%d removed, %d kept", removed, kept))) + }, + } + cmd.Flags().StringArrayVar(&force, "force", nil, "Remove this kept worktree even with work in it (repeatable; an absolute path from worktrees list)") + cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&shadow, "shadow", false, "Read the shadow connector's state instead") + return cmd +} + +// worktreeView is a kept worktree as the commands show it. +type worktreeView struct { + Path string `json:"path"` + State string `json:"state"` + // SizeBytes is what the worktree takes up on disk, so an operator can + // see what reclaiming it is worth; -1 when it is there and could not be + // read, and nothing at all for one that is gone. + SizeBytes int64 `json:"size_bytes,omitempty"` + WorkDir string `json:"work_dir"` + Branch string `json:"branch"` + Route string `json:"route"` + Reason string `json:"reason,omitempty"` + // Record is git's record of the worktree (<repo>/.git/worktrees/<name>), + // which outlives a directory something else removed: what an operator + // needs to find what is left, and what `git worktree prune` clears. + Record string `json:"record,omitempty"` + EventID int64 `json:"event_id"` + TaskID int64 `json:"task_id,omitempty"` + RetainedAt string `json:"retained_at,omitempty"` +} + +type pruneView struct { + worktreeView + Action string `json:"action"` + ForceRefused bool `json:"force_refused,omitempty"` + RetainedRefs []string `json:"retained_refs,omitempty"` + // BranchDeletedAt is where the task branch stood when a force on an + // orphaned worktree deleted it: nothing worked out what it reached, so + // this is what puts it back (git branch <name> <commit>). + BranchDeletedAt string `json:"branch_deleted_at,omitempty"` +} + +// sizeLimit bounds how long reading a worktree's size may take: a listing is +// not worth holding for a tree that cannot be walked. +const sizeLimit = 5 * time.Second + +// reasonOf is why a worktree is kept: nothing, for one that is not. +func reasonOf(w connector.Worktree) string { + if w.State == connector.WorktreeRemoved { + return "" + } + return string(w.RetainedReason) +} + +// recordOf is git's record of the worktree, when it is still there: the +// directory an orphaned worktree leaves behind. +func recordOf(w connector.Worktree) string { + if w.AdminDir == "" || w.State == connector.WorktreeRemoved { + return "" + } + if _, err := os.Lstat(w.AdminDir); err != nil { + return "" + } + return w.AdminDir +} + +// sizeOf is what a worktree takes up on disk. A worktree that is not there +// takes up nothing, and is not walked for an answer; one a removal has +// frozen is under its removing name. +func sizeOf(w connector.Worktree) int64 { + for _, path := range []string{w.Path, w.Path + connector.RemovingSuffix} { + switch _, err := os.Lstat(path); { + case err == nil: + return dirSize(path) + case !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist): + return -1 + } + } + return 0 +} + +// dirSize is what a directory takes up, in bytes, following no symlink; -1 +// when it cannot be read in time or at all. The walk runs apart from the +// answer: a filesystem call that never returns — a mount a worker left — +// keeps only its own goroutine, and never the listing. +func dirSize(path string) int64 { + deadline := time.Now().Add(sizeLimit) + walked := make(chan int64, 1) + go func() { + var total int64 + err := filepath.WalkDir(path, func(_ string, d os.DirEntry, err error) error { + if err != nil { + return err + } + if time.Now().After(deadline) { + return errors.New("the worktree could not be read in time") + } + if d.IsDir() { + return nil + } + info, err := d.Info() + if err != nil { + return err + } + if info.Mode().IsRegular() { + total += info.Size() + } + return nil + }) + if err != nil { + total = -1 + } + walked <- total + }() + timer := time.NewTimer(time.Until(deadline)) + defer timer.Stop() + select { + case total := <-walked: + return total + case <-timer.C: + return -1 + } +} + +func viewWorktree(w connector.Worktree) worktreeView { + v := worktreeView{ + Path: w.Path, State: string(w.State), SizeBytes: sizeOf(w), WorkDir: w.WorkDir, + Branch: w.Branch, Route: w.Route, Reason: reasonOf(w), Record: recordOf(w), + EventID: w.OriginatingEventID, TaskID: w.TaskID, + } + if !w.RetainedAt.IsZero() { + v.RetainedAt = w.RetainedAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339) + } + return v +} + +// openConnectWorktrees opens the ledger of the connector the active profile +// is set up as: the one it has, never a new one, and never a schema this +// binary would migrate under a connector that is running. +func openConnectWorktrees(app *appctx.App, shadow bool) (*connector.Worktrees, func(), error) { + if app == nil { + return nil, nil, errors.New("app not initialized") + } + name := app.Config.ActiveProfile + if name == "" { + return nil, nil, output.ErrUsageHint("Worktrees belong to a connector's profile", "Pass -P/--profile <name>, a profile set up with `basecamp connect setup`.") + } + path, err := setup.Path(config.GlobalConfigDir(), name) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, output.ErrUsage(err.Error()) + } + file, err := setup.Load(path) + switch { + case errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist): + return nil, nil, output.ErrUsageHint(fmt.Sprintf("Profile %q is not set up as a connector", name), "Run: basecamp connect setup -P "+shellQuote(name)) + case err != nil: + return nil, nil, output.ErrUsage("connect.json cannot be used: " + err.Error()) + } + // Named, not created: reading what a connector left must not make a + // state directory for a connector that never ran. + stateDir, err := connectStatePath(file, shadow) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, output.ErrUsage("The connector's state directory cannot be used: " + err.Error()) + } + ledgerPath := filepath.Join(stateDir, connector.LedgerFile) + if _, err := os.Lstat(ledgerPath); err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + return nil, nil, output.ErrUsageHint("This connector has not run yet: there is no ledger in "+stateDir, "Run: basecamp connect -P "+shellQuote(name)) + } + return nil, nil, err + } + ledger, err := connector.OpenExistingLedger(context.Background(), ledgerPath) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + wt, err := connector.NewWorktrees(connector.WorktreesOptions{ + Ledger: ledger, Root: filepath.Join(stateDir, connectWorktreesDir), + // What a removal refuses is said, not swallowed. + Logger: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelWarn})), + }) + if err != nil { + _ = ledger.Close() + return nil, nil, err + } + return wt, func() { _ = ledger.Close() }, nil +} diff --git a/internal/commands/connect_worktrees_test.go b/internal/commands/connect_worktrees_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..931f4f9bc --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/commands/connect_worktrees_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +package commands + +import ( + "bytes" + "context" + "encoding/json" + "os" + "os/exec" + "path/filepath" + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/appctx" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/config" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/admission" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/setup" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/output" +) + +// worktreesCmdEnv is a set-up connector profile with a ledger holding one +// retained worktree whose directory the operator already removed. +func worktreesCmdEnv(t *testing.T) (*appctx.App, *bytes.Buffer, connector.Worktree) { + t.Helper() + root := t.TempDir() + t.Setenv("XDG_CONFIG_HOME", filepath.Join(root, "config")) + t.Setenv("XDG_STATE_HOME", filepath.Join(root, "state")) + t.Setenv("USERPROFILE", root) + + file := setup.New("agent") + file.AccountID = "2914079" + file.Agent = setup.Agent{PersonID: 52007412, Kind: setup.KindAgent} + file.Trust.OperatorID = 26909558 + repo := filepath.Join(root, "repo") + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(repo, 0o700)) + if _, err := exec.LookPath("git"); err != nil { + t.Skip("git is not installed") + } + for _, args := range [][]string{{"init", "-q", "-b", "main"}, {"commit", "-q", "--allow-empty", "-m", "init"}} { + cmd := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "git", append([]string{"-c", "user.name=T", "-c", "user.email=t@example.invalid"}, args...)...) + cmd.Dir = repo + cmd.Env = []string{"HOME=" + root, "PATH=" + os.Getenv("PATH")} + out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput() + require.NoError(t, err, string(out)) + } + file.Projects[48699913] = admission.Route{Path: repo} + path, err := setup.Path(config.GlobalConfigDir(), "agent") + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o700)) + data, err := json.Marshal(file) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, data, 0o600)) + + stateDir, err := connectStateDir(file, false) + require.NoError(t, err) + ledger, err := connector.OpenLedger(filepath.Join(stateDir, connector.LedgerFile)) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer func() { _ = ledger.Close() }() + w := connector.Worktree{ + Path: filepath.Join(stateDir, "worktrees", "app-00000000", "7-abcdef"), Route: repo, Repository: repo, + Branch: connector.BranchPrefix + "7-abcdef", BaseCommit: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567", OriginatingEventID: 7, + } + w.WorkDir = w.Path + id, err := ledger.BeginWorktree(context.Background(), w) + require.NoError(t, err) + // Git's record of it, as the connector stores it once the worktree is + // made: what is left of an orphan. + w.AdminDir = filepath.Join(repo, ".git", "worktrees", "7-abcdef") + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(w.AdminDir, 0o700)) + require.NoError(t, ledger.WorktreeAdminDir(context.Background(), id, w.AdminDir)) + require.NoError(t, ledger.RetainWorktree(context.Background(), id, connector.RetainedDirty, connector.WorktreeCreating)) + + cfg := config.Default() + cfg.ActiveProfile = "agent" + var out bytes.Buffer + app := &appctx.App{Config: cfg, Output: output.New(output.Options{Format: output.FormatJSON, Writer: &out})} + return app, &out, w +} + +func runWorktreesCmd(t *testing.T, app *appctx.App, args ...string) error { + t.Helper() + cmd := NewConnectCmd() + cmd.SetArgs(append([]string{"worktrees"}, args...)) + cmd.SetContext(appctx.WithApp(context.Background(), app)) + cmd.SetOut(&bytes.Buffer{}) + cmd.SetErr(&bytes.Buffer{}) + cmd.SilenceErrors = true + cmd.SilenceUsage = true + return cmd.Execute() +} + +func TestConnectWorktreesListShowsTheKeptOnes(t *testing.T) { + app, out, w := worktreesCmdEnv(t) + require.NoError(t, runWorktreesCmd(t, app, "list")) + assert.Contains(t, out.String(), w.Path) + assert.Contains(t, out.String(), `"reason": "dirty"`) +} + +// A listing says what each kept worktree takes up, and says nothing about the +// size of one that is gone. +func TestConnectWorktreesSayWhatTheyTakeUp(t *testing.T) { + app, out, w := worktreesCmdEnv(t) + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(w.Path, 0o700)) + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(w.Path, "notes.txt"), bytes.Repeat([]byte("x"), 1234), 0o600)) + require.NoError(t, runWorktreesCmd(t, app, "list")) + assert.Contains(t, out.String(), `"size_bytes": 1234`) + + out.Reset() + require.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(w.Path)) + require.NoError(t, runWorktreesCmd(t, app, "prune")) + assert.Contains(t, out.String(), `"reason": "orphaned"`) + assert.NotContains(t, out.String(), `"size_bytes"`, "a worktree that is gone has no size") +} + +// An orphaned worktree is listed with git's record of it, which is what is +// left to deal with. +func TestConnectWorktreesShowTheRecordOfAnOrphan(t *testing.T) { + app, out, w := worktreesCmdEnv(t) + require.NoError(t, runWorktreesCmd(t, app, "list")) + assert.Contains(t, out.String(), `"record": "`+w.AdminDir+`"`) +} + +func TestConnectWorktreesPruneRefusesWhatItCannotName(t *testing.T) { + app, _, _ := worktreesCmdEnv(t) + err := runWorktreesCmd(t, app, "prune", "--force", "relative/path") + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "absolute path") + + err = runWorktreesCmd(t, app, "prune", "--force", "/not/a/kept/worktree") + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "Nothing was pruned") +} + +// A worktree whose directory is gone is reported as orphaned, with git's +// record of it, and a plain prune deletes none of what it left; the operator +// naming its path is what clears it. +func TestConnectWorktreesPruneLeavesAnOrphanAloneUntilItIsNamed(t *testing.T) { + app, out, w := worktreesCmdEnv(t) + require.NoError(t, runWorktreesCmd(t, app, "prune")) + assert.Contains(t, out.String(), `"reason": "orphaned"`) + assert.Contains(t, out.String(), `"record"`, "what is left of it") + assert.NotContains(t, out.String(), `"force_refused"`, "nothing was forced") + out.Reset() + require.NoError(t, runWorktreesCmd(t, app, "list")) + assert.Contains(t, out.String(), w.Path, "still listed for the operator") + + out.Reset() + require.NoError(t, runWorktreesCmd(t, app, "prune", "--force", w.Path)) + assert.Contains(t, out.String(), `"action": "forced"`) + out.Reset() + require.NoError(t, runWorktreesCmd(t, app, "list")) + assert.NotContains(t, out.String(), w.Path) +} diff --git a/internal/commands/doctor.go b/internal/commands/doctor.go index 1c758514b..f978cdef7 100644 --- a/internal/commands/doctor.go +++ b/internal/commands/doctor.go @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ import ( "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/appctx" "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/config" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/setup" "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/harness" "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/output" "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/version" @@ -149,6 +151,11 @@ func runDoctorChecks(ctx context.Context, app *appctx.App, verbose bool) []Check // 5. Config files check checks = append(checks, checkConfigFiles(app, verbose)...) + // 5b. The connector's session paths, for a profile set up as one. + if check := checkConnectorSessionPaths(app); check != nil { + checks = append(checks, *check) + } + // 6. Credentials check credCheck := checkCredentials(app, verbose) checks = append(checks, credCheck) @@ -1360,3 +1367,53 @@ func checkLegacyInstall() *Check { Hint: "Run: basecamp migrate", } } + +// checkConnectorSessionPaths reports whether a task token's unix socket fits +// under the session directory this profile's connector would use. A unix +// socket path is 103 bytes at most, and a long home, a deep XDG_RUNTIME_DIR +// or large account and person ids can pass it. The connector moves the socket +// to a short directory of its own rather than fail a dispatch, so this is a +// warning about the layout, not a failure — but a person should hear it here +// rather than discover it in a log. +// +// It answers for THIS process's environment: a connector started from a +// systemd user unit, launchd or cron may have a different XDG_RUNTIME_DIR, +// and the check says so in its message rather than pretending otherwise. +// +// It says nothing at all for a profile that is not set up as a connector. +func checkConnectorSessionPaths(app *appctx.App) *Check { + name := app.Config.ActiveProfile + if name == "" || !isValidProfileName(name) { + return nil + } + path, err := setup.Path(config.GlobalConfigDir(), name) + if err != nil { + return nil + } + file, err := setup.Load(path) + if err != nil { + return nil + } + sessions := connectSessionsPath(file) + attempt := filepath.Join(sessions, strings.Repeat("a", connector.AttemptIDLength)) + check := &Check{Name: "Connector Session Paths"} + if connector.TokenSocketFits(attempt) { + check.Status = "pass" + check.Message = sessions + return check + } + check.Status = "warn" + check.Message = fmt.Sprintf("%s is too deep for a task token's socket (a unix socket path is %d bytes at most, and this is what XDG_RUNTIME_DIR gives this shell)", sessions, connector.MaxSocketPath) + check.Hint = shortRuntimeDirHint() + return check +} + +// shortRuntimeDirHint names a short place for the runtime directory on this +// platform: macOS has no /run/user. +func shortRuntimeDirHint() string { + where := "/run/user/$UID" + if runtime.GOOS == "darwin" { + where = "/tmp" + } + return "The connector will put each token socket in a short directory of its own instead. Set XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to a short path (" + where + ", say) to keep it beside the session's own files." +} diff --git a/internal/connector/admission/commit.go b/internal/connector/admission/commit.go index 13a3cbce0..b1079a8c5 100644 --- a/internal/connector/admission/commit.go +++ b/internal/connector/admission/commit.go @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ func (c *Committer) Commit(ctx context.Context, v Verdict) (Verdict, error) { } switch { case written == v.State: - case v.State == StateAdmitted && written == StateQueued: + case v.State == StateAdmitted && (written == StateQueued || written == StateHeld): v.State = written default: return v, fmt.Errorf("admission: ledger wrote %s for a %s verdict on event %d", written, v.State, v.EventID) diff --git a/internal/connector/admission/commit_test.go b/internal/connector/admission/commit_test.go index 919cdca0d..4b0f5d8a1 100644 --- a/internal/connector/admission/commit_test.go +++ b/internal/connector/admission/commit_test.go @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ func TestCommitsAreSerialisedPerConversation(t *testing.T) { admitted++ case StateQueued: queued++ - case StateBlocked, StateDiscarded: + case StateBlocked, StateDiscarded, StateHeld: t.Errorf("unexpected %s commit", v.State) } } diff --git a/internal/connector/admission/matrix.go b/internal/connector/admission/matrix.go index 4869d96db..2697dad70 100644 --- a/internal/connector/admission/matrix.go +++ b/internal/connector/admission/matrix.go @@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ const ( StateQueued State = "queued" StateBlocked State = "blocked" StateDiscarded State = "discarded" + // StateHeld is never a verdict. It is what the ledger writes instead of + // admitted or queued for a record a hold tagged for review, which waits + // for a person. + StateHeld State = "held" ) // Reason explains a blocked or discarded verdict. diff --git a/internal/connector/dispatch_lifecycle_test.go b/internal/connector/dispatch_lifecycle_test.go index 5de670d71..b3e88e314 100644 --- a/internal/connector/dispatch_lifecycle_test.go +++ b/internal/connector/dispatch_lifecycle_test.go @@ -157,6 +157,10 @@ func reachRecord(t *testing.T, ledger *Ledger, state RecordState, held bool) { if state == StateCompleted { require.NoError(t, ledger.SetState(ctx, 1, StateCompleted, "")) } + case StateHeld: + // Held is written by a hold's review tag (ledger_hold.go), never by + // a transition these tests drive. + t.Fatalf("reachRecord does not build a %s record", state) } require.Equal(t, state, getRecord(t, ledger, 1).State) } diff --git a/internal/connector/dispatcher.go b/internal/connector/dispatcher.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3c381503d --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/dispatcher.go @@ -0,0 +1,1483 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "log/slog" + "net/url" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "slices" + "strconv" + "strings" + "sync" + "time" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/admission" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/ndjson" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/richtext" +) + +// The dispatcher starts a worker for every admitted conversation, keeps it to +// its deadline, delivers follow-ups into its session, and settles its task. +// +// # Invariants +// +// Beyond the ledger's (ledger_tasks.go), each held by a test in +// dispatcher_test.go: +// +// 1. The ledger first. An attempt is launching in the ledger before the +// driver is asked for anything, a follow-up is exposed before its prompt +// is sent, and an attempt is ended in the ledger only after its worker is +// gone. +// 2. The directory is the record's. A worker runs only in the route the +// record carries, and only while connect.json still approves that route +// for the record's project. +// 3. Nothing crosses to a worker that it does not need. The prompt names +// events and a recording URL, never content, and is under +// MaxPromptTokens at its worst case; the task token reaches only the +// worker's MCP server, over a socket that serves one handoff per start of +// that server, never an argv or an environment; both environments are +// allowlists. +// 4. Stop reasons are the dispatcher's own record: deadline and shutdown +// are stops it asked for; a canceled turn it did not ask for is failed; +// a worker gone with a turn in flight is lost. +// 5. A restart finds every attempt a previous process left live, ends its +// worker by the process group recorded (only while the group's leader is +// still that process) and settles it as lost before dispatching anything. + +// Defaults. +const ( + DefaultDispatchTick = time.Second + DefaultCancelGrace = 30 * time.Second + DefaultStillRunning = 10 * time.Minute + DefaultProgressInterval = 30 * time.Second + // MaxPromptTokens is the budget for anything the connector itself says to + // a worker. + MaxPromptTokens = 500 +) + +// MCPServerName is the name the worker's Basecamp MCP server is given, so its +// tools are mcp__basecamp__*. +const MCPServerName = "basecamp" + +// Workspaces decides the directory a task works in from its approved route. +// The default works in the route itself. +type Workspaces interface { + // Prepare returns the working directory for a task on route. + Prepare(ctx context.Context, route string, originatingEventID int64) (string, error) + // Finish is called once the task's worker is gone. + Finish(ctx context.Context, route, workDir string) error +} + +// PerTaskWorkspaces is a Workspaces that gives every task a directory of its +// own (a git worktree), so two tasks on one route do not share a working +// directory and the route itself is not held busy. The ledger still holds one +// live task per working directory. +type PerTaskWorkspaces interface { + Workspaces + PerTaskDirs() bool +} + +// WaitingWorkspaces is a Workspaces that knows some routes cannot take a +// task now — a repository whose worktree could not be made, say. The +// dispatcher leaves those routes out of the startable query, so records it +// could not start on them never fill the window ahead of other routes. +type WaitingWorkspaces interface { + Workspaces + RoutesWaiting() []string +} + +// RecoveringWorkspaces is a Workspaces with state of its own to reconcile on +// start. Recover runs after every attempt a previous process left live is +// settled. +type RecoveringWorkspaces interface { + Workspaces + Recover(ctx context.Context) error +} + +// ReplyLister lists the agent's comments or chat lines at a reply destination, +// for the adopted-reply rule. +type ReplyLister interface { + AgentReplies(ctx context.Context, bucketID int64, kind string, recordingID int64, since time.Time) ([]AgentReply, error) +} + +// DispatcherOptions configures the dispatcher. +type DispatcherOptions struct { + Ledger *Ledger + // Driver starts workers. + Driver driver.Driver + // Routes is connect.json's current routes by project. + Routes func() map[int64]admission.Route + // TokenWindow is how long a task token's socket waits for the worker's + // MCP server; DefaultTokenWindow when zero. + TokenWindow time.Duration + // Buckets is the --project scope; empty means every routed project. + Buckets []int64 + // Concurrency is the most live tasks; setup's default when zero. + Concurrency int + // Deadline is each task's deadline; zero for none. + Deadline time.Duration + // Launcher wraps workers; driver.DirectLauncher when nil. + Launcher driver.Launcher + // NoAutomaticRetry: never retry a failed spawn (sandbox mode). + NoAutomaticRetry bool + Workspaces Workspaces + + // MCP names what the worker's Basecamp MCP server runs as. + MCP WorkerMCP + // Policy is the permission policy; DefaultPolicy for the working + // directory when nil. + Policy func(workDir string) driver.PermissionPolicy + // Lookup reads the connector's environment for the allowlists; + // os.LookupEnv when nil. + Lookup func(string) (string, bool) + // PrivateDir is an owner-only directory for session files. + PrivateDir string + + // Replies, when set, is read for the adopted-reply rule. + Replies ReplyLister + // IsLifecycleMessage says whether a reply id is one of the connector's + // own messages; nil means none are. + IsLifecycleMessage func(id int64) bool + + Lines *ndjson.Writer + Logger *slog.Logger + // Redaction is what, besides the task token, the worker's environments, + // the private directory and the state directory, is taken out of every + // log line, error and status line the dispatcher writes (driver's + // redact.go). + Redaction driver.Redaction + + Tick time.Duration + CancelGrace time.Duration + StillRunning time.Duration + ProgressInterval time.Duration +} + +// WorkerMCP is how the worker's MCP server is started: this binary's +// `mcp -P <profile> --connect-state <dir>`. +type WorkerMCP struct { + // Command is the basecamp binary, absolute. + Command string + // Profile is the agent's profile. + Profile string + // StateDir is the connector's state directory. + StateDir string +} + +// MCPServerEnv is what `basecamp mcp` may take from the connector's +// environment besides driver.BaseEnv: its keyring's session bus and the CLI's +// own non-secret settings. BASECAMP_TOKEN is deliberately absent. +// +// It is the whole list, and there is no option to extend it. The bridge +// rebuilds the server's environment from driver.BaseEnv and this list after +// it has taken the token (connect_worker_mcp.go's workerMCPEnv), so a name +// pinned here and not there would be declared by the connector and then +// dropped a moment later — an allowlist that reads as configuration and does +// nothing (Copilot on #738). One list, read in both places. +var MCPServerEnv = []string{ + "DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS", "BASECAMP_NO_KEYRING", "BASECAMP_BASE_URL", "BASECAMP_CACHE_DIR", +} + +// Dispatcher runs tasks. +type Dispatcher struct { + opts DispatcherOptions + ledger *Ledger + log *slog.Logger + lines *ndjson.Writer + + mu sync.Mutex + live map[string]*taskRun + wg sync.WaitGroup + // stopping is closed when Run is shutting down, which is what bounds the + // adopted-reply rule's reads: their own context is the settlement's, + // which a shutdown deliberately does not cancel. + stopping chan struct{} + stoppingOnce sync.Once + + // terminateRecorded ends a previous process's worker; a test seam. + terminateRecorded func(driver.Process, time.Duration) (bool, error) + // afterTurn runs when a turn has ended cleanly, before anything more is + // exposed; a test seam. + afterTurn func() + // confirmGroupGone is the one-owner rule's step 3; a test seam. + confirmGroupGone func(driver.Process, time.Duration) error + // strandedAt is when the stranded count was last reported. Read and + // written only by the dispatch loop. + strandedAt time.Time + // held is how many attempts recovery left live because their workers + // could not be identified or verified. Written by Recover, read under mu. + held int + // red is the dispatcher's redaction rule; a task's lines use its own + // (taskRedaction), which adds the task's token and environments. + red *driver.Redactor + // socketBase is where a token socket goes when its session directory's + // path is too long for one; empty until the first attempt needs it. + socketBase string + socketBaseMu sync.Mutex +} + +// NewDispatcher builds a dispatcher. +func NewDispatcher(opts DispatcherOptions) (*Dispatcher, error) { + switch { + case opts.Ledger == nil: + return nil, errors.New("connector: the dispatcher needs the ledger") + case opts.Driver == nil: + return nil, errors.New("connector: the dispatcher needs a driver") + case opts.Routes == nil: + return nil, errors.New("connector: the dispatcher needs connect.json's routes") + case opts.MCP.Command == "" || opts.MCP.Profile == "" || opts.MCP.StateDir == "": + return nil, errors.New("connector: the dispatcher needs the worker's MCP server command, profile and state directory") + case opts.PrivateDir == "": + return nil, errors.New("connector: the dispatcher needs a private directory") + } + if opts.Concurrency <= 0 { + opts.Concurrency = 2 + } + if opts.Launcher == nil { + opts.Launcher = driver.DirectLauncher{} + } + if opts.Policy == nil { + opts.Policy = func(workDir string) driver.PermissionPolicy { return DefaultPolicy(workDir) } + } + if opts.Lookup == nil { + opts.Lookup = os.LookupEnv + } + if opts.Logger == nil { + opts.Logger = slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler) + } + if opts.Tick <= 0 { + opts.Tick = DefaultDispatchTick + } + if opts.TokenWindow <= 0 { + opts.TokenWindow = DefaultTokenWindow + } + if opts.CancelGrace <= 0 { + opts.CancelGrace = DefaultCancelGrace + } + if opts.ProgressInterval <= 0 { + opts.ProgressInterval = DefaultProgressInterval + } + // Every log line passes through the redaction rule; a task's own lines + // through its task's (taskRedaction). + opts.Redaction = opts.Redaction.With(driver.Redaction{Dirs: []string{opts.PrivateDir, opts.MCP.StateDir}}) + return &Dispatcher{ + opts: opts, + ledger: opts.Ledger, + log: slog.New(driver.NewRedactor(opts.Redaction).Handler(opts.Logger.Handler())), + red: driver.NewRedactor(opts.Redaction), + lines: opts.Lines, + live: map[string]*taskRun{}, + + stopping: make(chan struct{}), + + terminateRecorded: driver.TerminateRecorded, + confirmGroupGone: driver.ConfirmGroupGone, + }, nil +} + +// DispatchLine is the stdout line for an attempt's transitions. It carries +// ids and states, never content. +type DispatchLine struct { + Type string `json:"type"` + TaskID int64 `json:"task_id"` + AttemptID string `json:"attempt_id"` + EventIDs []int64 `json:"event_ids,omitempty"` + State string `json:"state"` + StopReason string `json:"stop_reason,omitempty"` +} + +// Run recovers what a previous process left, then dispatches until ctx ends. +// On the way out it cancels every live attempt with stop reason shutdown and +// settles it; it returns once all are settled. +func (d *Dispatcher) Run(ctx context.Context) error { + if err := d.Recover(ctx); err != nil { + return err + } + ticker := time.NewTicker(d.opts.Tick) + defer ticker.Stop() + for { + if err := d.dispatchReady(ctx); err != nil && ctx.Err() == nil { + d.log.Warn("connector: dispatch", "error", err) + } + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + // Adoption is a read of Basecamp with a budget of its own, and + // a shutdown must not wait that budget out for every task that + // has just settled: it is stopped here, and the wait that + // follows is only for it to notice. + d.stopAdopting() + d.wg.Wait() + return nil + case <-ticker.C: + } + } +} + +// Recover ends every attempt a previous process left live (invariant 5). +// +// It is cleanup, not dispatch. A shutdown while it runs must stop this +// process from starting anything new; it must not leave a previous +// process's attempt half-settled, with a worker ended and its record still +// live (Copilot on #738). So what recovery reads and what it settles go on a +// context cancellation does not reach, as every other settlement does +// (settleCtx). Only the working directories' own reconciliation, which +// settles nothing, is left on the caller's context. +func (d *Dispatcher) Recover(ctx context.Context) error { + cleanupCtx := context.WithoutCancel(ctx) + d.sweepPrivateDir() + // Recovery counts the attempts it leaves live afresh, so running it + // twice does not count them twice. + d.mu.Lock() + d.held = 0 + d.mu.Unlock() + attempts, err := d.ledger.LiveAttempts(cleanupCtx) + if err != nil { + return err + } + for _, a := range attempts { + if a.Process.PID == 0 { + // Launching with no process recorded: the crash fell between the + // spawn and the write, so a worker may exist that cannot be + // named. Treated as running (the spec's rule) means it is not + // settled around either: its attempt stays live and its + // conversation and directory stay held. + d.log.Error("connector: an attempt was left mid-launch and its worker cannot be identified; it stays live and its directory held", + "attempt_id", a.AttemptID, "task_id", a.TaskID) + d.hold() + continue + } + worker := a.Process.Identity() + signaled, err := d.terminateRecorded(worker, driver.DefaultGrace) + if err != nil { + // A worker that may still be running with the operator's + // authority is not settled around. Its attempt stays live, so its + // conversation and its directory stay held and nothing new runs + // there, until a person has looked. + d.log.Error("connector: could not verify whether a previous worker still runs; its attempt stays live and its directory held", + "attempt_id", a.AttemptID, "pid", a.Process.PID, "error", err) + d.hold() + continue + } + d.log.Info("connector: ending an attempt a previous process left", "attempt_id", a.AttemptID, + "task_id", a.TaskID, "was", string(a.State), "worker_signaled", signaled) + // Through the one release point, which confirms the group is gone + // before anything is settled or released. + d.release(cleanupCtx, Launch{TaskID: a.TaskID, AttemptID: a.AttemptID, Route: a.Route, WorkDir: a.WorkDir}, + worker, TokenHolder{Process: a.Taker.Identity(), Unaccounted: a.TakerUnaccounted}, + AttemptEnd{AttemptID: a.AttemptID, Stop: StopLost}, nil) + } + if w, ok := d.opts.Workspaces.(RecoveringWorkspaces); ok { + if err := w.Recover(ctx); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: recover working directories: %w", err) + } + } + return nil +} + +// stopAdopting ends the adopted-reply rule's reads. Run calls it on its way +// out: a settlement is written before adoption starts, so a shutdown drops +// the link it might have added rather than holding the exit for the +// adoption budget. Idempotent. +func (d *Dispatcher) stopAdopting() { + d.stoppingOnce.Do(func() { close(d.stopping) }) +} + +// heldCount is how many attempts are held; for tests and status. +func (d *Dispatcher) heldCount() int { + d.mu.Lock() + defer d.mu.Unlock() + return d.held +} + +// hold counts an attempt recovery left live: its worker may still exist, so +// it holds one of the connector's worker slots until a person settles it. +func (d *Dispatcher) hold() { + d.mu.Lock() + d.held++ + d.mu.Unlock() +} + +// sweepPrivateDir removes what a crashed process left in the session and +// socket directories. Nothing there carries the task token — it crosses over +// the socket, never in a file — but a stale MCP configuration, an empty +// session directory and a dead socket are litter with an attempt's name on +// them, and a start is when they are cleared. +func (d *Dispatcher) sweepPrivateDir() { + d.sweep(d.opts.PrivateDir) + // And the short socket base, where this connector needs one: a crash + // leaves a directory there that nothing else would remove. Asking with an + // attempt-sized path is how the dispatcher decides whether it needs one + // at all. + if base := d.shortSocketBase(filepath.Join(d.opts.PrivateDir, strings.Repeat("a", AttemptIDLength))); base != "" { + d.sweep(base) + } +} + +// sweep removes everything in dir. +func (d *Dispatcher) sweep(dir string) { + entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir) + if err != nil { + return + } + for _, e := range entries { + _ = os.RemoveAll(filepath.Join(dir, e.Name())) + } +} + +func (d *Dispatcher) dispatchReady(ctx context.Context) error { + d.mu.Lock() + runs := make([]*taskRun, 0, len(d.live)) + for _, r := range d.live { + runs = append(runs, r) + } + d.mu.Unlock() + + approved := d.approvedRoutes() + // Follow-ups first: an event on a live conversation joins its task, while + // connect.json still approves that task's directory for its project. + for _, r := range runs { + if !r.authorized() { + continue + } + if _, err := d.ledger.JoinConversation(ctx, r.launch.TaskID); err != nil { + return err + } + } + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + return nil + default: + } + if d.free() <= 0 { + return nil + } + // Invariant 2, in the query: only records whose route connect.json + // approves now, in the projects this run hears, and on a directory no live + // task holds. A record the dispatcher cannot start never fills the window. + startable := approved + if w, ok := d.opts.Workspaces.(WaitingWorkspaces); ok { + if waiting := w.RoutesWaiting(); len(waiting) > 0 { + startable = make(map[int64]string, len(approved)) + for bucket, route := range approved { + if !slices.Contains(waiting, route) { + startable[bucket] = route + } + } + } + } + records, err := d.ledger.StartableRecordsWhere(ctx, StartableFilter{ + Routes: startable, RouteHeld: !d.perTaskDirs(), Limit: d.opts.Concurrency * 4, + }) + if err != nil { + return err + } + d.reportStranded(ctx, approved) + for _, record := range records { + // Asked again on every record, not counted down: a start that failed + // can have held its attempt, and a held attempt takes a slot as a + // running one does (Copilot). + if d.free() <= 0 { + break + } + if d.workDirBusy(record.Decision.Route) { + continue + } + if err := d.start(ctx, record); err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, ErrNotStartable) { + continue + } + return err + } + } + return nil +} + +// free is how many more workers this connector may have: the concurrency it +// was given, less the attempts it is running and the attempts it is holding. +// An attempt recovery left live may still have a worker, and one whose worker +// could not be confirmed gone certainly may, so both take a slot. +func (d *Dispatcher) free() int { + d.mu.Lock() + defer d.mu.Unlock() + return d.opts.Concurrency - len(d.live) - d.held +} + +// StrandedInterval is how often the dispatcher says how much admitted work +// no route of connect.json's covers. +const StrandedInterval = 10 * time.Minute + +// reportStranded counts the records waiting for a worker that no approved +// route covers — a project unrouted, or its route changed since the record +// was admitted — and says so, rather than leaving them silently unstarted. +func (d *Dispatcher) reportStranded(ctx context.Context, approved map[int64]string) { + if time.Since(d.strandedAt) < StrandedInterval { + return + } + d.strandedAt = time.Now() + stranded, err := d.ledger.StrandedRecords(ctx, approved, d.opts.Buckets) + if err != nil { + d.log.Warn("connector: counting stranded records", "error", err) + return + } + if stranded > 0 { + d.log.Warn("connector: admitted work no route covers is waiting; route its project or discard it", + "records", stranded) + } +} + +// approvedRoutes is connect.json's routes now, narrowed to the projects this +// run hears. +func (d *Dispatcher) approvedRoutes() map[int64]string { + approved := map[int64]string{} + for bucket, route := range d.opts.Routes() { + if len(d.opts.Buckets) == 0 || slices.Contains(d.opts.Buckets, bucket) { + approved[bucket] = route.Path + } + } + return approved +} + +func (d *Dispatcher) perTaskDirs() bool { + w, ok := d.opts.Workspaces.(PerTaskWorkspaces) + return ok && w.PerTaskDirs() +} + +func (d *Dispatcher) workDirBusy(route string) bool { + if d.perTaskDirs() { + // Each task gets its own directory; LaunchTask's unique working + // directory is what holds. + return false + } + d.mu.Lock() + defer d.mu.Unlock() + for _, r := range d.live { + if r.launch.Route == route || r.launch.WorkDir == route { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +// start launches a task for record: the ledger first, then the driver, and +// the release point on every path that fails after it. Capacity is the +// caller's question (free), not this one's. +func (d *Dispatcher) start(ctx context.Context, record Record) error { + route := record.Decision.Route + workDir := route + if d.opts.Workspaces != nil { + dir, err := d.opts.Workspaces.Prepare(ctx, route, record.ID) + if err != nil { + d.log.Warn("connector: could not prepare a working directory", "event_id", record.ID, "error", err) + return nil + } + workDir = dir + } + launch, err := d.ledger.LaunchTask(ctx, LaunchSpec{ + EventID: record.ID, Route: route, WorkDir: workDir, Driver: d.opts.Driver.Name(), Deadline: d.opts.Deadline, + }) + if err != nil { + // No task was created, so there is no attempt to release and no + // worker to confirm: the directory prepared for it was never a + // task's. + d.discardPreparedWorkspace(ctx, route, workDir) + return err + } + d.line(DispatchLine{Type: "dispatch", TaskID: launch.TaskID, AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, EventIDs: launch.EventIDs, State: string(AttemptLaunching)}) + + // Settling must outlive a shutdown that interrupts the start. + settleCtx := context.WithoutCancel(ctx) + cfg, tokens, cleanup, err := d.sessionConfig(ctx, launch, record) + cfg.Redaction = d.taskRedaction(launch, cfg) + log := d.taskLog(cfg.Redaction) + refusals := &refusalRecorder{ledger: d.ledger, attemptID: launch.AttemptID, log: log} + cfg.Refusals = refusals + if err != nil { + // Nothing was asked of the driver: no process exists. + log.Warn("connector: could not prepare a session", "task_id", launch.TaskID, "error", err) + d.release(settleCtx, launch, driver.Process{}, TokenHolder{}, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, Stop: StopFailed, SpawnFailed: true, NoAutomaticRetry: d.opts.NoAutomaticRetry}, nil) + return nil //nolint:nilerr // settled as a start that ran nothing + } + session, err := d.opts.Driver.NewSession(ctx, cfg) + if err != nil { + spawnFailed := errors.Is(err, driver.ErrNotStarted) + // A configuration no retry can fix is proof no process existed and + // proof that starting again would fail the same way. + unusable := errors.Is(err, driver.ErrUnusable) + log.Warn("connector: worker did not start", "task_id", launch.TaskID, "attempt_id", launch.AttemptID, + "no_process", spawnFailed, "unusable", unusable, "error", err) + // The socket is finished with before the taker is read, as at every + // other release: closing it is not the same as waiting for it, and a + // holder read from a socket still deciding is a holder that may be + // about to exist (Copilot on #738). + taker := settledTaker(tokens, log, launch.AttemptID, d.opts.CancelGrace) + cleanup() + // A start that launched a process says so (driver.StartError); the + // release point confirms that group gone before anything is settled. + d.release(settleCtx, launch, driver.StartedProcess(err), taker, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, Stop: StopFailed, SpawnFailed: spawnFailed, + NoAutomaticRetry: d.opts.NoAutomaticRetry || unusable}, nil) + return nil + } + p := session.Process() + // The token goes only to this worker's own process group. + tokens.AllowGroup(p.PGID) + if err := d.ledger.MarkRunning(settleCtx, launch.AttemptID, recordedProcess(p, session.ID())); err != nil { + _ = session.Close() + // The socket was open to the worker's group, so a handoff may be in + // flight: it is finished with before the taker is read, as at every + // other release. + taker := settledTaker(tokens, log, launch.AttemptID, d.opts.CancelGrace) + cleanup() + d.release(settleCtx, launch, p, taker, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, Stop: StopFailed}, nil) + return err + } + d.line(DispatchLine{Type: "dispatch", TaskID: launch.TaskID, AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, State: string(AttemptRunning)}) + + run := &taskRun{d: d, launch: launch, record: record, session: session, cleanup: cleanup, log: log, refusals: refusals, tokens: tokens} + d.mu.Lock() + d.live[launch.AttemptID] = run + d.mu.Unlock() + d.wg.Add(1) + go func() { + defer d.wg.Done() + run.supervise(ctx) + }() + return nil +} + +// sessionConfig builds what the driver is given (invariant 3). +func (d *Dispatcher) sessionConfig(ctx context.Context, launch Launch, record Record) (driver.SessionConfig, *TokenSocket, func(), error) { + dir := filepath.Join(d.opts.PrivateDir, launch.AttemptID) + if err := os.Mkdir(dir, 0o700); err != nil { + return driver.SessionConfig{}, nil, func() {}, fmt.Errorf("connector: session directory: %w", err) + } + // The token's one carriage: a socket served only to the worker's + // process group (tokensocket.go). It goes in the attempt's own directory + // unless a socket path there would be longer than a unix socket takes. + socketDir, temporary, err := TokenSocketDir(dir, d.shortSocketBase(dir)) + if err != nil { + _ = os.RemoveAll(dir) + return driver.SessionConfig{}, nil, func() {}, err + } + removeSocketDir := func() { + if temporary { + _ = os.RemoveAll(socketDir) + } + } + tokens, err := ServeTaskToken(socketDir, launch.Token, d.opts.TokenWindow) + if err != nil { + removeSocketDir() + _ = os.RemoveAll(dir) + return driver.SessionConfig{}, nil, func() {}, err + } + // This attempt's own logger, so a handoff line goes through the task's + // redaction (its token, its socket directory) and not only the + // dispatcher's. The session's environment is not known yet; what these + // lines carry is ids and enums. + attemptID := launch.AttemptID + log := d.taskLog(d.taskRedaction(launch, driver.SessionConfig{SocketDir: socketDir})) + // The handoff outlives the start, and a shutdown must not stop the + // connector from recording who holds the token. + recordCtx := context.WithoutCancel(ctx) + // Every handoff, not only the first: an MCP host that restarts its stdio + // server re-runs the bridge, which takes the token again, and the newest + // server is the process the release point must end. + tokens.OnHandoff(func(handoff Handoff, taker driver.Process, afterADelivery bool) { + d.reportHandoff(log, attemptID, handoff, taker, afterADelivery) + switch { + case handoff == HandoffDelivered && taker.PID > 0: + if err := d.ledger.RecordTaker(recordCtx, attemptID, recordedProcess(taker, "")); err != nil { + log.Warn("connector: could not record the process that took the task token", "attempt_id", attemptID, "error", err) + } + case handoff == HandoffDelivered, handoff == HandoffUnaccounted: + // A delivery whose recipient could not be identified, or a + // holder the kernel stopped answering about: the attempt carries + // that across a restart too, so the next process holds it rather + // than read a missing taker as nobody having the token. + if err := d.ledger.MarkTakerUnaccounted(recordCtx, attemptID); err != nil { + log.Warn("connector: could not record that this task's token holder is unaccounted for", "attempt_id", attemptID, "error", err) + } + } + }) + cleanup := func() { + tokens.Close() + removeSocketDir() + _ = os.RemoveAll(dir) + } + + // Every name the server may have is set here, to this connector's value + // or to nothing: the agent hands its MCP servers its own whole + // environment, so a name the connector left unset would arrive carrying + // the agent's value, and BASECAMP_BASE_URL decides where the agent's + // Basecamp credential is sent. + serverEnv := driver.EnvMap(driver.BuildEnv(append(append([]string{}, driver.BaseEnv...), MCPServerEnv...), d.opts.Lookup, nil)) + for _, name := range MCPServerEnv { + if _, ok := serverEnv[name]; !ok { + serverEnv[name] = "" + } + } + return driver.SessionConfig{ + Cwd: launch.WorkDir, + Env: driver.BuildEnv(driver.BaseEnv, d.opts.Lookup, nil), + MCPServers: []driver.MCPServer{{ + Name: MCPServerName, + Command: d.opts.MCP.Command, + Args: []string{"connect", "worker-mcp", "--profile", d.opts.MCP.Profile, + "--connect-state", d.opts.MCP.StateDir, "--socket", tokens.Path()}, + Env: serverEnv, + }}, + Policy: d.opts.Policy(launch.WorkDir), + Launcher: d.opts.Launcher, + // EventIDs are the task's events. Only the originating one has been + // handed out at launch; the rest are exposed as they are prompted, so + // a launcher reading this list is told what the task may cover, not + // what the worker has seen. + SocketDir: socketDir, + Scope: driver.Scope{ + TaskID: launch.TaskID, AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, EventIDs: launch.EventIDs, + WorkDir: launch.WorkDir, SocketDir: socketDir, Class: record.Decision.Class, + }, + PrivateDir: dir, + }, tokens, cleanup, nil +} + +// taskRedaction is the dispatcher's redaction plus what only this task has: +// its token and the environments its worker and MCP server were given. +func (d *Dispatcher) taskRedaction(launch Launch, cfg driver.SessionConfig) driver.Redaction { + more := driver.Redaction{Secrets: []string{launch.Token}, Env: slices.Clone(cfg.Env), + // Where the socket lives is the task's too: it is not always under + // the private directory the dispatcher's own redaction names. + Dirs: []string{cfg.SocketDir}} + for _, server := range cfg.MCPServers { + more.Env = append(more.Env, driver.EnvOf(server.Env)...) + } + return d.opts.Redaction.With(more) +} + +// taskLog is the dispatcher's logger under a task's redaction. +func (d *Dispatcher) taskLog(r driver.Redaction) *slog.Logger { + return slog.New(driver.NewRedactor(r).Handler(d.opts.Logger.Handler())) +} + +// UnreportedFinishLine is the message a person greps for when a worker ended +// its turn without reporting the dispatch it was given. +const UnreportedFinishLine = "connector: a worker finished without reporting its dispatch" + +// reportUnreported says when a worker ended its turn cleanly and never +// reported an event it was handed. The ledger's own record is the guarantee — +// such an event settles completed(unknown), never succeeded — and this is the +// hint a person needs to go and look. +// +// It is the only signal there is for an agent whose Basecamp MCP server died +// mid-session: an agent that cannot call the tools cannot report, and Claude +// Code's stream carries no server status after its init message, so nothing +// tells the driver the server has gone. +func reportUnreported(log *slog.Logger, stop StopReason, settlement Settlement) { + if stop != StopFinished { + return + } + for _, event := range settlement.Events { + if event.Outcome == OutcomeUnknown && !event.Reported { + log.Warn(UnreportedFinishLine, "task_id", settlement.TaskID, + "attempt_id", settlement.AttemptID, "event_id", event.EventID) + } + } +} + +// shortSocketBase is the connector's own directory for token sockets that +// cannot live beside their session's files, made once and swept on start. A +// base that cannot be made is empty, and TokenSocketDir says so rather than +// putting a socket somewhere unchecked. +func (d *Dispatcher) shortSocketBase(preferred string) string { + if TokenSocketFits(preferred) { + return "" + } + d.socketBaseMu.Lock() + defer d.socketBaseMu.Unlock() + if d.socketBase != "" { + return d.socketBase + } + // The sessions directory's own name, which carries the account and the + // agent: two connectors of the same agent share a base, and no two + // others do. + base, err := ShortSocketBase(filepath.Base(d.opts.PrivateDir), d.opts.Lookup) + if err != nil { + d.log.Error("connector: no directory for a task token's socket", "error", err) + return "" + } + d.socketBase = base + return base +} + +// settledTaker stops the attempt's token socket and waits for it to finish +// with whatever it was doing, so a handoff in flight is not still deciding +// while the attempt is released. It is what the release point acts on. +func settledTaker(tokens *TokenSocket, log *slog.Logger, attemptID string, grace time.Duration) TokenHolder { + if tokens == nil { + return TokenHolder{} + } + // Nothing more is handed over; a delivery already under way finishes. + tokens.Close() + if !tokens.Settled(grace) { + // A handoff still deciding after the socket was closed and waited + // out is a token that may be crossing to a process this attempt + // will never see recorded. That is the same thing as a holder that + // cannot be accounted for, and it is held for the same reason. + log.Error("connector: the task token's socket was still busy when its attempt ended; the attempt is held rather than settled around a handoff that may still be in flight", + "attempt_id", attemptID) + holder := holderOf(tokens) + holder.Unaccounted = true + return holder + } + return holderOf(tokens) +} + +// reportHandoff says what became of one handoff of the task token. Only a +// socket the release point closed after it had served this worker is quiet: +// everything else leaves a worker whose Basecamp tools will not work, and no +// agent reports that on its own (card 23 measured both adapters). +func (d *Dispatcher) reportHandoff(log *slog.Logger, attemptID string, handoff Handoff, _ driver.Process, afterADelivery bool) { + switch handoff { + case HandoffDelivered: + case HandoffRefused: + // Whatever asked was not this worker's. It is the one event the peer + // check exists to catch, and it ends the socket, so it is said out + // loud whether or not a delivery came first. + log.Warn("connector: something that is not the worker asked for its task token; the socket is closed and this task's token will not be served again", + "attempt_id", attemptID) + case HandoffUndelivered: + log.Warn("connector: the worker's MCP server asked for its task token and could not be given it; the next start of it will be", + "attempt_id", attemptID) + case HandoffUnaccounted: + // The one thing worse than a worker without tools: a token out in a + // process the connector cannot see. Nothing else is served it, and + // the attempt will be held. + log.Error("connector: this task's token was delivered and the process holding it cannot be accounted for; no further handoff will be made and the attempt is held", + "attempt_id", attemptID) + case HandoffSpent: + log.Warn("connector: the worker's MCP server has restarted more often than the connector serves its token; a further start will have no Basecamp tools", + "attempt_id", attemptID, "handoffs", MaxTokenHandoffs) + case HandoffExpired: + // Before any delivery this is a worker that never took its token; + // after one it is a restart the socket waited for and did not see. + // Either way a server that starts now has no Basecamp tools. + log.Warn("connector: nothing took the worker's task token within the window; a server that starts now will have no Basecamp tools", + "attempt_id", attemptID, "after_a_delivery", afterADelivery) + default: + // Closed: the release point is done with this attempt, which is how + // every healthy one ends. + log.Debug("connector: the task token's socket is finished with", "attempt_id", attemptID, "handoff", string(handoff)) + } +} + +// holderOf is what a socket knows about the process holding its token. +func holderOf(tokens *TokenSocket) TokenHolder { + if tokens == nil { + return TokenHolder{} + } + return tokens.Holder() +} + +// confirmTakerGone is the release point's second confirmation: the process +// that took the task token from the socket, when the agent started it outside +// the worker's own process group. It is ended by its own group and confirmed +// gone like the worker; a process that cannot be confirmed holds the attempt, +// as any other unconfirmed group does. +// +// Its identity is recorded on the attempt as it is handed the token +// (Ledger.RecordTaker), so a connector that restarts ends it by that record +// too (Recover passes it to this same point). A taker the connector never +// managed to identify is the one case left to the agent's own exit: such a +// bridge ends when its agent's output closes. +func (d *Dispatcher) confirmTakerGone(worker driver.Process, holder TokenHolder) error { + if holder.Held() { + // The one rule for a holder the connector cannot account for: the + // token is out, nothing here can name the process that has it or + // prove it has gone, and an attempt is never released around that. + // It stays live — its directory, its conversation and one worker + // slot with it — for a person to settle (Copilot on #738). + return errors.New("connector: this task's token was delivered and the process holding it cannot be accounted for") + } + taker := holder.Process + ok := taker.PID > 0 && taker.PGID > 0 + if own, known := driver.OwnProcessGroup(); ok && known && taker.PGID == own { + // A record that names the connector's own group is a mistake, not a + // worker's server: nothing is signaled on it, and nothing is held + // for it either. + ok = false + } + if !ok || taker.PGID == worker.PGID { + // Nothing took the token, or it took it inside the worker's own + // group, which is already confirmed gone. + return nil + } + switch owns, err := driver.OwnsWorker(taker); { + case err != nil: + return fmt.Errorf("connector: the process that took the task token: %w", err) + case !owns: + // Gone, or a pid the kernel has given to something else: either way + // there is nothing of this attempt's left to end. + return nil + } + if _, err := d.terminateRecorded(taker, d.opts.CancelGrace); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: end the process that took the task token: %w", err) + } + return d.confirmGroupGone(taker, d.opts.CancelGrace) +} + +// settleAttempts is how many times ending an attempt is tried before it is +// left for the next start. +const settleAttempts = 5 + +// release is the ONE place an attempt is settled, its working directory +// released and its end reported: the single release point of the driver +// package's one-owner rule. Nothing else in the connector calls EndAttempt, +// Workspaces.Finish, or writes an ended dispatch line — a source test holds +// that (dispatcher_boundary_test.go). +// +// It releases nothing until the worker's process group is confirmed gone, and +// nothing if the ledger refuses the settlement. Either way the attempt stays +// live: its token, its conversation and its directory are still its own, a +// person settles it, and this process stops counting it among the workers it +// may start. +func (d *Dispatcher) release(ctx context.Context, launch Launch, worker driver.Process, holder TokenHolder, end AttemptEnd, run *taskRun) { + log := d.taskLog(d.taskRedaction(launch, driver.SessionConfig{})) + err := d.confirmGroupGone(worker, d.opts.CancelGrace) + if err == nil { + // An agent may start the connector's own MCP server in a process + // group of its own (Codex does), and that process holds the task's + // token: it is confirmed gone here too, by the same rule. + err = d.confirmTakerGone(worker, holder) + } + if err != nil { + d.hold() + if run != nil { + d.forget(launch.AttemptID) + } + log.Error("connector: the worker's process group is still alive; its attempt stays live, and its directory is not released", + "attempt_id", end.AttemptID, "task_id", launch.TaskID, "error", err) + d.line(DispatchLine{Type: "dispatch", TaskID: launch.TaskID, AttemptID: end.AttemptID, State: string(AttemptRunning), StopReason: "held"}) + return + } + settlement, err := d.settle(ctx, end) + if err != nil { + d.hold() + if run != nil { + d.forget(launch.AttemptID) + } + log.Error("connector: could not settle an attempt; it stays live, and its directory is not released", + "attempt_id", end.AttemptID, "task_id", launch.TaskID, "error", err) + d.line(DispatchLine{Type: "dispatch", TaskID: launch.TaskID, AttemptID: end.AttemptID, State: string(AttemptRunning), StopReason: "held"}) + return + } + reportUnreported(log, end.Stop, settlement) + // Adoption is a read of Basecamp, bounded but slow, and no dispatch + // waits on it: the settlement is already written, and the link it may + // add is not what the next start depends on. A shutdown does not wait it + // out either — it cancels the reads (Run) and waits only for this to + // return. + d.wg.Go(func() { d.adopt(ctx, settlement) }) + d.finishWorkspace(ctx, launch.Route, launch.WorkDir) + d.line(DispatchLine{Type: "dispatch", TaskID: launch.TaskID, AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, State: string(AttemptEnded), StopReason: string(end.Stop)}) + if run != nil { + d.forget(launch.AttemptID) + } +} + +// settle ends an attempt in the ledger, retrying a failure with backoff: an +// attempt left live holds its token, conversation and directory. +func (d *Dispatcher) settle(ctx context.Context, end AttemptEnd) (Settlement, error) { + backoff := 200 * time.Millisecond + for i := 1; ; i++ { + settlement, err := d.ledger.EndAttempt(ctx, end) + if err == nil || errors.Is(err, ErrNoLiveAttempt) || i == settleAttempts { + return settlement, err + } + time.Sleep(backoff) + backoff *= 2 + } +} + +// forget drops a run from the live set. The ledger, not this map, is the +// record of what a task is. +func (d *Dispatcher) forget(attemptID string) { + d.mu.Lock() + delete(d.live, attemptID) + d.mu.Unlock() +} + +// finishWorkspace releases a task's working directory. It is the release +// point's alone: a directory is released only once the task that owned it is +// settled and its worker's group is confirmed gone. +func (d *Dispatcher) finishWorkspace(ctx context.Context, route, workDir string) { + d.workspaceFinished(ctx, route, workDir) +} + +// discardPreparedWorkspace releases a directory prepared for a task that was +// never created, so no worker ever ran in it. +func (d *Dispatcher) discardPreparedWorkspace(ctx context.Context, route, workDir string) { + d.workspaceFinished(ctx, route, workDir) +} + +func (d *Dispatcher) workspaceFinished(ctx context.Context, route, workDir string) { + if d.opts.Workspaces == nil || workDir == "" { + return + } + if err := d.opts.Workspaces.Finish(ctx, route, workDir); err != nil { + d.log.Warn("connector: finishing a working directory", "error", err) + } +} + +// AdoptionBudget bounds the reads one settlement spends on the adopted-reply +// rule. Settlement runs on a context a shutdown does not cancel — an attempt +// half-settled is worse than a shutdown that takes a moment — but adoption +// only adds a link to a record already written, so a shutdown ends it rather +// than spending this budget on every task that has just settled. +const AdoptionBudget = 2 * time.Minute + +// adopt applies the adopted-reply rule to a settled task. +func (d *Dispatcher) adopt(ctx context.Context, s Settlement) { + if d.opts.Replies == nil { + return + } + // The settlement's context outlives a shutdown on purpose; these reads + // do not (Copilot on #738). + written := ctx + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, AdoptionBudget) + defer cancel() + finished := make(chan struct{}) + defer close(finished) + go func() { + select { + case <-d.stopping: + cancel() + case <-finished: + } + }() + candidates, err := d.ledger.AdoptionCandidates(ctx, s.TaskID) + if err != nil { + d.log.Warn("connector: adoption candidates", "task_id", s.TaskID, "error", err) + return + } + for _, c := range candidates { + record, ok, err := d.ledger.Get(ctx, c.EventID) + if err != nil || !ok { + continue + } + replies, err := d.opts.Replies.AgentReplies(ctx, record.BucketID, c.ReplyKind, c.ReplyRecordingID, c.DeliveredAt) + if err != nil { + d.log.Warn("connector: listing replies for adoption", "event_id", c.EventID, "error", err) + continue + } + id, ok := AdoptableReply(c, replies, d.opts.IsLifecycleMessage) + if !ok { + continue + } + // The listing is what a shutdown cancels; a link it already found is + // written whatever happens next. + if err := d.ledger.AdoptReply(written, s.TaskID, c.EventID, id); err != nil { + d.log.Warn("connector: adopting a reply", "event_id", c.EventID, "error", err) + } + } +} + +func (d *Dispatcher) line(l DispatchLine) { + if d.lines == nil { + return + } + // A status line crosses out like a log line does. Its strings are the + // dispatcher's own enums and ids, and pass through the rule regardless. + red := d.red + l.Type, l.AttemptID, l.State, l.StopReason = red.Sanitize(l.Type), red.Sanitize(l.AttemptID), red.Sanitize(l.State), red.Sanitize(l.StopReason) + if err := d.lines.WriteLine(l); err != nil { + d.log.Warn("connector: dispatch line", "error", err) + } +} + +// taskRun supervises one live attempt. +type taskRun struct { + d *Dispatcher + launch Launch + record Record + session driver.Session + cleanup func() + // tokens is the attempt's token socket, which knows the MCP server the + // token went to. + tokens *TokenSocket + // log is the dispatcher's logger under this task's redaction. + log *slog.Logger + + // refusals records the session's refusals as they happen. + refusals *refusalRecorder +} + +// supervise prompts the worker, delivers follow-ups, and settles the attempt +// when the worker is done or stopped. +func (r *taskRun) supervise(ctx context.Context) { + d := r.d + settleCtx := context.WithoutCancel(ctx) + updatesDone := make(chan struct{}) + go r.drainUpdates(settleCtx, updatesDone) + + var deadline <-chan time.Time + if !r.launch.DeadlineAt.IsZero() { + timer := time.NewTimer(time.Until(r.launch.DeadlineAt)) + defer timer.Stop() + deadline = timer.C + } + var stillRunning <-chan time.Time + if d.opts.StillRunning > 0 { + ticker := time.NewTicker(d.opts.StillRunning) + defer ticker.Stop() + stillRunning = ticker.C + } + + stop := r.promptLoop(ctx, deadline, stillRunning) + + _ = r.session.Close() + <-r.session.Done() + exit := r.session.Exit() + // Only an exit the worker chose fails a clean stop. Close signals a + // worker slow to leave, and a descendant holding its output makes the + // wait end in an error; neither is the worker failing. + if stop == StopFinished && exit.Code > 0 && !exit.Signaled { + stop = StopFailed + } + <-updatesDone + // The socket is finished with before the attempt is released, so the + // process that took the token is known to the release point rather than + // recorded a moment too late. + taker := settledTaker(r.tokens, r.log, r.launch.AttemptID, d.opts.CancelGrace) + r.cleanup() + // Every update is drained, so every refusal the driver read has been + // through the recorder; what the ledger would not take is settled now. + unrecorded := r.refusals.unrecorded() + + if stop != StopFinished { + if tail, ok := r.session.(interface{ StderrTail() string }); ok { + // The driver's StderrTail is already its redactor's Stderr: the + // last line, sanitized, never the text verbatim. + if text := strings.TrimSpace(tail.StderrTail()); text != "" { + r.log.Warn("connector: the worker's last output", "attempt_id", r.launch.AttemptID, + "stop_reason", string(stop), "stderr", richtext.SanitizeSingleLine(text)) + } + } + } + + // Through the one release point: it confirms the worker's group is gone + // before the attempt is settled or its directory released. + d.release(settleCtx, r.launch, r.session.Process(), taker, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: r.launch.AttemptID, Stop: stop, UnrecordedRefusals: unrecorded}, r) +} + +// promptLoop runs turns until there is nothing left to prompt or the attempt +// is stopped, and returns the stop reason (invariant 4). +func (r *taskRun) promptLoop(ctx context.Context, deadline, stillRunning <-chan time.Time) StopReason { + d := r.d + prompt := DispatchPrompt(r.launch, r.record) + for { + result, stop, done := r.turn(ctx, prompt, deadline, stillRunning) + if done { + return stop + } + if result.Stop != driver.TurnEndTurn { + // A cancel the dispatcher did not ask for is a refusal wearing a + // cancel's stop reason; the rest are the agent giving up. + return StopFailed + } + if !d.opts.Driver.Capabilities().FollowUpPrompts { + // Nothing more is exposed to a session that cannot take it: a + // follow-up settles never-exposed, back to admitted, and starts + // a task of its own. + return StopFinished + } + if d.afterTurn != nil { + d.afterTurn() + } + // A stop asked for while the turn was ending is still that stop, and + // nothing more is exposed to a worker about to be stopped. + if ctx.Err() != nil { + return StopShutdown + } + select { + case <-deadline: + return StopDeadline + default: + } + next, ok, err := r.nextFollowUp(context.WithoutCancel(ctx)) + if err != nil { + r.log.Warn("connector: follow-up", "task_id", r.launch.TaskID, "error", err) + return StopFailed + } + if !ok { + return StopFinished + } + prompt = FollowUpPrompt(next) + } +} + +// nextFollowUp exposes the next event on the task not yet handed to the +// worker, and returns it. Nothing joins or is exposed once connect.json has +// stopped approving the task's directory for its project. +func (r *taskRun) nextFollowUp(ctx context.Context) (int64, bool, error) { + if !r.authorized() { + r.log.Warn("connector: the task's route is no longer approved; no more instructions are handed to its worker", + "task_id", r.launch.TaskID) + return 0, false, nil + } + if _, err := r.d.ledger.JoinConversation(ctx, r.launch.TaskID); err != nil { + return 0, false, err + } + for { + ids, err := r.d.ledger.UnexposedEvents(ctx, r.launch.TaskID) + if err != nil || len(ids) == 0 { + return 0, false, err + } + exposed, err := r.d.ledger.ExposeEvent(ctx, r.launch.AttemptID, ids[0]) + if errors.Is(err, ErrHeld) { + // A hold: nothing more is handed to this worker, and the task + // finishes rather than failing. Its unexposed events wait for a + // person (ledger_hold.go). + r.log.Info("connector: the connector is held; no more instructions are handed to this worker", "task_id", r.launch.TaskID) + return 0, false, nil + } + if err != nil { + return 0, false, err + } + if exposed { + return ids[0], true, nil + } + } +} + +// turn sends one prompt and waits for it to end, for the deadline, for +// shutdown, or for the worker to go. done is true when the attempt is over, +// with stop its reason. +func (r *taskRun) turn(ctx context.Context, prompt string, deadline, stillRunning <-chan time.Time) (driver.PromptResult, StopReason, bool) { + d := r.d + type answer struct { + result driver.PromptResult + err error + } + answers := make(chan answer, 1) + go func() { + result, err := r.session.Prompt(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), prompt) + answers <- answer{result, err} + }() + + stopFor := func(reason StopReason) (driver.PromptResult, StopReason, bool) { + _ = r.session.Cancel(context.WithoutCancel(ctx)) + select { + case <-answers: + // The turn the stop cut short recorded its refusals as they + // happened. + case <-r.session.Done(): + case <-time.After(d.opts.CancelGrace): + } + return driver.PromptResult{}, reason, true + } + for { + select { + case a := <-answers: + return r.answered(a.result, a.err) + case <-r.session.Done(): + // The worker went with a turn in flight. A result it wrote just + // before exiting still counts. + select { + case a := <-answers: + return r.answered(a.result, a.err) + case <-time.After(time.Second): + } + return driver.PromptResult{}, r.goneStop(), true + case <-deadline: + return stopFor(StopDeadline) + case <-ctx.Done(): + return stopFor(StopShutdown) + case <-stillRunning: + if _, err := d.ledger.StillRunning(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), r.launch.AttemptID); err != nil { + r.log.Warn("connector: still-running", "attempt_id", r.launch.AttemptID, "error", err) + } + } + } +} + +// answered reads a finished prompt: an error is classified (invariant 4). Its +// refusals were recorded as they happened. An unsafe session the driver +// ended is failed. A worker that is gone is classified by how it went: one +// that exited on its own with a non-zero status failed, and one that vanished +// — signaled by someone else, or gone with no status the connector saw — is +// lost. Any other error waits briefly to see whether the worker is gone. +func (r *taskRun) answered(result driver.PromptResult, err error) (driver.PromptResult, StopReason, bool) { + switch { + case err == nil: + return result, "", false + case errors.Is(err, driver.ErrUnsafeMode): + // The permission mode is the security-relevant one, and keeps a line + // of its own. + r.log.Error("connector: the worker did not confirm its permission mode; stopped", + "task_id", r.launch.TaskID, "error", err) + return result, StopFailed, true + case errors.Is(err, driver.ErrSessionUnverified): + // A session the driver itself ended because it was not the one asked + // for is a failure, not a worker that went away: the connector caused + // this end and knows why. + r.log.Error("connector: the worker was not the session the connector asked for; stopped", + "task_id", r.launch.TaskID, "error", err) + return result, StopFailed, true + case errors.Is(err, driver.ErrSessionEnded): + return result, r.goneStop(), true + } + r.log.Warn("connector: prompt failed", "task_id", r.launch.TaskID, "error", err) + select { + case <-r.session.Done(): + return result, r.goneStop(), true + case <-time.After(time.Second): + } + return result, StopFailed, true +} + +// goneStop is the stop reason for a worker that went with a turn in flight: +// failed when it exited on its own with a non-zero status, lost otherwise. +func (r *taskRun) goneStop() StopReason { + select { + case <-r.session.Done(): + case <-time.After(time.Second): + return StopLost + } + if exit := r.session.Exit(); exit.Code > 0 && !exit.Signaled && exit.Err == nil { + return StopFailed + } + return StopLost +} + +// authorized reports whether connect.json still approves this task's +// directory for its project, in the projects this run hears. +func (r *taskRun) authorized() bool { + return r.d.approvedRoutes()[r.record.BucketID] == r.launch.Route +} + +// refusalRecorder is the dispatcher's driver.RefusalRecorder for one attempt: +// each refusal is written to the attempt's row as it happens, and one the +// ledger will not take is kept for the attempt's settlement (driver's +// "Refusals"). +type refusalRecorder struct { + ledger *Ledger + attemptID string + log *slog.Logger + + mu sync.Mutex + pending int +} + +// refusalWriteTimeout bounds a refusal's write, which runs on the goroutine +// reading the agent's stream. +const refusalWriteTimeout = 10 * time.Second + +// RecordRefusal implements driver.RefusalRecorder. +func (r *refusalRecorder) RecordRefusal(ctx context.Context, refusal driver.Refusal) error { + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), refusalWriteTimeout) + defer cancel() + r.log.Info("connector: a permission was refused", "attempt_id", r.attemptID, "tool", richtext.SanitizeSingleLine(refusal.Tool)) + err := r.ledger.RecordRefusal(ctx, r.attemptID) + if err != nil { + r.mu.Lock() + r.pending++ + r.mu.Unlock() + r.log.Warn("connector: a refusal could not be recorded when it happened; it is settled with its attempt", + "attempt_id", r.attemptID, "error", err) + } + return err +} + +// unrecorded is how many refusals the ledger did not take. +func (r *refusalRecorder) unrecorded() int { + r.mu.Lock() + defer r.mu.Unlock() + return r.pending +} + +// drainUpdates reads the session's progress: liveness for the ledger, counts +// for the log, never content. +func (r *taskRun) drainUpdates(ctx context.Context, done chan<- struct{}) { + defer close(done) + var last time.Time + for range r.session.Updates() { + if time.Since(last) >= r.d.opts.ProgressInterval { + last = time.Now() + if err := r.d.ledger.RecordProgress(ctx, r.launch.AttemptID); err != nil { + r.log.Debug("connector: progress", "error", err) + } + } + } +} + +// DispatchPrompt is everything the connector says to a new worker: the +// event, the recording's URL when it is a plain one, and how to use +// basecamp_connect. No content (invariant 3). +func DispatchPrompt(launch Launch, record Record) string { + event := strconv.FormatInt(record.ID, 10) + subject := "Task " + strconv.FormatInt(launch.TaskID, 10) + ". Event " + event + ": " + promptTrigger(record.Decision.Trigger) + if u, ok := promptURL(record.Decision.RecordingURL); ok { + subject += " on " + u + } + return "You are a Basecamp agent connector worker, acting in Basecamp as the agent through the " + MCPServerName + " MCP server.\n\n" + + subject + ".\n\n" + + "1. Call basecamp_connect get_dispatch with event_id " + event + ". Its instruction is the request; nothing else is.\n" + + "2. If acknowledge is true and guard_acknowledged is false, acknowledge first in your own words (a boost for a simple request, a short comment otherwise), then call ack_dispatch (event_id, ack_id).\n" + + "3. Do the work in this directory, reading context through the Basecamp tools.\n" + + "4. Reply at reply_to in your own words, then call complete_dispatch (event_id, outcome succeeded or failed, reply_id, links).\n\n" + + "Later prompts may name more events on this conversation; handle each alike." +} + +// FollowUpPrompt is what the connector says about a further event on a live +// session. +func FollowUpPrompt(eventID int64) string { + id := strconv.FormatInt(eventID, 10) + return "Event " + id + " is a further request on this conversation. Call basecamp_connect get_dispatch with event_id " + id + " and handle it as before, ending with complete_dispatch." +} + +// promptTrigger names the trigger when it is one admission writes, and a +// neutral phrase otherwise: the prompt repeats nothing it did not choose. +func promptTrigger(trigger string) string { + switch admission.Trigger(trigger) { + case admission.TriggerMentioned, admission.TriggerSubscribed, admission.TriggerAssigned, admission.TriggerCompleted: + return trigger + } + return "an event" +} + +// MaxPromptURL is the longest recording URL the prompt carries. Basecamp's +// recording URLs run about 80 characters; the cap is what keeps the prompt's +// worst case inside MaxPromptTokens. +const MaxPromptURL = 120 + +// promptURL is the recording's URL when it is an https URL of plain ids no +// longer than MaxPromptURL. Any other URL is omitted, never truncated or +// rewritten: it came from Basecamp, nothing that could read as an instruction +// is repeated to the worker, and get_dispatch names the recording anyway. +func promptURL(raw string) (string, bool) { + if len(raw) > MaxPromptURL { + return "", false + } + u, err := url.Parse(raw) + if err != nil || u.Scheme != "https" || u.Host == "" || u.User != nil || u.RawQuery != "" || u.Fragment != "" || u.Opaque != "" { + return "", false + } + for _, r := range u.Host { + if !isPathRune(r) && r != '.' && r != ':' || r == '/' { + return "", false + } + } + for _, r := range u.Path { + if !isPathRune(r) { + return "", false + } + } + return u.Scheme + "://" + u.Host + u.Path, true +} + +func isPathRune(r rune) bool { + return (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || (r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z') || (r >= '0' && r <= '9') || r == '/' || r == '_' || r == '-' +} diff --git a/internal/connector/dispatcher_boundary_test.go b/internal/connector/dispatcher_boundary_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c7d73c01b --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/dispatcher_boundary_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "os" + "regexp" + "strings" + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +// The one release point, as a property of the source rather than of a +// reviewer's attention: settling an attempt, releasing a working directory +// and reporting an end happen in Dispatcher.release and nowhere else, so no +// later card can add a path that releases a directory while a worker may +// still be in it. +func TestOnlyTheReleasePointSettlesAnAttemptOrReleasesItsDirectory(t *testing.T) { + source, err := os.ReadFile("dispatcher.go") + require.NoError(t, err) + functions := splitFunctions(string(source)) + require.NotEmpty(t, functions) + + for _, call := range []string{"EndAttempt(", "finishWorkspace(", "d.settle(", "d.adopt("} { + for name, body := range functions { + if name == "release" || name == call[:len(call)-1] || (name == "settle" && call == "EndAttempt(") { + continue + } + assert.NotContains(t, body, call, "%s calls %s outside the release point", name, call) + } + } + // The only other way to release a directory is one no task ever owned. + for name, body := range functions { + switch name { + case "finishWorkspace", "discardPreparedWorkspace", "workspaceFinished": + continue + } + assert.NotContains(t, body, "Workspaces.Finish(", "%s releases a working directory of its own accord", name) + } + for name, body := range functions { + if name == "release" { + continue + } + assert.NotContains(t, body, "State: string(AttemptEnded)", "%s reports an attempt ended outside the release point", name) + } + // Both confirmations are the release point's: the worker's own group, and + // the process the task token went to, which an agent may have started in + // a group of its own. + for _, call := range []string{"confirmGroupGone(", "confirmTakerGone("} { + assert.Contains(t, functions["release"], call, "the release point does not confirm with %s", call) + } +} + +// The one rule for reading who holds a task token, as a property of the +// source: a holder is read through settledTaker, which closes the socket and +// waits for a handoff in flight to finish first, and nowhere else. Reading +// holderOf directly is how the NewSession failure path came to settle an +// attempt around a holder the socket had not finished deciding (Copilot on +// #738), and it is the shape a later card would repeat. +func TestAHolderIsOnlyEverReadThroughTheSettledSocket(t *testing.T) { + source, err := os.ReadFile("dispatcher.go") + require.NoError(t, err) + functions := splitFunctions(string(source)) + require.NotEmpty(t, functions) + + require.Contains(t, functions["settledTaker"], "holderOf(", "settledTaker is where a holder is read") + for name, body := range functions { + if name == "settledTaker" || name == "holderOf" { + continue + } + assert.NotContains(t, body, "holderOf(", "%s reads a token holder without settling the socket first", name) + assert.NotContains(t, body, ".Holder()", "%s reads a token holder without settling the socket first", name) + } +} + +// splitFunctions maps each top-level function or method name in a Go file to +// its body text. +func splitFunctions(source string) map[string]string { + header := regexp.MustCompile(`(?m)^func (?:\([^)]*\) )?(\w+)\(`) + matches := header.FindAllStringSubmatchIndex(source, -1) + out := make(map[string]string, len(matches)) + for i, m := range matches { + end := len(source) + if i+1 < len(matches) { + end = matches[i+1][0] + } + name := source[m[2]:m[3]] + out[name] = strings.TrimSpace(source[m[0]:end]) + } + return out +} diff --git a/internal/connector/dispatcher_test.go b/internal/connector/dispatcher_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6111e6d54 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/dispatcher_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,1691 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "log/slog" + "net" + "os" + "os/exec" + "path/filepath" + "slices" + "strconv" + "strings" + "sync" + "syscall" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/admission" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver/drivertest" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/ndjson" +) + +// fakeDriver hands out fakeSessions and lets a test script each turn. +type fakeDriver struct { + mu sync.Mutex + process driver.Process + startErr []error + onStart func(cfg driver.SessionConfig) + sessions []*fakeSession + // turn answers each prompt; nil means end_turn at once. + turn func(s *fakeSession, n int, prompt string) (driver.PromptResult, error) + made chan *fakeSession +} + +func newFakeDriver() *fakeDriver { return &fakeDriver{made: make(chan *fakeSession, 16)} } + +func (d *fakeDriver) Name() string { return "fake" } +func (d *fakeDriver) Capabilities() driver.Capabilities { + return driver.Capabilities{FollowUpPrompts: true} +} + +func (d *fakeDriver) NewSession(_ context.Context, cfg driver.SessionConfig) (driver.Session, error) { + if d.onStart != nil { + d.onStart(cfg) + } + d.mu.Lock() + if len(d.startErr) > 0 { + err := d.startErr[0] + d.startErr = d.startErr[1:] + d.mu.Unlock() + return nil, err + } + s := &fakeSession{d: d, cfg: cfg, done: make(chan struct{}), updates: make(chan driver.Update), canceled: make(chan struct{}, 1)} + d.sessions = append(d.sessions, s) + d.mu.Unlock() + d.made <- s + return s, nil +} + +func (d *fakeDriver) LoadSession(context.Context, driver.SessionConfig, string) (driver.Session, error) { + return nil, errors.New("not supported") +} + +type fakeSession struct { + d *fakeDriver + cfg driver.SessionConfig + mu sync.Mutex + prompts []string + done chan struct{} + once sync.Once + updates chan driver.Update + canceled chan struct{} + exit driver.Exit + closed bool +} + +func (s *fakeSession) ID() string { return "session-1" } +func (s *fakeSession) Process() driver.Process { + if s.d.process.PGID != 0 { + return s.d.process + } + return driver.Process{PID: 1 << 30, PGID: 1 << 30, StartedAt: time.Now()} +} + +func (s *fakeSession) Prompt(_ context.Context, prompt string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + s.mu.Lock() + s.prompts = append(s.prompts, prompt) + n := len(s.prompts) + s.mu.Unlock() + if s.d.turn == nil { + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnEndTurn}, nil + } + return s.d.turn(s, n, prompt) +} + +func (s *fakeSession) Updates() <-chan driver.Update { return s.updates } + +func (s *fakeSession) Cancel(context.Context) error { + select { + case s.canceled <- struct{}{}: + default: + } + return nil +} + +func (s *fakeSession) Close() error { + s.mu.Lock() + exit := s.exit + s.mu.Unlock() + s.exitWith(exit) + return nil +} + +func (s *fakeSession) exitWith(e driver.Exit) { + s.once.Do(func() { + s.mu.Lock() + s.exit, s.closed = e, true + s.mu.Unlock() + close(s.updates) + close(s.done) + }) +} + +func (s *fakeSession) Done() <-chan struct{} { return s.done } +func (s *fakeSession) Exit() driver.Exit { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + return s.exit +} + +func (s *fakeSession) promptList() []string { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + return append([]string(nil), s.prompts...) +} + +type dispatchHarness struct { + ledger *Ledger + fake *fakeDriver + d *Dispatcher + routes map[int64]admission.Route + mu sync.Mutex +} + +func newDispatchHarness(t *testing.T, fake *fakeDriver, tweak func(*DispatcherOptions)) *dispatchHarness { + t.Helper() + h := &dispatchHarness{ledger: newTestLedger(t), fake: fake, routes: map[int64]admission.Route{adapterBucketID: {Path: testRoute}}} + // Session directories hold a unix socket, whose path the kernel keeps + // short; a test's own temporary directory can be too long for one. + private, err := os.MkdirTemp("/tmp", "bcc-test-") + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, os.Chmod(private, 0o700)) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(private) }) + opts := DispatcherOptions{ + Ledger: h.ledger, + Driver: fake, + Routes: func() map[int64]admission.Route { + h.mu.Lock() + defer h.mu.Unlock() + out := map[int64]admission.Route{} + for k, v := range h.routes { + out[k] = v + } + return out + }, + Concurrency: 2, + Deadline: time.Hour, + MCP: WorkerMCP{Command: "/usr/local/bin/basecamp", Profile: "agent", StateDir: "/state/2914079-52007412"}, + PrivateDir: private, + Lookup: func(k string) (string, bool) { + switch k { + case "HOME": + return "/home/operator", true + case "CLAUDE_CODE_MESSAGING_TOKEN", "BASECAMP_TOKEN": + return "test-token-not-real-host", true + } + return "", false + }, + Tick: 10 * time.Millisecond, + CancelGrace: 200 * time.Millisecond, + } + if tweak != nil { + tweak(&opts) + } + d, err := NewDispatcher(opts) + require.NoError(t, err) + h.d = d + return h +} + +// run runs the dispatcher until the returned stop is called, which waits for +// Run to return. +func (h *dispatchHarness) run(t *testing.T) func() { + t.Helper() + ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background()) + done := make(chan error, 1) + go func() { done <- h.d.Run(ctx) }() + var once sync.Once + stop := func() { + once.Do(func() { + cancel() + select { + case err := <-done: + require.NoError(t, err) + case <-time.After(10 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the dispatcher did not stop") + } + }) + } + t.Cleanup(stop) + return stop +} + +func (h *dispatchHarness) attemptsEnded(t *testing.T, n int) []attemptRow { + t.Helper() + var rows []attemptRow + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { + r, err := h.ledger.db.QueryContext(context.Background(), `SELECT state, stop_reason, spawn_failed FROM attempts WHERE state = 'ended' ORDER BY launched_at, rowid`) + if err != nil { + return false + } + defer r.Close() + rows = nil + for r.Next() { + var a attemptRow + if r.Scan(&a.State, &a.StopReason, &a.SpawnFailed) != nil { + return false + } + rows = append(rows, a) + } + return len(rows) >= n + }, 10*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond) + return rows +} + +// Dispatcher invariant 1: the ledger has the attempt launching and the event +// exposed before the driver is asked for anything. +func TestTheDriverIsAskedOnlyAfterTheLedgerSaysLaunching(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + var h *dispatchHarness + var sawLaunching, sawExposed bool + fake.onStart = func(cfg driver.SessionConfig) { + var state, delivery string + _ = h.ledger.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT state FROM attempts WHERE id = ?`, cfg.Scope.AttemptID).Scan(&state) + _ = h.ledger.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT delivery FROM task_events WHERE task_id = ? AND event_id = 1`, cfg.Scope.TaskID).Scan(&delivery) + sawLaunching, sawExposed = state == "launching", delivery == "exposed" + } + h = newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + rows := h.attemptsEnded(t, 1) + assert.True(t, sawLaunching) + assert.True(t, sawExposed) + assert.Equal(t, "finished", rows[0].StopReason) + assert.Equal(t, StateCompleted, getRecord(t, h.ledger, 1).State, "exposed and unreported is completed(unknown)") +} + +// Dispatcher invariant 3. +func TestNothingCrossesToTheWorkerThatItDoesNotNeed(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + // The worker's group is this test's own, so this process may take the + // token from the socket the way the worker's MCP server would. + fake.process = driver.Process{PID: os.Getpid(), PGID: syscall.Getpgrp(), StartedAt: time.Now()} + var cfg driver.SessionConfig + token := make(chan string, 1) + fake.turn = func(s *fakeSession, n int, _ string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + if n == 1 { + socket := cfg.MCPServers[0].Args[len(cfg.MCPServers[0].Args)-1] + dialer := net.Dialer{Timeout: 2 * time.Second} + conn, err := dialer.DialContext(context.Background(), "unix", socket) + if err == nil { + data, _ := io.ReadAll(conn) + _ = conn.Close() + token <- strings.TrimSpace(string(data)) + } else { + token <- "" + } + } + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnEndTurn}, nil + } + fake.onStart = func(c driver.SessionConfig) { cfg = c } + lines := &safeBuffer{} + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, func(o *DispatcherOptions) { + o.Lines = ndjson.NewWriter(lines) + // Unix socket paths are short. + dir, err := os.MkdirTemp("/tmp", "bc-sess-") + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, os.Chmod(dir, 0o700)) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(dir) }) + o.PrivateDir = dir + }) + // The "worker's group" is this test's own: confirming it gone would kill + // the test. + h.d.confirmGroupGone = func(driver.Process, time.Duration) error { return nil } + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + h.attemptsEnded(t, 1) + s := fake.sessions[0] + prompt := s.promptList()[0] + + assert.NotContains(t, prompt, "please look", "no content") + assert.NotContains(t, prompt, "A comment", "no title") + assert.Contains(t, prompt, "https://app.basecamp.com/2914079/buckets/48699913/recordings/10304028972") + t.Logf("production-sized prompt: %d tokens by the upper bound", estimateTokens(prompt)) + assert.Less(t, estimateTokens(prompt), MaxPromptTokens) + + // The token reaches the worker's MCP server only over the socket. + secret := <-token + require.NotEmpty(t, secret, "the worker's own group was handed the token") + require.Len(t, cfg.MCPServers, 1) + assert.Equal(t, []string{"connect", "worker-mcp"}, cfg.MCPServers[0].Args[:2], "the agent starts the connector's bridge") + for _, kv := range cfg.Env { + assert.False(t, strings.HasPrefix(kv, "CLAUDE_CODE_MESSAGING_TOKEN="), "the host's tokens stay the host's") + assert.False(t, strings.HasPrefix(kv, "BASECAMP_TOKEN=")) + } + _, hostToken := cfg.MCPServers[0].Env["BASECAMP_TOKEN"] + assert.False(t, hostToken) + assert.Equal(t, testRoute, cfg.Cwd) + assert.Equal(t, testRoute, cfg.Policy.Rules().WorkDir) + serverEnv := make([]string, 0, len(cfg.MCPServers[0].Env)) + for k, v := range cfg.MCPServers[0].Env { + serverEnv = append(serverEnv, k+"="+v) + } + drivertest.RequireNoSecret(t, secret, drivertest.Places{ + Env: append(cfg.Env, serverEnv...), + Args: append([]string{prompt}, cfg.MCPServers[0].Args...), + Texts: []string{lines.String()}, + Dirs: []string{h.d.opts.PrivateDir}, + }) +} + +// estimateTokens is a deliberately pessimistic count: two characters a token, +// where English prose runs about four and the worst a real tokenizer reaches +// on text like this — ids, punctuation, tool names — is about two. It is a +// calibrated bound, not a proof: card 22 measured an 899-byte prompt at 322 +// tokens with the real tokenizer, which this puts at 450, and the budget's +// margin is what absorbs the difference. A byte-per-token adversary would +// beat it, and nothing an agent writes reaches this prompt. +func estimateTokens(s string) int { + return (len(s) + 1) / 2 +} + +func TestASpawnFailureIsRetriedOnceByTheDispatcher(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + fake.startErr = []error{ + errors.Join(driver.ErrNotStarted, errors.New("no binary")), + errors.Join(driver.ErrNotStarted, errors.New("no binary")), + } + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + rows := h.attemptsEnded(t, 2) + assert.True(t, rows[0].SpawnFailed) + assert.True(t, rows[1].SpawnFailed) + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return getRecord(t, h.ledger, 1).State == StateBlocked }, 5*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond) + time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond) + var attempts int + require.NoError(t, h.ledger.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM attempts`).Scan(&attempts)) + assert.Equal(t, 2, attempts, "no third try") +} + +func TestAStartErrorThatMayHaveRunIsNotRetried(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + fake.startErr = []error{errors.New("handshake failed after start")} + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + rows := h.attemptsEnded(t, 1) + assert.False(t, rows[0].SpawnFailed) + assert.Equal(t, "failed", rows[0].StopReason) + time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond) + assert.Equal(t, StateCompleted, getRecord(t, h.ledger, 1).State) + var attempts int + require.NoError(t, h.ledger.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM attempts`).Scan(&attempts)) + assert.Equal(t, 1, attempts) +} + +// Dispatcher invariant 4. +func TestStopReasonsAreTheDispatchersOwnRecord(t *testing.T) { + blockUntilCanceled := func(s *fakeSession, _ int, _ string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + <-s.canceled + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnCanceled}, nil + } + t.Run("deadline", func(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + fake.turn = blockUntilCanceled + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, func(o *DispatcherOptions) { o.Deadline = 100 * time.Millisecond }) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + assert.Equal(t, "deadline", h.attemptsEnded(t, 1)[0].StopReason) + }) + t.Run("shutdown", func(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + fake.turn = blockUntilCanceled + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + stop := h.run(t) + <-fake.made + stop() + assert.Equal(t, "shutdown", h.attemptsEnded(t, 1)[0].StopReason, "Run returns only once live attempts are settled") + }) + t.Run("a cancel nobody asked for", func(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + fake.turn = func(*fakeSession, int, string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnCanceled}, nil + } + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + assert.Equal(t, "failed", h.attemptsEnded(t, 1)[0].StopReason) + }) + t.Run("a worker gone mid-turn", func(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + fake.turn = func(s *fakeSession, _ int, _ string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + s.exitWith(driver.Exit{Code: -1, Signaled: true}) + select {} + } + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + assert.Equal(t, "lost", h.attemptsEnded(t, 1)[0].StopReason) + }) + t.Run("unsafe mode", func(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + fake.turn = func(*fakeSession, int, string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + return driver.PromptResult{}, driver.ErrUnsafeMode + } + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + assert.Equal(t, "failed", h.attemptsEnded(t, 1)[0].StopReason) + }) + t.Run("a non-zero exit after a clean turn", func(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + fake.turn = func(s *fakeSession, _ int, _ string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + s.mu.Lock() + s.exit = driver.Exit{Code: 2} + s.mu.Unlock() + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnEndTurn}, nil + } + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + assert.Equal(t, "failed", h.attemptsEnded(t, 1)[0].StopReason) + }) +} + +func TestAFollowUpIsExposedBeforeItsPromptInTheSameSession(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + var h *dispatchHarness + release := make(chan struct{}) + var followUpExposed bool + fake.turn = func(s *fakeSession, n int, prompt string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + switch n { + case 1: + <-release + case 2: + var delivery string + _ = h.ledger.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT delivery FROM task_events WHERE task_id = ? AND event_id = 2`, s.cfg.Scope.TaskID).Scan(&delivery) + followUpExposed = delivery == "exposed" + } + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnEndTurn}, nil + } + h = newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + s := <-fake.made + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 2, "recording:1") + close(release) + + rows := h.attemptsEnded(t, 1) + assert.Equal(t, "finished", rows[0].StopReason) + prompts := s.promptList() + require.Len(t, prompts, 2) + assert.Equal(t, FollowUpPrompt(2), prompts[1]) + assert.True(t, followUpExposed) + assert.Len(t, fake.sessions, 1, "one session for the conversation") +} + +// Dispatcher invariant 2. +func TestARouteNoLongerApprovedIsNotDispatched(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + h.routes = map[int64]admission.Route{adapterBucketID: {Path: "/another/checkout"}} + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + time.Sleep(150 * time.Millisecond) + assert.Empty(t, fake.sessions) + assert.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, getRecord(t, h.ledger, 1).State) +} + +func TestConcurrencyIsABound(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + hold := make(chan struct{}) + fake.turn = func(s *fakeSession, _ int, _ string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + select { + case <-hold: + case <-s.canceled: + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnCanceled}, nil + } + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnEndTurn}, nil + } + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + for i, id := range []int64{1, 2, 3} { + route := "/work/r" + string(rune('a'+i)) + h.routes[adapterBucketID+int64(i)] = admission.Route{Path: route} + seenRecord(t, h.ledger, id) + v := admittedVerdict(id, 0, "recording:"+string(rune('a'+i))) + v.Route = route + _, err := h.ledger.ledgerCommitWithBucket(v, adapterBucketID+int64(i)) + require.NoError(t, err) + } + h.run(t) + <-fake.made + <-fake.made + time.Sleep(150 * time.Millisecond) + fake.mu.Lock() + assert.Len(t, fake.sessions, 2) + fake.mu.Unlock() + close(hold) + h.attemptsEnded(t, 3) +} + +// ledgerCommitWithBucket admits v and moves its record to another bucket, so +// tests can have several routed projects. +func (l *Ledger) ledgerCommitWithBucket(v admission.Verdict, bucket int64) (admission.State, error) { + state, err := l.Admission().Commit(context.Background(), v) + if err != nil { + return state, err + } + _, err = l.db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `UPDATE events SET bucket_id = ? WHERE id = ?`, bucket, v.EventID) + return state, err +} + +// Dispatcher invariant 5. +func TestARestartSettlesWhatAPreviousProcessLeftLive(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, h.ledger, 1) + // A pid above the kernel's maximum: no process, nothing to signal. + require.NoError(t, h.ledger.MarkRunning(context.Background(), l.AttemptID, AttemptProcess{PID: 1 << 30, PGID: 1 << 30, StartedAt: time.Now(), SessionID: "s"})) + leftover := filepath.Join(h.d.opts.PrivateDir, l.AttemptID) + require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(leftover, 0o700)) + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(leftover, "mcp.json"), []byte(`{"env":"test-token-not-real"}`), 0o600)) + + require.NoError(t, h.d.Recover(context.Background())) + assert.Equal(t, "lost", readAttempt(t, h.ledger, l.AttemptID).StopReason) + assert.Equal(t, "unknown", readTaskEvent(t, h.ledger, l.TaskID, 1).Outcome, "launching after a crash is read as running") + _, err := os.Stat(leftover) + assert.True(t, os.IsNotExist(err), "a session file that could hold a token is swept") + assert.Empty(t, fake.sessions) +} + +// A driver whose sessions take one prompt. +type oneShotDriver struct{ *fakeDriver } + +func (oneShotDriver) Capabilities() driver.Capabilities { return driver.Capabilities{} } + +func TestAFollowUpForAOneShotDriverStartsATaskOfItsOwn(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + release := make(chan struct{}) + var turns sync.Mutex + started := 0 + fake.turn = func(s *fakeSession, n int, _ string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + turns.Lock() + started++ + first := started == 1 + turns.Unlock() + if first { + <-release + } + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnEndTurn}, nil + } + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, func(o *DispatcherOptions) { o.Driver = oneShotDriver{fake} }) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + first := <-fake.made + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 2, "recording:1") + close(release) + + rows := h.attemptsEnded(t, 2) + assert.Equal(t, "finished", rows[0].StopReason) + assert.Len(t, first.promptList(), 1, "nothing more is prompted into a one-shot session") + second := <-fake.made + assert.Contains(t, second.promptList()[0], "Event 2:", "the follow-up is the originating event of a new task") + var unknown int + require.NoError(t, h.ledger.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM task_events WHERE task_id = ? AND event_id = 2 AND outcome <> ''`, first.cfg.Scope.TaskID).Scan(&unknown)) + assert.Zero(t, unknown, "never exposed on the first task, so not unknown there") +} + +type fakeWorkspaces struct { + perTask bool + mu sync.Mutex + n int + finished int + recovered bool +} + +func (w *fakeWorkspaces) Prepare(_ context.Context, route string, eventID int64) (string, error) { + w.mu.Lock() + defer w.mu.Unlock() + w.n++ + return route + "-wt-" + string(rune('0'+w.n)), nil +} +func (w *fakeWorkspaces) Finish(context.Context, string, string) error { + w.mu.Lock() + w.finished++ + w.mu.Unlock() + return nil +} +func (w *fakeWorkspaces) PerTaskDirs() bool { return w.perTask } +func (w *fakeWorkspaces) Recover(context.Context) error { + w.mu.Lock() + w.recovered = true + w.mu.Unlock() + return nil +} + +func TestPerTaskWorkspacesLetTwoTasksShareARoute(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + hold := make(chan struct{}) + fake.turn = func(s *fakeSession, _ int, _ string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + select { + case <-hold: + case <-s.canceled: + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnCanceled}, nil + } + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnEndTurn}, nil + } + ws := &fakeWorkspaces{perTask: true} + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, func(o *DispatcherOptions) { o.Workspaces = ws }) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 2, "recording:2") + h.run(t) + a, b := nextSession(t, fake), nextSession(t, fake) + assert.NotEqual(t, a.cfg.Cwd, b.cfg.Cwd) + close(hold) + h.attemptsEnded(t, 2) + assert.True(t, ws.recovered, "Recover runs on start") +} + +func nextSession(t *testing.T, fake *fakeDriver) *fakeSession { + t.Helper() + select { + case s := <-fake.made: + return s + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("no session was started") + return nil + } +} + +// admitRouted admits a record on its own conversation in bucket, routed to +// route. +func admitRouted(t *testing.T, ledger *Ledger, id, bucket int64, key, route string) { + t.Helper() + seenRecord(t, ledger, id) + v := admittedVerdict(id, 0, key) + v.Route = route + _, err := ledger.ledgerCommitWithBucket(v, bucket) + require.NoError(t, err) +} + +// Review r1, blocking: records the dispatcher cannot start never fill the +// window ahead of one it can. +func TestRecordsTheDispatcherCannotStartDoNotStarveOthers(t *testing.T) { + t.Run("a route no longer approved", func(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + for i := int64(1); i <= 12; i++ { + admitRouted(t, h.ledger, i, 777, "recording:u"+string(rune('a'+i)), "/unrouted") + } + admitRouted(t, h.ledger, 50, adapterBucketID, "recording:ok", testRoute) + h.run(t) + s := nextSession(t, fake) + assert.Equal(t, int64(50), s.cfg.Scope.EventIDs[0]) + }) + t.Run("a backlog on a busy route", func(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + hold := make(chan struct{}) + fake.turn = func(s *fakeSession, _ int, _ string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + select { + case <-hold: + case <-s.canceled: + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnCanceled}, nil + } + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnEndTurn}, nil + } + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + h.routes[888] = admission.Route{Path: "/work/other"} + for i := int64(1); i <= 12; i++ { + admitRouted(t, h.ledger, i, adapterBucketID, "recording:b"+string(rune('a'+i)), testRoute) + } + admitRouted(t, h.ledger, 50, 888, "recording:other", "/work/other") + h.run(t) + first, second := nextSession(t, fake), nextSession(t, fake) + assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{testRoute, "/work/other"}, []string{first.cfg.Cwd, second.cfg.Cwd}) + close(hold) + }) +} + +func TestTheProjectScopeNarrowsDispatch(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, func(o *DispatcherOptions) { o.Buckets = []int64{888} }) + h.routes[888] = admission.Route{Path: "/work/other"} + admitRouted(t, h.ledger, 1, adapterBucketID, "recording:1", testRoute) + admitRouted(t, h.ledger, 2, 888, "recording:2", "/work/other") + h.run(t) + s := nextSession(t, fake) + assert.Equal(t, int64(2), s.cfg.Scope.EventIDs[0]) + time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond) + assert.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, getRecord(t, h.ledger, 1).State, "a project outside --project is not dispatched") +} + +// Review r1, 2: a stop asked for as a turn ends is still that stop. +func TestAShutdownAsATurnEndsIsRecordedAsShutdown(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background()) + done := make(chan error, 1) + // The shutdown lands after the turn's clean answer, before a follow-up + // is looked for. + h.d.afterTurn = cancel + go func() { done <- h.d.Run(ctx) }() + t.Cleanup(func() { cancel(); <-done }) + assert.Equal(t, "shutdown", h.attemptsEnded(t, 1)[0].StopReason) +} + +// Review r1, 3 and 4. +func TestExitsTheDispatcherCausedAreNotFailures(t *testing.T) { + t.Run("a worker signaled on close after a clean turn", func(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + fake.turn = func(s *fakeSession, _ int, _ string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + s.mu.Lock() + s.exit = driver.Exit{Code: -1, Signaled: true} + s.mu.Unlock() + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnEndTurn}, nil + } + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + assert.Equal(t, "finished", h.attemptsEnded(t, 1)[0].StopReason) + }) + t.Run("an unsafe session the driver ended itself", func(t *testing.T) { + for i := range 10 { + t.Run(strconv.Itoa(i), func(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + fake.turn = func(s *fakeSession, _ int, _ string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + s.exitWith(driver.Exit{Code: -1, Signaled: true}) + return driver.PromptResult{}, driver.ErrUnsafeMode + } + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + assert.Equal(t, "failed", h.attemptsEnded(t, 1)[0].StopReason, "not lost") + }) + } + }) +} + +// Copilot and review r1, 5: an unverifiable worker is not settled around. +func TestAWorkerThatCannotBeVerifiedKeepsItsAttemptLive(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, h.ledger, 1) + require.NoError(t, h.ledger.MarkRunning(context.Background(), l.AttemptID, AttemptProcess{PID: 4242, PGID: 4242, StartedAt: time.Now(), SessionID: "s"})) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 2, "recording:2") + h.d.terminateRecorded = func(driver.Process, time.Duration) (bool, error) { + return false, errors.New("start time unreadable") + } + + require.NoError(t, h.d.Recover(context.Background())) + assert.Equal(t, "running", readAttempt(t, h.ledger, l.AttemptID).State, "not settled") + h.run(t) + time.Sleep(150 * time.Millisecond) + fake.mu.Lock() + defer fake.mu.Unlock() + assert.Empty(t, fake.sessions, "its directory stays held") +} + +// Review r1, 7. +func TestASettlementThatFailsIsRetried(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + var mu sync.Mutex + failures := 2 + h.ledger.SetHooks(Hooks{AttemptEnded: func(context.Context, Tx, Settlement) error { + mu.Lock() + defer mu.Unlock() + if failures > 0 { + failures-- + return errors.New("busy outbox") + } + return nil + }}) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + assert.Equal(t, "finished", h.attemptsEnded(t, 1)[0].StopReason) +} + +// Copilot r2: a route revoked while a task runs stops follow-ups joining it. +func TestAFollowUpDoesNotJoinATaskWhoseRouteWasRevoked(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + release := make(chan struct{}) + fake.turn = func(*fakeSession, int, string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + <-release + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnEndTurn}, nil + } + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + s := nextSession(t, fake) + + h.mu.Lock() + h.routes = map[int64]admission.Route{} + h.mu.Unlock() + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 2, "recording:1") + time.Sleep(150 * time.Millisecond) + assert.Equal(t, StateQueued, getRecord(t, h.ledger, 2).State, "not handed to a worker in a directory no longer approved") + close(release) + h.attemptsEnded(t, 1) + assert.Len(t, s.promptList(), 1) +} + +// Copilot r2: a crash mid-launch leaves a worker nobody can name. +func TestAnAttemptLeftMidLaunchKeepsItsDirectoryHeld(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, h.ledger, 1) + + require.NoError(t, h.d.Recover(context.Background())) + assert.Equal(t, "launching", readAttempt(t, h.ledger, l.AttemptID).State, "not settled around a worker that cannot be named") + h.run(t) + time.Sleep(150 * time.Millisecond) + fake.mu.Lock() + defer fake.mu.Unlock() + assert.Empty(t, fake.sessions) +} + +// Review r2 and card 23's review: a configuration no retry can fix is not +// retried. +func TestAnUnusableConfigurationIsNotRetried(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + fake.startErr = []error{errors.Join(driver.ErrNotStarted, driver.ErrUnusable)} + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + rows := h.attemptsEnded(t, 1) + assert.True(t, rows[0].SpawnFailed) + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return getRecord(t, h.ledger, 1).State == StateBlocked }, 5*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond) + time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond) + var attempts int + require.NoError(t, h.ledger.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM attempts`).Scan(&attempts)) + assert.Equal(t, 1, attempts, "no automatic retry of a configuration error") +} + +// Card 23's review: a session the driver says has ended is lost, not failed. +func TestASessionTheDriverSaysHasEndedIsLost(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + fake.turn = func(s *fakeSession, _ int, _ string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + refusal := driver.Refusal{ToolCallID: "t1", Tool: "Bash"} + _ = s.cfg.Refusals.RecordRefusal(context.Background(), refusal) + return driver.PromptResult{Refusals: []driver.Refusal{refusal}}, driver.ErrSessionEnded + } + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + assert.Equal(t, "lost", h.attemptsEnded(t, 1)[0].StopReason) + var refusals int + require.NoError(t, h.ledger.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT refusals FROM attempts`).Scan(&refusals)) + assert.Equal(t, 1, refusals, "refusals are counted whatever ended the turn") +} + +// Copilot r3: an attempt recovery left live holds a worker slot. +func TestAnAttemptLeftLiveHoldsAWorkerSlot(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + hold := make(chan struct{}) + fake.turn = func(s *fakeSession, _ int, _ string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + select { + case <-hold: + case <-s.canceled: + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnCanceled}, nil + } + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnEndTurn}, nil + } + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, func(o *DispatcherOptions) { o.Concurrency = 2 }) + // One attempt whose worker cannot be identified, on its own route. + h.routes[900] = admission.Route{Path: "/work/held"} + admitRouted(t, h.ledger, 1, 900, "recording:held", "/work/held") + _, err := h.ledger.LaunchTask(context.Background(), LaunchSpec{EventID: 1, Route: "/work/held", Driver: "fake"}) + require.NoError(t, err) + // Two more conversations, each with a route of its own. + h.routes[901] = admission.Route{Path: "/work/a"} + h.routes[902] = admission.Route{Path: "/work/b"} + admitRouted(t, h.ledger, 2, 901, "recording:a", "/work/a") + admitRouted(t, h.ledger, 3, 902, "recording:b", "/work/b") + + require.NoError(t, h.d.Recover(context.Background())) + h.run(t) + nextSession(t, fake) + time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond) + fake.mu.Lock() + live := len(fake.sessions) + fake.mu.Unlock() + assert.Equal(t, 1, live, "the held attempt's worker may still exist, so only one more starts") + close(hold) +} + +// The one-owner rule (see internal/connector/driver/worker.go): a task whose +// process tree is still alive never has its directory released or its record +// settled. +func TestATaskWithASurvivingGrandchildNeverReleasesItsDirectory(t *testing.T) { + work := t.TempDir() + worker, grandchild := drivertest.StartTree(t, work) + <-worker.Done() // the leader is gone; its grandchild is not + + fake := newFakeDriver() + // The session reports the worker's group, which still has a member, and + // closing it kills nothing. + fake.process = worker.Process() + ws := &fakeWorkspaces{} + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, func(o *DispatcherOptions) { + o.Workspaces = ws + o.CancelGrace = 200 * time.Millisecond + }) + // Confirmation without signaling, so the fixture's tree survives the + // check as a tree that ignored every signal would. + h.d.confirmGroupGone = func(p driver.Process, _ time.Duration) error { + if driver.GroupMembersRemain(p) { + return driver.ErrGroupOutlivedLeader + } + return nil + } + h.routes[adapterBucketID] = admission.Route{Path: work} + admitRouted(t, h.ledger, 1, adapterBucketID, "recording:1", work) + h.run(t) + + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { + attempts, err := h.ledger.LiveAttempts(context.Background()) + return err == nil && len(attempts) == 1 && attempts[0].State == AttemptRunning + }, 5*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond) + time.Sleep(500 * time.Millisecond) + drivertest.RequireGroupHeld(t, worker.Process()) + assert.True(t, drivertest.Alive(grandchild)) + + attempt := liveAttemptID(t, h.ledger) + assert.Equal(t, "running", readAttempt(t, h.ledger, attempt).State, "the record is not terminal") + assert.Equal(t, StateDispatched, getRecord(t, h.ledger, 1).State) + ws.mu.Lock() + defer ws.mu.Unlock() + assert.Zero(t, ws.finished, "the working directory is not released") +} + +// liveAttemptID is the id of the one attempt that has not ended. +func liveAttemptID(t *testing.T, ledger *Ledger) string { + t.Helper() + attempts, err := ledger.LiveAttempts(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, attempts, 1) + return attempts[0].AttemptID +} + +// Review r3: a turn a stop cut short still refused what it refused. +func TestAStoppedTurnStillCountsItsRefusals(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + fake.turn = func(s *fakeSession, _ int, _ string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + refusals := []driver.Refusal{{ToolCallID: "t1", Tool: "Bash"}, {ToolCallID: "t2", Tool: "WebFetch"}} + for _, r := range refusals { + _ = s.cfg.Refusals.RecordRefusal(context.Background(), r) + } + <-s.canceled + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnCanceled, Refusals: refusals}, nil + } + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, func(o *DispatcherOptions) { o.Deadline = 100 * time.Millisecond }) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + assert.Equal(t, "deadline", h.attemptsEnded(t, 1)[0].StopReason) + var refusals int + require.NoError(t, h.ledger.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT refusals FROM attempts`).Scan(&refusals)) + assert.Equal(t, 2, refusals) +} + +// Copilot r4: recovery releases nothing until the recorded group is confirmed +// gone, whatever the terminate step reported. +func TestRecoveryReleasesNothingWhileTheRecordedGroupSurvives(t *testing.T) { + work := t.TempDir() + worker, grandchild := drivertest.SurvivingWorker(t, work) + + fake := newFakeDriver() + ws := &fakeWorkspaces{} + lines := &safeBuffer{} + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, func(o *DispatcherOptions) { + o.Workspaces = ws + o.Lines = ndjson.NewWriter(lines) + o.CancelGrace = 100 * time.Millisecond + }) + h.routes[adapterBucketID] = admission.Route{Path: work} + admitRouted(t, h.ledger, 1, adapterBucketID, "recording:1", work) + l, err := h.ledger.LaunchTask(context.Background(), LaunchSpec{EventID: 1, Route: work, Driver: "fake"}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, h.ledger.MarkRunning(context.Background(), l.AttemptID, AttemptProcess{ + PID: worker.PID, PGID: worker.PGID, StartedAt: worker.StartedAt, SessionID: "s", + })) + // The terminate step reports it signaled the group, as it does for a + // worker that ignores every signal. + h.d.terminateRecorded = func(driver.Process, time.Duration) (bool, error) { return true, nil } + h.d.confirmGroupGone = func(p driver.Process, _ time.Duration) error { + if driver.GroupMembersRemain(p) { + return driver.ErrGroupOutlivedLeader + } + return nil + } + + require.NoError(t, h.d.Recover(context.Background())) + assert.Equal(t, "running", readAttempt(t, h.ledger, l.AttemptID).State, "the record is not terminal") + assert.Equal(t, StateDispatched, getRecord(t, h.ledger, 1).State) + assert.True(t, drivertest.Alive(grandchild)) + ws.mu.Lock() + assert.Zero(t, ws.finished, "the working directory is not released") + ws.mu.Unlock() + assert.NotContains(t, lines.String(), `"state":"ended"`, "and no end is reported") +} + +// Copilot r4: a settlement that cannot be written releases nothing either. +func TestASettlementThatCannotBeWrittenReleasesNothing(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + ws := &fakeWorkspaces{} + lines := &safeBuffer{} + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, func(o *DispatcherOptions) { + o.Workspaces = ws + o.Lines = ndjson.NewWriter(lines) + }) + h.ledger.SetHooks(Hooks{AttemptEnded: func(context.Context, Tx, Settlement) error { + return errors.New("the outbox refuses every time") + }}) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + + // The run gives up on the settlement and lets the attempt go, still live. + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { + return strings.Contains(lines.String(), `"state":"running"`) && liveRuns(h) == 0 + }, 10*time.Second, 50*time.Millisecond) + attempts, err := h.ledger.LiveAttempts(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, attempts, 1, "the attempt stays live") + assert.Zero(t, ws.finishedCount(), "its directory is not released") + assert.NotContains(t, lines.String(), `"state":"ended"`, "and no end is reported") + assert.Equal(t, StateDispatched, getRecord(t, h.ledger, 1).State) +} + +func (w *fakeWorkspaces) finishedCount() int { + w.mu.Lock() + defer w.mu.Unlock() + return w.finished +} + +func liveRuns(h *dispatchHarness) int { + h.d.mu.Lock() + defer h.d.mu.Unlock() + return len(h.d.live) +} + +// Card 23: a start whose handshake failed after it launched a process +// releases nothing until that group is confirmed gone. +func TestAStartThatFailedAfterLaunchingReleasesNothingWhileItsGroupLives(t *testing.T) { + work := t.TempDir() + worker, grandchild := drivertest.SurvivingWorker(t, work) + + fake := newFakeDriver() + fake.startErr = []error{&driver.StartError{Process: worker, Err: errors.New("handshake timed out")}} + ws := &fakeWorkspaces{} + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, func(o *DispatcherOptions) { o.Workspaces = ws; o.CancelGrace = 100 * time.Millisecond }) + h.d.confirmGroupGone = func(p driver.Process, _ time.Duration) error { + if driver.GroupMembersRemain(p) { + return driver.ErrGroupOutlivedLeader + } + return nil + } + h.routes[adapterBucketID] = admission.Route{Path: work} + admitRouted(t, h.ledger, 1, adapterBucketID, "recording:1", work) + h.run(t) + + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { + attempts, err := h.ledger.LiveAttempts(context.Background()) + return err == nil && len(attempts) == 1 && liveRuns(h) == 0 && h.d.heldCount() == 1 + }, 5*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond) + assert.True(t, drivertest.Alive(grandchild)) + assert.Zero(t, ws.finishedCount(), "the directory is not released") + assert.Equal(t, StateDispatched, getRecord(t, h.ledger, 1).State, "the record is not terminal") +} + +// Card 19: how a worker went decides its stop. Exiting on its own with a +// non-zero status is failed; vanishing is lost. +func TestAWorkerThatExitsNonZeroMidTurnFailedAndOneThatVanishedIsLost(t *testing.T) { + for name, tc := range map[string]struct { + exit driver.Exit + want string + }{ + "exited 2 on its own": {driver.Exit{Code: 2}, "failed"}, + "killed by someone else": {driver.Exit{Code: -1, Signaled: true}, "lost"}, + "gone with no status seen": {driver.Exit{Code: -1, Err: errors.New("wait failed")}, "lost"}, + } { + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + fake.turn = func(s *fakeSession, _ int, _ string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + s.exitWith(tc.exit) + return driver.PromptResult{}, driver.ErrSessionEnded + } + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + assert.Equal(t, tc.want, h.attemptsEnded(t, 1)[0].StopReason) + }) + } +} + +type waitingWorkspaces struct { + fakeWorkspaces + waiting []string +} + +func (w *waitingWorkspaces) Prepare(_ context.Context, route string, _ int64) (string, error) { + if slices.Contains(w.waiting, route) { + return "", errors.New("the repository cannot take a worktree") + } + return route, nil +} + +func (w *waitingWorkspaces) RoutesWaiting() []string { return w.waiting } + +// Card 19: a route that cannot take a task must not starve the others. +func TestAFailingRouteDoesNotStarveTheOthers(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + ws := &waitingWorkspaces{waiting: []string{"/work/broken"}} + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, func(o *DispatcherOptions) { o.Workspaces = ws }) + h.routes[700] = admission.Route{Path: "/work/broken"} + for i := int64(1); i <= 12; i++ { + admitRouted(t, h.ledger, i, 700, "recording:broken"+strconv.FormatInt(i, 10), "/work/broken") + } + admitRouted(t, h.ledger, 50, adapterBucketID, "recording:ok", testRoute) + h.run(t) + s := nextSession(t, fake) + assert.Equal(t, int64(50), s.cfg.Scope.EventIDs[0]) +} + +// The redaction rule at the connector's end (driver's redact.go): the task's +// own token, taken from the socket by the worker, comes back in what the +// driver reports, and nothing the dispatcher writes carries it. +func TestNothingTheDispatcherWritesCarriesASecret(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + fake.process = driver.Process{PID: os.Getpid(), PGID: syscall.Getpgrp(), StartedAt: time.Now()} + var cfg driver.SessionConfig + fake.onStart = func(c driver.SessionConfig) { cfg = c } + got := make(chan string, 1) + fake.turn = func(s *fakeSession, n int, _ string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + socket := cfg.MCPServers[0].Args[len(cfg.MCPServers[0].Args)-1] + dialer := net.Dialer{Timeout: 2 * time.Second} + conn, err := dialer.DialContext(context.Background(), "unix", socket) + require.NoError(t, err) + data, _ := io.ReadAll(conn) + _ = conn.Close() + token := strings.TrimSpace(string(data)) + got <- token + s.updates <- driver.Update{Kind: driver.UpdatePermission, Tool: "mcp__basecamp__" + token, Allowed: false} + // Everything the rule names, the way an agent reports a failure. + return driver.PromptResult{}, fmt.Errorf("agent failed: token %s, ledger %s, as someone@example.com", + token, filepath.Join("/state/2914079-52007412", "ledger.db")) + } + var logs safeBuffer + lines := &safeBuffer{} + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, func(o *DispatcherOptions) { + o.Logger = slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&logs, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug})) + o.Lines = ndjson.NewWriter(lines) + dir, err := os.MkdirTemp("/tmp", "bc-sess-") + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, os.Chmod(dir, 0o700)) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(dir) }) + o.PrivateDir = dir + }) + // The worker's group is this test's own: confirming it gone would kill + // the test. + h.d.confirmGroupGone = func(driver.Process, time.Duration) error { return nil } + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + h.attemptsEnded(t, 1) + + token := <-got + require.NotEmpty(t, token) + written := logs.String() + lines.String() + require.Contains(t, written, "prompt failed", "the failure was logged at all") + assert.NotContains(t, written, token, "the task token") + assert.NotContains(t, written, "/state/2914079-52007412", "a path under the state directory") + assert.NotContains(t, written, "someone@example.com", "an address the agent volunteered") + assert.NotContains(t, written, h.d.opts.PrivateDir, "a path under the runtime directory") +} + +// A task's redaction knows the task's token, whatever else it knows. +func TestATasksRedactionCarriesItsToken(t *testing.T) { + h := newDispatchHarness(t, newFakeDriver(), nil) + r := h.d.taskRedaction(Launch{Token: "test-token-not-real"}, driver.SessionConfig{Env: []string{"A=alpha-not-real"}}) + assert.Contains(t, r.Secrets, "test-token-not-real") + assert.Contains(t, r.Env, "A=alpha-not-real") + assert.Contains(t, r.Dirs, h.d.opts.PrivateDir) + assert.Contains(t, r.Dirs, h.d.opts.MCP.StateDir) +} + +// The refusal rule (driver's "Refusals"): a refusal is in the ledger while +// the worker still runs, and a worker that exits before its result keeps it. +// The result's own list is not counted again. +func TestARefusalIsInTheLedgerBeforeTheWorkerGoes(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + recorded := make(chan struct{}) + exit := make(chan struct{}) + fake.turn = func(s *fakeSession, _ int, _ string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + _ = s.cfg.Refusals.RecordRefusal(context.Background(), driver.Refusal{ToolCallID: "t1", Tool: "Bash"}) + close(recorded) + <-exit + s.exitWith(driver.Exit{Code: 3}) + return driver.PromptResult{Refusals: []driver.Refusal{{ToolCallID: "t1", Tool: "Bash"}}}, driver.ErrSessionEnded + } + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + + <-recorded + var refusals int + var state string + require.NoError(t, h.ledger.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT refusals, state FROM attempts`).Scan(&refusals, &state)) + assert.Equal(t, 1, refusals, "recorded at the moment, not at the end") + assert.NotEqual(t, "ended", state) + + close(exit) + h.attemptsEnded(t, 1) + require.NoError(t, h.ledger.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT refusals FROM attempts`).Scan(&refusals)) + assert.Equal(t, 1, refusals, "settled with the attempt, once") +} + +// A refusal the ledger will not take is kept for the attempt's settlement. +func TestARefusalTheLedgerRefusedIsCarriedToTheSettlement(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + r := &refusalRecorder{ledger: ledger, attemptID: "no-such-attempt", log: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)} + assert.Error(t, r.RecordRefusal(context.Background(), driver.Refusal{ToolCallID: "t1", Tool: "Bash"})) + assert.Equal(t, 1, r.unrecorded()) +} + +// Card 23's review: an agent may start the connector's own MCP server in a +// process group of its own (Codex does), so the release point ends the +// process that took the task token as well as the worker's group. +func TestTheProcessThatTookTheTokenIsEndedWithTheWorker(t *testing.T) { + // A process of its own, standing in for the bridge an agent started + // outside the worker's group. + bridge := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "/bin/sleep", "300") + bridge.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setpgid: true} + require.NoError(t, bridge.Start()) + t.Cleanup(func() { + _ = bridge.Process.Kill() + _ = bridge.Wait() + }) + taker, err := driver.LookupProcess(bridge.Process.Pid) + require.NoError(t, err) + + h := newDispatchHarness(t, newFakeDriver(), nil) + socket, err := ServeTaskToken(tokenDir(t), "test-token-not-real", time.Second) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer socket.Close() + socket.mu.Lock() + socket.taker = taker + socket.mu.Unlock() + // A worker in another group entirely, already confirmed gone. + worker := driver.Process{PID: 1 << 30, PGID: 1 << 30} + require.NoError(t, h.d.confirmTakerGone(worker, holderOf(socket))) + // Alive() counts a zombie, and this test is the process that has not + // reaped it; the rule's own question is whether anything of the group + // still runs. + assert.False(t, driver.GroupMembersRemain(taker), "the process holding the task token is ended with its worker") + + // Asked again, with nothing of it left, it is still gone. + assert.NoError(t, h.d.confirmTakerGone(worker, holderOf(socket))) +} + +// A token taken inside the worker's own group is already covered by the +// worker's own confirmation, and is not signaled twice. +func TestATakerInTheWorkersGroupIsNotEndedTwice(t *testing.T) { + h := newDispatchHarness(t, newFakeDriver(), nil) + socket, err := ServeTaskToken(tokenDir(t), "test-token-not-real", time.Second) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer socket.Close() + socket.mu.Lock() + socket.taker = driver.Process{PID: os.Getpid(), PGID: syscall.Getpgrp(), StartedAt: time.Now()} + socket.mu.Unlock() + require.NoError(t, h.d.confirmTakerGone(driver.Process{PID: os.Getpid(), PGID: syscall.Getpgrp()}, holderOf(socket))) + assert.NoError(t, h.d.confirmTakerGone(driver.Process{PID: 1 << 30, PGID: 1 << 30}, holderOf(socket)), + "this process's own group is never signaled, whatever a record says") +} + +// Card 23's review: a session the driver ended because it was not the one the +// connector asked for — an MCP server that never connected — is failed, not +// lost. Lost is for a worker that went away. +func TestASessionThatIsNotTheOneAskedForIsFailed(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + fake.turn = func(s *fakeSession, _ int, _ string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + // As the driver does: it ends the worker itself, so without the + // sentinel this reads as a worker that was signaled and went. + s.exitWith(driver.Exit{Signaled: true}) + return driver.PromptResult{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: MCP server %q did not connect", driver.ErrSessionUnverified, MCPServerName) + } + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + assert.Equal(t, "failed", h.attemptsEnded(t, 1)[0].StopReason) +} + +// Card 23's review, across a restart: the process that took the task token is +// recorded with the attempt, so a connector that comes back ends it rather +// than leave a process of its own holding a superseded token. +func TestARestartEndsTheProcessThatTookTheToken(t *testing.T) { + bridge := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "/bin/sleep", "300") + bridge.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setpgid: true} + require.NoError(t, bridge.Start()) + t.Cleanup(func() { + _ = bridge.Process.Kill() + _ = bridge.Wait() + }) + taker, err := driver.LookupProcess(bridge.Process.Pid) + require.NoError(t, err) + + h := newDispatchHarness(t, newFakeDriver(), nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, h.ledger, 1) + ctx := context.Background() + // A worker whose pid is above the kernel's maximum: gone, nothing to + // signal. Its MCP server is the one still running. + require.NoError(t, h.ledger.MarkRunning(ctx, l.AttemptID, AttemptProcess{PID: 1 << 30, PGID: 1 << 30, StartedAt: time.Now(), SessionID: "s"})) + require.NoError(t, h.ledger.RecordTaker(ctx, l.AttemptID, recordedProcess(taker, ""))) + + live, err := h.ledger.LiveAttempts(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, live, 1) + assert.Equal(t, taker.PID, live[0].Taker.PID, "the ledger carries it across the restart") + + require.NoError(t, h.d.Recover(ctx)) + assert.Equal(t, "lost", readAttempt(t, h.ledger, l.AttemptID).StopReason) + assert.False(t, driver.GroupMembersRemain(taker), "the process holding the token is ended by the restart") +} + +// A worker whose Basecamp MCP server dies mid-session cannot report what it +// was given; nothing in Claude Code's stream says so, so the end of a clean +// turn with an unreported event is logged for a person to find. +func TestACleanFinishWithAnUnreportedEventIsLogged(t *testing.T) { + var logs safeBuffer + fake := newFakeDriver() + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, func(o *DispatcherOptions) { + o.Logger = slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&logs, nil)) + }) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + require.Equal(t, "finished", h.attemptsEnded(t, 1)[0].StopReason) + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return strings.Contains(logs.String(), UnreportedFinishLine) }, + 5*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond, "a clean finish that reported nothing is named in the log") + assert.Contains(t, logs.String(), `"event_id":1`) +} + +// Card 22's review: a unix socket path is 103 bytes at most, and a long home +// or deep state directory puts a session directory past it. That would fail +// every dispatch, not one, so the socket moves rather than the task failing. +func TestADeepSessionDirectoryStillGetsItsTokenAcross(t *testing.T) { + deep, err := os.MkdirTemp("/tmp", "bcc-deep-") + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(deep) }) + // Long enough that a socket in an attempt's own directory cannot fit. + deep = filepath.Join(deep, strings.Repeat("d", 40), strings.Repeat("e", 40)) + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(deep, 0o700)) + require.False(t, TokenSocketFits(filepath.Join(deep, "att_000000000000000000000000")), + "the fixture must be past the limit for this test to mean anything") + + fake := newFakeDriver() + fake.process = driver.Process{PID: os.Getpid(), PGID: syscall.Getpgrp(), StartedAt: time.Now()} + var cfg driver.SessionConfig + fake.onStart = func(c driver.SessionConfig) { cfg = c } + token := make(chan string, 1) + fake.turn = func(*fakeSession, int, string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + socket := cfg.MCPServers[0].Args[len(cfg.MCPServers[0].Args)-1] + dialer := net.Dialer{Timeout: 2 * time.Second} + conn, dialErr := dialer.DialContext(context.Background(), "unix", socket) + if dialErr != nil { + token <- "" + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnEndTurn}, nil //nolint:nilerr // the failure is reported through the channel the test reads + } + data, _ := io.ReadAll(conn) + _ = conn.Close() + token <- strings.TrimSpace(string(data)) + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnEndTurn}, nil + } + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, func(o *DispatcherOptions) { o.PrivateDir = deep }) + // The worker's group is this test's own: confirming it gone would kill + // the test. + h.d.confirmGroupGone = func(driver.Process, time.Duration) error { return nil } + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + h.attemptsEnded(t, 1) + + assert.NotEmpty(t, <-token, "the worker's MCP server was handed its token from a socket that fits") + socket := cfg.MCPServers[0].Args[len(cfg.MCPServers[0].Args)-1] + assert.LessOrEqual(t, len(socket), 103) + _, err = os.Stat(filepath.Dir(socket)) + assert.True(t, os.IsNotExist(err), "and the directory it was moved to is removed with the attempt") +} + +// Opus r6: a socket directory the connector had to make elsewhere is its own +// to sweep, or a crash leaves one behind on every dispatch. +func TestAShortSocketDirectoryIsSweptOnStart(t *testing.T) { + runtimeDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("/tmp", "bcrt-") + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, os.Chmod(runtimeDir, 0o700)) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(runtimeDir) }) + + deep, err := os.MkdirTemp("/tmp", "bcc-deep-") + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(deep) }) + deep = filepath.Join(deep, strings.Repeat("d", 40), strings.Repeat("e", 40)) + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(deep, 0o700)) + + h := newDispatchHarness(t, newFakeDriver(), func(o *DispatcherOptions) { + o.PrivateDir = deep + o.Lookup = func(k string) (string, bool) { + if k == "XDG_RUNTIME_DIR" { + return runtimeDir, true + } + return "", false + } + }) + base := h.d.shortSocketBase(filepath.Join(deep, strings.Repeat("a", AttemptIDLength))) + require.NotEmpty(t, base) + assert.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(base, runtimeDir), "under the runtime directory this connector was given: %s vs %s", base, runtimeDir) + + // What a crashed run left behind. + leftover := filepath.Join(base, "s-from-a-crash") + require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(leftover, 0o700)) + require.NoError(t, h.d.Recover(context.Background())) + _, err = os.Stat(leftover) + assert.True(t, os.IsNotExist(err), "a start sweeps what a crash left in it") +} + +// Copilot: a start that failed can leave its attempt held, and a held +// attempt takes a worker slot. Capacity is asked again for every record in +// the pass, not counted down from what it was at the top. +func TestAHeldAttemptTakesASlotWithinTheSamePass(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + // Every start fails after a process existed, and no group can be + // confirmed gone: each attempt is held. + for range 3 { + fake.startErr = append(fake.startErr, + &driver.StartError{Process: driver.Process{PID: 1 << 30, PGID: 1 << 30}, Err: errors.New("handshake failed")}) + } + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, func(o *DispatcherOptions) { o.Concurrency = 2 }) + h.d.confirmGroupGone = func(driver.Process, time.Duration) error { return driver.ErrGroupOutlivedLeader } + // Three records on three directories, so nothing but the bound stops them. + for i, id := range []int64{1, 2, 3} { + route := "/work/held" + string(rune('a'+i)) + h.routes[adapterBucketID+int64(i)] = admission.Route{Path: route} + seenRecord(t, h.ledger, id) + v := admittedVerdict(id, 0, "recording:held"+string(rune('a'+i))) + v.Route = route + _, err := h.ledger.ledgerCommitWithBucket(v, adapterBucketID+int64(i)) + require.NoError(t, err) + } + h.run(t) + + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return h.d.heldCount() >= 2 }, 5*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond) + time.Sleep(300 * time.Millisecond) + assert.Equal(t, 2, h.d.heldCount(), "two held attempts fill the window, and the third record waits") + var attempts int + require.NoError(t, h.ledger.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM attempts`).Scan(&attempts)) + assert.Equal(t, 2, attempts, "no third worker while two are unaccounted for") + assert.LessOrEqual(t, h.d.free(), 0) +} + +// An agent hands its MCP servers its own whole environment, so a name the +// connector leaves unset arrives carrying the agent's value — and +// BASECAMP_BASE_URL is where the agent's Basecamp credential would be sent. +// Every name the server may have is pinned to this connector's value or to +// nothing. +// +// And no name beyond those two lists is pinned. The bridge rebuilds the +// server's environment from driver.BaseEnv and MCPServerEnv once it has +// taken the token (connect_worker_mcp.go), so anything pinned here that is +// not in them is declared by the connector and dropped a moment later — an +// allowlist that reads as configuration and does nothing (Copilot on #738). +func TestTheWorkersServerEnvironmentPinsEveryNameItMayHaveAndNoOther(t *testing.T) { + fake := newFakeDriver() + var cfg driver.SessionConfig + fake.onStart = func(c driver.SessionConfig) { cfg = c } + h := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, func(o *DispatcherOptions) { + o.Lookup = func(k string) (string, bool) { + if k == "BASECAMP_CACHE_DIR" { + return "/var/cache/connector", true + } + return "", false + } + }) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + h.attemptsEnded(t, 1) + + env := cfg.MCPServers[0].Env + require.NotEmpty(t, env) + for _, name := range MCPServerEnv { + value, ok := env[name] + assert.Truef(t, ok, "%s is not pinned, so the agent's own value would reach the server", name) + if name == "BASECAMP_CACHE_DIR" { + assert.Equal(t, "/var/cache/connector", value) + } else { + assert.Empty(t, value, "%s", name) + } + } + carried := append(append([]string{}, driver.BaseEnv...), MCPServerEnv...) + for name := range env { + assert.Containsf(t, carried, name, "%s is pinned here and the bridge does not carry it on", name) + } +} + +// Card 19, through the coordinator: the shared recorder deduplicates +// nothing. Two identical refusals are two refusals, and what counts as one is +// the driver's question, not the ledger's. +func TestTheRecorderCountsWhatItIsToldTwiceIfItIsToldTwice(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, ledger, 1) + r := &refusalRecorder{ledger: ledger, attemptID: l.AttemptID, log: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)} + + same := driver.Refusal{Tool: "Bash"} + require.NoError(t, r.RecordRefusal(context.Background(), same)) + require.NoError(t, r.RecordRefusal(context.Background(), same)) + assert.Equal(t, 0, r.unrecorded()) + + var refusals int + require.NoError(t, ledger.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), + `SELECT refusals FROM attempts WHERE id = ?`, l.AttemptID).Scan(&refusals)) + assert.Equal(t, 2, refusals, "identical refusals with no call id are distinct") +} + +// Opus r9: a peer that is not the worker's ends the socket for good, so it is +// said out loud whether or not a delivery came first — it is the one event +// the peer check exists to catch. +func TestARefusedHandoffIsAlwaysSaidOutLoud(t *testing.T) { + var logs safeBuffer + h := newDispatchHarness(t, newFakeDriver(), func(o *DispatcherOptions) { + o.Logger = slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&logs, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug})) + }) + for _, tc := range []struct { + handoff Handoff + after bool + want string + }{ + {HandoffRefused, true, "is not the worker asked for its task token"}, + {HandoffRefused, false, "is not the worker asked for its task token"}, + {HandoffUndelivered, true, "could not be given it"}, + {HandoffExpired, true, "within the window"}, + {HandoffSpent, true, "restarted more often"}, + } { + logs.Reset() + h.d.reportHandoff(slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&logs, nil)), "att_x", tc.handoff, driver.Process{}, tc.after) + assert.Contains(t, logs.String(), tc.want, "%s after=%v", tc.handoff, tc.after) + assert.Contains(t, logs.String(), `"level":"WARN"`, "%s after=%v is worth a warning", tc.handoff, tc.after) + } + + // Closed after a delivery is how every healthy attempt ends. + logs.Reset() + h.d.reportHandoff(slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&logs, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug})), "att_x", HandoffClosed, driver.Process{}, true) + assert.NotContains(t, logs.String(), `"level":"WARN"`) +} + +// Copilot on #738: a delivered token whose holder could not be identified +// used to be the same zero taker as no delivery at all, so the release point +// settled the attempt and released its directory around a process that may +// still have held the task's credential. It is held instead — here, and +// after a restart, because the ledger carries the state too. +func TestAnAttemptWhoseTokenHolderIsUnaccountedForIsHeld(t *testing.T) { + h := newDispatchHarness(t, newFakeDriver(), nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, h.ledger, 1) + ctx := context.Background() + // A worker whose pid is above the kernel's maximum: gone, nothing to + // signal, so only the token's holder is in question. + require.NoError(t, h.ledger.MarkRunning(ctx, l.AttemptID, AttemptProcess{PID: 1 << 30, PGID: 1 << 30, SessionID: "s"})) + require.NoError(t, h.ledger.MarkTakerUnaccounted(ctx, l.AttemptID)) + + require.Error(t, h.d.confirmTakerGone(driver.Process{PID: 1 << 30, PGID: 1 << 30}, TokenHolder{Unaccounted: true}), + "a token that is out and unaccounted for is never confirmed gone") + + live, err := h.ledger.LiveAttempts(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, live, 1) + require.True(t, live[0].TakerUnaccounted, "and the ledger carries that across a restart") + require.Zero(t, live[0].Taker.PID, "with no process recorded, which is why the flag is needed") + + require.NoError(t, h.d.Recover(ctx)) + assert.Empty(t, readAttempt(t, h.ledger, l.AttemptID).StopReason, + "the attempt stays live rather than being settled around the token's holder") + assert.Equal(t, 1, h.d.heldCount(), "and it holds one of the connector's worker slots until a person settles it") +} + +// Copilot on #738: recovery settles what a previous process left, and a +// shutdown signal arriving while it runs must not leave that attempt half +// settled — its worker ended and its record still live. +func TestRecoverySettlesEvenWhenTheRunContextIsAlreadyOver(t *testing.T) { + h := newDispatchHarness(t, newFakeDriver(), nil) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, h.ledger, 1) + // A worker whose pid is above the kernel's maximum: gone, nothing left + // to signal, so only the settlement is in question. + require.NoError(t, h.ledger.MarkRunning(context.Background(), l.AttemptID, + AttemptProcess{PID: 1 << 30, PGID: 1 << 30, SessionID: "s"})) + + ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background()) + cancel() + require.NoError(t, h.d.Recover(ctx)) + + assert.Equal(t, "lost", readAttempt(t, h.ledger, l.AttemptID).StopReason, + "cleanup runs on a context cancellation does not reach") + assert.Zero(t, h.d.heldCount(), "so nothing is held for want of a settlement that was never tried") +} + +// blockingReplies is a reply listing that answers only when its context ends. +type blockingReplies struct{ asked chan struct{} } + +func (b blockingReplies) AgentReplies(ctx context.Context, _ int64, _ string, _ int64, _ time.Time) ([]AgentReply, error) { + select { + case b.asked <- struct{}{}: + default: + } + <-ctx.Done() + return nil, ctx.Err() +} + +// Copilot on #738: adoption runs on the settlement's context, which a +// shutdown deliberately does not cancel, and on the wait group Run waits on +// at shutdown — so a slow reply listing could hold SIGINT for the whole +// adoption budget. +func TestAShutdownDoesNotWaitOutTheAdoptionBudget(t *testing.T) { + asked := make(chan struct{}, 1) + h := newDispatchHarness(t, newFakeDriver(), func(o *DispatcherOptions) { + o.Replies = blockingReplies{asked: asked} + }) + ctx := context.Background() + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, h.ledger, 1) + // A worker that pulled its dispatch and acknowledged it, and an attempt + // that then ended without the event being reported: one candidate for + // the adopted-reply rule. + disp, err := h.ledger.Dispatch(ctx, l.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, _, err = disp.Get(ctx, 1) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = disp.Ack(ctx, 1, nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + settlement, err := h.ledger.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: l.AttemptID, Stop: StopLost}) + require.NoError(t, err) + + done := make(chan struct{}) + // On the settlement's own context, as the release point runs it: the one + // a shutdown does not cancel. + go func() { + defer close(done) + h.d.adopt(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), settlement) + }() + select { + case <-asked: + case <-time.After(10 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the settled task never reached the adopted-reply rule") + } + + // What Run does on its way out. AdoptionBudget is two minutes. + h.d.stopAdopting() + select { + case <-done: + case <-time.After(10 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("a shutdown waited on the adoption budget") + } +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/acp/acp.go b/internal/connector/driver/acp/acp.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6b5ee1814 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/acp/acp.go @@ -0,0 +1,312 @@ +// Package acp is the connector as an Agent Client Protocol v1 client: one +// adapter process per session, spoken to over newline-delimited JSON-RPC 2.0 +// on its stdio. +// +// A session is opened with initialize, session/new {cwd, mcpServers} (or +// session/load / session/resume, where the agent advertises them), and put in +// its adapter's asking mode with session/set_mode before anything is prompted. +// Prompts are session/prompt; progress is session/update, reduced to kinds, +// ids and counts; a turn is ended with session/cancel; and every +// session/request_permission is answered by the connector's policy. The client +// advertises no fs and no terminal capability, so the agent works through its +// own tools and asks. +// +// # Invariants +// +// Beyond the driver package's, each held by a test in this package: +// +// 1. The adapter's environment is an allowlist. The adapter process gets +// SessionConfig.Env plus the variables its Adapter names, by exact name; +// every MCP server gets exactly its declared MCPServer.Env, sent as +// mcpServers[].env. Nothing of the connector's own environment is passed +// by inheritance, so a host token (CLAUDE_CODE_MESSAGING_TOKEN) never +// reaches the adapter or anything it starts. +// 2. No session runs outside its asking mode. After session/new or +// session/load the driver sets the adapter's asking mode and reads the +// mode back (session/set_config_option's configOptions, or a +// current_mode_update); a session that does not offer the mode, or does +// not confirm it, is ended with ErrUnsafeMode before NewSession returns. +// A later report of any other mode ends the session the same way. +// 3. Permission answers are chosen by option kind, never by id or label. +// An allow is allow_once and never allow_always, so no answer outlives +// the request; a refusal is reject_once (reject_always when that is all +// that is offered). A request outside a turn, for another session, or +// before the mode is confirmed is refused. +// 4. A refusal is the driver's record, not the agent's stop reason. Every +// refusal of a turn is on its PromptResult; a canceled stop the +// connector did not ask for is reported as TurnRefusal when the turn had +// refusals and as an error otherwise, never as TurnCanceled. +// 5. Load is gated by what the agent advertised at initialize: session/load +// when loadSession is true, session/resume when sessionCapabilities.resume +// is present, otherwise an error. Its history replay is not progress. +// 6. A configuration this driver cannot run — an adapter with no asking mode +// for the policy's, a policy for another directory, an MCP server without +// an absolute command, a Codex config that declares MCP servers — is +// ErrUnusable beside ErrNotStarted: nothing started, and a retry would +// fail the same way. +// 7. The adapter is the pinned one: initialize must report protocol version +// 1 and the Adapter's package and version, or the session is ended. +// 8. Nothing the agent volunteers is kept: _auth/status_update (which +// carries the account's email) is dropped unread, updates carry no text, +// and agent-written text that reaches an error is redacted first. +// 9. A session runs only on the MCP servers it was given, as far as its +// adapter says. The adapter's own account of them is read (Claude Code's +// init, forwarded; codex-acp's startup failures), and a server that did +// not connect — or, for Claude, a first turn that ends with no init at +// all — fails the turn with ErrMCPServerNotConnected and ends the worker. +// +// Three of these are rules rather than single checks, so each is stated once +// and held in one place: the MCP isolation boundary in mcp.go, who may decide +// a permission and on what evidence in permission.go, and what bounds every +// buffer the driver keeps in limits.go. +package acp + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "slices" + "sync/atomic" + "time" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" +) + +// Name is the driver's name, as connect.json and the ledger spell it. +const Name = "acp" + +// ProtocolVersion is the ACP version the connector speaks. +const ProtocolVersion = 1 + +// Defaults. +const ( + DefaultHandshakeTimeout = 2 * time.Minute + DefaultCloseGrace = 5 * time.Second +) + +// confirmGroupGone is driver.ConfirmGroupGone; a seam for this package's +// tests. +var confirmGroupGone = driver.ConfirmGroupGone + +// afterHandshake runs between a handshake returning and the session being +// handed out. It does nothing; it is where this package's tests stand to +// claim a failure in exactly that window. +var afterHandshake = func(*session) {} + +// Errors. +var ( + // ErrLoadUnsupported is a session/load asked of an agent that advertises + // neither loadSession nor session resume. + ErrLoadUnsupported = errors.New("acp: the agent advertises neither session/load nor session/resume") + // ErrWrongAdapter is an agent that is not the pinned adapter. + ErrWrongAdapter = errors.New("acp: the agent is not the pinned adapter") +) + +// Options configures the driver. +type Options struct { + // Adapter is the pinned adapter the driver runs. + Adapter Adapter + // Binary is the adapter executable, absolute: Locate's answer. + Binary string + // Args are the adapter's arguments; none for the pinned adapters. + Args []string + // Lookup reads the connector's environment for Adapter.Env; + // os.LookupEnv when nil. + Lookup func(string) (string, bool) + // HandshakeTimeout bounds initialize, session/new or load, and setting the + // mode. + HandshakeTimeout time.Duration + // CloseGrace is how long the adapter has to exit after its input closes, + // and then after SIGTERM, before its process group is killed. + CloseGrace time.Duration + + // trace is this package's tests' view of the wire. + trace func(dir string, line []byte) +} + +// Driver starts ACP sessions with one adapter. +type Driver struct { + opts Options + // loadSession is what the last initialize advertised: 0 unknown, 1 no, + // 2 yes. + loadSession atomic.Int32 +} + +var _ driver.Driver = (*Driver)(nil) + +// New builds the driver. +func New(opts Options) (*Driver, error) { + switch { + case opts.Adapter.Name == "" || opts.Adapter.Package == "" || opts.Adapter.Version == "": + return nil, errors.New("acp: the driver needs a pinned adapter") + case !filepath.IsAbs(opts.Binary): + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acp: the adapter executable %q is not an absolute path", opts.Binary) + } + if opts.Lookup == nil { + opts.Lookup = os.LookupEnv + } + if opts.HandshakeTimeout <= 0 { + opts.HandshakeTimeout = DefaultHandshakeTimeout + } + if opts.CloseGrace <= 0 { + opts.CloseGrace = DefaultCloseGrace + } + return &Driver{opts: opts}, nil +} + +// Name implements driver.Driver. +func (d *Driver) Name() string { return Name } + +// Capabilities implements driver.Driver. LoadSession is what the installed +// adapter advertised at its last initialize, and the pinned version's until +// one has run; LoadSession itself checks again. +func (d *Driver) Capabilities() driver.Capabilities { + load := d.opts.Adapter.LoadSession + switch d.loadSession.Load() { + case 1: + load = false + case 2: + load = true + } + return driver.Capabilities{LoadSession: load, FollowUpPrompts: true, PermissionCallback: true} +} + +// NewSession implements driver.Driver. +func (d *Driver) NewSession(ctx context.Context, cfg driver.SessionConfig) (driver.Session, error) { + return d.open(ctx, cfg, "") +} + +// LoadSession implements driver.Driver. +func (d *Driver) LoadSession(ctx context.Context, cfg driver.SessionConfig, sessionID string) (driver.Session, error) { + if !validSessionID(sessionID) { + // Through the session's redaction, even here: this is the one error + // path before the adapter's environment joins it, and the id it names + // came from outside. + red := driver.NewRedactor(cfg.Redaction) + return nil, red.Err(fmt.Errorf("%w: %w: %q is not an ACP session id", + driver.ErrNotStarted, driver.ErrUnusable, red.Sanitize(sessionID))) + } + return d.open(ctx, cfg, sessionID) +} + +// open starts the adapter and opens (loadID empty) or loads a session. Once +// the process exists, every failure ends its group and is not ErrNotStarted +// (driver invariant 4). +func (d *Driver) open(ctx context.Context, cfg driver.SessionConfig, loadID string) (driver.Session, error) { + if cfg.Policy == nil || !filepath.IsAbs(cfg.Cwd) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w: a session needs a policy and an absolute working directory", driver.ErrNotStarted, driver.ErrUnusable) + } + rules := cfg.Policy.Rules() + mode, ok := d.opts.Adapter.Modes[rules.Mode] + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w: %w: %s has no asking mode for policy mode %q", driver.ErrNotStarted, driver.ErrUnusable, driver.ErrUnsafeMode, d.opts.Adapter.Name, rules.Mode) + } + if filepath.Clean(rules.WorkDir) != filepath.Clean(cfg.Cwd) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w: the policy's working directory is not the session's", driver.ErrNotStarted, driver.ErrUnusable) + } + servers, err := wireServers(cfg.MCPServers) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w: %w", driver.ErrNotStarted, driver.ErrUnusable, err) + } + env := mergeEnv(cfg.Env, driver.BuildEnv(d.opts.Adapter.Env, d.opts.Lookup, nil)) + env = setEnv(env, d.opts.Adapter.SetEnv) + if d.opts.Adapter.Preflight != nil { + // Read in the environment the adapter is about to run in, not this + // process's: what the preflight looks for (a CODEX_HOME, a HOME) is + // what the adapter will resolve its own configuration against. + if err := d.opts.Adapter.Preflight(cfg.Cwd, lookupIn(env)); err != nil { + // Configuration on this machine: the same session would fail the + // same way, so it is not retried. + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w: %w", driver.ErrNotStarted, driver.ErrUnusable, err) + } + } + + // Everything this session says passes through the dispatcher's redaction, + // plus the environment built here, its MCP servers' environments and its + // private directory. + more := driver.Redaction{Env: slices.Clone(env), Dirs: []string{cfg.PrivateDir, cfg.SocketDir}} + for _, server := range cfg.MCPServers { + more.Env = append(more.Env, driver.EnvOf(server.Env)...) + } + red := driver.NewRedactor(cfg.Redaction.With(more)) + worker, err := driver.StartWorker(ctx, cfg.Launcher, cfg.Scope, driver.Command{ + Path: d.opts.Binary, Args: append([]string{}, d.opts.Args...), Env: env, Dir: cfg.Cwd, + }) + if err != nil { + return nil, red.Err(err) + } + names := make([]string, 0, len(cfg.MCPServers)) + for _, srv := range cfg.MCPServers { + names = append(names, srv.Name) + } + s := newSession(sessionOptions{ + Worker: worker, Policy: cfg.Policy, AskMode: mode, Grace: d.opts.CloseGrace, Redactor: red, + MCPStatus: d.opts.Adapter.MCPStatus, MCPNames: names, Refusals: cfg.Refusals, trace: d.opts.trace, + }) + hctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, d.opts.HandshakeTimeout) + defer cancel() + if err := s.handshake(hctx, d, cfg, servers, loadID); err != nil { + s.abort() + // A session ended for a reason of its own — an MCP server that did + // not connect, a mode it left — reports that reason, not the closed + // stream it caused. + if own := s.failure(); own != nil { + err = own + } + if ctxErr := hctx.Err(); ctxErr != nil && !errors.Is(err, ctxErr) { + err = fmt.Errorf("%w (%w)", err, ctxErr) + } + // The one-owner rule's step 3: the adapter may have started the + // agent and its MCP servers before the handshake failed, and the + // caller settles this attempt on the error. A group that is not + // confirmed gone says so (driver.ErrGroupOutlivedLeader). + if gone := confirmGroupGone(worker.Process(), d.opts.CloseGrace); gone != nil { + err = fmt.Errorf("%w; %w", err, gone) + } + // A start that launched a process says which (driver invariant 4): + // the connector confirms its group gone before it settles anything. + return nil, &driver.StartError{Process: worker.Process(), Err: red.Err(fmt.Errorf("%w%s", err, s.stderrNote()))} + } + afterHandshake(s) + if own := s.failure(); own != nil { + // A failure claimed while the handshake was returning: the worker is + // already being ended, so the session is never handed out. + s.abort() + if gone := confirmGroupGone(worker.Process(), d.opts.CloseGrace); gone != nil { + own = fmt.Errorf("%w; %w", own, gone) + } + return nil, &driver.StartError{Process: worker.Process(), Err: red.Err(own)} + } + return s, nil +} + +// handshake is initialize, the session, and its mode. +func (s *session) handshake(ctx context.Context, d *Driver, cfg driver.SessionConfig, servers []wireServer, loadID string) error { + caps, err := s.initialize(ctx, d.opts.Adapter) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if caps.LoadSession || caps.Resume { + d.loadSession.Store(2) + } else { + d.loadSession.Store(1) + } + var opened sessionState + if loadID == "" { + opened, err = s.newSession(ctx, cfg.Cwd, servers, d.opts.Adapter.SessionMeta) + } else { + opened, err = s.loadSession(ctx, caps, loadID, cfg.Cwd, servers, d.opts.Adapter.SessionMeta) + } + if err != nil { + return err + } + if err := s.enterAskingMode(ctx, opened); err != nil { + return err + } + // Last, because it is the one check made on what the adapter is actually + // running rather than on what it was given, and it needs a session in its + // asking mode to ask. + return s.verifyMCPConfiguration(ctx, d.opts.Adapter) +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/acp/acp_test.go b/internal/connector/driver/acp/acp_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2a2d21f63 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/acp/acp_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,2547 @@ +//go:build unix + +package acp + +import ( + "bufio" + "context" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "maps" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "slices" + "strings" + "sync" + "sync/atomic" + "syscall" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver/drivertest" +) + +func TestMain(m *testing.M) { + if len(os.Args) > 2 && os.Args[1] == fakeAgentArg { + runFakeAgent(os.Args[2]) + os.Exit(0) + } + if len(os.Args) > 1 && os.Args[1] == fakeChildArg { + runFakeChild() + os.Exit(0) + } + modeConfirmWait = 500 * time.Millisecond + os.Exit(m.Run()) +} + +const ( + testPackage = "@example/fake-acp" + testVersion = "9.9.9" +) + +var testAdapter = Adapter{ + Name: "fake-acp", + Package: testPackage, + Version: testVersion, + Env: []string{"FAKE_AGENT_KEY"}, + SetEnv: map[string]string{"FAKE_AGENT_SWITCH": "on"}, + Modes: map[driver.PermissionMode]string{driver.ModeEditsInWorkDir: "ask"}, + SessionMeta: map[string]any{ + "vendor": map[string]any{"settingSources": []string{}}, + }, + LoadSession: true, +} + +// recordingPolicy allows by a function and remembers what it was asked. +type recordingPolicy struct { + workDir string + allow func(driver.PermissionRequest) bool + + mu sync.Mutex + asked []driver.PermissionRequest +} + +func (p *recordingPolicy) Rules() driver.PermissionRules { + return driver.PermissionRules{Mode: driver.ModeEditsInWorkDir, WorkDir: p.workDir} +} + +func (p *recordingPolicy) Decide(_ context.Context, req driver.PermissionRequest) driver.PermissionDecision { + p.mu.Lock() + p.asked = append(p.asked, req) + p.mu.Unlock() + return driver.PermissionDecision{Allow: p.allow != nil && p.allow(req)} +} + +func (p *recordingPolicy) requests() []driver.PermissionRequest { + p.mu.Lock() + defer p.mu.Unlock() + return slices.Clone(p.asked) +} + +type harness struct { + // withConfig is a test's last word on the session config. + withConfig func(driver.SessionConfig) driver.SessionConfig + fakeDir string + t *testing.T + sc scenario + dir string + policy *recordingPolicy + lookup map[string]string + grace time.Duration +} + +// newHarness is a fake agent that answers initialize as the pinned adapter, +// offers the asking mode, and confirms it by read-back, unless the test says +// otherwise. +func newHarness(t *testing.T) *harness { + t.Helper() + dir, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(t.TempDir()) + require.NoError(t, err) + // The fake agent's own files live apart from the session's working + // directory: its record holds what it was sent, the task token included, + // and the working directory is where no token may be. + fakeDir := t.TempDir() + return &harness{ + fakeDir: fakeDir, + t: t, + dir: dir, + sc: scenario{ + Record: filepath.Join(fakeDir, "record.json"), AgentName: testPackage, AgentVersion: testVersion, + Modes: []string{"auto", "ask", "bypassPermissions"}, CurrentMode: "bypassPermissions", ModeConfig: true, Confirm: "readback", + LoadSession: true, + }, + policy: &recordingPolicy{workDir: dir}, + lookup: map[string]string{}, + grace: 2 * time.Second, + } +} + +func (h *harness) driver() *Driver { + h.t.Helper() + raw, err := json.Marshal(h.sc) + require.NoError(h.t, err) + path := filepath.Join(h.fakeDir, "scenario.json") + require.NoError(h.t, os.WriteFile(path, raw, 0o600)) + exe, err := os.Executable() + require.NoError(h.t, err) + d, err := New(Options{ + Adapter: testAdapter, Binary: exe, Args: []string{fakeAgentArg, path}, + Lookup: func(name string) (string, bool) { v, ok := h.lookup[name]; return v, ok }, + HandshakeTimeout: 10 * time.Second, CloseGrace: h.grace, + }) + require.NoError(h.t, err) + return d +} + +func (h *harness) config() driver.SessionConfig { + cfg := driver.SessionConfig{ + Cwd: h.dir, + Env: []string{"HOME=" + h.dir, "PATH=/usr/bin:/bin"}, + MCPServers: []driver.MCPServer{{ + Name: "basecamp", Command: "/usr/local/bin/basecamp", Args: []string{"mcp", "--profile", "agent"}, + Env: map[string]string{"BASECAMP_CONNECT_TASK_TOKEN": "test-token-not-real", "HOME": h.dir}, + }}, + Policy: h.policy, + Scope: driver.Scope{WorkDir: h.dir}, + PrivateDir: h.t.TempDir(), + } + if h.withConfig != nil { + cfg = h.withConfig(cfg) + } + return cfg +} + +func (h *harness) open() driver.Session { + h.t.Helper() + s, err := h.driver().NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(h.t, err) + h.t.Cleanup(func() { _ = s.Close() }) + return s +} + +// record is what the fake agent has written about its run so far. It waits +// for the file: a process that has just been started may not have written it +// yet on a loaded machine. +func (h *harness) record() agentRecord { + h.t.Helper() + var rec agentRecord + var raw []byte + require.Eventually(h.t, func() bool { + var err error + raw, err = os.ReadFile(h.sc.Record) + return err == nil + }, 30*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond, "the agent wrote no record") + require.NoError(h.t, json.Unmarshal(raw, &rec)) + return rec +} + +func (h *harness) turns(turns ...turnScript) { h.sc.Turns = turns } + +func raw(t *testing.T, v any) json.RawMessage { + t.Helper() + data, err := json.Marshal(v) + require.NoError(t, err) + return data +} + +func permission(t *testing.T, call map[string]any, options ...[2]string) json.RawMessage { + t.Helper() + opts := make([]any, 0, len(options)) + for _, o := range options { + opts = append(opts, map[string]any{"optionId": o[0], "name": "label " + o[0], "kind": o[1]}) + } + return raw(t, map[string]any{"toolCall": call, "options": opts}) +} + +func standardOptions() [][2]string { + return [][2]string{{"allow-once", "allow_once"}, {"allow-always", "allow_always"}, {"reject", "reject_once"}} +} + +func gone(pid int) bool { + return errors.Is(syscall.Kill(pid, 0), syscall.ESRCH) +} + +func waitGone(t *testing.T, pid int) { + t.Helper() + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return gone(pid) }, 10*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond, "pid %d still exists", pid) +} + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------- invariant 1 + +func TestTheAdapterEnvironmentIsAnAllowlist(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.lookup = map[string]string{ + "FAKE_AGENT_KEY": "test-key-not-real", + "CLAUDE_CODE_MESSAGING_TOKEN": "test-host-token-not-real", + "BASECAMP_TOKEN": "test-basecamp-token-not-real", + } + h.sc.Probe = []string{"FAKE_AGENT_KEY", "FAKE_AGENT_SWITCH"} + cfg := h.config() + drivertest.RequireNoSecretFilesDuring(t, "test-token-not-real", []string{cfg.Cwd, cfg.PrivateDir}, func() { + s, err := h.driver().NewSession(context.Background(), cfg) + require.NoError(t, err) + _ = s.Close() + }) + + rec := h.record() + // The task token reaches the MCP server's declared environment, over the + // wire, and nowhere the adapter process itself keeps. + drivertest.RequireNoSecret(t, "test-token-not-real", drivertest.Places{Env: rec.EnvKV, Args: rec.Args, Dirs: []string{cfg.Cwd, cfg.PrivateDir}}) + drivertest.RequireNoSecret(t, "test-host-token-not-real", drivertest.Places{Env: rec.EnvKV, Args: rec.Args}) + drivertest.RequireNoSecret(t, "test-basecamp-token-not-real", drivertest.Places{Env: rec.EnvKV, Args: rec.Args}) + assert.Equal(t, []string{"FAKE_AGENT_KEY", "FAKE_AGENT_SWITCH", "HOME", "PATH"}, rec.Env, + "the adapter gets the session's environment, its named variables and its own switches, and nothing else") + assert.Equal(t, "test-key-not-real", rec.Probe["FAKE_AGENT_KEY"]) + assert.Equal(t, "on", rec.Probe["FAKE_AGENT_SWITCH"]) + + var params struct { + Cwd string `json:"cwd"` + MCPServers []wireServer `json:"mcpServers"` + Meta json.RawMessage `json:"_meta"` + } + require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Params["session/new"], ¶ms)) + assert.Equal(t, h.dir, params.Cwd) + require.Len(t, params.MCPServers, 1) + srv := params.MCPServers[0] + assert.Equal(t, []wireEnv{{Name: "BASECAMP_CONNECT_TASK_TOKEN", Value: "test-token-not-real"}, {Name: "HOME", Value: h.dir}}, srv.Env, + "every variable the MCP server needs is declared in mcpServers[].env, and nothing else") + assert.Equal(t, []string{"mcp", "--profile", "agent"}, srv.Args) + assert.NotContains(t, strings.Join(srv.Args, " "), "test-token-not-real", "no token in argv") + assert.JSONEq(t, `{"vendor":{"settingSources":[]}}`, string(params.Meta)) +} + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------- invariant 2 + +func TestTheAskingModeIsSetAndReadBack(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + s := h.open() + rec := h.record() + assert.Equal(t, []string{"initialize", "session/new", "session/set_mode", "session/set_config_option"}, rec.Methods) + var set struct { + ModeID string `json:"modeId"` + } + require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Params["session/set_mode"], &set)) + assert.Equal(t, "ask", set.ModeID) + assert.Equal(t, "sess-1", s.ID()) +} + +func TestTheAskingModeIsConfirmedByAModeUpdate(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.sc.ModeConfig = false + h.sc.Confirm = "notify" + h.open() + assert.Equal(t, []string{"initialize", "session/new", "session/set_mode"}, h.record().Methods) +} + +func TestASessionThatCannotBePutInItsAskingModeIsNotRun(t *testing.T) { + cases := map[string]func(*scenario){ + "the mode is not offered": func(sc *scenario) { sc.Modes = []string{"auto", "bypassPermissions"} }, + "the read-back reports the old mode": func(sc *scenario) { sc.Confirm = "stale" }, + "no mode update follows": func(sc *scenario) { sc.ModeConfig = false; sc.Confirm = "none" }, + "set_mode fails": func(sc *scenario) { sc.Confirm = "error" }, + "the agent has no modes at all": func(sc *scenario) { sc.Modes = nil; sc.ModeConfig = false }, + "a mode update overtakes the answer that confirms it": func(sc *scenario) { + sc.ModeBeforeSetAnswer = "bypassPermissions" + }, + "only a stale mode update, no option": func(sc *scenario) { sc.ModeConfig = false; sc.Confirm = "stale" }, + } + for name, mutate := range cases { + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + mutate(&h.sc) + s, err := h.driver().NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Nil(t, s) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrUnsafeMode) + assert.NotErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrNotStarted, "a process existed") + assert.NotContains(t, h.record().Methods, "session/prompt") + waitGone(t, h.record().PID) + }) + } +} + +func TestLeavingTheAskingModeMidTurnEndsTheSession(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{{ModeChange: "bypassPermissions"}, {SleepMS: 5000}}, Stop: "end_turn"}) + s := h.open() + _, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrUnsafeMode) + select { + case <-s.Done(): + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the worker was not ended") + } + _, err = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "again") + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrUnsafeMode) +} + +func TestAPolicyModeTheAdapterHasNoAskingModeForStartsNothing(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + d := h.driver() + d.opts.Adapter.Modes = map[driver.PermissionMode]string{} + _, err := d.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrNotStarted) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrUnsafeMode) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrUnusable, "a configuration no retry can fix") + _, statErr := os.Stat(h.sc.Record) + assert.ErrorIs(t, statErr, os.ErrNotExist, "no process was started") +} + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------- invariant 3 + +func outcomeOf(t *testing.T, raw json.RawMessage) (string, string) { + t.Helper() + var o struct { + Outcome struct { + Outcome string `json:"outcome"` + OptionID string `json:"optionId"` + } `json:"outcome"` + } + require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(raw, &o)) + return o.Outcome.Outcome, o.Outcome.OptionID +} + +func TestPermissionOptionsAreChosenByKindNeverByIdOrLabel(t *testing.T) { + // Ids that lie about their kinds. + lying := [][2]string{{"reject", "allow_once"}, {"allow-once", "reject_once"}, {"yes", "allow_always"}} + call := map[string]any{"toolCallId": "call-1", "kind": "edit", "locations": []any{map[string]any{"path": "x"}}} + + for _, tc := range []struct { + name string + allow bool + options [][2]string + want [2]string + }{ + {"allowed picks allow_once", true, lying, [2]string{"selected", "reject"}}, + {"refused picks reject_once", false, lying, [2]string{"selected", "allow-once"}}, + {"allowed never picks allow_always", true, [][2]string{{"always", "allow_always"}, {"no", "reject_once"}}, [2]string{"selected", "no"}}, + {"refused falls back to reject_always", false, [][2]string{{"once", "allow_once"}, {"never", "reject_always"}}, [2]string{"selected", "never"}}, + {"nothing to refuse with is canceled", false, [][2]string{{"once", "allow_once"}}, [2]string{outcomeCanceled, ""}}, + } { + t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.policy.allow = func(driver.PermissionRequest) bool { return tc.allow } + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{{Permission: permission(t, call, tc.options...)}}, Stop: "end_turn"}) + s := h.open() + res, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.NoError(t, err) + rec := h.record() + require.Len(t, rec.Outcomes, 1) + outcome, option := outcomeOf(t, rec.Outcomes[0]) + assert.Equal(t, tc.want, [2]string{outcome, option}) + if tc.want[1] == "reject" { + assert.Empty(t, res.Refusals) + } else { + assert.Equal(t, []driver.Refusal{{ToolCallID: "call-1", Tool: "edit"}}, res.Refusals) + } + }) + } +} + +func TestARequestForAnotherSessionIsRefusedUnasked(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.policy.allow = func(driver.PermissionRequest) bool { return true } + call := map[string]any{"toolCallId": "call-9", "kind": "edit"} + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{{Permission: raw(t, map[string]any{ + "sessionId": "someone-else", "toolCall": call, + "options": []any{map[string]any{"optionId": "ok", "kind": "allow_once"}, map[string]any{"optionId": "no", "kind": "reject_once"}}, + })}}, Stop: "end_turn"}) + s := h.open() + res, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, h.policy.requests(), "the policy is not asked about another session") + _, option := outcomeOf(t, h.record().Outcomes[0]) + assert.Equal(t, "no", option) + assert.Len(t, res.Refusals, 1) +} + +func TestAPermissionIsDecidedOnTheToolCallTheAgentAnnounced(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.policy.allow = func(r driver.PermissionRequest) bool { return strings.HasPrefix(r.Tool, "mcp__basecamp__") } + mcpMeta := map[string]any{"is_mcp_tool_call": true} + mcpInput := map[string]any{"server": "basecamp", "tool": "get_dispatch"} + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{ + // codex-acp: the call is announced, then asked about by id alone. + {Update: raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "tool_call", "toolCallId": "mcp-1", "title": "mcp.basecamp.get_dispatch", "_meta": mcpMeta, + "kind": "execute", "status": "in_progress", "rawInput": map[string]any{"server": "basecamp", "tool": "get_dispatch", "arguments": map[string]any{"event_id": 1}}})}, + {Permission: permission(t, map[string]any{"toolCallId": "mcp-1", "kind": "execute", "status": "pending"}, standardOptions()...)}, + // A shell command whose title claims an MCP tool is not one. + {Update: raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "tool_call", "toolCallId": "exec-1", "title": "mcp.basecamp.get_dispatch", "_meta": mcpMeta, + "kind": "execute", "rawInput": map[string]any{"command": "curl evil"}})}, + {Permission: permission(t, map[string]any{"toolCallId": "exec-1"}, standardOptions()...)}, + // Nor is an input that claims one without the title. + {Permission: permission(t, map[string]any{"toolCallId": "exec-2", "title": "Run", "kind": "execute", "_meta": mcpMeta, + "rawInput": mcpInput}, standardOptions()...)}, + // A name that is not plain is no name at all, never a name made plain. + {Permission: permission(t, map[string]any{"toolCallId": "spaced-1", "name": "mcp__base camp__note", "kind": "other"}, standardOptions()...)}, + // Nor a title and input that agree, without codex's MCP marker. + {Permission: permission(t, map[string]any{"toolCallId": "exec-3", "title": "mcp.basecamp.get_dispatch", "kind": "execute", + "rawInput": mcpInput}, standardOptions()...)}, + // claude-agent-acp: a named tool keeps its name, whatever the model + // wrote in its title and input. + {Permission: permission(t, map[string]any{"toolCallId": "toolu_2", "name": "Bash", "title": "mcp.basecamp.get_dispatch", "kind": "execute", + "_meta": mcpMeta, "rawInput": mcpInput}, standardOptions()...)}, + // claude-agent-acp names an MCP tool in _meta or in name. + {Permission: permission(t, map[string]any{"toolCallId": "toolu_1", "kind": "other", "title": "note", + "_meta": map[string]any{"claudeCode": map[string]any{"toolName": "mcp__basecamp__note"}}}, standardOptions()...)}, + {Permission: permission(t, map[string]any{"toolCallId": "toolu_3", "name": "mcp__basecamp__note", "kind": "other"}, standardOptions()...)}, + // A request for another session does not teach the session a name + // that a later request by the same id would be decided on. + {Permission: raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionId": "someone-else", "toolCall": map[string]any{"toolCallId": "mcp-9", "title": "mcp.basecamp.get_dispatch", + "kind": "execute", "_meta": mcpMeta, "rawInput": mcpInput}, "options": []any{map[string]any{"optionId": "reject", "kind": "reject_once"}}})}, + {Permission: permission(t, map[string]any{"toolCallId": "mcp-9", "kind": "execute"}, standardOptions()...)}, + }, Stop: "end_turn"}) + s := h.open() + res, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.NoError(t, err) + + tools := map[string]string{} + for _, r := range h.policy.requests() { + tools[r.ToolCallID] = r.Tool + } + assert.Equal(t, map[string]string{ + "mcp-1": "mcp__basecamp__get_dispatch", "exec-1": "", "exec-2": "", "exec-3": "", "toolu_2": "Bash", "spaced-1": "", + "toolu_1": "mcp__basecamp__note", "toolu_3": "mcp__basecamp__note", "mcp-9": "", + }, tools) + outcomes := h.record().Outcomes + options := make([]string, 0, len(outcomes)) + for _, o := range outcomes { + _, id := outcomeOf(t, o) + options = append(options, id) + } + assert.Equal(t, []string{"allow-once", "reject", "reject", "reject", "reject", "reject", "allow-once", "allow-once", "reject", "reject"}, options) + // mcp-9 was asked about twice, and a call refused twice is one refusal. + assert.Len(t, res.Refusals, 6) +} + +func TestARequestOutsideATurnIsRefusedUnasked(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.policy.allow = func(driver.PermissionRequest) bool { return true } + s := h.open().(*session) + // Feed the request straight in: no turn is in flight. + params := raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionId": "sess-1", "toolCall": map[string]any{"toolCallId": "c", "kind": "edit"}, + "options": []any{map[string]any{"optionId": "ok", "kind": "allow_once"}, map[string]any{"optionId": "no", "kind": "reject_once"}}}) + s.onRequest(json.RawMessage(`99`), "session/request_permission", params, s.claim("session/request_permission")) + assert.Empty(t, h.policy.requests()) +} + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------- invariant 4 + +func TestARefusalIsNeverReportedAsACancel(t *testing.T) { + call := map[string]any{"toolCallId": "exec-1", "kind": "execute"} + t.Run("codex ends a refused turn as canceled", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{{Permission: permission(t, call, standardOptions()...)}}, Stop: string(driver.TurnCanceled)}) + res, err := h.open().Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnRefusal, res.Stop) + assert.Equal(t, []driver.Refusal{{ToolCallID: "exec-1", Tool: "execute"}}, res.Refusals) + }) + t.Run("claude ends it as end_turn, with the refusal on record", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{{Permission: permission(t, call, standardOptions()...)}}, Stop: "end_turn"}) + res, err := h.open().Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnEndTurn, res.Stop) + assert.Len(t, res.Refusals, 1) + }) + t.Run("a canceled stop nobody asked for is an error", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Stop: string(driver.TurnCanceled)}) + res, err := h.open().Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.Error(t, err) + assert.NotEqual(t, driver.TurnCanceled, res.Stop) + }) + t.Run("a cancel the connector asked for is canceled", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{{Update: raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "agent_message_chunk", "content": map[string]any{"type": "text", "text": "hi"}})}}, + WaitForCancel: true, Stop: string(driver.TurnCanceled)}) + s := h.open() + answers := make(chan driver.PromptResult, 1) + go func() { + res, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + assert.NoError(t, err) + answers <- res + }() + <-s.Updates() + require.NoError(t, s.Cancel(context.Background())) + select { + case res := <-answers: + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnCanceled, res.Stop) + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("no answer after cancel") + } + }) + t.Run("an unknown stop reason is an error", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Stop: "gave_up"}) + _, err := h.open().Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.Error(t, err) + }) +} + +func TestACancelWithNoTurnEndsTheNextOneAndOnlyIt(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{WaitForCancel: true, Stop: string(driver.TurnCanceled)}, turnScript{Stop: "end_turn"}) + s := h.open() + require.NoError(t, s.Cancel(context.Background())) + assert.NotContains(t, h.record().Methods, "session/cancel", "nothing is sent for a turn that is not there") + + res, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnCanceled, res.Stop, "the turn the cancel raced starts canceled") + assert.Contains(t, h.record().Methods, "session/cancel") + + res, err = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "follow-up") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnEndTurn, res.Stop, "a cancel ends one turn, not the session's every turn after it") + n := 0 + for _, m := range h.record().Methods { + if m == "session/cancel" { + n++ + } + } + assert.Equal(t, 1, n, "one cancel, for one turn") +} + +func TestAPermissionIsNotAllowedOnceTheTurnIsCanceled(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + started := make(chan struct{}) + release := make(chan struct{}) + var once sync.Once + h.policy.allow = func(driver.PermissionRequest) bool { + once.Do(func() { close(started) }) + <-release + return true + } + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{{Permission: permission(t, map[string]any{"toolCallId": "c1", "kind": "edit"}, standardOptions()...)}}, + WaitForCancel: true, Stop: string(driver.TurnCanceled)}, turnScript{Stop: "end_turn"}) + s := h.open() + answers := make(chan driver.PromptResult, 1) + go func() { + res, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + assert.NoError(t, err) + answers <- res + }() + <-started + require.NoError(t, s.Cancel(context.Background())) + close(release) + select { + case res := <-answers: + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnCanceled, res.Stop) + assert.Len(t, res.Refusals, 1, "a permission the policy allowed while the turn was canceled is refused") + case <-time.After(10 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the canceled turn never ended") + } + _, option := outcomeOf(t, h.record().Outcomes[0]) + assert.Equal(t, "reject", option) + + // The cancel ended the turn it found; the next one is not born canceled. + res, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "follow-up") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnEndTurn, res.Stop) + n := 0 + for _, m := range h.record().Methods { + if m == "session/cancel" { + n++ + } + } + assert.Equal(t, 1, n) +} + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------- invariant 5 + +func TestLoadIsGatedByWhatTheAgentAdvertises(t *testing.T) { + replay := []json.RawMessage{ + raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "user_message_chunk", "content": map[string]any{"type": "text", "text": "old"}}), + raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "agent_message_chunk", "content": map[string]any{"type": "text", "text": "old answer"}}), + raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "tool_call", "toolCallId": "t0", "kind": "read"}), + } + for _, tc := range []struct { + name string + load, resume bool + method string + }{ + {"loadSession", true, false, "session/load"}, + {"resume only", false, true, "session/resume"}, + {"both prefers load", true, true, "session/load"}, + } { + t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.sc.LoadSession, h.sc.Resume, h.sc.Replay = tc.load, tc.resume, replay + h.sc.SessionID = "sess-earlier" + d := h.driver() + s, err := d.LoadSession(context.Background(), h.config(), "sess-earlier") + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + assert.Equal(t, "sess-earlier", s.ID()) + rec := h.record() + assert.Contains(t, rec.Methods, tc.method) + assert.NotContains(t, rec.Methods, "session/new") + assert.True(t, d.Capabilities().LoadSession, "a session this driver can reload, by load or resume") + select { + case u := <-s.Updates(): + t.Fatalf("a load's replay was reported as progress: %+v", u) + default: + } + assert.Contains(t, rec.Methods, "session/set_config_option", "a loaded session is put in its asking mode too") + }) + } + t.Run("neither", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.sc.LoadSession, h.sc.Resume = false, false + d := h.driver() + _, err := d.LoadSession(context.Background(), h.config(), "sess-earlier") + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrLoadUnsupported) + assert.False(t, d.Capabilities().LoadSession) + assert.NotErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrNotStarted) + waitGone(t, h.record().PID) + }) + t.Run("a session id the ledger could not have written starts nothing", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + _, err := h.driver().LoadSession(context.Background(), h.config(), "../../etc; rm") + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrNotStarted) + }) +} + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------- invariants 6 and 7, and driver invariant 4 + +func TestOnlyAStartThatRanNothingIsErrNotStarted(t *testing.T) { + t.Run("missing binary", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + d := h.driver() + d.opts.Binary = filepath.Join(h.dir, "no-such-adapter") + _, err := d.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrNotStarted) + }) + for name, mutate := range map[string]func(*scenario){ + "initialize fails": func(sc *scenario) { sc.FailInitialize = true }, + "another adapter": func(sc *scenario) { sc.AgentName = "@someone/else" }, + "another adapter version": func(sc *scenario) { sc.AgentVersion = "9.9.10" }, + "another protocol": func(sc *scenario) { sc.ProtocolVersion = 2 }, + } { + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + mutate(&h.sc) + _, err := h.driver().NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.NotErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrNotStarted) + assert.Equal(t, h.record().PID, driver.StartedProcess(err).PID, "a start that launched a process says which") + assert.NotContains(t, h.record().Methods, "session/new") + waitGone(t, h.record().PID) + }) + } + t.Run("a handshake that never answers", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.sc.Hang = "session/new" + d := h.driver() + d.opts.HandshakeTimeout = 3 * time.Second + _, err := d.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, context.DeadlineExceeded) + assert.NotErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrNotStarted) + waitGone(t, h.record().PID) + }) +} + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------- driver invariant 5 + +func TestCloseEndsTheWholeProcessGroup(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.sc.SpawnChild, h.sc.IgnoreStdinEOF, h.sc.IgnoreTerminate = true, true, true + h.grace = 200 * time.Millisecond + s := h.open() + rec := h.record() + require.NotZero(t, rec.ChildPID) + assert.Equal(t, rec.PID, s.Process().PGID) + + closed := make(chan error, 1) + go func() { closed <- s.Close() }() + select { + case err := <-closed: + require.NoError(t, err) + case <-time.After(10 * time.Second): + _ = syscall.Kill(-rec.PID, syscall.SIGKILL) + t.Fatal("Close did not end an adapter that ignores EOF and SIGTERM") + } + require.NoError(t, s.Close(), "Close is idempotent") + select { + case <-s.Done(): + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the adapter outlived Close") + } + waitGone(t, rec.PID) + waitGone(t, rec.ChildPID) + _, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrSessionEnded) +} + +func TestAWorkerThatDiesMidTurnEndsThePrompt(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Hang: true}) + s := h.open() + answers := make(chan error, 1) + go func() { + _, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + answers <- err + }() + time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond) + require.NoError(t, syscall.Kill(s.Process().PID, syscall.SIGKILL)) + select { + case err := <-answers: + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrSessionEnded) + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("Prompt did not return when the worker died") + } +} + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------- invariant 8 + +func TestNothingTheAgentVolunteersIsKept(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.sc.AuthEmail = "person@example.com" + h.turns( + turnScript{Steps: []step{ + {Update: raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "agent_message_chunk", "content": map[string]any{"type": "text", "text": "secret words the connector never keeps"}})}, + {Update: raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "tool_call", "toolCallId": "t1", "title": "cat /home/person/.ssh/id_rsa", "kind": "read", + "status": "pending", "rawInput": map[string]any{"path": "/home/person/.ssh/id_rsa"}, "name": "Read person@example.com"})}, + {Update: raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "tool_call_update", "toolCallId": "t2", "title": "cat /home/person/.ssh/id_rsa", "kind": "read"})}, + {Update: raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "usage_update", "used": 1200, "size": 200000})}, + {Update: raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "plan", "entries": []any{map[string]any{"content": "step one"}}})}, + }, Stop: "end_turn", Usage: raw(t, map[string]any{"inputTokens": 12, "outputTokens": 34})}, + turnScript{ErrorMessage: "quota exhausted for person@example.com"}, + ) + s := h.open() + res, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, driver.Usage{InputTokens: 12, OutputTokens: 34, ContextUsed: 1200, ContextSize: 200000}, res.Usage) + + var updates []driver.Update + for len(updates) < 6 { + select { + case u := <-s.Updates(): + updates = append(updates, u) + case <-time.After(2 * time.Second): + t.Fatalf("only %d updates", len(updates)) + } + } + kinds := make([]driver.UpdateKind, 0, len(updates)) + for _, u := range updates { + kinds = append(kinds, u.Kind) + assert.NotContains(t, u.Tool, "@") + assert.NotContains(t, u.Tool, "ssh") + } + assert.Equal(t, []driver.UpdateKind{driver.UpdateAgentMessageChunk, driver.UpdateToolCall, driver.UpdateToolCallUpdate, driver.UpdateUsage, driver.UpdatePlan, driver.UpdateUsage}, kinds) + assert.Empty(t, updates[2].Tool, "a title is never a tool's name") + assert.Equal(t, len("secret words the connector never keeps"), updates[0].Chars) + assert.Equal(t, driver.ToolRead, updates[1].ToolKind) + assert.Equal(t, driver.ToolPending, updates[1].Status) + + _, err = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "again") + require.Error(t, err) + assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), "person@example.com") + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "quota exhausted") + + h2 := newHarness(t) + h2.sc.AuthEmail, h2.sc.FailInitialize = "person@example.com", true + _, err = h2.driver().NewSession(context.Background(), h2.config()) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), "person@example.com") +} + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------- turns + +func TestAPromptWhoseContextEndsLeavesTheTurnToFinish(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{{SleepMS: 400}}, Stop: "end_turn"}, turnScript{Stop: "end_turn"}) + s := h.open() + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 50*time.Millisecond) + defer cancel() + _, err := s.Prompt(ctx, "slow") + require.ErrorIs(t, err, context.DeadlineExceeded) + _, err = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "overlapping") + require.Error(t, err, "the first turn is still in flight") + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { + _, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "next") + return err == nil + }, 5*time.Second, 50*time.Millisecond) +} + +func TestFollowUpsArePromptsInTheSameSession(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + d := h.driver() + caps := d.Capabilities() + assert.True(t, caps.FollowUpPrompts) + assert.True(t, caps.PermissionCallback) + s, err := d.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + for range 3 { + res, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "next") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnEndTurn, res.Stop) + } + methods := h.record().Methods + n := 0 + for _, m := range methods { + if m == "session/prompt" { + n++ + } + } + assert.Equal(t, 3, n) + assert.Equal(t, Name, d.Name()) +} + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------- adapters + +func TestLocateFindsOnlyThePinnedVersion(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + a := Adapter{Name: "fake-acp", Package: "@example/fake-acp", Version: "1.2.3"} + _, err := Locate(dir, a) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAdapterMissing) + _, err = Locate("relative/dir", a) + require.Error(t, err) + + pkg := filepath.Join(dir, "node_modules", "@example", "fake-acp") + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(pkg, 0o755)) + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(pkg, "package.json"), []byte(`{"name":"@example/fake-acp","version":"1.2.4"}`), 0o600)) + _, err = Locate(dir, a) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "pinned") + + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(pkg, "package.json"), []byte(`{"name":"@example/fake-acp","version":"1.2.3"}`), 0o600)) + _, err = Locate(dir, a) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAdapterMissing, "no executable yet") + bin := filepath.Join(dir, "node_modules", ".bin") + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(bin, 0o755)) + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(bin, "fake-acp"), []byte("#!/bin/sh\n"), 0o700)) + got, err := Locate(dir, a) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, filepath.Join(bin, "fake-acp"), got) +} + +func TestThePinnedAdapters(t *testing.T) { + for _, a := range Adapters() { + got, ok := AdapterNamed(a.Name) + require.True(t, ok) + assert.Equal(t, a.Package, got.Package) + assert.NotEmpty(t, a.Modes[driver.ModeEditsInWorkDir], a.Name) + for _, name := range a.Env { + assert.NotContains(t, []string{"CLAUDE_CODE_EXECUTABLE", "CODEX_PATH", "CLAUDE_CODE_MESSAGING_TOKEN", "BASECAMP_TOKEN"}, name, + "%s may not take a variable that swaps its pinned agent or carries the host's token", a.Name) + } + } + options := ClaudeAgentACP.SessionMeta["claudeCode"].(map[string]any)["options"].(map[string]any) + assert.Equal(t, true, options["strictMcpConfig"], "only the session's MCP servers") + assert.Equal(t, MCPStatusInit, ClaudeAgentACP.MCPStatus) + assert.Equal(t, []map[string]string{{"type": "system", "subtype": "init"}}, ClaudeAgentACP.SessionMeta["claudeCode"].(map[string]any)["emitRawSDKMessages"], + "the init, and only the init, is forwarded") + assert.Equal(t, MCPStatusStartupFailures, CodexACP.MCPStatus) + assert.Equal(t, []string{"EnterPlanMode", "ExitPlanMode"}, options["disallowedTools"], "a plan-mode switch would leave the verified mode") + assert.Equal(t, []string{}, options["settingSources"], "none of the host's settings") + assert.Equal(t, false, options["allowDangerouslySkipPermissions"]) + assert.Equal(t, "true", CodexACP.SetEnv["DISABLE_MCP_CONFIG_FILTERING"], "the requested server is never dropped for a configured one") + assert.NotNil(t, CodexACP.Preflight) + assert.Equal(t, "0.78.0", ClaudeAgentACP.Version) + assert.Equal(t, "1.12.0", CodexACP.Version) + + var manifest struct { + Dependencies map[string]string `json:"dependencies"` + } + data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("adapters", "package.json")) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(data, &manifest)) + for _, a := range Adapters() { + assert.Equal(t, a.Version, manifest.Dependencies[a.Package], "adapters/package.json pins what the driver checks") + } + var codexCfg map[string]any + require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(CodexACP.SetEnv["CODEX_CONFIG"]), &codexCfg), "CODEX_CONFIG is JSON") + + _, ok := AdapterNamed("nobody") + assert.False(t, ok) + dir, err := DefaultAdaptersDir(func(name string) (string, bool) { + return map[string]string{"HOME": "/home/agent"}[name], name == "HOME" + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "/home/agent/.local/share/basecamp/acp-adapters", dir) +} + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------- hangs + +func TestAnAgentThatStopsReadingCannotHoldCancelOrClose(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.sc.StopReadingAfter = "session/set_config_option" + h.grace = 300 * time.Millisecond + s := h.open() + + prompted := make(chan error, 1) + go func() { + // Larger than the pipe and the agent's read buffer: the write sticks. + _, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("x", 8<<20)) + prompted <- err + }() + time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond) + + canceled := make(chan error, 1) + go func() { canceled <- s.Cancel(context.Background()) }() + select { + case err := <-canceled: + require.Error(t, err) + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("Cancel waited on a stuck write") + } + closed := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { _ = s.Close(); close(closed) }() + select { + case <-closed: + case <-time.After(10 * time.Second): + _ = syscall.Kill(-s.Process().PGID, syscall.SIGKILL) + t.Fatal("Close waited on a stuck write") + } + select { + case err := <-prompted: + require.Error(t, err) + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the stuck prompt never returned") + } +} + +func TestALineTooLongEndsTheWorker(t *testing.T) { + old := maxLine + maxLine = 1 << 20 + t.Cleanup(func() { maxLine = old }) + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{{Update: raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "agent_message_chunk", + "content": map[string]any{"type": "text", "text": strings.Repeat("y", 2<<20)}})}}, Hang: true}) + s := h.open() + _, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrSessionEnded) + select { + case <-s.Done(): + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the worker outlived its unreadable stream") + } +} + +func TestAModeChangeFailsTheTurnBeforeTheWorkerIsGone(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{{ModeChange: "bypassPermissions"}}, Hang: true}) + s := h.open().(*session) + release := make(chan struct{}) + ended := make(chan struct{}) + s.mu.Lock() + s.endUnsafe = func() { + <-release + s.worker.Terminate(0) + close(ended) + } + s.mu.Unlock() + answers := make(chan error, 1) + go func() { + _, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + answers <- err + }() + select { + case err := <-answers: + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrUnsafeMode, "the turn fails on the mode report, not on the worker's end") + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + close(release) + t.Fatal("the turn waited for the worker to be ended") + } + close(release) + select { + case <-ended: + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the worker was not ended") + } + <-s.Done() +} + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------- foreign MCP configuration + +func TestCodexConfigThatDeclaresMCPServersRefusesTheSession(t *testing.T) { + root := t.TempDir() + home := filepath.Join(root, "home") + cwd := filepath.Join(root, "repo", "sub") + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(home, ".codex"), 0o700)) + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(cwd, 0o700)) + lookup := func(name string) (string, bool) { + if name == "HOME" { + return home, true + } + return "", false + } + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(home, ".codex", "config.toml"), []byte("model = \"x\"\n[projects.\"/tmp\"]\ntrust_level = \"trusted\"\n"), 0o600)) + require.NoError(t, codexPreflight(cwd, lookup)) + + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(home, ".codex", "config.toml"), []byte("[mcp_servers.basecamp]\ncommand = \"/bin/evil\"\n"), 0o600)) + require.ErrorIs(t, codexPreflight(cwd, lookup), ErrForeignMCPConfig) + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(home, ".codex", "config.toml"), []byte("['mcp_servers'.basecamp]\ncommand = \"/bin/evil\"\n"), 0o600)) + require.ErrorIs(t, codexPreflight(cwd, lookup), ErrForeignMCPConfig, "a quoted key declares them too") + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(home, ".codex", "config.toml"), []byte("[\"mcp\\u005fservers\".basecamp]\ncommand = \"/bin/evil\"\n"), 0o600)) + require.ErrorIs(t, codexPreflight(cwd, lookup), ErrForeignMCPConfig, "a key with an escape is refused rather than read") + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(home, ".codex", "config.toml"), []byte("[profiles.\"my profile\".mcp_servers.x]\ncommand = \"/bin/evil\"\n"), 0o600)) + require.ErrorIs(t, codexPreflight(cwd, lookup), ErrForeignMCPConfig, "a quoted table path declares them too") + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(home, ".codex", "config.toml"), []byte("[profiles . demo . mcp_servers . basecamp]\ncommand = \"/bin/evil\"\n"), 0o600)) + require.ErrorIs(t, codexPreflight(cwd, lookup), ErrForeignMCPConfig, "TOML allows space around the dots") + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(home, ".codex", "config.toml"), []byte("\ufeff[mcp_servers.basecamp]\ncommand = \"/bin/evil\"\n"), 0o600)) + require.ErrorIs(t, codexPreflight(cwd, lookup), ErrForeignMCPConfig, "a byte order mark does not hide the first line") + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(home, ".codex", "config.toml"), + []byte("profile = \"demo\"\nprofiles = { demo = { mcp_servers = { basecamp = { command = \"/bin/evil\" } } } }\n"), 0o600)) + require.ErrorIs(t, codexPreflight(cwd, lookup), ErrForeignMCPConfig, "an inline table declares them on one line, at any depth") + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(home, ".codex", "config.toml"), []byte("model = \"x\"\nwindows_path = \"C:\\\\codex\"\n"), 0o600)) + require.NoError(t, codexPreflight(cwd, lookup), "an escape in a value is not a key") + require.NoError(t, os.Chmod(filepath.Join(home, ".codex", "config.toml"), 0o000)) + require.ErrorIs(t, codexPreflight(cwd, lookup), ErrForeignMCPConfig, "a config this cannot read is refused, not assumed empty") + require.NoError(t, os.Chmod(filepath.Join(home, ".codex", "config.toml"), 0o600)) + codexHome := filepath.Join(root, "codex-home") + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(codexHome, 0o700)) + withCodexHome := func(name string) (string, bool) { + if name == "CODEX_HOME" { + return codexHome, true + } + return lookup(name) + } + require.NoError(t, codexPreflight(cwd, withCodexHome), "CODEX_HOME replaces ~/.codex") + + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(root, "repo", ".codex"), 0o700)) + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "repo", ".codex", "config.toml"), []byte("mcp_servers.basecamp.command = \"/bin/evil\"\n"), 0o600)) + require.ErrorIs(t, codexPreflight(cwd, withCodexHome), ErrForeignMCPConfig, "a project layer above the working directory counts") + + h := newHarness(t) + d := h.driver() + d.opts.Adapter.Preflight = func(string, func(string) (string, bool)) error { return ErrForeignMCPConfig } + _, err := d.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrForeignMCPConfig) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrNotStarted) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrUnusable) + _, statErr := os.Stat(h.sc.Record) + assert.ErrorIs(t, statErr, os.ErrNotExist, "nothing was started") +} + +func TestCloseGivesUpOnOutputAnEscapedDescendantHolds(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.sc.EscapingChild, h.sc.IgnoreStdinEOF, h.sc.IgnoreTerminate = true, true, true + h.grace = 300 * time.Millisecond + s := h.open() + rec := h.record() + require.NotZero(t, rec.ChildPID) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = syscall.Kill(rec.ChildPID, syscall.SIGKILL) }) + + closed := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { _ = s.Close(); close(closed) }() + select { + case <-closed: + case <-time.After(10 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("Close waited on output a process outside the worker's group holds") + } + waitGone(t, rec.PID) + assert.False(t, gone(rec.ChildPID), "the escaped descendant is not this driver's to kill by name") +} + +func TestAgentTextIsFitForALog(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{ErrorMessage: "quota for person@example.com\u001b[31mred\u009b31mred\nsecond line\ttab"}) + s := h.open() + _, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.Error(t, err) + for _, bad := range []string{"person@example.com", "\u001b", "\u009b", "\n", "\t"} { + assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), bad) + } + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "quota for") +} + +func TestAFloodOfPermissionRequestsIsBounded(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + release := make(chan struct{}) + var deciding atomic.Int32 + h.policy.allow = func(driver.PermissionRequest) bool { + deciding.Add(1) + defer deciding.Add(-1) + <-release + return true + } + const flood = 60 + h.turns(turnScript{ + FloodPermissions: flood, + FloodCall: permission(t, map[string]any{"kind": "edit"}, standardOptions()...), + Stop: "end_turn", + }) + s := h.open() + type answer struct { + res driver.PromptResult + err error + } + // The result comes back on a channel rather than being asserted where it + // arrives: a goroutine that outlives the test must not be the one to fail + // it. + answers := make(chan answer, 1) + go func() { + res, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + answers <- answer{res, err} + }() + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return deciding.Load() == maxDecisions }, 60*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond, + "the session decides at most %d at once", maxDecisions) + // Every request but the ones stuck in a decision has been answered. + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return len(h.record().Outcomes) >= flood-maxDecisions }, 60*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond, + "a flood is answered as it arrives") + assert.LessOrEqual(t, deciding.Load(), int32(maxDecisions)) + answered := h.record().Outcomes + close(release) + var got answer + select { + case got = <-answers: + case <-time.After(60 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the flooded turn never ended") + } + require.NoError(t, got.err) + res := got.res + assert.NotEmpty(t, res.Refusals, "a request refused for want of room is still a refusal on the turn") + canceled := 0 + for _, o := range answered { + if len(o) == 0 || string(o) == "null" { + continue + } + if outcome, _ := outcomeOf(t, o); outcome == outcomeCanceled { + canceled++ + } + } + assert.Positive(t, canceled, "what reaches the policy past its bound is refused undecided") + allowed := 0 + for _, o := range h.record().Outcomes { + if len(o) == 0 || string(o) == "null" { + continue + } + if _, option := outcomeOf(t, o); option == "allow-once" { + allowed++ + } + } + assert.Positive(t, allowed, "while what fits is still decided") +} + +// The connection answers at most maxHandlers requests at once, whatever the +// agent sends: the rest are refused as they are read, so no flood of requests +// becomes a flood of goroutines. +func TestTheConnectionBoundsRequestsInFlight(t *testing.T) { + // What the client writes, the test reads; what the test writes, the + // client reads. + fromClient, toAgent := io.Pipe() + toClient, fromAgent := io.Pipe() + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = toAgent.Close(); _ = fromAgent.Close() }) + + c := newConn(toAgent) + var busy atomic.Int32 + c.onBusy = func(string, json.RawMessage, any) { busy.Add(1) } + release := make(chan struct{}) + var inFlight, peak atomic.Int32 + c.onRequest = func(id json.RawMessage, _ string, _ json.RawMessage, _ any) { + n := inFlight.Add(1) + for { + p := peak.Load() + if n <= p || peak.CompareAndSwap(p, n) { + break + } + } + <-release + inFlight.Add(-1) + c.reply(id, map[string]any{"outcome": map[string]any{"outcome": outcomeCanceled}}) + } + go func() { _ = c.read(toClient) }() + + answers := make(chan int, 1) + go func() { + // Read what the client writes, so no reply of its own can block it. + refused := 0 + scanner := bufio.NewScanner(fromClient) + for scanner.Scan() { + if strings.Contains(scanner.Text(), "too many requests") { + refused++ + } + if strings.Contains(scanner.Text(), "outcome") { + break + } + } + answers <- refused + }() + for i := range 64 { + _, err := fmt.Fprintf(fromAgent, `{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":%d,"method":"session/request_permission","params":{}}`+"\n", i) + require.NoError(t, err) + } + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return int(inFlight.Load()) == maxHandlers }, 10*time.Second, 5*time.Millisecond) + time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond) + assert.Equal(t, int32(maxHandlers), peak.Load(), "no more goroutines than the bound, whatever arrives") + close(release) + select { + case refused := <-answers: + assert.Positive(t, refused, "what does not fit is refused as it is read") + assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, int(busy.Load()), refused, "and every one of those refusals is heard by the session") + case <-time.After(10 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("no answer reached the agent") + } +} + +func TestWhatOneToolCallMayCostTheSession(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + s := h.open().(*session) + // What a tool call costs is what it costs inside a turn: outside one, + // nothing of it is kept at all. + s.mu.Lock() + s.turn = &turn{done: make(chan struct{})} + s.mu.Unlock() + long := strings.Repeat("c", maxToolCallID+1) + locations := make([]any, 0, maxLocations*4) + for i := range maxLocations * 4 { + locations = append(locations, map[string]any{"path": fmt.Sprintf("/work/%d", i)}) + } + u, ok := decodeUpdate(raw(t, map[string]any{ + "sessionUpdate": "tool_call", "toolCallId": long, "kind": "edit", "status": "pending", "locations": locations, + })) + require.True(t, ok) + assert.Len(t, u.Locations, maxLocations, "a call carries as many paths as this driver carries, no more") + assert.True(t, u.Unplaceable, "and a call whose paths did not all fit is one the policy cannot place") + info := s.noteTool(u) + assert.Len(t, info.locations, maxLocations) + assert.True(t, info.unplaceable) + s.mu.Lock() + remembered := len(s.tools) + s.mu.Unlock() + assert.Zero(t, remembered, "an id past what an id can be is not a key to keep") + + for i := range maxTools + 10 { + s.noteTool(sessionUpdate{ToolCallID: fmt.Sprintf("call-%d", i), Kind: "edit", Status: "pending"}) + } + s.mu.Lock() + remembered = len(s.tools) + s.mu.Unlock() + assert.Equal(t, maxTools, remembered) +} + +// A permission being decided as the turn ends is still on the turn's result: +// the agent can answer the prompt before it hears the answer to its request. +func TestARefusalDecidedAsTheTurnEndsIsOnItsResult(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + deciding := make(chan struct{}) + h.policy.allow = func(driver.PermissionRequest) bool { + close(deciding) + time.Sleep(300 * time.Millisecond) + return false + } + h.turns(turnScript{ + FloodPermissions: 1, + FloodCall: permission(t, map[string]any{"kind": "edit"}, standardOptions()...), + StopWithoutWaiting: true, + Stop: "end_turn", + }) + s := h.open() + res, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.NoError(t, err) + select { + case <-deciding: + default: + t.Fatal("the policy was never asked") + } + assert.Len(t, res.Refusals, 1) +} + +// A handshake that fails after the adapter started leaves nothing of its +// process group behind by the time NewSession returns: the caller settles the +// attempt on that error. +func TestAFailedHandshakeLeavesNoGroupBehind(t *testing.T) { + // Several runs: the window this closes is a matter of milliseconds. + for run := range 4 { + h := newHarness(t) + h.sc.SpawnChild, h.sc.IgnoreTerminate = true, true + // Past initialize, so the agent has surely started and said so. + h.sc.Hang = "session/new" + d := h.driver() + d.opts.HandshakeTimeout = 3 * time.Second + d.opts.CloseGrace = 2 * time.Second + _, err := d.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.Error(t, err) + rec := h.record() + require.NotZero(t, rec.ChildPID) + assert.True(t, gone(rec.ChildPID) && gone(rec.PID), + "run %d: the adapter's group is gone when NewSession returns, not a moment later", run) + } +} + +func TestARefusalRecordIsBounded(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + s := h.open().(*session) + tr := &turn{done: make(chan struct{})} + s.mu.Lock() + s.turn = tr + s.mu.Unlock() + t.Cleanup(func() { + s.mu.Lock() + s.turn = nil + s.mu.Unlock() + }) + long := strings.Repeat("x", 4*maxToolCallID) + for i := range maxRecorded + maxRefusals + 100 { + s.record(driver.PermissionRequest{ToolCallID: fmt.Sprintf("%s-%d", long, i), Kind: driver.ToolEdit}, tr) + } + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + assert.Len(t, tr.refusals, maxRefusals, "a turn holds so many refusals and no more") + assert.LessOrEqual(t, len(tr.refusals[0].ToolCallID), maxToolCallID, "a recorded id is cut, and then redacted") + assert.LessOrEqual(t, len(s.recorded), maxRecorded, "and a session remembers so many and no more") + assert.ErrorIs(t, s.unsafe, ErrRefusalMemoryFull, "and a session that reaches that bound ends") +} + +// A session remembers so many refused tool call ids and no more, and the one +// that fills that memory is the last refusal it records: past the bound a +// repeat cannot be told from a first, so the session ends rather than write +// the same tool call to the ledger twice. +func TestARefusalPastWhatASessionCanRememberEndsIt(t *testing.T) { + recorder := &drivertest.Refusals{} + h := newHarness(t) + h.withConfig = func(cfg driver.SessionConfig) driver.SessionConfig { + cfg.Refusals = recorder + return cfg + } + s := h.open().(*session) + for i := range maxRecorded { + s.record(driver.PermissionRequest{ToolCallID: fmt.Sprintf("call-%d", i), Kind: driver.ToolEdit}, nil) + } + require.Equal(t, maxRecorded, len(recorder.Recorded()), "each of them recorded once") + assert.ErrorIs(t, s.failure(), ErrRefusalMemoryFull, "and the session that can remember no more ends") + + // One more tool call, asked about twice. The session cannot say whether + // it has refused this one before. + s.record(driver.PermissionRequest{ToolCallID: "over", Kind: driver.ToolEdit}, nil) + s.record(driver.PermissionRequest{ToolCallID: "over", Kind: driver.ToolEdit}, nil) + + over := 0 + for _, r := range recorder.Recorded() { + if r.ToolCallID == "over" { + over++ + } + } + assert.Equal(t, 0, over, "a refusal the session cannot promise is the only one is not written, let alone written twice") + assert.Equal(t, maxRecorded, len(recorder.Recorded()), "the ledger holds one record per tool call and no more") + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + assert.Len(t, s.recorded, maxRecorded, "and the memory itself never grows past its bound") +} + +// A cancel that arrives once the agent has answered the prompt, while the +// session still waits on a decision, is not sent: that turn is over. +func TestACancelAfterTheAgentAnsweredIsNotSent(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + deciding := make(chan struct{}) + h.policy.allow = func(driver.PermissionRequest) bool { + close(deciding) + time.Sleep(600 * time.Millisecond) + return false + } + h.turns(turnScript{ + FloodPermissions: 1, + FloodCall: permission(t, map[string]any{"kind": "edit"}, standardOptions()...), + StopWithoutWaiting: true, + Stop: "end_turn", + }) + s := h.open() + answers := make(chan driver.PromptResult, 1) + go func() { + res, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + assert.NoError(t, err) + answers <- res + }() + <-deciding + // The agent answers the prompt 150ms after asking; the decision takes 600. + time.Sleep(350 * time.Millisecond) + require.NoError(t, s.Cancel(context.Background())) + res := <-answers + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnEndTurn, res.Stop) + assert.NotContains(t, h.record().Methods, "session/cancel") +} + +// A turn the agent has answered asks nothing more: a request that arrives +// while the session waits on a decision still in flight is refused, not put +// to the policy. +func TestARequestAfterTheAgentAnsweredIsNotAllowed(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + var calls atomic.Int32 + h.policy.allow = func(req driver.PermissionRequest) bool { + if calls.Add(1) == 1 { + time.Sleep(800 * time.Millisecond) + } + return true + } + h.turns(turnScript{ + FloodPermissions: 1, + FloodCall: permission(t, map[string]any{"kind": "edit", "locations": []any{map[string]any{"path": "x"}}}, standardOptions()...), + StopWithoutWaiting: true, + Stop: "end_turn", + LateRequest: permission(t, map[string]any{"toolCallId": "late", "kind": "edit"}, standardOptions()...), + }) + s := h.open() + _, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return len(h.record().Outcomes) == 2 }, 10*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond) + for _, r := range h.policy.requests() { + assert.NotEqual(t, "late", r.ToolCallID, "a request after the answer is not put to the policy") + } + late := h.record().Outcomes + _, lastOption := outcomeOf(t, late[len(late)-1]) + assert.NotEqual(t, "allow-once", lastOption) +} + +// A cancel that arrives after the agent has answered does not turn the +// agent's own stop into one the connector asked for. +func TestACancelAfterTheAnswerDoesNotClaimTheStop(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.policy.allow = func(driver.PermissionRequest) bool { + time.Sleep(700 * time.Millisecond) + return true + } + h.turns(turnScript{ + FloodPermissions: 1, + FloodCall: permission(t, map[string]any{"kind": "edit", "locations": []any{map[string]any{"path": "x"}}}, standardOptions()...), + StopWithoutWaiting: true, + Stop: string(driver.TurnCanceled), + }) + s := h.open() + type answer struct { + res driver.PromptResult + err error + } + answers := make(chan answer, 1) + go func() { + res, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + answers <- answer{res, err} + }() + // The agent answers 150ms in; the decision runs to 700ms. + time.Sleep(400 * time.Millisecond) + require.NoError(t, s.Cancel(context.Background())) + a := <-answers + assert.NotEqual(t, driver.TurnCanceled, a.res.Stop, "the connector's cancel came after the agent had stopped") + // The decision still in flight came back allowed after the agent had + // answered, so it was refused; the agent's own canceled stop is that refusal. + require.NoError(t, a.err) + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnRefusal, a.res.Stop) + assert.NotContains(t, h.record().Methods, "session/cancel") +} + +func TestTheTurnEndWaitsForRequestsAlreadyRead(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + s := h.open().(*session) + claimed := s.claim("session/request_permission") + assert.Nil(t, turnOf(claimed), "no turn in flight") + go func() { + time.Sleep(300 * time.Millisecond) + s.mu.Lock() + s.deciding-- + s.mu.Unlock() + }() + start := time.Now() + s.drainDecisions() + assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, time.Since(start), 250*time.Millisecond, "a request read but not yet decided holds the turn's end") +} + +func TestUpdatesCarryBoundedIDs(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + s := h.open().(*session) + s.emit(driver.Update{Kind: driver.UpdateToolCall, ToolCallID: strings.Repeat("i", 10*maxToolCallID)}) + select { + case u := <-s.Updates(): + assert.LessOrEqual(t, len(u.ToolCallID), maxToolCallID, "an id is cut, and then redacted") + case <-time.After(2 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("no update") + } +} + +// The driver asks for the group's confirmation with the worker it started, +// and an answer that the group outlived its leader is in the error the caller +// settles on. +func TestAFailedHandshakeAsksForTheGroupsConfirmation(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.sc.FailInitialize = true + var asked []driver.Process + old := confirmGroupGone + confirmGroupGone = func(p driver.Process, grace time.Duration) error { + asked = append(asked, p) + return driver.ErrGroupOutlivedLeader + } + t.Cleanup(func() { confirmGroupGone = old }) + _, err := h.driver().NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrGroupOutlivedLeader) + require.Len(t, asked, 1) + assert.Equal(t, h.record().PID, asked[0].PGID, "the group of the adapter this session started") +} + +// The prompt's answer settles its turn as it is read, on the reading +// goroutine, so a request read right after it is outside the turn whatever +// the turn's own goroutine has done yet. +func TestAnAnswerSettlesItsTurnAsItIsRead(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.policy.allow = func(driver.PermissionRequest) bool { return true } + s := h.open().(*session) + tr := &turn{done: make(chan struct{}), call: s.conn.register("session/prompt")} + s.mu.Lock() + s.turn = tr + s.mu.Unlock() + t.Cleanup(func() { + s.mu.Lock() + s.turn = nil + s.mu.Unlock() + }) + + s.onResponse(tr.call.id) + params := raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionId": "sess-1", "toolCall": map[string]any{"toolCallId": "after", "kind": "edit"}, + "options": []any{map[string]any{"optionId": "ok", "kind": "allow_once"}, map[string]any{"optionId": "no", "kind": "reject_once"}}}) + s.onRequest(json.RawMessage(`98`), "session/request_permission", params, s.claim("session/request_permission")) + assert.Empty(t, h.policy.requests(), "a request read after the answer is not put to the policy") +} + +// The install fails on a Node version an adapter does not support, rather +// than leaving an installation Locate accepts and the first dispatch cannot +// run: npm only warns about engines without --engine-strict. +func TestTheAdapterInstallRefusesAnUnsupportedNode(t *testing.T) { + makefile, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("..", "..", "..", "..", "Makefile")) + require.NoError(t, err) + var install string + for _, line := range strings.Split(string(makefile), "\n") { + if strings.Contains(line, "npm ci") && strings.Contains(line, "ACP_ADAPTERS_DIR") { + install = line + } + } + require.NotEmpty(t, install, "make acp-adapters installs with npm ci") + assert.Contains(t, install, "--engine-strict") + assert.Contains(t, install, "--ignore-scripts") + + var lock struct { + Packages map[string]struct { + Engines map[string]string `json:"engines"` + } `json:"packages"` + } + raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("adapters", "package-lock.json")) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(raw, &lock)) + assert.NotEmpty(t, lock.Packages["node_modules/"+ClaudeAgentACP.Package].Engines["node"], + "the pinned adapter states the Node it needs, which --engine-strict enforces") +} + +// A session whose MCP server did not connect does not go on: the worker +// would run without the Basecamp tools and its task token, and a turn that +// ends without them would be settled as finished. +func TestASessionWhoseMCPServerDidNotConnectDoesNotGoOn(t *testing.T) { + withStatus := func(h *harness, status MCPStatus) *Driver { + d := h.driver() + d.opts.Adapter.MCPStatus = status + return d + } + t.Run("claude: the init reports every server connected", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{{MCPInit: map[string]string{"basecamp": "connected"}}}, Stop: "end_turn"}, turnScript{Stop: "end_turn"}) + s, err := withStatus(h, MCPStatusInit).NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + for range 2 { + res, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnEndTurn, res.Stop) + } + }) + for name, init := range map[string]map[string]string{ + "claude: the server failed": {"basecamp": "failed"}, + "claude: the server is pending": {"basecamp": "pending"}, + "claude: the server is missing": {"other": "connected"}, + } { + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{{MCPInit: init}, {SleepMS: 3000}}, Stop: "end_turn"}) + s, err := withStatus(h, MCPStatusInit).NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + _, err = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMCPServerNotConnected) + select { + case <-s.Done(): + case <-time.After(10 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the worker was not ended") + } + }) + } + t.Run("claude: a turn that ends with no init at all", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Stop: "end_turn"}) + s, err := withStatus(h, MCPStatusInit).NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + _, err = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMCPServerNotConnected, "never told is not connected") + }) + t.Run("codex: a startup failure", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{ + {Update: raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "tool_call", "toolCallId": "mcp_startup.basecamp", "kind": "other", + "title": "mcp__basecamp__startup", "status": "failed"})}, + {SleepMS: 3000}, + }, Stop: "end_turn"}) + s, err := withStatus(h, MCPStatusStartupFailures).NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + _, err = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMCPServerNotConnected) + }) + t.Run("claude: a server the session never gave it", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{{MCPInit: map[string]string{"basecamp": "connected", "elsewhere": "connected"}}, {SleepMS: 3000}}, Stop: "end_turn"}) + s, err := withStatus(h, MCPStatusInit).NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + _, err = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMCPServerNotConnected) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "never gave it") + }) + t.Run("a failure while the session is opening is what the start reports", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.sc.MCPInitAtSessionStart = map[string]string{"basecamp": "failed"} + _, err := withStatus(h, MCPStatusInit).NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMCPServerNotConnected, "not the closed stream that failure caused") + }) + t.Run("an init naming another session vouches for nothing", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.sc.MCPInitAtSessionStart = map[string]string{"basecamp": "connected"} + h.sc.MCPInitSessionID = "someone-elses-session" + h.turns(turnScript{Stop: "end_turn"}) + s, err := withStatus(h, MCPStatusInit).NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + _, err = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMCPServerNotConnected, "this session was never told about its own servers") + }) + t.Run("codex: a startup failure for a server nobody gave it", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{ + {Update: raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "tool_call", "toolCallId": "mcp_startup.elsewhere", "kind": "other", + "title": "mcp__elsewhere__startup", "status": "failed"})}, + {SleepMS: 3000}, + }, Stop: "end_turn"}) + s, err := withStatus(h, MCPStatusStartupFailures).NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + _, err = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMCPServerNotConnected) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "never gave it") + }) + t.Run("codex: no failure reported is no failure", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Stop: "end_turn"}) + s, err := withStatus(h, MCPStatusStartupFailures).NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + _, err = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.NoError(t, err) + }) +} + +// An agent that asks faster than its refusals can be written has stopped +// working with this client: the connection says so, and the session ends +// rather than leaving requests unanswered for ever. +func TestAnAgentThatOutrunsEvenItsRefusalsEndsTheSession(t *testing.T) { + t.Run("the connection reports the overflow", func(t *testing.T) { + oldBusy, oldHandlers := maxBusy, maxHandlers + maxBusy, maxHandlers = 2, 2 + t.Cleanup(func() { maxBusy, maxHandlers = oldBusy, oldHandlers }) + + // A writer nobody reads: refusals queue up rather than going out. + _, toAgent := io.Pipe() + toClient, fromAgent := io.Pipe() + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = toAgent.Close(); _ = fromAgent.Close() }) + c := newConn(toAgent) + release := make(chan struct{}) + defer close(release) + c.onRequest = func(json.RawMessage, string, json.RawMessage, any) { <-release } + overflowed := make(chan struct{}) + var once sync.Once + c.onOverflow = func() { once.Do(func() { close(overflowed) }) } + go func() { _ = c.read(toClient) }() + + go func() { + for i := range 64 { + if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(fromAgent, `{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":%d,"method":"session/request_permission","params":{}}`+"\n", i); err != nil { + return + } + } + }() + select { + case <-overflowed: + case <-time.After(20 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("an agent outrunning every bound was never reported") + } + }) + + t.Run("the session ends", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Hang: true}) + s := h.open() + answers := make(chan error, 1) + go func() { + _, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + answers <- err + }() + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return slices.Contains(h.record().Methods, "session/prompt") }, + 10*time.Second, 50*time.Millisecond) + s.(*session).conn.onOverflow() + select { + case err := <-answers: + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "unanswered") + case <-time.After(10 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the turn did not end") + } + select { + case <-s.Done(): + case <-time.After(10 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the worker was not ended") + } + }) +} + +// A session that is not the one the connector asked for is the driver +// package's own sentinel, so every driver settles it the same way. +func TestAnUnverifiedSessionIsTheSharedSentinel(t *testing.T) { + require.ErrorIs(t, ErrMCPServerNotConnected, driver.ErrSessionUnverified) + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{{MCPInit: map[string]string{"basecamp": "failed"}}, {SleepMS: 3000}}, Stop: "end_turn"}) + d := h.driver() + d.opts.Adapter.MCPStatus = MCPStatusInit + s, err := d.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + _, err = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrSessionUnverified) +} + +// redactionSecret is the value fed through every error path. It is obviously +// fake, and is planted where a real secret would be: in the session's +// environment, in its MCP server's environment, in the name of its private +// directory, and in what the agent writes back. +const redactionSecret = "test-token-not-real-a71c3e" + +func redactionHarness(t *testing.T) *harness { + t.Helper() + h := newHarness(t) + h.sc.Secret = redactionSecret + h.withConfig = func(cfg driver.SessionConfig) driver.SessionConfig { + private := filepath.Join(cfg.PrivateDir, redactionSecret) + require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(private, 0o700)) + cfg.PrivateDir = private + cfg.Env = append(slices.Clone(cfg.Env), "FAKE_AGENT_SECRET="+redactionSecret) + cfg.MCPServers[0].Env["BASECAMP_CONNECT_TASK_TOKEN"] = redactionSecret + cfg.Redaction = driver.Redaction{Secrets: []string{redactionSecret}} + return cfg + } + return h +} + +// The redaction rule (driver's redact.go): nothing this driver hands back +// carries the secret, whichever way the session fails. +func TestNoErrorPathCarriesTheSecretOut(t *testing.T) { + drivertest.RequireRedacted(t, redactionSecret, []drivertest.RedactionPath{ + {Name: "start", Run: func(t *testing.T) drivertest.Crossing { + h := redactionHarness(t) + // The adapter is not the pinned one, and its stderr, which + // carries the secret, is in the failure. + h.sc.AgentVersion = "0.0.0" + _, err := h.driver().NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.Error(t, err) + return drivertest.Crossing{Errors: []error{err}} + }}, + {Name: "handshake", Run: func(t *testing.T) drivertest.Crossing { + h := redactionHarness(t) + h.sc.Confirm = "stale" + h.sc.CurrentMode = redactionSecret + h.sc.Modes = []string{"ask", redactionSecret} + _, err := h.driver().NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrUnsafeMode) + return drivertest.Crossing{Errors: []error{err}} + }}, + {Name: "prompt", Run: func(t *testing.T) drivertest.Crossing { + h := redactionHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{ + {Update: raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "tool_call", "toolCallId": redactionSecret, "name": redactionSecret, "kind": "edit"})}, + {Permission: permission(t, map[string]any{"toolCallId": redactionSecret, "name": redactionSecret, "kind": "edit"}, standardOptions()...)}, + }, ErrorMessage: "the agent failed with " + redactionSecret}) + s := h.open() + result, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.Error(t, err) + return drivertest.Crossing{Errors: []error{err}, Results: []driver.PromptResult{result}, + Updates: drainUpdates(s), Texts: []string{s.(*session).stderrNote()}} + }}, + {Name: "cancel", Run: func(t *testing.T) drivertest.Crossing { + h := redactionHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{{Update: raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "agent_message_chunk", + "content": map[string]any{"type": "text", "text": redactionSecret}})}}, WaitForCancel: true, Stop: string(driver.TurnCanceled)}) + s := h.open() + results := make(chan driver.PromptResult, 1) + go func() { + res, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + assert.NoError(t, err) + results <- res + }() + <-s.Updates() + err := s.Cancel(context.Background()) + res := <-results + return drivertest.Crossing{Errors: []error{err}, Results: []driver.PromptResult{res}, + Updates: drainUpdates(s), Texts: []string{s.(*session).stderrNote()}} + }}, + {Name: "close", Run: func(t *testing.T) drivertest.Crossing { + h := redactionHarness(t) + s := h.open() + err := s.Close() + _, promptErr := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + return drivertest.Crossing{Errors: []error{err, promptErr}, + Updates: drainUpdates(s), Texts: []string{s.(*session).stderrNote()}} + }}, + }) +} + +// drainUpdates is every update the session has emitted so far. +func drainUpdates(s driver.Session) []driver.Update { + var out []driver.Update + for { + select { + case u, ok := <-s.Updates(): + if !ok { + return out + } + out = append(out, u) + case <-time.After(200 * time.Millisecond): + return out + } + } +} + +// A refusal is recorded as it is made, once per tool call id, so a worker +// that dies before its result has already reported it (driver's "Refusals"). +func TestEveryRefusalIsRecordedOnceAsItIsMade(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + recorder := &drivertest.Refusals{} + h.withConfig = func(cfg driver.SessionConfig) driver.SessionConfig { + cfg.Refusals = recorder + return cfg + } + call := map[string]any{"toolCallId": "call-1", "kind": "edit"} + // Two ids that are cut to the same first bytes are still two calls. + long := strings.Repeat("d", maxToolCallID) + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{ + {Permission: permission(t, call, standardOptions()...)}, + // The same call asked about twice is one refusal. + {Permission: permission(t, call, standardOptions()...)}, + {Permission: permission(t, map[string]any{"toolCallId": "call-2", "kind": "execute"}, standardOptions()...)}, + {Permission: permission(t, map[string]any{"toolCallId": long + "-one", "kind": "edit"}, standardOptions()...)}, + {Permission: permission(t, map[string]any{"toolCallId": long + "-two", "kind": "edit"}, standardOptions()...)}, + }, Hang: true}) + s := h.open() + go func() { _, _ = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") }() + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return len(recorder.Recorded()) == 4 }, 10*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond, + "each refusal is recorded as it is made, before the turn ends") + recorded := recorder.Recorded() + assert.Equal(t, []driver.Refusal{{ToolCallID: "call-1", Tool: "edit"}, {ToolCallID: "call-2", Tool: "execute"}}, recorded[:2]) +} + +// The dispatcher logs a worker's last output when it stops badly; it reads +// it off the session, so the session must offer it. +func TestTheDispatcherCanReadTheAdaptersLastWords(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.sc.Secret = "the adapter's last words" + s := h.open() + tail, ok := s.(interface{ StderrTail() string }) + require.True(t, ok, "the dispatcher probes for this method") + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return strings.Contains(tail.StderrTail(), "last words") }, + 10*time.Second, 50*time.Millisecond) +} + +// A session that failed while its handshake was returning is ended, not +// handed out: nothing prompts a worker the driver has already killed. +func TestASessionAlreadyFailedIsNeverHandedOut(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + // The failure lands while session/new is being answered; the handshake + // itself succeeds. + h.sc.MCPInitAtSessionStart = map[string]string{"basecamp": "failed"} + d := h.driver() + d.opts.Adapter.MCPStatus = MCPStatusInit + s, err := d.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMCPServerNotConnected) + assert.Nil(t, s) + waitGone(t, h.record().PID) +} + +// And a failure claimed in the window between the handshake returning and the +// session being handed out: the seam stands where only a race could. +func TestASessionThatFailsAsItIsHandedOutIsNotHandedOut(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + failure := errors.New("acp: claimed as the handshake returned") + old := afterHandshake + afterHandshake = func(s *session) { s.fail(failure) } + t.Cleanup(func() { afterHandshake = old }) + + s, err := h.driver().NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + assert.Nil(t, s) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, failure) + var start *driver.StartError + require.ErrorAs(t, err, &start, "a start that ran a process says which") + assert.NotZero(t, start.Process.PID) + waitGone(t, h.record().PID) +} + +// A permission request this client cannot read is a refusal it made, and is +// recorded like any other. +func TestAnUnreadableRequestIsARefusalToo(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + recorder := &drivertest.Refusals{} + h.withConfig = func(cfg driver.SessionConfig) driver.SessionConfig { + cfg.Refusals = recorder + return cfg + } + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{{Permission: raw(t, []any{"not", "an", "object"})}}, Hang: true}) + s := h.open() + go func() { _, _ = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") }() + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return len(recorder.Recorded()) == 1 }, 10*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond) + select { + case u := <-s.Updates(): + assert.Equal(t, driver.UpdatePermission, u.Kind) + assert.False(t, u.Allowed) + case <-time.After(2 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("no update for a refusal") + } +} + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------- what the agent writes is bounded + +// An adapter can send an account of its MCP servers for any session it likes, +// as often as it likes, before the session's own id is known. What is held is +// bounded in every direction: how many accounts, which ids may have one, and +// how much of one is kept. +func TestTheAccountsHeldBeforeASessionIsNamedAreBounded(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + d := h.driver() + d.opts.Adapter.MCPStatus = MCPStatusInit + s := h.open().(*session) + s.mu.Lock() + s.id = "" + s.mcpStatus = MCPStatusInit + s.mu.Unlock() + + init := func(id string, servers ...map[string]any) { + list := make([]any, 0, len(servers)) + for _, srv := range servers { + list = append(list, srv) + } + s.onSDKMessage(raw(t, map[string]any{ + "sessionId": id, + "message": map[string]any{"type": "system", "subtype": "init", "mcp_servers": list}, + })) + } + // An id this session could never have been given is not held at all, so + // it does not even take a place among the few that are. + init(strings.Repeat("x", 4096), map[string]any{"name": "basecamp", "status": "connected"}) + init("../../etc/passwd", map[string]any{"name": "basecamp", "status": "connected"}) + s.mu.Lock() + assert.Empty(t, s.earlyInit, "no account is held for an id this session could not have") + s.mu.Unlock() + + // Then a flood of accounts, each naming far more servers than the + // session was given, and each name far longer than a name. + long := strings.Repeat("l", 8192) + for i := range maxEarlyInit * 20 { + servers := make([]map[string]any, 0, 200) + for j := range 200 { + servers = append(servers, map[string]any{"name": fmt.Sprintf("%s-%d-%d", long, i, j), "status": long}) + } + init(fmt.Sprintf("sess-%d", i), servers...) + } + + s.mu.Lock() + held := len(s.earlyInit) + ids := slices.Collect(maps.Keys(s.earlyInit)) + widest, longest := 0, 0 + for _, a := range s.earlyInit { + width := len(a.statuses) + if a.foreign { + width++ + } + widest = max(widest, width) + longest = max(longest, len(a.reason)) + for name, status := range a.statuses { + longest = max(longest, len(name), len(status)) + } + } + names := len(s.mcpNames) + s.mu.Unlock() + assert.LessOrEqual(t, held, maxEarlyInit, "no more accounts held than could ever be used") + for _, id := range ids { + assert.True(t, validSessionID(id), "an id this session could never be given is not held: %q", id) + } + assert.LessOrEqual(t, widest, names+1, "an account holds the session's own servers and the one name it did not give") + assert.LessOrEqual(t, longest, 512, "and none of it is the agent's to size") + + // And what is held is still an account: the one that turns out to name + // this session vouches for its servers when the id arrives. + s.mu.Lock() + s.earlyInit = nil + s.mcpConfirmed = false + s.mu.Unlock() + init("sess-good", map[string]any{"name": "basecamp", "status": "connected"}) + s.nameSession("sess-good") + s.mu.Lock() + confirmed, unsafe := s.mcpConfirmed, s.unsafe + s.mu.Unlock() + assert.NoError(t, unsafe, "an account of the servers the session gave is no reason to end it") + assert.True(t, confirmed, "and it is the account that vouches for them") +} + +// A path no filesystem takes, and a mode no adapter has, are cut to what they +// can be rather than kept whole. +func TestALongPathAndALongModeAreCutToWhatTheyCanBe(t *testing.T) { + long := strings.Repeat("p", maxLocationPath*4) + u, ok := decodeUpdate(raw(t, map[string]any{ + "sessionUpdate": "tool_call", "toolCallId": "c1", "kind": "edit", + "locations": []any{map[string]any{"path": "/work/" + long}}, + })) + require.True(t, ok) + require.Len(t, u.Locations, 1) + assert.Len(t, u.Locations[0], maxLocationPath) + assert.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(u.Locations[0], "/work/"), "what is kept is the leading part, which is what the policy judges") + + h := newHarness(t) + s := h.open().(*session) + s.reportMode(strings.Repeat("m", maxMode*4)) + s.mu.Lock() + mode := s.mode + s.mu.Unlock() + assert.Len(t, mode, maxMode) +} + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------- what a decision may rest on + +// A tool call announced where the session could not be asked about it — a +// load's replayed history — tells the session nothing: a later request that +// names only that call's id is decided without the name the replay carried. +func TestAReplayedToolCallCannotNameALaterRequest(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.policy.allow = func(r driver.PermissionRequest) bool { return strings.HasPrefix(r.Tool, "mcp__basecamp__") } + h.sc.SessionID = "sess-earlier" + h.sc.Replay = []json.RawMessage{ + raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "tool_call", "toolCallId": "replayed-1", "kind": "other", + "name": "mcp__basecamp__note", "status": "in_progress"}), + } + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{ + {Permission: permission(t, map[string]any{"toolCallId": "replayed-1", "kind": "other"}, standardOptions()...)}, + }, Stop: "end_turn"}) + + s, err := h.driver().LoadSession(context.Background(), h.config(), "sess-earlier") + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + res, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.NoError(t, err) + + requests := h.policy.requests() + require.Len(t, requests, 1) + assert.Empty(t, requests[0].Tool, "a call the replay named is not a call this session announced") + assert.NotEmpty(t, res.Refusals, "so it is decided on its kind, and refused") + outcomes := h.record().Outcomes + require.Len(t, outcomes, 1) + _, option := outcomeOf(t, outcomes[0]) + assert.Equal(t, "reject", option) +} + +// Two options of one id say nothing about which the agent would act on, so +// none is selected and the request is answered as canceled. +func TestOptionsSharingAnIDSelectNothing(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.policy.allow = func(driver.PermissionRequest) bool { return true } + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{ + {Permission: permission(t, map[string]any{"toolCallId": "dup-1", "kind": "read"}, + [2]string{"x", "allow_once"}, [2]string{"x", "reject_once"})}, + }, Stop: "end_turn"}) + s := h.open() + res, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.NoError(t, err) + outcomes := h.record().Outcomes + require.Len(t, outcomes, 1) + kind, option := outcomeOf(t, outcomes[0]) + assert.Equal(t, outcomeCanceled, kind, "nothing of that list is selected") + assert.Empty(t, option) + assert.NotEmpty(t, res.Refusals, "and it is a call this session did not allow") +} + +// A request turned away at the connection's own bound is answered later, off +// the reading goroutine; the turn it belongs to is the one it was read in. +func TestARequestRefusedAtTheBoundCarriesTheTurnItWasReadIn(t *testing.T) { + fromClient, toAgent := io.Pipe() + toClient, fromAgent := io.Pipe() + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = toAgent.Close(); _ = fromAgent.Close() }) + go func() { _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, fromClient) }() + + c := newConn(toAgent) + mine := &claimed{turn: &turn{}} + c.claim = func(string) any { return mine } + heard := make(chan any, 1) + c.onBusy = func(_ string, _ json.RawMessage, got any) { heard <- got } + released := make(chan any, 1) + c.release = func(got any) { released <- got } + hold := make(chan struct{}) + t.Cleanup(func() { close(hold) }) + c.onRequest = func(json.RawMessage, string, json.RawMessage, any) { <-hold } + go func() { _ = c.read(toClient) }() + + for i := range maxHandlers + 1 { + _, err := fmt.Fprintf(fromAgent, `{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":%d,"method":"session/request_permission","params":{}}`+"\n", i) + require.NoError(t, err) + } + select { + case got := <-heard: + assert.Same(t, mine, got, "the refusal is recorded against what the request was read in") + case <-time.After(10 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the refusal was never heard") + } + select { + case got := <-released: + assert.Same(t, mine, got, "and the turn's end stops waiting for it once it is answered") + case <-time.After(10 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the claim was never given up") + } +} + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------- nothing hangs + +// An agent that has stopped reading its input cannot hold a prompt past its +// context, however much of the prompt is still in the pipe. +func TestAPromptWhoseWriteIsStuckReturnsWithItsContext(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.sc.StopReadingAfter = "session/set_config_option" + s := h.open() + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 500*time.Millisecond) + defer cancel() + start := time.Now() + _, err := s.Prompt(ctx, strings.Repeat("prompt ", 1<<20)) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, context.DeadlineExceeded) + assert.Less(t, time.Since(start), 10*time.Second) +} + +// A cancel is one per turn: a second call ends nothing more and sends +// nothing more. +func TestASecondCancelIsNotASecondCancel(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{WaitForCancel: true, Stop: "cancelled"}) //nolint:misspell // ACP's wire value + s := h.open() + answers := make(chan error, 1) + go func() { + _, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + answers <- err + }() + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return slices.Contains(h.record().Methods, "session/prompt") }, + 10*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond) + require.NoError(t, s.Cancel(context.Background())) + require.NoError(t, s.Cancel(context.Background()), "a second cancel is not an error") + <-answers + cancels := 0 + for _, m := range h.record().Methods { + if m == "session/cancel" { + cancels++ + } + } + assert.Equal(t, 1, cancels, "one cancel per turn, whoever asks twice") +} + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------- configuration + +// Two MCP servers of one name are one name in the agent's account of them, so +// there is no session this driver can judge. +func TestTwoMCPServersOfOneNameAreUnusable(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.withConfig = func(cfg driver.SessionConfig) driver.SessionConfig { + cfg.MCPServers = append(cfg.MCPServers, cfg.MCPServers[0]) + return cfg + } + _, err := h.driver().NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrUnusable) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrNotStarted) + _, statErr := os.Stat(h.sc.Record) + assert.ErrorIs(t, statErr, os.ErrNotExist, "nothing was started") +} + +// What the preflight reads is the environment the adapter will run in, not +// the connector's: a session's own environment is what the adapter resolves +// its configuration against. +func TestThePreflightReadsTheEnvironmentTheAdapterWillHave(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.lookup["CODEX_HOME"] = "/connector/home" + h.withConfig = func(cfg driver.SessionConfig) driver.SessionConfig { + cfg.Env = append(cfg.Env, "CODEX_HOME=/session/home") + return cfg + } + seen := make(chan string, 1) + d := h.driver() + d.opts.Adapter.Preflight = func(_ string, lookup func(string) (string, bool)) error { + v, _ := lookup("CODEX_HOME") + seen <- v + return nil + } + s, err := d.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + assert.Equal(t, "/session/home", <-seen) +} + +// A name the session never gave is not kept as a name, because a name put +// through a sanitizer can come out as one the session did give: an account +// naming "base\acamp" as connected vouches for nothing. +func TestAForeignNameThatReadsAsAGivenOneVouchesForNothing(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + s := h.open().(*session) + s.mu.Lock() + s.id = "" + s.mcpStatus = MCPStatusInit + s.mcpConfirmed = false + s.earlyInit = nil + s.mu.Unlock() + + s.onSDKMessage(raw(t, map[string]any{ + "sessionId": "sess-good", + "message": map[string]any{"type": "system", "subtype": "init", "mcp_servers": []any{ + map[string]any{"name": "base\acamp", "status": "connected"}, + }}, + })) + s.nameSession("sess-good") + + s.mu.Lock() + confirmed, unsafe := s.mcpConfirmed, s.unsafe + s.mu.Unlock() + assert.False(t, confirmed, "a server the session never gave vouches for no server it did") + require.ErrorIs(t, unsafe, ErrMCPServerNotConnected) +} + +// A permission request read in no turn belongs to no turn: a prompt that +// started after it was read did not ask for it, and its refusal is not on +// that prompt's result. The ledger still has it. +func TestARefusalReadInNoTurnIsOnNoTurnsResult(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + recorder := &drivertest.Refusals{} + h.withConfig = func(cfg driver.SessionConfig) driver.SessionConfig { + cfg.Refusals = recorder + return cfg + } + s := h.open().(*session) + outside := s.claim("session/request_permission") + require.Nil(t, turnOf(outside), "no turn was in flight when it was read") + t.Cleanup(func() { s.release(outside) }) + + later := &turn{done: make(chan struct{})} + s.mu.Lock() + s.turn = later + s.mu.Unlock() + s.record(driver.PermissionRequest{ToolCallID: "outside-1", Tool: "Bash", Kind: driver.ToolExecute}, turnOf(outside)) + + s.mu.Lock() + refusals := len(later.refusals) + s.mu.Unlock() + assert.Zero(t, refusals, "a turn that began after the request was read did not ask for it") + assert.Equal(t, []driver.Refusal{{ToolCallID: "outside-1", Tool: "Bash"}}, recorder.Recorded(), + "and it is still the driver's own record") +} + +// A refusal with no tool call id is counted every time it happens: only an id +// can say that two refusals are one call. +func TestRefusalsWithNoToolCallIDAreCountedEveryTime(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + recorder := &drivertest.Refusals{} + h.withConfig = func(cfg driver.SessionConfig) driver.SessionConfig { + cfg.Refusals = recorder + return cfg + } + // Three requests naming no call at all, identical in every field. + nameless := map[string]any{"kind": "execute"} + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{ + {Permission: permission(t, nameless, standardOptions()...)}, + {Permission: permission(t, nameless, standardOptions()...)}, + {Permission: permission(t, nameless, standardOptions()...)}, + }, Stop: "end_turn"}) + s := h.open() + res, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Len(t, res.Refusals, 3, "three nameless denials are three refusals") + assert.Len(t, recorder.Recorded(), 3, "and three records") +} + +// A call whose paths this driver could not carry whole is a call the policy +// cannot place: it is refused without being asked, rather than judged on the +// paths that fit. The policy allows an edit only when every path it names is +// inside the working directory, so judging a subset is how a refusal becomes +// an allow. +func TestACallWhosePathsDoNotFitIsRefusedUnasked(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.policy.allow = func(driver.PermissionRequest) bool { return true } + inside := make([]any, 0, maxLocations+1) + for i := range maxLocations { + inside = append(inside, map[string]any{"path": filepath.Join(h.dir, fmt.Sprintf("f%d", i))}) + } + // The path that would have refused the call is the one past the cap. + tooMany := append(slices.Clone(inside), map[string]any{"path": "/etc/shadow"}) + tooLong := []any{map[string]any{"path": filepath.Join(h.dir, strings.Repeat("s/", 3000)+"x")}} + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{ + {Permission: permission(t, map[string]any{"toolCallId": "many-1", "kind": "edit", "locations": tooMany}, standardOptions()...)}, + {Permission: permission(t, map[string]any{"toolCallId": "long-1", "kind": "edit", "locations": tooLong}, standardOptions()...)}, + // And a call announced with paths that did not fit is still + // unplaceable when the agent asks about it by id alone. + {Update: raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "tool_call", "toolCallId": "many-2", "kind": "edit", + "status": "in_progress", "locations": tooMany})}, + {Permission: permission(t, map[string]any{"toolCallId": "many-2", "kind": "edit"}, standardOptions()...)}, + }, Stop: "end_turn"}) + s := h.open() + res, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.NoError(t, err) + + assert.Empty(t, h.policy.requests(), "a call the policy cannot place is not put to it") + outcomes := make([]string, 0, 3) + for _, o := range h.record().Outcomes { + kind, option := outcomeOf(t, o) + outcomes = append(outcomes, kind) + assert.Empty(t, option, "refused with no option of the agent's") + } + assert.Equal(t, []string{outcomeCanceled, outcomeCanceled, outcomeCanceled}, outcomes) + assert.Len(t, res.Refusals, 3, "and each is a refusal of this driver's") +} + +// A tool call that has finished is forgotten whatever the session could be +// asked at that moment: what it said of itself must not outlive it and +// describe a call a later turn is asked about. +func TestAFinishedToolCallIsForgottenEvenOutsideATurn(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + s := h.open().(*session) + first := &turn{done: make(chan struct{})} + s.mu.Lock() + s.turn = first + s.mu.Unlock() + s.noteTool(sessionUpdate{ToolCallID: "X", Name: "mcp__basecamp__note", Kind: "read", Status: "in_progress"}) + s.mu.Lock() + _, known := s.tools["X"] + s.mu.Unlock() + require.True(t, known, "a call announced in a turn is what the session knows of it") + + // The turn is answered, and the call completes after it: outside any turn. + s.mu.Lock() + s.turn = nil + s.mu.Unlock() + s.noteTool(sessionUpdate{ToolCallID: "X", Status: "completed"}) + s.mu.Lock() + _, stillKnown := s.tools["X"] + s.mu.Unlock() + assert.False(t, stillKnown, "a finished call is forgotten") + + second := &turn{done: make(chan struct{})} + s.mu.Lock() + s.turn = second + s.mu.Unlock() + info := s.noteTool(sessionUpdate{ToolCallID: "X", Kind: "execute"}) + assert.Empty(t, info.name, "so the next turn's request by that id inherits no name") + assert.Equal(t, driver.ToolExecute, info.kind) +} + +// Whose account of the MCP servers this is, is decided under one lock: the +// session's id can arrive while an account is being read, and an account read +// as nobody's must not then be applied as this session's. +func TestAnAccountIsNeverAppliedToTheSessionItDoesNotName(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + s := h.open().(*session) + foreign := raw(t, map[string]any{ + "sessionId": "sess-other", + "message": map[string]any{"type": "system", "subtype": "init", "mcp_servers": []any{ + map[string]any{"name": "basecamp", "status": "connected"}, + }}, + }) + // The two meet on a barrier: the account is read as nobody's just as the + // session's own id arrives. + for range 50000 { + s.mu.Lock() + s.id = "" + s.mcpStatus = MCPStatusInit + s.mcpConfirmed = false + s.earlyInit = nil + s.mu.Unlock() + ready, done := make(chan struct{}), make(chan struct{}) + go func() { + close(ready) + s.onSDKMessage(foreign) + close(done) + }() + <-ready + s.nameSession("sess-real") + <-done + s.mu.Lock() + confirmed := s.mcpConfirmed + s.mu.Unlock() + if confirmed { + t.Fatal("another session's account vouched for this session's MCP servers") + } + } +} + +// A cancel never reaches a turn whose prompt is still on its way: the turn +// holds its place in the queue until its write is done, so no session/cancel +// can be written for a prompt the agent has not been sent. +func TestACancelDoesNotTouchATurnWhosePromptIsStillBeingWritten(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.sc.StopReadingAfter = "session/set_config_option" + h.grace = 500 * time.Millisecond + s := h.open().(*session) + go func() { _, _ = s.Prompt(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("prompt ", 1<<20)) }() + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + return s.turn != nil + }, 10*time.Second, 5*time.Millisecond, "the turn is in flight") + + err := s.Cancel(context.Background()) + require.Error(t, err, "the agent is not reading, so the cancel could not be sent") + s.mu.Lock() + canceled := s.turn != nil && s.turn.canceled + s.mu.Unlock() + assert.False(t, canceled, "and it did not mark a turn whose prompt is still being written") +} + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------- what the adapter says it got + +// chunk is one agent_message_chunk of text, as an adapter answers its own +// read-back command. +func chunk(t *testing.T, text string) json.RawMessage { + t.Helper() + return raw(t, map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "agent_message_chunk", "content": map[string]any{"type": "text", "text": text}}) +} + +// The boundary's one guarantee: what the adapter says it is running is +// compared with what the session declared, after it is running, and a +// difference ends the session before anyone is handed it. +func TestASessionRunsOnlyTheMCPServersTheAdapterSaysItGot(t *testing.T) { + for _, tc := range []struct { + name string + readback Readback + answer string + wantErr bool + }{ + {"claude counts them and agrees", Readback{Command: "/mcp", Parse: claudeMCPReport}, + "1 MCP server(s): 1 connected, 0 not connected, 0 disabled. Use `/mcp` in the terminal for details.", false}, + {"claude counts one too many", Readback{Command: "/mcp", Parse: claudeMCPReport}, + "2 MCP server(s): 2 connected, 0 not connected, 0 disabled.", true}, + {"claude counts one unusable", Readback{Command: "/mcp", Parse: claudeMCPReport}, + "1 MCP server(s): 0 connected, 1 not connected, 0 disabled.", true}, + {"claude says nothing this can read", Readback{Command: "/mcp", Parse: claudeMCPReport}, + "MCP is fine, trust me.", true}, + {"codex names what the session gave", Readback{Command: "/mcp", Parse: codexMCPReport}, + "Configured MCP servers:\n- basecamp", false}, + {"codex names its own built-in too", Readback{Command: "/mcp", Parse: codexMCPReport, BuiltIn: []string{"codex_apps"}}, + "Configured MCP servers:\n- codex_apps: 49 tools, 27 resources, auth=bearerToken\n- basecamp", false}, + {"codex names a built-in nobody allowed", Readback{Command: "/mcp", Parse: codexMCPReport}, + "Configured MCP servers:\n- codex_apps: 49 tools, 27 resources, auth=bearerToken\n- basecamp", true}, + {"codex names a server of the host's", Readback{Command: "/mcp", Parse: codexMCPReport}, + "Configured MCP servers:\n- basecamp\n- host-secrets: 3 tools", true}, + {"codex does not have the session's own", Readback{Command: "/mcp", Parse: codexMCPReport}, + "Configured MCP servers:\n- something-else", true}, + } { + t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{{Update: chunk(t, tc.answer)}}, Stop: "end_turn"}) + d := h.driver() + d.opts.Adapter.Readback = tc.readback + s, err := d.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + if tc.wantErr { + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMCPReadback) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrSessionUnverified, "a session that is not the one asked for") + assert.Nil(t, s) + waitGone(t, h.record().PID) + return + } + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + assert.Contains(t, string(h.record().Params["session/prompt"]), "/mcp", "the adapter was asked") + select { + case u := <-s.Updates(): + t.Fatalf("the read-back was reported as progress: %+v", u) + default: + } + }) + } +} + +// The adapter's own answer is read once and kept nowhere: the read-back's own +// text is not in an update, and a chunk longer than the answer can be is cut. +func TestTheReadbackTextIsReadOnceAndKeptNowhere(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + long := strings.Repeat("x", maxReadback*4) + h.turns(turnScript{Steps: []step{ + {Update: chunk(t, "Configured MCP servers:\n- basecamp\n"+long)}, + }, Stop: "end_turn"}, turnScript{Steps: []step{{Update: chunk(t, "secret words")}}, Stop: "end_turn"}) + d := h.driver() + d.opts.Adapter.Readback = Readback{Command: "/mcp", Parse: codexMCPReport} + s, err := d.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + + sess := s.(*session) + sess.mu.Lock() + collecting := sess.readback + sess.mu.Unlock() + assert.Nil(t, collecting, "nothing is collected once the answer has been read") + + _, err = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "go") + require.NoError(t, err) + for { + select { + case u := <-s.Updates(): + assert.NotContains(t, fmt.Sprintf("%+v", u), "secret words", "an update carries no text of the agent's") + continue + default: + } + break + } +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/acp/adapters.go b/internal/connector/driver/acp/adapters.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fda980083 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/acp/adapters.go @@ -0,0 +1,447 @@ +package acp + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "fmt" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "regexp" + "strconv" + "strings" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver/claude" +) + +// Adapter is one ACP agent adapter at a pinned version: what it is called, +// what it may take from the connector's environment, and which of its modes +// is the asking mode for each connector permission mode. Mode ids are not +// portable across adapters, so they are named here and nowhere else. +type Adapter struct { + // Name is the adapter's executable, as connect.json names it. + Name string + // Package is its npm package, and the agentInfo.name it reports at + // initialize. + Package string + // Version is the pinned version, and the agentInfo.version it must report. + Version string + // Env names what the adapter may take from the connector's environment + // besides driver.BaseEnv: where its agent's configuration lives and how it + // authenticates. Exact names only. Nothing that swaps the agent binary the + // adapter bundles (CLAUDE_CODE_EXECUTABLE, CODEX_PATH) is among them: the + // pin covers the agent too. + Env []string + // SetEnv are variables the driver itself sets for the adapter: its own + // switches, never a secret and never taken from the connector's + // environment. + SetEnv map[string]string + // Modes maps a connector permission mode to the adapter's asking mode: + // the mode in which the agent sends session/request_permission for what + // it would otherwise do unasked. A permission mode with no entry cannot + // be run. + Modes map[driver.PermissionMode]string + // SessionMeta is the _meta sent with session/new, session/load and + // session/resume: the adapter's own switches, for what ACP itself cannot + // say. Never a secret, never content. + SessionMeta map[string]any + // LoadSession is what the pinned version advertises, until a session + // reports what the installed one does. + LoadSession bool + // MCPStatus is how the adapter tells the client whether the session's MCP + // servers connected: MCPStatusInit (the agent's init message, which must + // report every server connected before the first turn ends) or + // MCPStatusStartupFailures (a failed startup is reported, success is + // not). The driver ends a session whose server did not connect. + MCPStatus MCPStatus + // Readback is how the adapter is asked for its own account of the MCP + // configuration the session is running, and how that answer is read. It + // is the session's one check on the boundary, made after the adapter is + // running (see mcp.go). + Readback Readback + // Preflight refuses, before anything starts, a session the adapter would + // run with configuration the connector cannot switch off: nil when there is + // none to check. + Preflight func(cwd string, lookup func(string) (string, bool)) error +} + +// ClaudeAgentACP is Claude Code over ACP. +// +// Its asking mode is "default" (the adapter's "Manual": ask before every +// change, inside the working directory too). Its session _meta turns off the +// host's Claude Code settings, which would otherwise bring the host's +// defaultMode, allow rules and hooks into the session; takes +// bypassPermissions out of the session's mode catalog altogether; and makes +// the session's mcpServers the only MCP servers it has (strictMcpConfig), so +// a user-scope or project .mcp.json server, one named basecamp among them, +// never loads beside or instead of the connector's. +var ClaudeAgentACP = Adapter{ + Name: "claude-agent-acp", + Package: "@agentclientprotocol/claude-agent-acp", + Version: "0.78.0", + Env: append([]string{}, claude.Env...), + Modes: map[driver.PermissionMode]string{ + driver.ModeEditsInWorkDir: "default", + }, + SessionMeta: map[string]any{ + "claudeCode": map[string]any{ + "emitRawSDKMessages": []map[string]string{{"type": "system", "subtype": "init"}}, + "options": map[string]any{ + "settingSources": []string{}, + "allowDangerouslySkipPermissions": false, + "strictMcpConfig": true, + // A plan-mode switch is the model leaving the mode the driver + // verified, which ends the session; the worker has no one to + // present a plan to anyway. + "disallowedTools": []string{"EnterPlanMode", "ExitPlanMode"}, + }, + }, + }, + // Claude Code's init message, and only it, is forwarded: the driver + // reads each MCP server's name and status from it and nothing else. + MCPStatus: MCPStatusInit, + Readback: Readback{Command: "/mcp", Parse: claudeMCPReport}, + LoadSession: true, +} + +// CodexACP is Codex over ACP. +// +// Its asking mode is "read-only" (the adapter's "Ask for approval"). Codex +// gates less than Claude in it: work inside the workspace goes through +// unasked, and only what reaches outside it is put to the policy. Same policy, +// different reach; neither is containment. +// +// codex-acp runs `codex app-server`, which has no --ignore-user-config, so +// the host's config is switched off where a session's config can do it +// (CODEX_CONFIG, which the adapter layers onto every thread it starts): the +// host's plugins, hooks and apps, its skills' instructions, and the parts of +// the environment a model's shell command would otherwise inherit. +// +// The adapter's modes fix the sandbox per turn, and "read-only" leaves /tmp +// and $TMPDIR writable: Codex writes there unasked, where the policy never +// sees it. The session also opens in the asking mode (INITIAL_AGENT_MODE) +// rather than in the adapter's default, before the driver sets and confirms +// it. +var CodexACP = Adapter{ + Name: "codex-acp", + Package: "@agentclientprotocol/codex-acp", + Version: "1.12.0", + Env: []string{"CODEX_HOME", "OPENAI_API_KEY", "CODEX_API_KEY", "OPENAI_BASE_URL"}, + SetEnv: map[string]string{ + "CODEX_CONFIG": codexConfig, + "INITIAL_AGENT_MODE": "read-only", + // Without it, codex-acp drops a requested MCP server whose name any + // config layer already uses, and the agent gets that one instead. + "DISABLE_MCP_CONFIG_FILTERING": "true", + }, + Preflight: codexPreflight, + MCPStatus: MCPStatusStartupFailures, + // codex brings its own apps connector, which its /mcp lists whatever the + // session declared. Its tools are not offered to the session's model + // (features.apps is false in codexConfig, and compatibility check 9 asks + // the agent what it can call), so it is named here and nothing else is. + Readback: Readback{Command: "/mcp", Parse: codexMCPReport, BuiltIn: []string{"codex_apps"}}, + Modes: map[driver.PermissionMode]string{ + driver.ModeEditsInWorkDir: "read-only", + }, + LoadSession: true, +} + +// Readback is how an adapter is asked what MCP configuration it is actually +// running, and how its answer is read. Both pinned adapters answer a command +// of their own — claude-agent-acp's and codex-acp's "/mcp" — and both answer +// it themselves, without the model: the turn costs no tokens, and the answer +// is the adapter's, not something a prompt could talk it into. +type Readback struct { + // Command is the prompt that asks for it. Empty means the adapter cannot + // be asked, and a session on it can only be checked as it runs. + Command string + // Parse reads the adapter's answer. An answer it cannot read is a session + // this driver will not vouch for, so a parse error ends the session. + Parse func(text string) (MCPReport, error) + // BuiltIn are servers the pinned adapter brings itself, which are in its + // answer whatever the session declared. Each one is here because its + // tools are not offered to the model — proven, per adapter, by the + // compatibility check — and for no other reason. + BuiltIn []string +} + +// MCPReport is an adapter's own account of the MCP configuration a session is +// running. An adapter that names its servers fills Names; one that only counts +// them fills Count and Unusable. +type MCPReport struct { + Names []string + Count int + Unusable int +} + +// ErrMCPReadback is an adapter whose account of its own MCP configuration +// cannot be read, or does not match what the session declared. +var ErrMCPReadback = fmt.Errorf("%w: the agent is not running the MCP configuration the session declared", driver.ErrSessionUnverified) + +// claudeMCPReport reads claude-agent-acp's answer, which counts the servers +// rather than naming them: "1 MCP server(s): 1 connected, 0 not connected, 0 +// disabled." +var claudeMCPCounts = regexp.MustCompile(`(\d+) MCP server\(s\): (\d+) connected, (\d+) not connected, (\d+) disabled`) + +func claudeMCPReport(text string) (MCPReport, error) { + m := claudeMCPCounts.FindStringSubmatch(text) + if m == nil { + return MCPReport{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: its answer does not count them", ErrMCPReadback) + } + total, err1 := strconv.Atoi(m[1]) + connected, err2 := strconv.Atoi(m[2]) + unconnected, err3 := strconv.Atoi(m[3]) + disabled, err4 := strconv.Atoi(m[4]) + if err1 != nil || err2 != nil || err3 != nil || err4 != nil { + return MCPReport{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: its counts are not numbers", ErrMCPReadback) + } + if connected+unconnected+disabled != total { + return MCPReport{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: its counts do not add up", ErrMCPReadback) + } + return MCPReport{Count: total, Unusable: unconnected + disabled}, nil +} + +// codexMCPReport reads codex-acp's answer, which names them: +// +// Configured MCP servers: +// - codex_apps: 49 tools, 27 resources, auth=bearerToken +// - basecamp +var codexMCPHeader = "Configured MCP servers:" + +func codexMCPReport(text string) (MCPReport, error) { + _, list, found := strings.Cut(text, codexMCPHeader) + if !found { + return MCPReport{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: its answer does not list them", ErrMCPReadback) + } + report := MCPReport{} + for _, line := range strings.Split(list, "\n") { + line = strings.TrimSpace(line) + name, ok := strings.CutPrefix(line, "- ") + if !ok { + continue + } + if before, _, cut := strings.Cut(name, ":"); cut { + name = before + } + if name = strings.TrimSpace(name); name != "" { + report.Names = append(report.Names, name) + } + } + if len(report.Names) == 0 { + return MCPReport{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: it listed no server at all", ErrMCPReadback) + } + report.Count = len(report.Names) + return report, nil +} + +// MCPStatus names how an adapter reports its MCP servers' startup. +type MCPStatus string + +const ( + // MCPStatusInit: claude-agent-acp forwards Claude Code's system/init + // message, with each MCP server's status, as a _claude/sdkMessage + // notification when the session asks for it. + MCPStatusInit MCPStatus = "init" + // MCPStatusStartupFailures: codex-acp reports a server that failed or + // was canceled at startup as a failed tool call named + // mcp_startup.<server>. + MCPStatusStartupFailures MCPStatus = "startup_failures" +) + +// ErrMCPServerNotConnected is a session whose MCP server did not connect: the +// worker would run without the tools the connector gave it, the Basecamp +// tools and its task token among them. +var ErrMCPServerNotConnected = fmt.Errorf("%w: an MCP server of the session did not connect", driver.ErrSessionUnverified) + +// ErrForeignMCPConfig is agent configuration that declares MCP servers of its +// own, which the connector cannot keep out of a session. +var ErrForeignMCPConfig = errors.New("acp: the agent's configuration declares MCP servers of its own") + +// escapedTOMLKey is a table header or a key whose name carries a backslash +// escape. +var escapedTOMLKey = regexp.MustCompile(`^\s*(\[\[?[^\]]*\\|[^=\n]*\\[^=\n]*=)`) + +// codexPreflight refuses a session when a Codex config layer declares MCP +// servers: the user's ($CODEX_HOME, or ~/.codex), the system's, or a +// project's .codex/config.toml in the working directory or above it. Codex +// merges every layer into the session, and a server declared there would run +// beside the connector's, or, named basecamp, in place of it with every tool +// allowed; in the asking mode its tool calls need not be put to the policy at +// all. +// +// It reads for the name, not the TOML: the name anywhere in the file — a +// table header, a dotted key, an inline table, a profile, a comment — refuses +// the session. Parsing it would mean matching Codex's own merge of profiles, +// includes and overrides, and being wrong there is being wrong in the +// direction that runs a foreign server. A false alarm refuses a session; a +// miss would not. +// +// It covers the layers a file on this machine can hold. Codex also takes +// configuration from layers this cannot read — an MDM profile, a cloud-managed +// config, a plugin — so it is a guard, not a proof. What would be a proof is +// the effective configuration the app server reports, which ACP does not carry. +func codexPreflight(cwd string, lookup func(string) (string, bool)) error { + var files []string + home := "" + if v, ok := lookup("CODEX_HOME"); ok && v != "" { + // Codex reads a relative CODEX_HOME against the working directory. + home = v + if !filepath.IsAbs(v) { + home = filepath.Join(cwd, v) + } + } else if v, ok := lookup("HOME"); ok && filepath.IsAbs(v) { + home = filepath.Join(v, ".codex") + } + if home != "" { + files = append(files, filepath.Join(home, "config.toml"), filepath.Join(home, "managed_config.toml")) + } + files = append(files, "/etc/codex/config.toml", "/etc/codex/managed_config.toml") + for dir := filepath.Clean(cwd); ; dir = filepath.Dir(dir) { + files = append(files, filepath.Join(dir, ".codex", "config.toml")) + if filepath.Dir(dir) == dir { + break + } + } + for _, file := range files { + raw, err := os.ReadFile(file) //nolint:gosec // G304: codex's own config locations + if err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + continue + } + // A file that is there and cannot be read is not a file this can + // say anything about, and Codex may read it where this cannot. + return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s cannot be read: %w", ErrForeignMCPConfig, file, err) + } + text := strings.TrimPrefix(string(raw), "\ufeff") + if strings.Contains(text, "mcp_servers") { + return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s (codex-acp would load them into the session)", ErrForeignMCPConfig, file) + } + for _, line := range strings.Split(text, "\n") { + if escapedTOMLKey.MatchString(line) { + // TOML decodes escapes in a quoted key, so "mcp\u005fservers" + // is mcp_servers to Codex and something else to a reader. A + // key this cannot read plainly is refused rather than guessed. + return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s has a key this cannot read (an escape in a quoted key)", ErrForeignMCPConfig, file) + } + } + } + return nil +} + +// codexConfig is the thread config codex-acp layers onto every session. The +// features are the ones the codex spawn driver disables; the same host +// surfaces reach an app-server thread. +const codexConfig = `{"features":{"apps":false,"plugins":false,"remote_plugin":false,"hooks":false,` + + `"browser_use":false,"browser_use_external":false,"computer_use":false,"in_app_browser":false,` + + `"image_generation":false,"memories":false,"skill_mcp_dependency_install":false,"tool_suggest":false},` + + `"skills":{"bundled":{"enabled":false},"include_instructions":false},` + + `"shell_environment_policy":{"inherit":"core"},"web_search":"disabled"}` + +// Adapters are the pinned adapters the driver runs. +func Adapters() []Adapter { return []Adapter{ClaudeAgentACP, CodexACP} } + +// AdapterNamed is the pinned adapter of that name. +func AdapterNamed(name string) (Adapter, bool) { + for _, a := range Adapters() { + if a.Name == name { + return a, true + } + } + return Adapter{}, false +} + +// workerAdapters is the adapter for each worker connect.json names. +var workerAdapters = map[string]Adapter{ + "claude": ClaudeAgentACP, + "codex": CodexACP, +} + +// AdapterForWorker is the pinned adapter the acp driver runs for a +// connect.json worker. It is how anything outside this package — doctor +// among them — names the adapter a profile would run, rather than spelling +// the naming rule again. +func AdapterForWorker(worker string) (Adapter, bool) { + a, ok := workerAdapters[worker] + return a, ok +} + +// ForWorker is the acp driver for a connect.json worker: its pinned adapter, +// located in adaptersDir (DefaultAdaptersDir when empty). lookup reads the +// connector's environment; os.LookupEnv when nil. +func ForWorker(worker, adaptersDir string, lookup func(string) (string, bool)) (*Driver, error) { + a, ok := AdapterForWorker(worker) + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acp: no ACP adapter for worker %q", worker) + } + if adaptersDir == "" { + dir, err := DefaultAdaptersDir(lookup) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + adaptersDir = dir + } + bin, err := Locate(adaptersDir, a) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return New(Options{Adapter: a, Binary: bin, Lookup: lookup}) +} + +// ErrAdapterMissing is an adapter that is not installed where the connector +// was told to look. +var ErrAdapterMissing = errors.New("acp: adapter not installed") + +// DefaultAdaptersDir is where `make acp-adapters` installs the pinned +// adapters unless told otherwise: $XDG_DATA_HOME/basecamp/acp-adapters, or +// ~/.local/share/basecamp/acp-adapters. +func DefaultAdaptersDir(lookup func(string) (string, bool)) (string, error) { + if lookup == nil { + lookup = os.LookupEnv + } + if data, ok := lookup("XDG_DATA_HOME"); ok && filepath.IsAbs(data) { + return filepath.Join(data, "basecamp", "acp-adapters"), nil + } + home, ok := lookup("HOME") + if !ok || !filepath.IsAbs(home) { + return "", errors.New("acp: no home directory to find the adapters under") + } + return filepath.Join(home, ".local", "share", "basecamp", "acp-adapters"), nil +} + +// Locate finds adapter a installed in dir (an npm prefix, as `npm ci --prefix +// dir` makes one) and checks it is the pinned version. It never installs +// anything: an adapter is downloaded when an operator installs it, never when +// a task is dispatched. +func Locate(dir string, a Adapter) (string, error) { + if !filepath.IsAbs(dir) { + return "", fmt.Errorf("acp: the adapters directory %q is not absolute", dir) + } + manifest := filepath.Join(dir, "node_modules", filepath.FromSlash(a.Package), "package.json") + raw, err := os.ReadFile(manifest) //nolint:gosec // G304: the operator's adapters directory + if err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %s@%s is not in %s (run make acp-adapters)", ErrAdapterMissing, a.Package, a.Version, dir) + } + return "", fmt.Errorf("acp: read %s: %w", manifest, err) + } + var pkg struct { + Name string `json:"name"` + Version string `json:"version"` + } + if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &pkg); err != nil { + return "", fmt.Errorf("acp: read %s: %w", manifest, err) + } + if pkg.Name != a.Package || pkg.Version != a.Version { + return "", 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Installed with make acp-adapters; never downloaded at dispatch time.", + "dependencies": { + "@agentclientprotocol/claude-agent-acp": "0.78.0", + "@agentclientprotocol/codex-acp": "1.12.0" + } +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/acp/compat_helpers_test.go b/internal/connector/driver/acp/compat_helpers_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..76941a1e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/acp/compat_helpers_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +//go:build unix + +package acp + +import ( + "crypto/sha256" + "encoding/hex" + "errors" + "fmt" + "strings" + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +// hostDigestShowsToken reads compatibility check 5's host probe: the SHA-256 +// the worker's shell computed of the host token variable as it saw it. A +// probe that is not a digest — no hashing tool on the machine (stock macOS has +// shasum, not sha256sum), or a pipeline that printed nothing — proves nothing, +// and is an error rather than a pass. +func hostDigestShowsToken(probe, host string) (bool, error) { + digest := strings.TrimSpace(probe) + if digest == "NOHASH" { + return false, errors.New("the worker's shell has neither sha256sum nor shasum") + } + if len(digest) != 64 { + return false, fmt.Errorf("the probe wrote %d characters, not a SHA-256 digest", len(digest)) + } + if _, err := hex.DecodeString(digest); err != nil { + return false, fmt.Errorf("the probe wrote something that is not a digest: %w", err) + } + sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(host)) + return digest == hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]), nil +} + +func TestTheHostTokenProbeProvesNothingWithoutADigest(t *testing.T) { + host := "test-host-token-not-real" + sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(host)) + seen, err := hostDigestShowsToken(hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])+"\n", host) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, seen) + + empty := sha256.Sum256(nil) + seen, err = hostDigestShowsToken(hex.EncodeToString(empty[:]), host) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.False(t, seen, "the digest of nothing: the shell did not see the token") + + for _, probe := range []string{"", "\n", "NOHASH", "sha256sum: not found", strings.Repeat("z", 64)} { + _, err := hostDigestShowsToken(probe, host) + assert.Error(t, err, "%q is not a digest, and must not pass as proof", probe) + } +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/acp/compat_test.go b/internal/connector/driver/acp/compat_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..69cebef81 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/acp/compat_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,823 @@ +//go:build acpcompat && (linux || darwin) + +package acp + +// The adapter-compatibility test: the card 23 spike's four checks, run through +// this driver against the real pinned adapters; a fifth, that the worker's own +// shell sees neither the task token nor the host's token; and a sixth, that an +// MCP server the working directory declares never runs beside or instead of +// the connector's; and a seventh, that the connector's token bridge reaches +// its one-use socket from where the adapter starts MCP servers, with the +// token in no process's environment or command line and in no file; and an +// eighth, which reports what each adapter does when a session's MCP server +// dies mid-session. It sends real prompts, so it +// spends model quota on whatever account each adapter is logged in to, and it +// is skipped unless the adapters are installed: +// +// make acp-adapters # npm ci the pinned adapters (once) +// make test-acp-compat # the eight checks against both +// +// Environment: BASECAMP_ACP_ADAPTERS_DIR (required; the npm prefix), +// BASECAMP_ACP_ADAPTER (one adapter name; both when unset), +// BASECAMP_ACP_CHECKS (e.g. "1,3"; all when unset), and +// BASECAMP_ACP_TRANSCRIPTS (a directory for redacted JSON-RPC transcripts). +// +// Credentials: the connector's task token is a dummy string throughout. The +// adapters authenticate as whatever account they are logged in to on this +// machine, which is what these prompts are billed to. + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/sha256" + "encoding/hex" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "fmt" + "os" + "os/exec" + "path/filepath" + "runtime" + "slices" + "strconv" + "strings" + "sync" + "sync/atomic" + "syscall" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver/drivertest" +) + +const ( + compatProbeVar = "BASECAMP_CONNECT_TASK_TOKEN" + compatDummyToken = "test-token-not-real-0000" + compatServer = "basecamp" + // hostTokenVar is a variable the host's Claude Code session carries and + // no worker may see. + hostTokenVar = "CLAUDE_CODE_MESSAGING_TOKEN" +) + +func TestAdapterCompat(t *testing.T) { + dir := os.Getenv("BASECAMP_ACP_ADAPTERS_DIR") + if dir == "" { + t.Skip("BASECAMP_ACP_ADAPTERS_DIR is not set; run make test-acp-compat") + } + stub := buildStub(t) + checks := map[string]func(*testing.T, compatEnv){ + "1": checkMCPEnv, "2": checkLoadAfterRestart, "3": checkPolicyPermission, "4": checkCancel, + "5": checkShellEnvironment, "6": checkDecoyMCPServer, "7": checkTokenBridge, "8": checkMCPRestart, + } + if only := os.Getenv("BASECAMP_ACP_ADAPTER"); only != "" { + if _, ok := AdapterNamed(only); !ok { + t.Fatalf("BASECAMP_ACP_ADAPTER %q names no pinned adapter", only) + } + } + want := strings.Split(envOr("BASECAMP_ACP_CHECKS", "1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8"), ",") + for _, adapter := range Adapters() { + if only := os.Getenv("BASECAMP_ACP_ADAPTER"); only != "" && only != adapter.Name { + continue + } + t.Run(adapter.Name, func(t *testing.T) { + bin, err := Locate(dir, adapter) + if errors.Is(err, ErrAdapterMissing) { + t.Skipf("%v", err) + } + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + for _, n := range want { + check, ok := checks[strings.TrimSpace(n)] + if !ok { + t.Fatalf("BASECAMP_ACP_CHECKS names no check %q", n) + } + t.Run("check"+strings.TrimSpace(n), func(t *testing.T) { + check(t, compatEnv{adapter: adapter, bin: bin, stub: stub, check: strings.TrimSpace(n)}) + }) + } + }) + } +} + +type compatEnv struct { + adapter Adapter + bin string + stub string + check string +} + +func envOr(name, fallback string) string { + if v := os.Getenv(name); v != "" { + return v + } + return fallback +} + +func buildStub(t *testing.T) string { + t.Helper() + out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "stubmcp") + cmd := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "go", "build", "-o", out, "./testdata/stubmcp") + cmd.Stderr = os.Stderr + if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("build stubmcp: %v", err) + } + return out +} + +// driverFor builds a driver whose wire goes, redacted, to a transcript. +func (e compatEnv) driverFor(t *testing.T, part string) *Driver { + t.Helper() + d, err := New(Options{Adapter: e.adapter, Binary: e.bin, CloseGrace: 5 * time.Second}) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + redactor := driver.NewRedactor(driver.Redaction{}) + if tdir := os.Getenv("BASECAMP_ACP_TRANSCRIPTS"); tdir != "" { + if err := os.MkdirAll(tdir, 0o700); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + // The transcripts hold prompts, tool text and host paths; only emails + // and credential-shaped runs are redacted. Owner-only, even when the + // directory was there before. + if err := os.Chmod(tdir, 0o700); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + name := fmt.Sprintf("%s-check%s%s.jsonl", e.adapter.Name, e.check, part) + f, err := os.OpenFile(filepath.Join(tdir, name), os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY|os.O_TRUNC, 0o600) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = f.Close() }) + var mu sync.Mutex + d.opts.trace = func(dir string, line []byte) { + mu.Lock() + defer mu.Unlock() + // Redacted at the sink: the adapters volunteer the account email. + _, _ = fmt.Fprintf(f, "{\"t\":%q,\"dir\":%q,\"msg\":%s}\n", time.Now().UTC().Format("15:04:05.000"), dir, redactor.Sanitize(string(line))) + } + } + return d +} + +// compatPolicy is the v1 policy's shape with a switch for allowing what lies +// outside the working directory, and a log of what it was asked. +type compatPolicy struct { + workDir string + allowOutside atomic.Bool + + mu sync.Mutex + asked []driver.PermissionRequest +} + +func (p *compatPolicy) Rules() driver.PermissionRules { + return driver.PermissionRules{ + Mode: driver.ModeEditsInWorkDir, WorkDir: p.workDir, + AllowKinds: []driver.ToolKind{driver.ToolRead, driver.ToolSearch, driver.ToolThink}, + AllowMCPServers: []string{compatServer}, + } +} + +func (p *compatPolicy) Decide(_ context.Context, req driver.PermissionRequest) driver.PermissionDecision { + p.mu.Lock() + p.asked = append(p.asked, req) + p.mu.Unlock() + if strings.HasPrefix(req.Tool, "mcp__"+compatServer+"__") || p.allowOutside.Load() { + return driver.PermissionDecision{Allow: true} + } + inside := len(req.Locations) > 0 + for _, loc := range req.Locations { + rel, err := filepath.Rel(p.workDir, loc) + inside = inside && err == nil && !strings.HasPrefix(rel, "..") + } + return driver.PermissionDecision{Allow: inside && (req.Kind == driver.ToolEdit || req.Kind == driver.ToolRead)} +} + +func (p *compatPolicy) log(t *testing.T) { + p.mu.Lock() + defer p.mu.Unlock() + for _, r := range p.asked { + t.Logf("asked: tool=%q kind=%s locations=%d options=%v", r.Tool, r.Kind, len(r.Locations), r.Options) + } +} + +func (e compatEnv) config(t *testing.T, workDir, record string, policy driver.PermissionPolicy) driver.SessionConfig { + t.Helper() + serverEnv := driver.EnvMap(driver.BuildEnv(driver.BaseEnv, os.LookupEnv, map[string]string{compatProbeVar: compatDummyToken})) + return driver.SessionConfig{ + Cwd: workDir, + Env: driver.BuildEnv(driver.BaseEnv, os.LookupEnv, nil), + MCPServers: []driver.MCPServer{{ + Name: compatServer, Command: e.stub, + Args: []string{"--record", record, "--probe", compatProbeVar, "--fingerprint", hostTokenVar}, + Env: serverEnv, + }}, + Policy: policy, + Scope: driver.Scope{WorkDir: workDir}, + PrivateDir: t.TempDir(), + } +} + +type stubRecord struct { + PID int `json:"pid"` + ProbeVars map[string]string `json:"probe_vars"` + Fingerprints map[string]string `json:"fingerprints"` + EnvVarNames []string `json:"env_var_names"` + Methods []string `json:"methods"` + Notes []string `json:"notes"` +} + +func readRecord(t *testing.T, path string, until func(stubRecord) bool, wait time.Duration) stubRecord { + t.Helper() + deadline := time.Now().Add(wait) + var rec stubRecord + for { + if raw, err := os.ReadFile(path); err == nil && json.Unmarshal(raw, &rec) == nil && until(rec) { + return rec + } + if time.Now().After(deadline) { + return rec + } + time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond) + } +} + +func workDir(t *testing.T) string { + t.Helper() + dir, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(t.TempDir()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + return dir +} + +func outsideTmp(t *testing.T) string { + t.Helper() + cache, err := os.UserCacheDir() + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := os.MkdirAll(cache, 0o700); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + dir, err := os.MkdirTemp(cache, "basecamp-acp-compat-") + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(dir) }) + return dir +} + +func turnCtx(t *testing.T) context.Context { + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Minute) + t.Cleanup(cancel) + return ctx +} + +// Check 1: mcpServers[].env carries the token to the server, the server +// connects, the host's own token does not reach it, the session is in its +// asking mode, and closing the session ends the server with the adapter. +func checkMCPEnv(t *testing.T, e compatEnv) { + wd := workDir(t) + record := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "record.json") + policy := &compatPolicy{workDir: wd} + d := e.driverFor(t, "") + s, err := d.NewSession(turnCtx(t), e.config(t, wd, record, policy)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewSession: %v", err) + } + rec := readRecord(t, record, func(r stubRecord) bool { return slices.Contains(r.Methods, "tools/list") }, 60*time.Second) + _ = s.Close() + + if got := rec.ProbeVars[compatProbeVar]; got != compatDummyToken { + t.Errorf("the MCP server did not get %s from mcpServers[].env (got %q)", compatProbeVar, got) + } + if !slices.Contains(rec.Methods, "initialize") || !slices.Contains(rec.Methods, "tools/list") { + t.Errorf("the agent did not complete the MCP handshake: %v", rec.Methods) + } + // Claude Code gives every process it starts a messaging token of its own + // session; what must never arrive is the host's. + if host, ok := os.LookupEnv(hostTokenVar); ok { + sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(host)) + if rec.Fingerprints[hostTokenVar] == hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]) { + t.Errorf("the host's %s reached the MCP server", hostTokenVar) + } + } else { + t.Logf("%s is not set in this environment; the host-token half of check 1 proves nothing here", hostTokenVar) + } + t.Logf("MCP server env: %d variables", len(rec.EnvVarNames)) + if rec.PID > 0 { + if err := syscall.Kill(rec.PID, 0); !errors.Is(err, syscall.ESRCH) { + t.Errorf("the MCP server (pid %d) outlived Close: %v", rec.PID, err) + } + } + if !d.Capabilities().PermissionCallback { + t.Error("the driver does not report the permission callback") + } +} + +// Check 2: the session survives the connector: a fresh adapter process loads +// it by id and it still knows what the first process's turn was told. +func checkLoadAfterRestart(t *testing.T, e compatEnv) { + wd := workDir(t) + passphrase := "COMPAT-PASSPHRASE-4417" + policy := &compatPolicy{workDir: wd} + + first := e.driverFor(t, "a") + s1, err := first.NewSession(turnCtx(t), e.config(t, wd, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "a.json"), policy)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewSession: %v", err) + } + id := s1.ID() + res, err := s1.Prompt(turnCtx(t), "Remember this passphrase for later: "+passphrase+". Reply with just the word OK. Do not use any tools.") + if err != nil || res.Stop != driver.TurnEndTurn { + _ = s1.Close() + t.Fatalf("seed prompt: %+v %v", res, err) + } + _ = s1.Close() + if !first.Capabilities().LoadSession { + t.Fatal("the adapter advertises no session/load or resume") + } + + second := e.driverFor(t, "b") + record := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "b.json") + s2, err := second.LoadSession(turnCtx(t), e.config(t, wd, record, policy), id) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("LoadSession in a fresh process: %v", err) + } + defer s2.Close() + if s2.ID() != id { + t.Fatalf("loaded session id %q, want %q", s2.ID(), id) + } + res, err = s2.Prompt(turnCtx(t), "Call the note tool of the "+compatServer+" MCP server once, with the passphrase I asked you to remember as its text. Then stop.") + policy.log(t) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("prompt after load: %v", err) + } + rec := readRecord(t, record, func(r stubRecord) bool { return len(r.Notes) > 0 }, 10*time.Second) + if !slices.ContainsFunc(rec.Notes, func(n string) bool { return strings.Contains(n, passphrase) }) { + t.Fatalf("the loaded session did not recall the passphrase through the MCP tool (stop %s, %d notes, refusals %v)", res.Stop, len(rec.Notes), res.Refusals) + } +} + +// Check 3: a permission is put to the policy and its answer holds both ways: +// refused, the write does not happen and the turn is not reported canceled; +// allowed, it does. +func checkPolicyPermission(t *testing.T, e compatEnv) { + wd := workDir(t) + // Outside means outside /tmp too: codex-acp's modes leave /tmp writable + // unasked, so a refusal there is never put to the policy. + outside := outsideTmp(t) + refused := filepath.Join(outside, "refused.txt") + allowed := filepath.Join(outside, "allowed.txt") + policy := &compatPolicy{workDir: wd} + d := e.driverFor(t, "") + s, err := d.NewSession(turnCtx(t), e.config(t, wd, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "r.json"), policy)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewSession: %v", err) + } + defer s.Close() + + // A live model may decline to attempt the write at all, which asks the + // policy nothing and proves nothing; the attempt is what is under test, + // so it is asked for again before the check gives a verdict. + var res driver.PromptResult + for attempt := range 2 { + ask := "Create a file at the absolute path " + refused + " containing the single word NO. Then stop." + if attempt > 0 { + ask = "Try again, and actually attempt the write this time: create a file at the absolute path " + refused + + " containing the single word NO, then stop. If a permission is refused, stop there." + } + res, err = s.Prompt(turnCtx(t), ask) + policy.log(t) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("refused phase: %v", err) + } + if _, err := os.Stat(refused); err == nil { + t.Fatalf("the policy refused, and the file was written anyway") + } + if len(res.Refusals) > 0 { + break + } + t.Logf("refused phase attempt %d: the agent asked nothing (stop %s)", attempt+1, res.Stop) + } + if len(res.Refusals) == 0 { + t.Fatalf("the agent never asked, or the refusal was not recorded (stop %s)", res.Stop) + } + if res.Stop == driver.TurnCanceled { + t.Fatalf("a policy refusal was reported as a cancel") + } + t.Logf("refused phase: stop %s, %d refusals", res.Stop, len(res.Refusals)) + + policy.allowOutside.Store(true) + res, err = s.Prompt(turnCtx(t), "Create a file at the absolute path "+allowed+" containing the single word YES. Then stop.") + policy.log(t) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("allowed phase: %v", err) + } + if _, err := os.Stat(allowed); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("the policy allowed, and the file was not written (stop %s, refusals %v)", res.Stop, res.Refusals) + } +} + +// Check 4: session/cancel ends the turn in flight with a canceled stop. +func checkCancel(t *testing.T, e compatEnv) { + wd := workDir(t) + policy := &compatPolicy{workDir: wd} + d := e.driverFor(t, "") + s, err := d.NewSession(turnCtx(t), e.config(t, wd, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "c.json"), policy)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewSession: %v", err) + } + defer s.Close() + + type answer struct { + res driver.PromptResult + err error + } + answers := make(chan answer, 1) + go func() { + res, err := s.Prompt(turnCtx(t), "Write a very long essay, at least three thousand words, about the history of the typewriter. Do not use any tools.") + answers <- answer{res, err} + }() + select { + case <-s.Updates(): + case <-time.After(90 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("no progress within 90s") + } + time.Sleep(1500 * time.Millisecond) + if err := s.Cancel(context.Background()); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Cancel: %v", err) + } + select { + case a := <-answers: + if a.err != nil { + t.Fatalf("the canceled prompt errored: %v", a.err) + } + if a.res.Stop != driver.TurnCanceled { + t.Fatalf("stop %q after session/cancel, want %q", a.res.Stop, driver.TurnCanceled) + } + case <-time.After(90 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the prompt did not return within 90s of session/cancel") + } +} + +// Check 5: what the MCP server is given stays with the MCP server. The model's +// shell sees neither the task token nor the host's Claude Code token. +func checkShellEnvironment(t *testing.T, e compatEnv) { + wd := workDir(t) + policy := &compatPolicy{workDir: wd} + // The probe is a shell command, which claude-agent-acp asks about. + policy.allowOutside.Store(true) + d := e.driverFor(t, "") + s, err := d.NewSession(turnCtx(t), e.config(t, wd, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "s.json"), policy)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewSession: %v", err) + } + defer s.Close() + // A script, not a one-liner: what is under test is what the worker's + // shell holds, not how well a model retypes a pipeline. + script := "#!/bin/sh\n" + + "if [ -n \"$" + compatProbeVar + "\" ]; then echo PRESENT; else echo ABSENT; fi > token-probe.txt\n" + + "if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then H=sha256sum; elif command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then H=\"shasum -a 256\"; else H=; fi\n" + + "if [ -n \"$H\" ]; then printf %s \"$" + hostTokenVar + "\" | $H | cut -c1-64 > host-probe.txt; else echo NOHASH > host-probe.txt; fi\n" + if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(wd, "probe.sh"), []byte(script), 0o700); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + res, err := s.Prompt(turnCtx(t), "Run `sh probe.sh` in the current working directory, once, and then stop. Do not read or change the script.") + policy.log(t) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("prompt: %v", err) + } + probe, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(wd, "token-probe.txt")) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("the probe did not run (stop %s, refusals %v): %v", res.Stop, res.Refusals, err) + } + if strings.TrimSpace(string(probe)) != "ABSENT" { + t.Errorf("the model's shell sees %s", compatProbeVar) + } + if host, ok := os.LookupEnv(hostTokenVar); ok { + digest, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(wd, "host-probe.txt")) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("the host probe did not run: %v", err) + } + seen, err := hostDigestShowsToken(string(digest), host) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("the host probe proves nothing: %v", err) + } + if seen { + t.Errorf("the model's shell sees the host's %s", hostTokenVar) + } + } +} + +// Check 6: an MCP server the project declares (Claude's .mcp.json, Codex's +// .codex/config.toml), named like the connector's, never runs. Claude runs +// the session with the connector's server alone; the driver refuses a Codex +// session before anything starts. +func checkDecoyMCPServer(t *testing.T, e compatEnv) { + wd := workDir(t) + decoy := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "decoy.json") + record := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "real.json") + claudeDecoy := `{"mcpServers":{"` + compatServer + `":{"type":"stdio","command":"` + e.stub + `","args":["--record","` + decoy + `"]},` + + `"extra":{"type":"stdio","command":"` + e.stub + `","args":["--record","` + decoy + `"]}}}` + if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(wd, ".mcp.json"), []byte(claudeDecoy), 0o600); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(wd, ".codex"), 0o700); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + codexDecoy := "[mcp_servers." + compatServer + "]\ncommand = \"" + e.stub + "\"\nargs = [\"--record\", \"" + decoy + "\"]\n" + if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(wd, ".codex", "config.toml"), []byte(codexDecoy), 0o600); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + policy := &compatPolicy{workDir: wd} + d := e.driverFor(t, "") + s, err := d.NewSession(turnCtx(t), e.config(t, wd, record, policy)) + if e.adapter.Name == CodexACP.Name { + if !errors.Is(err, ErrForeignMCPConfig) || !errors.Is(err, driver.ErrNotStarted) { + if s != nil { + _ = s.Close() + } + t.Fatalf("a Codex session with a project MCP server was not refused before it started: %v", err) + } + return + } + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewSession: %v", err) + } + defer s.Close() + res, err := s.Prompt(turnCtx(t), "Call the note tool of the "+compatServer+" MCP server once, with the text decoy-check. Then stop.") + policy.log(t) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("prompt: %v", err) + } + rec := readRecord(t, record, func(r stubRecord) bool { return len(r.Notes) > 0 }, 10*time.Second) + if len(rec.Notes) == 0 { + t.Errorf("the connector's MCP server was not the one called (stop %s, refusals %v)", res.Stop, res.Refusals) + } + if _, err := os.Stat(decoy); err == nil { + t.Errorf("an MCP server from the working directory's .mcp.json ran") + } +} + +// Check 7: the task token's carriage, as the dispatcher builds it. The MCP +// server is the connector's bridge (`basecamp connect worker-mcp`), the token +// is served once on a socket in the attempt's private directory, and the +// socket is told the worker's process group only once NewSession returns — +// the order the dispatcher uses. The bridge must reach the socket from +// wherever the adapter starts it, the handoff must be delivered, and the +// token must not be in any environment, command line or file of the worker's +// processes. No Basecamp account is involved: the bridge's profile is a dummy +// in a private config, so the `basecamp mcp` it becomes cannot authenticate — +// which is also how this checks that a session whose MCP server did not +// connect is refused rather than run. +func checkTokenBridge(t *testing.T, e compatEnv) { + if runtime.GOOS != "linux" { + t.Skip("the process walk reads /proc") + } + wd := workDir(t) + bin := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "basecamp") + build := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "go", "build", "-o", bin, "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/cmd/basecamp") + build.Stderr = os.Stderr + if err := build.Run(); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("build basecamp: %v", err) + } + config := t.TempDir() + if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(config, "basecamp"), 0o700); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + profile := `{"profiles":{"compat-dummy":{"base_url":"https://example.invalid","account_id":"1"}}}` + if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(config, "basecamp", "config.json"), []byte(profile), 0o600); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + private, err := os.MkdirTemp(os.TempDir(), "acp-bridge-") + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(private) }) + state := t.TempDir() + token := "test-token-not-real-" + strings.Repeat("b", 23) + tokens, err := connector.ServeTaskToken(private, token, 2*time.Minute) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("ServeTaskToken: %v", err) + } + defer tokens.Close() + + serverEnv := driver.EnvMap(driver.BuildEnv(driver.BaseEnv, os.LookupEnv, map[string]string{ + "XDG_CONFIG_HOME": config, "BASECAMP_NO_KEYRING": "1", + })) + policy := &compatPolicy{workDir: wd} + cfg := driver.SessionConfig{ + Cwd: wd, + Env: driver.BuildEnv(driver.BaseEnv, os.LookupEnv, nil), + MCPServers: []driver.MCPServer{{ + Name: compatServer, Command: bin, + Args: []string{"connect", "worker-mcp", "--profile", "compat-dummy", "--connect-state", state, "--socket", tokens.Path()}, + Env: serverEnv, + }}, + Policy: policy, + Scope: driver.Scope{WorkDir: wd}, + PrivateDir: private, + } + d := e.driverFor(t, "") + var s driver.Session + var places drivertest.Places + drivertest.RequireNoSecretFilesDuring(t, token, []string{wd, private, state}, func() { + started := time.Now() + s, err = d.NewSession(turnCtx(t), cfg) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewSession: %v", err) + } + t.Logf("NewSession took %s", time.Since(started).Round(time.Millisecond)) + tokens.AllowGroup(s.Process().PGID) + handed := make(chan connector.Handoff, 1) + go func() { handed <- tokens.Result() }() + deadline := time.After(90 * time.Second) + for { + places = addWorkerProcesses(places, s.Process().PID) + select { + case h := <-handed: + if h != connector.HandoffDelivered { + _ = s.Close() + t.Fatalf("the bridge did not take the token: %s", h) + } + t.Logf("handoff %s %s after NewSession began", h, time.Since(started).Round(time.Millisecond)) + // The bridge execs `basecamp mcp` once it has the token: walk + // the tree again only when that process is there, so the + // server that holds the token is among what is checked. + mcpSeen := false + for wait := time.Now().Add(30 * time.Second); time.Now().Before(wait); time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond) { + places = addWorkerProcesses(places, s.Process().PID) + for _, args := range places.Args { + if strings.Contains(args, " mcp ") && strings.Contains(args, "--connect-token-fd") { + mcpSeen = true + } + } + if mcpSeen { + break + } + } + if !mcpSeen { + _ = s.Close() + t.Fatal("the bridge never became basecamp mcp") + } + // And the agent's own account of the server. The bridge's + // `basecamp mcp` cannot serve here — its profile is a dummy + // with no credentials — so the agent reports the server + // failed, and the driver must refuse to go on with a session + // whose MCP server did not connect (invariant 9). A session + // whose server does serve is the live end-to-end proof. + _, err := s.Prompt(turnCtx(t), "Reply with just the word OK. Do not use any tools.") + if !errors.Is(err, ErrMCPServerNotConnected) { + _ = s.Close() + t.Fatalf("a turn ran with an MCP server that did not connect: %v", err) + } + t.Logf("the turn was refused: %v; %d worker processes seen", err, len(places.Args)) + _ = s.Close() + return + case <-deadline: + _ = s.Close() + t.Fatal("no handoff within 90s") + case <-time.After(100 * time.Millisecond): + } + } + }) + drivertest.RequireNoSecret(t, token, places) +} + +// addWorkerProcesses adds the environment and command line of every process +// descended from root, root included, to places. +func addWorkerProcesses(places drivertest.Places, root int) drivertest.Places { + entries, err := os.ReadDir("/proc") + if err != nil { + return places + } + parent := map[int]int{} + for _, e := range entries { + pid, err := strconv.Atoi(e.Name()) + if err != nil { + continue + } + raw, err := os.ReadFile("/proc/" + e.Name() + "/stat") + if err != nil { + continue + } + fields := strings.Fields(string(raw)[strings.LastIndexByte(string(raw), ')')+1:]) + if len(fields) > 1 { + ppid, _ := strconv.Atoi(fields[1]) + parent[pid] = ppid + } + } + for pid := range parent { + for p, n := pid, 0; p > 1 && n < 64; p, n = parent[p], n+1 { + if p != root { + continue + } + dir := "/proc/" + strconv.Itoa(pid) + if cmdline, err := os.ReadFile(dir + "/cmdline"); err == nil { + places.Args = append(places.Args, strings.ReplaceAll(string(cmdline), "\x00", " ")) + } + if environ, err := os.ReadFile(dir + "/environ"); err == nil { + places.Env = append(places.Env, strings.Split(string(environ), "\x00")...) + } + break + } + } + return places +} + +// checkMCPRestart reports what an adapter does when a session's MCP server +// dies while the session is running: re-runs the server's command as a new +// process, keeps talking to what is already there, or leaves the session +// without the server. The connector's token bridge serves one handoff per +// start of that command, so a re-run is the shape it is built for, and a +// server left dead is the shape only ErrMCPServerNotConnected protects. +// +// The server it kills is the stub this check's own session declared, started +// by the adapter this check started, in the worker's process group: it is +// killed by the pid the stub itself recorded, and nothing else is signalled. +func checkMCPRestart(t *testing.T, e compatEnv) { + wd := workDir(t) + record := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "record.json") + policy := &compatPolicy{workDir: wd} + d := e.driverFor(t, "") + s, err := d.NewSession(turnCtx(t), e.config(t, wd, record, policy)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewSession: %v", err) + } + defer func() { _ = s.Close() }() + first := readRecord(t, record, func(r stubRecord) bool { return slices.Contains(r.Methods, "tools/list") }, 90*time.Second) + if first.PID == 0 { + t.Fatal("the MCP server never started, so there is nothing to kill") + } + if err := syscall.Kill(first.PID, syscall.SIGKILL); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("kill the MCP server (pid %d): %v", first.PID, err) + } + for deadline := time.Now().Add(30 * time.Second); ; { + if errors.Is(syscall.Kill(first.PID, 0), syscall.ESRCH) { + break + } + if time.Now().After(deadline) { + t.Fatalf("the MCP server (pid %d) did not die", first.PID) + } + time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond) + } + t.Logf("killed the session's MCP server (pid %d)", first.PID) + + // Asked twice: a model that answers without reaching for the tool tells + // us nothing about the adapter, and which of the two happened is not + // visible from here. + var res driver.PromptResult + var second stubRecord + for range 2 { + res, err = s.Prompt(turnCtx(t), "Use the basecamp MCP tool named note with the text after. "+ + "You must call that tool. If calling it fails, say exactly UNAVAILABLE.") + second = readRecord(t, record, func(r stubRecord) bool { + return r.PID != 0 && r.PID != first.PID && slices.Contains(r.Methods, "initialize") + }, 30*time.Second) + if second.PID != 0 && second.PID != first.PID { + break + } + if err != nil { + break + } + } + switch { + case second.PID != 0 && second.PID != first.PID: + worker := s.Process() + t.Logf("RESTARTED: %s re-ran the server's command as a new process (pid %d after %d); "+ + "a per-start handoff is the right shape. turn: stop=%v err=%v", e.adapter.Name, second.PID, first.PID, res.Stop, err) + // What the connector's token socket checks of a peer: its process + // group, or its descent from the worker's leader. + ppid, pgid := parentAndGroup(t, second.PID) + t.Logf("the restarted server: pid %d ppid %d pgid %d; the worker: pid %d pgid %d%s", + second.PID, ppid, pgid, worker.PID, worker.PGID, + map[bool]string{true: " (same group)", false: " (another group)"}[pgid == worker.PGID]) + case errors.Is(err, ErrMCPServerNotConnected): + t.Logf("NOT RESTARTED, and reported: %s left the server dead and said so; the driver refused the turn: %v", e.adapter.Name, err) + default: + t.Logf("NO RESTART SEEN, and nothing reported: %s put no new server on the record across two turns, "+ + "which ended stop=%v err=%v. Either the adapter left the server dead or the model never reached for the "+ + "tool; neither is visible to the client, so nothing but the session's own account of its servers stands "+ + "between a worker and a turn without its tools", e.adapter.Name, res.Stop, err) + } +} + +// parentAndGroup is a process's parent and process group, as ps reports them. +func parentAndGroup(t *testing.T, pid int) (int, int) { + t.Helper() + out, err := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "ps", "-o", "ppid=,pgid=", "-p", strconv.Itoa(pid)).Output() + if err != nil { + t.Logf("ps for pid %d: %v", pid, err) + return 0, 0 + } + fields := strings.Fields(string(out)) + if len(fields) != 2 { + return 0, 0 + } + ppid, _ := strconv.Atoi(fields[0]) + pgid, _ := strconv.Atoi(fields[1]) + return ppid, pgid +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/acp/fakeagent_test.go b/internal/connector/driver/acp/fakeagent_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b237c072c --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/acp/fakeagent_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,528 @@ +//go:build unix + +package acp + +import ( + "bufio" + "context" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "os" + "os/exec" + "os/signal" + "slices" + "strings" + "sync" + "syscall" + "time" +) + +// The test binary doubles as a fake ACP agent: run as +// `<test binary> -fake-acp-agent <scenario.json>`, it speaks ACP on stdio as +// the scenario says and records what it was started with and what it was +// told. Arguments, not the environment, name the scenario, because the driver +// under test passes the agent an allowlisted environment. +const ( + fakeAgentArg = "-fake-acp-agent" + fakeChildArg = "-fake-acp-child" +) + +type scenario struct { + Record string `json:"record"` + // Probe names variables whose values are recorded (test values only). + Probe []string `json:"probe"` + + ProtocolVersion int `json:"protocol_version"` + AgentName string `json:"agent_name"` + AgentVersion string `json:"agent_version"` + FailInitialize bool `json:"fail_initialize"` + LoadSession bool `json:"load_session"` + Resume bool `json:"resume"` + SessionID string `json:"session_id"` + + Modes []string `json:"modes"` + CurrentMode string `json:"current_mode"` + ModeConfig bool `json:"mode_config"` + // Confirm is how a set mode is confirmed: "readback" (the config option + // answer reports it), "stale" (it reports the old mode), "notify" (a + // current_mode_update follows set_mode), "none", or "error" (set_mode + // fails). + Confirm string `json:"confirm"` + // ModeBeforeSetAnswer is a mode update sent on the wire just before the + // answer to the set that was supposed to confirm the asking mode. + ModeBeforeSetAnswer string `json:"mode_before_set_answer"` + + // Replay are updates sent before a load's response. + Replay []json.RawMessage `json:"replay"` + // Turns script each prompt in order; the last repeats. + Turns []turnScript `json:"turns"` + + // StopReadingAfter names a method after which the agent reads no more + // input. + StopReadingAfter string `json:"stop_reading_after"` + // MCPInitAtSessionStart is the init the agent forwards while it is + // answering session/new, with these server statuses. + MCPInitAtSessionStart map[string]string `json:"mcp_init_at_session_start,omitempty"` + // MCPInitSessionID is the session the early init names; the session's own + // id when empty. + MCPInitSessionID string `json:"mcp_init_session_id,omitempty"` + // Hang names a method the agent never answers. + Hang string `json:"hang"` + AuthEmail string `json:"auth_email"` + // Secret is written back where an agent writes text: its stderr. + Secret string `json:"secret"` + SpawnChild bool `json:"spawn_child"` + // EscapingChild starts the child in a session of its own, holding the + // agent's output: a process group kill does not reach it. + EscapingChild bool `json:"escaping_child"` + IgnoreStdinEOF bool `json:"ignore_stdin_eof"` + IgnoreTerminate bool `json:"ignore_terminate"` +} + +type turnScript struct { + Steps []step `json:"steps"` + // Stop is the stop reason; with WaitForCancel it is sent once + // session/cancel arrives. + Stop string `json:"stop"` + Usage json.RawMessage `json:"usage,omitempty"` + WaitForCancel bool `json:"wait_for_cancel"` + ErrorMessage string `json:"error_message"` + // Hang never answers the prompt. + Hang bool `json:"hang"` + // FloodPermissions asks for this many permissions at once. + FloodPermissions int `json:"flood_permissions"` + FloodCall json.RawMessage `json:"flood_call,omitempty"` + // StopWithoutWaiting answers the prompt without waiting for the + // permissions it asked for. + StopWithoutWaiting bool `json:"stop_without_waiting"` + // LateRequest is a permission request sent just after the prompt is + // answered. + LateRequest json.RawMessage `json:"late_request,omitempty"` +} + +type step struct { + Update json.RawMessage `json:"update,omitempty"` + SessionID string `json:"session_id"` + Permission json.RawMessage `json:"permission,omitempty"` + ModeChange string `json:"mode_change"` + // MCPInit sends Claude Code's init, forwarded as claude-agent-acp does, + // with these MCP server statuses. + MCPInit map[string]string `json:"mcp_init,omitempty"` + SleepMS int `json:"sleep_ms"` +} + +type agentRecord struct { + PID int `json:"pid"` + ChildPID int `json:"child_pid"` + Env []string `json:"env"` + // EnvKV and Args are the whole environment and command line: the fake's + // environment holds test values only. + EnvKV []string `json:"env_kv"` + Args []string `json:"args"` + Probe map[string]string `json:"probe"` + Methods []string `json:"methods"` + Params map[string]json.RawMessage + Outcomes []json.RawMessage `json:"outcomes"` +} + +type fakeAgent struct { + sc scenario + out *bufio.Writer + + mu sync.Mutex + rec agentRecord + nextID int + pending map[int]chan json.RawMessage + mode string + prompts int + canceled chan struct{} + // cancelEarly is a cancel handled before the prompt it followed on the + // wire: the fake handles each message on its own goroutine, so the two + // can run in either order. + cancelEarly bool +} + +func runFakeAgent(path string) { + raw, err := os.ReadFile(path) + if err != nil { + os.Exit(3) + } + var sc scenario + if json.Unmarshal(raw, &sc) != nil { + os.Exit(3) + } + if sc.IgnoreTerminate { + signal.Ignore(syscall.SIGTERM) + } + if sc.Secret != "" { + _, _ = os.Stderr.WriteString("the adapter says: " + sc.Secret + "\n") + } + a := &fakeAgent{sc: sc, out: bufio.NewWriter(os.Stdout), pending: map[int]chan json.RawMessage{}, mode: sc.CurrentMode} + a.rec.PID = os.Getpid() + a.rec.Params = map[string]json.RawMessage{} + a.rec.Probe = map[string]string{} + a.rec.EnvKV = os.Environ() + a.rec.Args = os.Args + for _, kv := range os.Environ() { + name, _, _ := strings.Cut(kv, "=") + a.rec.Env = append(a.rec.Env, name) + if slices.Contains(sc.Probe, name) { + a.rec.Probe[name] = os.Getenv(name) + } + } + slices.Sort(a.rec.Env) + if sc.SpawnChild || sc.EscapingChild { + child := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), os.Args[0], fakeChildArg) + if sc.EscapingChild { + child.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setsid: true} + child.Stdout = os.Stdout + } + if child.Start() == nil { + a.rec.ChildPID = child.Process.Pid + } + } + a.flush() + + in := bufio.NewScanner(os.Stdin) + in.Buffer(make([]byte, 1<<20), 16<<20) + for in.Scan() { + var m struct { + ID json.RawMessage `json:"id"` + Method string `json:"method"` + Params json.RawMessage `json:"params"` + Result json.RawMessage `json:"result"` + } + if json.Unmarshal(in.Bytes(), &m) != nil { + continue + } + if m.Method == "" { + var id int + if json.Unmarshal(m.ID, &id) == nil { + a.mu.Lock() + ch := a.pending[id] + a.mu.Unlock() + if ch != nil { + ch <- m.Result + } + } + continue + } + a.mu.Lock() + a.rec.Methods = append(a.rec.Methods, m.Method) + a.rec.Params[m.Method] = m.Params + a.mu.Unlock() + a.flush() + go a.handle(m.ID, m.Method, m.Params) + if m.Method == sc.StopReadingAfter { + // Reads no more, and outlives no test: a run that is interrupted + // while the client's write is stuck would otherwise leave this + // process behind with nothing to end it. + stall() + } + } + if sc.IgnoreStdinEOF { + stall() + } +} + +// stall is an agent that does nothing more, for longer than any test waits +// and not forever. +func stall() { + time.Sleep(10 * time.Minute) + os.Exit(0) +} + +// runFakeChild is a process the fake agent leaves in its group: it ignores +// SIGTERM, so only a group SIGKILL ends it. +func runFakeChild() { + signal.Ignore(syscall.SIGTERM, syscall.SIGHUP) + time.Sleep(time.Hour) +} + +func (a *fakeAgent) flush() { + a.mu.Lock() + data, _ := json.Marshal(a.rec) + a.mu.Unlock() + tmp := a.sc.Record + ".tmp" + if os.WriteFile(tmp, data, 0o600) == nil { + _ = os.Rename(tmp, a.sc.Record) + } +} + +func (a *fakeAgent) send(v any) { + data, _ := json.Marshal(v) + a.mu.Lock() + defer a.mu.Unlock() + _, _ = a.out.Write(append(data, '\n')) + _ = a.out.Flush() +} + +func (a *fakeAgent) reply(id json.RawMessage, result any) { + a.send(map[string]any{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": id, "result": result}) +} + +func (a *fakeAgent) fail(id json.RawMessage, message string) { + a.send(map[string]any{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": id, "error": map[string]any{"code": -32603, "message": message}}) +} + +func (a *fakeAgent) update(sessionID string, update any) { + a.send(map[string]any{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "session/update", "params": map[string]any{"sessionId": sessionID, "update": update}}) +} + +func (a *fakeAgent) request(method string, params any) json.RawMessage { + a.mu.Lock() + a.nextID++ + id := a.nextID + ch := make(chan json.RawMessage, 1) + a.pending[id] = ch + a.mu.Unlock() + a.send(map[string]any{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": id, "method": method, "params": params}) + return <-ch +} + +// sendMCPInit forwards Claude Code's init the way claude-agent-acp does. +func (a *fakeAgent) sendMCPInit(sessionID string, statuses map[string]string) { + servers := make([]any, 0, len(statuses)) + for name, status := range statuses { + servers = append(servers, map[string]any{"name": name, "status": status}) + } + a.send(map[string]any{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "_claude/sdkMessage", "params": map[string]any{ + "sessionId": sessionID, "message": map[string]any{"type": "system", "subtype": "init", "mcp_servers": servers, + "cwd": "/somewhere", "tools": []string{"Bash"}, "model": "x"}}}) +} + +func (a *fakeAgent) sessionID() string { + if a.sc.SessionID != "" { + return a.sc.SessionID + } + return "sess-1" +} + +func (a *fakeAgent) modes() map[string]any { + available := make([]any, 0, len(a.sc.Modes)) + for _, m := range a.sc.Modes { + available = append(available, map[string]any{"id": m, "name": m}) + } + a.mu.Lock() + defer a.mu.Unlock() + return map[string]any{"currentModeId": a.mode, "availableModes": available} +} + +func (a *fakeAgent) configOptions(current string) []any { + options := make([]any, 0, len(a.sc.Modes)) + for _, m := range a.sc.Modes { + options = append(options, map[string]any{"value": m, "name": m}) + } + return []any{ + map[string]any{"id": "model", "category": "model", "type": "select", "currentValue": "x", "options": []any{map[string]any{"value": "x", "name": "x"}}}, + map[string]any{"id": "mode", "category": "mode", "type": "select", "currentValue": current, "options": options}, + } +} + +func (a *fakeAgent) sessionState() map[string]any { + st := map[string]any{"sessionId": a.sessionID()} + if len(a.sc.Modes) > 0 { + st["modes"] = a.modes() + } + if a.sc.ModeConfig { + a.mu.Lock() + st["configOptions"] = a.configOptions(a.mode) + a.mu.Unlock() + } + return st +} + +func (a *fakeAgent) handle(id json.RawMessage, method string, params json.RawMessage) { + sc := a.sc + if method == sc.Hang { + return + } + switch method { + case "initialize": + if sc.AuthEmail != "" { + a.send(map[string]any{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "_auth/status_update", "params": map[string]any{"authStatus": map[string]any{"account": map[string]any{"email": sc.AuthEmail}}}}) + } + if sc.FailInitialize { + a.fail(id, "initialize failed for "+sc.AuthEmail) + return + } + version := sc.ProtocolVersion + if version == 0 { + version = 1 + } + caps := map[string]any{"loadSession": sc.LoadSession} + if sc.Resume { + caps["sessionCapabilities"] = map[string]any{"resume": map[string]any{}} + } + a.reply(id, map[string]any{"protocolVersion": version, "agentCapabilities": caps, "agentInfo": map[string]any{"name": sc.AgentName, "version": sc.AgentVersion}}) + case "session/new": + if sc.MCPInitAtSessionStart != nil { + named := sc.MCPInitSessionID + if named == "" { + named = a.sessionID() + } + a.sendMCPInit(named, sc.MCPInitAtSessionStart) + } + a.reply(id, a.sessionState()) + case "session/load", "session/resume": + for _, u := range sc.Replay { + a.update(a.sessionID(), u) + } + st := a.sessionState() + delete(st, "sessionId") + a.reply(id, st) + case "session/set_mode": + var p struct { + ModeID string `json:"modeId"` + } + _ = json.Unmarshal(params, &p) + switch sc.Confirm { + case "error": + a.fail(id, "no") + return + case "stale", "none": + default: + a.mu.Lock() + a.mode = p.ModeID + a.mu.Unlock() + } + if sc.Confirm == "notify" { + a.update(a.sessionID(), map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "current_mode_update", "currentModeId": p.ModeID}) + } + a.reply(id, map[string]any{}) + case "session/set_config_option": + var p struct { + Value string `json:"value"` + } + _ = json.Unmarshal(params, &p) + a.mu.Lock() + if sc.Confirm != "stale" && sc.Confirm != "none" { + a.mode = p.Value + } + opts := a.configOptions(a.mode) + a.mu.Unlock() + if sc.ModeBeforeSetAnswer != "" { + a.update(a.sessionID(), map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "current_mode_update", "currentModeId": sc.ModeBeforeSetAnswer}) + } + a.reply(id, map[string]any{"configOptions": opts}) + case "session/cancel": + a.mu.Lock() + if a.canceled != nil { + close(a.canceled) + a.canceled = nil + } else { + a.cancelEarly = true + } + a.mu.Unlock() + case "session/prompt": + a.prompt(id) + default: + if len(id) > 0 { + a.fail(id, "unknown method") + } + } +} + +func (a *fakeAgent) prompt(id json.RawMessage) { + a.mu.Lock() + n := a.prompts + a.prompts++ + canceled := make(chan struct{}) + a.canceled = canceled + if a.cancelEarly { + a.cancelEarly = false + close(canceled) + a.canceled = nil + } + a.mu.Unlock() + if len(a.sc.Turns) == 0 { + a.reply(id, map[string]any{"stopReason": "end_turn"}) + return + } + ts := a.sc.Turns[min(n, len(a.sc.Turns)-1)] + for _, st := range ts.Steps { + if st.SleepMS > 0 { + time.Sleep(time.Duration(st.SleepMS) * time.Millisecond) + } + sid := a.sessionID() + if st.SessionID != "" { + sid = st.SessionID + } + if len(st.Update) > 0 { + a.update(sid, st.Update) + } + if st.MCPInit != nil { + a.sendMCPInit(sid, st.MCPInit) + } + if st.ModeChange != "" { + a.update(sid, map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "current_mode_update", "currentModeId": st.ModeChange}) + } + if len(st.Permission) > 0 { + var p any + if json.Unmarshal(st.Permission, &p) != nil { + p = st.Permission + } else if object, ok := p.(map[string]any); ok { + if _, named := object["sessionId"]; !named { + object["sessionId"] = sid + } + p = object + } + outcome := a.request("session/request_permission", p) + a.mu.Lock() + a.rec.Outcomes = append(a.rec.Outcomes, outcome) + a.mu.Unlock() + a.flush() + } + } + if ts.FloodPermissions > 0 { + var wg sync.WaitGroup + for i := range ts.FloodPermissions { + wg.Add(1) + go func() { + defer wg.Done() + var p map[string]any + _ = json.Unmarshal(ts.FloodCall, &p) + p["sessionId"] = a.sessionID() + call, _ := p["toolCall"].(map[string]any) + call["toolCallId"] = fmt.Sprintf("flood-%d", i) + outcome := a.request("session/request_permission", p) + a.mu.Lock() + a.rec.Outcomes = append(a.rec.Outcomes, outcome) + a.mu.Unlock() + a.flush() + }() + } + if ts.StopWithoutWaiting { + // Long enough for the client to have the request in hand. + time.Sleep(150 * time.Millisecond) + } else { + wg.Wait() + } + a.flush() + } + if ts.Hang { + select {} + } + if ts.WaitForCancel { + <-canceled + } + if ts.ErrorMessage != "" { + a.fail(id, ts.ErrorMessage) + return + } + result := map[string]any{"stopReason": ts.Stop} + if len(ts.Usage) > 0 { + result["usage"] = ts.Usage + } + a.reply(id, result) + if len(ts.LateRequest) > 0 { + var p map[string]any + _ = json.Unmarshal(ts.LateRequest, &p) + p["sessionId"] = a.sessionID() + outcome := a.request("session/request_permission", p) + a.mu.Lock() + a.rec.Outcomes = append(a.rec.Outcomes, outcome) + a.mu.Unlock() + a.flush() + } +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/acp/limits.go b/internal/connector/driver/acp/limits.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2f339b2b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/acp/limits.go @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +package acp + +import "time" + +// What bounds every buffer this driver keeps +// +// An ACP agent writes all of it: the lines it sends, the ids and paths it +// names, the options it offers, the requests it asks. None of it is the +// agent's to grow without end, so every collection and every wait this +// driver keeps is bounded here, in one place, rather than at the site that +// happens to fill it. +// +// - Per line: maxLine caps a line read from the agent; a longer one ends +// the session. agentText cuts the text of an error before it is +// sanitized (rpc.go) and again after, to 120 runes. +// - Per session: maxTools tool calls remembered, maxRecorded refusals +// remembered as recorded — a session that reaches that one ends, rather +// than record a refusal twice — maxMode bytes of the mode last reported, +// maxEarlyInit accounts of the MCP servers held until the session's id is +// known, and updatesBuffer updates for a consumer that has not read them, +// which are dropped rather than blocking it. +// - Per turn: maxRefusals refusals kept on a result. +// - Per tool call: maxToolCallID bytes of id, maxLocations paths, and +// maxLocationPath bytes of each. A call whose paths do not all fit is +// unplaceable: refused, never judged on the paths that did. +// - Per option list: maxOptionDepth of nesting and maxConfigOptions +// options, however they are grouped. +// - At once: maxHandlers agent requests being answered, maxDecisions of +// them at the policy, maxBusy refusals waiting to be written. An agent +// that outruns the last of these ends its session, and the requests +// dropped in that ending are neither answered nor recorded. +// - Per error: stderrNoteLines of the adapter's stderr. +// - Per read-back: maxReadback bytes of the adapter's own answer. +// - In time: modeConfirmWait for a mode to be confirmed, decisionDrain for +// the decisions still in flight when a turn ends, and Options.CloseGrace +// for each wait Close and Cancel make on the worker. What follows the +// grace — a process group's SIGKILL, the reader's last read — is bounded +// by the driver package's own waits, not by this one. + +// maxLine is the longest line the connector reads from an agent. A session/load +// replay or a large tool result can be long; a line past this ends the session +// rather than growing without bound. +// A variable so tests need not write one. +var maxLine = 64 << 20 + +// maxHandlers bounds the agent requests answered at once, and maxBusy the +// refusals waiting to be written. A variable so tests need not send a +// thousand requests. +var ( + maxHandlers = 16 + maxBusy = 256 +) + +// updatesBuffer is how many updates wait for a consumer that has not read +// them. An update is progress, not a record: past this the oldest are the +// ones that no longer matter, so emit drops rather than let an agent's pace +// be set by a reader's. +const updatesBuffer = 256 + +// maxOptionDepth bounds how deeply a select option's groups may nest: the +// agent writes that JSON, and a deep one would otherwise recurse until the +// process dies. +const maxOptionDepth = 8 + +// maxDecisions bounds the permission requests one session decides at once. +const maxDecisions = 8 + +// decisionDrain is how long a turn's end waits for permissions still being +// decided. +var decisionDrain = 2 * time.Second + +// maxRefusals bounds the refusals one turn records; past it, a refusal is +// still an update. maxRecorded bounds the refusals a session remembers +// having recorded, maxTools the tool calls it remembers, maxToolCallID the +// id of one and maxLocations the paths it may name: the agent writes all of +// them, and a session's memory is not its to grow. +const ( + maxRefusals = 1024 + // maxRecorded is the last tool call id a session remembers having + // refused. Reaching it ends the session (ErrRefusalMemoryFull): a + // session that cannot remember cannot promise the ledger one record per + // tool call, and recording one twice is a count too high. + maxRecorded = 4096 + maxTools = 1024 + maxToolCallID = 256 + maxLocations = 64 +) + +// maxMode bounds the mode name a session keeps. The agent writes it, it is +// only ever compared against the asking mode and shown in an error, and one +// longer than this is not a mode any adapter has. +const maxMode = 256 + +// maxEarlyInit bounds the accounts of MCP servers held while the session's +// own id is still unknown. An account is useful only if its id turns out to +// be this session's, so a few are all that can ever be used; past this an +// account is dropped, and a session whose own account was dropped fails its +// first turn rather than running unvouched for. +const maxEarlyInit = 8 + +// maxLocationPath bounds a path an agent names for a tool call, and +// maxConfigOptions the options it offers in one list or one update. A call +// whose paths do not all fit — too many of them, or one too long — is a call +// the policy cannot place, and is refused rather than judged on the part that +// fits. +const ( + maxLocationPath = 4096 + maxConfigOptions = 256 +) + +// maxReadback bounds the adapter's answer to its own read-back command, in +// each chunk and in total. The answer is the adapter's own text and it is +// read once, at the start of a session, so a few kilobytes is all of it. +const maxReadback = 4 << 10 + +// stderrNoteLines is how many of the adapter's last stderr lines an error +// carries. The error becomes the attempt's own text, so this is a few lines +// of why, not the whole of what a failing adapter printed. +const stderrNoteLines = 5 + +// modeConfirmWait is how long a session with no mode config option has to +// report the mode it was set to. A variable so tests need not wait it out. +var modeConfirmWait = 10 * time.Second diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/acp/mcp.go b/internal/connector/driver/acp/mcp.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fd65f83a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/acp/mcp.go @@ -0,0 +1,372 @@ +package acp + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "fmt" + "net/url" + "path/filepath" + "slices" + "strings" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" +) + +// The MCP isolation boundary +// +// A session runs on the MCP servers it was given and on no others, and each +// of those runs on the environment it was given. Three places hold that +// line: +// +// 1. What is declared. wireServers turns SessionConfig.MCPServers into the +// session/new mcpServers[], each with its whole environment written out: +// some adapters pass their own environment down to a server and some +// pass almost nothing, so nothing a server needs is left to inheritance. +// What a server may inherit is bounded by what the adapter itself was +// given, which is an allowlist (invariant 1, held in Driver.open). A +// server without a name or an absolute command is ErrUnusable, and so is +// an environment name that is not one. +// +// 2. What the adapter must not add. The adapter is configured so it can +// load no MCP server of the host's: claude-agent-acp is given +// settingSources: [] and strictMcpConfig, and codex-acp is refused +// before it starts when its config declares mcp_servers +// (ErrForeignMCPConfig, from codexPreflight) and is run with +// DISABLE_MCP_CONFIG_FILTERING so the servers it was given reach the +// session whole. Both live with the adapters, in adapters.go. +// +// 3. What the adapter says it got. verifyMCPConfiguration asks the adapter +// what MCP configuration it is actually running — both pinned adapters +// answer their own "/mcp", themselves, with no model and no tokens — and +// ends the session unless that answer is the servers the session gave it, +// plus at most a server the pinned adapter brings itself whose tools are +// not offered to the model. Everything in 1 and 2 is what the connector +// asked for; this is the only place that knows what it got, so this is +// the guarantee and the rest is how it is usually true. +// +// 4. What actually connected. Every account of the servers is read and +// judged in this file, whichever adapter sends it and whatever shape it +// arrives in: Claude Code's init, forwarded as an SDK message +// (onSDKMessage), or codex-acp's failed mcp_startup.<server> tool calls +// (noteStartupFailure). reportMCPServers judges an account — a server +// the session was given that did not connect, or a server it was never +// given that is there anyway, fails the turn with +// ErrMCPServerNotConnected and ends the worker (invariant 9) — and +// mcpUnconfirmedLocked judges the absence of one, which only the end of a +// turn can see. An account naming another session is not this session's +// and is held or dropped, never applied. +// +// Ending the session ends the servers: the adapter starts them, the worker's +// process group is ended as a group, and a server the adapter keeps outside +// that group loses the stdio it was started with. +// wireServer is ACP's stdio McpServer. +type wireServer struct { + Name string `json:"name"` + Command string `json:"command"` + Args []string `json:"args"` + Env []wireEnv `json:"env"` +} + +type wireEnv struct { + Name string `json:"name"` + Value string `json:"value"` +} + +// wireServers declares every server's whole environment (invariant 1): some +// adapters pass their own environment down to MCP servers and some pass +// almost nothing, so nothing a server needs is left to inheritance. +func wireServers(servers []driver.MCPServer) ([]wireServer, error) { + out := make([]wireServer, 0, len(servers)) + seen := make(map[string]bool, len(servers)) + for _, srv := range servers { + if srv.Name == "" || !filepath.IsAbs(srv.Command) { + return nil, errors.New("acp: an MCP server needs a name and an absolute command") + } + if seen[srv.Name] { + // Two servers of one name are one name in the agent's account of + // them, so one could stand for the other: there is no session + // this driver can judge. + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acp: two MCP servers are named %q", srv.Name) + } + seen[srv.Name] = true + env := make([]wireEnv, 0, len(srv.Env)) + for k, v := range srv.Env { + if k == "" || strings.ContainsAny(k, "=\x00") { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acp: MCP server %q has an invalid environment name", srv.Name) + } + env = append(env, wireEnv{Name: k, Value: v}) + } + slices.SortFunc(env, func(a, b wireEnv) int { return strings.Compare(a.Name, b.Name) }) + args := srv.Args + if args == nil { + args = []string{} + } + out = append(out, wireServer{Name: srv.Name, Command: srv.Command, Args: args, Env: env}) + } + return out, nil +} + +// reportMCPServers takes the agent's own account of its MCP servers +// (invariant 9): every server the session was given must be connected, and a +// server it was never given must not be there at all. +// +// complete says whether statuses is the agent's whole account of them (an +// init) or only what it said about one server (a startup failure). +func (s *session) reportMCPServers(statuses map[string]string, complete bool) { + s.mu.Lock() + names := slices.Clone(s.mcpNames) + s.mu.Unlock() + for name, status := range statuses { + switch { + case !slices.Contains(names, name): + // strictMcpConfig and the Codex preflight are meant to leave the + // agent nothing else; a server it names is evidence they did not, + // whether this is its whole list or one startup report. + s.fail(fmt.Errorf("%w: the agent has a server the session never gave it, %q", ErrMCPServerNotConnected, s.conn.agentText(name))) + return + case status != "connected": + s.fail(fmt.Errorf("%w: %q is %q", ErrMCPServerNotConnected, name, s.conn.agentText(status))) + return + } + } + if !complete { + return + } + for _, name := range names { + if statuses[name] != "connected" { + s.fail(fmt.Errorf("%w: the agent did not report %q at all", ErrMCPServerNotConnected, name)) + return + } + } + s.mu.Lock() + s.mcpConfirmed = true + s.mu.Unlock() +} + +// onSDKMessage reads the one Claude Code message the session asks +// claude-agent-acp to forward, its init, for each MCP server's name and +// status. Everything else in it, and every other message, is dropped unread. +func (s *session) onSDKMessage(params json.RawMessage) { + if s.mcpStatus != MCPStatusInit { + return + } + var n struct { + SessionID string `json:"sessionId"` + Message struct { + Type string `json:"type"` + Subtype string `json:"subtype"` + MCPServers []struct { + Name string `json:"name"` + Status string `json:"status"` + } `json:"mcp_servers"` + } `json:"message"` + } + if json.Unmarshal(params, &n) != nil || n.SessionID == "" || + n.Message.Type != "system" || n.Message.Subtype != "init" { + return + } + statuses := map[string]string{} + for _, srv := range n.Message.MCPServers { + statuses[srv.Name] = srv.Status + } + // Reduced before anything else: what arrives is the agent's to send, and + // as much of it as it likes, until the session's own id settles which one + // account matters. Both paths below apply the same reduced account, so + // neither can be the lenient one. + held := s.reduce(statuses) + // Whose account this is, is decided under one lock: the session's id can + // arrive between reading it and acting on it, and an account read as + // nobody's must not then be applied as this session's. + s.mu.Lock() + switch { + case s.id == "": + // The session's id is not known yet: this account is held until it + // is, so an init naming another session cannot vouch for this one. An + // id this session could never be given is not held at all, and + // neither is an account past the bound. + if validSessionID(n.SessionID) { + if s.earlyInit == nil { + s.earlyInit = map[string]earlyAccount{} + } + if _, ok := s.earlyInit[n.SessionID]; ok || len(s.earlyInit) < maxEarlyInit { + s.earlyInit[n.SessionID] = held + } + } + s.mu.Unlock() + case n.SessionID != s.id: + // Another session's account, and this session's id is known: it says + // nothing about this one. + s.mu.Unlock() + default: + s.mu.Unlock() + s.reportAccount(held) + } +} + +// collect adds a chunk of the agent's own answer to a read-back command, +// while one is being read and at no other time. +func (s *session) collect(text string) { + if text == "" { + return + } + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + if s.readback == nil || s.readback.Len() >= maxReadback { + return + } + if room := maxReadback - s.readback.Len(); len(text) > room { + text = text[:room] + } + s.readback.WriteString(text) +} + +// verifyMCPConfiguration is the boundary check: it asks the adapter what MCP +// configuration it is actually running and compares that with what this +// session declared. It runs once, after the adapter is up and in its asking +// mode and before the session is handed to anyone, and a difference ends the +// session. +// +// Everything before it — the servers written into session/new, the adapter's +// own switches, the Codex preflight — is what the connector asked for. This +// is what the adapter says it got. Only the second can be a guarantee, so a +// difference is ErrMCPReadback (an unverified session) whether the cause is a +// configuration layer this driver cannot read, an adapter that filtered what +// it was given, or an answer it cannot parse. +// +// The one thing allowed beyond the session's own servers is a server the +// pinned adapter brings itself (Readback.BuiltIn), which is there because its +// tools are not offered to the session's model at all. +func (s *session) verifyMCPConfiguration(ctx context.Context, a Adapter) error { + if a.Readback.Command == "" || a.Readback.Parse == nil { + return nil + } + s.mu.Lock() + s.readback = &strings.Builder{} + // The read-back is not progress: nothing of its turn is emitted, and + // nothing it says of a tool call is kept. + s.replaying = true + declared := slices.Clone(s.mcpNames) + s.mu.Unlock() + _, err := s.Prompt(ctx, a.Readback.Command) + s.mu.Lock() + text := s.readback.String() + s.readback = nil + s.replaying = false + s.mu.Unlock() + if err != nil { + return err + } + report, err := a.Readback.Parse(text) + if err != nil { + return err + } + return matchesDeclared(report, declared, a.Readback.BuiltIn) +} + +// matchesDeclared is the comparison itself: the servers the adapter says it +// has, against the servers the session gave it and the ones its own adapter +// brings. +func matchesDeclared(report MCPReport, declared, builtIn []string) error { + allowed := append(slices.Clone(declared), builtIn...) + if report.Unusable > 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("%w: it reports %d of its servers unusable", ErrMCPReadback, report.Unusable) + } + if report.Names == nil { + // An adapter that counts its servers without naming them: the count + // is what there is to compare. + if report.Count != len(allowed) { + return fmt.Errorf("%w: it reports %d servers, the session gave %d", ErrMCPReadback, report.Count, len(allowed)) + } + return nil + } + for _, name := range report.Names { + if !slices.Contains(allowed, name) { + return fmt.Errorf("%w: it has %q, which the session never gave it", ErrMCPReadback, name) + } + } + for _, name := range declared { + if !slices.Contains(report.Names, name) { + return fmt.Errorf("%w: it does not have %q, which the session gave it", ErrMCPReadback, name) + } + } + return nil +} + +// earlyAccount is an account of the MCP servers that arrived before the +// session's id did, reduced to what judging it needs: what the agent said of +// each server this session was given, keyed by the session's own name for it, +// and whether it named a server the session did not give. Neither the agent's +// own names nor how many it sends are kept, so what is held is bounded by +// what the session gave — and a name the session never gave is never kept as +// a name at all, only as the reason it fails, because a name put through a +// sanitizer can come out as one the session did give. +type earlyAccount struct { + statuses map[string]string + foreign bool + // reason is the foreign name and status, sanitized, for the error only. + reason string +} + +// reduce is that reduction. +func (s *session) reduce(statuses map[string]string) earlyAccount { + s.mu.Lock() + names := slices.Clone(s.mcpNames) + s.mu.Unlock() + held := earlyAccount{statuses: make(map[string]string, len(names))} + for name, status := range statuses { + if i := slices.Index(names, name); i >= 0 { + // Keyed by the session's own name, which is the one thing here + // that is not the agent's text. + held.statuses[names[i]] = s.conn.agentText(status) + continue + } + if !held.foreign { + held.foreign = true + held.reason = fmt.Sprintf("%q is %q", s.conn.agentText(name), s.conn.agentText(status)) + } + } + return held +} + +// reportAccount applies a held account: a server the session never gave fails +// it here, because that name was not kept, and the rest is judged by +// reportMCPServers like any other account. +func (s *session) reportAccount(a earlyAccount) { + if a.foreign { + s.fail(fmt.Errorf("%w: the agent has a server the session never gave it, %s", ErrMCPServerNotConnected, a.reason)) + return + } + s.reportMCPServers(a.statuses, true) +} + +// mcpUnconfirmedLocked reports the third case of the rule: a Claude session +// whose turn ended with no account of its MCP servers at all. The other two +// (a server that did not connect, a server the session never gave) are +// reportMCPServers'; this one can only be seen when a turn ends, so +// finishTurn asks it here rather than judging for itself. +func (s *session) mcpUnconfirmedLocked() bool { + return s.mcpStatus == MCPStatusInit && len(s.mcpNames) > 0 && !s.mcpConfirmed +} + +// noteStartupFailure reads codex-acp's account, which arrives as failed tool +// calls named for the server that did not start, one at a time. +// +// A load's replayed history can carry one of these from the session's earlier +// life, and nothing on the wire tells it apart from the failure of the server +// this process has just started — both are session/update for the same +// session, both during the load. So a replayed failure fails the load, which +// is the safe way round: a session that cannot be loaded is started fresh, +// and a startup failure taken for history would be a worker running without +// the tools it was given. +func (s *session) noteStartupFailure(u sessionUpdate) { + if s.mcpStatus != MCPStatusStartupFailures || !strings.HasPrefix(u.ToolCallID, "mcp_startup.") || + (u.Status != string(driver.ToolFailed) && u.Status != outcomeCanceled) { + return + } + name := strings.TrimPrefix(u.ToolCallID, "mcp_startup.") + if unescaped, err := url.PathUnescape(name); err == nil { + name = unescaped + } + s.reportMCPServers(map[string]string{name: "failed"}, false) +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/acp/permission.go b/internal/connector/driver/acp/permission.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8b3fe336e --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/acp/permission.go @@ -0,0 +1,373 @@ +package acp + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/sha256" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "slices" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" +) + +// Who may decide a permission, and on what evidence +// +// The connector's policy decides; the agent's request is evidence only of +// what the agent asked for. onRequest is the only place a permission is +// decided. One other path answers a request without deciding it, and records +// the refusal it is: a request past the connection's handler bound is +// answered busy (onBusy). Past even the queue of those, a request is dropped +// unanswered and unrecorded and the session is ended — an agent that outruns +// its own refusals is not working with this client. +// +// A request reaches the policy only when all of this holds: it names this +// session's own id, it was read inside a turn that has not been answered +// (the claim taken on the reading goroutine, not whatever turn is in flight +// when this goroutine runs), the asking mode is confirmed, the session is +// neither unsafe nor closed, and fewer than maxDecisions are already at the +// policy. Anything else is refused without a decision — and a refusal is +// this driver's own record, written by record, never read back from the +// agent's stop reason. +// +// What of the request is trusted: +// +// - sessionId, compared against the id the agent itself gave at +// session/new. It routes nothing; it is a guard. +// - options[].kind, matched against ACP's kinds. An option id is carried +// back to the agent as an opaque value and is never what selects. +// - toolCall.toolCallId, as an opaque key for the call, cut to +// maxToolCallID wherever it is kept or shown (the session's tool calls, +// an update, a refusal) and digested where once-ness is decided. +// +// What is not, because an adapter can write anything: +// +// - The option ids and labels. The answer is chosen by kind — allow_once, +// never allow_always, so no answer outlives its request — and a list +// that gives one id to two options selects nothing at all. +// - The call's title and raw input. Neither is kept, and neither names a +// tool on its own: they are read only to corroborate codex-acp's MCP +// calls, which arrive with no name, and only where the adapter's own +// marking, the title and the input agree. What claude-agent-acp names in +// _meta or in name is taken as it gives it — the adapter's word for its +// own tool — and in either case only in a form the policy can key on +// (plainName), never one made plain by dropping what is not. +// - The locations. They are the agent's paths, cut to what a path can be, +// and are kept against the call — and so reach a later request about it — +// only while the session could be asked about that call at all +// (mayAskLocked). +// +// The policy may take its time, so the conditions are rechecked before an +// allow is sent: a session canceled, ended or found unsafe while it decided +// allows nothing more. +// mayAskLocked reports whether the session could be asked to decide something +// for turn t right now: t is the turn in flight, the agent has not answered +// it, no history is replaying, the mode is confirmed, and the session is +// neither unsafe nor closed. It is the one condition on which a request is +// put to the policy and the one on which evidence about a tool call is kept, +// so an update the session could not be asked about cannot describe a call +// that a later request is decided on. +func (s *session) mayAskLocked(t *turn) bool { + return t != nil && s.turn == t && !t.settling && !s.replaying && + s.verified && s.unsafe == nil && !s.closed +} + +// onRequest answers the agent's requests. The client offers no fs and no +// terminal, so a permission is the only request it serves. +func (s *session) onRequest(id json.RawMessage, method string, params json.RawMessage, claim any) { + defer s.release(claim) + if method != "session/request_permission" { + s.conn.replyError(id, codeMethodNotFound, "method not supported by this client") + return + } + // The turn the request was read in, not whatever turn is in flight by + // the time this goroutine runs. + t := turnOf(claim) + var p struct { + SessionID string `json:"sessionId"` + ToolCall json.RawMessage `json:"toolCall"` + Options []struct { + OptionID string `json:"optionId"` + Kind string `json:"kind"` + } `json:"options"` + } + if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil { + // Unreadable, so nothing is allowed — which is a refusal this driver + // made, and it is recorded like any other. + s.record(driver.PermissionRequest{Kind: driver.ToolOther}, t) + s.emit(driver.Update{Kind: driver.UpdatePermission, ToolKind: driver.ToolOther}) + s.conn.replyError(id, codeInvalidParams, "unreadable permission request") + return + } + call, _ := decodeUpdate(p.ToolCall) + + select { + case s.decisions <- struct{}{}: + defer func() { <-s.decisions }() + default: + // More at once than a session has any business asking: refused + // without a decision, and recorded as the refusal it is. + s.refuse(id, driver.PermissionRequest{ToolCallID: call.ToolCallID, Tool: toolName(call), Kind: toolKind(call.Kind)}, t) + return + } + + s.mu.Lock() + askable := s.mayAskLocked(t) && s.id != "" && p.SessionID == s.id + canceled := t != nil && t.canceled + s.mu.Unlock() + + // Only a request the session can be asked is merged into what it knows + // of its tool calls: one for another session, or outside a turn, could + // otherwise name a call that a later request is decided on. + info := toolInfo{name: toolName(call), kind: toolKind(call.Kind), locations: call.Locations} + if askable { + info = s.noteTool(call) + } + req := driver.PermissionRequest{ + ToolCallID: call.ToolCallID, + Tool: info.name, + Kind: info.kind, + Locations: slices.Clone(info.locations), + } + if info.unplaceable || call.Unplaceable { + // The policy allows such a call only when every path it names is + // inside the working directory, and this is a call whose paths this + // driver could not carry whole. It is refused without being asked, + // rather than judged on the paths that fit. + s.refuse(id, req, t) + return + } + for _, o := range p.Options { + req.Options = append(req.Options, driver.PermissionOption{ID: o.OptionID, Kind: driver.PermissionOptionKind(o.Kind)}) + } + + if canceled { + // A turn being canceled answers its open requests as canceled, as + // ACP asks of a client. It is still a call this session did not + // allow, so it is recorded as one. + s.refuse(id, req, t) + return + } + allow := askable && s.policy.Decide(context.Background(), req).Allow + if allow { + // The policy took its time; the session may have been canceled or + // found unsafe while it did, and neither allows anything more. + s.mu.Lock() + allow = s.turn == t && !t.settling && !t.canceled && s.unsafe == nil && !s.closed + s.mu.Unlock() + } + option := chooseOption(req.Options, allow) + if allow && option == "" { + // Allowing is only ever allow_once; without it, the answer is no. + allow = false + option = chooseOption(req.Options, false) + } + if !allow { + s.record(req, t) + } + s.emit(driver.Update{Kind: driver.UpdatePermission, ToolCallID: req.ToolCallID, Tool: req.Tool, ToolKind: req.Kind, Allowed: allow}) + if option == "" { + s.conn.reply(id, map[string]any{"outcome": map[string]any{"outcome": outcomeCanceled}}) + return + } + s.conn.reply(id, map[string]any{"outcome": map[string]any{"outcome": "selected", "optionId": option}}) +} + +// outcomeCanceled is ACP's permission outcome for a request not answered by +// an option. +const outcomeCanceled = "cancelled" //nolint:misspell // ACP's wire value + +// onBusy records a permission request refused at the connection's handler +// bound as the refusal it is. +func (s *session) onBusy(method string, params json.RawMessage, claim any) { + if method != "session/request_permission" { + return + } + var p struct { + ToolCall json.RawMessage `json:"toolCall"` + } + _ = json.Unmarshal(params, &p) + call, _ := decodeUpdate(p.ToolCall) + req := driver.PermissionRequest{ToolCallID: call.ToolCallID, Tool: toolName(call), Kind: toolKind(call.Kind)} + // On the turn the request was read in: this refusal is answered off the + // reading goroutine, so by now a later turn may be in flight. + s.record(req, turnOf(claim)) + s.emit(driver.Update{Kind: driver.UpdatePermission, ToolCallID: req.ToolCallID, Tool: req.Tool, ToolKind: req.Kind}) +} + +// refuse answers a request the session will not put to the policy at all, +// with no option of the agent's, and records it as the refusal it is. +func (s *session) refuse(id json.RawMessage, req driver.PermissionRequest, t *turn) { + s.record(req, t) + s.emit(driver.Update{Kind: driver.UpdatePermission, ToolCallID: req.ToolCallID, Tool: req.Tool, ToolKind: req.Kind}) + s.conn.reply(id, map[string]any{"outcome": map[string]any{"outcome": outcomeCanceled}}) +} + +// ErrRefusalMemoryFull is a session that has refused more distinct tool calls +// than it can remember having refused (maxRecorded). Once-per-tool-call is +// this driver's guarantee to the ledger, and past that bound a repeat cannot +// be told from a first: the session ends, and writes no further refusal it +// cannot promise is the only one, rather than going on and recording the same +// tool call twice. +var ErrRefusalMemoryFull = errors.New("acp: a session has refused more tool calls than it can remember, and cannot record another only once") + +// record puts a refusal on the turn it belongs to (invariant 4): the turn the +// request was read in, which its claim carried. A request read in no turn +// belongs to no turn — it is recorded in the ledger and on nothing else, +// because a turn that started after it was read did not ask for it. +func (s *session) record(req driver.PermissionRequest, t *turn) { + id := req.ToolCallID + if len(id) > maxToolCallID { + id = id[:maxToolCallID] + } + refusal := driver.Refusal{ToolCallID: s.red.Sanitize(id), Tool: s.red.Sanitize(refusalTool(req))} + // Once-ness is per the id the agent sent, by digest: two ids cut or + // redacted to the same text are still two calls. + key := sha256.Sum256([]byte(req.ToolCallID)) + + s.mu.Lock() + // An id the agent did not give cannot be told from another: such a + // refusal is recorded every time rather than folded into one. + // A named one is recorded while the session can still remember having + // recorded it, and not once it cannot (ErrRefusalMemoryFull). + first := req.ToolCallID == "" || (!s.recordedFull && !s.recorded[key]) + var ( + ending bool + failed *turn + end func() + ) + if first && req.ToolCallID != "" { + s.recorded[key] = true + if len(s.recorded) >= maxRecorded { + // The last id this session can remember. Past it a repeat cannot + // be told from a first, so the session ends here rather than go + // on writing a refusal the ledger already has: once per tool + // call is the guarantee, and a client that cannot keep it stops. + s.recordedFull = true + ending = s.failLocked(ErrRefusalMemoryFull) + failed, end = s.turn, s.endUnsafe + } + } + if t != nil && s.turn == t && len(t.refusals) < maxRefusals && (req.ToolCallID == "" || !t.seen[key]) { + if t.seen == nil { + t.seen = map[[sha256.Size]byte]bool{} + } + t.seen[key] = true + t.refusals = append(t.refusals, refusal) + } + recorder := s.recorder + s.mu.Unlock() + + // The ledger, not a session's memory, is where a refusal is kept: a + // worker that exits before its result, or a turn cut short, ends that + // memory. Once per tool call id (driver's "Refusals"); the recorder owns + // what happens when the ledger refuses the write. + if first && recorder != nil { + _ = recorder.RecordRefusal(context.Background(), refusal) + } + if ending { + s.endAfterTurn(failed, end) + } +} + +// chooseOption selects by kind, never by id or label (invariant 3). A list +// that gives one id to two options says nothing about which the agent will +// act on, so nothing is selected from it and the request is answered as +// canceled. +func chooseOption(options []driver.PermissionOption, allow bool) string { + seen := make(map[string]bool, len(options)) + for _, o := range options { + if o.ID == "" { + continue + } + if seen[o.ID] { + return "" + } + seen[o.ID] = true + } + want := []driver.PermissionOptionKind{driver.RejectOnce, driver.RejectAlways} + if allow { + want = []driver.PermissionOptionKind{driver.AllowOnce} + } + for _, kind := range want { + for _, o := range options { + if o.Kind == kind && o.ID != "" { + return o.ID + } + } + } + return "" +} + +func refusalTool(req driver.PermissionRequest) string { + if req.Tool != "" { + return req.Tool + } + return string(req.Kind) +} + +// toolInfo is what is known of one tool call. +type toolInfo struct { + name string + kind driver.ToolKind + locations []string + // unplaceable is a call whose paths this driver could not carry whole, so + // the policy cannot place it. It is never allowed. + unplaceable bool +} + +// noteTool merges what u says about its tool call into what the session +// knows of it, and returns the result. A later message fills in what an +// earlier one left out; it never blanks what was known. +// +// What it keeps is evidence a permission decision may rest on, so it is kept +// only on the condition a request is put to the policy at all: an update read +// outside a turn, or while a load replays a session's history, says what it +// says of itself and leaves nothing behind for a later request to inherit. +func (s *session) noteTool(u sessionUpdate) toolInfo { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + usable := u.ToolCallID != "" && len(u.ToolCallID) <= maxToolCallID + done := false + switch toolStatus(u.Status) { + case driver.ToolCompleted, driver.ToolFailed: + done = true + case driver.ToolPending, driver.ToolInProgress: + } + if usable && done { + // A call that has finished is forgotten whatever the session could be + // asked right now: what it said of itself must not outlive it and + // describe a call a later turn is asked about. + delete(s.tools, u.ToolCallID) + } + if !s.mayAskLocked(s.turn) { + info := toolInfo{ + name: toolName(u), kind: toolKind(u.Kind), + locations: slices.Clone(u.Locations), unplaceable: u.Unplaceable, + } + if info.kind == "" { + info.kind = driver.ToolOther + } + return info + } + info := s.tools[u.ToolCallID] + if name := toolName(u); name != "" { + info.name = name + } + if u.Kind != "" { + info.kind = toolKind(u.Kind) + } + if info.kind == "" { + info.kind = driver.ToolOther + } + if len(u.Locations) > 0 || u.Unplaceable { + info.locations = slices.Clone(u.Locations) + info.unplaceable = u.Unplaceable + } + if !usable || done { + return info + } + if _, known := s.tools[u.ToolCallID]; known || len(s.tools) < maxTools { + s.tools[u.ToolCallID] = info + } + return info +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/acp/rpc.go b/internal/connector/driver/acp/rpc.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9ca4b24ce --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/acp/rpc.go @@ -0,0 +1,416 @@ +package acp + +import ( + "bufio" + "context" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "io" + "strconv" + "sync" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/richtext" +) + +// JSON-RPC 2.0 over newline-delimited JSON, hand-rolled: ACP v1's stdio +// transport is one JSON object per line in each direction, and the surface +// the connector uses is a handful of methods. The community Go SDKs track the +// protocol's unstable drafts; a transcript of exactly what went over the wire +// is worth more here than their generated types. + +// JSON-RPC error codes the client sends. +const ( + codeMethodNotFound = -32601 + codeInvalidParams = -32602 + // codeBusy is JSON-RPC's implementation-defined server error range. + codeBusy = -32000 +) + +type wireMessage struct { + JSONRPC string `json:"jsonrpc"` + ID json.RawMessage `json:"id,omitempty"` + Method string `json:"method,omitempty"` + Params json.RawMessage `json:"params,omitempty"` + Result json.RawMessage `json:"result,omitempty"` + Error *wireError `json:"error,omitempty"` +} + +type wireError struct { + Code int `json:"code"` + Message string `json:"message"` +} + +// rpcError is an error response from the agent. Its message is the agent's +// text, so it is redacted and cut short before it becomes an error string. +type rpcError struct { + Method string + Code int + Message string +} + +func (e *rpcError) Error() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("acp: %s: agent error %d: %s", e.Method, e.Code, e.Message) +} + +// errConnClosed is a call on a connection whose agent has stopped writing. +var errConnClosed = fmt.Errorf("%w: the agent closed its output", driver.ErrSessionEnded) + +// conn is one JSON-RPC connection to an agent process. +type conn struct { + w io.Writer + writeMu sync.Mutex + + mu sync.Mutex + nextID int64 + pending map[int64]chan wireMessage + closed bool + + // onNotification runs on the reading goroutine, in wire order, so a mode + // update is applied before the response that follows it is delivered. + onNotification func(method string, params json.RawMessage) + // onResponse runs on the reading goroutine before a response is handed + // to its caller, so what follows it on the wire is read knowing it came. + onResponse func(id int64) + // onBusy hears a request refused at the handler bound, before its answer + // is written, so the refusal is on the record. It is given what the + // request was read in, because it runs later than the reading of it. + onBusy func(method string, params json.RawMessage, claimed any) + // release gives up a claim taken for a request that was dropped without + // being answered at all. + release func(claimed any) + // onOverflow hears that even the refusals have backed up. + onOverflow func() + // onRequest runs on its own goroutine per request; it must answer with + // reply or replyError. + onRequest func(id json.RawMessage, method string, params json.RawMessage, claimed any) + // claim runs on the reading goroutine as a request is admitted, in wire + // order, and what it returns is handed to onRequest: the state the + // request arrived in, before anything read after it can change that. + claim func(method string) any + + // handlers bounds the requests being answered at once: a flood of them + // spawns no more than this many goroutines, and the rest are refused as + // they are read. + handlers chan struct{} + // busy carries the requests refused at the bound to the one goroutine + // that records and answers them: neither happens on the reader, so an + // agent that floods requests cannot stall what the client reads. + busy chan busyRequest + + done chan struct{} + + // red is what every text of this connection that reaches an error or a + // log passes through. + red *driver.Redactor + // trace, set only by this package's tests, sees every line in each + // direction ("->" to the agent, "<-" from it). + trace func(dir string, line []byte) +} + +func newConn(w io.Writer) *conn { + c := &conn{ + w: w, pending: map[int64]chan wireMessage{}, + handlers: make(chan struct{}, maxHandlers), + busy: make(chan busyRequest, maxBusy), + done: make(chan struct{}), + } + go c.answerBusy() + return c +} + +// busyRequest is a request refused at the handler bound, with what it was +// read in. +type busyRequest struct { + id json.RawMessage + method string + params json.RawMessage + claimed any +} + +// answerBusy records and answers the requests refused at the handler bound, +// until the connection ends. +func (c *conn) answerBusy() { + for { + select { + case r := <-c.busy: + if c.onBusy != nil { + c.onBusy(r.method, r.params, r.claimed) + } + c.replyError(r.id, codeBusy, "too many requests at once") + if c.release != nil { + c.release(r.claimed) + } + case <-c.done: + return + } + } +} + +// read dispatches lines until r ends, then fails every pending call. It +// returns the scanner's error: a line past maxLine, or a failed read. +func (c *conn) read(r io.Reader) error { + scanner := bufio.NewScanner(r) + scanner.Buffer(make([]byte, 64<<10), maxLine) + defer func() { + c.mu.Lock() + c.closed = true + for id, ch := range c.pending { + close(ch) + delete(c.pending, id) + } + c.mu.Unlock() + close(c.done) + }() + for scanner.Scan() { + line := scanner.Bytes() + if len(line) == 0 { + continue + } + if c.trace != nil { + c.trace("<-", line) + } + var m wireMessage + if json.Unmarshal(line, &m) != nil || m.JSONRPC != "2.0" { + continue + } + switch { + case m.Method != "" && len(m.ID) > 0: + if c.onRequest == nil { + c.replyError(m.ID, codeMethodNotFound, "method not supported by this client") + continue + } + // What the request was read in is taken here either way, on the + // reading goroutine and in wire order: the turn it belongs to is + // the turn in flight now, not whatever is in flight when it is + // answered. + var claimed any + if c.claim != nil { + claimed = c.claim(m.Method) + } + select { + case c.handlers <- struct{}{}: + default: + // Already answering as many as this client answers at once. + // Recorded and answered off the reader: an agent flooding + // requests while it has stopped reading its input must not + // stall what the client reads from it. + select { + case c.busy <- busyRequest{id: m.ID, method: m.Method, params: m.Params, claimed: claimed}: + default: + // More unanswered requests than any agent asks: it is not + // working with this client, and the session ends. This one + // is neither answered nor recorded; the session's end is + // the answer to all of them. + if c.release != nil { + c.release(claimed) + } + if c.onOverflow != nil { + c.onOverflow() + } + } + continue + } + id, method, params := m.ID, m.Method, m.Params + go func() { + defer func() { <-c.handlers }() + c.onRequest(id, method, params, claimed) + }() + case m.Method != "": + if c.onNotification != nil { + c.onNotification(m.Method, m.Params) + } + default: + id, err := strconv.ParseInt(string(m.ID), 10, 64) + if err != nil { + continue + } + c.mu.Lock() + ch := c.pending[id] + delete(c.pending, id) + c.mu.Unlock() + if ch != nil { + if c.onResponse != nil { + c.onResponse(id) + } + ch <- m + } + } + } + return scanner.Err() +} + +// call sends a request and decodes its result into out. A ctx that ends +// abandons the wait, not the request; out is written only when the result is +// delivered to this caller. +func (c *conn) call(ctx context.Context, method string, params, out any) error { + p := c.register(method) + type answer struct { + raw json.RawMessage + err error + } + answers := make(chan answer, 1) + go func() { + // The write is on this goroutine too: an agent that has stopped + // reading its input would otherwise hold the caller past its context. + if err := c.sendCall(p, params); err != nil { + answers <- answer{nil, err} + return + } + raw, err := p.result() + answers <- answer{raw, err} + }() + select { + case a := <-answers: + if a.err != nil || out == nil { + return a.err + } + if err := json.Unmarshal(a.raw, out); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("acp: %s: unreadable result: %w", method, err) + } + return nil + case <-ctx.Done(): + c.abandon(p) + return ctx.Err() + } +} + +// pendingCall is a request on the wire, waiting for its response. +type pendingCall struct { + c *conn + id int64 + method string + ch chan wireMessage +} + +// register reserves an id and a response slot for a request not yet sent. On +// a closed connection the slot is already closed. +func (c *conn) register(method string) *pendingCall { + c.mu.Lock() + defer c.mu.Unlock() + c.nextID++ + p := &pendingCall{c: c, id: c.nextID, method: method, ch: make(chan wireMessage, 1)} + if c.closed { + close(p.ch) + } else { + c.pending[p.id] = p.ch + } + return p +} + +// sendCall writes a registered request. +func (c *conn) sendCall(p *pendingCall, params any) error { + if err := c.send(map[string]any{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": p.id, "method": p.method, "params": params}); err != nil { + c.abandon(p) + return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s: %w", driver.ErrSessionEnded, p.method, err) + } + return nil +} + +// result blocks until the response arrives, the call is abandoned, or the +// connection ends. +func (p *pendingCall) result() (json.RawMessage, error) { + m, ok := <-p.ch + if !ok { + return nil, errConnClosed + } + if m.Error != nil { + return nil, &rpcError{Method: p.method, Code: m.Error.Code, Message: p.c.agentText(m.Error.Message)} + } + return m.Result, nil +} + +// wait is result decoded into out. +func (p *pendingCall) wait(out any) error { + raw, err := p.result() + if err != nil || out == nil { + return err + } + if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, out); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("acp: %s: unreadable result: %w", p.method, err) + } + return nil +} + +// abandon stops waiting for a call: its slot is closed, so whoever waits on +// it gets errConnClosed, and a response that arrives later is dropped. +func (c *conn) abandon(p *pendingCall) { + if p == nil { + // A turn that is ending before its prompt was registered has no + // call to abandon. + return + } + c.mu.Lock() + defer c.mu.Unlock() + if ch, ok := c.pending[p.id]; ok { + delete(c.pending, p.id) + close(ch) + } +} + +// notifyIf writes a notification only if still() holds once the write lock is +// taken: a notification that waited behind a stuck write is dropped if what +// it was about has ended while it waited. +func (c *conn) notifyIf(still func() bool, method string, params any) error { + data, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": method, "params": params}) + if err != nil { + return err + } + c.writeMu.Lock() + defer c.writeMu.Unlock() + if !still() { + return nil + } + if c.trace != nil { + c.trace("->", data) + } + _, err = c.w.Write(append(data, '\n')) + return err +} + +func (c *conn) reply(id json.RawMessage, result any) { + _ = c.send(map[string]any{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": id, "result": result}) +} + +func (c *conn) replyError(id json.RawMessage, code int, message string) { + _ = c.send(map[string]any{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": id, "error": map[string]any{"code": code, "message": message}}) +} + +func (c *conn) send(v any) error { + data, err := json.Marshal(v) + if err != nil { + return err + } + c.writeMu.Lock() + defer c.writeMu.Unlock() + if c.trace != nil { + c.trace("->", data) + } + if _, err := c.w.Write(append(data, '\n')); err != nil { + return err + } + return nil +} + +// closeWrite closes the agent's input. Not under the write lock: a write +// stuck on a full pipe holds that lock, and closing the pipe is what unblocks +// it. +func (c *conn) closeWrite(closer io.Closer) { + _ = closer.Close() +} + +// agentText is text the agent wrote, made fit for an error string that ends +// up in a log: redacted (driver invariant 6), stripped of the escapes and +// controls a terminal would act on, on one line, and short. +func (c *conn) agentText(s string) string { + // Cut first: a line from the agent may be megabytes, and none of it past + // the first few hundred bytes reaches the error anyway. + if len(s) > 4<<10 { + s = s[:4<<10] + } + out := []rune(richtext.SanitizeSingleLine(c.red.Sanitize(s))) + if len(out) > 120 { + out = out[:120] + } + return string(out) +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/acp/session.go b/internal/connector/driver/acp/session.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6549746e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/acp/session.go @@ -0,0 +1,1224 @@ +package acp + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/sha256" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "slices" + "strings" + "sync" + "time" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/version" +) + +// session is one adapter process and the one ACP session it serves. +type session struct { + worker *driver.Worker + conn *conn + policy driver.PermissionPolicy + askMode string + grace time.Duration + + updates chan driver.Update + readerEnd chan struct{} + + // promptSem orders a prompt's request and a cancel's notification on the + // wire, so a cancel never reaches the agent before the prompt it ends. A + // channel, not a mutex, so a cancel can give up waiting on a prompt whose + // write is stuck. + promptSem chan struct{} + // decisions bounds the permission requests decided at once: an agent that + // floods them cannot spawn work without end, and what does not fit is + // refused. + decisions chan struct{} + + mu sync.Mutex + id string + turn *turn + mode string + // modeSeq counts mode reports, so an answer to a set cannot overwrite a + // report that arrived after that set went out. + modeSeq int64 + modeSeen chan struct{} + verified bool + // deciding counts the permission requests admitted and not yet answered, + // counted from the moment they are read. + deciding int + // canceled is a cancel that found no turn to end: the next turn starts + // canceled, and takes the flag with it. + canceled bool + unsafe error + // readback collects the text of the agent's own answer to a read-back + // command, and is nil at every other moment of a session's life. + readback *strings.Builder + // earlyInit holds an account of the MCP servers that arrived before the + // session's id did, by the id it named. + earlyInit map[string]earlyAccount + // mcpStatus, mcpNames and mcpConfirmed are how the session learns its MCP + // servers connected (Adapter.MCPStatus). + mcpStatus MCPStatus + mcpNames []string + mcpConfirmed bool + // red is what every error, update text and stderr tail of this session + // passes through. + red *driver.Redactor + // recorder records each refusal once, as it is made (driver's + // "Refusals"); recorded is the tool call ids already recorded. + recorder driver.RefusalRecorder + recorded map[[sha256.Size]byte]bool + // recordedFull is set once recorded reaches maxRecorded: the session can + // remember no further tool call id, so it records no further refusal for + // one, and ends (ErrRefusalMemoryFull). + recordedFull bool + replaying bool + updatesClosed bool + closed bool + context driver.Usage + // tools is what the agent said about each tool call it announced, so a + // permission request that names only the call's id is decided on the call. + tools map[string]toolInfo + + closeOnce sync.Once + // endUnsafe ends the worker of a session found outside its asking mode; + // the worker's Terminate, replaced only by this package's tests. + endUnsafe func() +} + +// turn is a prompt in flight. +type turn struct { + done chan struct{} + // settling is set once the agent has answered the prompt: nothing more is + // sent for this turn. + settling bool + // call is the turn's session/prompt, registered before it is sent. + call *pendingCall + canceled bool + refusals []driver.Refusal + // seen is the tool calls already on refusals, by digest of the id the + // agent sent: a call the stream announced and the result repeats is one + // refusal, and two ids that are shown the same are still two calls. + seen map[[sha256.Size]byte]bool + result driver.PromptResult + err error +} + +var _ driver.Session = (*session)(nil) + +// sessionOptions is everything a session is given before it reads a line: +// nothing is set on it once its reader has started. +type sessionOptions struct { + Worker *driver.Worker + Policy driver.PermissionPolicy + AskMode string + Grace time.Duration + Redactor *driver.Redactor + MCPStatus MCPStatus + MCPNames []string + Refusals driver.RefusalRecorder + trace func(string, []byte) +} + +func newSession(opts sessionOptions) *session { + worker, red, trace := opts.Worker, opts.Redactor, opts.trace + s := &session{ + worker: worker, + policy: opts.Policy, + askMode: opts.AskMode, + grace: opts.Grace, + mcpStatus: opts.MCPStatus, + mcpNames: opts.MCPNames, + recorder: opts.Refusals, + updates: make(chan driver.Update, updatesBuffer), + readerEnd: make(chan struct{}), + modeSeen: make(chan struct{}), + promptSem: make(chan struct{}, 1), + decisions: make(chan struct{}, maxDecisions), + tools: map[string]toolInfo{}, + recorded: map[[sha256.Size]byte]bool{}, + } + s.endUnsafe = func() { worker.Terminate(0) } + s.conn = newConn(worker.Stdin()) + s.conn.red = red + s.red = red + s.conn.trace = trace + s.conn.onNotification = s.onNotification + s.conn.onRequest = s.onRequest + s.conn.claim = s.claim + s.conn.onResponse = s.onResponse + s.conn.onBusy = s.onBusy + s.conn.release = s.release + s.conn.onOverflow = func() { + s.fail(errors.New("acp: the agent has more requests unanswered than this client will hold")) + } + go func() { + if err := s.conn.read(worker.Stdout()); err != nil { + // A line past maxLine or a broken pipe: the session cannot go + // on, so its worker does not either. + s.worker.Terminate(0) + } + // Drain what is left so the agent never blocks on a full pipe. + _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, worker.Stdout()) + s.mu.Lock() + s.updatesClosed = true + close(s.updates) + s.mu.Unlock() + close(s.readerEnd) + }() + return s +} + +func (s *session) ID() string { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + return s.id +} + +func (s *session) Process() driver.Process { return s.worker.Process() } +func (s *session) Updates() <-chan driver.Update { return s.updates } +func (s *session) Done() <-chan struct{} { return s.worker.Done() } +func (s *session) Exit() driver.Exit { return s.worker.Exit() } + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------- handshake + +type agentCaps struct { + LoadSession bool + Resume bool +} + +func (s *session) initialize(ctx context.Context, a Adapter) (agentCaps, error) { + var r struct { + ProtocolVersion int `json:"protocolVersion"` + AgentCapabilities struct { + LoadSession bool `json:"loadSession"` + SessionCapabilities struct { + Resume json.RawMessage `json:"resume"` + } `json:"sessionCapabilities"` + } `json:"agentCapabilities"` + AgentInfo *struct { + Name string `json:"name"` + Version string `json:"version"` + } `json:"agentInfo"` + } + err := s.conn.call(ctx, "initialize", map[string]any{ + "protocolVersion": ProtocolVersion, + // No fs, no terminal: the agent works through its own tools, and asks. + "clientCapabilities": map[string]any{ + "fs": map[string]any{"readTextFile": false, "writeTextFile": false}, + "terminal": false, + }, + "clientInfo": map[string]any{"name": "basecamp-connect", "version": version.Version}, + }, &r) + if err != nil { + return agentCaps{}, err + } + if r.ProtocolVersion != ProtocolVersion { + return agentCaps{}, fmt.Errorf("acp: the agent answered protocol version %d, not %d", r.ProtocolVersion, ProtocolVersion) + } + if r.AgentInfo == nil || r.AgentInfo.Name != a.Package || r.AgentInfo.Version != a.Version { + name, ver := "", "" + if r.AgentInfo != nil { + name, ver = r.AgentInfo.Name, r.AgentInfo.Version + } + return agentCaps{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: it reports %s@%s, pinned is %s@%s", ErrWrongAdapter, s.conn.agentText(name), s.conn.agentText(ver), a.Package, a.Version) + } + resume := len(r.AgentCapabilities.SessionCapabilities.Resume) > 0 && string(r.AgentCapabilities.SessionCapabilities.Resume) != "null" + return agentCaps{LoadSession: r.AgentCapabilities.LoadSession, Resume: resume}, nil +} + +// sessionState is what session/new, session/load and session/resume answer. +type sessionState struct { + SessionID string `json:"sessionId"` + Modes *struct { + CurrentModeID string `json:"currentModeId"` + AvailableModes []struct { + ID string `json:"id"` + } `json:"availableModes"` + } `json:"modes"` + ConfigOptions []configOption `json:"configOptions"` +} + +// configOption is a session config option, reduced to what finds the mode. +type configOption struct { + ID string `json:"id"` + Category string `json:"category"` + Type string `json:"type"` + CurrentValue json.RawMessage `json:"currentValue"` + Options json.RawMessage `json:"options"` +} + +func (s *session) newSession(ctx context.Context, cwd string, servers []wireServer, meta map[string]any) (sessionState, error) { + params := map[string]any{"cwd": cwd, "mcpServers": servers} + if meta != nil { + params["_meta"] = meta + } + var st sessionState + if err := s.conn.call(ctx, "session/new", params, &st); err != nil { + return st, err + } + if !validSessionID(st.SessionID) { + return st, errors.New("acp: session/new answered no usable session id") + } + s.nameSession(st.SessionID) + return st, nil +} + +// nameSession is where the session's id becomes known: an account of the MCP +// servers that arrived before it is applied now, and only the one that named +// this session. +func (s *session) nameSession(id string) { + s.mu.Lock() + s.id = id + early, held := s.earlyInit[id] + s.earlyInit = nil + s.mu.Unlock() + if held { + s.reportAccount(early) + } +} + +// loadSession reopens a session by id, by the method the agent advertised +// (invariant 5). The history the agent replays is not progress. +func (s *session) loadSession(ctx context.Context, caps agentCaps, id, cwd string, servers []wireServer, meta map[string]any) (sessionState, error) { + var method string + switch { + case caps.LoadSession: + method = "session/load" + case caps.Resume: + method = "session/resume" + default: + return sessionState{}, ErrLoadUnsupported + } + s.mu.Lock() + s.replaying = true + s.mu.Unlock() + s.nameSession(id) + defer func() { + s.mu.Lock() + s.replaying = false + s.mu.Unlock() + }() + params := map[string]any{"sessionId": id, "cwd": cwd, "mcpServers": servers} + if meta != nil { + params["_meta"] = meta + } + var st sessionState + if err := s.conn.call(ctx, method, params, &st); err != nil { + return st, err + } + st.SessionID = id + return st, nil +} + +// enterAskingMode puts the session in its adapter's asking mode and reads the +// mode back (invariant 2). session/set_mode answers nothing, so the read-back +// is session/set_config_option's full option list where the agent has a mode +// option, and otherwise a current_mode_update. +func (s *session) enterAskingMode(ctx context.Context, st sessionState) error { + offered := false + if st.Modes != nil { + for _, m := range st.Modes.AvailableModes { + offered = offered || m.ID == s.askMode + } + } + modeOpt := modeOption(st.ConfigOptions) + if modeOpt != nil && slices.Contains(optionValues(modeOpt.Options), s.askMode) { + offered = true + } + if !offered { + return fmt.Errorf("%w: the agent does not offer the asking mode %q", driver.ErrUnsafeMode, s.askMode) + } + if st.Modes != nil { + s.reportMode(st.Modes.CurrentModeID) + } + if v, ok := stringValue(modeOpt); ok { + s.reportMode(v) + } + + if st.Modes != nil { + if err := s.conn.call(ctx, "session/set_mode", map[string]any{"sessionId": st.SessionID, "modeId": s.askMode}, nil); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("%w: session/set_mode: %w", driver.ErrUnsafeMode, err) + } + } + if modeOpt != nil { + var r struct { + ConfigOptions []configOption `json:"configOptions"` + } + s.mu.Lock() + seq := s.modeSeq + s.mu.Unlock() + err := s.conn.call(ctx, "session/set_config_option", map[string]any{"sessionId": st.SessionID, "configId": modeOpt.ID, "value": s.askMode}, &r) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("%w: session/set_config_option: %w", driver.ErrUnsafeMode, err) + } + v, ok := stringValue(modeOption(r.ConfigOptions)) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("%w: session/set_config_option answered no mode", driver.ErrUnsafeMode) + } + s.reportModeSince(v, seq) + } else { + wait, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, modeConfirmWait) + defer cancel() + s.awaitMode(wait) + } + + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + if s.mode != s.askMode { + return fmt.Errorf("%w: asked for mode %q, the agent reports %q", driver.ErrUnsafeMode, s.askMode, s.conn.agentText(s.mode)) + } + s.verified = true + return nil +} + +// awaitMode waits for the agent to report the asking mode, or for ctx. +func (s *session) awaitMode(ctx context.Context) { + for { + s.mu.Lock() + if s.mode == s.askMode { + s.mu.Unlock() + return + } + seen := s.modeSeen + s.mu.Unlock() + select { + case <-seen: + case <-s.readerEnd: + return + case <-ctx.Done(): + return + } + } +} + +// reportMode records the mode the agent reports. Once the asking mode is +// confirmed, any other mode makes the session unsafe: its turn fails with +// ErrUnsafeMode and its process group is ended (invariant 2). +func (s *session) reportMode(id string) { s.reportModeSince(id, -1) } + +// reportModeSince records a mode the agent reports. since is the sequence the +// caller last saw: a report older than what has arrived since then is dropped, +// so the answer to a set_config_option cannot undo a mode update that followed +// it on the wire. A negative since always applies. +func (s *session) reportModeSince(id string, since int64) { + s.mu.Lock() + if since >= 0 && s.modeSeq != since { + s.mu.Unlock() + return + } + s.modeSeq++ + if len(id) > maxMode { + id = id[:maxMode] + } + s.mode = id + close(s.modeSeen) + s.modeSeen = make(chan struct{}) + claimed := false + if s.verified && id != s.askMode { + // Claimed here, under the lock that saw the mode change: nothing + // starts a turn against an agent already known to have left it. + claimed = s.failLocked(fmt.Errorf("%w: the agent left mode %q for %q", driver.ErrUnsafeMode, s.askMode, s.conn.agentText(id))) + } + t := s.turn + end := s.endUnsafe + s.mu.Unlock() + if claimed { + s.endAfterTurn(t, end) + } +} + +// fail ends a session that cannot go on: its turn fails with err, and its +// worker is ended after. The first failure is the one reported. +func (s *session) fail(err error) { + s.mu.Lock() + claimed := s.failLocked(err) + t := s.turn + end := s.endUnsafe + s.mu.Unlock() + if claimed { + s.endAfterTurn(t, end) + } +} + +// failLocked claims the session's failure under the caller's own lock, so +// nothing starts a turn between seeing the reason and recording it. It +// reports whether this caller is the one that ends the session. +func (s *session) failLocked(err error) bool { + if s.unsafe != nil { + return false + } + s.unsafe = err + return true +} + +// failure is why the session ended, when it ended for a reason of its own. +func (s *session) failure() error { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + return s.unsafe +} + +// endAfterTurn fails the turn first and ends the worker after, so whoever +// waits on both hears the reason before the worker is gone. +func (s *session) endAfterTurn(t *turn, end func()) { + go func() { + if t != nil { + s.conn.abandon(t.call) + // Bounded: a turn whose prompt is still stuck in a write the + // agent never reads must not keep the worker alive. + select { + case <-t.done: + case <-time.After(s.grace): + } + } + end() + }() +} + +func modeOption(options []configOption) *configOption { + for i := range options { + if options[i].Category == "mode" && options[i].Type == "select" { + return &options[i] + } + } + return nil +} + +func stringValue(o *configOption) (string, bool) { + if o == nil { + return "", false + } + var v string + if json.Unmarshal(o.CurrentValue, &v) != nil { + return "", false + } + return v, true +} + +// optionValues are a select option's values, flat or grouped. +func optionValues(raw json.RawMessage) []string { return optionValuesAt(raw, 0) } + +func optionValuesAt(raw json.RawMessage, depth int) []string { + if depth >= maxOptionDepth { + return nil + } + var items []struct { + Value *string `json:"value"` + Options json.RawMessage `json:"options"` + } + if json.Unmarshal(raw, &items) != nil { + return nil + } + var out []string + for _, it := range items { + if len(out) >= maxConfigOptions { + break + } + if it.Value != nil { + out = append(out, *it.Value) + } + if len(it.Options) > 0 { + out = append(out, optionValuesAt(it.Options, depth+1)...) + } + } + return out +} + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------- turns + +// Prompt implements driver.Session. +func (s *session) Prompt(ctx context.Context, prompt string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + select { + case s.promptSem <- struct{}{}: + default: + // Nothing is on the wire: wait for the turn ahead, but not past this + // session's end or the caller's context. + select { + case s.promptSem <- struct{}{}: + case <-s.readerEnd: + return driver.PromptResult{}, driver.ErrSessionEnded + case <-ctx.Done(): + return driver.PromptResult{}, ctx.Err() + } + } + s.mu.Lock() + var refuse error + switch { + case s.closed: + refuse = driver.ErrSessionEnded + case s.unsafe != nil: + refuse = s.unsafe + case !s.verified: + refuse = fmt.Errorf("%w: the mode was never confirmed", driver.ErrUnsafeMode) + case s.turn != nil: + refuse = errors.New("acp: a turn is already in flight") + } + if refuse != nil { + s.mu.Unlock() + <-s.promptSem + return driver.PromptResult{}, s.red.Err(refuse) + } + t := &turn{done: make(chan struct{}), call: s.conn.register("session/prompt")} + // A cancel that arrived before the turn it was meant for ends this one, + // and only this one. + t.canceled = s.canceled + s.canceled = false + s.turn = t + id := s.id + s.mu.Unlock() + + answer := t.call + // The write is on its own goroutine, and the turn's place in the queue is + // held until it is done: an agent that has stopped reading its input + // cannot hold this caller past its context, and no cancel of this turn + // goes out before the prompt it cancels. + go func() { + err := s.conn.sendCall(answer, map[string]any{ + "sessionId": id, + "prompt": []any{map[string]any{"type": "text", "text": prompt}}, + }) + s.mu.Lock() + canceled := t.canceled + s.mu.Unlock() + <-s.promptSem + if canceled && err == nil { + go func() { + _ = s.conn.notifyIf(func() bool { return s.inFlight(t) }, "session/cancel", map[string]any{"sessionId": id}) + }() + } + s.finishTurn(t, answer, err) + }() + + select { + case <-t.done: + return t.result, t.err + case <-ctx.Done(): + return driver.PromptResult{}, ctx.Err() + } +} + +// finishTurn waits for the prompt's response and settles the turn, whether or +// not anyone is still waiting on Prompt. +func (s *session) finishTurn(t *turn, answer *pendingCall, sendErr error) { + var resp struct { + StopReason string `json:"stopReason"` + Usage *struct { + InputTokens int64 `json:"inputTokens"` + OutputTokens int64 `json:"outputTokens"` + } `json:"usage"` + } + err := sendErr + if err == nil { + err = answer.wait(&resp) + } + s.mu.Lock() + t.settling = true + s.mu.Unlock() + + s.drainDecisions() + s.mu.Lock() + if s.turn == t { + s.turn = nil + } + refusals := slices.Clone(t.refusals) + canceled := t.canceled + unsafe := s.unsafe + usage := s.context + unconfirmed := s.mcpUnconfirmedLocked() + s.mu.Unlock() + if unsafe == nil && err == nil && unconfirmed { + // A turn ended and the agent never said its MCP servers connected: + // nothing it did can be vouched for, and nothing more is asked of it. + unsafe = fmt.Errorf("%w: the agent never reported its MCP servers", ErrMCPServerNotConnected) + s.fail(unsafe) + } + + result := driver.PromptResult{Refusals: refusals, Usage: usage} + if resp.Usage != nil { + result.Usage.InputTokens = resp.Usage.InputTokens + result.Usage.OutputTokens = resp.Usage.OutputTokens + } + switch { + case unsafe != nil: + err = unsafe + case err != nil: + default: + result.Stop, err = s.stopOf(resp.StopReason, canceled, len(refusals)) + if err == nil && resp.Usage != nil { + u := result.Usage + s.emit(driver.Update{Kind: driver.UpdateUsage, Usage: &u}) + } + } + t.result, t.err = result, s.red.Err(err) + close(t.done) +} + +// drainDecisions waits, briefly, for the permissions being decided to be +// answered, so a refusal made as the turn ends is still on its result +// (invariant 4). +func (s *session) drainDecisions() { + deadline := time.Now().Add(decisionDrain) + for time.Now().Before(deadline) { + s.mu.Lock() + n := s.deciding + s.mu.Unlock() + if n == 0 { + return + } + time.Sleep(time.Millisecond) + } +} + +// claim is taken on the reading goroutine as a permission request is +// admitted: the turn it arrived in, and a count the turn's end waits on. A +// request read before the prompt's answer belongs to that turn, however late +// its goroutine runs. +func (s *session) claim(method string) any { + if method != "session/request_permission" { + return nil + } + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + s.deciding++ + return &claimed{turn: s.turn} +} + +// claimed is what a permission request was read in: the turn it belongs to, +// counted among the session's decisions until it is answered. A request +// refused at the connection's own bound carries one too, so its refusal is +// recorded against the turn it arrived in and that turn's end waits for it. +type claimed struct{ turn *turn } + +// release gives up a claim, whether the request it was taken for was +// answered by the policy, refused unasked, or dropped unanswered. +func (s *session) release(c any) { + if c == nil { + return + } + s.mu.Lock() + s.deciding-- + s.mu.Unlock() +} + +// turnOf is the turn a claim was taken in, or nil. +func turnOf(c any) *turn { + if got, ok := c.(*claimed); ok { + return got.turn + } + return nil +} + +// stopOf maps ACP's stop reason to the driver's (invariant 4). +func (s *session) stopOf(reason string, canceled bool, refusals int) (driver.TurnStop, error) { + switch driver.TurnStop(reason) { + case driver.TurnEndTurn, driver.TurnMaxTokens, driver.TurnMaxTurnRequests, driver.TurnRefusal: + return driver.TurnStop(reason), nil + case driver.TurnCanceled: + switch { + case canceled: + return driver.TurnCanceled, nil + case refusals > 0: + // codex-acp ends a turn it was refused in as canceled. + return driver.TurnRefusal, nil + } + return "", errors.New("acp: the agent ended the turn as canceled, and the connector asked for no cancel") + } + return "", fmt.Errorf("acp: the agent ended the turn with an unknown stop reason %q", s.conn.agentText(reason)) +} + +// Cancel implements driver.Session: session/cancel for the turn in flight. +// +// A cancel waits at most for ctx or the close grace, whichever ends first, +// both for the prompt's own write and for its notification's, so an agent that +// has stopped reading its input cannot hold the caller. +func (s *session) Cancel(ctx context.Context) error { + grace := time.NewTimer(s.grace) + defer grace.Stop() + stuck := errors.New("acp: the agent is not reading its input; the cancel could not be sent") + select { + case s.promptSem <- struct{}{}: + case <-ctx.Done(): + return ctx.Err() + case <-grace.C: + return stuck + } + s.mu.Lock() + t := s.turn + settling := t != nil && t.settling + // One cancel per turn: the caller that ends the turn is the one that + // sends the notification, so a second call cannot put another + // session/cancel on the wire for a turn already canceled. + mine := t != nil && !settling && !t.canceled + if mine { + t.canceled = true + } + // A cancel with no turn in flight is remembered for the next one: the + // dispatcher asked for this session to stop, and the turn it meant to end + // may be a moment from starting. A turn the agent has already answered is + // over; its stop stands as the agent gave it. + s.canceled = t == nil + id := s.id + s.mu.Unlock() + // The prompt this cancel ends is on the wire; a later prompt cannot start + // while its turn is in flight. + <-s.promptSem + if !mine { + return nil + } + sent := make(chan error, 1) + go func() { + // The turn this cancel was for may have ended while the write waited; + // it is checked again once the write is ours, so a cancel is never + // sent for a turn the connector did not mean. + sent <- s.conn.notifyIf(func() bool { return s.inFlight(t) }, "session/cancel", map[string]any{"sessionId": id}) + }() + select { + case err := <-sent: + return err + case <-ctx.Done(): + return ctx.Err() + case <-grace.C: + return stuck + } +} + +// Close implements driver.Session: the adapter's input is closed, it is given +// grace to exit, and its process group is ended either way, which takes the +// agent and every MCP server it started with it. +func (s *session) Close() error { + s.closeOnce.Do(func() { + s.mu.Lock() + s.closed = true + s.mu.Unlock() + s.conn.closeWrite(s.worker.Stdin()) + select { + case <-s.worker.Done(): + case <-time.After(s.grace): + } + s.worker.Terminate(s.grace) + s.awaitReader() + }) + return nil +} + +// awaitReader waits for the session's reader to finish, and gives up on the +// worker's output when something outside its process group still holds the +// pipe: the worker is gone, and its output is no longer worth waiting for. +func (s *session) awaitReader() { + select { + case <-s.readerEnd: + return + case <-time.After(s.grace): + } + s.worker.CloseStdout() + select { + case <-s.readerEnd: + case <-time.After(s.grace): + // The reader is not coming back: the worker is gone and its output + // abandoned, so nothing is waiting on it that the caller needs. + } +} + +// abort ends a session that failed its handshake, without grace. +func (s *session) abort() { + s.closeOnce.Do(func() { + s.mu.Lock() + s.closed = true + s.mu.Unlock() + s.worker.Terminate(0) + s.awaitReader() + }) +} + +// StderrTail is what may be passed on of the adapter's stderr: the +// dispatcher logs it when a worker stops badly. +func (s *session) StderrTail() string { return s.worker.StderrTail(s.red) } + +// stderrNote is the end of the adapter's stderr, redacted, for an error. +func (s *session) stderrNote() string { + // More than the last line, because an adapter that fails to start says + // why on one line and prints a stack trace after it; not every line, + // because this becomes the attempt's own error text. + lines := s.worker.StderrLines(s.red) + if len(lines) == 0 { + return "" + } + if len(lines) > stderrNoteLines { + lines = lines[len(lines)-stderrNoteLines:] + } + return " (adapter stderr: " + strings.Join(lines, " | ") + ")" +} + +// StderrLines is every bounded line of the adapter's stderr. An ACP agent +// reports its refusals over the protocol, never here, so this is diagnostics +// for a worker that stopped badly, not a record. +func (s *session) StderrLines() []string { return s.worker.StderrLines(s.red) } + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------- from the agent + +// sessionUpdate is the part of a session/update (or a permission request's +// tool call) the driver reads. Text, titles beyond an MCP call's, raw inputs +// beyond an MCP call's server and tool, and outputs are never decoded into +// anything kept. +type sessionUpdate struct { + SessionUpdate string + ToolCallID string + Kind string + Status string + Name string + MetaToolName string + // MCPCall is codex-acp's _meta.is_mcp_tool_call. + MCPCall bool + Title string + MCPServer string + MCPTool string + Locations []string + // Unplaceable is a call this driver cannot carry the paths of whole: + // more paths than maxLocations, or one longer than maxLocationPath. The + // policy places a call by every path it names, so a call whose paths are + // not all here is one the policy cannot place. + Unplaceable bool + Used *int64 + Size *int64 + Chars int + // Text is the text of a chunk, kept only so an adapter's answer to its + // own read-back command can be read (mcp.go). Nothing else reads it, and + // no update this driver emits carries it. + Text string + CurrentModeID string + ConfigOptions []configOption +} + +// decodeUpdate reads an update field by field, so one field of an unexpected +// shape costs that field, not the update: an agent that sends a mode report +// beside something this client does not know still has its mode read. +func decodeUpdate(raw json.RawMessage) (sessionUpdate, bool) { + var fields map[string]json.RawMessage + if json.Unmarshal(raw, &fields) != nil { + return sessionUpdate{}, false + } + var u sessionUpdate + str := func(key string) string { + var v string + _ = json.Unmarshal(fields[key], &v) + return v + } + u.SessionUpdate = str("sessionUpdate") + u.ToolCallID = str("toolCallId") + u.Kind = str("kind") + u.Status = str("status") + u.Name = str("name") + u.Title = str("title") + u.CurrentModeID = str("currentModeId") + var meta struct { + ClaudeCode struct { + ToolName string `json:"toolName"` + } `json:"claudeCode"` + MCPCall bool `json:"is_mcp_tool_call"` + } + if json.Unmarshal(fields["_meta"], &meta) == nil { + u.MetaToolName = meta.ClaudeCode.ToolName + u.MCPCall = meta.MCPCall + } + var input struct { + Server string `json:"server"` + Tool string `json:"tool"` + } + if json.Unmarshal(fields["rawInput"], &input) == nil { + u.MCPServer, u.MCPTool = input.Server, input.Tool + } + var locations []json.RawMessage + if json.Unmarshal(fields["locations"], &locations) == nil { + if len(locations) > maxLocations { + // More paths than this driver carries. The policy allows a call + // only when every path it names is inside the working directory, + // so judging it on the ones that fit would allow a call by + // leaving out the path that refuses it. + u.Unplaceable = true + locations = locations[:maxLocations] + } + for _, l := range locations { + var loc struct { + Path string `json:"path"` + } + if json.Unmarshal(l, &loc) != nil || loc.Path == "" { + continue + } + if len(loc.Path) > maxLocationPath { + // A pathname longer than the driver carries is not a path + // this call can be placed by either: what is cut off can be + // the part that leaves the working directory, and a tool that + // normalizes before it opens would still reach it. + u.Unplaceable = true + loc.Path = loc.Path[:maxLocationPath] + } + u.Locations = append(u.Locations, loc.Path) + } + } + var n int64 + if json.Unmarshal(fields["used"], &n) == nil && len(fields["used"]) > 0 { + used := n + u.Used = &used + } + if json.Unmarshal(fields["size"], &n) == nil && len(fields["size"]) > 0 { + size := n + u.Size = &size + } + var block struct { + Text string `json:"text"` + } + if json.Unmarshal(fields["content"], &block) == nil { + u.Chars = len(block.Text) + u.Text = block.Text + if len(u.Text) > maxReadback { + u.Text = u.Text[:maxReadback] + } + } + var options []json.RawMessage + if json.Unmarshal(fields["configOptions"], &options) == nil { + if len(options) > maxConfigOptions { + options = options[:maxConfigOptions] + } + for _, o := range options { + var opt configOption + if json.Unmarshal(o, &opt) == nil { + u.ConfigOptions = append(u.ConfigOptions, opt) + } + } + } + return u, true +} + +// onNotification handles the agent's notifications in wire order. Only +// session/update is read; _auth/status_update, which carries the account's +// email, and every extension are dropped unread (invariant 8). +func (s *session) onNotification(method string, params json.RawMessage) { + if method == "_claude/sdkMessage" { + s.onSDKMessage(params) + return + } + if method != "session/update" { + return + } + var n struct { + SessionID string `json:"sessionId"` + Update json.RawMessage `json:"update"` + } + if json.Unmarshal(params, &n) != nil || !s.ours(n.SessionID) { + return + } + u, ok := decodeUpdate(n.Update) + if !ok { + return + } + s.noteStartupFailure(u) + switch u.SessionUpdate { + case "current_mode_update": + s.reportMode(u.CurrentModeID) + case "config_option_update": + if v, ok := stringValue(modeOption(u.ConfigOptions)); ok { + s.reportMode(v) + } + case "tool_call", "tool_call_update": + info := s.noteTool(u) + kind := driver.UpdateToolCall + if u.SessionUpdate == "tool_call_update" { + kind = driver.UpdateToolCallUpdate + } + s.emit(driver.Update{Kind: kind, ToolCallID: u.ToolCallID, Tool: info.name, ToolKind: info.kind, Status: toolStatus(u.Status)}) + case "usage_update": + s.mu.Lock() + if u.Used != nil { + s.context.ContextUsed = *u.Used + } + if u.Size != nil { + s.context.ContextSize = *u.Size + } + usage := s.context + s.mu.Unlock() + s.emit(driver.Update{Kind: driver.UpdateUsage, Usage: &usage}) + case "agent_message_chunk": + s.collect(u.Text) + s.emit(driver.Update{Kind: driver.UpdateAgentMessageChunk, Chars: u.Chars}) + case "plan": + s.emit(driver.Update{Kind: driver.UpdatePlan}) + } +} + +// ours reports whether a message names this session. One adapter process +// serves one session, so this is a guard, not routing. +func (s *session) ours(id string) bool { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + return s.id == "" || id == s.id +} + +func (s *session) emit(u driver.Update) { + u.At = time.Now() + if len(u.ToolCallID) > maxToolCallID { + u.ToolCallID = u.ToolCallID[:maxToolCallID] + } + // Ids and names are the agent's own text: nothing of a worker's leaves + // through an update either (the redaction rule). + u.ToolCallID = s.red.Sanitize(u.ToolCallID) + u.Tool = s.red.Sanitize(u.Tool) + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + if s.updatesClosed || s.replaying { + return + } + select { + case s.updates <- u: + default: + } +} + +// onResponse marks a turn settling the moment its prompt's answer is read, +// on the reading goroutine: a request read after that answer is outside the +// turn, however soon the turn's own goroutine runs. +func (s *session) onResponse(id int64) { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + if t := s.turn; t != nil && t.call != nil && t.call.id == id { + t.settling = true + } +} + +// inFlight reports whether t is still the turn the agent is working on. +func (s *session) inFlight(t *turn) bool { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + return s.turn == t && !t.settling +} + +// toolName is the agent's name for the tool, where it says one: never the +// call's title or input, which carry what the call does. +// +// claude-agent-acp names its tools in _meta or in name (mcp__<server>__<tool> +// for an MCP tool), and a name it gives is final: its titles and raw inputs +// are the model's to write. codex-acp gives an MCP call no name; it marks it +// in _meta and titles it "mcp.<server>.<tool>" beside a raw input of +// {server, tool}. Only a call with no name, so marked, whose title and input +// agree, is given the MCP tool's name. +func toolName(u sessionUpdate) string { + if u.MetaToolName != "" { + return plainName(u.MetaToolName) + } + if u.Name != "" { + return plainName(u.Name) + } + if u.MCPCall && u.MCPServer != "" && u.MCPTool != "" && u.Title == "mcp."+u.MCPServer+"."+u.MCPTool && + plainName(u.MCPServer) == u.MCPServer && plainName(u.MCPTool) == u.MCPTool && + !strings.Contains(u.MCPServer, "__") && !strings.Contains(u.MCPServer, ".") { + return "mcp__" + u.MCPServer + "__" + u.MCPTool + } + return "" +} + +// plainName is a tool name the policy can key on, or nothing. A name is never +// made plain by dropping what is not: "mcp__base camp__x" must not become the +// allowed "mcp__basecamp__x", so a name with anything outside the set is no +// name at all, and the call is decided on its kind. +func plainName(s string) string { + if s == "" || len(s) > 100 { + return "" + } + for _, r := range s { + switch { + case r >= 'a' && r <= 'z', r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z', r >= '0' && r <= '9', r == '_', r == '-', r == '.': + default: + return "" + } + } + return s +} + +func toolKind(kind string) driver.ToolKind { + switch k := driver.ToolKind(kind); k { + case driver.ToolRead, driver.ToolEdit, driver.ToolDelete, driver.ToolMove, driver.ToolSearch, + driver.ToolExecute, driver.ToolThink, driver.ToolFetch, driver.ToolOther: + return k + } + return driver.ToolOther +} + +func toolStatus(status string) driver.ToolStatus { + switch st := driver.ToolStatus(status); st { + case driver.ToolPending, driver.ToolInProgress, driver.ToolCompleted, driver.ToolFailed: + return st + } + return "" +} + +// validSessionID is an id the ledger can keep and a later process can hand +// back: short, and plain. +func validSessionID(id string) bool { + if id == "" || len(id) > 128 { + return false + } + for _, r := range id { + if (r < 'a' || r > 'z') && (r < 'A' || r > 'Z') && (r < '0' || r > '9') && r != '-' && r != '_' && r != '.' && r != ':' { + return false + } + } + return true +} + +// mergeEnv adds the adapter's own variables to the dispatcher's allowlisted +// environment. A variable the dispatcher set wins. +func mergeEnv(base, extra []string) []string { + have := map[string]bool{} + for _, kv := range base { + k, _, _ := strings.Cut(kv, "=") + have[k] = true + } + out := slices.Clone(base) + if out == nil { + out = []string{} + } + for _, kv := range extra { + k, _, _ := strings.Cut(kv, "=") + if !have[k] { + out = append(out, kv) + } + } + slices.Sort(out) + return out +} + +// lookupIn reads a variable from an environment already built, so whatever +// reads it sees what the adapter will. +func lookupIn(env []string) func(string) (string, bool) { + return func(name string) (string, bool) { + for i := len(env) - 1; i >= 0; i-- { + if after, ok := strings.CutPrefix(env[i], name+"="); ok { + return after, true + } + } + return "", false + } +} + +// setEnv sets the adapter's own switches over whatever env holds of the same +// name. +func setEnv(env []string, set map[string]string) []string { + if len(set) == 0 { + return env + } + out := make([]string, 0, len(env)+len(set)) + for _, kv := range env { + k, _, _ := strings.Cut(kv, "=") + if _, ok := set[k]; !ok { + out = append(out, kv) + } + } + for k, v := range set { + out = append(out, k+"="+v) + } + slices.Sort(out) + return out +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/acp/testdata/stubmcp/main.go b/internal/connector/driver/acp/testdata/stubmcp/main.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0a24df6fe --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/acp/testdata/stubmcp/main.go @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +// stubmcp is a minimal stdio MCP server for the ACP adapter-compatibility +// test, ported from the card 23 spike. It records what it was started with and +// what it was asked, so a check can tell "spawned" from "spawned and +// connected", and see what the agent sent its one tool. +// +// Data minimization: the record holds the value of only the probe variables +// named on its command line, which the test sets to dummy values. Every other +// variable is recorded by name only, so a real credential in the environment +// it inherited never reaches the record. +package main + +import ( + "bufio" + "crypto/sha256" + "encoding/hex" + "encoding/json" + "flag" + "os" + "sort" + "strings" + "sync" + "time" +) + +type record struct { + PID int `json:"pid"` + ProbeVars map[string]string `json:"probe_vars"` + // Fingerprints are SHA-256 digests of the variables named by + // --fingerprint: enough to tell whose value a variable carries, without + // the value. + Fingerprints map[string]string `json:"fingerprints"` + EnvVarNames []string `json:"env_var_names"` + Methods []string `json:"methods"` + Notes []string `json:"notes"` +} + +var ( + mu sync.Mutex + rec record + path string +) + +func main() { + probes := flag.String("probe", "", "comma-separated variable names whose values may be recorded") + fingerprints := flag.String("fingerprint", "", "comma-separated variable names whose values are recorded as digests") + flag.StringVar(&path, "record", "", "where to write the record") + flag.Parse() + + rec.PID = os.Getpid() + rec.ProbeVars = map[string]string{} + for _, name := range strings.Split(*probes, ",") { + if name = strings.TrimSpace(name); name == "" { + continue + } + if v, ok := os.LookupEnv(name); ok { + rec.ProbeVars[name] = v + } + } + rec.Fingerprints = map[string]string{} + for _, name := range strings.Split(*fingerprints, ",") { + if name = strings.TrimSpace(name); name == "" { + continue + } + if v, ok := os.LookupEnv(name); ok { + sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(v)) + rec.Fingerprints[name] = hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]) + } + } + for _, kv := range os.Environ() { + name, _, _ := strings.Cut(kv, "=") + rec.EnvVarNames = append(rec.EnvVarNames, name) + } + sort.Strings(rec.EnvVarNames) + flush() + serve() +} + +func flush() { + if path == "" { + return + } + data, err := json.MarshalIndent(&rec, "", " ") + if err != nil { + return + } + tmp := path + ".tmp" + if os.WriteFile(tmp, data, 0o600) == nil { + _ = os.Rename(tmp, path) + } +} + +func serve() { + in := bufio.NewScanner(os.Stdin) + in.Buffer(make([]byte, 1<<20), 16<<20) + out := bufio.NewWriter(os.Stdout) + reply := func(id json.RawMessage, result any) { + if len(id) == 0 { + return + } + data, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": id, "result": result}) + _, _ = out.Write(append(data, '\n')) + _ = out.Flush() + } + for in.Scan() { + var m struct { + ID json.RawMessage `json:"id"` + Method string `json:"method"` + Params json.RawMessage `json:"params"` + } + if json.Unmarshal(in.Bytes(), &m) != nil { + continue + } + mu.Lock() + rec.Methods = append(rec.Methods, m.Method) + flush() + mu.Unlock() + + switch m.Method { + case "initialize": + var p struct { + ProtocolVersion string `json:"protocolVersion"` + } + _ = json.Unmarshal(m.Params, &p) + if p.ProtocolVersion == "" { + p.ProtocolVersion = "2025-06-18" + } + reply(m.ID, map[string]any{ + "protocolVersion": p.ProtocolVersion, + "capabilities": map[string]any{"tools": map[string]any{}}, + "serverInfo": map[string]any{"name": "acp-compat-stub", "version": "0.1.0"}, + }) + case "tools/list": + reply(m.ID, map[string]any{"tools": []any{map[string]any{ + "name": "note", + "description": "Records a short note for the test harness.", + "inputSchema": map[string]any{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]any{"text": map[string]any{"type": "string"}}, + "required": []string{"text"}, + }, + }}}) + case "tools/call": + var p struct { + Arguments struct { + Text string `json:"text"` + } `json:"arguments"` + } + _ = json.Unmarshal(m.Params, &p) + mu.Lock() + rec.Notes = append(rec.Notes, p.Arguments.Text) + flush() + mu.Unlock() + reply(m.ID, map[string]any{ + "content": []any{map[string]any{"type": "text", "text": "noted at " + time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)}}, + "isError": false, + }) + case "ping": + reply(m.ID, map[string]any{}) + case "resources/list": + reply(m.ID, map[string]any{"resources": []any{}}) + case "prompts/list": + reply(m.ID, map[string]any{"prompts": []any{}}) + default: + reply(m.ID, map[string]any{}) + } + } +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/claude/claude.go b/internal/connector/driver/claude/claude.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..002dc9877 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/claude/claude.go @@ -0,0 +1,906 @@ +// Package claude is the spawn driver for Claude Code: `claude -p` with +// streaming JSON in and out, adapted onto the driver package's ACP-shaped +// session. +// +// One process is one session. Prompts are user messages written to its stdin, +// so a follow-up is a further prompt in the same session; a turn ends with the +// result message. The permission policy is frozen into flags before the +// process starts and verified on the first turn: the init message must report +// the permission mode asked for, or the session is ended as unsafe. The host's +// own Claude Code settings and MCP servers are not loaded, and the built-in +// tools are limited to the ones the policy allows, so a tool the policy +// refuses does not exist in the session at all. +package claude + +import ( + "bufio" + "context" + "crypto/rand" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "slices" + "strings" + "sync" + "time" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" +) + +// Name is the driver's name. +const Name = "claude" + +// Env is what Claude Code may take from the connector's environment besides +// driver.BaseEnv: where its configuration lives and how it authenticates. +var Env = []string{"CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL"} + +// Options configures the driver. +type Options struct { + // Binary is the claude executable; "claude" on PATH when empty. + Binary string + // Model is passed as --model when set. + Model string + // Lookup reads the connector's environment for Env; os.LookupEnv when + // nil. + Lookup func(string) (string, bool) + // CloseGrace is how long a session's process has to exit after its stdin + // closes, before its group is terminated. + CloseGrace time.Duration +} + +// Driver starts Claude Code sessions. +type Driver struct { + opts Options +} + +var _ driver.Driver = (*Driver)(nil) + +// New builds the driver. +func New(opts Options) *Driver { + if opts.Binary == "" { + opts.Binary = "claude" + } + if opts.Lookup == nil { + opts.Lookup = os.LookupEnv + } + if opts.CloseGrace <= 0 { + opts.CloseGrace = 5 * time.Second + } + return &Driver{opts: opts} +} + +// Name implements driver.Driver. +func (d *Driver) Name() string { return Name } + +// Capabilities implements driver.Driver. +func (d *Driver) Capabilities() driver.Capabilities { + return driver.Capabilities{LoadSession: true, FollowUpPrompts: true} +} + +// NewSession implements driver.Driver. +func (d *Driver) NewSession(ctx context.Context, cfg driver.SessionConfig) (driver.Session, error) { + id, err := newUUID() + if err != nil { + return nil, d.redactor(cfg).Err(fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", driver.ErrNotStarted, err)) + } + s, err := d.start(ctx, cfg, id, false) + return s, d.redactor(cfg).Err(err) +} + +// LoadSession implements driver.Driver. +func (d *Driver) LoadSession(ctx context.Context, cfg driver.SessionConfig, sessionID string) (driver.Session, error) { + if !validUUID(sessionID) { + return nil, d.redactor(cfg).Err(fmt.Errorf("%w: %w: session id %q is not a Claude Code session id", driver.ErrNotStarted, driver.ErrUnusable, sessionID)) + } + s, err := d.start(ctx, cfg, sessionID, true) + return s, d.redactor(cfg).Err(err) +} + +// env is the worker's whole environment: the dispatcher's, plus the variables +// this driver names for its agent. +func (d *Driver) env(cfg driver.SessionConfig) []string { + return mergeEnv(cfg.Env, driver.BuildEnv(Env, d.opts.Lookup, nil)) +} + +// redactor is what every error and text of a session passes through: the +// dispatcher's Redaction, plus the environment this driver builds, its MCP +// servers' environments and its private directory. +func (d *Driver) redactor(cfg driver.SessionConfig) *driver.Redactor { + more := driver.Redaction{Env: d.env(cfg), Dirs: []string{cfg.PrivateDir}} + for _, server := range cfg.MCPServers { + more.Env = append(more.Env, driver.EnvOf(server.Env)...) + } + return driver.NewRedactor(cfg.Redaction.With(more)) +} + +// modeIDs maps the connector's permission modes to Claude Code's. +var modeIDs = map[driver.PermissionMode]string{ + driver.ModeEditsInWorkDir: "acceptEdits", +} + +// kindTools are Claude Code's built-in tools for each kind the policy can +// allow. Edits are acceptEdits's, confined to the working directory. +var kindTools = map[driver.ToolKind][]string{ + driver.ToolRead: {"Read"}, + driver.ToolSearch: {"Glob", "Grep"}, + driver.ToolThink: {"TodoWrite"}, + driver.ToolEdit: {"Edit", "Write", "NotebookEdit"}, +} + +// Args is the command line for a session, without the binary. Exposed so the +// flags that hold the policy are tested as written. +func Args(cfg driver.SessionConfig, sessionID string, resume bool, mcpConfigPath, model string) ([]string, error) { + rules := cfg.Policy.Rules() + mode, ok := modeIDs[rules.Mode] + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("claude: no Claude Code mode for policy mode %q", rules.Mode) + } + if filepath.Clean(rules.WorkDir) != filepath.Clean(cfg.Cwd) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("claude: the policy's working directory %q is not the session's %q", rules.WorkDir, cfg.Cwd) + } + tools := slices.Clone(kindTools[driver.ToolEdit]) + var allowed []string + for _, kind := range rules.AllowKinds { + names, ok := kindTools[kind] + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("claude: no Claude Code tools for kind %q", kind) + } + // The tools exist in the session but get no allow rule: an allow + // rule for Read is a read anywhere on disk, where the policy allows + // reads in the working directory, which the mode already grants. + tools = append(tools, names...) + } + for _, server := range rules.AllowMCPServers { + allowed = append(allowed, "mcp__"+server) + } + + args := []string{ + "-p", + "--input-format", "stream-json", + "--output-format", "stream-json", + "--verbose", + // The host's settings (a defaultMode of bypassPermissions, allow + // rules, hooks) are not this session's. + "--setting-sources", "", + "--permission-mode", mode, + // Nobody answers a prompt: what the rules do not allow is refused. + "--permission-prompts", "none", + "--tools", strings.Join(tools, ","), + "--allowed-tools", strings.Join(allowed, ","), + "--strict-mcp-config", + "--mcp-config", mcpConfigPath, + } + if resume { + args = append(args, "--resume", sessionID) + } else { + args = append(args, "--session-id", sessionID) + } + if model != "" { + args = append(args, "--model", model) + } + return args, nil +} + +func (d *Driver) start(ctx context.Context, cfg driver.SessionConfig, sessionID string, resume bool) (driver.Session, error) { + if cfg.Policy == nil || cfg.PrivateDir == "" || cfg.Cwd == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w: a session needs a policy, a working directory and a private directory", driver.ErrNotStarted, driver.ErrUnusable) + } + mcpPath, err := writeMCPConfig(cfg.PrivateDir, cfg.MCPServers) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", driver.ErrNotStarted, err) + } + args, err := Args(cfg, sessionID, resume, mcpPath, d.opts.Model) + if err != nil { + _ = os.Remove(mcpPath) + // A mode or a policy the flags cannot express is not a start to try + // again: it is configuration. + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w: %w", driver.ErrNotStarted, driver.ErrUnusable, err) + } + env := d.env(cfg) + worker, err := driver.StartWorker(ctx, cfg.Launcher, cfg.Scope, driver.Command{Path: d.opts.Binary, Args: args, Env: env, Dir: cfg.Cwd}) + if err != nil { + _ = os.Remove(mcpPath) + return nil, err + } + s := &session{ + id: sessionID, + worker: worker, + mode: args[slices.Index(args, "--permission-mode")+1], + mcpPath: mcpPath, + mcpNames: serverNames(cfg.MCPServers), + grace: d.opts.CloseGrace, + updates: make(chan driver.Update, 256), + slot: make(chan struct{}, 1), + readerEnd: make(chan struct{}), + red: d.redactor(cfg), + recorder: cfg.Refusals, + recorded: map[string]bool{}, + } + go s.read() //nolint:contextcheck // the reader outlives the start's context: it runs as long as the worker does + return s, nil +} + +// mergeEnv adds the driver's own variables to the dispatcher's allowlisted +// environment. A variable the dispatcher set wins. +func mergeEnv(base, extra []string) []string { + have := map[string]bool{} + for _, kv := range base { + k, _, _ := strings.Cut(kv, "=") + have[k] = true + } + out := slices.Clone(base) + if out == nil { + out = []string{} + } + for _, kv := range extra { + k, _, _ := strings.Cut(kv, "=") + if !have[k] { + out = append(out, kv) + } + } + slices.Sort(out) + return out +} + +func serverNames(servers []driver.MCPServer) []string { + names := make([]string, 0, len(servers)) + for _, s := range servers { + names = append(names, s.Name) + } + return names +} + +// writeMCPConfig writes the session's MCP servers owner-only. The file holds +// each server's command, its declared environment and the path of the token +// socket — never the task token, which crosses over that socket and is in no +// file (the connector's "The task token's carriage"). It is still created +// exclusively in the private directory and removed as soon as the agent has +// started its servers, and again on Close: the socket path is not a secret, +// but it is this attempt's, and nothing of an attempt outlives it. +func writeMCPConfig(dir string, servers []driver.MCPServer) (string, error) { + type entry struct { + Type string `json:"type"` + Command string `json:"command"` + Args []string `json:"args"` + Env map[string]string `json:"env"` + } + config := struct { + MCPServers map[string]entry `json:"mcpServers"` + }{MCPServers: map[string]entry{}} + for _, s := range servers { + if s.Name == "" || s.Command == "" { + return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: an MCP server needs a name and a command", driver.ErrUnusable) + } + env := s.Env + if env == nil { + env = map[string]string{} + } + config.MCPServers[s.Name] = entry{Type: "stdio", Command: s.Command, Args: s.Args, Env: env} + } + data, err := json.Marshal(config) + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + path := filepath.Join(dir, "mcp.json") + f, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL, 0o600) + if err != nil { + return "", fmt.Errorf("claude: write MCP config: %w", err) + } + if _, err := f.Write(data); err != nil { + _ = f.Close() + _ = os.Remove(path) + return "", fmt.Errorf("claude: write MCP config: %w", err) + } + if err := f.Close(); err != nil { + _ = os.Remove(path) + return "", fmt.Errorf("claude: write MCP config: %w", err) + } + return path, nil +} + +// session is one Claude Code process. +type session struct { + id string + worker *driver.Worker + mode string + mcpPath string + mcpNames []string + grace time.Duration + + updates chan driver.Update + readerEnd chan struct{} + // red is what every error, update text and stderr tail of this session + // passes through before it leaves the driver. + red *driver.Redactor + // recorder records each refusal once, as it is read (driver's + // "Refusals"); recorded is the tool call ids already recorded. Both are + // touched only by the reader goroutine. + recorder driver.RefusalRecorder + recorded map[string]bool + + // beforePromptWrite runs between a turn's registration and its write; a + // test seam. + beforePromptWrite func() + // beforeCancelWrite runs inside Cancel, under the write lock, before the + // interrupt is written; a test seam. + beforeCancelWrite func() + // cancelPending is a cancel that arrived with no turn to interrupt. The + // next turn takes it. + cancelPending bool + // ended is why the session ended, when it ended with no turn in flight to + // carry the reason: the next Prompt answers with it rather than waiting + // for a turn nothing will finish. + ended error + + mu sync.Mutex + turn *turn + verified bool + closed bool + // slot is the right to write to the worker, held across registering a + // turn and sending its prompt so an interrupt cannot reach a turn other + // than the one it was asked for. A channel, not a mutex, because a + // worker that stops reading its input makes a write block, and a caller + // waiting for the slot must be able to give up: Cancel takes it with a + // deadline, and Close does not take it at all. + slot chan struct{} +} + +// turn is a prompt in flight. +type turn struct { + done chan struct{} + result driver.PromptResult + err error + canceled bool + refusals []driver.Refusal +} + +var _ driver.Session = (*session)(nil) + +func (s *session) ID() string { return s.id } +func (s *session) Process() driver.Process { return s.worker.Process() } +func (s *session) Updates() <-chan driver.Update { return s.updates } +func (s *session) Done() <-chan struct{} { return s.worker.Done() } +func (s *session) Exit() driver.Exit { return s.worker.Exit() } + +// StderrTail is what may be passed on of the agent's stderr: its last line. +func (s *session) StderrTail() string { return s.worker.StderrTail(s.red) } + +// StderrLines is every bounded line of it, which is where a refusal written +// before the agent's later output is read (driver's "Refusals"). +func (s *session) StderrLines() []string { return s.worker.StderrLines(s.red) } + +// Prompt implements driver.Session. +func (s *session) Prompt(ctx context.Context, prompt string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + result, err := s.prompt(ctx, prompt) + return result, s.red.Err(err) +} + +func (s *session) prompt(ctx context.Context, prompt string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + // The turn is registered and its message written under the write lock, + // so a Cancel that sees the turn writes its interrupt after the prompt, + // never before it, where it would interrupt nothing. + if err := s.takeSlot(ctx, 0); err != nil { + // A session that ended for a reason answers with that reason. + s.mu.Lock() + ended := s.ended + s.mu.Unlock() + if ended != nil { + return driver.PromptResult{}, ended + } + return driver.PromptResult{}, err + } + s.mu.Lock() + if s.closed || s.ended != nil { + ended := s.ended + s.mu.Unlock() + s.releaseSlot() + if ended != nil { + return driver.PromptResult{}, ended + } + return driver.PromptResult{}, driver.ErrSessionEnded + } + if s.turn != nil { + s.mu.Unlock() + s.releaseSlot() + return driver.PromptResult{}, errors.New("claude: a turn is already in flight") + } + t := &turn{done: make(chan struct{})} + pending := s.cancelPending + s.cancelPending = false + t.canceled = pending + s.turn = t + s.mu.Unlock() + if s.beforePromptWrite != nil { + s.beforePromptWrite() + } + msg := map[string]any{"type": "user", "message": map[string]any{"role": "user", "content": prompt}} + err := s.writeHeld(msg) + if pending && err == nil { + // The interrupt follows the prompt it cancels, still holding the + // slot, so nothing can come between them. + err = s.writeHeld(interruptRequest()) + } + s.releaseSlot() + if err != nil { + s.finish(t, driver.PromptResult{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", driver.ErrSessionEnded, err)) + } + select { + case <-t.done: + return t.result, t.err + case <-ctx.Done(): + return driver.PromptResult{}, ctx.Err() + } +} + +// Cancel implements driver.Session: Claude Code's interrupt control request. +// Cancel implements driver.Session: Claude Code's interrupt control request. +// +// It takes the write lock before it looks at the turn, the same order Prompt +// takes them, so the turn it interrupts is the turn it observed: no prompt +// can register and be written in between and take the interrupt meant for +// another turn. +func (s *session) Cancel(ctx context.Context) error { + return s.red.Err(s.cancel(ctx)) +} + +func (s *session) cancel(ctx context.Context) error { + if err := s.takeSlot(ctx, s.grace); err != nil { + // The worker is not reading its input; the connector's next step is + // to close the session, which ends it whatever it is doing. + s.mu.Lock() + if s.turn != nil { + s.turn.canceled = true + } + s.mu.Unlock() + return fmt.Errorf("claude: the agent is not reading its input: %w", err) + } + defer s.releaseSlot() + s.mu.Lock() + t := s.turn + if t != nil { + t.canceled = true + } else { + // Nothing to interrupt yet: the next turn is the one the connector + // meant to cancel, and starts canceled. + s.cancelPending = true + } + s.mu.Unlock() + if t == nil { + return nil + } + if s.beforeCancelWrite != nil { + s.beforeCancelWrite() + } + return s.writeHeld(interruptRequest()) +} + +// interruptRequest is Claude Code's interrupt control request. A request id +// it will not answer twice is enough; the reply is not awaited. +func interruptRequest() map[string]any { + id, err := newUUID() + if err != nil { + id = "interrupt" + } + return map[string]any{"type": "control_request", "request_id": id, "request": map[string]any{"subtype": "interrupt"}} +} + +// Close implements driver.Session. +func (s *session) Close() error { + s.mu.Lock() + s.closed = true + s.mu.Unlock() + // Closed without the slot on purpose: a write blocked on a worker that + // stopped reading ends with a broken pipe rather than holding Close. + _ = s.worker.Stdin().Close() + select { + case <-s.worker.Done(): + case <-time.After(s.grace): + } + s.worker.Terminate(s.grace) + select { + case <-s.readerEnd: + case <-time.After(s.grace): + // The worker is gone and a descendant outside its group still holds + // the output: stop reading it. + s.worker.CloseStdout() + <-s.readerEnd + } + s.removeMCPConfig() + return nil +} + +func (s *session) removeMCPConfig() { + if err := os.Remove(s.mcpPath); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + return + } +} + +// takeSlot waits for the right to write. A zero wait waits for ctx alone. +func (s *session) takeSlot(ctx context.Context, wait time.Duration) error { + var deadline <-chan time.Time + if wait > 0 { + timer := time.NewTimer(wait) + defer timer.Stop() + deadline = timer.C + } + select { + case s.slot <- struct{}{}: + return nil + case <-ctx.Done(): + return ctx.Err() + case <-deadline: + return context.DeadlineExceeded + case <-s.worker.Done(): + return driver.ErrSessionEnded + } +} + +func (s *session) releaseSlot() { <-s.slot } + +// writeHeld writes one message; the caller holds the slot. +func (s *session) writeHeld(v any) error { + data, err := json.Marshal(v) + if err != nil { + return err + } + _, err = s.worker.Stdin().Write(append(data, '\n')) + return err +} + +func (s *session) finish(t *turn, result driver.PromptResult, err error) { + s.mu.Lock() + if s.turn != t { + s.mu.Unlock() + return + } + s.turn = nil + s.mu.Unlock() + t.result, t.err = result, err + close(t.done) +} + +// end records why the session is over, for a prompt that comes after it. +func (s *session) end(err error) { + s.mu.Lock() + if s.ended == nil { + s.ended = err + } + s.mu.Unlock() +} + +func (s *session) emit(u driver.Update) { + u.At = time.Now() + u.Tool = s.red.Sanitize(u.Tool) + u.ToolCallID = s.red.Sanitize(u.ToolCallID) + select { + case s.updates <- u: + default: + } +} + +// read maps the process's stream onto updates and turn results until the +// process closes its stdout. +func (s *session) read() { + defer func() { + // Nothing more will be read from the worker's output. + s.worker.CloseStdout() + close(s.updates) + s.mu.Lock() + t := s.turn + s.mu.Unlock() + s.mu.Lock() + verified := s.verified + s.mu.Unlock() + // A session that ended without ever confirming what it was is not a + // worker that merely went away: it may have run a turn in a mode this + // driver never saw (invariant 2, and Copilot's reading of it). The + // dispatcher settles ErrSessionUnverified as failed rather than lost. + why := errors.Join(driver.ErrSessionEnded) + if !verified { + why = fmt.Errorf("%w: %w: the agent closed its output before it confirmed the session", + driver.ErrSessionUnverified, driver.ErrSessionEnded) + } + if t != nil { + // Copilot: the turn ends with nothing to report but what it + // refused, which the ledger already has, and which its caller + // still reads on the result. + s.mu.Lock() + refusals := slices.Clone(t.refusals) + s.mu.Unlock() + s.finish(t, driver.PromptResult{Refusals: refusals}, why) + } + // Whatever comes next: there is no reader to finish a turn, so a + // later prompt is answered rather than left waiting. + s.end(why) + close(s.readerEnd) + }() + scanner := bufio.NewScanner(s.worker.Stdout()) + scanner.Buffer(make([]byte, 64<<10), 64<<20) + for scanner.Scan() { + s.handle(scanner.Bytes()) + } + // Drain what a scanner error left, so the process never blocks writing. + _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, s.worker.Stdout()) +} + +// streamMessage is the part of a stream-json line the driver reads. Text and +// tool inputs are never decoded into anything kept. +type streamMessage struct { + Type string `json:"type"` + Subtype string `json:"subtype"` + SessionID string `json:"session_id"` + PermissionMode string `json:"permissionMode"` + MCPServers []struct { + Name string `json:"name"` + Status string `json:"status"` + } `json:"mcp_servers"` + Message *struct { + Content json.RawMessage `json:"content"` + } `json:"message"` + ToolName string `json:"tool_name"` + ToolUseID string `json:"tool_use_id"` + StopReason string `json:"stop_reason"` + IsError bool `json:"is_error"` + PermissionDenials []struct { + ToolName string `json:"tool_name"` + ToolUseID string `json:"tool_use_id"` + } `json:"permission_denials"` + Usage *struct { + InputTokens int64 `json:"input_tokens"` + OutputTokens int64 `json:"output_tokens"` + } `json:"usage"` +} + +type contentBlock struct { + Type string `json:"type"` + ID string `json:"id"` + Name string `json:"name"` + Text string `json:"text"` + ToolUseID string `json:"tool_use_id"` + IsError bool `json:"is_error"` +} + +func (s *session) handle(line []byte) { + var m streamMessage + if err := json.Unmarshal(line, &m); err != nil { + return + } + switch { + case m.Type == "system" && m.Subtype == "init": + s.handleInit(m) + case m.Type == "system" && m.Subtype == "permission_denied": + s.refused(m.ToolUseID, m.ToolName) + case m.Type == "assistant" && m.Message != nil: + var blocks []contentBlock + if json.Unmarshal(m.Message.Content, &blocks) != nil { + return + } + for _, b := range blocks { + switch b.Type { + case "tool_use": + s.emit(driver.Update{Kind: driver.UpdateToolCall, ToolCallID: b.ID, Tool: b.Name, ToolKind: toolKind(b.Name), Status: driver.ToolInProgress}) + case "text": + s.emit(driver.Update{Kind: driver.UpdateAgentMessageChunk, Chars: len(b.Text)}) + } + } + case m.Type == "user" && m.Message != nil: + var blocks []contentBlock + if json.Unmarshal(m.Message.Content, &blocks) != nil { + return + } + for _, b := range blocks { + if b.Type != "tool_result" { + continue + } + status := driver.ToolCompleted + if b.IsError { + status = driver.ToolFailed + } + s.emit(driver.Update{Kind: driver.UpdateToolCallUpdate, ToolCallID: b.ToolUseID, Status: status}) + } + case m.Type == "result": + s.handleResult(m) + } +} + +// handleInit verifies the session is the one asked for (driver invariant 2): +// the mode, and the MCP servers connected. A session that is not is ended. +func (s *session) handleInit(m streamMessage) { + var problem error + switch { + case m.PermissionMode != s.mode: + problem = fmt.Errorf("%w: asked for %q, the agent reports %q", driver.ErrUnsafeMode, s.mode, m.PermissionMode) + case m.SessionID != s.id: + problem = fmt.Errorf("%w: asked for session %s, the agent reports another", driver.ErrSessionUnverified, s.id) + default: + for _, name := range s.mcpNames { + connected := false + for _, server := range m.MCPServers { + if server.Name == name && server.Status == "connected" { + connected = true + } + } + if !connected { + problem = fmt.Errorf("%w: MCP server %q did not connect", driver.ErrSessionUnverified, name) + } + } + } + // The agent has started its servers, or failed to: the config file, which + // holds their environments, is not needed again. + s.removeMCPConfig() + s.mu.Lock() + t := s.turn + if problem == nil { + s.verified = true + } + s.mu.Unlock() + if problem != nil { + if t != nil { + s.finish(t, driver.PromptResult{}, problem) + } else { + // No turn to carry it: the next Prompt answers with the reason + // this session was ended, so an unsafe mode is never read as a + // worker merely gone. + s.end(problem) + } + s.worker.Terminate(0) + } +} + +func (s *session) refused(toolUseID, tool string) { + refusal, first := s.record(toolUseID, tool) + if !first { + // A stream that announces one refusal twice refused once. + return + } + s.mu.Lock() + if s.turn != nil { + s.turn.refusals = append(s.turn.refusals, refusal) + } + s.mu.Unlock() + s.emit(driver.Update{Kind: driver.UpdatePermission, ToolCallID: toolUseID, Tool: tool, ToolKind: toolKind(tool), Allowed: false}) +} + +// record is the moment a refusal is read from the stream: it is recorded +// through the session's recorder before anything else is done with it, and +// only the first time its tool call id is seen (driver's "Refusals"). +func (s *session) record(toolUseID, tool string) (driver.Refusal, bool) { + refusal := driver.Refusal{ToolCallID: s.red.Sanitize(toolUseID), Tool: s.red.Sanitize(tool)} + // Once per tool call id, where there is one. A refusal with no id — one + // read from a line of output rather than from a call — is its own every + // time it happens: two identical refusals are two refusals (card 19's + // Codex accounting), and only an id can say otherwise. + if toolUseID != "" { + if s.recorded[toolUseID] { + return refusal, false + } + s.recorded[toolUseID] = true + } + if s.recorder != nil { + // The recorder owns what happens when the ledger refuses the write; + // the refusal happened either way. + _ = s.recorder.RecordRefusal(context.Background(), refusal) + } + return refusal, true +} + +func (s *session) handleResult(m streamMessage) { + s.mu.Lock() + t := s.turn + verified := s.verified + s.mu.Unlock() + if t == nil { + return + } + if !verified { + // A result before the init message proved the mode is not a turn this + // driver can vouch for. + s.finish(t, driver.PromptResult{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: no init message before the result", driver.ErrUnsafeMode)) + s.worker.Terminate(0) + return + } + s.mu.Lock() + refusals := slices.Clone(t.refusals) + canceled := t.canceled + s.mu.Unlock() + for _, d := range m.PermissionDenials { + // Only an id can say two refusals are one: denials with no id are + // each their own, however alike (Opus r9 — "" matched "" here and + // three nameless denials counted as one). + if d.ToolUseID != "" && slices.ContainsFunc(refusals, func(r driver.Refusal) bool { return r.ToolCallID == s.red.Sanitize(d.ToolUseID) }) { + continue + } + // A refusal the stream did not announce is still the driver's own + // record, and is reported both ways (invariant 3). + refusal, first := s.record(d.ToolUseID, d.ToolName) + if !first { + continue + } + refusals = append(refusals, refusal) + s.emit(driver.Update{Kind: driver.UpdatePermission, ToolCallID: d.ToolUseID, Tool: d.ToolName, ToolKind: toolKind(d.ToolName), Allowed: false}) + } + result := driver.PromptResult{Refusals: refusals} + if m.Usage != nil { + result.Usage = driver.Usage{InputTokens: m.Usage.InputTokens, OutputTokens: m.Usage.OutputTokens} + s.emit(driver.Update{Kind: driver.UpdateUsage, Usage: &result.Usage}) + } + switch { + case canceled: + // Only a cancel the connector asked for reads as canceled (driver + // invariant 3). + result.Stop = driver.TurnCanceled + case m.Subtype == "error_max_turns": + result.Stop = driver.TurnMaxTurnRequests + case m.StopReason == "max_tokens": + result.Stop = driver.TurnMaxTokens + case m.StopReason == "refusal": + result.Stop = driver.TurnRefusal + case m.Subtype == "success" && !m.IsError: + result.Stop = driver.TurnEndTurn + default: + s.finish(t, result, fmt.Errorf("claude: the turn ended in error (%s)", sanitize(m.Subtype))) + return + } + s.finish(t, result, nil) +} + +// toolKind maps a Claude Code tool name to ACP's kind. +func toolKind(name string) driver.ToolKind { + for kind, tools := range kindTools { + if slices.Contains(tools, name) { + return kind + } + } + switch name { + case "Bash": + return driver.ToolExecute + case "WebFetch", "WebSearch": + return driver.ToolFetch + } + return driver.ToolOther +} + +func sanitize(s string) string { + out := make([]rune, 0, len(s)) + for _, r := range s { + if (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || r == '_' { + out = append(out, r) + } + if len(out) >= 40 { + break + } + } + return string(out) +} + +func newUUID() (string, error) { + var b [16]byte + if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil { + return "", err + } + b[6] = (b[6] & 0x0f) | 0x40 + b[8] = (b[8] & 0x3f) | 0x80 + return fmt.Sprintf("%x-%x-%x-%x-%x", b[0:4], b[4:6], b[6:8], b[8:10], b[10:16]), nil +} + +func validUUID(s string) bool { + if len(s) != 36 { + return false + } + for i, r := range s { + switch i { + case 8, 13, 18, 23: + if r != '-' { + return false + } + default: + if (r < '0' || r > '9') && (r < 'a' || r > 'f') { + return false + } + } + } + return true +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/claude/claude_test.go b/internal/connector/driver/claude/claude_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..11d65ba0b --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/claude/claude_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,841 @@ +//go:build unix + +package claude + +import ( + "bufio" + "context" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "slices" + "strings" + "syscall" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver/drivertest" +) + +// The test binary doubles as a fake claude: run with FAKE_CLAUDE set, it +// speaks the stream-json protocol according to the scenario it names and +// writes what it was started with to FAKE_CLAUDE_REPORT. +func TestMain(m *testing.M) { + if scenario := os.Getenv("FAKE_CLAUDE"); scenario != "" { + fakeClaude(scenario) + os.Exit(0) + } + os.Exit(m.Run()) +} + +type fakeReport struct { + Args []string `json:"args"` + Env []string `json:"env"` + MCPConfig string `json:"mcp_config"` + MCPMode os.FileMode `json:"mcp_mode"` + Extra map[string]string `json:"extra"` +} + +func argAfter(args []string, flag string) string { + i := slices.Index(args, flag) + if i < 0 || i+1 >= len(args) { + return "" + } + return args[i+1] +} + +func fakeClaude(scenario string) { + args := os.Args[1:] + report := fakeReport{Args: args, Env: os.Environ(), Extra: map[string]string{}} + mcpPath := argAfter(args, "--mcp-config") + var servers []string + if info, err := os.Stat(mcpPath); err == nil { + report.MCPMode = info.Mode().Perm() + data, _ := os.ReadFile(mcpPath) + report.MCPConfig = string(data) + var cfg struct { + MCPServers map[string]any `json:"mcpServers"` + } + _ = json.Unmarshal(data, &cfg) + for name := range cfg.MCPServers { + servers = append(servers, name) + } + } + writeReport := func() { + // Written whole and renamed into place: a test reading the report + // while it is rewritten must never see half of it. + data, _ := json.Marshal(report) + path := os.Getenv("FAKE_CLAUDE_REPORT") + _ = os.WriteFile(path+".tmp", data, 0o600) + _ = os.Rename(path+".tmp", path) + } + writeReport() + + // A worker that writes a secret it was handed to its own stderr, which + // the connector reads and may log. + secret := os.Getenv("FAKE_CLAUDE_SECRET") + if secret != "" { + // The secret first, then the noise that would bury it: a driver that + // reads only the LAST line would miss it, and one that reads the + // lines raw would pass it on. + fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "claude: failed while using "+secret) + fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "claude: retrying in 2s") + fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "claude: giving up") + } + + out := bufio.NewWriter(os.Stdout) + emit := func(v any) { + data, _ := json.Marshal(v) + _, _ = out.Write(append(data, '\n')) + _ = out.Flush() + } + sessionID := argAfter(args, "--session-id") + if sessionID == "" { + sessionID = argAfter(args, "--resume") + } + mode := argAfter(args, "--permission-mode") + if scenario == "handshake-secret" { + // An agent that reports a mode carrying what it was handed. + mode = secret + } + if scenario == "badmode" { + mode = "bypassPermissions" + } + status := "connected" + if scenario == "mcpfailed" { + status = "failed" + } + + if scenario == "deaf" || scenario == "deaf-secret" { + // Reads nothing, ever: the pipe fills and a write blocks. + select {} + } + if scenario == "badmode-eager" { + // An init before any prompt, in a mode the policy did not ask for. + emit(map[string]any{"type": "system", "subtype": "init", "session_id": sessionID, "permissionMode": "bypassPermissions", "mcp_servers": []any{}}) + select {} + } + + in := bufio.NewScanner(os.Stdin) + inited := false + for in.Scan() { + var msg map[string]any + if json.Unmarshal(in.Bytes(), &msg) != nil { + continue + } + switch msg["type"] { + case "control_request", "user": + // The order messages reach the agent is what a cancel's + // correctness rests on. + kind, _ := msg["type"].(string) + report.Extra["wire"] += kind + " " + writeReport() + } + switch msg["type"] { + case "control_request": + // Like Claude Code, an interrupt with no turn running does + // nothing. + if inited && (scenario == "hang" || scenario == "child") { + emit(map[string]any{"type": "result", "subtype": "error_during_execution", "is_error": true, "session_id": sessionID}) + } + continue + case "user": + default: + continue + } + if !inited { + inited = true + mcp := make([]map[string]string, 0, len(servers)) + for _, s := range servers { + mcp = append(mcp, map[string]string{"name": s, "status": status}) + } + emit(map[string]any{"type": "system", "subtype": "init", "session_id": sessionID, "permissionMode": mode, "mcp_servers": mcp}) + if _, err := os.Stat(mcpPath); err == nil { + report.Extra["mcp_after_init"] = "present" + } + } + if scenario == "denial-secret" { + // A refusal and a failed turn, both named after the secret. + emit(map[string]any{"type": "system", "subtype": "permission_denied", "tool_name": secret, "tool_use_id": secret}) + emit(map[string]any{"type": "assistant", "message": map[string]any{"content": []any{ + map[string]any{"type": "tool_use", "id": secret, "name": secret}, + }}}) + emit(map[string]any{"type": "result", "subtype": "error_" + secret, "is_error": true, "session_id": sessionID, + "permission_denials": []any{map[string]any{"tool_name": secret, "tool_use_id": secret + "-late"}}}) + continue + } + if scenario == "die-secret" { + os.Exit(3) + } + if scenario == "nameless-result-denials" { + // Three denials in the result, none with a call id: three + // refusals, not one. + emit(map[string]any{"type": "result", "subtype": "success", "stop_reason": "end_turn", "is_error": false, "session_id": sessionID, + "permission_denials": []any{ + map[string]any{"tool_name": "Bash"}, + map[string]any{"tool_name": "Write"}, + map[string]any{"tool_name": "WebFetch"}, + }}) + continue + } + if scenario == "two-nameless-refusals" { + // Two refusals of the same tool with no call id between them: + // two refusals, not one (card 19's Codex accounting). + for range 2 { + emit(map[string]any{"type": "system", "subtype": "permission_denied", "tool_name": "Bash"}) + } + emit(map[string]any{"type": "result", "subtype": "success", "stop_reason": "end_turn", "is_error": false, "session_id": sessionID}) + continue + } + if scenario == "denied-twice" { + // One refusal the stream announces twice and the result repeats. + for range 2 { + emit(map[string]any{"type": "system", "subtype": "permission_denied", "tool_name": "Bash", "tool_use_id": "toolu_twice"}) + } + emit(map[string]any{"type": "result", "subtype": "success", "stop_reason": "end_turn", "is_error": false, "session_id": sessionID, + "permission_denials": []any{map[string]any{"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_use_id": "toolu_twice"}}}) + continue + } + if scenario == "deny-then-die" { + // Refused, and gone before any result could repeat it. + emit(map[string]any{"type": "system", "subtype": "permission_denied", "tool_name": "Bash", "tool_use_id": "toolu_dead"}) + os.Exit(3) + } + switch scenario { + case "hang": + continue + case "child": + // A grandchild in the worker's group. + cmd := execSleep() + report.Extra["child"] = fmt.Sprint(cmd) + writeReport() + continue + case "die": + os.Exit(3) + case "late-denial": + // A denial the stream never announced, only the result. + emit(map[string]any{"type": "result", "subtype": "success", "stop_reason": "end_turn", "is_error": false, "session_id": sessionID, + "permission_denials": []any{map[string]any{"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_use_id": "toolu_late"}}}) + continue + case "escape": + // A descendant in a session of its own, holding stdout. + pid, _ := syscall.ForkExec("/bin/sleep", []string{"sleep", "300"}, &syscall.ProcAttr{ + Env: []string{}, Files: []uintptr{0, 1, 2}, Sys: &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setsid: true}, + }) + report.Extra["escaped"] = fmt.Sprint(pid) + writeReport() + } + emit(map[string]any{"type": "assistant", "message": map[string]any{"content": []any{ + map[string]any{"type": "text", "text": "secret words the connector never keeps"}, + map[string]any{"type": "tool_use", "id": "toolu_1", "name": "Bash", "input": map[string]any{"command": "rm -rf /"}}, + }}}) + emit(map[string]any{"type": "system", "subtype": "permission_denied", "tool_name": "Bash", "tool_use_id": "toolu_1"}) + emit(map[string]any{"type": "result", "subtype": "success", "stop_reason": "end_turn", "is_error": false, "session_id": sessionID, + "usage": map[string]any{"input_tokens": 12, "output_tokens": 34}, + "permission_denials": []any{map[string]any{"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_use_id": "toolu_1", "tool_input": map[string]any{"command": "rm -rf /"}}}}) + writeReport() + } + writeReport() +} + +func execSleep() int { + pid, err := syscall.ForkExec("/bin/sleep", []string{"sleep", "300"}, &syscall.ProcAttr{Env: []string{}}) + if err != nil { + return 0 + } + return pid +} + +type fixture struct { + driver *Driver + cfg driver.SessionConfig + report string +} + +func newFixture(t *testing.T, scenario string) fixture { + t.Helper() + work := t.TempDir() + private := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "session") + require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(private, 0o700)) + report := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "report.json") + exe, err := os.Executable() + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Setenv("CONNECTOR_CANARY_NOT_REAL", "leaked") + return fixture{ + driver: New(Options{Binary: exe, CloseGrace: time.Second, Lookup: func(k string) (string, bool) { + if k == "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY" { + return "test-key-not-real", true + } + return "", false + }}), + cfg: driver.SessionConfig{ + Cwd: work, + Env: []string{"FAKE_CLAUDE=" + scenario, "FAKE_CLAUDE_REPORT=" + report, "HOME=" + work}, + MCPServers: []driver.MCPServer{{ + Name: "basecamp", Command: "/usr/local/bin/basecamp", Args: []string{"mcp", "--profile", "agent"}, + Env: map[string]string{"BASECAMP_CONNECT_TASK_TOKEN": "test-token-not-real"}, + }}, + Policy: policy{workDir: work}, + Scope: driver.Scope{WorkDir: work}, + PrivateDir: private, + }, + report: report, + } +} + +func (f fixture) readReport(t *testing.T) fakeReport { + t.Helper() + r, err := f.report_() + require.NoError(t, err) + return r +} + +// report_ reads the report without failing the test, for polling. +func (f fixture) report_() (fakeReport, error) { + var r fakeReport + data, err := os.ReadFile(f.report) + if err != nil { + return r, err + } + return r, json.Unmarshal(data, &r) +} + +type policy struct{ workDir string } + +func (p policy) Decide(context.Context, driver.PermissionRequest) driver.PermissionDecision { + return driver.PermissionDecision{} +} + +func (p policy) Rules() driver.PermissionRules { + return driver.PermissionRules{ + Mode: driver.ModeEditsInWorkDir, WorkDir: p.workDir, + AllowKinds: []driver.ToolKind{driver.ToolRead, driver.ToolSearch}, AllowMCPServers: []string{"basecamp"}, + } +} + +func start(t *testing.T, f fixture) driver.Session { + t.Helper() + s, err := f.driver.NewSession(context.Background(), f.cfg) + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = s.Close() }) + return s +} + +// Driver invariants 1 and 2 as written on the command line: an explicit mode, +// no host settings, no other MCP servers, only the allowed tools, and no +// token in argv. +func TestArgsFreezeThePolicyAndCarryNoSecret(t *testing.T) { + f := newFixture(t, "ok") + args, err := Args(f.cfg, "11111111-2222-4333-8444-555555555555", false, "/private/mcp.json", "") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "acceptEdits", argAfter(args, "--permission-mode")) + assert.Equal(t, "none", argAfter(args, "--permission-prompts")) + require.Contains(t, args, "--setting-sources") + assert.Equal(t, "", argAfter(args, "--setting-sources"), "no user, project or local settings") + assert.Contains(t, args, "--strict-mcp-config") + tools := strings.Split(argAfter(args, "--tools"), ",") + assert.NotContains(t, tools, "Bash") + assert.NotContains(t, tools, "WebFetch") + assert.Equal(t, "mcp__basecamp", argAfter(args, "--allowed-tools"), "no read tool is an allow rule: that would allow reads anywhere") + assert.Contains(t, tools, "Read", "the tool exists; the mode confines it to the working directory") + assert.NotContains(t, strings.Join(args, " "), "test-token-not-real") + + f.cfg.Cwd = "/elsewhere" + _, err = Args(f.cfg, "11111111-2222-4333-8444-555555555555", false, "/private/mcp.json", "") + assert.Error(t, err, "a policy for another directory is not this session's") +} + +func TestASessionRunsAVerifiedTurnAndRecordsRefusals(t *testing.T) { + f := newFixture(t, "ok") + s := start(t, f) + var updates []driver.Update + done := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { + for u := range s.Updates() { + updates = append(updates, u) + } + close(done) + }() + + result, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "hello") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnEndTurn, result.Stop) + assert.Equal(t, []driver.Refusal{{ToolCallID: "toolu_1", Tool: "Bash"}}, result.Refusals) + assert.Equal(t, int64(12), result.Usage.InputTokens) + + // The credential rule, from the moment the MCP servers started: no file + // under the working directory or the session's own directory carries the + // task token, however briefly, through a follow-up and the close. + drivertest.RequireNoSecretFilesDuring(t, "test-token-not-real", []string{f.cfg.Cwd, f.cfg.PrivateDir}, func() { + // A follow-up in the same session. + result, err = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "again") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnEndTurn, result.Stop) + require.NoError(t, s.Close()) + }) + <-done + + for _, u := range updates { + encoded, _ := json.Marshal(u) + assert.NotContains(t, string(encoded), "secret words", "updates carry no content") + assert.NotContains(t, string(encoded), "rm -rf", "updates carry no tool input") + } + assert.True(t, slices.ContainsFunc(updates, func(u driver.Update) bool { return u.Kind == driver.UpdatePermission && !u.Allowed })) + + r := f.readReport(t) + // The token is in neither the agent's own environment nor its argv. + drivertest.RequireNoSecret(t, "test-token-not-real", drivertest.Places{Env: r.Env, Args: r.Args, Dirs: []string{f.cfg.Cwd}}) + assert.NotContains(t, strings.Join(r.Env, "\n"), "CONNECTOR_CANARY_NOT_REAL") + assert.Contains(t, r.Env, "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=test-key-not-real", "the driver's own named variables are added") + assert.Equal(t, os.FileMode(0o600), r.MCPMode) + assert.Contains(t, r.MCPConfig, "test-token-not-real", "the token reaches the MCP server's declared environment") + _, statErr := os.Stat(filepath.Join(f.cfg.PrivateDir, "mcp.json")) + assert.True(t, os.IsNotExist(statErr), "the config file holding the token is removed") +} + +func TestTheConfigFileIsRemovedOnceTheServersStart(t *testing.T) { + f := newFixture(t, "hang") + s := start(t, f) + go func() { _, _ = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "hello") }() + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { + _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(f.cfg.PrivateDir, "mcp.json")) + return os.IsNotExist(err) + }, 5*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond) +} + +// Driver invariant 2. +func TestAnUnconfirmedModeIsUnsafe(t *testing.T) { + f := newFixture(t, "badmode") + s := start(t, f) + _, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "hello") + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrUnsafeMode) + select { + case <-s.Done(): + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("an unsafe session's worker was left running") + } +} + +func TestAnMCPServerThatDidNotConnectEndsTheSession(t *testing.T) { + f := newFixture(t, "mcpfailed") + s := start(t, f) + _, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "hello") + assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "did not connect") +} + +// Driver invariant 3. +func TestOnlyAnAskedForCancelReadsAsCanceled(t *testing.T) { + f := newFixture(t, "hang") + s := start(t, f) + answers := make(chan driver.PromptResult, 1) + go func() { + result, _ := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "hello") + answers <- result + }() + time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond) + require.NoError(t, s.Cancel(context.Background())) + select { + case result := <-answers: + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnCanceled, result.Stop) + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the cancel did not end the turn") + } + + // The same error result with no cancel asked for is not a cancel. + f = newFixture(t, "hang") + s = start(t, f) + go func() { + time.Sleep(300 * time.Millisecond) + // A cancel written by someone else, not through Cancel. + ss := s.(*session) + if err := ss.takeSlot(context.Background(), time.Second); err == nil { + _ = ss.writeHeld(map[string]any{"type": "control_request", "request_id": "x", "request": map[string]any{"subtype": "interrupt"}}) + ss.releaseSlot() + } + }() + result, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "hello") + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.NotEqual(t, driver.TurnCanceled, result.Stop) +} + +func TestAWorkerThatDiesMidTurnEndsTheSession(t *testing.T) { + f := newFixture(t, "die") + s := start(t, f) + _, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "hello") + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrSessionEnded) + <-s.Done() + assert.Equal(t, 3, s.Exit().Code) +} + +// Driver invariant 5. +func TestCloseLeavesNoProcessOfTheSessionBehind(t *testing.T) { + f := newFixture(t, "child") + s := start(t, f) + go func() { _, _ = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "hello") }() + var child int + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { + data, err := os.ReadFile(f.report) + if err != nil { + return false + } + var r fakeReport + if json.Unmarshal(data, &r) != nil || r.Extra["child"] == "" { + return false + } + _, err = fmt.Sscan(r.Extra["child"], &child) + return err == nil && child > 0 + }, 5*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond) + require.NoError(t, s.Close()) + assert.Eventually(t, func() bool { + return syscall.Kill(child, 0) != nil + }, 5*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond) + require.NoError(t, s.Close(), "Close is idempotent") +} + +func TestAMissingBinaryIsNotStarted(t *testing.T) { + f := newFixture(t, "ok") + f.driver.opts.Binary = "/nonexistent/claude" + _, err := f.driver.NewSession(context.Background(), f.cfg) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrNotStarted) + entries, _ := os.ReadDir(f.cfg.PrivateDir) + assert.Empty(t, entries, "nothing holding the token is left behind") +} + +func TestACancelRightAfterPromptStillInterruptsThatTurn(t *testing.T) { + f := newFixture(t, "hang") + s := start(t, f) + ss := s.(*session) + ss.beforePromptWrite = func() { + go func() { _ = s.Cancel(context.Background()) }() + time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond) + } + answers := make(chan driver.PromptResult, 1) + go func() { + result, _ := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "hello") + answers <- result + }() + select { + case result := <-answers: + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnCanceled, result.Stop) + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the interrupt went out before the prompt and interrupted nothing") + } +} + +func TestCloseReturnsWhenADescendantOutsideTheGroupHoldsTheOutput(t *testing.T) { + f := newFixture(t, "escape") + f.driver.opts.CloseGrace = 200 * time.Millisecond + s := start(t, f) + go func() { _, _ = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "hello") }() + var escaped int + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { + data, err := os.ReadFile(f.report) + if err != nil { + return false + } + var r fakeReport + if json.Unmarshal(data, &r) != nil || r.Extra["escaped"] == "" { + return false + } + _, err = fmt.Sscan(r.Extra["escaped"], &escaped) + return err == nil && escaped > 0 + }, 5*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = syscall.Kill(escaped, syscall.SIGKILL) }) + + closed := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { + _ = s.Close() + close(closed) + }() + select { + case <-closed: + case <-time.After(10 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("Close waited on output held by a process outside the worker's group") + } +} + +// Copilot r2: a refusal only the result reports is still reported both ways. +func TestARefusalOnlyTheResultReportsIsAlsoAnUpdate(t *testing.T) { + f := newFixture(t, "late-denial") + s := start(t, f) + var updates []driver.Update + done := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { + for u := range s.Updates() { + updates = append(updates, u) + } + close(done) + }() + result, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "hello") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, []driver.Refusal{{ToolCallID: "toolu_late", Tool: "Bash"}}, result.Refusals) + require.NoError(t, s.Close()) + <-done + assert.True(t, slices.ContainsFunc(updates, func(u driver.Update) bool { + return u.Kind == driver.UpdatePermission && u.ToolCallID == "toolu_late" && !u.Allowed + }), "the refusal is an update too") +} + +// Review r2: a cancel that arrives before the turn cancels that turn. +func TestACancelBeforeAnyTurnCancelsTheNextOne(t *testing.T) { + f := newFixture(t, "hang") + s := start(t, f) + require.NoError(t, s.Cancel(context.Background())) + result, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "hello") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnCanceled, result.Stop) +} + +// Copilot on #739: the interrupt goes to the turn Cancel observed, never to a +// prompt that registered after it. +func TestACancelNeverInterruptsALaterTurn(t *testing.T) { + f := newFixture(t, "hang") + s := start(t, f) + ss := s.(*session) + first := make(chan driver.PromptResult, 1) + go func() { + result, _ := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "one") + first <- result + }() + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { + ss.mu.Lock() + defer ss.mu.Unlock() + return ss.turn != nil + }, 5*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond) + + second := make(chan driver.PromptResult, 1) + ss.beforeCancelWrite = func() { + // The turn Cancel observed finishes, and another prompt tries to take + // its place before the interrupt is written. + ss.mu.Lock() + t := ss.turn + ss.mu.Unlock() + ss.finish(t, driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnEndTurn}, nil) + asking := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { + close(asking) + result, _ := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "two") + second <- result + }() + // The second prompt is asking to write; whether it may is what this + // test is about, and nothing here waits on a clock to find out. + <-asking + } + require.NoError(t, s.Cancel(context.Background())) + <-first + + select { + case <-second: + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + } + // The fake writes its record after it reads each line, so the wire is + // read until it settles rather than sampled once. + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { + r, err := f.report_() + return err == nil && r.Extra["wire"] == "user control_request user " + }, 10*time.Second, 50*time.Millisecond, + "the interrupt follows the turn it was asked for, and never the prompt that came after it") +} + +// Review r3: an unsafe mode found before the first turn registers is still a +// failure, not a session that merely ended. +func TestAnUnsafeModeBeforeTheFirstTurnIsStillUnsafe(t *testing.T) { + f := newFixture(t, "badmode-eager") + s := start(t, f) + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { + select { + case <-s.Done(): + return true + default: + return false + } + }, 5*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond) + _, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "hello") + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrUnsafeMode, "the reason the session ended, not a bare session-ended") +} + +// Card 23's review: a worker that stops reading its input must not be able to +// hold a cancel or a close. +func ss(s driver.Session) *session { return s.(*session) } + +func TestAnAgentThatStopsReadingCannotHoldCancelOrClose(t *testing.T) { + f := newFixture(t, "deaf") + f.driver.opts.CloseGrace = 300 * time.Millisecond + s := start(t, f) + // Enough to fill the pipe, so the write blocks on a worker that reads + // nothing. + go func() { _, _ = s.Prompt(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("x", 1<<20)) }() + // Wait for that prompt to hold the write slot, rather than for a clock. + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return len(ss(s).slot) == 1 }, 10*time.Second, 5*time.Millisecond) + + canceled := make(chan error, 1) + go func() { canceled <- s.Cancel(context.Background()) }() + select { + case err := <-canceled: + assert.Error(t, err, "the cancel gives up rather than waiting on a worker that is not reading") + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("Cancel waited on a worker that stopped reading") + } + + closed := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { + _ = s.Close() + close(closed) + }() + select { + case <-closed: + case <-time.After(10 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("Close waited on a worker that stopped reading") + } +} + +// redactionSecret is the value fed through every error path. It is obviously +// fake, and is planted everywhere a real secret would be: in the worker's +// environment, in its MCP server's environment, in the name of its private +// directory, and in what the agent writes back. +const redactionSecret = "test-token-not-real-c9f2b1" + +func redactionFixture(t *testing.T, scenario string) fixture { + t.Helper() + f := newFixture(t, scenario) + private := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), redactionSecret) + require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(private, 0o700)) + f.cfg.PrivateDir = private + f.cfg.Env = append(f.cfg.Env, "FAKE_CLAUDE_SECRET="+redactionSecret) + f.cfg.MCPServers[0].Env["BASECAMP_CONNECT_TASK_TOKEN"] = redactionSecret + f.cfg.Redaction = driver.Redaction{Secrets: []string{redactionSecret}} + return f +} + +// stderrText is everything of a session's stderr a driver would pass on: the +// tail and every bounded line, which is where a refusal written before the +// noise is read (driver's "Refusals"). +func stderrText(s driver.Session) []string { + var out []string + if tail, ok := s.(interface{ StderrTail() string }); ok { + out = append(out, tail.StderrTail()) + } + if lines, ok := s.(interface{ StderrLines() []string }); ok { + out = append(out, lines.StderrLines()...) + } + return out +} + +// The redaction rule (driver's redact.go): nothing the driver hands back +// carries the secret, whichever way the session fails. +func TestNoErrorPathCarriesTheSecretOut(t *testing.T) { + drivertest.RequireRedacted(t, redactionSecret, []drivertest.RedactionPath{ + {Name: "start", Run: func(t *testing.T) drivertest.Crossing { + f := redactionFixture(t, "ok") + // A private directory the driver cannot write its MCP config in: + // the failure names the path, and the path carries the secret. + require.NoError(t, os.Remove(f.cfg.PrivateDir)) + _, err := f.driver.NewSession(context.Background(), f.cfg) + require.Error(t, err) + return drivertest.Crossing{Errors: []error{err}} + }}, + {Name: "handshake", Run: func(t *testing.T) drivertest.Crossing { + f := redactionFixture(t, "handshake-secret") + s := start(t, f) + result, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "hello") + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrUnsafeMode) + <-s.Done() + return drivertest.Crossing{Errors: []error{err}, Results: []driver.PromptResult{result}, + Updates: drain(s), Texts: stderrText(s)} + }}, + {Name: "prompt", Run: func(t *testing.T) drivertest.Crossing { + f := redactionFixture(t, "denial-secret") + s := start(t, f) + result, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "hello") + require.Error(t, err) + updates := make(chan []driver.Update, 1) + go func() { updates <- drain(s) }() + require.NoError(t, s.Close()) + return drivertest.Crossing{Errors: []error{err}, Results: []driver.PromptResult{result}, + Updates: <-updates, Texts: stderrText(s)} + }}, + {Name: "cancel", Run: func(t *testing.T) drivertest.Crossing { + f := redactionFixture(t, "deaf-secret") + f.driver.opts.CloseGrace = 300 * time.Millisecond + s := start(t, f) + go func() { _, _ = s.Prompt(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("x", 1<<20)) }() + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return len(ss(s).slot) == 1 }, 10*time.Second, 5*time.Millisecond) + err := s.Cancel(context.Background()) + require.Error(t, err) + return drivertest.Crossing{Errors: []error{err}, Texts: stderrText(s)} + }}, + {Name: "close", Run: func(t *testing.T) drivertest.Crossing { + f := redactionFixture(t, "die-secret") + s := start(t, f) + _, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "hello") + require.Error(t, err, "the worker died in the turn") + closeErr := s.Close() + after, afterErr := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "again") + return drivertest.Crossing{Errors: []error{err, closeErr, afterErr}, Results: []driver.PromptResult{after}, + Updates: drain(s), Texts: stderrText(s)} + }}, + }) +} + +// drain is every update a closed session emitted. +func drain(s driver.Session) []driver.Update { + var updates []driver.Update + for u := range s.Updates() { + updates = append(updates, u) + } + return updates +} + +// The refusal rule (driver's "Refusals"): each refusal is recorded once, as +// it is read, whether the result repeats it, announces it late, or never +// comes. +func TestEveryRefusalIsRecordedOnceAsItIsRead(t *testing.T) { + for _, tc := range []struct { + scenario string + want []driver.Refusal + }{ + {"ok", []driver.Refusal{{ToolCallID: "toolu_1", Tool: "Bash"}}}, + {"late-denial", []driver.Refusal{{ToolCallID: "toolu_late", Tool: "Bash"}}}, + {"deny-then-die", []driver.Refusal{{ToolCallID: "toolu_dead", Tool: "Bash"}}}, + {"denied-twice", []driver.Refusal{{ToolCallID: "toolu_twice", Tool: "Bash"}}}, + {"two-nameless-refusals", []driver.Refusal{{Tool: "Bash"}, {Tool: "Bash"}}}, + {"nameless-result-denials", []driver.Refusal{{Tool: "Bash"}, {Tool: "Write"}, {Tool: "WebFetch"}}}, + } { + t.Run(tc.scenario, func(t *testing.T) { + f := newFixture(t, tc.scenario) + recorder := &drivertest.Refusals{} + f.cfg.Refusals = recorder + s := start(t, f) + go func() { + for range s.Updates() { + } + }() + result, _ := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "hello") + require.NoError(t, s.Close()) + assert.Equal(t, tc.want, recorder.Recorded()) + // Copilot: a turn the worker's exit ended still reports what it + // refused. + assert.Equal(t, tc.want, result.Refusals) + }) + } +} + +// Card 23's review: a worker whose Basecamp MCP server never connected can +// neither read its dispatch nor report it, so the driver ends the session +// with the sentinel the dispatcher settles as failed. +func TestAnMCPServerThatDidNotConnectIsAnUnverifiedSession(t *testing.T) { + f := newFixture(t, "mcpfailed") + s := start(t, f) + _, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "hello") + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrSessionUnverified) + select { + case <-s.Done(): + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("a session with no Basecamp tools was left running") + } +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/codex/codex.go b/internal/connector/driver/codex/codex.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a50d428cd --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/codex/codex.go @@ -0,0 +1,1226 @@ +// Package codex is the spawn driver for Codex: `codex exec --json`, adapted +// onto the driver package's ACP-shaped session. +// +// One process is one turn. `codex exec` reads its prompt from stdin to the end +// and exits once the turn is over, so a session takes a single prompt and +// advertises no follow-up prompts; a follow-up waits for a new attempt, and +// LoadSession continues the conversation in a new process with +// `codex exec resume`. +// +// # Invariants +// +// The driver package's invariants hold here, each by a test in codex_test.go: +// +// 1. Nothing is inherited. The process environment is SessionConfig.Env and +// the few variables Codex itself needs; the host's config.toml, rules, +// hooks, plugins, connected apps and skills are not loaded; the only MCP +// servers are SessionConfig.MCPServers. The model's shell gets Codex's +// core environment only. +// 2. Nothing is written to disk to start a session, and no MCP server's +// environment reaches Codex's own. A server's declared environment goes +// to Codex as its mcp_servers env table, which Codex hands only to that +// server. It carries no secret: the task token reaches the worker's MCP +// server over the connector's one-use socket (connector/tokensocket.go), +// never through the driver. (Codex's own env_vars would copy a variable +// from Codex's environment, and from there to the model's shell.) +// 3. The permission mode is set by flags and verified. `codex exec` echoes +// no mode, and an override Codex does not recognize is silently ignored, +// so the driver reads the policy Codex actually applied from the turn's +// turn_context record in its rollout file, and ends the session as +// unsafe (ErrUnsafeMode) when it is not the one asked for or cannot be +// read. Both the sandbox mode and the filesystem policy the sandbox is +// built from are checked: nothing but the working directory writable. +// A turn is never reported finished before that check passed, and +// a turn that fails or loses its process after Codex reported its thread +// waits for the check too, so an unsafe session is reported as unsafe. +// The check runs beside the turn, not before it: Codex writes the record +// as the turn starts, so the window is the first model response. +// 4. Every MCP server is required: Codex refuses to start a turn when one +// fails to initialize, so a worker never runs without its Basecamp +// server. +// 5. Cancel ends the process group the driver started. A turn ends as +// TurnCanceled only when Cancel asked for it. +// 6. Updates carry kinds, ids and counts, never the agent's text, a +// command, or a tool's arguments, and everything that leaves the driver — +// errors, updates, refusals, the stderr tail — goes through the shared +// redactor. +// 7. Every refusal is recorded through SessionConfig.Refusals as it is read, +// once per call, whichever way the turn ends: a refusal Codex puts only on +// its stderr is read before a canceled, failed or lost turn is finished. +// +// Codex's reach differs from Claude Code's, and this driver claims nothing +// beyond it: Codex reads and searches through shell commands, so its shell +// is not removed but confined by Codex's own sandbox (workspace-write: +// writes only inside the working directory, no network, no /tmp) with +// approvals set to never, so whatever the sandbox would refuse is refused +// without asking anyone. That is still policy, not containment: the sandbox +// is Codex's, not the connector's. One consequence is worth knowing: a +// worktree's git data lives outside the working directory, so a Codex worker +// cannot commit, and a Codex task that edits anything ends with its worktree +// kept. Codex's sandbox reads the whole filesystem, but runs the model's +// shell in a PID namespace of its own, so the processes outside it — MCP +// servers among them — are not visible to it. +package codex + +import ( + "bufio" + "context" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "regexp" + "slices" + "strconv" + "strings" + "sync" + "time" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" +) + +// Name is the driver's name. +const Name = "codex" + +// Env is what Codex may take from the connector's environment besides +// driver.BaseEnv: where its state and login live, and an API key for a login +// that uses one. +var Env = []string{"CODEX_HOME", "CODEX_API_KEY"} + +// DefaultVerifyTimeout is how long the driver waits for Codex's rollout to +// show the policy it applied. +const DefaultVerifyTimeout = 15 * time.Second + +// Options configures the driver. +type Options struct { + // Binary is the codex executable; "codex" on PATH when empty. + Binary string + // Model is passed as --model when set. + Model string + // Lookup reads the connector's environment for Env; os.LookupEnv when + // nil. + Lookup func(string) (string, bool) + // CloseGrace is how long a session's process group has between SIGTERM + // and SIGKILL. + CloseGrace time.Duration + // VerifyTimeout bounds the wait for the rollout's policy record. + VerifyTimeout time.Duration +} + +// Driver starts Codex sessions. +type Driver struct { + opts Options +} + +var _ driver.Driver = (*Driver)(nil) + +// New builds the driver. +func New(opts Options) *Driver { + if opts.Binary == "" { + opts.Binary = "codex" + } + if opts.Lookup == nil { + opts.Lookup = os.LookupEnv + } + if opts.CloseGrace <= 0 { + opts.CloseGrace = 5 * time.Second + } + if opts.VerifyTimeout <= 0 { + opts.VerifyTimeout = DefaultVerifyTimeout + } + return &Driver{opts: opts} +} + +// Name implements driver.Driver. +func (d *Driver) Name() string { return Name } + +// Capabilities implements driver.Driver. A Codex process takes one prompt. +func (d *Driver) Capabilities() driver.Capabilities { + // LoadSession works (codex exec resume), but it is not advertised: the + // thread id is known only once the prompt is written, after the + // dispatcher has recorded the session, so no ledger record could name + // one to resume. + return driver.Capabilities{} +} + +// NewSession implements driver.Driver. The session's id is Codex's thread id, +// which Codex reports only once the prompt is written: ID is empty until then. +func (d *Driver) NewSession(ctx context.Context, cfg driver.SessionConfig) (driver.Session, error) { + s, err := d.start(ctx, cfg, "") + return s, d.redactor(cfg).Err(err) +} + +// redactor is what every error and text of a session passes through: the +// dispatcher's Redaction, plus the environment this driver builds, its MCP +// servers' environments and its private directory. +func (d *Driver) redactor(cfg driver.SessionConfig) *driver.Redactor { + more := driver.Redaction{Env: d.env(cfg), Dirs: []string{cfg.PrivateDir}} + for _, server := range cfg.MCPServers { + more.Env = append(more.Env, driver.EnvOf(server.Env)...) + } + return driver.NewRedactor(cfg.Redaction.With(more)) +} + +// env is the worker's whole environment: the dispatcher's, plus what Codex +// itself needs. +func (d *Driver) env(cfg driver.SessionConfig) []string { + return mergeEnv(cfg.Env, driver.BuildEnv(Env, d.opts.Lookup, nil)) +} + +// LoadSession implements driver.Driver: `codex exec resume <thread id>`. +func (d *Driver) LoadSession(ctx context.Context, cfg driver.SessionConfig, sessionID string) (driver.Session, error) { + if !validThreadID(sessionID) { + return nil, d.redactor(cfg).Err(fmt.Errorf("%w: %w: session id %q is not a Codex thread id", driver.ErrNotStarted, driver.ErrUnusable, sessionID)) + } + s, err := d.start(ctx, cfg, sessionID) + return s, d.redactor(cfg).Err(err) +} + +// Policy Codex runs every session under, as its turn_context spells it. +const ( + approvalNever = "never" + sandboxWorkdir = "workspace-write" +) + +// disabledFeatures are Codex features that reach past the session's MCP +// servers and working directory: the account's connected apps and plugins, +// the host's hooks, a browser and the desktop, image generation, memories +// shared across sessions, and installing what a skill asks for. +var disabledFeatures = []string{ + "apps", "plugins", "remote_plugin", "hooks", + "browser_use", "browser_use_external", "computer_use", "in_app_browser", + "image_generation", "memories", "skill_mcp_dependency_install", "tool_suggest", +} + +// allowedKinds are the tool kinds a policy may allow that Codex can honor: +// its reads, searches and planning run inside the sandbox that confines +// edits to the working directory. +var allowedKinds = []driver.ToolKind{driver.ToolRead, driver.ToolSearch, driver.ToolThink} + +var validServerName = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$`) + +// Args is the command line for a session, without the binary. Exposed so the +// flags that hold the policy are tested as written. +func Args(cfg driver.SessionConfig, resumeID, model string) ([]string, error) { + if cfg.Policy == nil { + return nil, errors.New("codex: a session needs a policy") + } + rules := cfg.Policy.Rules() + if rules.Mode != driver.ModeEditsInWorkDir { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: codex: no Codex sandbox for policy mode %q", driver.ErrUnusable, rules.Mode) + } + if filepath.Clean(rules.WorkDir) != filepath.Clean(cfg.Cwd) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: codex: the policy's working directory %q is not the session's %q", driver.ErrUnusable, rules.WorkDir, cfg.Cwd) + } + for _, kind := range rules.AllowKinds { + if !slices.Contains(allowedKinds, kind) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: codex: no Codex policy allows kind %q and nothing else", driver.ErrUnusable, kind) + } + } + + args := []string{"exec"} + if resumeID != "" { + args = append(args, "resume") + } + args = append(args, + "--json", + // A -c key Codex does not know is ignored in silence, and the flags + // below are what invariant 1 rests on. + "--strict-config", + // The host's config.toml (its MCP servers, profiles, hooks, trust) + // and its execpolicy rules are not this session's. + "--ignore-user-config", + "--ignore-rules", + // connect.json approved the directory; Codex's own trust prompt has + // nobody to answer it. + "--skip-git-repo-check", + "-c", "approval_policy="+tomlString(approvalNever), + "-c", "sandbox_mode="+tomlString(sandboxWorkdir), + "-c", "sandbox_workspace_write.network_access=false", + "-c", "sandbox_workspace_write.exclude_slash_tmp=true", + "-c", "sandbox_workspace_write.exclude_tmpdir_env_var=true", + "-c", "sandbox_workspace_write.writable_roots=[]", + // The model's shell commands get Codex's core variables, not the + // worker's whole environment. + "-c", "shell_environment_policy.inherit="+tomlString("core"), + "-c", "web_search="+tomlString("disabled"), + // Skills on the host (the connector's own front-thread skill among + // them) are not instructions this worker follows. + "-c", "skills.bundled.enabled=false", + "-c", "skills.include_instructions=false", + ) + for _, f := range disabledFeatures { + args = append(args, "--disable", f) + } + for _, s := range cfg.MCPServers { + if !validServerName.MatchString(s.Name) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: codex: MCP server name %q is not one Codex's config can key", driver.ErrUnusable, s.Name) + } + if s.Command == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: codex: MCP server %q has no command", driver.ErrUnusable, s.Name) + } + approval := "prompt" + if slices.Contains(rules.AllowMCPServers, s.Name) { + approval = "approve" + } + key := "mcp_servers." + s.Name + "." + env, err := tomlTable(s.Env) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: codex: MCP server %q: %w", driver.ErrUnusable, s.Name, err) + } + args = append(args, + "-c", key+"command="+tomlString(s.Command), + "-c", key+"args="+tomlArray(s.Args), + "-c", key+"env="+env, + "-c", key+"required=true", + "-c", key+"default_tools_approval_mode="+tomlString(approval), + ) + } + if model != "" { + args = append(args, "--model", model) + } + if resumeID != "" { + args = append(args, resumeID) + } + // The prompt is read from stdin, never argv. + return append(args, "-"), nil +} + +func (d *Driver) start(ctx context.Context, cfg driver.SessionConfig, resumeID string) (driver.Session, error) { + if cfg.Policy == nil || cfg.PrivateDir == "" || cfg.Cwd == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: a session needs a policy, a working directory and a private directory", driver.ErrNotStarted) + } + env := d.env(cfg) + sessions, err := sessionsDir(env) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", driver.ErrNotStarted, err) + } + var offset int64 + if resumeID != "" { + path, err := findRollout(sessions, resumeID) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", driver.ErrNotStarted, err) + } + info, err := os.Stat(path) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", driver.ErrNotStarted, err) + } + offset = info.Size() + } + args, err := Args(cfg, resumeID, d.opts.Model) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", driver.ErrNotStarted, err) + } + worker, err := driver.StartWorker(ctx, cfg.Launcher, cfg.Scope, driver.Command{Path: d.opts.Binary, Args: args, Env: env, Dir: cfg.Cwd}) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + s := &session{ + red: d.redactor(cfg), + recorder: cfg.Refusals, + recorded: map[string]bool{}, + id: resumeID, + worker: worker, + cwd: cfg.Cwd, + sessions: sessions, + offset: offset, + grace: d.opts.CloseGrace, + verifyAfter: d.opts.VerifyTimeout, + writing: make(chan struct{}, 1), + updates: make(chan driver.Update, 256), + readerEnd: make(chan struct{}), + } + go s.read() //nolint:contextcheck // the reader outlives the start's context: it runs as long as the worker does + return s, nil +} + +// sessionsDir is where Codex writes rollouts for this environment. +func sessionsDir(env []string) (string, error) { + vars := driver.EnvMap(env) + home := vars["CODEX_HOME"] + if home == "" { + if vars["HOME"] == "" { + return "", errors.New("codex: the worker's environment names no HOME or CODEX_HOME") + } + home = filepath.Join(vars["HOME"], ".codex") + } + if !filepath.IsAbs(home) { + return "", fmt.Errorf("codex: CODEX_HOME %q is not absolute", home) + } + return filepath.Join(home, "sessions"), nil +} + +// mergeEnv adds the driver's own variables to the dispatcher's allowlisted +// environment. A variable the dispatcher set wins. +func mergeEnv(base, extra []string) []string { + have := map[string]bool{} + for _, kv := range base { + k, _, _ := strings.Cut(kv, "=") + have[k] = true + } + out := slices.Clone(base) + if out == nil { + out = []string{} + } + for _, kv := range extra { + k, _, _ := strings.Cut(kv, "=") + if !have[k] { + out = append(out, kv) + } + } + slices.Sort(out) + return out +} + +var validEnvName = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$`) + +// tomlTable is an inline TOML table of strings, keys sorted. +func tomlTable(values map[string]string) (string, error) { + keys := make([]string, 0, len(values)) + for k := range values { + if !validEnvName.MatchString(k) { + return "", fmt.Errorf("environment variable name %q", k) + } + keys = append(keys, k) + } + slices.Sort(keys) + parts := make([]string, 0, len(keys)) + for _, k := range keys { + parts = append(parts, tomlString(k)+"="+tomlString(values[k])) + } + return "{" + strings.Join(parts, ",") + "}", nil +} + +// tomlString is a TOML basic string. Only \\, \" and \uXXXX escapes are +// used, which TOML and JSON read alike. +func tomlString(s string) string { + var b strings.Builder + b.WriteByte('"') + for _, r := range s { + switch { + case r == '"' || r == '\\': + b.WriteByte('\\') + b.WriteRune(r) + case r < 0x20 || r == 0x7f: + fmt.Fprintf(&b, `\u%04x`, r) + default: + b.WriteRune(r) + } + } + b.WriteByte('"') + return b.String() +} + +func tomlArray(items []string) string { + quoted := make([]string, len(items)) + for i, s := range items { + quoted[i] = tomlString(s) + } + return "[" + strings.Join(quoted, ",") + "]" +} + +// session is one Codex process. +type session struct { + worker *driver.Worker + cwd string + sessions string + offset int64 + grace time.Duration + verifyAfter time.Duration + + // red is what every error, update text and stderr tail of this session + // passes through. + red *driver.Redactor + // recorder records each refusal once, as it is made or read (driver's + // "Refusals"); recorded is what has been recorded already, by tool call + // id for the refusals on the stream and by line for the ones Codex only + // logs. + recorder driver.RefusalRecorder + recorded map[string]bool + + updates chan driver.Update + readerEnd chan struct{} + + mu sync.Mutex + id string + prompted bool + // ended is the reader's record that the worker's output is over. + ended bool + // cancelEarly is a Cancel before any prompt: the prompt, when it comes, + // is not sent. + cancelEarly bool + turn *turn + verifyDone chan struct{} + verifyErr error + closed bool + // writing is a one-slot semaphore around the worker's stdin. A lock + // would be worse: a worker that stops reading its input blocks the + // write, and everything waiting on the lock — Close among them — waits + // with it. Whoever cannot take it in time goes on without it and ends + // the process instead. + writing chan struct{} +} + +// turn is the prompt in flight. +type turn struct { + done chan struct{} + result driver.PromptResult + err error + canceled bool + refusals []driver.Refusal +} + +var _ driver.Session = (*session)(nil) + +func (s *session) ID() string { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + return s.id +} +func (s *session) Process() driver.Process { return s.worker.Process() } + +// StderrTail is the last line of the worker's stderr, redacted, for a caller +// diagnosing an end. +func (s *session) StderrTail() string { return s.worker.StderrTail(s.red) } +func (s *session) Updates() <-chan driver.Update { return s.updates } +func (s *session) Done() <-chan struct{} { return s.worker.Done() } +func (s *session) Exit() driver.Exit { return s.worker.Exit() } + +// errOnePrompt is a second prompt to a Codex process. +var errOnePrompt = fmt.Errorf("%w: a Codex session takes one prompt", driver.ErrSessionEnded) + +// Prompt implements driver.Session: the prompt is written to stdin, which is +// then closed, and the turn runs to its end. +func (s *session) Prompt(ctx context.Context, prompt string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + s.mu.Lock() + switch { + case s.closed: + s.mu.Unlock() + return driver.PromptResult{}, driver.ErrSessionEnded + case s.prompted: + s.mu.Unlock() + return driver.PromptResult{}, errOnePrompt + case s.cancelEarly: + // Cancel came before the prompt and already ended the worker: + // nothing is written, and the turn is canceled, even if the worker's + // output is over by now. + s.prompted = true + s.mu.Unlock() + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnCanceled}, nil + case s.ended: + // The worker's output ended while this prompt was on its way in: a + // turn installed now would wait for a result nobody is left to write. + s.mu.Unlock() + return driver.PromptResult{}, driver.ErrSessionEnded + } + s.prompted = true + t := &turn{done: make(chan struct{})} + s.turn = t + s.mu.Unlock() + + // The write runs apart: a worker that stops reading blocks it, and a ctx + // that ends must still end the wait (driver.Session's contract), while the + // turn itself is ended by Cancel or Close. What it may end up recording — + // a refusal read from the worker's last word — outlives this prompt's + // context, as every refusal does. + //nolint:contextcheck // the recorder's write is not this prompt's to cancel + go func() { + s.writing <- struct{}{} + _, err := io.WriteString(s.worker.Stdin(), prompt) + if closeErr := s.worker.Stdin().Close(); err == nil { + err = closeErr + } + <-s.writing + if err == nil { + return + } + // A cancel that closed the worker's stdin is what made the write + // fail: the turn is canceled, not a session that ended on its own. + s.mu.Lock() + canceled := t.canceled + s.mu.Unlock() + if canceled { + s.finishCanceled(t) + } else { + s.finish(t, driver.PromptResult{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", driver.ErrSessionEnded, err)) + } + }() + select { + case <-t.done: + return t.result, s.red.Err(t.err) + case <-ctx.Done(): + return driver.PromptResult{}, ctx.Err() + } +} + +// Cancel implements driver.Session: the process group is ended, and the turn +// in flight ends canceled. A Cancel before the session's prompt cancels that +// prompt, which the dispatcher may send from another goroutine an instant +// later. +func (s *session) Cancel(context.Context) error { + s.mu.Lock() + t := s.turn + if t != nil { + t.canceled = true + } else if !s.prompted { + // A cancel that races the prompt it is meant for: the worker is ended + // now, whether that prompt ever comes or not. + s.cancelEarly = true + t = &turn{} + } + s.mu.Unlock() + if t == nil { + return nil + } + go s.worker.Terminate(s.grace) + return nil +} + +// Close implements driver.Session. +func (s *session) Close() error { + s.mu.Lock() + s.closed = true + s.mu.Unlock() + // Stdin is closed under the semaphore when it is free; a prompt still + // blocked writing it keeps it, and Terminate below ends that. + select { + case s.writing <- struct{}{}: + _ = s.worker.Stdin().Close() + <-s.writing + case <-time.After(s.grace): + } + select { + case <-s.worker.Done(): + case <-time.After(s.grace): + } + s.worker.Terminate(s.grace) + select { + case <-s.readerEnd: + case <-time.After(s.grace): + // The worker is gone and a descendant outside its group still holds + // the output: stop reading it, rather than hold the attempt, its + // working directory and the connector's shutdown open forever. + s.worker.CloseStdout() + <-s.readerEnd + } + return nil +} + +func (s *session) finish(t *turn, result driver.PromptResult, err error) { + s.mu.Lock() + if s.turn != t { + s.mu.Unlock() + return + } + s.turn = nil + s.mu.Unlock() + t.result, t.err = result, err + close(t.done) +} + +func (s *session) emit(u driver.Update) { + u.At = time.Now() + u.Tool = s.red.Sanitize(u.Tool) + u.ToolCallID = s.red.Sanitize(u.ToolCallID) + select { + case s.updates <- u: + default: + } +} + +// read maps the process's JSON lines onto updates and the turn's result until +// the process closes its stdout. +func (s *session) read() { + defer func() { + // The updates channel closes last: finishing the turn still emits + // (a refusal read from stderr), and a send on a closed channel is a + // panic, not a dropped update. + defer close(s.updates) + s.mu.Lock() + s.ended = true + t := s.turn + s.mu.Unlock() + // Whatever ended the turn, and whether or not one is still in flight, + // a refusal Codex only logged is read before the session is done: a + // cancel, which finishes its turn early, is where they would + // otherwise be lost. The stderr is whole only once the process is + // gone, which closing its stdout does not say. + if s.worker != nil { + select { + case <-s.worker.Done(): + case <-time.After(s.grace): + } + } + s.stderrRefusals() + if t != nil { + s.mu.Lock() + canceled := t.canceled + s.mu.Unlock() + refusals := s.refusalsOf(t) + switch { + case canceled: + s.finishCanceled(t) + default: + err := s.failedVerification() + if err == nil { + err = driver.ErrSessionEnded + } + s.finish(t, driver.PromptResult{Refusals: refusals}, err) + } + } + close(s.readerEnd) + }() + scanner := bufio.NewScanner(s.worker.Stdout()) + scanner.Buffer(make([]byte, 64<<10), 64<<20) + for scanner.Scan() { + s.handle(scanner.Bytes()) + } + // Drain what a scanner error left, so the process never blocks writing. + _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, s.worker.Stdout()) +} + +// event is the part of a `codex exec --json` line the driver reads. Text, +// commands, arguments and results are never decoded into anything kept. +type event struct { + Type string `json:"type"` + ThreadID string `json:"thread_id"` + Item *struct { + ID string `json:"id"` + Type string `json:"type"` + Status string `json:"status"` + Server string `json:"server"` + Tool string `json:"tool"` + Text string `json:"text"` + Error *struct { + Message string `json:"message"` + } `json:"error"` + } `json:"item"` + Usage *struct { + InputTokens int64 `json:"input_tokens"` + OutputTokens int64 `json:"output_tokens"` + } `json:"usage"` +} + +func (s *session) handle(line []byte) { + var e event + if err := json.Unmarshal(line, &e); err != nil { + return + } + switch e.Type { + case "thread.started": + s.threadStarted(e.ThreadID) + case "item.started", "item.updated", "item.completed": + if e.Item != nil { + s.item(e.Type, e) + } + case "turn.completed": + s.turnCompleted(e) + case "turn.failed": + s.turnFailed() + } +} + +// threadStarted records the thread id and starts reading the rollout for the +// policy Codex applied (invariant 3). An unsafe session is ended as soon as the +// check fails, while the model may still be thinking; a turn that ends first +// waits for the check. +func (s *session) threadStarted(id string) { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + if s.verifyDone != nil { + return + } + done := make(chan struct{}) + s.verifyDone = done + if !validThreadID(id) || (s.id != "" && s.id != id) { + s.verifyErr = fmt.Errorf("%w: Codex reported thread %q", driver.ErrUnsafeMode, sanitize(id)) + close(done) + go s.unsafe(s.verifyErr) + return + } + s.id = id + go func() { + err := verifyRollout(s.sessions, id, s.offset, s.cwd, s.verifyAfter) + s.mu.Lock() + s.verifyErr = err + s.mu.Unlock() + close(done) + if err != nil { + s.unsafe(err) + } + }() +} + +// unsafe ends the turn in flight with err and the process group. +func (s *session) unsafe(err error) { + s.mu.Lock() + t := s.turn + s.mu.Unlock() + if t == nil { + s.worker.Terminate(0) + return + } + s.finishUnsafe(t, err) +} + +// finishUnsafe ends a turn whose session did not run under the policy it was +// asked to: the worker goes first, then its last word is read, so the result +// carries the refusals it made and logged before it was stopped, as every +// other ending does. +func (s *session) finishUnsafe(t *turn, err error) { + s.worker.Terminate(0) + s.lastWord() + s.finish(t, driver.PromptResult{Refusals: s.refusalsOf(t)}, err) +} + +// failedVerification is a turn that ended some other way than completed: once +// Codex reported its thread, the check's verdict is waited for, so an unsafe +// session is reported as unsafe rather than as a plain failure. Before a +// thread there was no turn to verify. +func (s *session) failedVerification() error { + s.mu.Lock() + started := s.verifyDone != nil + s.mu.Unlock() + if !started { + return nil + } + return s.verified() +} + +// lastWord waits for the worker to go, bounded by the grace, and reads the +// refusals it only logged. Whatever ends a turn ends it after this, so a +// refusal Codex wrote on its way out is in the turn's result and not only in +// the ledger. +func (s *session) lastWord() { + if s.worker != nil { + select { + case <-s.worker.Done(): + case <-time.After(s.grace): + } + } + s.stderrRefusals() +} + +// finishCanceled ends a turn the connector canceled, after the worker's last +// word. A policy check that has already failed is reported over the cancel; +// one still running is not waited for, because the process it would judge is +// being ended by the cancel anyway. +func (s *session) finishCanceled(t *turn) { + s.lastWord() + // The turn's refusals are read after the worker's last word, so the + // result carries what the ledger carries. + refusals := s.refusalsOf(t) + s.mu.Lock() + done := s.verifyDone + s.mu.Unlock() + if done != nil { + select { + case <-done: + s.mu.Lock() + verdict := s.verifyErr + s.mu.Unlock() + if verdict != nil { + s.finish(t, driver.PromptResult{Refusals: refusals}, verdict) + return + } + default: + } + } + s.finish(t, driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnCanceled, Refusals: refusals}, nil) +} + +// verified waits for the policy check's verdict. +func (s *session) verified() error { + s.mu.Lock() + done := s.verifyDone + s.mu.Unlock() + if done == nil { + return fmt.Errorf("%w: the turn ended before Codex reported its thread", driver.ErrUnsafeMode) + } + select { + case <-done: + case <-time.After(s.verifyAfter + 5*time.Second): + return fmt.Errorf("%w: the policy check did not finish", driver.ErrUnsafeMode) + } + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + return s.verifyErr +} + +func (s *session) item(kind string, e event) { + it := e.Item + u := driver.Update{ToolCallID: it.ID, Status: toolStatus(kind, it.Status)} + switch it.Type { + case "agent_message": + if kind == "item.completed" { + s.emit(driver.Update{Kind: driver.UpdateAgentMessageChunk, Chars: len(it.Text)}) + } + return + case "reasoning", "error", "user_message": + return + case "command_execution": + u.Tool, u.ToolKind = "exec", driver.ToolExecute + case "file_change": + u.Tool, u.ToolKind = "apply_patch", driver.ToolEdit + case "mcp_tool_call": + u.Tool, u.ToolKind = "mcp__"+sanitize(it.Server)+"__"+sanitize(it.Tool), driver.ToolOther + case "web_search": + u.Tool, u.ToolKind = "web_search", driver.ToolFetch + case "todo_list": + if kind == "item.completed" || kind == "item.started" { + s.emit(driver.Update{Kind: driver.UpdatePlan}) + } + return + default: + u.Tool, u.ToolKind = sanitize(it.Type), driver.ToolOther + } + if kind == "item.started" { + u.Kind = driver.UpdateToolCall + } else { + u.Kind = driver.UpdateToolCallUpdate + } + s.emit(u) + if kind == "item.completed" && it.Type == "mcp_tool_call" && it.Error != nil && refusedByApproval(it.Error.Message) { + s.refused("item:"+it.ID, it.ID, u.Tool, u.ToolKind) + } +} + +func toolStatus(kind, status string) driver.ToolStatus { + switch status { + case "completed": + return driver.ToolCompleted + case "failed", "declined": + return driver.ToolFailed + case "in_progress": + return driver.ToolInProgress + } + if kind == "item.started" { + return driver.ToolInProgress + } + return driver.ToolCompleted +} + +// refusedByApproval is Codex's message for a call its approval policy +// refused: under approvals set to never, a call that needs one is refused. +func refusedByApproval(message string) bool { + return strings.Contains(message, "approval policy is never") || strings.Contains(message, "rejected by user approval settings") +} + +// refused is the moment a refusal is read: it is recorded through the +// session's recorder before anything else is done with it, and only the first +// time its tool call id is seen (driver's "Refusals"). A refusal Codex logs +// and gives no id gets the key the caller passes. +func (s *session) refused(key, id, tool string, kind driver.ToolKind) { + refusal := driver.Refusal{ToolCallID: s.red.Sanitize(id), Tool: s.red.Sanitize(tool)} + s.mu.Lock() + first := !s.recorded[key] + if first { + s.recorded[key] = true + if s.turn != nil { + s.turn.refusals = append(s.turn.refusals, refusal) + } + } + s.mu.Unlock() + if !first { + return + } + if s.recorder != nil { + // The recorder owns what happens when the ledger refuses the write; + // the refusal happened either way. + _ = s.recorder.RecordRefusal(context.Background(), refusal) + } + s.emit(driver.Update{Kind: driver.UpdatePermission, ToolCallID: id, Tool: tool, ToolKind: kind, Allowed: false}) +} + +func (s *session) turnCompleted(e event) { + s.mu.Lock() + t := s.turn + s.mu.Unlock() + if t == nil { + return + } + s.mu.Lock() + canceled := t.canceled + s.mu.Unlock() + if canceled { + // A cancel that won does not wait out the policy check either. + s.finishCanceled(t) + return + } + if err := s.verified(); err != nil { + s.finishUnsafe(t, err) + return + } + // Codex exits right after the turn it completed, and its stderr is whole + // only once it has: a refusal it logged and did not put on the stream is + // in the tail by then. + select { + case <-s.worker.Done(): + case <-time.After(s.grace): + } + s.stderrRefusals() + s.mu.Lock() + result := driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnEndTurn, Refusals: slices.Clone(t.refusals)} + if t.canceled { + // Only a cancel the connector asked for reads as canceled. + result.Stop = driver.TurnCanceled + } + s.mu.Unlock() + if e.Usage != nil { + result.Usage = driver.Usage{InputTokens: e.Usage.InputTokens, OutputTokens: e.Usage.OutputTokens} + s.emit(driver.Update{Kind: driver.UpdateUsage, Usage: &result.Usage}) + } + s.finish(t, result, nil) +} + +func (s *session) turnFailed() { + s.mu.Lock() + t := s.turn + s.mu.Unlock() + if t == nil { + return + } + s.mu.Lock() + canceled := t.canceled + s.mu.Unlock() + if canceled { + s.finishCanceled(t) + return + } + // As after a completed turn: the stderr tail is whole once Codex exits. + select { + case <-s.worker.Done(): + case <-time.After(s.grace): + } + s.stderrRefusals() + refusals := s.refusalsOf(t) + if err := s.failedVerification(); err != nil { + s.finishUnsafe(t, err) + return + } + s.finish(t, driver.PromptResult{Refusals: refusals}, errors.New("codex: the turn failed")) +} + +// refusalsOf is a turn's refusals so far. +func (s *session) refusalsOf(t *turn) []driver.Refusal { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + return slices.Clone(t.refusals) +} + +// stderrRefusals counts the refusals Codex logs but does not put on its JSON +// stream: an edit outside the working directory. Best effort: the stderr +// kept is a tail. +func (s *session) stderrRefusals() { + if s.worker == nil { + return + } + // Every line the worker's stderr kept, sanitized: a refusal Codex logs + // and does not put on the stream is one of them, wherever it is in the + // output. + seen := map[string]int{} + for _, line := range s.worker.StderrLines(s.red) { + if !refusedByApproval(line) { + continue + } + tool, kind := "exec", driver.ToolExecute + if strings.Contains(line, "patch rejected") { + tool, kind = "apply_patch", driver.ToolEdit + } + // Codex gives these no id, so the key is the line and how many times + // it has been seen in this output: two refusals Codex logged the same + // way are two, and reading the same output again — every way a turn + // can end reads it — records each of them once. + seen[line]++ + s.refused("stderr:"+strconv.Itoa(seen[line])+":"+line, "", tool, kind) + } +} + +// turnContext is the part of a rollout's turn_context record the driver +// checks. +type turnContext struct { + Cwd string `json:"cwd"` + ApprovalPolicy string `json:"approval_policy"` + SandboxPolicy struct { + Type string `json:"type"` + NetworkAccess bool `json:"network_access"` + ExcludeTmpdirEnvVar bool `json:"exclude_tmpdir_env_var"` + ExcludeSlashTmp bool `json:"exclude_slash_tmp"` + WritableRoots []string `json:"writable_roots"` + } `json:"sandbox_policy"` + // FileSystem is the filesystem policy Codex's sandbox is actually built + // from; PermissionProfile carries the same in older records. + FileSystem *fileSystemPolicy `json:"file_system_sandbox_policy"` + PermissionProfile *struct { + FileSystem *fileSystemPolicy `json:"file_system"` + } `json:"permission_profile"` +} + +type fileSystemPolicy struct { + Kind string `json:"kind"` + Type string `json:"type"` + Entries []struct { + Path struct { + Type string `json:"type"` + Path string `json:"path"` + } `json:"path"` + Access string `json:"access"` + } `json:"entries"` +} + +// writesOnlyIn reports whether a filesystem policy is restricted and lets +// nothing but cwd be written. +func (p *fileSystemPolicy) writesOnlyIn(cwd string) bool { + if p == nil || (p.Kind != "restricted" && p.Type != "restricted") { + return false + } + writable := false + for _, e := range p.Entries { + if e.Access == "read" || e.Access == "none" { + continue + } + if e.Path.Type != "path" || !samePath(e.Path.Path, cwd) { + return false + } + writable = true + } + return writable +} + +// verifyRollout waits for the first turn_context record after offset in the +// thread's rollout and checks it is the policy the flags asked for. +func verifyRollout(sessions, threadID string, offset int64, cwd string, timeout time.Duration) error { + deadline := time.Now().Add(timeout) + var path string + for { + if path == "" { + if p, err := findRollout(sessions, threadID); err == nil { + path = p + } + } + if path != "" { + tc, found, next, err := readTurnContext(path, offset) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("%w: reading Codex's rollout: %w", driver.ErrUnsafeMode, err) + } + offset = next + if found { + return checkTurnContext(tc, cwd) + } + } + if time.Now().After(deadline) { + return fmt.Errorf("%w: Codex's rollout showed no policy within %s", driver.ErrUnsafeMode, timeout) + } + time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond) + } +} + +func checkTurnContext(tc turnContext, cwd string) error { + p := tc.SandboxPolicy + switch { + case tc.ApprovalPolicy != approvalNever: + return fmt.Errorf("%w: asked for approvals %q, Codex applied %q", driver.ErrUnsafeMode, approvalNever, sanitize(tc.ApprovalPolicy)) + case p.Type != sandboxWorkdir: + return fmt.Errorf("%w: asked for sandbox %q, Codex applied %q", driver.ErrUnsafeMode, sandboxWorkdir, sanitize(p.Type)) + case p.NetworkAccess || !p.ExcludeSlashTmp || !p.ExcludeTmpdirEnvVar || len(p.WritableRoots) > 0: + return fmt.Errorf("%w: Codex's sandbox reaches past the working directory", driver.ErrUnsafeMode) + case !samePath(tc.Cwd, cwd): + return fmt.Errorf("%w: Codex runs in another directory than the session's", driver.ErrUnsafeMode) + } + fs := tc.FileSystem + if fs == nil && tc.PermissionProfile != nil { + fs = tc.PermissionProfile.FileSystem + } + if !fs.writesOnlyIn(cwd) { + return fmt.Errorf("%w: Codex's filesystem sandbox writes past the working directory, or was not reported", driver.ErrUnsafeMode) + } + return nil +} + +func samePath(a, b string) bool { + if a == "" || b == "" { + return false + } + if filepath.Clean(a) == filepath.Clean(b) { + return true + } + ra, errA := filepath.EvalSymlinks(a) + rb, errB := filepath.EvalSymlinks(b) + return errA == nil && errB == nil && ra == rb +} + +// readTurnContext scans complete lines from offset for a turn_context record. +// It returns the offset after the last complete line it read. +func readTurnContext(path string, offset int64) (turnContext, bool, int64, error) { + f, err := os.Open(path) + if err != nil { + return turnContext{}, false, offset, err + } + defer func() { _ = f.Close() }() + if _, err := f.Seek(offset, io.SeekStart); err != nil { + return turnContext{}, false, offset, err + } + r := bufio.NewReaderSize(f, 64<<10) + for { + line, err := r.ReadBytes('\n') + if err != nil { + // A line without its newline is still being written. + if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) { + return turnContext{}, false, offset, nil + } + return turnContext{}, false, offset, err + } + offset += int64(len(line)) + var rec struct { + Type string `json:"type"` + Payload json.RawMessage `json:"payload"` + } + if json.Unmarshal(line, &rec) != nil || rec.Type != "turn_context" { + continue + } + var tc turnContext + if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Payload, &tc); err != nil { + return turnContext{}, false, offset, errors.New("an unreadable turn_context record") + } + return tc, true, offset, nil + } +} + +// findRollout finds a thread's rollout file: sessions/YYYY/MM/DD/rollout-*-<id>.jsonl. +func findRollout(sessions, threadID string) (string, error) { + if !validThreadID(threadID) { + return "", fmt.Errorf("codex: %q is not a thread id", sanitize(threadID)) + } + matches, err := filepath.Glob(filepath.Join(sessions, "*", "*", "*", "rollout-*-"+threadID+".jsonl")) + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + switch len(matches) { + case 0: + return "", fmt.Errorf("codex: no rollout for thread %s", threadID) + case 1: + return matches[0], nil + } + return "", fmt.Errorf("codex: %d rollouts for thread %s", len(matches), threadID) +} + +var threadIDPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$`) + +func validThreadID(s string) bool { return threadIDPattern.MatchString(s) } + +// sanitize keeps a vendor token (a server or tool name, a policy value) to a +// short run of plain characters. +func sanitize(s string) string { + out := make([]rune, 0, len(s)) + for _, r := range s { + if (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || (r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z') || (r >= '0' && r <= '9') || r == '_' || r == '-' { + out = append(out, r) + } + if len(out) >= 64 { + break + } + } + return string(out) +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/codex/codex_test.go b/internal/connector/driver/codex/codex_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..494a506f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/codex/codex_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,1138 @@ +//go:build unix + +package codex + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "slices" + "strconv" + "strings" + "syscall" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver/drivertest" +) + +const ( + testThread = "01a0adfe-499c-7f63-9553-b9975a3c4b55" + testToken = "test-token-not-real" + hostCanary = "host-canary-not-real" + serverOnly = "declared-for-the-server-only" +) + +// safeTurnContext is the policy the driver's flags ask for. +func safeTurnContext() map[string]any { + return map[string]any{ + "approval_policy": "never", + "sandbox_policy": map[string]any{ + "type": "workspace-write", "network_access": false, + "exclude_tmpdir_env_var": true, "exclude_slash_tmp": true, + }, + // "$CWD" is the fake's own working directory. + "file_system_sandbox_policy": map[string]any{ + "kind": "restricted", + "entries": []any{ + map[string]any{"path": map[string]any{"type": "special", "value": map[string]any{"kind": "root"}}, "access": "read"}, + map[string]any{"path": map[string]any{"type": "path", "path": "$CWD"}, "access": "write"}, + map[string]any{"path": map[string]any{"type": "path", "path": "$CWD/.git"}, "access": "read"}, + }, + }, + } +} + +func fsEntries(tc map[string]any) []any { + return tc["file_system_sandbox_policy"].(map[string]any)["entries"].([]any) +} + +type harness struct { + t *testing.T + home string // CODEX_HOME + workDir string + private string + mcpOut string + drv *Driver +} + +func newHarness(t *testing.T, sc scenario) *harness { + t.Helper() + root := t.TempDir() + h := &harness{ + t: t, + home: filepath.Join(root, "codex-home"), + workDir: filepath.Join(root, "work"), + private: filepath.Join(root, "private"), + mcpOut: filepath.Join(root, "mcp-env.txt"), + } + require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(h.home, 0o700)) + require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(h.workDir, 0o700)) + require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(h.private, 0o700)) + if sc.Thread == "" { + sc.Thread = testThread + } + h.scenario(sc) + self, err := os.Executable() + require.NoError(t, err) + host := map[string]string{ + "CODEX_HOME": h.home, + "HOME": root, + "PATH": os.Getenv("PATH"), + "HOST_SECRET_NOT_REAL": hostCanary, + "OPENAI_API_KEY": hostCanary, + } + h.drv = New(Options{ + Binary: self, + Lookup: func(k string) (string, bool) { v, ok := host[k]; return v, ok }, + CloseGrace: 2 * time.Second, + VerifyTimeout: time.Second, + }) + return h +} + +func (h *harness) scenario(sc scenario) { + if sc.Thread == "" { + sc.Thread = testThread + } + data, err := json.Marshal(sc) + require.NoError(h.t, err) + require.NoError(h.t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(h.home, "scenario.json"), data, 0o600)) +} + +type testPolicy struct { + workDir string + kinds []driver.ToolKind + servers []string + mode driver.PermissionMode +} + +func (p testPolicy) Decide(context.Context, driver.PermissionRequest) driver.PermissionDecision { + return driver.PermissionDecision{} +} + +func (p testPolicy) Rules() driver.PermissionRules { + mode := p.mode + if mode == "" { + mode = driver.ModeEditsInWorkDir + } + return driver.PermissionRules{Mode: mode, WorkDir: p.workDir, AllowKinds: p.kinds, AllowMCPServers: p.servers} +} + +func (h *harness) config() driver.SessionConfig { + return driver.SessionConfig{ + Cwd: h.workDir, + Env: []string{"HOME=" + filepath.Dir(h.home), "PATH=" + os.Getenv("PATH")}, + MCPServers: []driver.MCPServer{{ + Name: "basecamp", + Command: "/bin/sh", + Args: []string{"-c", `env > "$MCP_ENV_OUT"`}, + Env: map[string]string{"MCP_ENV_OUT": h.mcpOut, "SERVER_ONLY_NOT_SECRET": serverOnly, "PATH": os.Getenv("PATH")}, + }}, + Policy: connector.DefaultPolicy(h.workDir), + Scope: driver.Scope{WorkDir: h.workDir}, + PrivateDir: h.private, + } +} + +func (h *harness) observed() observed { + h.t.Helper() + data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(h.home, "observed.json")) + require.NoError(h.t, err) + var obs observed + require.NoError(h.t, json.Unmarshal(data, &obs)) + return obs +} + +func (h *harness) run(ctx context.Context, cfg driver.SessionConfig) (driver.Session, driver.PromptResult, error) { + h.t.Helper() + s, err := h.drv.NewSession(ctx, cfg) + require.NoError(h.t, err) + h.t.Cleanup(func() { _ = s.Close() }) + result, err := s.Prompt(ctx, "Task 1. Event 2.") + return s, result, err +} + +func turnCompleted() string { + return `{"type":"turn.completed","usage":{"input_tokens":120,"output_tokens":7}}` +} + +// The flags hold the v1 policy as written: the host's configuration, rules, +// features and skills off; approvals never; the sandbox confined to the +// working directory; the MCP server required, its tools approved only when +// the policy allows its server; the prompt on stdin. +func TestArgsHoldThePolicy(t *testing.T) { + cfg := driver.SessionConfig{ + Cwd: "/work/app", + Policy: connector.DefaultPolicy("/work/app"), + MCPServers: []driver.MCPServer{ + {Name: "basecamp", Command: "/bin/basecamp", Args: []string{"connect", "worker-mcp", "--socket", "/run/token.sock"}, Env: map[string]string{"HOME": "/home/op", "BASECAMP_NO_KEYRING": `a"quoted\value`}}, + {Name: "other", Command: "/bin/other"}, + }, + } + args, err := Args(cfg, "", "") + require.NoError(t, err) + + joined := strings.Join(args, "\x00") + for _, want := range [][]string{ + {"--json"}, {"--ignore-user-config"}, {"--ignore-rules"}, + {"-c", `approval_policy="never"`}, + {"-c", `sandbox_mode="workspace-write"`}, + {"-c", "sandbox_workspace_write.network_access=false"}, + {"-c", "sandbox_workspace_write.exclude_slash_tmp=true"}, + {"-c", "sandbox_workspace_write.exclude_tmpdir_env_var=true"}, + {"-c", "sandbox_workspace_write.writable_roots=[]"}, + {"-c", `shell_environment_policy.inherit="core"`}, + {"-c", "skills.include_instructions=false"}, + {"-c", "skills.bundled.enabled=false"}, + {"--disable", "apps"}, {"--disable", "plugins"}, {"--disable", "hooks"}, + {"--strict-config"}, + {"-c", `mcp_servers.basecamp.command="/bin/basecamp"`}, + {"-c", `mcp_servers.basecamp.args=["connect","worker-mcp","--socket","/run/token.sock"]`}, + {"-c", `mcp_servers.basecamp.env={"BASECAMP_NO_KEYRING"="a\"quoted\\value","HOME"="/home/op"}`}, + {"-c", "mcp_servers.basecamp.required=true"}, + {"-c", `mcp_servers.basecamp.default_tools_approval_mode="approve"`}, + {"-c", "mcp_servers.other.required=true"}, + {"-c", `mcp_servers.other.default_tools_approval_mode="prompt"`}, + } { + assert.Contains(t, joined, strings.Join(want, "\x00")) + } + assert.Equal(t, "exec", args[0]) + assert.Equal(t, "-", args[len(args)-1], "the prompt is read from stdin") + + resumed, err := Args(cfg, testThread, "gpt-test") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, []string{"exec", "resume"}, resumed[:2]) + assert.Equal(t, []string{"--model", "gpt-test", testThread, "-"}, resumed[len(resumed)-4:]) +} + +// A policy Codex's flags cannot hold is refused before anything starts. +func TestArgsRefuseAPolicyCodexCannotHold(t *testing.T) { + server := []driver.MCPServer{{Name: "basecamp", Command: "/bin/basecamp"}} + for name, cfg := range map[string]driver.SessionConfig{ + "another mode": {Cwd: "/w", Policy: testPolicy{workDir: "/w", mode: "anything"}, MCPServers: server}, + "another workdir": {Cwd: "/w", Policy: testPolicy{workDir: "/elsewhere"}, MCPServers: server}, + "execute allowed": {Cwd: "/w", Policy: testPolicy{workDir: "/w", kinds: []driver.ToolKind{driver.ToolExecute}}, MCPServers: server}, + "fetch allowed": {Cwd: "/w", Policy: testPolicy{workDir: "/w", kinds: []driver.ToolKind{driver.ToolFetch}}, MCPServers: server}, + "unkeyable server": {Cwd: "/w", Policy: testPolicy{workDir: "/w"}, MCPServers: []driver.MCPServer{{Name: "a.b", Command: "/bin/x"}}}, + "no command": {Cwd: "/w", Policy: testPolicy{workDir: "/w"}, MCPServers: []driver.MCPServer{{Name: "other"}}}, + "unkeyable env name": {Cwd: "/w", Policy: testPolicy{workDir: "/w"}, MCPServers: []driver.MCPServer{{Name: "other", Command: "/bin/x", Env: map[string]string{"A=B": "x"}}}}, + } { + _, err := Args(cfg, "", "") + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrUnusable, name) + } +} + +// Invariants 1 and 2 under the connector's own token carriage: the MCP +// server gets exactly its declared environment, Codex's own environment gets +// none of it and nothing of the host's, and with a task token served on its +// one-use socket (as the dispatcher serves it) the token is in no +// environment, no argv, no log and no file, at any moment of the session. +func TestTheTaskTokenIsNowhereTheDriverTouches(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, scenario{RunMCP: true, TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), Events: []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`, turnCompleted()}}) + tokens, err := connector.ServeTaskToken(h.private, testToken, time.Minute) + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(tokens.Close) + cfg := h.config() + cfg.MCPServers[0].Args = append(cfg.MCPServers[0].Args, "--socket", tokens.Path()) + + var s driver.Session + stop := drivertest.WatchForSecretFiles(testToken, h.private, h.workDir, h.home) + s, result, err := h.run(context.Background(), cfg) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, s.Close()) + assert.Empty(t, stop(), "no file ever held the token") + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnEndTurn, result.Stop) + assert.Equal(t, testThread, s.ID()) + + obs := h.observed() + for _, kv := range obs.Env { + assert.NotContains(t, kv, hostCanary, "nothing outside the allowlist is inherited") + assert.NotContains(t, kv, serverOnly, "an MCP server's environment is not Codex's") + } + assert.Contains(t, obs.Env, "CODEX_HOME="+h.home) + assert.Equal(t, "Task 1. Event 2.", obs.Prompt) + serverEnv, err := os.ReadFile(h.mcpOut) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, string(serverEnv), "SERVER_ONLY_NOT_SECRET="+serverOnly) + + drivertest.RequireNoSecret(t, testToken, drivertest.Places{ + Env: obs.Env, + Args: obs.Args, + Texts: []string{s.(*session).StderrTail(), string(serverEnv)}, + Dirs: []string{h.workDir, h.private, h.home}, + }) +} + +// The credential rule, while the session runs, in drivertest's own form: no +// file under the session's directories ever carries the token. +func TestNoTokenFileEverExists(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, scenario{RunMCP: true, TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), Events: []string{turnCompleted()}}) + tokens, err := connector.ServeTaskToken(h.private, testToken, time.Minute) + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(tokens.Close) + cfg := h.config() + cfg.MCPServers[0].Args = append(cfg.MCPServers[0].Args, "--socket", tokens.Path()) + drivertest.RequireNoSecretFilesDuring(t, testToken, []string{h.private, h.workDir, h.home}, func() { + s, _, err := h.run(context.Background(), cfg) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, s.Close()) + }) +} + +// Invariant 3: a turn is finished only once the rollout shows the policy the +// flags asked for; any other policy, or none, ends the session as unsafe. +func TestTheAppliedPolicyIsVerified(t *testing.T) { + events := []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`, turnCompleted()} + unsafe := map[string]func(tc map[string]any){ + "approvals on request": func(tc map[string]any) { tc["approval_policy"] = "on-request" }, + "full access": func(tc map[string]any) { tc["sandbox_policy"].(map[string]any)["type"] = "danger-full-access" }, + "network": func(tc map[string]any) { tc["sandbox_policy"].(map[string]any)["network_access"] = true }, + "slash tmp": func(tc map[string]any) { tc["sandbox_policy"].(map[string]any)["exclude_slash_tmp"] = false }, + "writable roots": func(tc map[string]any) { tc["sandbox_policy"].(map[string]any)["writable_roots"] = []string{"/"} }, + "another directory": func(tc map[string]any) { tc["cwd"] = "/" }, + "no filesystem policy": func(tc map[string]any) { delete(tc, "file_system_sandbox_policy") }, + "root writable": func(tc map[string]any) { + fsEntries(tc)[0].(map[string]any)["access"] = "write" + }, + "another path writable": func(tc map[string]any) { + tc["file_system_sandbox_policy"].(map[string]any)["entries"] = append(fsEntries(tc), + map[string]any{"path": map[string]any{"type": "path", "path": "/tmp"}, "access": "write"}) + }, + "unrestricted": func(tc map[string]any) { tc["file_system_sandbox_policy"].(map[string]any)["kind"] = "unrestricted" }, + } + for name, mutate := range unsafe { + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + tc := safeTurnContext() + mutate(tc) + h := newHarness(t, scenario{TurnContext: tc, Events: events}) + s, _, err := h.run(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrUnsafeMode) + waitDone(t, s) + }) + } + t.Run("no policy record", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, scenario{Events: events}) + s, _, err := h.run(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrUnsafeMode) + waitDone(t, s) + }) + t.Run("no thread", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, scenario{NoThread: true, TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), Events: events}) + s, _, err := h.run(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrUnsafeMode) + waitDone(t, s) + }) + t.Run("the policy asked for", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, scenario{TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), Events: events}) + _, result, err := h.run(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnEndTurn, result.Stop) + assert.Equal(t, driver.Usage{InputTokens: 120, OutputTokens: 7}, result.Usage) + }) +} + +// An unsafe session is ended while its turn is still running, not when the +// turn ends. +func TestAnUnsafeSessionIsEndedMidTurn(t *testing.T) { + tc := safeTurnContext() + tc["approval_policy"] = "untrusted" + h := newHarness(t, scenario{TurnContext: tc, Hang: true, Child: true, Events: []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`}}) + start := time.Now() + s, _, err := h.run(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrUnsafeMode) + waitDone(t, s) + assert.Less(t, time.Since(start), 30*time.Second) + assertGone(t, h.observed().ChildPID) +} + +// A resumed thread is judged by the turn it runs now, not by an earlier turn +// already in its rollout. +func TestAResumedThreadIsJudgedByItsNewTurn(t *testing.T) { + bad := safeTurnContext() + bad["approval_policy"] = "on-request" + h := newHarness(t, scenario{OldTurnContext: nil}) + // An earlier, safe turn is on disk before the resume. + rollout := filepath.Join(h.home, "sessions", "2026", "09", "16", "rollout-2026-09-16T08-00-00-"+testThread+".jsonl") + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(rollout), 0o700)) + old := safeTurnContext() + old["cwd"] = h.workDir + line, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"type": "turn_context", "payload": old}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(rollout, append(line, '\n'), 0o600)) + h.scenario(scenario{TurnContext: bad, Events: []string{turnCompleted()}}) + // The fake appends to the rollout it finds under today's name; point it at + // the same file. + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(h.home, "sessions", "2026", "09", "17"), 0o700)) + require.NoError(t, os.Rename(rollout, filepath.Join(h.home, "sessions", "2026", "09", "17", "rollout-2026-09-17T08-00-00-"+testThread+".jsonl"))) + + s, err := h.drv.LoadSession(context.Background(), h.config(), testThread) + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = s.Close() }) + _, err = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "Event 3.") + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrUnsafeMode) + assert.Equal(t, []string{"exec", "resume"}, h.observed().Args[:2]) +} + +func TestLoadSessionRefusesAThreadItCannotFind(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, scenario{}) + _, err := h.drv.LoadSession(context.Background(), h.config(), testThread) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrNotStarted) + _, err = h.drv.LoadSession(context.Background(), h.config(), "not-a-thread") + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrNotStarted) + entries, err := os.ReadDir(h.private) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, entries, "nothing is written for a session that never starts") +} + +// Invariant 4: an MCP server that fails leaves no turn: Codex refuses to start +// one, and the driver reports the session ended, never not-started, because +// a process existed. +func TestAFailedMCPServerEndsTheSession(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, scenario{RunMCP: true, TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), Events: []string{turnCompleted()}}) + cfg := h.config() + cfg.MCPServers[0].Args = []string{"-c", "exit 1"} + _, _, err := h.run(context.Background(), cfg) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrSessionEnded) + assert.NotErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrNotStarted) +} + +// Invariant 5: Cancel ends the whole process group, and only a cancel the +// connector asked for reads as canceled. +func TestCancelEndsTheProcessGroup(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, scenario{TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), Hang: true, Child: true, Events: []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`}}) + s, err := h.drv.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = s.Close() }) + + type answer struct { + result driver.PromptResult + err error + } + answers := make(chan answer, 1) + go func() { + r, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "Event 1.") + answers <- answer{r, err} + }() + pid := waitChild(t, h) + require.NoError(t, s.Cancel(context.Background())) + + select { + case a := <-answers: + require.NoError(t, a.err) + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnCanceled, a.result.Stop) + case <-time.After(20 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the canceled turn did not end") + } + waitDone(t, s) + assertGone(t, pid) +} + +func TestAWorkerThatExitsMidTurnIsNotCanceled(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, scenario{TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), Events: []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`}, Exit: 0}) + _, result, err := h.run(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrSessionEnded) + assert.NotEqual(t, driver.TurnCanceled, result.Stop) +} + +func TestAFailedTurnIsAnError(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, scenario{TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), Events: []string{`{"type":"turn.failed","error":{"message":"someone@example.com"}}`}, Exit: 1}) + _, _, err := h.run(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), "example.com") +} + +func TestASessionTakesOnePrompt(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, scenario{TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), Events: []string{turnCompleted()}}) + s, _, err := h.run(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "Event 4.") + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrSessionEnded) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, errOnePrompt, "refused as a second prompt, not as a write to a closed pipe") + assert.False(t, h.drv.Capabilities().FollowUpPrompts) + assert.False(t, h.drv.Capabilities().LoadSession, "no ledger record can name a Codex thread to resume yet") +} + +// Invariant 6: updates carry kinds, ids and counts. A refusal Codex's +// approval policy made is the driver's own record, and does not read as a +// cancel. +func TestUpdatesCarryNoContentAndRefusalsAreRecorded(t *testing.T) { + secret := "SECRET-CONTENT-not-real" + events := []string{ + `{"type":"turn.started"}`, + `{"type":"item.completed","item":{"id":"item_0","type":"agent_message","text":"` + secret + `"}}`, + `{"type":"item.started","item":{"id":"item_1","type":"command_execution","command":"cat ` + secret + `","status":"in_progress"}}`, + `{"type":"item.completed","item":{"id":"item_1","type":"command_execution","command":"cat ` + secret + `","aggregated_output":"` + secret + `","exit_code":0,"status":"completed"}}`, + `{"type":"item.started","item":{"id":"item_2","type":"file_change","changes":[{"path":"/` + secret + `","kind":"add"}],"status":"in_progress"}}`, + `{"type":"item.completed","item":{"id":"item_3","type":"mcp_tool_call","server":"other","tool":"write","arguments":{"x":"` + secret + `"},"error":{"message":"MCP tool call requires approval, but approval policy is never"},"status":"failed"}}`, + turnCompleted(), + } + h := newHarness(t, scenario{TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), Events: events}) + s, err := h.drv.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + var updates []driver.Update + collected := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { + for u := range s.Updates() { + updates = append(updates, u) + } + close(collected) + }() + result, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "Event 1.") + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, s.Close()) + <-collected + + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnEndTurn, result.Stop) + require.Len(t, result.Refusals, 1) + assert.Equal(t, driver.Refusal{ToolCallID: "item_3", Tool: "mcp__other__write"}, result.Refusals[0]) + + data, err := json.Marshal(updates) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.NotContains(t, string(data), secret) + kinds := make([]driver.UpdateKind, 0, len(updates)) + for _, u := range updates { + kinds = append(kinds, u.Kind) + } + for _, want := range []driver.UpdateKind{driver.UpdateAgentMessageChunk, driver.UpdateToolCall, driver.UpdateToolCallUpdate, driver.UpdatePermission, driver.UpdateUsage} { + assert.Contains(t, kinds, want) + } + i := slices.IndexFunc(updates, func(u driver.Update) bool { return u.Kind == driver.UpdateAgentMessageChunk }) + assert.Equal(t, len(secret), updates[i].Chars) +} + +// ErrNotStarted means no process: a missing binary is one, and leaves the +// session's private directory as it found it. +func TestAMissingBinaryIsNotStarted(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, scenario{}) + h.drv.opts.Binary = filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "no-codex") + _, err := h.drv.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrNotStarted) + entries, err := os.ReadDir(h.private) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, entries) +} + +func waitDone(t *testing.T, s driver.Session) { + t.Helper() + select { + case <-s.Done(): + case <-time.After(20 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the worker did not exit") + } +} + +func waitChild(t *testing.T, h *harness) int { + t.Helper() + deadline := time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second) + for time.Now().Before(deadline) { + if data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(h.home, "observed.json")); err == nil { + var obs observed + if json.Unmarshal(data, &obs) == nil && obs.ChildPID > 0 { + return obs.ChildPID + } + } + time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond) + } + t.Fatal("the fake never started its child") + return 0 +} + +func assertGone(t *testing.T, pid int) { + t.Helper() + require.Positive(t, pid) + deadline := time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second) + for time.Now().Before(deadline) { + if err := syscall.Kill(pid, 0); errors.Is(err, syscall.ESRCH) { + return + } + // A zombie still answers kill(0); its state is Z. + if stat, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("/proc", itoa(pid), "stat")); err == nil && zombie(string(stat)) { + return + } + time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond) + } + t.Fatalf("process %d outlived its group's end", pid) +} + +func itoa(n int) string { return strconv.Itoa(n) } + +// zombie reports whether a /proc/<pid>/stat line is a zombie's. +func zombie(stat string) bool { + _, rest, ok := strings.Cut(stat, ") ") + return ok && strings.HasPrefix(rest, "Z") +} + +// Invariant 3: a turn that fails, or loses its process, before the policy +// check has spoken waits for it, so an unsafe session reads as unsafe. +func TestAFailedTurnWaitsForThePolicyCheck(t *testing.T) { + for name, sc := range map[string]scenario{ + "turn failed": {Events: []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`, `{"type":"turn.failed","error":{"message":"x"}}`}, Exit: 1}, + "process gone": {Events: []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`}, Exit: 1}, + } { + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + // No policy record: the check only fails when its timeout passes, + // well after the turn ended. + h := newHarness(t, sc) + _, _, err := h.run(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrUnsafeMode) + }) + } +} + +// Invariant 5: a Cancel that comes before the prompt it races cancels that +// prompt; nothing is sent and the worker is ended. +func TestACancelBeforeThePromptCancelsIt(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, scenario{TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), Hang: true, Events: []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`}}) + s, err := h.drv.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = s.Close() }) + require.NoError(t, s.Cancel(context.Background())) + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second) + defer cancel() + result, err := s.Prompt(ctx, "Event 1.") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnCanceled, result.Stop) + waitDone(t, s) +} + +// A canceled turn whose policy check has already failed is reported unsafe, +// not canceled; one whose check is still running is canceled at once. +func TestACanceledTurnReportsAFailedPolicyCheck(t *testing.T) { + for name, tc := range map[string]struct { + done bool + err error + want error + }{ + "check failed": {done: true, err: driver.ErrUnsafeMode, want: driver.ErrUnsafeMode}, + "check passed": {done: true}, + "check running": {}, + } { + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + s := &session{verifyDone: make(chan struct{}), verifyErr: tc.err} + if tc.done { + close(s.verifyDone) + } + turn := &turn{done: make(chan struct{})} + s.turn = turn + s.finishCanceled(turn) + <-turn.done + if tc.want != nil { + require.ErrorIs(t, turn.err, tc.want) + return + } + require.NoError(t, turn.err) + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnCanceled, turn.result.Stop) + }) + } +} + +// Invariant 5: Close does not wait forever on a descendant that left the +// worker's process group and still holds its output. +func TestCloseDoesNotWaitForAnEscapedChild(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, scenario{TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), Escape: true, Events: []string{turnCompleted()}}) + s, err := h.drv.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = s.Prompt(context.Background(), "Event 1.") + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { + if pid := h.observed().EscapedPID; pid > 0 { + _ = syscall.Kill(pid, syscall.SIGKILL) + } + }) + done := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { _ = s.Close(); close(done) }() + select { + case <-done: + case <-time.After(30 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("Close waited on an escaped child") + } +} + +// Invariant 6 and 3 together: a refusal Codex logs on stderr after the turn's +// last stdout line is still counted, and emitting it as the session ends does +// not send on a closed channel. +func TestARefusalLoggedAtTheVeryEndIsCounted(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, scenario{ + TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), + Events: []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`, turnCompleted()}, + Stderr: "patch rejected: writing outside of the project; rejected by user approval settings", + }) + s, err := h.drv.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + drained := make(chan int, 1) + go func() { + n := 0 + for u := range s.Updates() { + if u.Kind == driver.UpdatePermission { + n++ + } + } + drained <- n + }() + result, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "Event 1.") + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, s.Close()) + assert.Len(t, result.Refusals, 1) + assert.Positive(t, <-drained) +} + +// The same, when the process dies without completing its turn: the refusal is +// still emitted, and emitting it as the reader ends is not a send on a closed +// channel. +func TestARefusalLoggedAsTheWorkerDiesIsCounted(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, scenario{ + TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), + Events: []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`}, + Stderr: "patch rejected: writing outside of the project; rejected by user approval settings", + Exit: 1, + }) + s, err := h.drv.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + drained := make(chan int, 1) + go func() { + n := 0 + for u := range s.Updates() { + if u.Kind == driver.UpdatePermission { + n++ + } + } + drained <- n + }() + result, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "Event 1.") + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrSessionEnded) + assert.Len(t, result.Refusals, 1) + assert.Positive(t, <-drained) + require.NoError(t, s.Close()) +} + +// A worker that stops reading its input cannot hold Close or Cancel: the +// prompt's write waits on the worker, and nothing else waits on the write. +func TestAWorkerThatStopsReadingHoldsNothing(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, scenario{TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), Deaf: true, Hang: true, Events: []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`}}) + s, err := h.drv.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + go func() { _, _ = s.Prompt(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("Event 1. ", 200_000)) }() + waitDeaf(t, h) + + canceled := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { + require.NoError(t, s.Cancel(context.Background())) + close(canceled) + }() + select { + case <-canceled: + case <-time.After(20 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("a worker that stopped reading held Cancel") + } + + // And Close on its own, with no cancel to end the process first. + closed := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { + _ = s.Close() + close(closed) + }() + select { + case <-closed: + case <-time.After(30 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("a worker that stopped reading held Close") + } + waitDone(t, s) +} + +func waitDeaf(t *testing.T, h *harness) { + t.Helper() + deadline := time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second) + for time.Now().Before(deadline) { + if data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(h.home, "observed.json")); err == nil { + var obs observed + if json.Unmarshal(data, &obs) == nil && obs.Deaf { + return + } + } + time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond) + } + t.Fatal("the fake never stopped reading") +} + +// The same for Close on its own: a prompt still blocked writing to a worker +// that stopped reading does not hold it. +func TestCloseSurvivesAWorkerThatStoppedReading(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, scenario{TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), Deaf: true, Hang: true, Events: []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`}}) + s, err := h.drv.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + go func() { _, _ = s.Prompt(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("Event 1. ", 200_000)) }() + waitDeaf(t, h) + + closed := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { + _ = s.Close() + close(closed) + }() + select { + case <-closed: + case <-time.After(30 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("a worker that stopped reading held Close") + } + waitDone(t, s) +} + +// A turn that completes while a cancel is pending ends canceled at once, not +// after the policy check's whole timeout. +func TestACompletedTurnThatWasCanceledDoesNotWaitForTheCheck(t *testing.T) { + s := &session{verifyDone: make(chan struct{}), verifyAfter: time.Hour} + turn := &turn{done: make(chan struct{}), canceled: true} + s.turn = turn + done := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { s.turnCompleted(event{}); close(done) }() + select { + case <-done: + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("a canceled turn waited for the policy check") + } + require.NoError(t, turn.err) + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnCanceled, turn.result.Stop) +} + +// A cancel with no prompt yet ends the worker at once, whether the prompt ever +// comes or not. +func TestACancelWithNoPromptEndsTheWorker(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, scenario{TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), Hang: true}) + s, err := h.drv.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = s.Close() }) + require.NoError(t, s.Cancel(context.Background())) + waitDone(t, s) + result, err := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "Event 1.") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnCanceled, result.Stop, "canceled, not ended, though the worker is gone") +} + +// A refusal Codex logs after a failed turn's event is still counted. +func TestARefusalLoggedAfterAFailedTurnIsCounted(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, scenario{ + TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), + Events: []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`, `{"type":"turn.failed","error":{"message":"x"}}`}, + Stderr: "patch rejected: writing outside of the project; rejected by user approval settings", + Exit: 1, + }) + _, result, err := h.run(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Len(t, result.Refusals, 1) +} + +// Prompt honors its context even while its write is blocked on a worker that +// stopped reading. +func TestAPromptBlockedWritingHonorsItsContext(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, scenario{TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), Deaf: true, Hang: true}) + s, err := h.drv.NewSession(context.Background(), h.config()) + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = s.Close() }) + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 500*time.Millisecond) + defer cancel() + returned := make(chan error, 1) + go func() { + _, err := s.Prompt(ctx, strings.Repeat("Event 1. ", 200_000)) + returned <- err + }() + select { + case err := <-returned: + require.ErrorIs(t, err, context.DeadlineExceeded) + case <-time.After(20 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("a blocked write held Prompt past its context") + } +} + +// redactionSecret is the value fed through every error path. It is obviously +// fake, and is planted everywhere a real secret would be: in the worker's +// environment, in its MCP server's environment, in the name of its private +// directory, and in what the agent writes back. +const redactionSecret = "test-token-not-real-c9f2b1" + +func redactionHarness(t *testing.T, sc scenario) (*harness, driver.SessionConfig) { + t.Helper() + h := newHarness(t, sc) + private := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), redactionSecret) + require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(private, 0o700)) + cfg := h.config() + cfg.PrivateDir = private + cfg.Env = append(cfg.Env, "FAKE_CODEX_SECRET="+redactionSecret) + cfg.MCPServers[0].Env["BASECAMP_CONNECT_TASK_TOKEN"] = redactionSecret + cfg.Redaction = driver.Redaction{Secrets: []string{redactionSecret}} + return h, cfg +} + +func drain(s driver.Session) []driver.Update { + var updates []driver.Update + for u := range s.Updates() { + updates = append(updates, u) + } + return updates +} + +// The redaction rule (driver's redact.go): nothing this driver hands back +// carries the secret, whichever way the session fails. +func TestNoErrorPathCarriesTheSecretOut(t *testing.T) { + secretEvents := []string{ + `{"type":"turn.started"}`, + `{"type":"item.completed","item":{"id":"` + redactionSecret + `","type":"mcp_tool_call","server":"` + redactionSecret + `","tool":"` + redactionSecret + `","status":"failed","error":{"message":"MCP tool call requires approval, but approval policy is never"}}}`, + } + stderr := "fatal: writing " + redactionSecret + ": patch rejected: writing outside of the project; rejected by user approval settings" + drivertest.RequireRedacted(t, redactionSecret, []drivertest.RedactionPath{ + {Name: "start", Run: func(t *testing.T) drivertest.Crossing { + h, cfg := redactionHarness(t, scenario{}) + h.drv.opts.Binary = filepath.Join(cfg.PrivateDir, "no-codex") + _, err := h.drv.NewSession(context.Background(), cfg) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrNotStarted) + return drivertest.Crossing{Errors: []error{err}} + }}, + {Name: "handshake", Run: func(t *testing.T) drivertest.Crossing { + tc := safeTurnContext() + tc["approval_policy"] = "on-request" + h, cfg := redactionHarness(t, scenario{TurnContext: tc, Events: append(secretEvents, turnCompleted()), Stderr: stderr}) + s, result, err := h.run(context.Background(), cfg) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrUnsafeMode) + updates := make(chan []driver.Update, 1) + go func() { updates <- drain(s) }() + require.NoError(t, s.Close()) + return drivertest.Crossing{Errors: []error{err}, Results: []driver.PromptResult{result}, + Updates: <-updates, Texts: []string{s.(*session).StderrTail()}} + }}, + {Name: "prompt", Run: func(t *testing.T) drivertest.Crossing { + h, cfg := redactionHarness(t, scenario{TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), + Events: append(secretEvents, `{"type":"turn.failed","error":{"message":"`+redactionSecret+`"}}`), Stderr: stderr, Exit: 1}) + s, result, err := h.run(context.Background(), cfg) + require.Error(t, err) + updates := make(chan []driver.Update, 1) + go func() { updates <- drain(s) }() + require.NoError(t, s.Close()) + return drivertest.Crossing{Errors: []error{err}, Results: []driver.PromptResult{result}, + Updates: <-updates, Texts: []string{s.(*session).StderrTail()}} + }}, + {Name: "cancel", Run: func(t *testing.T) drivertest.Crossing { + h, cfg := redactionHarness(t, scenario{TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), Deaf: true, Hang: true, Stderr: stderr}) + s, err := h.drv.NewSession(context.Background(), cfg) + require.NoError(t, err) + go func() { _, _ = s.Prompt(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("x", 1<<20)) }() + waitDeaf(t, h) + cancelErr := s.Cancel(context.Background()) + closeErr := s.Close() + return drivertest.Crossing{Errors: []error{cancelErr, closeErr}, Texts: []string{s.(*session).StderrTail()}} + }}, + {Name: "close", Run: func(t *testing.T) drivertest.Crossing { + h, cfg := redactionHarness(t, scenario{TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), Events: secretEvents, Stderr: stderr, Exit: 1}) + s, result, err := h.run(context.Background(), cfg) + require.Error(t, err, "the worker died in the turn") + updates := make(chan []driver.Update, 1) + go func() { updates <- drain(s) }() + closeErr := s.Close() + after, afterErr := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "again") + return drivertest.Crossing{Errors: []error{err, closeErr, afterErr}, + Results: []driver.PromptResult{result, after}, Updates: <-updates, Texts: []string{s.(*session).StderrTail()}} + }}, + }) +} + +// The refusal rule (driver's "Refusals"): every refusal is recorded as it is +// read, once per call, whichever way the turn ends — a canceled turn included, +// where a refusal Codex only logged would otherwise go with the session. +func TestEveryRefusalIsRecordedOnce(t *testing.T) { + denial := `{"type":"item.completed","item":{"id":"item_7","type":"mcp_tool_call","server":"other","tool":"write","error":{"message":"MCP tool call requires approval, but approval policy is never"},"status":"failed"}}` + stderr := "patch rejected: writing outside of the project; rejected by user approval settings" + for name, tc := range map[string]struct { + events []string + exit int + cancel bool + wantErr bool + wantSeen int + }{ + "a completed turn": {events: []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`, denial, turnCompleted()}, wantSeen: 2}, + "a failed turn": {events: []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`, denial, `{"type":"turn.failed","error":{"message":"x"}}`}, exit: 1, wantErr: true, wantSeen: 2}, + "a lost worker": {events: []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`, denial}, exit: 1, wantErr: true, wantSeen: 2}, + } { + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + recorder := &drivertest.Refusals{} + h := newHarness(t, scenario{TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), Events: tc.events, Stderr: stderr, Exit: tc.exit}) + cfg := h.config() + cfg.Refusals = recorder + s, result, err := h.run(context.Background(), cfg) + if tc.wantErr { + require.Error(t, err) + } else { + require.NoError(t, err) + } + require.NoError(t, s.Close()) + assert.Len(t, recorder.Recorded(), tc.wantSeen, "each refusal recorded once") + assert.Len(t, result.Refusals, tc.wantSeen) + }) + } +} + +// A worker whose output ends before it does: the refusal it logs on its way +// out is still read, because the reader waits for the process, not for its +// stdout. +func TestARefusalLoggedAfterTheOutputEndsIsStillRecorded(t *testing.T) { + recorder := &drivertest.Refusals{} + h := newHarness(t, scenario{ + TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), + Events: []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`}, + CloseStdout: true, + Stderr: "patch rejected: writing outside of the project; rejected by user approval settings", + Exit: 1, + }) + cfg := h.config() + cfg.Refusals = recorder + s, result, err := h.run(context.Background(), cfg) + require.Error(t, err) + require.NoError(t, s.Close()) + assert.Len(t, recorder.Recorded(), 1, "the refusal Codex logged after closing its output") + assert.Len(t, result.Refusals, 1) +} + +// A session stopped for running under a policy it was not asked to run under +// still reports the refusals it made: they are the ledger's and the result's. +func TestAnUnsafeSessionStillReportsItsRefusals(t *testing.T) { + recorder := &drivertest.Refusals{} + denial := `{"type":"item.completed","item":{"id":"item_9","type":"mcp_tool_call","server":"other","tool":"write","error":{"message":"MCP tool call requires approval, but approval policy is never"},"status":"failed"}}` + unsafe := safeTurnContext() + unsafe["approval_policy"] = "on-request" + h := newHarness(t, scenario{ + TurnContext: unsafe, + Events: []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`, denial, turnCompleted()}, + }) + cfg := h.config() + cfg.Refusals = recorder + s, result, err := h.run(context.Background(), cfg) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrUnsafeMode) + waitDone(t, s) + assert.Len(t, recorder.Recorded(), 1) + assert.Len(t, result.Refusals, 1, "the result carries what the ledger carries") +} + +// Codex logs its sandbox refusals and keeps writing: each one is recorded, +// not only whatever it said last. +func TestEveryRefusalCodexOnlyLogsIsRecorded(t *testing.T) { + recorder := &drivertest.Refusals{} + h := newHarness(t, scenario{ + TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), + Events: []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`, turnCompleted()}, + Stderr: strings.Join([]string{ + "patch rejected: writing outside of the project; rejected by user approval settings", + "ERROR: command failed because the approval policy is never", + "thinking about the next step", + // The same diagnostic twice is two refusals, not one. + "ERROR: command failed because the approval policy is never", + }, "\n"), + }) + cfg := h.config() + cfg.Refusals = recorder + s, result, err := h.run(context.Background(), cfg) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, s.Close()) + assert.Len(t, recorder.Recorded(), 3, "every refusal, wherever it is and however it reads") + assert.Len(t, result.Refusals, 3) +} + +// A refusal Codex logged is recorded even when the turn it belonged to has +// already ended: the reader reads the stderr of a worker that is gone, with +// no turn left to hang it on. +func TestARefusalIsRecordedEvenWithNoTurnLeft(t *testing.T) { + recorder := &drivertest.Refusals{} + h := newHarness(t, scenario{ + TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), + Deaf: true, + Hang: true, + Events: []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`}, + Stderr: "patch rejected: writing outside of the project; rejected by user approval settings", + }) + cfg := h.config() + cfg.Refusals = recorder + s, err := h.drv.NewSession(context.Background(), cfg) + require.NoError(t, err) + // A worker that never reads its input: the prompt's write blocks, and the + // cancel that closes its stdin ends the turn from the write's side, not + // the reader's. + go func() { _, _ = s.Prompt(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("Event 1. ", 200_000)) }() + waitDeaf(t, h) + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return strings.Contains(s.(*session).StderrTail(), "rejected") }, 10*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond) + require.NoError(t, s.Cancel(context.Background())) + require.NoError(t, s.Close()) + waitDone(t, s) + + assert.Len(t, recorder.Recorded(), 1, "the refusal is recorded, turn or no turn") +} + +// A refusal Codex logs on its way out of a canceled turn is in the turn's +// result, not only in the ledger: the cancel waits for the worker's last word. +func TestACanceledTurnCarriesALateRefusalInItsResult(t *testing.T) { + recorder := &drivertest.Refusals{} + h := newHarness(t, scenario{ + TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), + Events: []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`}, + Hang: true, + // Codex logs the refusal as it is being ended, not before. + StderrOnTerm: "patch rejected: writing outside of the project; rejected by user approval settings", + }) + cfg := h.config() + cfg.Refusals = recorder + s, err := h.drv.NewSession(context.Background(), cfg) + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = s.Close() }) + answers := make(chan driver.PromptResult, 1) + go func() { + result, _ := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "Event 1.") + answers <- result + }() + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { + data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(h.home, "observed.json")) + return err == nil && strings.Contains(string(data), "Event 1.") + }, 10*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond) + require.NoError(t, s.Cancel(context.Background())) + select { + case result := <-answers: + assert.Len(t, result.Refusals, 1, "the result carries what the ledger carries") + case <-time.After(20 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the canceled turn did not end") + } + assert.Len(t, recorder.Recorded(), 1) +} + +// A canceled turn records what Codex logged before it went. +func TestACanceledTurnRecordsItsRefusals(t *testing.T) { + recorder := &drivertest.Refusals{} + h := newHarness(t, scenario{ + TurnContext: safeTurnContext(), + Events: []string{`{"type":"turn.started"}`}, + Stderr: "patch rejected: writing outside of the project; rejected by user approval settings", + Hang: true, + }) + cfg := h.config() + cfg.Refusals = recorder + s, err := h.drv.NewSession(context.Background(), cfg) + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = s.Close() }) + answers := make(chan driver.PromptResult, 1) + go func() { + result, _ := s.Prompt(context.Background(), "Event 1.") + answers <- result + }() + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return strings.Contains(s.(*session).StderrTail(), "rejected") }, 10*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond) + require.NoError(t, s.Cancel(context.Background())) + select { + case result := <-answers: + assert.Equal(t, driver.TurnCanceled, result.Stop) + assert.Len(t, result.Refusals, 1) + case <-time.After(20 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the canceled turn did not end") + } + assert.Len(t, recorder.Recorded(), 1, "the refusal Codex logged is recorded, not lost with the cancel") +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/codex/fake_test.go b/internal/connector/driver/codex/fake_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c5a92d742 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/codex/fake_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +//go:build unix + +package codex + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "io" + "os" + "os/exec" + "os/signal" + "path/filepath" + "regexp" + "strings" + "syscall" + "testing" + "time" +) + +// The test binary doubles as a fake `codex`: run with "exec" as its first +// argument, it plays the scenario in $CODEX_HOME/scenario.json instead of +// running tests. Everything it saw (argv, environment, prompt, the MCP +// server's environment) is written beside the scenario. +func TestMain(m *testing.M) { + if len(os.Args) > 1 && os.Args[1] == "exec" { + os.Exit(fakeCodex()) + } + os.Exit(m.Run()) +} + +type scenario struct { + Thread string `json:"thread"` + // TurnContext is written to the rollout as the turn_context payload; + // nil writes none. + TurnContext map[string]any `json:"turn_context"` + // OldTurnContext is written before the prompt is read, as an earlier + // turn of a resumed thread would be. + OldTurnContext map[string]any `json:"old_turn_context"` + // Events are written to stdout after thread.started. + Events []string `json:"events"` + // NoThread skips thread.started. + NoThread bool `json:"no_thread"` + // RunMCP starts each MCP server as Codex would and waits for it. + RunMCP bool `json:"run_mcp"` + // Child starts a child process in the fake's group and records its pid. + Child bool `json:"child"` + // Escape leaves a process of its own, outside the fake's process group, + // holding the fake's stdout. + Escape bool `json:"escape"` + // Stderr is written, slowly, after the events. + Stderr string `json:"stderr"` + // CloseStdout closes stdout before the stderr is written: the reader is + // done with the process well before the process is done. + CloseStdout bool `json:"close_stdout"` + // StderrOnTerm is written to stderr when the process is asked to end, as + // a refusal Codex logs on its way out of a cancel is. + StderrOnTerm string `json:"stderr_on_term"` + // Deaf never reads its stdin: the prompt's write blocks once the pipe + // fills. + Deaf bool `json:"deaf"` + // Hang waits to be killed after the events. + Hang bool `json:"hang"` + // Exit is the exit status. + Exit int `json:"exit"` +} + +type observed struct { + Args []string `json:"args"` + Env []string `json:"env"` + Cwd string `json:"cwd"` + Prompt string `json:"prompt"` + MCPExit int `json:"mcp_exit"` + ChildPID int `json:"child_pid"` + EscapedPID int `json:"escaped_pid"` + Deaf bool `json:"deaf"` +} + +func fakeCodex() int { + home := os.Getenv("CODEX_HOME") + data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(home, "scenario.json")) + if err != nil { + fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "fake codex: no scenario:", err) + return 2 + } + var sc scenario + if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &sc); err != nil { + fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "fake codex: bad scenario:", err) + return 2 + } + if sc.StderrOnTerm != "" { + ending := make(chan os.Signal, 1) + signal.Notify(ending, syscall.SIGTERM) + go func() { + <-ending + fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, sc.StderrOnTerm) + os.Exit(0) + }() + } + obs := observed{Args: os.Args[1:], Env: os.Environ()} + obs.Cwd, _ = os.Getwd() + save := func() { + out, _ := json.Marshal(obs) + _ = os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(home, "observed.json"), out, 0o600) + } + defer save() + + rollout := filepath.Join(home, "sessions", "2026", "09", "17", "rollout-2026-09-17T08-00-00-"+sc.Thread+".jsonl") + _ = os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(rollout), 0o700) + if sc.OldTurnContext != nil { + appendRecord(rollout, "turn_context", sc.OldTurnContext) + } + + if sc.Deaf { + obs.Deaf = true + save() + } else { + prompt, _ := io.ReadAll(os.Stdin) + obs.Prompt = string(prompt) + save() + } + + if sc.RunMCP { + for _, server := range mcpServers(os.Args) { + cmd := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), server.command, server.args...) //nolint:gosec // the fake runs what the driver configured + // As Codex does: a near-empty environment plus the declared env. + cmd.Env = []string{"HOME=" + os.Getenv("HOME"), "PATH=" + os.Getenv("PATH")} + for k, v := range server.env { + cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, k+"="+v) + } + if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil { + obs.MCPExit = 1 + fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "required MCP servers failed to initialize") + return 1 + } + } + save() + } + + if sc.Escape { + // setsid puts it in a group of its own, and it inherits stdout. + escaped := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "setsid", "sleep", "120") + escaped.Stdout = os.Stdout + if err := escaped.Start(); err == nil { + obs.EscapedPID = escaped.Process.Pid + save() + } + } + if sc.Child { + child := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "sleep", "300") + if err := child.Start(); err == nil { + obs.ChildPID = child.Process.Pid + save() + } + } + + appendRecord(rollout, "session_meta", map[string]any{"id": sc.Thread}) + if sc.TurnContext != nil { + tc := map[string]any{} + for k, v := range sc.TurnContext { + tc[k] = v + } + if _, ok := tc["cwd"]; !ok { + tc["cwd"] = obs.Cwd + } + raw, _ := json.Marshal(tc) + _ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.ReplaceAll(string(raw), "$CWD", obs.Cwd)), &tc) + appendRecord(rollout, "turn_context", tc) + } + if !sc.NoThread { + fmt.Printf(`{"type":"thread.started","thread_id":%q}`+"\n", sc.Thread) + } + for _, e := range sc.Events { + fmt.Println(e) + } + if sc.CloseStdout { + _ = os.Stdout.Close() + } + if sc.Stderr != "" { + // After the last stdout line, as a sandbox refusal Codex logs is. + time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond) + fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, sc.Stderr) + } + if sc.Hang { + time.Sleep(5 * time.Minute) + } + return sc.Exit +} + +func appendRecord(path, kind string, payload map[string]any) { + line, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"type": kind, "payload": payload}) + f, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE, 0o600) + if err != nil { + return + } + _, _ = f.Write(append(line, '\n')) + _ = f.Close() +} + +type fakeServer struct { + command string + args []string + env map[string]string +} + +var tomlPair = regexp.MustCompile(`("(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*")=("(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*")`) + +// mcpServers reads the mcp_servers overrides back from argv. The values are +// the JSON-compatible subset of TOML the driver writes; an env table is +// {"K"="v",...}. +func mcpServers(argv []string) []fakeServer { + servers := map[string]*fakeServer{} + get := func(name string) *fakeServer { + if servers[name] == nil { + servers[name] = &fakeServer{env: map[string]string{}} + } + return servers[name] + } + for i := 0; i+1 < len(argv); i++ { + if argv[i] != "-c" { + continue + } + key, value, _ := strings.Cut(argv[i+1], "=") + rest, ok := strings.CutPrefix(key, "mcp_servers.") + if !ok { + continue + } + name, field, _ := strings.Cut(rest, ".") + switch field { + case "command": + _ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(value), &get(name).command) + case "args": + _ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(value), &get(name).args) + case "env": + for _, m := range tomlPair.FindAllStringSubmatch(value, -1) { + var k, v string + _ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(m[1]), &k) + _ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(m[2]), &v) + get(name).env[k] = v + } + } + } + out := make([]fakeServer, 0, len(servers)) + for _, s := range servers { + out = append(out, *s) + } + return out +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/driver.go b/internal/connector/driver/driver.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..13fd9fbda --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/driver.go @@ -0,0 +1,582 @@ +// Package driver is the connector's agent boundary: how a dispatched task +// becomes a working coding agent, and how the connector hears what it does. +// +// # The shape is ACP's +// +// The interface is Agent Client Protocol v1's session model, whatever speaks +// underneath. A Driver opens a session (session/new) or reloads one +// (session/load) in a working directory with an explicit set of MCP servers; +// a Session takes prompts, each returning a stop reason (session/prompt); +// progress arrives as a stream of updates (session/update); a turn is ended +// with Cancel (session/cancel); and a permission the agent asks for is +// answered by the connector's policy (session/request_permission). A spawn +// driver (claude -p, codex exec) is an adapter onto that shape: it maps its +// vendor stream onto the same updates and stop reasons, freezes the policy +// into flags it verifies, and cancels by ending the process group it started. +// So the ACP driver is one more driver, not a rewrite. +// +// # Invariants every driver holds +// +// Each is held by a test in the driver that implements it. +// +// 1. Nothing is inherited. A worker process gets exactly the environment in +// SessionConfig.Env and each MCP server exactly MCPServer.Env; the +// connector's own environment (which carries tokens of its host) never +// reaches either. No secret is ever put in a process's argv. +// 2. The permission mode is set explicitly and verified. A session whose +// agent did not confirm the mode the policy asked for is unsafe, and the +// driver refuses to go on with it (ErrUnsafeMode) rather than run under +// the host's own configuration. +// 3. A refusal is the driver's own record. A policy refusal is not +// distinguishable from a cancel by the agent's stop reason, so every +// refusal the driver made or observed is recorded once, through +// SessionConfig.Refusals, at the moment it is made or observed; it is +// reported as well as a Refusal on the prompt's result and as an update; +// and a stop the connector did not ask for is never reported as +// TurnCanceled. See "Refusals" below. +// 4. ErrNotStarted means no worker process ever existed. It is the only +// start error after which the connector retries on its own, so a driver +// returns it only when it can prove nothing ran; any doubt is some other +// error. A configuration no retry can fix wraps ErrUnusable as well, and +// is not retried. Whatever the error, a start that fails leaves no +// process behind: either none was started, or the driver ended the one it +// started — through Terminate, so the whole group goes — before +// returning. A driver that cannot promise that returns a Session the +// connector can Close instead of an error. +// 5. A worker is ended by the process group the driver started, never by +// name. Close is idempotent and leaves no process of the session behind. +// 6. Content stays in the stream. Updates carry kinds, ids, tool names and +// counts; they never carry the agent's text or a tool's input, so a sink +// that logs an update cannot log content. What a sink does log from an +// agent stream goes through the redaction rule (redact.go). +// +// # Refusals: where one is recorded, and when it counts as settled +// +// A refusal is a permission the agent asked for and did not get. It is +// recorded in the ledger, once, at the moment the driver answers the request +// — or, for an agent that answers its own requests under a mode the driver +// froze (claude -p), at the moment the driver first reads that it was +// refused. It is never held only in a session's memory, because a worker that +// exits before its result, a connector that crashes mid-turn, and a turn cut +// short by a deadline all end the session that memory lives in. +// +// 1. The driver calls SessionConfig.Refusals.RecordRefusal before it sends +// its answer to the agent, or before it emits the update for a refusal +// it observed. It calls it once per tool call id: a refusal the stream +// announced and the result repeats is one refusal. A refusal with NO +// tool call id — one read from a line of the agent's output rather than +// from a call — counts every time it happens, identical text included: +// two refusals of the same tool are two refusals, and nothing but an id +// can say they are one. +// The recorder itself deduplicates NOTHING: it records what it is told, +// once per call. Deciding what is one refusal is the driver's, which +// knows what it read — a tool call id where the agent gives one, and +// where a driver reads refusals from lines of output, the line AND its +// occurrence in that output, so two identical lines are two refusals and +// reading the same output twice records neither again (card 19). +// 2. The dispatcher's recorder writes it to the attempt's row at once +// (connector.Ledger.RecordRefusal: attempts.refusals, incremented while +// the attempt is live). A write the ledger refuses is carried by the +// recorder into the attempt's settlement instead, and logged. +// 3. The refusal is settled with its attempt: EndAttempt adds whatever the +// recorder could not write, and the ended attempt's count is final. The +// session's updates are drained before the attempt is released, and the +// recorder is called before an update is emitted, so a worker that exits +// between a refusal and its result has already recorded it. +// +// Once-ness is the driver's (a set of tool call ids per session), not a key in +// the ledger: it holds for as long as a session lives, which is as long as a +// refusal can be reported twice. A connector that restarts does not resume a +// session — its attempt is settled as lost and its task superseded — so a +// ledger key on (attempt, tool call) would buy nothing, and this is settled, +// not open. +// +// Where a refusal can be seen differs by agent: Claude Code announces it in +// its stream and repeats it in the turn's result, and an agent that writes +// refusals only to stderr is read through Worker.StderrLines, not +// StderrTail — the tail is the last line, and whatever the agent prints next +// would bury the refusal. +// +// Where this can still be broken: a refusal the agent never reports — a tool +// it declined to ask for, or a denial its stream does not carry — is not a +// refusal the driver can record. +package driver + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "time" +) + +// Driver starts and reloads sessions for one kind of coding agent. +type Driver interface { + // Name is the driver's name as connect.json and the ledger spell it: + // "claude", "codex", "acp". + Name() string + // Capabilities says what the driver supports beyond NewSession and Prompt. + Capabilities() Capabilities + // NewSession starts a worker and opens a session in cfg.Cwd. + // + // An error that wraps ErrNotStarted means no process ever existed, and + // the connector may retry the start once. Any other error from a start + // that launched a process wraps a *StartError carrying that process, whose + // group the driver has already asked to end: the connector confirms it + // gone (ConfirmGroupGone) before it settles anything, however long the + // driver's own handshake took to fail. + NewSession(ctx context.Context, cfg SessionConfig) (Session, error) + // LoadSession reopens a session by the id an earlier Session reported, + // where Capabilities().LoadSession is true. Its errors read as + // NewSession's, and leave no process behind either. + LoadSession(ctx context.Context, cfg SessionConfig, sessionID string) (Session, error) +} + +// Capabilities are what a driver advertises, as an ACP agent advertises its +// own at initialize. +type Capabilities struct { + // LoadSession: LoadSession works, so a follow-up after the worker ended + // can continue its conversation. + LoadSession bool + // FollowUpPrompts: a live session takes further prompts, so a follow-up + // is delivered into the same session rather than as a new attempt. + FollowUpPrompts bool + // PermissionCallback: the agent asks, and PermissionPolicy.Decide answers + // each request. False for a spawn driver, whose permissions are frozen + // into flags from PermissionPolicy.Rules before the process starts. + PermissionCallback bool +} + +// Session is one live conversation with a worker. +type Session interface { + // ID is the agent's session id (ACP sessionId, Claude Code's session_id). + // It is known when NewSession returns. + ID() string + // Process is the worker's process, or the zero Process when the session + // runs somewhere the connector cannot signal. + Process() Process + // Prompt sends one prompt and blocks until the turn ends. The first + // prompt of a session is its handshake: a driver that verifies the + // agent's mode on it returns ErrUnsafeMode and ends the session. A ctx + // that ends makes Prompt return ctx's error without ending the turn; use + // Cancel for that. + Prompt(ctx context.Context, prompt string) (PromptResult, error) + // Updates streams the session's progress. It is closed when the session + // ends. A consumer that stops reading does not stall the agent: a driver + // drops updates rather than block. + Updates() <-chan Update + // Cancel ends the turn in flight. Prompt then returns TurnCanceled. + // With no turn in flight it does nothing. + Cancel(ctx context.Context) error + // Close ends the session and its worker: the process group is signaled, + // given grace, and killed. Idempotent; safe concurrently with Prompt, + // which then returns an error. + Close() error + // Done is closed once the worker has exited, however it exited. + Done() <-chan struct{} + // Exit is how the worker exited; meaningful once Done is closed. + Exit() Exit +} + +// SessionConfig is everything a driver needs to start a session. The +// dispatcher builds it from the task's record; the driver adds nothing of its +// own beyond its binary and its flags. +type SessionConfig struct { + // Cwd is the approved working directory, absolute. + Cwd string + // Env is the worker process's whole environment, as KEY=VALUE. Nothing + // else is inherited (invariant 1). BuildEnv makes one from an allowlist. + Env []string + // MCPServers are the only MCP servers the agent gets. A driver makes the + // agent ignore every other MCP configuration it would otherwise load. + MCPServers []MCPServer + // Policy answers permissions. + Policy PermissionPolicy + // Launcher wraps the worker command. Nil means DirectLauncher. + Launcher Launcher + // Scope is what the launcher is told the worker is for. + Scope Scope + // SocketDir is the directory holding the task token's unix socket, which + // the worker's MCP server dials. It is PrivateDir in the ordinary case + // and a short directory of the connector's own where a socket path under + // PrivateDir would be longer than a unix socket takes. It is in Scope + // too, which is what a launcher is given. + SocketDir string + // PrivateDir is an owner-only directory the driver may write session + // files into (an MCP config, say). The driver removes what it wrote when + // the session is closed; the dispatcher sweeps the directory on start. + PrivateDir string + // Refusals records every refusal at the moment it is made or observed. + // Nil records nothing; the dispatcher always sets it. + Refusals RefusalRecorder + // Redaction is what the driver takes out of every error it returns and + // every text an update or a stderr tail carries (redact.go). The driver + // adds the environment it builds, its MCP servers' environments and + // PrivateDir to it. + Redaction Redaction +} + +// MCPServer is one stdio MCP server handed to the agent, as ACP's +// mcpServers[] entry. +type MCPServer struct { + // Name is the server's name as the agent's tools will be prefixed. + Name string + // Command is the executable, absolute. + Command string + // Args are its arguments. Never a secret: argv is readable by every + // process on the machine. + Args []string + // Env is the server's whole environment, KEY -> VALUE. Declared + // explicitly, never counted on to be inherited: some agents pass their + // own environment down and some pass almost nothing. + Env map[string]string +} + +// Process is a worker process the connector started. +type Process struct { + // PID is the process's id; zero when there is none to signal. + PID int + // PGID is its process group, which Close signals. A driver starts every + // worker as the leader of a new group, so PGID == PID. + PGID int + // StartedAt is when the process started, to tell it from a later one + // that reused its id. + StartedAt time.Time + // StartedExact is true when StartedAt is the kernel's own start time for + // the pid, which is what an identity is compared by. False is a + // wall-clock stamp the driver took around the fork because the kernel + // could not be asked: readable, but not an identity, and the one-owner + // rule signals nothing and releases nothing on one (ErrIdentityUnknown). + StartedExact bool +} + +// Exit is how a worker ended. +type Exit struct { + // Code is the exit status, or -1 when a signal ended the process. + Code int + // Signaled is true when a signal ended it. + Signaled bool + // Err is a failure to wait on the process at all. + Err error +} + +// TurnStop is why a prompt turn ended: ACP v1's stop reasons. +type TurnStop string + +const ( + // TurnEndTurn is the agent finishing its turn. + TurnEndTurn TurnStop = "end_turn" + // TurnMaxTokens is the token limit. + TurnMaxTokens TurnStop = "max_tokens" + // TurnMaxTurnRequests is the agent's own request budget for the turn. + TurnMaxTurnRequests TurnStop = "max_turn_requests" + // TurnRefusal is the agent refusing to continue. + TurnRefusal TurnStop = "refusal" + // TurnCanceled is a cancel the connector asked for, and only that + // (invariant 3). The value is ACP's spelling. + TurnCanceled TurnStop = "cancelled" //nolint:misspell // ACP's wire value +) + +// PromptResult is a finished turn. +type PromptResult struct { + Stop TurnStop + // Refusals are the permissions refused during the turn (invariant 3). + Refusals []Refusal + // Usage is the turn's token use, where the agent reports it. + Usage Usage +} + +// Refusal is one permission the policy refused. +type Refusal struct { + // ToolCallID is the agent's id for the call. + ToolCallID string + // Tool is the tool's name or ACP kind; never its input. + Tool string +} + +// RefusalRecorder records a refusal at the moment a driver makes or observes +// it (see "Refusals" above). RecordRefusal must not block for long: a driver +// calls it on the goroutine that reads the agent's stream. +type RefusalRecorder interface { + RecordRefusal(ctx context.Context, r Refusal) error +} + +// Usage is token accounting. +type Usage struct { + InputTokens int64 + OutputTokens int64 + // ContextUsed and ContextSize are ACP usage_update's {used, size}, where + // known. + ContextUsed int64 + ContextSize int64 +} + +// UpdateKind names a session update, as ACP's sessionUpdate does. +type UpdateKind string + +const ( + UpdateToolCall UpdateKind = "tool_call" + UpdateToolCallUpdate UpdateKind = "tool_call_update" + UpdateUsage UpdateKind = "usage_update" + UpdateAgentMessageChunk UpdateKind = "agent_message_chunk" + // UpdatePlan is optional: no adapter the spike ran emitted one. + UpdatePlan UpdateKind = "plan" + // UpdatePermission is a permission decision the driver made or observed. + UpdatePermission UpdateKind = "permission" +) + +// ToolStatus is a tool call's status. +type ToolStatus string + +const ( + ToolPending ToolStatus = "pending" + ToolInProgress ToolStatus = "in_progress" + ToolCompleted ToolStatus = "completed" + ToolFailed ToolStatus = "failed" +) + +// ToolKind is ACP's tool kind. +type ToolKind string + +const ( + ToolRead ToolKind = "read" + ToolEdit ToolKind = "edit" + ToolDelete ToolKind = "delete" + ToolMove ToolKind = "move" + ToolSearch ToolKind = "search" + ToolExecute ToolKind = "execute" + ToolThink ToolKind = "think" + ToolFetch ToolKind = "fetch" + ToolOther ToolKind = "other" +) + +// Update is one piece of progress. It carries no content (invariant 6): +// progress is for liveness, budgets and the ledger, never for reading what +// the agent said. +type Update struct { + Kind UpdateKind + At time.Time + + // ToolCallID, Tool, ToolKind and Status describe a tool call. + ToolCallID string + // Tool is the tool's name ("Bash", "mcp__basecamp__basecamp_connect"). + Tool string + ToolKind ToolKind + Status ToolStatus + + // Usage is set on UpdateUsage. + Usage *Usage + // Chars is the length of an agent message chunk, whose text is not + // carried. + Chars int + // Allowed is set on UpdatePermission: whether the policy allowed it. + Allowed bool +} + +// PermissionPolicy is the connector's answer to what a worker may do. +// Permission answers are policy, not containment: the worker still runs with +// the operator's ambient authority, and nothing here is a sandbox. +type PermissionPolicy interface { + // Decide answers one request, for drivers that ask + // (Capabilities.PermissionCallback). + Decide(ctx context.Context, req PermissionRequest) PermissionDecision + // Rules is the same policy, pre-decided, for drivers whose permissions + // are fixed before the worker starts. + Rules() PermissionRules +} + +// PermissionRequest is ACP's session/request_permission, reduced to what a +// policy decides on. +type PermissionRequest struct { + ToolCallID string + Tool string + Kind ToolKind + // Locations are the paths the call touches, where the agent says. + Locations []string + // Options are the choices the agent offers. A driver selects by kind, + // never by id or label: ids are not portable across agents. + Options []PermissionOption +} + +// PermissionOption is one choice the agent offers. +type PermissionOption struct { + ID string + Kind PermissionOptionKind +} + +// PermissionOptionKind is ACP's option kind. +type PermissionOptionKind string + +const ( + AllowOnce PermissionOptionKind = "allow_once" + AllowAlways PermissionOptionKind = "allow_always" + RejectOnce PermissionOptionKind = "reject_once" + RejectAlways PermissionOptionKind = "reject_always" +) + +// PermissionDecision is the policy's answer. A driver answers with the offered +// option of kind AllowOnce or RejectOnce, and refuses when the kind it needs +// is not offered. +type PermissionDecision struct { + Allow bool +} + +// PermissionRules is a policy pre-decided. +type PermissionRules struct { + // Mode is the asking mode the agent must run in and confirm. + Mode PermissionMode + // WorkDir is where edits are allowed; everything outside it is refused. + WorkDir string + // AllowKinds are the tool kinds allowed without asking, besides edits + // inside WorkDir. + AllowKinds []ToolKind + // AllowMCPServers are the MCP servers whose every tool is allowed. + AllowMCPServers []string +} + +// PermissionMode is the connector's name for an agent's permission mode. A +// driver maps it to the agent's own mode id and verifies the agent reports +// that id back. +type PermissionMode string + +const ( + // ModeEditsInWorkDir allows edits inside the working directory, and + // refuses, without asking anyone, whatever the rules do not allow. + ModeEditsInWorkDir PermissionMode = "edits_in_workdir" +) + +// Launcher wraps the worker command: the seam where a sandbox launcher +// (sandbox-run) takes the dispatch. Scopes in, working directory and receipts +// out. +type Launcher interface { + // Launch returns the command that actually runs and the directory it runs + // in. A launcher refuses a request whose scope it cannot honor. + Launch(ctx context.Context, req LaunchRequest) (Launched, error) + // Receipts are what the launcher confirms the worker did, for the attempt + // the scope named. The direct launcher confirms nothing. + Receipts(ctx context.Context, attemptID string) ([]Receipt, error) +} + +// Scope is what a worker is for, as the launcher is told. +type Scope struct { + TaskID int64 + AttemptID string + // EventIDs are the events the task may cover. Only the originating event + // has been handed to the worker when the session starts; the others are + // exposed as they are prompted. + EventIDs []int64 + // WorkDir is the approved working directory the record carries. + WorkDir string + // SocketDir holds the task token's unix socket, which the worker's MCP + // server dials. A launcher that confines a worker must let it reach this + // directory, or the worker's MCP server cannot be handed its token. It is + // SessionConfig.PrivateDir in the ordinary case, and a short directory of + // the connector's own where a socket path under PrivateDir would be + // longer than a unix socket takes. + SocketDir string + Class string +} + +// Command is a process to run: path, argv (without the path) and the whole +// environment. +type Command struct { + Path string + Args []string + Env []string + Dir string +} + +// LaunchRequest is a worker command and its scope. +type LaunchRequest struct { + Scope Scope + Command Command +} + +// Launched is what runs. +type Launched struct { + Command Command + // WorkDir is the directory the worker works in: Scope.WorkDir for the + // direct launcher, a broker-owned scope under a sandbox. + WorkDir string +} + +// Receipt is something a launcher confirms a worker posted. +type Receipt struct { + Kind string + ID int64 + URL string +} + +// DirectLauncher runs the worker as it is, in the scope's directory. +type DirectLauncher struct{} + +// Launch implements Launcher. +func (DirectLauncher) Launch(_ context.Context, req LaunchRequest) (Launched, error) { + if req.Scope.WorkDir == "" { + return Launched{}, errors.New("driver: a launch needs the working directory the record carries") + } + cmd := req.Command + cmd.Dir = req.Scope.WorkDir + return Launched{Command: cmd, WorkDir: req.Scope.WorkDir}, nil +} + +// Receipts implements Launcher. +func (DirectLauncher) Receipts(context.Context, string) ([]Receipt, error) { return nil, nil } + +// StartError is a start that failed after it launched a process. The +// driver has asked the process's group to end; the connector owns confirming +// it gone before it settles the attempt or releases its directory. +type StartError struct { + Process Process + Err error +} + +func (e *StartError) Error() string { + return "driver: the worker started and then failed: " + e.Err.Error() +} +func (e *StartError) Unwrap() error { return e.Err } + +// StartedProcess is the process a failed start launched, if it launched one. +func StartedProcess(err error) Process { + var started *StartError + if errors.As(err, &started) { + return started.Process + } + return Process{} +} + +// DefaultGrace is how long a worker's process group has between SIGTERM and +// SIGKILL. +const DefaultGrace = 10 * time.Second + +// Errors a driver reports. +var ( + // ErrNotStarted wraps a start that failed before any worker process + // existed (invariant 4): the binary is missing, the launcher refused, the + // fork failed. Only this is retried automatically. + ErrNotStarted = errors.New("driver: the worker was not started") + // ErrUnusable wraps ErrNotStarted for a configuration no retry can fix: + // a mode the driver cannot express, a policy for another directory, an + // MCP server without a command. No process existed, and starting again + // would fail the same way, so the connector does not retry it. + ErrUnusable = errors.New("driver: the session's configuration cannot start a worker") + // ErrUnsafeMode is an agent that did not confirm the permission mode the + // policy asked for (invariant 2). The session is ended. + ErrUnsafeMode = errors.New("driver: the agent did not confirm the permission mode asked for") + // ErrSessionUnverified is a session that started but is not the one the + // connector asked for: an MCP server the agent did not connect, or a + // session id that is not the one requested. The driver ends such a + // session rather than let a worker run without the tools its dispatch + // needs — a worker with no Basecamp tools can neither read its dispatch + // nor report it, and would otherwise finish with the mention unanswered + // (card 23's finding). A driver's own sentinel for one of these wraps + // this one. + ErrSessionUnverified = errors.New("driver: the session is not the one the connector asked for") + // A server that stops working AFTER the handshake is not detectable from + // Claude Code's stream, which carries server status only in its init + // message: the connector's record is what catches it, since an event the + // worker could not report settles completed(unknown) and never succeeded, + // and the dispatcher logs connector.UnreportedFinishLine for a person to + // find. + // + // ErrSessionEnded is a call on a session whose worker is gone. + ErrSessionEnded = errors.New("driver: the session has ended") +) diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/driver_test.go b/internal/connector/driver/driver_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..af1c70bc4 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/driver_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,341 @@ +//go:build unix + +package driver + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "os" + "os/exec" + "path/filepath" + "strconv" + "strings" + "syscall" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func lookupFrom(m map[string]string) func(string) (string, bool) { + return func(k string) (string, bool) { v, ok := m[k]; return v, ok } +} + +func TestBuildEnvTakesExactNamesOnly(t *testing.T) { + host := map[string]string{ + "HOME": "/home/x", "PATH": "/bin", "CLAUDE_CODE_MESSAGING_TOKEN": "test-token-not-real", + "BASECAMP_TOKEN": "test-token-not-real", "HOMEBREW_PREFIX": "/opt", + } + env := BuildEnv(BaseEnv, lookupFrom(host), map[string]string{"PATH": "/usr/bin", "EXTRA": "1", "BAD=NAME": "x"}) + assert.Equal(t, []string{"EXTRA=1", "HOME=/home/x", "PATH=/usr/bin"}, env) +} + +func TestStartWorkerNeverInheritsTheConnectorsEnvironment(t *testing.T) { + t.Setenv("CONNECTOR_CANARY_NOT_REAL", "leaked") + out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "env.txt") + w, err := StartWorker(context.Background(), nil, Scope{WorkDir: t.TempDir()}, + Command{Path: "/bin/sh", Args: []string{"-c", "env > " + out}, Env: []string{"ONLY=this"}}) + require.NoError(t, err) + <-w.Done() + data, err := os.ReadFile(out) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.NotContains(t, string(data), "CONNECTOR_CANARY_NOT_REAL") + assert.Contains(t, string(data), "ONLY=this") + + // A nil Env is not "inherit". + w, err = StartWorker(context.Background(), nil, Scope{WorkDir: t.TempDir()}, + Command{Path: "/bin/sh", Args: []string{"-c", "env > " + out}}) + require.NoError(t, err) + <-w.Done() + data, err = os.ReadFile(out) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.NotContains(t, string(data), "CONNECTOR_CANARY_NOT_REAL") +} + +type refusingLauncher struct{} + +func (refusingLauncher) Launch(context.Context, LaunchRequest) (Launched, error) { + return Launched{}, errors.New("scope refused") +} +func (refusingLauncher) Receipts(context.Context, string) ([]Receipt, error) { return nil, nil } + +func TestAStartThatRanNothingIsErrNotStarted(t *testing.T) { + _, err := StartWorker(context.Background(), nil, Scope{WorkDir: t.TempDir()}, Command{Path: "/nonexistent/claude-not-here"}) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNotStarted) + _, err = StartWorker(context.Background(), refusingLauncher{}, Scope{WorkDir: t.TempDir()}, Command{Path: "/bin/true"}) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNotStarted) + _, err = StartWorker(context.Background(), nil, Scope{}, Command{Path: "/bin/true"}) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNotStarted, "the direct launcher needs the record's directory") +} + +func alive(pid int) bool { return syscall.Kill(pid, 0) == nil } + +// startWithChild starts a shell that starts a long child, and returns the +// worker and the child's pid. +func startWithChild(t *testing.T) (*Worker, int) { + t.Helper() + pidFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "child") + w, err := StartWorker(context.Background(), nil, Scope{WorkDir: t.TempDir()}, + Command{Path: "/bin/sh", Args: []string{"-c", "sleep 300 & echo $! > " + pidFile + "; wait"}, Env: []string{"PATH=/bin:/usr/bin"}}) + require.NoError(t, err) + var child int + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { + data, err := os.ReadFile(pidFile) + if err != nil || len(strings.TrimSpace(string(data))) == 0 { + return false + } + child, err = strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(string(data))) + return err == nil + }, 5*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond) + return w, child +} + +func TestTerminateEndsTheWholeProcessGroup(t *testing.T) { + w, child := startWithChild(t) + assert.Equal(t, w.Process().PID, w.Process().PGID) + w.Terminate(time.Second) + assert.Eventually(t, func() bool { return !alive(child) }, 5*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond, "the worker's own children go with it") +} + +func TestTerminateRecordedLeavesAReusedPidAlone(t *testing.T) { + cmd := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "/bin/sleep", "300") + cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setpgid: true} + require.NoError(t, cmd.Start()) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cmd.Process.Kill(); _ = cmd.Wait() }) + // The kernel's own identity for it, which is what a record carries. + p, err := LookupProcess(cmd.Process.Pid) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, p.StartedExact) + + reused := p + reused.StartedAt = p.StartedAt.Add(-time.Hour) + signaled, err := TerminateRecorded(reused, time.Second) + assert.False(t, signaled, "a recorded start time that does not match is another process") + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrGroupOutlivedLeader, "and a group still holding that id is not this worker's to end") + assert.True(t, alive(cmd.Process.Pid)) + + signaled, err = TerminateRecorded(p, 2*time.Second) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, signaled) + _ = cmd.Wait() +} + +func TestTerminateReturnsWhenADescendantLeftTheGroupHoldingTheOutput(t *testing.T) { + python, err := exec.LookPath("python3") + if err != nil { + t.Skip("python3 is needed to start a descendant in a new session") + } + pidFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "escaped") + script := "import os,sys,time\nif os.fork()==0:\n os.setsid()\n open(sys.argv[1],'w').write(str(os.getpid()))\n time.sleep(300)\nelse:\n time.sleep(300)\n" + w, err := StartWorker(context.Background(), nil, Scope{WorkDir: t.TempDir()}, + Command{Path: python, Args: []string{"-c", script, pidFile}, Env: []string{"PATH=/bin:/usr/bin"}}) + require.NoError(t, err) + var escaped int + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { + data, err := os.ReadFile(pidFile) + if err != nil { + return false + } + escaped, err = strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(string(data))) + return err == nil + }, 5*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = syscall.Kill(escaped, syscall.SIGKILL) }) + + done := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { + w.Terminate(100 * time.Millisecond) + close(done) + }() + select { + case <-done: + case <-time.After(10 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("Terminate waited on a descendant outside the worker's group") + } +} + +// Copilot r3: a process group can outlive its leader, and its members may be +// the worker's own children. +func TestAGroupThatOutlivedItsLeaderIsNotSilenceAbsence(t *testing.T) { + w, child := startWithChild(t) + leader := w.Process() + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = syscall.Kill(child, syscall.SIGKILL) }) + + // The leader alone goes; its child keeps the group. + require.NoError(t, syscall.Kill(leader.PID, syscall.SIGKILL)) + <-w.Done() + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return processStartTimeGone(leader.PID) }, 5*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond) + + signaled, err := TerminateRecorded(leader, time.Second) + assert.False(t, signaled) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrGroupOutlivedLeader) + assert.True(t, alive(child), "and the child is left alone for a person to decide about") +} + +// processStartTimeGone reports whether the kernel has no process by that pid. +func processStartTimeGone(pid int) bool { + _, err := processStartTime(pid) + return errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) +} + +// The one-owner rule's identity question: a pid is not an identity. +func TestOwnsWorkerAnswersWhetherThisIsStillTheWorker(t *testing.T) { + w, child := startWithChild(t) + p := w.Process() + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = syscall.Kill(child, syscall.SIGKILL) }) + + owns, err := OwnsWorker(p) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, owns, "the worker it started") + + reused := p + reused.StartedAt = p.StartedAt.Add(-time.Hour) + owns, err = OwnsWorker(reused) + assert.False(t, owns, "the same pid with another start time is another process") + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrGroupOutlivedLeader, "and its group still has members") + + owns, err = OwnsWorker(Process{PID: 1 << 30, PGID: 1 << 30, StartedAt: time.Now()}) + assert.False(t, owns) + assert.NoError(t, err, "a pid that names nothing, in a group with no members, is simply gone") + + owns, err = OwnsWorker(Process{}) + assert.False(t, owns) + assert.NoError(t, err, "a session with no process here is nothing to own") +} + +// Copilot r4: only "no such process group" proves a group is gone; a probe +// that was refused is not absence. +func TestOnlyNoSuchProcessGroupProvesAbsence(t *testing.T) { + assert.NoError(t, groupProbe(4242, syscall.ESRCH), "no such group: gone") + assert.ErrorIs(t, groupProbe(4242, nil), ErrGroupOutlivedLeader, "answered: members remain") + assert.ErrorIs(t, groupProbe(4242, syscall.EPERM), ErrGroupOutlivedLeader, "refused: not proven gone") + assert.ErrorIs(t, groupProbe(4242, syscall.EINVAL), ErrGroupOutlivedLeader, "any other answer: not proven gone") +} + +// openDescriptors counts this process's open file descriptors. +func openDescriptors(t *testing.T) int { + t.Helper() + entries, err := os.ReadDir("/proc/self/fd") + if err != nil { + t.Skip("no /proc/self/fd here") + } + return len(entries) +} + +// Copilot via card 22: descriptors have an owner too. A failed start closes +// what it opened, and a terminated worker's output is released. +func TestWorkersDoNotLeakDescriptors(t *testing.T) { + before := openDescriptors(t) + for range 50 { + _, err := StartWorker(context.Background(), nil, Scope{WorkDir: t.TempDir()}, Command{Path: "/nonexistent/claude-not-here"}) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNotStarted) + } + // At most: an earlier test's worker may release its pipes meanwhile, but + // fifty failed starts that each leaked would be fifty more. + assert.LessOrEqual(t, openDescriptors(t), before, "fifty failed starts leave no descriptor open") + + for range 5 { + w, err := StartWorker(context.Background(), nil, Scope{WorkDir: t.TempDir()}, Command{Path: "/bin/true", Env: []string{}}) + require.NoError(t, err) + w.Terminate(time.Second) + } + assert.Eventually(t, func() bool { return openDescriptors(t) <= before }, 2*pipeWaitDelay+2*time.Second, 50*time.Millisecond, + "a terminated worker's pipes are released without anyone else closing them") +} + +// sleepInItsOwnGroup starts a process that leads a group of its own, and +// gives back the kernel's identity for it. It stands in for whatever holds a +// pid now: a worker of a later attempt, or any process of this user the +// kernel gave a recycled id to. +func sleepInItsOwnGroup(t *testing.T) (*exec.Cmd, Process) { + t.Helper() + cmd := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "/bin/sleep", "300") + cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setpgid: true} + require.NoError(t, cmd.Start()) + t.Cleanup(func() { + _ = cmd.Process.Kill() + _ = cmd.Wait() + }) + p, err := LookupProcess(cmd.Process.Pid) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, p.StartedExact, "the kernel's own start time is the identity") + return cmd, p +} + +// Copilot on #738: the driver records the kernel's start time when it can +// get one, but the comparison accepted anything within three seconds of it, +// so under fast pid reuse a stranger started just after the record was +// written passed as the worker. +func TestAProcessStartedJustAfterTheRecordIsNotTheRecordedOne(t *testing.T) { + cmd, p := sleepInItsOwnGroup(t) + + stranger := p + stranger.StartedAt = p.StartedAt.Add(-time.Second) + gone, err := ProcessGone(stranger) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, gone, "a second between the record and the kernel is another process, not this one") + + owns, err := OwnsWorker(stranger) + assert.False(t, owns) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrGroupOutlivedLeader, "and its group is not settled around either") + + signaled, err := TerminateRecorded(stranger, 100*time.Millisecond) + assert.False(t, signaled) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrGroupOutlivedLeader) + assert.True(t, alive(cmd.Process.Pid), "nothing is signaled on a record that does not match") +} + +// The wall-clock fallback is not an identity: where the kernel would not say +// when a process started, the rule refuses to answer rather than compare +// against a stamp taken around a fork. +func TestARecordWithNoKernelStartTimeIsRefused(t *testing.T) { + cmd, p := sleepInItsOwnGroup(t) + + stamped := Process{PID: p.PID, PGID: p.PGID, StartedAt: time.Now()} + _, err := ProcessGone(stamped) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIdentityUnknown) + + owns, err := OwnsWorker(stamped) + assert.False(t, owns) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIdentityUnknown, "neither owned nor gone: unanswerable") + + signaled, err := TerminateRecorded(stamped, 100*time.Millisecond) + assert.False(t, signaled) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIdentityUnknown) + assert.True(t, alive(cmd.Process.Pid)) + + // And a record with a pid but no start time at all — a ledger row + // written where the kernel could not be asked — is the same answer, not + // "gone, settle it". + owns, err = OwnsWorker(Process{PID: p.PID, PGID: p.PGID}) + assert.False(t, owns) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIdentityUnknown) +} + +// Copilot on #738: group identity was checked once, before the grace period, +// and the SIGKILL that followed went out by the saved negative pgid however +// long the wait had been. This is what that costs once the id has changed +// hands: the record names a pid that now leads somebody else's group. +func TestALaterGroupSignalIsNotSentToAGroupTheRecordNoLongerOwns(t *testing.T) { + cmd, p := sleepInItsOwnGroup(t) + // What the connector recorded a while ago for the worker that had this + // pid before the kernel gave it away. + recorded := p + recorded.StartedAt = p.StartedAt.Add(-time.Hour) + + err := ConfirmGroupGone(recorded, 100*time.Millisecond) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrGroupOutlivedLeader, "the group is not proven gone") + // Not alive(), which counts the zombie this test has not reaped: the + // question is whether anything of that group still runs. + assert.True(t, GroupMembersRemain(p), "and the group that holds the id now is left running") + _ = cmd + + // The same rule, asked directly: nothing is signaled on a record whose + // identity cannot be established either. + assert.ErrorIs(t, signalRecordedGroup(Process{PID: p.PID, PGID: p.PGID, StartedAt: time.Now()}, syscall.SIGKILL), ErrIdentityUnknown) + assert.True(t, alive(cmd.Process.Pid)) + + // And the worker it really is may still be ended by its group. + require.NoError(t, signalRecordedGroup(p, syscall.SIGKILL)) + assert.Eventually(t, func() bool { return !GroupMembersRemain(p) }, 5*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond) +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/drivertest/drivertest.go b/internal/connector/driver/drivertest/drivertest.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c4b535bd7 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/drivertest/drivertest.go @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +//go:build unix + +// Package drivertest is the shared way to test the connector's one-owner +// rule: a task's process tree, its working directory or worktree, and its +// ledger record have a single owner and a single release point (see the rule +// written out in internal/connector/driver/worker.go). +// +// Cards that start workers, remove worktrees or settle records use these +// helpers rather than each writing their own process fixtures. +package drivertest + +import ( + "context" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "strconv" + "strings" + "syscall" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" +) + +// StartTree starts a worker that forks a grandchild of its own inside the +// worker's process group, with dir as its working directory, and returns the +// worker and the grandchild's pid. Both are killed when the test ends. +// +// It is the fixture for the rule's hardest case: the leader can be gone while +// the tree it made still runs in the task's directory, so nothing may release +// that directory or settle that record until the group is confirmed gone. +func StartTree(t *testing.T, dir string) (*driver.Worker, int) { + t.Helper() + pidFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "grandchild") + // The grandchild holds the working directory open and outlives its + // parent, which exits at once. + script := "cd " + dir + " && (sleep 300 & echo $! > " + pidFile + ") && exit 0" + worker, err := driver.StartWorker(context.Background(), nil, driver.Scope{WorkDir: dir}, + driver.Command{Path: "/bin/sh", Args: []string{"-c", script}, Env: []string{"PATH=/bin:/usr/bin"}}) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("start a worker tree: %v", err) + } + t.Cleanup(func() { worker.Terminate(time.Second) }) + + var grandchild int + deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second) + for { + data, readErr := os.ReadFile(pidFile) + if readErr == nil { + if pid, convErr := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(string(data))); convErr == nil && pid > 0 { + grandchild = pid + break + } + } + if time.Now().After(deadline) { + t.Fatal("the worker's grandchild never started") + } + time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond) + } + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = syscall.Kill(grandchild, syscall.SIGKILL) }) + return worker, grandchild +} + +// SurvivingWorker is StartTree with its leader already gone: the process the +// ledger would have recorded, plus the grandchild still running in dir. It is +// the fixture for "the task's tree outlived the worker", which every release +// path must hold against. +func SurvivingWorker(t *testing.T, dir string) (driver.Process, int) { + t.Helper() + worker, grandchild := StartTree(t, dir) + <-worker.Done() + RequireGroupHeld(t, worker.Process()) + return worker.Process(), grandchild +} + +// Alive reports whether a pid still names a live process. +func Alive(pid int) bool { return syscall.Kill(pid, 0) == nil } + +// RequireGroupHeld fails the test unless the process group is still held, +// which is what keeps a task's directory and record its own. +func RequireGroupHeld(t *testing.T, p driver.Process) { + t.Helper() + if !driver.GroupMembersRemain(p) { + t.Fatalf("process group %d is gone; the fixture cannot test the rule", p.PGID) + } +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/drivertest/redaction.go b/internal/connector/driver/drivertest/redaction.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..56c563191 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/drivertest/redaction.go @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +package drivertest + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "slices" + "strings" + "sync" + "testing" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" +) + +// RedactionPaths are the ways out of a worker a driver's redaction case must +// cover: a start that fails, a handshake that fails, a turn that fails, a +// cancel, and a close. Each is a place a driver builds text out of what the +// agent or the operating system said, which is where a secret gets out. +var RedactionPaths = []string{"start", "handshake", "prompt", "cancel", "close"} + +// Crossing is everything one error path handed back to the connector: what a +// person or a file could end up holding. +type Crossing struct { + // Errors are every error the path returned. + Errors []error + // Updates are every update the session emitted. + Updates []driver.Update + // Results are every turn result. + Results []driver.PromptResult + // Texts are the rest: a stderr tail, a log the driver wrote, a status + // line. + Texts []string +} + +// RedactionPath is one error path, named from RedactionPaths. +type RedactionPath struct { + Name string + Run func(t *testing.T) Crossing +} + +// RequireRedacted is the redaction rule's test (driver's redact.go): a driver +// is fed a secret it must never pass on — in its environment, in its MCP +// server's environment, in what the agent writes back, or in a path under the +// directories the connector named — and every error, update, result and text +// that comes back out of it is checked for that secret. +// +// A driver's case must cover every path in RedactionPaths; one left out fails +// the test, because an unexercised path is exactly where the rule rots. +func RequireRedacted(t *testing.T, secret string, paths []RedactionPath) { + t.Helper() + if secret == "" { + t.Fatal("RequireRedacted needs the secret to look for") + } + for _, name := range RedactionPaths { + if !slices.ContainsFunc(paths, func(p RedactionPath) bool { return p.Name == name }) { + t.Errorf("the redaction case does not cover the %q path", name) + } + } + for _, path := range paths { + t.Run(path.Name, func(t *testing.T) { + crossing := path.Run(t) + for i, err := range crossing.Errors { + if err == nil { + continue + } + // The message, and every verbose form of it, since a %+v in + // a log reaches whatever the error kept. + for _, text := range []string{err.Error(), fmt.Sprintf("%v", err), fmt.Sprintf("%+v", err), fmt.Sprintf("%#v", err)} { + if strings.Contains(text, secret) { + t.Errorf("the secret is in error #%d: %s", i, text) + break + } + } + } + for i, u := range crossing.Updates { + encoded, _ := json.Marshal(u) + if strings.Contains(string(encoded), secret) { + t.Errorf("the secret is in update #%d: %s", i, encoded) + } + } + for i, r := range crossing.Results { + if text := fmt.Sprintf("%+v", r); strings.Contains(text, secret) { + t.Errorf("the secret is in turn result #%d: %s", i, text) + } + } + for i, text := range crossing.Texts { + if strings.Contains(text, secret) { + t.Errorf("the secret is in text #%d: %s", i, text) + } + } + }) + } +} + +// Refusals is a driver.RefusalRecorder that keeps what it is told, for a +// driver's test of the refusal rule (driver's "Refusals"): every refusal +// recorded once, at the moment it is read, including one a worker that died +// before its result never repeated. +type Refusals struct { + mu sync.Mutex + calls []driver.Refusal +} + +var _ driver.RefusalRecorder = (*Refusals)(nil) + +// RecordRefusal implements driver.RefusalRecorder. +func (r *Refusals) RecordRefusal(_ context.Context, refusal driver.Refusal) error { + r.mu.Lock() + defer r.mu.Unlock() + r.calls = append(r.calls, refusal) + return nil +} + +// Recorded is every refusal recorded so far, in order. +func (r *Refusals) Recorded() []driver.Refusal { + r.mu.Lock() + defer r.mu.Unlock() + return slices.Clone(r.calls) +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/drivertest/secrets.go b/internal/connector/driver/drivertest/secrets.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f27cb1879 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/drivertest/secrets.go @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +//go:build unix + +package drivertest + +import ( + "io/fs" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "strings" + "sync" + "testing" + "time" +) + +// Places are where a secret must not be found. The credential rule (written +// out beside "One owner, one release point" in driver/worker.go) forbids a +// token in a worker's environment, in any argv, in any log, and in any file +// under a working directory or the connector's state directory. +type Places struct { + // Env is an environment, as KEY=VALUE. + Env []string + // Args are a command line. + Args []string + // Texts are logs, output lines, anything written. + Texts []string + // Dirs are walked, and every regular file in them read, except SQLite + // databases and their journals (see isDatabaseFile). + // + // A directory holding a database this process has open must not be + // scanned from this process at all: SQLite's POSIX locks belong to the + // process, and closing any descriptor to the database, its -wal or its + // -shm drops every one of them, so another process may checkpoint and + // reset the WAL under the open handle, which then reads stale data or + // fails with SQLITE_IOERR_SHORT_READ. Skipping those files by name keeps + // this walk from opening them; a database under another name cannot be + // recognized without opening it, so a caller that keeps one open under a + // name of its own runs the scan from a subprocess of its own (card 22 + // does; this package ships no helper for it). + Dirs []string +} + +// RequireNoSecret fails the test wherever secret appears in places. +func RequireNoSecret(t *testing.T, secret string, places Places) { + t.Helper() + if secret == "" { + t.Fatal("RequireNoSecret needs the secret to look for") + } + for _, kv := range places.Env { + if strings.Contains(kv, secret) { + name, _, _ := strings.Cut(kv, "=") + t.Errorf("the secret is in the environment, as %s", name) + } + } + for i, arg := range places.Args { + if strings.Contains(arg, secret) { + t.Errorf("the secret is in argv[%d]", i) + } + } + for i, text := range places.Texts { + if strings.Contains(text, secret) { + t.Errorf("the secret is in written text #%d", i) + } + } + for _, found := range filesContaining(places.Dirs, secret) { + t.Errorf("the secret is in a file: %s", found) + } +} + +// WatchForSecretFiles watches dirs for any file that carries secret, however +// briefly, from now until the returned stop is called, and stop returns every +// such file it saw. It is the check for a token file that exists for less +// than a second — an owner-only environment file a wrapper deletes once the +// child has read it — which a check made afterwards cannot see. Most tests +// want RequireNoSecretFilesDuring. +func WatchForSecretFiles(secret string, dirs ...string) (stop func() []string) { + var ( + mu sync.Mutex + seen = map[string]bool{} + done = make(chan struct{}) + ended = make(chan struct{}) + ) + go func() { + defer close(ended) + ticker := time.NewTicker(5 * time.Millisecond) + defer ticker.Stop() + for { + for _, found := range filesContaining(dirs, secret) { + mu.Lock() + seen[found] = true + mu.Unlock() + } + select { + case <-done: + return + case <-ticker.C: + } + } + }() + var once sync.Once + var result []string + return func() []string { + once.Do(func() { + close(done) + <-ended + mu.Lock() + defer mu.Unlock() + for found := range seen { + result = append(result, found) + } + }) + return result + } +} + +// RequireNoSecretFilesDuring fails the test for every file under dirs that +// carried secret at any moment while during ran. +func RequireNoSecretFilesDuring(t *testing.T, secret string, dirs []string, during func()) { + t.Helper() + stop := WatchForSecretFiles(secret, dirs...) + during() + for _, found := range stop() { + t.Errorf("a file carried the secret while it was watched: %s", found) + } +} + +func filesContaining(dirs []string, secret string) []string { + var found []string + for _, dir := range dirs { + root, err := os.OpenRoot(dir) + if err != nil { + continue + } + _ = fs.WalkDir(root.FS(), ".", func(path string, entry fs.DirEntry, walkErr error) error { + if walkErr != nil { + // A directory that vanished while it was walked holds nothing + // to find; the watch looks again. + return nil //nolint:nilerr // a file gone mid-walk is not a finding + } + if !entry.Type().IsRegular() || isDatabaseFile(entry.Name()) { + return nil + } + data, readErr := root.ReadFile(path) + if readErr == nil && len(data) <= 4<<20 && strings.Contains(string(data), secret) { + found = append(found, filepath.Join(dir, path)) + } + return nil + }) + _ = root.Close() + } + return found +} + +// isDatabaseFile reports a SQLite database or journal by its name. It is told +// by name, never by reading its header: opening and closing a descriptor to a +// database another handle in this process holds drops that handle's locks. +func isDatabaseFile(name string) bool { + for _, suffix := range []string{".db", ".db-wal", ".db-shm", ".db-journal", ".sqlite", ".sqlite-wal", ".sqlite-shm", ".sqlite-journal", ".sqlite3", ".sqlite3-wal", ".sqlite3-shm", ".sqlite3-journal"} { + if strings.HasSuffix(name, suffix) { + return true + } + } + return false +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/drivertest/secrets_test.go b/internal/connector/driver/drivertest/secrets_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ba62394d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/drivertest/secrets_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +//go:build unix + +package drivertest + +import ( + "errors" + "os" + "os/exec" + "path/filepath" + "syscall" + "testing" + "time" +) + +// The watcher sees a token file that exists for a few milliseconds — card +// 19's case, an env file a wrapper deletes as soon as its child reads it. +func TestTheWatcherSeesATokenFileThatLivesMilliseconds(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + stop := WatchForSecretFiles("test-token-not-real", dir) + path := filepath.Join(dir, "env") + if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("BASECAMP_CONNECT_TASK_TOKEN=test-token-not-real\n"), 0o600); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond) + _ = os.Remove(path) + if found := stop(); len(found) != 1 || found[0] != path { + t.Fatalf("a token file that lived 50ms was not seen: %v", found) + } +} + +// Card 22: SQLite's locks are the process's, and closing any descriptor to a +// database drops them. A scan of a state directory must not open the ledger +// this process holds, or another process may reset its WAL underneath it. +func TestTheScanLeavesADatabaseThisProcessHoldsLocked(t *testing.T) { + python, err := exec.LookPath("python3") + if err != nil { + t.Skip("python3 checks the lock from another process") + } + dir := t.TempDir() + for _, name := range []string{"ledger.db", "ledger.db-wal", "ledger.db-shm"} { + if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, name), []byte("test-token-not-real"), 0o600); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + } + db, err := os.OpenFile(filepath.Join(dir, "ledger.db"), os.O_RDWR, 0) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + defer db.Close() + lock := syscall.Flock_t{Type: syscall.F_WRLCK, Whence: 0, Start: 0, Len: 0} + if err := syscall.FcntlFlock(db.Fd(), syscall.F_SETLK, &lock); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + RequireNoSecret(t, "test-token-not-real", Places{Dirs: []string{dir}}) + if found := WatchForSecretFiles("test-token-not-real", dir); len(found()) != 0 { + t.Error("a database file was read") + } + + probe := exec.CommandContext(t.Context(), python, "-c", "import fcntl,sys\nf=open(sys.argv[1],'r+')\ntry:\n fcntl.lockf(f, fcntl.LOCK_EX|fcntl.LOCK_NB)\nexcept OSError:\n sys.exit(3)\n", filepath.Join(dir, "ledger.db")) + err = probe.Run() + var exit *exec.ExitError + if !errors.As(err, &exit) || exit.ExitCode() != 3 { + t.Fatalf("another process could lock the database this one holds: the scan dropped its lock (%v)", err) + } +} + +// Files that are not databases are still read. +func TestTheScanStillReadsFilesThatAreNotDatabases(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "ledger.db.json") + if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("test-token-not-real"), 0o600); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if found := filesContaining([]string{dir}, "test-token-not-real"); len(found) != 1 || found[0] != path { + t.Fatalf("a file that is not a database was skipped: %v", found) + } +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/env.go b/internal/connector/driver/env.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dd267b285 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/env.go @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +package driver + +import ( + "slices" + "strings" +) + +// BaseEnv is the environment every worker process may get from the +// connector's own: what a program needs to find its home, its tools, its +// locale and its terminal, and nothing that authenticates anyone. A driver +// adds the few variables its agent needs by name; nothing is passed by +// pattern. +var BaseEnv = []string{ + "HOME", "PATH", "USER", "LOGNAME", "SHELL", "LANG", "LC_ALL", "LC_CTYPE", + "TERM", "TMPDIR", "TZ", + "XDG_CONFIG_HOME", "XDG_DATA_HOME", "XDG_STATE_HOME", "XDG_CACHE_HOME", "XDG_RUNTIME_DIR", +} + +// BuildEnv is the environment made of the allowlisted names that lookup has, +// plus extra, which wins over a looked-up value of the same name. Its output +// is sorted, so the same inputs make the same environment. +// +// lookup is os.LookupEnv in production. A name is taken only as given: no +// prefix, no pattern, so a new variable of the host's never reaches a worker +// by resembling an allowed one. +func BuildEnv(allow []string, lookup func(string) (string, bool), extra map[string]string) []string { + values := map[string]string{} + for _, name := range allow { + if name == "" || strings.ContainsAny(name, "=\x00") { + continue + } + if v, ok := lookup(name); ok { + values[name] = v + } + } + for k, v := range extra { + if k == "" || strings.ContainsAny(k, "=\x00") { + continue + } + values[k] = v + } + out := make([]string, 0, len(values)) + for k, v := range values { + out = append(out, k+"="+v) + } + slices.Sort(out) + return out +} + +// EnvMap is BuildEnv's result as a map, for an MCPServer's Env. +func EnvMap(env []string) map[string]string { + out := make(map[string]string, len(env)) + for _, kv := range env { + if k, v, ok := strings.Cut(kv, "="); ok { + out[k] = v + } + } + return out +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/proctime_darwin.go b/internal/connector/driver/proctime_darwin.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6c88ddb9b --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/proctime_darwin.go @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +package driver + +import ( + "errors" + "os" + "time" + + "golang.org/x/sys/unix" +) + +// processStartTime is when the kernel started pid, from kern.proc.pid. +func processStartTime(pid int) (time.Time, error) { + info, err := unix.SysctlKinfoProc("kern.proc.pid", pid) + if err != nil { + // kern.proc.pid answers a pid with no process with EIO or ESRCH, + // not an empty record: that is a process that is gone. + if errors.Is(err, unix.EIO) || errors.Is(err, unix.ESRCH) { + return time.Time{}, os.ErrNotExist + } + return time.Time{}, err + } + if info.Proc.P_pid != int32(pid) { + return time.Time{}, os.ErrNotExist + } + if info.Proc.P_stat == sZomb { + // A zombie runs nothing; only its parent's wait is left of it. + return time.Time{}, os.ErrNotExist + } + tv := info.Proc.P_starttime + return time.Unix(int64(tv.Sec), int64(tv.Usec)*1000), nil +} + +// sZomb is SZOMB from sys/proc.h. +const sZomb = 5 + +// groupRunning reports whether any member of the process group is not a +// zombie, from kern.proc.pgrp. +func groupRunning(pgid int) (bool, error) { + procs, err := unix.SysctlKinfoProcSlice("kern.proc.pgrp", pgid) + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + for _, p := range procs { + if int(p.Eproc.Pgid) == pgid && p.Proc.P_stat != sZomb { + return true, nil + } + } + return false, nil +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/proctime_linux.go b/internal/connector/driver/proctime_linux.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d3f0fdb9a --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/proctime_linux.go @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +package driver + +import ( + "bufio" + "errors" + "fmt" + "os" + "strconv" + "strings" + "sync" + "time" +) + +// clockTicks is USER_HZ, which Linux fixes at 100 for /proc on every +// architecture Go releases for. +const clockTicks = 100 + +// procStat is the part of /proc/<pid>/stat the one-owner rule reads. +type procStat struct { + state byte + pgrp int + ticks int64 +} + +func readProcStat(pid int) (procStat, error) { + raw, err := os.ReadFile("/proc/" + strconv.Itoa(pid) + "/stat") + if err != nil { + return procStat{}, err + } + // The command name is parenthesized and may hold spaces or parentheses; + // the fields after the last ')' are fixed. + end := strings.LastIndexByte(string(raw), ')') + if end < 0 { + return procStat{}, errors.New("driver: unreadable /proc stat") + } + fields := strings.Fields(string(raw)[end+1:]) + // fields[0] is the state (field 3), fields[2] the process group (field + // 5), fields[19] the start time (field 22). + if len(fields) < 20 || len(fields[0]) != 1 { + return procStat{}, errors.New("driver: short /proc stat") + } + pgrp, err := strconv.Atoi(fields[2]) + if err != nil { + return procStat{}, fmt.Errorf("driver: /proc stat pgrp: %w", err) + } + ticks, err := strconv.ParseInt(fields[19], 10, 64) + if err != nil { + return procStat{}, fmt.Errorf("driver: /proc stat starttime: %w", err) + } + return procStat{state: fields[0][0], pgrp: pgrp, ticks: ticks}, nil +} + +// processStartTime is when the kernel started pid: /proc/<pid>/stat's +// starttime, in ticks since boot, plus the boot time from /proc/stat. A +// zombie is a process that is gone: it runs nothing, and only its parent's +// wait is left of it. +func processStartTime(pid int) (time.Time, error) { + st, err := readProcStat(pid) + if err != nil { + return time.Time{}, err + } + if st.state == 'Z' { + return time.Time{}, os.ErrNotExist + } + boot, err := bootTime() + if err != nil { + return time.Time{}, err + } + return boot.Add(time.Duration(st.ticks) * time.Second / clockTicks), nil +} + +// groupRunning reports whether any member of the process group is not a +// zombie. A pid that exits while the listing is read is skipped; a listing +// that cannot be read is an error, which is not absence. +func groupRunning(pgid int) (bool, error) { + entries, err := os.ReadDir("/proc") + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + for _, e := range entries { + pid, err := strconv.Atoi(e.Name()) + if err != nil || pid <= 0 { + continue + } + // A process whose stat cannot be read is not a member of this user's + // worker group: it is gone, or it belongs to someone else (a host + // mounted with hidepid answers EACCES for every other user's). Either + // way, skipping it loses nothing the rule needs, and failing on it + // would hold every attempt on such a host. + st, err := readProcStat(pid) + if err != nil { + continue + } + if st.pgrp == pgid && st.state != 'Z' { + return true, nil + } + } + return false, nil +} + +// bootTime is constant for as long as this machine has been up, and reading +// it means scanning /proc/stat past every per-CPU line, so it is read once. +var boot struct { + once sync.Once + at time.Time + err error +} + +func bootTime() (time.Time, error) { + boot.once.Do(func() { boot.at, boot.err = readBootTime() }) + return boot.at, boot.err +} + +func readBootTime() (time.Time, error) { + f, err := os.Open("/proc/stat") + if err != nil { + return time.Time{}, err + } + defer f.Close() + scanner := bufio.NewScanner(f) + for scanner.Scan() { + if rest, ok := strings.CutPrefix(scanner.Text(), "btime "); ok { + secs, err := strconv.ParseInt(strings.TrimSpace(rest), 10, 64) + if err != nil { + return time.Time{}, err + } + return time.Unix(secs, 0), nil + } + } + return time.Time{}, errors.New("driver: no btime in /proc/stat") +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/proctime_other.go b/internal/connector/driver/proctime_other.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0d425c799 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/proctime_other.go @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +//go:build unix && !linux && !darwin + +package driver + +import ( + "errors" + "time" +) + +// processStartTime is unknown here, so a recorded worker is never signaled: +// a pid cannot be told from a later process that reused it. +func processStartTime(int) (time.Time, error) { + return time.Time{}, errors.New("driver: process start times are not readable on this platform") +} + +// groupRunning cannot list a group here, so a group the kernel still has is +// never proven to hold only zombies. +func groupRunning(int) (bool, error) { + return false, errors.New("driver: process groups are not listable on this platform") +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/redact.go b/internal/connector/driver/redact.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..146492a79 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/redact.go @@ -0,0 +1,366 @@ +package driver + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "log/slog" + "path/filepath" + "regexp" + "slices" + "strings" + "unicode" +) + +// # Redaction: what leaves a worker, and what is taken out of it first +// +// Everything that crosses out of a worker toward a person or a file — an +// error a driver returns, a log line, a dispatch status line, a tool name in +// an update, the tail of the adapter's stderr — passes through one function, +// Redactor.Sanitize, before it is written anywhere. Err, Stderr and Handler +// are Sanitize applied to an error, to stderr and to a logger; nothing else +// in the connector redacts on its own. +// +// Sanitize removes, in this order: +// +// 1. Every character that drives a terminal rather than printing on one: +// C0 but for tab and newline, DEL, and the C1 block. It goes first so +// that an escape character inside a secret cannot carry it past the +// rules below. +// 2. Every value in Redaction.Secrets, wherever it appears: the task token +// and the agent's credentials, named by whoever holds them. +// 3. Every value of the worker's environment and of its MCP servers' +// environments (Redaction.Env) that BaseEnv does not name. BaseEnv is +// the operator's home, path, locale and terminal, chosen because none of +// it authenticates anyone; everything a driver or the dispatcher adds by +// name (an API key, a config directory) is a value the agent was given, +// and is taken out. Values shorter than minEnvValue are left, since a +// one-character value would take out every letter it matches. +// 4. Every path under Redaction.Dirs — the connector's state directory, +// which holds the ledger, and its runtime directory, which holds session +// files and token sockets — to the end of the path, whether it is written +// as given or with its symlinks resolved. +// 5. Email addresses: agents volunteer the signed-in account's address +// unprompted. +// 6. Credential-shaped runs: a bearer header's value, and any unbroken run +// of 40 or more token characters. +// +// Stderr is further never passed on verbatim: only its last line is kept, +// sanitized, stripped of control characters and cut to maxStderr bytes. +// +// A nil *Redactor still applies rules 1, 5 and 6, so no caller is ever +// without the control and pattern rules. +// +// Where this can still be broken: a secret the Redactor was not told about +// and that has no credential shape (a short password, say) passes; a secret +// the agent transforms before it writes it (base64, reversed, split across +// lines) passes; and a path outside the named directories is shown as it is. +// The rule removes what the connector knows is secret; it cannot recognize a +// secret it was never shown. + +// Redaction names what a Redactor takes out. +type Redaction struct { + // Secrets are values removed wherever they appear: a task token, an + // agent credential. + Secrets []string + // Env is an environment, as KEY=VALUE, whose values are removed unless + // BaseEnv names them. + Env []string + // Dirs are directories any path under which is removed: the state and + // runtime directories. + Dirs []string +} + +// With is r with more added. +func (r Redaction) With(more Redaction) Redaction { + return Redaction{ + Secrets: append(slices.Clone(r.Secrets), more.Secrets...), + Env: append(slices.Clone(r.Env), more.Env...), + Dirs: append(slices.Clone(r.Dirs), more.Dirs...), + } +} + +// EnvOf is an MCP server's environment map as KEY=VALUE, for Redaction.Env. +func EnvOf(m map[string]string) []string { + out := make([]string, 0, len(m)) + for k, v := range m { + out = append(out, k+"="+v) + } + return out +} + +const ( + // minEnvValue is the shortest environment value removed by value. + minEnvValue = 6 + // maxStderr is the most of a worker's stderr ever passed on, per line. + maxStderr = 300 + // maxStderrLines is how many of a worker's last stderr lines Lines + // returns: enough that a refusal is not lost behind the diagnostics that + // follow it, few enough to be a bound. + maxStderrLines = 50 +) + +const ( + redactedSecret = "[redacted]" + redactedPath = "[connector path]" + redactedEmail = "[email redacted]" + redactedCred = "[credential redacted]" //nolint:gosec // G101: the placeholder that replaces a credential, not one +) + +var ( + emailPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`[A-Za-z0-9._%+\-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.\-]+\.[A-Za-z]{2,}`) + // bearerPattern is a credential-shaped run: a bearer header value or a + // long unbroken token. + bearerPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\bbearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/\-]+=*|\b[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{40,}\b`) +) + +// Redactor applies a Redaction. Build one with NewRedactor; it is safe for +// concurrent use. +type Redactor struct { + values *strings.Replacer + paths *regexp.Regexp +} + +// NewRedactor compiles r. +func NewRedactor(r Redaction) *Redactor { + seen := map[string]bool{} + var values []string + add := func(v string) { + if v != "" && !seen[v] { + seen[v] = true + values = append(values, v) + } + } + for _, s := range r.Secrets { + add(s) + } + base := map[string]bool{} + for _, name := range BaseEnv { + base[name] = true + } + for _, kv := range r.Env { + name, value, ok := strings.Cut(kv, "=") + if ok && !base[name] && len(value) >= minEnvValue { + add(value) + } + } + // Longest first, so a value that contains another is removed whole. + slices.SortFunc(values, func(a, b string) int { return len(b) - len(a) }) + pairs := make([]string, 0, 2*len(values)) + for _, v := range values { + pairs = append(pairs, v, redactedSecret) + } + + var dirs []string + for _, d := range r.Dirs { + if d == "" { + continue + } + d = filepath.Clean(d) + dirs = append(dirs, d) + if resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(d); err == nil && resolved != d { + dirs = append(dirs, resolved) + } + } + slices.SortFunc(dirs, func(a, b string) int { return len(b) - len(a) }) + var paths *regexp.Regexp + if len(dirs) > 0 { + alternatives := make([]string, len(dirs)) + for i, d := range dirs { + alternatives[i] = regexp.QuoteMeta(d) + } + // The directory, and the rest of the path up to the first character + // that ends a path in a message: a space, a quote, a bracket, or the + // punctuation an error puts after a file name. + paths = regexp.MustCompile(`(?:` + strings.Join(alternatives, "|") + `)(?:/[^\s"'` + "`" + `)\]:;,]*)?`) + } + return &Redactor{values: strings.NewReplacer(pairs...), paths: paths} +} + +// Sanitize is the one function every text crossing out of a worker passes +// through. See the rule above. +func (r *Redactor) Sanitize(s string) string { + // Controls first: a terminal is the connector's stderr, and stripping + // them afterwards would let an escape character sitting inside a secret + // carry that secret past the replacer. + s = stripControls(s) + if r != nil { + s = r.values.Replace(s) + if r.paths != nil { + s = r.paths.ReplaceAllString(s, redactedPath) + } + } + s = emailPattern.ReplaceAllString(s, redactedEmail) + return bearerPattern.ReplaceAllString(s, redactedCred) +} + +// stripControls removes every character that drives a terminal rather than +// printing on one: C0, DEL and the C1 block. What is sanitized ends up on +// the connector's stderr and in its log, and the fields interpolated into it +// are a worker's own — the permission mode Claude reports, a tool name — so +// a malformed or hostile value must not be able to move the cursor, repaint +// the screen or start an escape sequence there. +// +// Tab and newline stay. Neither drives a terminal, and both are what a +// legitimate multi-line log field is made of; a message that must be one +// line says so itself (Redactor.line, which maps every remaining control to +// a space). Carriage return does not stay: it rewrites the line it is on, +// which is how output is made to lie about what it said. +func stripControls(s string) string { + return strings.Map(func(c rune) rune { + switch { + case c == '\t' || c == '\n': + return c + case c < 0x20, c == 0x7f, c >= 0x80 && c <= 0x9f: + return -1 + } + return c + }, s) +} + +// Stderr is what may be passed on of a worker's stderr: its last non-empty +// line, sanitized, on one line, and no longer than maxStderr bytes. +func (r *Redactor) Stderr(text string) string { + lines := r.Lines(text) + if len(lines) == 0 { + return "" + } + return lines[len(lines)-1] +} + +// Lines is what may be passed on of a worker's stderr when the LAST line is +// not enough: its last maxStderrLines non-empty lines, each sanitized, on one +// line and no longer than maxStderr bytes, oldest first. +// +// Stderr gives the last line, which is where a program that could not start +// says why. A refusal, though, is written when it happens and whatever the +// agent prints afterwards buries it, so a driver that reads refusals from +// stderr reads them here (driver.go's "Refusals"). +func (r *Redactor) Lines(text string) []string { + raw := strings.Split(text, "\n") + out := make([]string, 0, len(raw)) + for _, line := range raw { + if clean := r.line(line); clean != "" { + out = append(out, clean) + } + } + if len(out) > maxStderrLines { + out = out[len(out)-maxStderrLines:] + } + return out +} + +// line is one line of a worker's output, sanitized, on one line and bounded. +func (r *Redactor) line(text string) string { + text = r.Sanitize(strings.TrimRight(text, "\r\n")) + text = strings.Map(func(c rune) rune { + if unicode.IsControl(c) { + return ' ' + } + return c + }, text) + if len(text) > maxStderr { + text = strings.ToValidUTF8(text[len(text)-maxStderr:], "") + } + return strings.TrimSpace(text) +} + +// Err is err with its message sanitized. errors.Is still answers for every +// error err wraps, and errors.As for a *StartError, whose own error is +// sanitized in turn; nothing else of the original chain is reachable, so no +// wrapped message can carry a secret past it. +func (r *Redactor) Err(err error) error { + if err == nil { + return nil + } + var already *redactedError + if errors.As(err, &already) && already.by == r { + return err + } + return &redactedError{msg: r.Sanitize(err.Error()), orig: err, by: r} +} + +type redactedError struct { + msg string + orig error + by *Redactor +} + +func (e *redactedError) Error() string { return e.msg } + +func (e *redactedError) Is(target error) bool { return errors.Is(e.orig, target) } + +func (e *redactedError) As(target any) bool { + switch t := target.(type) { + case **StartError: + var started *StartError + if !errors.As(e.orig, &started) { + return false + } + *t = &StartError{Process: started.Process, Err: e.by.Err(started.Err)} + return true + case **redactedError: + *t = e + return true + } + return false +} + +// Format keeps %+v and %#v from reaching the original error. +func (e *redactedError) Format(f fmt.State, _ rune) { _, _ = f.Write([]byte(e.msg)) } + +// Handler is h with every message and attribute sanitized. A string, an +// error or any value that is not a number, a boolean, a time or a duration +// is written as its sanitized text. +func (r *Redactor) Handler(h slog.Handler) slog.Handler { + return &redactingHandler{next: h, r: r} +} + +type redactingHandler struct { + next slog.Handler + r *Redactor +} + +func (h *redactingHandler) Enabled(ctx context.Context, level slog.Level) bool { + return h.next.Enabled(ctx, level) +} + +func (h *redactingHandler) Handle(ctx context.Context, rec slog.Record) error { + out := slog.NewRecord(rec.Time, rec.Level, h.r.Sanitize(rec.Message), rec.PC) + rec.Attrs(func(a slog.Attr) bool { + out.AddAttrs(h.attr(a)) + return true + }) + return h.next.Handle(ctx, out) +} + +func (h *redactingHandler) WithAttrs(attrs []slog.Attr) slog.Handler { + clean := make([]slog.Attr, len(attrs)) + for i, a := range attrs { + clean[i] = h.attr(a) + } + return &redactingHandler{next: h.next.WithAttrs(clean), r: h.r} +} + +func (h *redactingHandler) WithGroup(name string) slog.Handler { + return &redactingHandler{next: h.next.WithGroup(name), r: h.r} +} + +func (h *redactingHandler) attr(a slog.Attr) slog.Attr { + v := a.Value.Resolve() + switch v.Kind() { + case slog.KindInt64, slog.KindUint64, slog.KindFloat64, slog.KindBool, slog.KindTime, slog.KindDuration: + return slog.Attr{Key: a.Key, Value: v} + case slog.KindGroup: + group := v.Group() + clean := make([]slog.Attr, len(group)) + for i, g := range group { + clean[i] = h.attr(g) + } + return slog.Attr{Key: a.Key, Value: slog.GroupValue(clean...)} + case slog.KindString: + return slog.String(a.Key, h.r.Sanitize(v.String())) + default: + return slog.String(a.Key, h.r.Sanitize(fmt.Sprint(v.Any()))) + } +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/redact_test.go b/internal/connector/driver/redact_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c49077b1b --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/redact_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +package driver + +import ( + "bytes" + "errors" + "fmt" + "log/slog" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "strings" + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func TestTheRedactionRuleTakesOutEverythingItNames(t *testing.T) { + state := t.TempDir() + r := NewRedactor(Redaction{ + Secrets: []string{"test-token-not-real"}, + Env: []string{"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=test-key-not-real", "HOME=/home/operator", "TZ=UTC", "SHORT=abc"}, + Dirs: []string{state}, + }) + + assert.NotContains(t, r.Sanitize("token test-token-not-real used"), "test-token-not-real", "a named secret") + assert.NotContains(t, r.Sanitize("key test-key-not-real used"), "test-key-not-real", "a value of the worker's environment") + assert.Contains(t, r.Sanitize("under /home/operator/Work"), "/home/operator/Work", "BaseEnv's values are the operator's own, not the agent's") + assert.Contains(t, r.Sanitize("abc"), "abc", "a value too short to remove safely") + assert.NotContains(t, r.Sanitize("open "+filepath.Join(state, "ledger.db")+": denied"), state, "a path under the state directory") + assert.Contains(t, r.Sanitize("open "+filepath.Join(state, "ledger.db")+": denied"), ": denied", "and the rest of the message stands") + assert.NotContains(t, r.Sanitize("logged in as someone@example.com"), "someone@example.com") + assert.NotContains(t, r.Sanitize("with Bearer abc.def-ghi"), "abc.def-ghi") + assert.NotContains(t, r.Sanitize(strings.Repeat("x", 48)), strings.Repeat("x", 48)) + + // The pattern rules hold even for a caller with no redaction of its own. + assert.NotContains(t, (*Redactor)(nil).Sanitize("someone@example.com"), "someone@example.com") +} + +func TestTheRuleFollowsADirectoryThroughItsSymlink(t *testing.T) { + resolved := t.TempDir() + link := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "state") + require.NoError(t, os.Symlink(resolved, link)) + r := NewRedactor(Redaction{Dirs: []string{link}}) + assert.NotContains(t, r.Sanitize("open "+filepath.Join(resolved, "ledger.db")), resolved, "the resolved path is the same directory") + assert.NotContains(t, r.Sanitize("open "+filepath.Join(link, "ledger.db")), link) +} + +func TestStderrIsNeverPassedOnVerbatim(t *testing.T) { + r := NewRedactor(Redaction{Secrets: []string{"test-token-not-real"}}) + out := r.Stderr("starting\nusing test-token-not-real\x07 now\n") + assert.NotContains(t, out, "test-token-not-real") + assert.NotContains(t, out, "starting", "only the last line") + assert.NotContains(t, out, "\x07", "no control characters") + assert.LessOrEqual(t, len(r.Stderr(strings.Repeat("y", 4000))), maxStderr) +} + +func TestARedactedErrorAnswersIsAndAsWithoutCarryingTheSecret(t *testing.T) { + r := NewRedactor(Redaction{Secrets: []string{"test-token-not-real"}}) + inner := fmt.Errorf("%w: wrote test-token-not-real", ErrUnusable) + err := r.Err(&StartError{Process: Process{PID: 42, PGID: 42}, Err: errors.Join(ErrNotStarted, inner)}) + + assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), "test-token-not-real") + assert.NotContains(t, fmt.Sprintf("%+v", err), "test-token-not-real", "and no verbose format reaches the original") + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNotStarted) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUnusable) + assert.Equal(t, 42, StartedProcess(err).PID, "the process a failed start left is still readable") + + var started *StartError + require.True(t, errors.As(err, &started)) + assert.NotContains(t, started.Err.Error(), "test-token-not-real", "including the error it carries") + assert.Nil(t, r.Err(nil)) +} + +func TestEveryLogRecordPassesThroughTheRule(t *testing.T) { + var buf bytes.Buffer + r := NewRedactor(Redaction{Secrets: []string{"test-token-not-real"}}) + log := slog.New(r.Handler(slog.NewJSONHandler(&buf, nil))) + log = log.With("with", "test-token-not-real") + log.WithGroup("g").Error("wrote test-token-not-real", + "text", "test-token-not-real", + "error", errors.New("test-token-not-real"), + "any", []string{"test-token-not-real"}, + "count", 3) + + out := buf.String() + assert.NotContains(t, out, "test-token-not-real") + assert.Contains(t, out, `"count":3`, "numbers stay numbers") +} + +// Card 19: a refusal an agent writes to stderr is followed by whatever it +// prints next, and the tail is only the last line. Lines keeps them all, +// bounded and sanitized. +func TestStderrLinesKeepARefusalTheDiagnosticsBury(t *testing.T) { + r := NewRedactor(Redaction{Secrets: []string{"test-token-not-real"}}) + text := "refused: exec of /bin/rm (test-token-not-real)\nreading config\x07\n\nretrying in 2s\n" + lines := r.Lines(text) + require.Len(t, lines, 3, "the empty line is not one") + assert.Contains(t, lines[0], "refused: exec of /bin/rm", "the refusal is still there, first") + assert.NotContains(t, lines[0], "test-token-not-real", "and sanitized") + assert.Equal(t, "reading config", lines[1], "control characters are stripped") + assert.Equal(t, "retrying in 2s", lines[2]) + assert.Equal(t, "retrying in 2s", r.Stderr(text), "the tail is still the last line") + + many := make([]string, 0, maxStderrLines+20) + for i := range maxStderrLines + 20 { + many = append(many, fmt.Sprintf("line %d", i)) + } + bounded := r.Lines(strings.Join(many, "\n")) + assert.Len(t, bounded, maxStderrLines, "and the whole thing is bounded") + assert.Equal(t, "line 69", bounded[len(bounded)-1], "keeping the newest") + assert.LessOrEqual(t, len(r.Lines(strings.Repeat("z", 4000))[0]), maxStderr) +} + +// Copilot on #738: Sanitize is the last thing every driver error and log +// field passes through, and the connector's stderr is a terminal. A field a +// worker chose — Claude's reported permission mode, a tool name — must not be +// able to move the cursor, repaint the screen or start an escape sequence +// there. Tab and newline stay: they are what a legitimate multi-line log +// field is made of, and neither drives a terminal. +func TestTheRuleTakesTerminalControlsOutOfEverythingItSanitizes(t *testing.T) { + r := NewRedactor(Redaction{Secrets: []string{"test-token-not-real"}}) + + out := r.Sanitize("mode \x1b[31;1mdanger\x1b[0m\a set") + assert.NotContains(t, out, "\x1b", "an escape character never reaches a terminal") + assert.NotContains(t, out, "\a", "nor a bell") + assert.Contains(t, out, "danger", "and the text itself still reads") + + assert.NotContains(t, r.Sanitize("a\u009b2Kb"), "\u009b", "the C1 block is an escape sequence of its own") + assert.NotContains(t, r.Sanitize("a\x7fb"), "\x7f", "DEL too") + assert.NotContains(t, r.Sanitize("keep\roverwrite"), "\r", "a carriage return rewrites the line it is on") + assert.Equal(t, "one\ttwo\nthree", r.Sanitize("one\ttwo\nthree"), "tab and newline are a log field's own") + + // A control character in the middle of a secret must not hide it from + // the replacer, so the controls come out first. + assert.NotContains(t, r.Sanitize("test-token\x1b-not-real"), "not-real") + + // The pattern rules hold for a caller with no redaction of its own, and + // so does this one. + assert.NotContains(t, (*Redactor)(nil).Sanitize("\x1b]0;title\a"), "\x1b") +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/spawn/spawn.go b/internal/connector/driver/spawn/spawn.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f1e69f490 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/spawn/spawn.go @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +// Package spawn chooses a spawn driver by the worker connect.json names: the +// coding agent started as a process per session. +package spawn + +import ( + "fmt" + "sort" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver/claude" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver/codex" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/setup" +) + +// Options are what every spawn driver may take. +type Options struct { + // Lookup reads the connector's environment for the worker's own + // variables; os.LookupEnv when nil. + Lookup func(string) (string, bool) +} + +// constructors builds each worker's driver. A worker added to setup.Workers +// adds its row here. +var constructors = map[string]func(Options) driver.Driver{ + setup.WorkerClaude: func(o Options) driver.Driver { return claude.New(claude.Options{Lookup: o.Lookup}) }, + setup.WorkerCodex: func(o Options) driver.Driver { return codex.New(codex.Options{Lookup: o.Lookup}) }, +} + +// New is the spawn driver for worker. +func New(worker string, opts Options) (driver.Driver, error) { + build, ok := constructors[worker] + if !ok { + names := make([]string, 0, len(constructors)) + for name := range constructors { + names = append(names, name) + } + sort.Strings(names) + return nil, fmt.Errorf("spawn: no driver for worker %q (have %v)", worker, names) + } + return build(opts), nil +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/spawn/spawn_test.go b/internal/connector/driver/spawn/spawn_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..025b90ecc --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/spawn/spawn_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +package spawn + +import ( + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/setup" +) + +func TestEveryWorkerSetupAcceptsHasADriver(t *testing.T) { + for _, worker := range setup.Workers { + d, err := New(worker, Options{}) + require.NoError(t, err, worker) + assert.Equal(t, worker, d.Name()) + } + _, err := New("nobody", Options{}) + assert.Error(t, err) +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/worker.go b/internal/connector/driver/worker.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f95c7381d --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/worker.go @@ -0,0 +1,654 @@ +//go:build unix + +package driver + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "os" + "os/exec" + "strings" + "sync" + "syscall" + "time" +) + +// pipeWaitDelay bounds how long a worker that has exited is waited on for +// pipes a stray descendant still holds. +const pipeWaitDelay = 2 * time.Second + +// # One owner, one release point +// +// This is the connector's rule for a task's process tree, its working +// directory (or worktree), and its ledger record. All three belong to one +// owner — the attempt — and are released at one point, in this order: +// +// 1. Every worker starts as the leader of its own process group +// (StartWorker), so the tree it makes can be signaled as one. +// 2. A cancel, a deadline or a shutdown ends that group: SIGTERM, a bounded +// wait, then SIGKILL, by process group id and never by name (Terminate). +// 3. The group is then CONFIRMED gone (ConfirmGroupGone). Only after that +// may the attempt be settled, its directory or worktree released, and its +// record made terminal. +// 4. A group that cannot be confirmed gone — members left, a pid whose +// identity cannot be established, a platform that cannot say — leaves the +// record HELD: live in the ledger, its conversation and directory still +// its own, for a person to settle. Never terminal, never released. +// 5. A restart reaps by the same rule (TerminateRecorded, then the same +// confirmation), and asks OwnsWorker first: a pid is not an identity, so +// ownership is the pid AND the kernel's own start time for it, compared +// exactly. Everything that acts on a recorded worker asks OwnsWorker +// rather than testing a pid of its own: in this card, recovery (through +// TerminateRecorded) and the release point's second confirmation; any +// later one — status, redispatch, discard, hold — the same way. Every +// group signal that follows the first asks again (signalRecordedGroup): +// ownership established before a grace period is not ownership after it, +// because a pid freed during the grace can be leading another group by +// the time the kill goes out. +// +// The one thing this cannot cover is a descendant that leaves the group by +// calling setsid: it is outside every group signal, and the connector can +// only avoid waiting on it (WaitDelay, CloseStdout). Containment is the +// sandbox launcher's job, not this rule's. +// +// Cards that start workers, remove worktrees or settle records use the +// functions here rather than writing their own. +// +// # What a driver promises, and where each promise can still be broken +// +// The rule above is about the release point. These are the promises the rest +// of the boundary makes, each with the paths that can still break it named, +// so a reader does not have to take "held everywhere" on trust. +// +// ## A worker's lifetime +// +// - After a start returns a Session, a process group exists whose leader is +// the worker, and the connector owns it: Process() names it, and nobody +// else may signal it. +// - After a start returns an ERROR, no process of that session exists. +// Either none was started, or the driver ended the one it started, whole +// group, before returning (Driver.NewSession). ErrNotStarted says more: +// none ever existed, so the connector may retry the start once. +// - Cancel ends the turn, not the worker, and never blocks on a worker that +// has stopped reading its input: it gives up instead, and says so. +// - Close ends the session and its group — signal, bounded wait, kill — and +// is idempotent. It never waits on the worker's cooperation. +// - A worker that goes with a turn in flight is classified by how it went: +// one that exited on its own with a non-zero status FAILED, and one that +// vanished — signaled by someone else, or gone with no status the +// connector observed — is LOST. +// - Descriptors have an owner too. A start that fails closes every +// descriptor it opened; a terminated worker's output pipe is closed by +// the Worker once its reader has had the same bound to drain it that Wait +// gives a stray descendant, whether or not the reader closed it. +// - After a crash of the connector, the group survives. A later process +// identifies it by OwnsWorker (pid AND recorded start time), ends it with +// TerminateRecorded, and confirms with ConfirmGroupGone before anything +// is settled or released. +// +// Where this can still be broken: a descendant that calls setsid leaves the +// group and no signal reaches it (there is no portable way to see it, and +// containment is the sandbox launcher's); a driver that returns an error +// after leaving a process behind breaks the start promise, which is why it is +// written on the method rather than left to each driver; and on a platform +// where process start times cannot be read — or for a worker whose start +// time the kernel would not give — OwnsWorker refuses to answer and nothing +// may be settled; the run command refuses to start on such a platform at +// all. +// +// ## Credentials +// +// Two secrets exist around a worker, and each has one carriage. +// +// - The agent's Basecamp credential stays in the CLI's credential store. It +// is never in any environment, argv, file or log the connector writes; +// the worker's MCP server, running as the agent's profile, reads it from +// that store itself. +// - A task token lives from LaunchTask to the end of its task. The ledger +// keeps only its hash. It crosses only to the worker's MCP server, and +// never to the agent process: the dispatcher serves it over a unix socket +// in the attempt's owner-only runtime directory, once per start of that +// server (an MCP host that restarts a stdio server re-runs it, so the +// bridge asks again) and at most connector.MaxTokenHandoffs times, +// only to a peer of this user in the worker's process group or descended +// from its leader (connector.ServeTaskToken), and `basecamp connect +// worker-mcp` passes it on to `basecamp mcp` over an inherited +// descriptor. It is never in an environment, never in argv, never in a +// file, and never in a log or a dispatch line. +// - The agent's own credential (ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, where one is used) is in +// the agent's environment because the agent needs it, and nowhere else +// the connector writes. +// +// drivertest.RequireNoSecret and RequireNoSecretFilesDuring are the checks: +// the environment, argv, written text, and — watched continuously, so a file +// that lives milliseconds is still caught — every file under the working and +// session directories. What comes back OUT of a worker is the redaction +// rule's (redact.go), and drivertest.RequireRedacted is its check. +// +// Where this can still be broken: an agent may copy what it was handed +// anywhere its tools can write, and any process of this user in the worker's +// group could take the token first — the group is the agent's own tree. +// +// ## The environment a worker and its MCP servers get +// +// - The connector owns both. SessionConfig.Env is the worker's whole +// environment and MCPServer.Env is each server's, and each is an +// allowlist the dispatcher built by name (BuildEnv over BaseEnv, plus the +// variables a driver names for its own agent). +// - No credential is in either: the agent's Basecamp credential stays in +// the CLI's store, and the task token travels over the socket. +// - No secret is ever in argv, which every process on the machine can read. +// +// Where this can still be broken: an agent may ADD to the environment it +// hands its MCP servers — Claude Code passes its own whole environment down, +// which carries the agent's own credentials — so the declared environment is +// a floor, not a ceiling. The bridge (`basecamp connect worker-mcp`) execs +// `basecamp mcp` with the declared environment only, so the connector's own +// server does not keep them; a third-party MCP server the operator adds to a +// worker would inherit them regardless, and the connector ships none. +// +// ## When an attempt may be adopted, settled or released +// +// - Adoption links a reply to an event; it is never evidence that work +// finished, and never makes an outcome succeeded. It needs exactly one +// reply by the agent at that destination after the event's own +// acknowledgement and before any later instruction's, it is never the +// worker's own acknowledgement, and a listing the scan limit cut short +// adopts nothing. +// - An attempt is settled, its directory released and its record made +// terminal at one point (Dispatcher.release), and only after the group is +// confirmed gone and the ledger has taken the settlement. +// - An attempt that cannot be confirmed or cannot be settled stays live and +// holds its conversation, its directory and one of the connector's worker +// slots, until a person settles it. +// +// Where this can still be broken: adoption trusts Basecamp's ordering of +// replies against this machine's clock for "after the acknowledgement", so a +// clock far behind the server's could see a reply as later than it was — the +// exactly-one rule and the acknowledgement exclusion are what keep that from +// mattering; and a person who writes to the ledger by hand can of course +// strand anything. +// +// Worker is a process a spawn driver started: the leader of its own process +// group, with its stdin and stdout piped and its stderr kept, redacted, for +// diagnosis. Every spawn driver starts its agent through StartWorker, so the +// rules for processes (invariants 1, 4 and 5) live in one place. +type Worker struct { + cmd *exec.Cmd + process Process + stdin io.WriteCloser + stdout *os.File + stderr *tailBuffer + + done chan struct{} + exit Exit + killOnce sync.Once + releaseOnce sync.Once +} + +// StartWorker launches cmd through launcher, in scope, as a new process group. +// An error wrapping ErrNotStarted means no process exists; StartWorker returns +// no other error. +func StartWorker(ctx context.Context, launcher Launcher, scope Scope, cmd Command) (*Worker, error) { + if launcher == nil { + launcher = DirectLauncher{} + } + launched, err := launcher.Launch(ctx, LaunchRequest{Scope: scope, Command: cmd}) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: launcher: %w", ErrNotStarted, err) + } + c := launched.Command + if c.Path == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: no command", ErrNotStarted) + } + if c.Env == nil { + // exec.Cmd reads a nil Env as "inherit the connector's". A worker + // never does (invariant 1); an empty environment is written as one. + c.Env = []string{} + } + // The worker outlives the call that starts it; Terminate ends it, never + // a context. + ec := exec.CommandContext(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), c.Path, c.Args...) //nolint:gosec // G204: the driver's own binary and flags, never content + ec.Dir = c.Dir + ec.Env = c.Env + ec.SysProcAttr = newProcessGroup() + // A descendant that left the group (a daemon that called setsid) can + // hold the worker's stdout or stderr open after the worker is gone. Wait + // would block on it, and with it Terminate and every shutdown behind + // it; past this delay the pipes are closed and the worker counts as + // exited. + ec.WaitDelay = pipeWaitDelay + w := &Worker{cmd: ec, stderr: &tailBuffer{max: 8 << 10}, done: make(chan struct{})} + ec.Stderr = w.stderr + if w.stdin, err = ec.StdinPipe(); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrNotStarted, err) + } + // Stdout is a pipe of the Worker's own, not exec's StdoutPipe: Wait + // closes an exec pipe when the process exits, which can drop the last + // lines a worker wrote before exiting while they are still being read. + // This one closes only when the reader has everything, or CloseStdout. + readEnd, writeEnd, err := os.Pipe() + if err != nil { + // Descriptors are owned too: a start that fails closes every one it + // opened. + _ = w.stdin.Close() + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrNotStarted, err) + } + ec.Stdout = writeEnd + w.stdout = readEnd + if err := ec.Start(); err != nil { + // exec.Cmd.Start returns an error only when no process was created: + // a missing binary, a bad directory, a failed fork. + _ = w.stdin.Close() + _ = readEnd.Close() + _ = writeEnd.Close() + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrNotStarted, err) + } + // The child has its copy; this process keeps none, so the reader sees + // end of file once the worker and everything it started have closed it. + _ = writeEnd.Close() + // The kernel's own start time for this pid, not the clock: it is what + // tells this worker from a later process the kernel gives the same pid, + // and OwnsWorker compares against it exactly. Where the kernel cannot be + // asked, the wall-clock stamp is kept for a person to read and the + // identity is marked inexact: no tolerance stands in for it, because a + // tolerance wide enough to cover a stamp taken around a fork is wide + // enough to accept a stranger under fast pid reuse (Copilot). Nothing is + // signaled on an inexact identity and nothing of its attempt is released. + started, exact := time.Now(), false + if kernel, err := processStartTime(ec.Process.Pid); err == nil { + started, exact = kernel, true + } + w.process = Process{PID: ec.Process.Pid, PGID: ec.Process.Pid, StartedAt: started, StartedExact: exact} + go func() { + err := ec.Wait() + w.exit = exitOf(ec, err) + close(w.done) + }() + return w, nil +} + +func exitOf(cmd *exec.Cmd, err error) Exit { + state := cmd.ProcessState + if state == nil { + return Exit{Code: -1, Err: err} + } + if ws, ok := state.Sys().(syscall.WaitStatus); ok && ws.Signaled() { + return Exit{Code: -1, Signaled: true} + } + var exitErr *exec.ExitError + if err != nil && !errors.As(err, &exitErr) { + return Exit{Code: state.ExitCode(), Err: err} + } + return Exit{Code: state.ExitCode()} +} + +// Process is the worker's process. +func (w *Worker) Process() Process { return w.process } + +// Stdin is the worker's standard input. +func (w *Worker) Stdin() io.WriteCloser { return w.stdin } + +// Stdout is the worker's standard output. Read it to end of file. +func (w *Worker) Stdout() io.Reader { return w.stdout } + +// CloseStdout closes the worker's output: a reader blocked on it returns, and +// the descriptor is released. +// For a worker that is gone while a descendant that left its group still +// holds the pipe. +func (w *Worker) CloseStdout() { _ = w.stdout.Close() } + +// Done is closed once the process has exited and been reaped. +func (w *Worker) Done() <-chan struct{} { return w.done } + +// Exit is how it exited; meaningful once Done is closed. +func (w *Worker) Exit() Exit { + <-w.done + return w.exit +} + +// StderrTail is what may be passed on of the worker's stderr, through r +// (Redactor.Stderr): never the text verbatim. +func (w *Worker) StderrTail(r *Redactor) string { return r.Stderr(w.stderr.String()) } + +// StderrLines is what may be passed on of the worker's stderr when its last +// line is not enough — a refusal the agent wrote before it wrote anything +// else — through r (Redactor.Lines): bounded in lines and in bytes, each +// sanitized, never the text verbatim. +func (w *Worker) StderrLines(r *Redactor) []string { return r.Lines(w.stderr.String()) } + +// Terminate ends the process group: SIGTERM, grace, SIGKILL. It returns once +// the leader is reaped. Idempotent. +func (w *Worker) Terminate(grace time.Duration) { + w.killOnce.Do(func() { + _ = w.stdin.Close() + select { + case <-w.done: + // The leader is gone and reaped, so its pid — which is its + // group's id — may be the kernel's to give away: the group is + // signaled only while it is still provably this worker's. + _ = signalRecordedGroup(w.process, syscall.SIGKILL) + return + default: + } + _ = signalRecordedGroup(w.process, syscall.SIGTERM) + select { + case <-w.done: + case <-time.After(grace): + } + // The worker may have exited and been reaped during the grace, so + // ownership is established again rather than assumed from before it. + _ = signalRecordedGroup(w.process, syscall.SIGKILL) + // The leader by its own pid as well: were it not a group leader, the + // group signal would reach nothing and Terminate would wait forever. + _ = w.cmd.Process.Kill() + }) + <-w.done + // The output pipe is the Worker's to release as well. Its reader gets the + // same bound Wait gives a stray descendant to finish draining what the + // worker wrote before it went, and then the descriptor is closed whether + // or not the reader closed it. + w.releaseOnce.Do(func() { + time.AfterFunc(pipeWaitDelay, w.CloseStdout) + }) +} + +// ErrGroupOutlivedLeader is a recorded process group whose leader is gone — +// or is a pid the kernel has since reused — while the group still has +// members. They may be the worker's own children, so the caller must not +// treat the worker as finished. +var ErrGroupOutlivedLeader = errors.New("driver: the recorded process group outlived its leader") + +// OwnsWorker answers the one-owner rule's identity question: is the process +// this record names still the worker the task owns? +// +// A pid is not an identity — the kernel reuses them — so ownership is the pid +// AND the start time the owner recorded for it. Everything that acts on a +// recorded worker (recovery, status, redispatch, discard, hold) asks this +// before it acts, rather than writing its own pid check: +// +// - (true, nil): the process is still that worker. It may be signaled. +// - (false, nil): it is gone, and its group has no members left. Its record +// may be settled and its directory released. +// - (false, ErrGroupOutlivedLeader): the leader is gone or is now some other +// process, and the recorded group still has members — they may be the +// worker's children. Nothing may be settled or released. +// - (false, err): the identity cannot be established here (an unreadable +// process table, a record with no kernel start time, a platform that +// cannot say). Nothing may be settled or released either. +func OwnsWorker(p Process) (bool, error) { + if p.PID <= 0 || p.PGID <= 0 { + // There is no process here to own. + return false, nil + } + gone, err := ProcessGone(p) + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + if gone { + // The leader is gone, or its pid is somebody else's now: what is left + // of the group decides whether anything of this worker remains. + return false, groupGone(p.PGID) + } + return true, nil +} + +// ErrIdentityUnknown is a record the connector cannot tell from a later +// process that reused its pid, because no kernel start time was ever +// recorded for it. It is not "gone" and it is not "still running": it is +// unanswerable, and the one-owner rule signals nothing and releases nothing +// on an unanswerable identity. +var ErrIdentityUnknown = errors.New("driver: the recorded process has no kernel start time, so it cannot be told from a later process that reused its pid") + +// ProcessGone reports whether the process a record names is gone: no process +// by that pid, a zombie, or a later process the kernel gave the same pid. It +// asks only about that process and says nothing about its group, which is +// what a caller wants to know about a worker's MCP server — the group is the +// agent's and outlives its servers. +// +// The comparison is exact. A kernel start time is read the same way every +// time it is read, in ticks since boot, so the process that was recorded +// answers with the value recorded for it and anything else is another +// process. A record whose start time the kernel never gave (StartedExact +// false) is ErrIdentityUnknown rather than a comparison against a tolerance: +// under fast pid reuse a window wide enough to cover a wall-clock stamp is +// wide enough to accept a stranger. +// +// It is the one place the question "is this still that process?" is answered; +// OwnsWorker asks it too, and adds the group. +func ProcessGone(p Process) (bool, error) { + if p.PID <= 0 { + return true, nil + } + started, err := processStartTime(p.PID) + if err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + // No process by that pid at all: nothing of it is left, whatever + // the record says about when it started. + return true, nil + } + return false, err + } + if !p.StartedExact { + return false, fmt.Errorf("%w: pid %d", ErrIdentityUnknown, p.PID) + } + if !started.Equal(p.StartedAt) { + return true, nil + } + return false, nil +} + +// LookupProcess is a live process's identity: its pid, the process group it +// leads or belongs to, and the start time that tells it from a later process +// the kernel gave the same pid. A process that is gone — or a zombie, which +// runs nothing — is os.ErrNotExist. +// +// It is how the connector takes the identity of a process it did not start +// but knows about, such as the MCP server that took a task token from the +// socket, which an agent may have started in a process group of its own. +func LookupProcess(pid int) (Process, error) { + if pid <= 0 { + return Process{}, os.ErrNotExist + } + started, err := processStartTime(pid) + if err != nil { + return Process{}, err + } + pgid, err := syscall.Getpgid(pid) + if err != nil { + return Process{}, err + } + return Process{PID: pid, PGID: pgid, StartedAt: started, StartedExact: true}, nil +} + +// signalRecordedGroup is the one place a recorded worker's process group is +// signaled, and it establishes that the group is still that worker's every +// time — not once, before a grace period, for every signal that follows it. +// A group signal is sent by the LEADER's pid, and a pid the kernel has taken +// back can lead a group of its own: the worker this connector started a +// minute later, say, which every signal held over from the last one would +// then end. +// +// It signals in two cases and neither is an assumption: +// +// - the recorded process is alive and is still that worker (OwnsWorker), or +// - the worker LED the group, no live process holds its pid any more, and +// the group still has members. Those members are the worker's own +// orphaned children: the kernel keeps a pid allocated for as long as a +// live process uses it as its process group id, so a group id cannot +// change hands while anything is still in the group. +// +// Everything else signals nothing. A pid that is alive and is NOT the +// recorded process is the case this exists for: the id has changed hands, +// and any group under it is a stranger's — the worker this connector started +// a minute later, say. An identity that cannot be established at all +// (ErrIdentityUnknown, an unreadable process table) is an error the caller +// holds on rather than a signal. And a record that names a process which +// only belonged to the group (a taker, whose pid is not the group's id) +// proves nothing about the group once that process is gone. +// +// Where this can still be broken: between the observation and the signal the +// last member can exit and the kernel can give the pid away. There is no +// portable way to signal a group as one atomic act — pidfd is per process, +// not per group — so that window is the syscall pair's, and it is the reason +// the connector confirms rather than assumes. +func signalRecordedGroup(p Process, sig syscall.Signal) error { + switch owns, err := OwnsWorker(p); { + case owns: + case err != nil && !errors.Is(err, ErrGroupOutlivedLeader): + return err + case p.PID != p.PGID || !pidUnheld(p.PID) || !GroupMembersRemain(p): + return nil + } + return signalGroup(p.PGID, sig) +} + +// pidUnheld reports whether no live process holds the pid: there is none, or +// what is left of one is a zombie, which runs nothing and keeps the id from +// being given away until its parent reaps it. +func pidUnheld(pid int) bool { + _, err := processStartTime(pid) + return errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) +} + +// TerminateRecorded ends a worker a previous connector process started, by +// the process group it recorded, and only while OwnsWorker says that group is +// still this task's worker: a pid the kernel has since given to something +// else is left alone. It reports whether it signaled anything. +func TerminateRecorded(p Process, grace time.Duration) (bool, error) { + switch owns, err := OwnsWorker(p); { + case err != nil: + return false, err + case !owns: + return false, nil + } + if err := signalGroup(p.PGID, syscall.SIGTERM); err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, syscall.ESRCH) { + return false, nil + } + return false, err + } + deadline := time.Now().Add(grace) + for time.Now().Before(deadline) { + if groupGone(p.PGID) == nil { + return true, nil + } + time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond) + } + // The worker may have gone during the grace and its pid been given to a + // new group leader, so this signal asks again whose group it is. + _ = signalRecordedGroup(p, syscall.SIGKILL) + return true, nil +} + +// GroupMembersRemain reports whether the process group still has members. It +// signals nothing: it is the observation the one-owner rule's step 3 and 4 +// rest on, and what a caller asks when it must not disturb the group. +// +// A probe that cannot answer — the group exists but is not ours to signal — +// counts as members remaining, because the rule releases nothing it cannot +// prove gone. +func GroupMembersRemain(p Process) bool { + return p.PGID > 1 && groupGone(p.PGID) != nil +} + +// groupGone reports nil only when the kernel says there is no such process +// group, or when every member it still lists is a zombie. Anything else — +// a member that runs, a listing that could not be read, or a probe that was +// refused — is not absence, and the rule holds rather than releases. +// +// A zombie answers a zero-signal like a live process, and one stays a member +// until its parent waits for it. The connector's own worker is such a child +// between its exit and the Wait that reaps it, so a probe that counted +// zombies could hold a finished worker for as long as that Wait is late. +func groupGone(pgid int) error { + err := signalGroup(pgid, 0) + if err == nil { + running, listErr := groupRunning(pgid) + switch { + case listErr != nil: + return fmt.Errorf("%w: %d: %w", ErrGroupOutlivedLeader, pgid, listErr) + case !running: + return nil + } + } + return groupProbe(pgid, err) +} + +// groupProbe reads what a zero-signal to a process group said. Only ESRCH — +// "no such process group" — is proof of absence; a refusal (EPERM, from a +// group this process may not signal) is a group that is probably there and +// certainly not proven gone. +func groupProbe(pgid int, err error) error { + switch { + case err == nil: + return fmt.Errorf("%w: %d", ErrGroupOutlivedLeader, pgid) + case errors.Is(err, syscall.ESRCH): + return nil + default: + return fmt.Errorf("%w: %d: %w", ErrGroupOutlivedLeader, pgid, err) + } +} + +// ConfirmGroupGone is step 3 of the one-owner rule: it answers whether a +// worker's process group is gone, and it is what every caller asks before +// settling an attempt, releasing a working directory or removing a worktree. +// +// It signals the group once more — a worker that ignored SIGTERM gets SIGKILL +// — then waits up to grace for the last member to go. A group with members +// left is ErrGroupOutlivedLeader, and the zero Process (a session the +// connector cannot signal at all) is gone as far as this rule goes, since +// there is nothing of it here to own. +func ConfirmGroupGone(p Process, grace time.Duration) error { + if p.PGID <= 0 { + return nil + } + if err := groupGone(p.PGID); err == nil { + return nil + } + if err := signalRecordedGroup(p, syscall.SIGKILL); err != nil { + // The group is not proven gone and whose it is cannot be + // established, so it is neither signaled nor confirmed: the attempt + // is held for a person. + return err + } + deadline := time.Now().Add(grace) + // The wait backs off: each probe of a group that still has members reads + // every process's state, and a stubborn worker must not cost a busy host + // a full process listing twenty times a second for the whole grace. + for wait := 50 * time.Millisecond; ; { + err := groupGone(p.PGID) + if err == nil || time.Now().After(deadline) { + return err + } + time.Sleep(wait) + if wait < 500*time.Millisecond { + wait *= 2 + } + } +} + +// tailBuffer keeps the last max bytes written to it. +type tailBuffer struct { + mu sync.Mutex + max int + buf []byte +} + +func (b *tailBuffer) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + b.mu.Lock() + defer b.mu.Unlock() + b.buf = append(b.buf, p...) + if over := len(b.buf) - b.max; over > 0 { + b.buf = b.buf[over:] + } + return len(p), nil +} + +func (b *tailBuffer) String() string { + b.mu.Lock() + defer b.mu.Unlock() + return strings.ToValidUTF8(string(b.buf), "") +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/worker_other.go b/internal/connector/driver/worker_other.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4ac9ca54f --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/worker_other.go @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +//go:build !unix + +package driver + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "io" + "time" +) + +var errUnsupported = errors.New("driver: workers run on Unix only (process groups)") + +// Worker is unavailable off Unix. +type Worker struct{} + +// StartWorker refuses off Unix; nothing is started. +func StartWorker(context.Context, Launcher, Scope, Command) (*Worker, error) { + return nil, errors.Join(ErrNotStarted, errUnsupported) +} + +func (*Worker) Process() Process { return Process{} } +func (*Worker) Stdin() io.WriteCloser { return nil } +func (*Worker) Stdout() io.Reader { return nil } +func (*Worker) CloseStdout() {} +func (*Worker) Done() <-chan struct{} { return nil } +func (*Worker) Exit() Exit { return Exit{} } +func (*Worker) StderrTail(*Redactor) string { return "" } +func (*Worker) StderrLines(*Redactor) []string { return nil } +func (*Worker) Terminate(time.Duration) {} + +// OwnsWorker cannot answer off Unix, and an identity that cannot be +// established is never acted on. +func OwnsWorker(Process) (bool, error) { return false, errUnsupported } + +// GroupMembersRemain cannot answer off Unix, and what cannot be proven gone +// is held: it answers that members remain. +func GroupMembersRemain(Process) bool { return true } + +// ConfirmGroupGone cannot answer off Unix. +func ConfirmGroupGone(Process, time.Duration) error { return errUnsupported } + +// OwnProcessGroup cannot answer off Unix. +func OwnProcessGroup() (int, bool) { return 0, false } + +// ProcessGone cannot answer off Unix, and what cannot be answered is not +// proven gone. +func ProcessGone(Process) (bool, error) { return false, errUnsupported } + +// LookupProcess cannot answer off Unix. +func LookupProcess(int) (Process, error) { return Process{}, errUnsupported } + +// TerminateRecorded does nothing off Unix. +func TerminateRecorded(Process, time.Duration) (bool, error) { return false, errUnsupported } diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/worker_unix.go b/internal/connector/driver/worker_unix.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b53bde913 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/worker_unix.go @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +//go:build unix + +package driver + +import "syscall" + +// newProcessGroup makes the child the leader of a new process group, so the +// whole tree it starts is signaled as one. +func newProcessGroup() *syscall.SysProcAttr { + return &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setpgid: true} +} + +// OwnProcessGroup is the connector's own process group, which nothing of a +// worker's is ever in: every worker leads a group of its own. +func OwnProcessGroup() (int, bool) { return syscall.Getpgrp(), true } + +// signalGroup signals every process in the group. A non-positive pgid is +// refused — kill(0) and kill(-1) mean this group and every process — and so +// is the connector's own group: every worker leads a group of its own +// (Setpgid), so a recorded group that is this process's own is a mistake, and +// signaling it would end the connector and everything it is supervising. +func signalGroup(pgid int, sig syscall.Signal) error { + if pgid <= 1 || pgid == syscall.Getpgrp() { + return syscall.EINVAL + } + return syscall.Kill(-pgid, sig) +} diff --git a/internal/connector/driver/zombie_linux_test.go b/internal/connector/driver/zombie_linux_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6cdbab269 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/driver/zombie_linux_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +package driver + +import ( + "context" + "os" + "os/exec" + "path/filepath" + "strconv" + "strings" + "syscall" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +// startUnreaped starts script as the leader of its own group and never waits +// for it until the test ends, the way the connector's own worker sits between +// its exit and the Wait that reaps it. The script runs once stdin closes. +func startUnreaped(t *testing.T, script string) (*exec.Cmd, Process) { + t.Helper() + cmd := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "/bin/sh", "-c", "read _; "+script) + cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setpgid: true} + stdin, err := cmd.StdinPipe() + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, cmd.Start()) + t.Cleanup(func() { + _ = syscall.Kill(-cmd.Process.Pid, syscall.SIGKILL) + _ = cmd.Wait() + }) + started, err := processStartTime(cmd.Process.Pid) + require.NoError(t, err) + p := Process{PID: cmd.Process.Pid, PGID: cmd.Process.Pid, StartedAt: started} + require.NoError(t, stdin.Close()) + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { + st, err := readProcStat(p.PID) + return err == nil && st.state == 'Z' + }, 5*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond, "the leader exits and is left unreaped") + return cmd, p +} + +// Coordinator: a zombie answers a zero-signal like a live process. A group +// whose only member is the connector's own unreaped child is gone. +func TestAGroupOfOnlyAnUnreapedLeaderIsGone(t *testing.T) { + _, p := startUnreaped(t, "exit 0") + + begin := time.Now() + require.NoError(t, ConfirmGroupGone(p, 2*time.Second)) + assert.Less(t, time.Since(begin), time.Second, "not held for the grace") + assert.False(t, GroupMembersRemain(p)) + + owns, err := OwnsWorker(p) + assert.False(t, owns, "a zombie is not the worker") + assert.NoError(t, err) + + signaled, err := TerminateRecorded(p, 2*time.Second) + assert.False(t, signaled) + assert.NoError(t, err) +} + +// A zombie leader does not make a live member absent. +func TestAnUnreapedLeaderWithALiveChildIsStillHeld(t *testing.T) { + pidFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "child") + _, p := startUnreaped(t, "sleep 30 & echo $! > "+pidFile+"; exit 0") + var child int + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { + data, err := os.ReadFile(pidFile) + if err != nil { + return false + } + child, err = strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(string(data))) + return err == nil + }, 5*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond) + + assert.True(t, GroupMembersRemain(p)) + owns, err := OwnsWorker(p) + assert.False(t, owns) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrGroupOutlivedLeader) + assert.True(t, alive(child)) +} diff --git a/internal/connector/intake_feed_test.go b/internal/connector/intake_feed_test.go index d3b7dfc25..eb0681d87 100644 --- a/internal/connector/intake_feed_test.go +++ b/internal/connector/intake_feed_test.go @@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ func (b *safeBuffer) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return b.buf.Write(p) } +func (b *safeBuffer) Reset() { + b.mu.Lock() + defer b.mu.Unlock() + b.buf.Reset() +} + func (b *safeBuffer) String() string { b.mu.Lock() defer b.mu.Unlock() diff --git a/internal/connector/ledger.go b/internal/connector/ledger.go index 97ae4c4f4..9131dbf42 100644 --- a/internal/connector/ledger.go +++ b/internal/connector/ledger.go @@ -49,6 +49,10 @@ const ( StateCompleted RecordState = "completed" // StateDiscarded is terminal with a verified verdict. StateDiscarded RecordState = "discarded" + // StateHeld waits for a person. A record tagged for review by a hold + // becomes held where it would have waited for a worker, and only a + // person's redispatch or discard moves it on. It keeps its snapshot. + StateHeld RecordState = "held" ) // Lane names which lane first served an event. It is diagnostic: dedupe is by @@ -78,6 +82,7 @@ type Ledger struct { file *openLedgerFile closed sync.Once now func() time.Time + hooks Hooks } // OpenLedger opens (creating if absent) the ledger at path and brings its @@ -814,6 +819,39 @@ BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'an acknowledgement id is written with the acknowledgement, once'); END; `, + // Migration 7. The dispatcher's side of a task: what it runs in, its + // attempts, and how each ended. See ledger_tasks.go for the invariants + // these tables hold. + // + // This was migration 6 while it sat on #736's head; main took 6 for the + // acknowledgement trigger before this branch landed, and a shipped + // migration is never renumbered under a ledger that has applied it. + migrationTasksAndAttempts, + // Migration 8. The outbox every lifecycle message goes through. See + // outbox.go for the invariants it holds. + migrationOutbox, + + // Migration 9. The git worktrees a task runs in: the row written before + // `git worktree add`, the states it moves through, and the ones kept when + // a task ends holding work. See ledger_worktrees.go. + // + // 8, 9 and 10 were each written as 8 on their own branch, against + // different predecessors. They ship together here, so the order is + // settled: 7 the dispatcher's tasks and attempts, 8 the outbox, 9 the + // worktrees, 10 the operator's tables. These numbers do not move again — + // a ledger that has applied one never sees it renumbered. + migrationWorktrees, + + // Migration 10. The hold marker, intake generations, the review tag and + // people's decisions on records. See ledger_hold.go for the invariants + // they hold. + // + // This was migration 8 while it sat on card 20's head, behind the tasks + // and attempts at 6 and the outbox at 7. Main took 6 for the + // acknowledgement trigger, which pushed those two to 7 and 8 and this to + // 9. The numbers move only because nothing has shipped them yet; once a + // ledger has applied one, its number is fixed. + migrationOperator, } func (l *Ledger) migrate(ctx context.Context) error { @@ -823,6 +861,17 @@ func (l *Ledger) migrate(ctx context.Context) error { )`); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("connector: create migration table: %w", err) } + // A ledger a newer basecamp wrote is refused, not opened as if it were + // current: its triggers and states (a held record, say) are rules this + // binary does not know, and running over them could break them — the + // rollback case. + var newest int + if err := l.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COALESCE(MAX(version), 0) FROM schema_migrations`).Scan(&newest); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: read schema version: %w", err) + } + if newest > len(migrations) { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: ledger at schema %d, this basecamp writes %d: %w", newest, len(migrations), ErrLedgerSchema) + } for i := range migrations { version := i + 1 diff --git a/internal/connector/ledger_admission.go b/internal/connector/ledger_admission.go index d46aad1d2..f27d43b97 100644 --- a/internal/connector/ledger_admission.go +++ b/internal/connector/ledger_admission.go @@ -160,6 +160,30 @@ func (a Admission) commit(ctx context.Context, v admission.Verdict, state Record if !moved { return "", explainVerdictRefusal(ctx, tx, v) } + if state == StateAdmitted || state == StateQueued { + // A record a hold tagged for review is written held by the database + // instead (ledger_hold.go). The verdict reports what was written, so + // neither the hooks nor the stdout line call it admitted. + var written string + if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT state FROM events WHERE id = ?`, v.EventID).Scan(&written); err != nil { + return "", fmt.Errorf("connector: read verdict on %d back: %w", v.EventID, err) + } + state = RecordState(written) + } + if l.hooks.VerdictCommitted != nil { + committed := CommittedVerdict{ + EventID: v.EventID, + State: state, + Reason: string(v.Reason), + Trigger: string(v.Trigger), + Acknowledge: v.Acknowledge, + ReplyKind: string(reply.Kind), + ReplyRecordingID: reply.RecordingID, + } + if err := l.hooks.VerdictCommitted(ctx, tx, committed); err != nil { + return "", fmt.Errorf("connector: verdict hook for %d: %w", v.EventID, err) + } + } if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil { return "", fmt.Errorf("connector: commit verdict on %d: %w", v.EventID, err) } diff --git a/internal/connector/ledger_decisions.go b/internal/connector/ledger_decisions.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..17944aeed --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/ledger_decisions.go @@ -0,0 +1,487 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "database/sql" + "errors" + "fmt" + "strings" + "time" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" +) + +// ErrDecisionRefused is a redispatch or discard the record's state does not +// accept. The message says why. +var ErrDecisionRefused = errors.New("refused") + +// eventTask is the latest task an event was on, as a decision reads it. +type eventTask struct { + found bool + taskID int64 + delivery Delivery + outcome Outcome + superseded bool + ended bool + // completedAt is when the event's outcome settled, as stored. + completedAt string + // live is the task's attempt that has not ended, if any, with its + // recorded process. + liveAttempt string + process AttemptProcess +} + +func loadEventTask(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, eventID int64) (eventTask, error) { + var ( + et eventTask + delivery, outcome string + superseded, ended sql.NullString + completed sql.NullString + attempt, startedText sql.NullString + pid, pgid sql.NullInt64 + ) + err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, ` +SELECT te.task_id, te.delivery, te.outcome, te.completed_at, t.superseded_at, t.ended_at, + a.id, a.pid, a.pgid, a.process_started +FROM task_events te +JOIN tasks t ON t.id = te.task_id +LEFT JOIN attempts a ON a.task_id = t.id AND a.state <> 'ended' +WHERE te.event_id = ? AND te.withdrawn_at IS NULL +ORDER BY te.task_id DESC LIMIT 1`, eventID).Scan(&et.taskID, &delivery, &outcome, &completed, &superseded, &ended, + &attempt, &pid, &pgid, &startedText) + switch { + case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows): + return eventTask{}, nil + case err != nil: + return eventTask{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: read the task of event %d: %w", eventID, err) + } + et.found = true + et.delivery, et.outcome = Delivery(delivery), Outcome(outcome) + et.superseded, et.ended, et.completedAt = superseded.Valid, ended.Valid, completed.String + if attempt.Valid { + et.liveAttempt = attempt.String + et.process = AttemptProcess{PID: int(pid.Int64), PGID: int(pgid.Int64)} + if startedText.Valid { + if et.process.StartedAt, err = parseStamp(startedText.String); err != nil { + return eventTask{}, err + } + } + } + return et, nil +} + +// operatorRecord is a record with the columns a decision reads. +type operatorRecord struct { + Record + review bool + authorizedAt sql.NullString + // redispatchDecision is the redispatch waiting for the record's task to + // end; zero when none is. + redispatchDecision int64 +} + +func loadOperatorRecord(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, eventID int64) (operatorRecord, error) { + record, err := loadRecord(ctx, tx, eventID) + if err != nil { + return operatorRecord{}, err + } + out := operatorRecord{Record: record} + var decision sql.NullInt64 + if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT review, authorized_at, redispatch_decision FROM events WHERE id = ?`, eventID). + Scan(&out.review, &out.authorizedAt, &decision); err != nil { + return operatorRecord{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: read event %d: %w", eventID, err) + } + out.redispatchDecision = decision.Int64 + return out, nil +} + +// RedispatchResult is what a redispatch did. +type RedispatchResult struct { + EventID int64 `json:"event_id"` + FromState RecordState `json:"from_state"` + FromReason string `json:"from_reason,omitempty"` + FromOutcome Outcome `json:"from_outcome,omitempty"` + // State is the record's state after the authorization. + State RecordState `json:"state"` + // Admitted says the record waits for a worker now. + Admitted bool `json:"admitted"` + // Pending says the record's task is still live: it is admitted in the + // transaction that ends that task. + Pending bool `json:"pending,omitempty"` + // Rerun says the record was authorized as blocked: the caller runs its + // prerequisite again (admission), which admits it when it succeeds. + Rerun bool `json:"rerun,omitempty"` + // SupersededTaskID is the task whose token this redispatch retired; zero + // when it was already retired. + SupersededTaskID int64 `json:"superseded_task_id,omitempty"` + // Worker is the replaced attempt's recorded process, still live in the + // ledger: the caller terminates it (driver.TerminateRecorded). + Worker *LiveWorker `json:"worker,omitempty"` + // Held says the hold marker stands: authorized, and nothing launches + // until release. + Held bool `json:"held,omitempty"` +} + +// LiveWorker is an attempt's recorded worker process. +type LiveWorker struct { + AttemptID string `json:"attempt_id"` + TaskID int64 `json:"task_id"` + // PID, PGID and StartedAt are the recorded process: with the start time, + // the pid is an identity (driver.OwnsWorker). + PID int `json:"pid"` + PGID int `json:"pgid"` + StartedAt time.Time `json:"started_at"` +} + +// Identity is the process the record names, for the one-owner rule. +func (w LiveWorker) Identity() driver.Process { + return recordedIdentity(w.PID, w.PGID, w.StartedAt) +} + +// Redispatch authorizes a record to run again, or for the first time, and +// records who authorized it (invariants 4 to 6). +// +// - completed with outcome unknown or failed: the task's token is +// superseded; admitted at once when the task has ended, otherwise when it +// ends. Refused without a snapshot or a route. +// - held with its snapshot and route and no blocking reason: admitted. +// - blocked, or held over a blocking reason: authorized as blocked, and +// Rerun asks the caller to run what blocked it. +// - succeeded, discarded, and anything live (seen, admitted, queued, +// dispatched) are refused with ErrDecisionRefused. +func (l *Ledger) Redispatch(ctx context.Context, eventID int64, by string) (RedispatchResult, error) { + if strings.TrimSpace(by) == "" { + return RedispatchResult{}, errors.New("connector: a redispatch records who authorized it") + } + var out RedispatchResult + err := retryBusy(func() error { + var err error + out, err = l.redispatch(ctx, eventID, by) + return err + }) + return out, err +} + +func (l *Ledger) redispatch(ctx context.Context, eventID int64, by string) (RedispatchResult, error) { + tx, err := l.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil) + if err != nil { + return RedispatchResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: begin redispatch: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }() + + record, err := loadOperatorRecord(ctx, tx, eventID) + if err != nil { + return RedispatchResult{}, err + } + task, err := loadEventTask(ctx, tx, eventID) + if err != nil { + return RedispatchResult{}, err + } + out := RedispatchResult{EventID: eventID, FromState: record.State, FromReason: record.Reason, FromOutcome: task.outcome} + refuse := func(why string) error { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: redispatch of event %d %s: %w", eventID, why, ErrDecisionRefused) + } + dispatchable := !record.ContentDropped && len(record.Decision.Snapshot) > 0 && record.Decision.Routed && record.Decision.ConversationKey != "" + now := l.timestamp() + authorize := []assignment{{column: "authorized_at", value: now}, {column: "authorized_by", value: by}} + recorded := false + + switch record.State { + case StateSeen, StateAdmitted, StateQueued, StateDispatched: + return RedispatchResult{}, refuse(fmt.Sprintf("is %s: it is live, and runs without one", record.State)) + case StateDiscarded: + return RedispatchResult{}, refuse(fmt.Sprintf("is discarded (%s)", record.Reason)) + + case StateCompleted: + switch { + case !task.found || task.delivery != DeliveryCompleted: + return RedispatchResult{}, refuse("has no settled outcome to redispatch") + case task.outcome == OutcomeSucceeded: + return RedispatchResult{}, refuse("succeeded; a success is not run again") + case task.outcome != OutcomeUnknown && task.outcome != OutcomeFailed: + return RedispatchResult{}, refuse(fmt.Sprintf("has outcome %q", task.outcome)) + case record.redispatchDecision != 0: + return RedispatchResult{}, refuse("already has a redispatch waiting for its task to end") + case !dispatchable: + return RedispatchResult{}, refuse("no longer has the snapshot and route a dispatch needs (retention dropped them, or the verdict carried none)") + } + if !task.superseded { + // The replaced worker is refused by basecamp_connect from here on + // (invariant 5). Through supersedeTask and not a bare write to + // superseded_at: the supersession retires the task's rows in the + // same statement (tasks_supersession_retires_its_events), so an + // event this task never exposed has to be returned to admitted + // here or it is never returned at all — the settlement at the + // attempt's end reads only rows that are still live, and finds + // none. A returned event is not startable while the task it left + // has not ended, so nothing runs beside the worker being stopped. + if err := l.supersedeTask(ctx, tx, task.taskID); err != nil { + return RedispatchResult{}, err + } + out.SupersededTaskID = task.taskID + } + if task.liveAttempt != "" { + out.Worker = &LiveWorker{AttemptID: task.liveAttempt, TaskID: task.taskID, + PID: task.process.PID, PGID: task.process.PGID, StartedAt: task.process.StartedAt} + } + to := StateCompleted + if task.ended { + to = StateAdmitted + } + // The decision is the authorization the database checks: the record + // names it, and only a decision made after the outcome settled lets a + // completed record move (invariant 4). + decisionID, err := insertDecision(ctx, tx, decision{action: "redispatch", eventID: eventID, by: by, at: notBefore(now, task.completedAt), + fromState: record.State, fromReason: record.Reason, fromOutcome: task.outcome, toState: to, + supersededTask: out.SupersededTaskID, note: pendingNote(task)}) + if err != nil { + return RedispatchResult{}, err + } + recorded = true + if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE events SET authorized_at = ?, authorized_by = ?, redispatch_decision = ? WHERE id = ?`, now, by, decisionID, eventID); err != nil { + return RedispatchResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: authorize event %d: %w", eventID, err) + } + if task.ended { + moved, err := l.move(ctx, tx, transition{id: eventID, state: StateAdmitted, from: []RecordState{StateCompleted}, byOperator: true, + set: []assignment{{column: "redispatch_decision", value: nil}}}) + if err != nil { + return RedispatchResult{}, err + } + if !moved { + return RedispatchResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: admit event %d: %w", eventID, ErrNotATransition) + } + out.Admitted = true + } else { + out.Pending = true + } + + case StateHeld: + if record.Reason == "" && dispatchable { + // Queued behind a live conversation, as admission would write it. + target := StateAdmitted + var live bool + if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM events WHERE conversation_key = ? AND id <> ? AND state IN ('admitted', 'dispatched'))`, + record.Decision.ConversationKey, eventID).Scan(&live); err != nil { + return RedispatchResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: read conversation of %d: %w", eventID, err) + } + if live { + target = StateQueued + } + moved, err := l.move(ctx, tx, transition{id: eventID, state: target, from: []RecordState{StateHeld}, byOperator: true, set: authorize}) + if err != nil { + return RedispatchResult{}, err + } + if !moved { + return RedispatchResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: admit event %d: %w", eventID, ErrNotATransition) + } + out.Admitted = target == StateAdmitted + break + } + // A held record carries no reason today (events_review_is_held clears + // it), but the spec's "held over a blocking reason" is a record a + // migration may yet write, and it re-runs what blocked it. + reason := record.Reason + if reason == "" { + reason = "held_incomplete" + } + moved, err := l.move(ctx, tx, transition{id: eventID, state: StateBlocked, reason: reason, from: []RecordState{StateHeld}, byOperator: true}) + if err != nil { + return RedispatchResult{}, err + } + if !moved { + return RedispatchResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: authorize event %d: %w", eventID, ErrNotATransition) + } + if err := authorizeBlocked(ctx, tx, eventID, now, by); err != nil { + return RedispatchResult{}, err + } + out.Rerun = true + + case StateBlocked: + // The record keeps its state; what blocked it runs again. Writing + // the authorization is not a state change and leaves the revision + // the re-run loads at. + if err := authorizeBlocked(ctx, tx, eventID, now, by); err != nil { + return RedispatchResult{}, err + } + out.Rerun = true + + default: + return RedispatchResult{}, refuse(fmt.Sprintf("is in a state %q this build does not know", record.State)) + } + + if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT state FROM events WHERE id = ?`, eventID).Scan(&out.State); err != nil { + return RedispatchResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: read event %d back: %w", eventID, err) + } + if _, out.Held, err = readHold(ctx, tx); err != nil { + return RedispatchResult{}, err + } + if !recorded { + note := "" + if out.Rerun { + note = "prerequisite runs again" + } + if err := recordDecision(ctx, tx, decision{action: "redispatch", eventID: eventID, by: by, at: now, + fromState: record.State, fromReason: record.Reason, fromOutcome: task.outcome, toState: out.State, + supersededTask: out.SupersededTaskID, note: note}); err != nil { + return RedispatchResult{}, err + } + } + if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil { + return RedispatchResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: commit redispatch of %d: %w", eventID, err) + } + return out, nil +} + +// DiscardResult is what a discard did. +type DiscardResult struct { + EventID int64 `json:"event_id"` + FromState RecordState `json:"from_state"` + FromReason string `json:"from_reason,omitempty"` + FromOutcome Outcome `json:"from_outcome,omitempty"` + // Already says the record was discarded by a person before; nothing + // changed. + Already bool `json:"already_discarded,omitempty"` + // Canceled counts lifecycle messages still pending for the event that + // will not be sent. + Canceled int `json:"canceled_messages"` +} + +// Discard closes a held, blocked or unknown record without running it, as +// discarded(by_operator), and records who decided. Anything else is refused +// with ErrDecisionRefused. +func (l *Ledger) Discard(ctx context.Context, eventID int64, by string) (DiscardResult, error) { + if strings.TrimSpace(by) == "" { + return DiscardResult{}, errors.New("connector: a discard records who decided") + } + var out DiscardResult + err := retryBusy(func() error { + var err error + out, err = l.discard(ctx, eventID, by) + return err + }) + return out, err +} + +func (l *Ledger) discard(ctx context.Context, eventID int64, by string) (DiscardResult, error) { + tx, err := l.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil) + if err != nil { + return DiscardResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: begin discard: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }() + + record, err := loadOperatorRecord(ctx, tx, eventID) + if err != nil { + return DiscardResult{}, err + } + task, err := loadEventTask(ctx, tx, eventID) + if err != nil { + return DiscardResult{}, err + } + out := DiscardResult{EventID: eventID, FromState: record.State, FromReason: record.Reason, FromOutcome: task.outcome} + refuse := func(why string) error { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: discard of event %d %s: %w", eventID, why, ErrDecisionRefused) + } + switch record.State { + case StateDiscarded: + if record.Reason == ReasonByOperator { + out.Already = true + return out, nil + } + return DiscardResult{}, refuse(fmt.Sprintf("is already discarded (%s)", record.Reason)) + case StateCompleted: + if !task.found || task.outcome != OutcomeUnknown { + return DiscardResult{}, refuse(fmt.Sprintf("completed with outcome %q; only an unknown outcome is discarded", task.outcome)) + } + case StateHeld, StateBlocked: + default: + return DiscardResult{}, refuse(fmt.Sprintf("is %s: only a held, blocked or unknown record is discarded", record.State)) + } + + now := l.timestamp() + // Recorded before the move, which the database allows out of completed + // only against it (invariant 4). + if err := recordDecision(ctx, tx, decision{action: "discard", eventID: eventID, by: by, at: notBefore(now, task.completedAt), + fromState: record.State, fromReason: record.Reason, fromOutcome: task.outcome, toState: StateDiscarded}); err != nil { + return DiscardResult{}, err + } + moved, err := l.move(ctx, tx, transition{id: eventID, state: StateDiscarded, reason: ReasonByOperator, + from: []RecordState{StateHeld, StateBlocked, StateCompleted}, byOperator: true, + set: []assignment{{column: "redispatch_decision", value: nil}}}) + if err != nil { + return DiscardResult{}, err + } + if !moved { + return DiscardResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: discard event %d: %w", eventID, ErrNotATransition) + } + // What the connector would still have said about this event is not said: + // a guard acknowledgement or holding reply for a record a person closed. + res, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, ` +UPDATE outbox SET state = 'canceled', finished_at = ?, note = 'discarded by a person' +WHERE event_id = ? AND state = 'pending' AND kind IN ('guard_ack', 'holding_reply')`, now, eventID) + if err != nil { + return DiscardResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: cancel lifecycle messages for %d: %w", eventID, err) + } + canceled, err := res.RowsAffected() + if err != nil { + return DiscardResult{}, err + } + out.Canceled = int(canceled) + if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil { + return DiscardResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: commit discard of %d: %w", eventID, err) + } + return out, nil +} + +// AuthorizedBlocked lists blocked records a person authorized, oldest first: +// authorized since the record entered its current run of blocked states, so +// an authorization that answered an earlier outcome does not count. +// The redispatch command runs the prerequisite itself; this is for the +// blocked-record recovery schedule to run it again when that did not settle +// it (the schedule is plan step 22's, and nothing calls this yet). +func (l *Ledger) AuthorizedBlocked(ctx context.Context, limit int) ([]int64, error) { + rows, err := l.db.QueryContext(ctx, `SELECT id FROM events WHERE state = 'blocked' AND authorized_at >= blocked_at ORDER BY id LIMIT ?`, limit) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: authorized blocked records: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }() + var ids []int64 + for rows.Next() { + var id int64 + if err := rows.Scan(&id); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ids = append(ids, id) + } + return ids, rows.Err() +} + +// notBefore is now, or the stored time an outcome settled when that is later: +// a decision is never recorded as made before the outcome it decides on, even +// with a clock that stepped back. +func notBefore(now, settled string) string { + if settled > now { + return settled + } + return now +} + +func pendingNote(task eventTask) string { + if task.ended { + return "" + } + return fmt.Sprintf("waits for task %d to end", task.taskID) +} + +// authorizeBlocked records a person's authorization on a blocked record, never +// dated before the record entered its current run of blocked states: an +// authorization counts for that block only when it is not older than it +// (AuthorizedBlocked), and neither a move's own later stamp nor a clock that +// stepped back may make a fresh one look stale. +func authorizeBlocked(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, eventID int64, now, by string) error { + if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, ` +UPDATE events SET authorized_at = MAX(?, COALESCE(blocked_at, '')), authorized_by = ? +WHERE id = ? AND state = 'blocked'`, now, by, eventID); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: authorize event %d: %w", eventID, err) + } + return nil +} diff --git a/internal/connector/ledger_dispatch.go b/internal/connector/ledger_dispatch.go index 59c8dbfbb..c76789fed 100644 --- a/internal/connector/ledger_dispatch.go +++ b/internal/connector/ledger_dispatch.go @@ -712,6 +712,11 @@ ORDER BY te.event_id LIMIT 1`, taskID).Scan(&eventID) // instruction, and the exposure can no longer be withdrawn as a // spawn that failed before any worker existed. if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE task_events SET pulled_at = ? WHERE task_id = ? AND event_id = ? AND pulled_at IS NULL`, now, taskID, eventID); err != nil { + // A hold refuses a first pull (ledger_hold.go): the worker is + // told the connector is held, not given the instruction. + if held, holdErr := isHeld(ctx, tx); holdErr == nil && held { + return Instruction{}, false, fmt.Errorf("connector: event %d: %w", eventID, ErrHeld) + } return Instruction{}, false, fmt.Errorf("connector: record the pull of %d: %w", eventID, err) } wrote = true diff --git a/internal/connector/ledger_events.go b/internal/connector/ledger_events.go index 4e278c040..4b33fc8f8 100644 --- a/internal/connector/ledger_events.go +++ b/internal/connector/ledger_events.go @@ -291,6 +291,11 @@ type transition struct { retryAt time.Time // set is further columns written in the same statement. set []assignment + // byOperator adds the edges only a person's decision has (operatorEdges): + // out of held, and out of completed by a redispatch or a discard. The + // database refuses them to anything that does not also write the + // decision (ledger_hold.go). + byOperator bool } // assignment is one further column a transition writes. column is this @@ -314,6 +319,8 @@ func (l *Ledger) move(ctx context.Context, db dbtx, t transition) (bool, error) if t.reason == "" { return false, fmt.Errorf("connector: set state of %d: a %s record needs a reason", t.id, t.state) } + case StateHeld: + // A held record may keep the reason it was blocked on, or none. case StateSeen, StateAdmitted, StateQueued, StateDispatched, StateCompleted: if t.reason != "" { return false, fmt.Errorf("connector: set state of %d: a %s record takes no reason", t.id, t.state) @@ -326,6 +333,9 @@ func (l *Ledger) move(ctx context.Context, db dbtx, t transition) (bool, error) return false, fmt.Errorf("connector: set state of %d: only a blocked record has a retry deadline", t.id) } froms := enterableFrom(t.state) + if t.byOperator { + froms = append(froms, operatorEdgesInto(t.state)...) + } if len(t.from) > 0 { froms = slices.DeleteFunc(froms, func(from string) bool { return !slices.Contains(t.from, RecordState(from)) @@ -467,6 +477,8 @@ var ErrNoSuchRecord = errors.New("no such event record") // The tombstone is what makes an explicit replay safe forever, so it is never // deleted — only the payload goes. Non-terminal records are never touched: // their payload is the only copy of what intake was told. +// Nor is a completed record a person redispatched while its task was live: +// that task's end admits it, and admitted needs its snapshot. func (l *Ledger) DropContent(ctx context.Context, discardedBefore, completedBefore time.Time) (int, error) { res, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, ` UPDATE events @@ -476,7 +488,7 @@ SET details = NULL, event_type = '', kind = '', action = '', bucket_id = 0, snapshot = NULL, trigger_name = '', acknowledge = 0, conversation_key = '', reply_kind = '', reply_recording_id = 0, routed = 0, route = '', class = '', recording_url = '', requester_id = 0 -WHERE content_dropped = 0 +WHERE content_dropped = 0 AND redispatch_decision IS NULL AND ((state = ? AND updated_at < ?) OR (state = ? AND updated_at < ?))`, string(StateDiscarded), stamp(discardedBefore), string(StateCompleted), stamp(completedBefore)) diff --git a/internal/connector/ledger_hold.go b/internal/connector/ledger_hold.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..05910d1a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/ledger_hold.go @@ -0,0 +1,527 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "database/sql" + "errors" + "fmt" + "os" + "strings" + "time" +) + +// The hold marker, intake generations, the review tag, and people's decisions +// on records: the ledger half of `basecamp connect --hold`, `release`, +// `redispatch`, `discard`, `shadow promote` and `import`. +// +// # Invariants +// +// Each is held by the database where SQL can say it, and by a test that fails +// without it (operator_invariants_test.go). +// +// 1. Nothing a hold tagged for review reaches a worker without a person. A +// tagged, unauthorized record written admitted or queued — by admission, +// by a task's end returning it, by anything — is written held instead, by +// a trigger, in the same statement. A held record is not startable. +// 2. The hold marker stops dispatch and posting at the database. While it +// stands no attempt row can be written, no task takes a follow-up, no +// event is handed to a worker for the first time — neither a first +// exposure nor a first pull of an event the launch exposed, so a worker a +// crashed connector left running is told nothing new — and no outbox +// intent can move to sending. It lives in the ledger, so every +// start respects it, and only Release clears it. What it does not stop is +// what such a worker already holds: an instruction it was handed before +// the hold, and its own Basecamp credential. Ending it is the one-owner +// rule's (driver/worker.go), and a person can hurry it with redispatch. +// 3. A hold is one transaction: the marker, a new intake generation, the +// review tag on every non-terminal record of the generations before it +// (clearing any earlier authorization, a redispatch still waiting for its +// task included), and admitted or queued records moved to held. +// 4. A person's decision is one transaction with the state change it makes, +// and it records who decided. A terminal record leaves its state only +// against a decision row made after its outcome settled: completed to +// admitted by the redispatch the record names, which the move consumes; +// completed(unknown) to discarded(by_operator) by a discard, and +// completed(unknown or failed) to discarded(imported_done) by an import's +// done decision. Discarded never leaves. A trigger refuses every other +// edge. +// 5. A redispatch never runs two workers for one event. The replaced task's +// token is superseded in the authorization's transaction, and an event +// whose task is still live is not admitted until that task ends: the +// authorization waits on the record and a trigger applies it in the +// transaction that ends the task. One live task per conversation keeps +// the new task from starting before then. +// 6. Admitted means dispatchable. A redispatch admits only a record that +// still has its snapshot and route; anything else is decided again by +// admission, whose verdict stands. +// 7. Shadow promote and import are atomic under a crash: each is one ledger +// transaction, and promote exposes the shadow ledger at the normal path +// only after its hold committed, by one rename (promote.go). +// 8. Reading is not deciding. Status opens the ledger read-only, takes no +// lock, and says nothing of content, feed positions or tokens. +const migrationOperator = ` +CREATE TABLE generations ( + id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, + cause TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (cause IN ('hold', 'shadow_promote')), + opened_by TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (opened_by <> ''), + opened_at TEXT NOT NULL +); + +CREATE TABLE hold_marker ( + id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1), + generation INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES generations (id), + cause TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (cause IN ('hold', 'shadow_promote')), + held_by TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (held_by <> ''), + held_at TEXT NOT NULL +); + +CREATE TABLE decisions ( + id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, + action TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (action IN ('hold', 'release', 'redispatch', 'discard', 'shadow_promote', 'import')), + event_id INTEGER, + decided_by TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (decided_by <> ''), + decided_at TEXT NOT NULL, + from_state TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', + from_reason TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', + from_outcome TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', + to_state TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', + superseded_task_id INTEGER, + note TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '' +); +CREATE INDEX decisions_event ON decisions (event_id, id); + +CREATE TABLE connection ( + id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1), + state TEXT NOT NULL, + pid INTEGER NOT NULL, + changed_at TEXT NOT NULL, + detail TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '' +); + +ALTER TABLE events ADD COLUMN generation INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; +ALTER TABLE events ADD COLUMN review INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; +ALTER TABLE events ADD COLUMN authorized_at TEXT; +ALTER TABLE events ADD COLUMN authorized_by TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''; +ALTER TABLE events ADD COLUMN redispatch_decision INTEGER REFERENCES decisions (id); +CREATE INDEX events_review ON events (review, state); + +CREATE TRIGGER events_generation +AFTER INSERT ON events +BEGIN + UPDATE events SET generation = (SELECT COALESCE(MAX(id), 0) FROM generations) WHERE id = NEW.id; +END; + +CREATE TRIGGER events_review_is_held +AFTER UPDATE OF state, review, authorized_at ON events +WHEN NEW.state IN ('admitted', 'queued') AND NEW.review = 1 AND NEW.authorized_at IS NULL +BEGIN + UPDATE events SET state = 'held', reason = '', revision = revision + 1 WHERE id = NEW.id; +END; + +-- A held record's acknowledgement guard is canceled, not merely delayed: the +-- record may wait days for a person, and "received" then is worse than +-- nothing. A redispatch does not write a new one — the worker's own +-- acknowledgement is the first thing its prompt asks for. +CREATE TRIGGER events_held_cancels_guard +AFTER UPDATE OF state ON events +WHEN NEW.state = 'held' AND OLD.state <> 'held' +BEGIN + UPDATE outbox SET state = 'canceled', note = 'held', + finished_at = strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%f000000Z', 'now') + WHERE intent_key = 'guard_ack:event:' || NEW.id AND state = 'pending'; +END; + +CREATE TRIGGER attempts_refused_under_hold +BEFORE INSERT ON attempts +WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM hold_marker) +BEGIN + SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'the connector is held: nothing is dispatched until basecamp connect release'); +END; + +CREATE TRIGGER task_events_exposure_refused_under_hold +BEFORE UPDATE OF delivery ON task_events +WHEN OLD.delivery = 'admitted' AND NEW.delivery = 'exposed' AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM hold_marker) +BEGIN + SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'the connector is held: no instruction is handed to a worker until basecamp connect release'); +END; + +-- The other first hand-off: an event the launch exposed carries only a +-- pointer until a worker pulls its instruction, so a first pull is new work +-- reaching that worker and the hold refuses it too. A repeat — a worker +-- asking again for what it already pulled — is answered. +CREATE TRIGGER task_events_pull_refused_under_hold +BEFORE UPDATE OF pulled_at ON task_events +WHEN OLD.pulled_at IS NULL AND NEW.pulled_at IS NOT NULL AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM hold_marker) +BEGIN + SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'the connector is held: no instruction is handed to a worker until basecamp connect release'); +END; + +CREATE TRIGGER outbox_refused_under_hold +BEFORE UPDATE OF state ON outbox +WHEN NEW.state = 'sending' AND OLD.state <> 'sending' AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM hold_marker) +BEGIN + SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'the connector is held: nothing is posted until basecamp connect release'); +END; + +DROP TRIGGER events_terminal_is_terminal; +CREATE TRIGGER events_terminal_is_terminal +BEFORE UPDATE OF state ON events +WHEN OLD.state IN ('completed', 'discarded') AND NEW.state <> OLD.state + AND NOT ( + OLD.state = 'completed' AND NEW.state = 'admitted' + AND OLD.redispatch_decision IS NOT NULL AND NEW.redispatch_decision IS NULL + AND OLD.content_dropped = 0 AND OLD.snapshot IS NOT NULL + AND (SELECT te.outcome FROM task_events te WHERE te.event_id = OLD.id AND te.withdrawn_at IS NULL + ORDER BY te.task_id DESC LIMIT 1) IN ('unknown', 'failed') + AND EXISTS ( + SELECT 1 FROM decisions d + WHERE d.id = OLD.redispatch_decision AND d.event_id = OLD.id AND d.action = 'redispatch' + AND d.decided_at >= (SELECT te.completed_at FROM task_events te WHERE te.event_id = OLD.id AND te.withdrawn_at IS NULL + ORDER BY te.task_id DESC LIMIT 1)) + ) + AND NOT ( + OLD.state = 'completed' AND NEW.state = 'discarded' AND NEW.reason = 'by_operator' + AND (SELECT te.outcome FROM task_events te WHERE te.event_id = OLD.id AND te.withdrawn_at IS NULL + ORDER BY te.task_id DESC LIMIT 1) = 'unknown' + AND EXISTS ( + SELECT 1 FROM decisions d + WHERE d.event_id = OLD.id AND d.action = 'discard' + AND d.decided_at >= (SELECT te.completed_at FROM task_events te WHERE te.event_id = OLD.id AND te.withdrawn_at IS NULL + ORDER BY te.task_id DESC LIMIT 1)) + ) + AND NOT ( + OLD.state = 'completed' AND NEW.state = 'discarded' AND NEW.reason = 'imported_done' + AND (SELECT te.outcome FROM task_events te WHERE te.event_id = OLD.id AND te.withdrawn_at IS NULL + ORDER BY te.task_id DESC LIMIT 1) IN ('unknown', 'failed') + AND EXISTS ( + SELECT 1 FROM decisions d + WHERE d.event_id = OLD.id AND d.action = 'import' + AND d.decided_at >= (SELECT te.completed_at FROM task_events te WHERE te.event_id = OLD.id AND te.withdrawn_at IS NULL + ORDER BY te.task_id DESC LIMIT 1)) + ) +BEGIN + SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'a terminal record cannot change state'); +END; + +CREATE TRIGGER tasks_end_applies_redispatch +AFTER UPDATE OF ended_at ON tasks +WHEN OLD.ended_at IS NULL AND NEW.ended_at IS NOT NULL +BEGIN + UPDATE events + SET state = 'admitted', reason = '', redispatch_decision = NULL, revision = revision + 1, + updated_at = NEW.ended_at, blocked_at = NULL, retry_at = NULL + WHERE state = 'completed' AND redispatch_decision IS NOT NULL + AND content_dropped = 0 AND snapshot IS NOT NULL + AND id IN (SELECT event_id FROM task_events WHERE task_id = NEW.id); +END; +` + +// ErrHeld is the hold marker refusing to hand a worker something new. It is +// not a failure of the task: nothing more is handed over until release. +var ErrHeld = errors.New("the connector is held") + +// Reasons a person's decision writes. +const ( + // ReasonByOperator is a record a person closed without running it. + ReasonByOperator = "by_operator" + // ReasonImportedDone is a tombstone an import wrote for an entry a person + // confirmed was finished before the cutover. + ReasonImportedDone = "imported_done" +) + +// operatorEdges are the moves only a person's decision makes, by target: the +// states a record may leave for it. The lifecycle's own edges (ledger_events.go) +// are what the connector does by itself; these are never taken automatically. +var operatorEdges = map[RecordState][]RecordState{ + // A redispatch admits a completed record, or a held one with its snapshot + // (queued when its conversation is live). + StateAdmitted: {StateCompleted, StateHeld}, + StateQueued: {StateHeld}, + // A hold holds what was waiting for a worker. + StateHeld: {StateAdmitted, StateQueued}, + // A redispatch of a record held over a blocking reason runs it again as + // blocked. + StateBlocked: {StateHeld}, + // A discard closes a held record or an unknown outcome. + StateDiscarded: {StateHeld, StateCompleted}, +} + +func operatorEdgesInto(target RecordState) []string { + out := make([]string, 0, len(operatorEdges[target])) + for _, from := range operatorEdges[target] { + out = append(out, string(from)) + } + return out +} + +// HoldCause is what set a hold. +type HoldCause string + +const ( + // HoldByOperator is `basecamp connect --hold`. + HoldByOperator HoldCause = "hold" + // HoldByPromote is `basecamp connect shadow promote`. + HoldByPromote HoldCause = "shadow_promote" +) + +// Hold is the standing hold marker. +type Hold struct { + // Generation is the intake generation the latest hold opened. Records of + // earlier generations were tagged for review. + Generation int64 `json:"generation"` + Cause HoldCause `json:"cause"` + HeldBy string `json:"held_by"` + HeldAt time.Time `json:"held_at"` +} + +// HoldResult is what setting a hold did. +type HoldResult struct { + Hold Hold `json:"hold"` + // Tagged is how many non-terminal records were tagged for review. + Tagged int `json:"tagged_for_review"` + // Held is how many of them were waiting for a worker and are now held. + Held int `json:"held"` +} + +// SetHold sets the durable hold marker, opens a new intake generation, and +// tags every non-terminal record of the generations before it for review, in +// one transaction (invariant 3). A hold already standing keeps its first +// setter and time; the new generation and tags are written again. +func (l *Ledger) SetHold(ctx context.Context, by string, cause HoldCause) (HoldResult, error) { + if strings.TrimSpace(by) == "" { + return HoldResult{}, errors.New("connector: a hold records who set it") + } + if cause != HoldByOperator && cause != HoldByPromote { + return HoldResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: %q is not a hold cause", cause) + } + var out HoldResult + err := retryBusy(func() error { + tx, err := l.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: begin hold: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }() + out, err = l.hold(ctx, tx, by, cause) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: commit hold: %w", err) + } + return nil + }) + return out, err +} + +// holdStep is a test seam: a crash test kills the process at a named step. +var holdStep = func(string) {} + +func (l *Ledger) hold(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, by string, cause HoldCause) (HoldResult, error) { + now := l.timestamp() + res, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO generations (cause, opened_by, opened_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?)`, string(cause), by, now) + if err != nil { + return HoldResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: open a generation: %w", err) + } + generation, err := res.LastInsertId() + if err != nil { + return HoldResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: open a generation: %w", err) + } + if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, ` +INSERT INTO hold_marker (id, generation, cause, held_by, held_at) VALUES (1, ?, ?, ?, ?) +ON CONFLICT (id) DO UPDATE SET generation = excluded.generation`, generation, string(cause), by, now); err != nil { + return HoldResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: set the hold marker: %w", err) + } + holdStep("marker") + + var waiting int + if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM events WHERE state IN ('admitted', 'queued')`).Scan(&waiting); err != nil { + return HoldResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: count waiting records: %w", err) + } + // Tagging a waiting record holds it: events_review_is_held fires on the + // review column in this same statement (invariant 1). + tagged, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, ` +UPDATE events SET review = 1, authorized_at = NULL, authorized_by = '' +WHERE state NOT IN ('completed', 'discarded') AND generation < ?`, generation) + if err != nil { + return HoldResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: tag records for review: %w", err) + } + n, err := tagged.RowsAffected() + if err != nil { + return HoldResult{}, err + } + if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, ` +UPDATE events SET redispatch_decision = NULL, authorized_at = NULL, authorized_by = '' +WHERE state = 'completed' AND redispatch_decision IS NOT NULL`); err != nil { + return HoldResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: revoke waiting redispatches: %w", err) + } + holdStep("tagged") + var stillWaiting int + if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM events WHERE state IN ('admitted', 'queued') AND review = 1`).Scan(&stillWaiting); err != nil { + return HoldResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: count held records: %w", err) + } + if stillWaiting != 0 { + return HoldResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: %d tagged records are still waiting for a worker", stillWaiting) + } + if err := recordDecision(ctx, tx, decision{action: string(cause), by: by, at: now, + note: fmt.Sprintf("generation %d; %d tagged for review", generation, n)}); err != nil { + return HoldResult{}, err + } + hold, ok, err := readHold(ctx, tx) + if err != nil { + return HoldResult{}, err + } + if !ok { + return HoldResult{}, errors.New("connector: the hold marker did not stand") + } + return HoldResult{Hold: hold, Tagged: int(n), Held: waiting}, nil +} + +// ReleaseResult is what a release did. +type ReleaseResult struct { + // Released is false when no hold stood. + Released bool `json:"released"` + Hold Hold `json:"hold,omitzero"` + // StillHeld counts held records, which stay held. + StillHeld int `json:"still_held"` +} + +// Release clears the hold marker. Held records stay held; records a person +// authorized and records of the newest generation dispatch. +func (l *Ledger) Release(ctx context.Context, by string) (ReleaseResult, error) { + if strings.TrimSpace(by) == "" { + return ReleaseResult{}, errors.New("connector: a release records who released") + } + var out ReleaseResult + err := retryBusy(func() error { + out = ReleaseResult{} + tx, err := l.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: begin release: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }() + hold, ok, err := readHold(ctx, tx) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM events WHERE state = 'held'`).Scan(&out.StillHeld); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: count held records: %w", err) + } + if !ok { + return nil + } + now := l.timestamp() + if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM hold_marker WHERE id = 1`); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: clear the hold marker: %w", err) + } + if err := recordDecision(ctx, tx, decision{action: "release", by: by, at: now, + note: fmt.Sprintf("hold of generation %d set by %s", hold.Generation, hold.HeldBy)}); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: commit release: %w", err) + } + out.Released, out.Hold = true, hold + return nil + }) + return out, err +} + +// isHeld reports whether the hold marker stands, inside a caller's +// transaction: what a refused write asks before it calls itself a failure. +func isHeld(ctx context.Context, q rowQuerier) (bool, error) { + _, ok, err := readHold(ctx, q) + return ok, err +} + +// Held reports whether the hold marker stands. Its signature is +// OutboxOptions.Paused's. +func (l *Ledger) Held(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) { + _, ok, err := l.HoldMarker(ctx) + return ok, err +} + +// HoldMarker reads the standing hold, if any. +func (l *Ledger) HoldMarker(ctx context.Context) (Hold, bool, error) { + return readHold(ctx, l.db) +} + +type rowQuerier interface { + QueryRowContext(ctx context.Context, query string, args ...any) *sql.Row +} + +func readHold(ctx context.Context, q rowQuerier) (Hold, bool, error) { + var ( + h Hold + cause, stamp string + ) + err := q.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT generation, cause, held_by, held_at FROM hold_marker WHERE id = 1`).Scan(&h.Generation, &cause, &h.HeldBy, &stamp) + switch { + case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows): + return Hold{}, false, nil + case err != nil: + return Hold{}, false, fmt.Errorf("connector: read the hold marker: %w", err) + } + h.Cause = HoldCause(cause) + if h.HeldAt, err = parseStamp(stamp); err != nil { + return Hold{}, false, err + } + return h, true, nil +} + +// decision is one row of the decisions table. +type decision struct { + action string + eventID int64 + by, at string + fromState RecordState + fromReason string + fromOutcome Outcome + toState RecordState + supersededTask int64 + note string +} + +func recordDecision(ctx context.Context, tx Tx, d decision) error { + _, err := insertDecision(ctx, tx, d) + return err +} + +func insertDecision(ctx context.Context, tx Tx, d decision) (int64, error) { + res, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, ` +INSERT INTO decisions (action, event_id, decided_by, decided_at, from_state, from_reason, from_outcome, to_state, superseded_task_id, note) +VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`, + d.action, nullableID64(d.eventID), d.by, d.at, string(d.fromState), d.fromReason, string(d.fromOutcome), + string(d.toState), nullableID64(d.supersededTask), d.note) + if err != nil { + return 0, fmt.Errorf("connector: record the decision: %w", err) + } + return res.LastInsertId() +} + +// Connection states the run command reports for status. +const ( + // ConnectionRunning is a connector starting its parts — intake, + // admission, dispatch, outbox — having passed every check before them. It + // says nothing finer about the feed's socket, which intake does not report. + ConnectionRunning = "running" + // ConnectionStopped is a connector that exited through its own shutdown. + // A second signal or a crash leaves the last state standing, so status + // reads this beside the instance lock's holder rather than instead of it. + ConnectionStopped = "stopped" +) + +// NoteConnection records the running connector's connection state, for +// status. detail is a short diagnostic phrase and never carries a position, +// a ticket or content. +func (l *Ledger) NoteConnection(ctx context.Context, state, detail string) error { + return retryBusy(func() error { + _, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, ` +INSERT INTO connection (id, state, pid, changed_at, detail) VALUES (1, ?, ?, ?, ?) +ON CONFLICT (id) DO UPDATE SET state = excluded.state, pid = excluded.pid, changed_at = excluded.changed_at, detail = excluded.detail`, + state, os.Getpid(), l.timestamp(), detail) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: note connection state: %w", err) + } + return nil + }) +} diff --git a/internal/connector/ledger_import.go b/internal/connector/ledger_import.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6aae30267 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/ledger_import.go @@ -0,0 +1,262 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "bytes" + "context" + "database/sql" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "fmt" + "strings" +) + +// ReconciliationVersion is the reconciliation file format import reads. +const ReconciliationVersion = 1 + +// Reconciliation decisions. +const ( + // DecisionDone is an entry a person confirmed the old connector's work + // finished: the record becomes a tombstone. + DecisionDone = "done" + // DecisionHeld is every other mapped entry: the record is tagged for + // review and waits for a person. + DecisionHeld = "held" +) + +// Reconciliation is the cutover's reconciliation file: the old connector's +// handled entries, each mapped to a feed event and decided. +type Reconciliation struct { + Version int `json:"version"` + Entries []ReconciliationEntry `json:"entries"` +} + +// ReconciliationEntry is one mapped entry. +type ReconciliationEntry struct { + EventID int64 `json:"event_id"` + Decision string `json:"decision"` +} + +// ParseReconciliation reads a reconciliation file strictly: unknown fields, +// a second entry for one event, and a decision other than done or held are +// refused, so a file that means something else is never half-understood. +func ParseReconciliation(data []byte) (Reconciliation, error) { + dec := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(data)) + dec.DisallowUnknownFields() + var r Reconciliation + if err := dec.Decode(&r); err != nil { + return Reconciliation{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: reconciliation file: %w", err) + } + // Everything after the file's one value, not only another value: a stray + // brace is a file that does not say what it looks like it says. + if rest := bytes.TrimSpace(data[dec.InputOffset():]); len(rest) > 0 { + return Reconciliation{}, errors.New("connector: reconciliation file: more than one JSON value") + } + if err := r.Validate(); err != nil { + return Reconciliation{}, err + } + return r, nil +} + +// Validate refuses a reconciliation this build cannot apply: another version, +// an entry without an event, a decision that is neither done nor held, or one +// event decided twice. Import checks it too, so a caller that built the value +// itself meets the same rules as one that parsed a file. +func (r Reconciliation) Validate() error { + if r.Version != ReconciliationVersion { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: reconciliation version %d; this build reads %d", r.Version, ReconciliationVersion) + } + seen := make(map[int64]bool, len(r.Entries)) + for i, e := range r.Entries { + switch { + case e.EventID <= 0: + return fmt.Errorf("connector: reconciliation entry %d names no event id", i) + case e.Decision != DecisionDone && e.Decision != DecisionHeld: + return fmt.Errorf("connector: reconciliation entry for event %d has decision %q; use done or held", e.EventID, e.Decision) + case seen[e.EventID]: + return fmt.Errorf("connector: reconciliation names event %d twice", e.EventID) + } + seen[e.EventID] = true + } + return nil +} + +// ImportResult is what an import did. +type ImportResult struct { + // Tombstoned counts records closed as discarded(imported_done), Inserted + // the tombstones written for events the ledger had never seen. + Tombstoned int `json:"tombstoned"` + Inserted int `json:"tombstones_inserted"` + // AlreadyTerminal counts done entries whose record had already finished. + AlreadyTerminal int `json:"already_terminal"` + // Tagged counts non-terminal records tagged for review, and Held those + // of them that were waiting for a worker and are now held. + Tagged int `json:"tagged_for_review"` + Held int `json:"held"` +} + +// importStep is a test seam: a crash test kills the process at a named step. +var importStep = func(string) {} + +// Import applies a reconciliation in one transaction (invariant 7): a +// tombstone for each entry decided done, and the review tag on every other +// non-terminal record, mapped or not, each keeping its state and blocking +// reason. An entry that cannot be applied — a done entry whose record a +// worker holds, a held entry for an event the ledger never saw — refuses the +// whole file, and nothing is written. +func (l *Ledger) Import(ctx context.Context, r Reconciliation, by string) (ImportResult, error) { + if strings.TrimSpace(by) == "" { + return ImportResult{}, errors.New("connector: an import records who applied it") + } + if err := r.Validate(); err != nil { + return ImportResult{}, err + } + var out ImportResult + err := retryBusy(func() error { + var err error + out, err = l.importReconciliation(ctx, r, by) + return err + }) + return out, err +} + +func (l *Ledger) importReconciliation(ctx context.Context, r Reconciliation, by string) (ImportResult, error) { + tx, err := l.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil) + if err != nil { + return ImportResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: begin import: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }() + + var out ImportResult + now := l.timestamp() + done := map[int64]bool{} + for _, e := range r.Entries { + var state string + err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT state FROM events WHERE id = ?`, e.EventID).Scan(&state) + missing := errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) + if err != nil && !missing { + return ImportResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: import event %d: %w", e.EventID, err) + } + recorded := false + toState := StateDiscarded + switch e.Decision { + case DecisionDone: + done[e.EventID] = true + // A person said it is finished: whatever authorized it to run + // again, a redispatch waiting for its task included, is withdrawn. + if !missing { + if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE events SET redispatch_decision = NULL, authorized_at = NULL, authorized_by = '' WHERE id = ?`, e.EventID); err != nil { + return ImportResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: import event %d: %w", e.EventID, err) + } + } + switch { + case missing: + // A tombstone and nothing else: the event can never become a + // task, whichever lane serves it later. + if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, ` +INSERT INTO events (id, state, reason, lane, event_type, kind, action, bucket_id, creator_id, recording_id, + created_at, seen_at, updated_at, content_dropped) +VALUES (?, 'discarded', ?, 'import', '', '', '', 0, 0, 0, ?, ?, ?, 1)`, e.EventID, ReasonImportedDone, now, now, now); err != nil { + return ImportResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: import tombstone for %d: %w", e.EventID, err) + } + out.Inserted++ + case state == string(StateCompleted): + // An unknown or failed outcome waits for a person, and this + // file is that person's decision: the record closes, so no + // redispatch or notice asks for it again. A success is already + // finished. + task, err := loadEventTask(ctx, tx, e.EventID) + if err != nil { + return ImportResult{}, err + } + if task.outcome != OutcomeUnknown && task.outcome != OutcomeFailed { + out.AlreadyTerminal++ + toState = StateCompleted + break + } + // Recorded before the move, which the database allows out of + // completed only against it (invariant 4). + if err := recordDecision(ctx, tx, decision{action: "import", eventID: e.EventID, by: by, at: notBefore(now, task.completedAt), + fromState: StateCompleted, fromOutcome: task.outcome, toState: StateDiscarded, note: "done"}); err != nil { + return ImportResult{}, err + } + recorded = true + moved, err := l.move(ctx, tx, transition{id: e.EventID, state: StateDiscarded, reason: ReasonImportedDone, + from: []RecordState{StateCompleted}, byOperator: true}) + if err != nil { + return ImportResult{}, err + } + if !moved { + return ImportResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: import: event %d (completed) cannot be closed: %w", e.EventID, ErrDecisionRefused) + } + out.Tombstoned++ + case state == string(StateDiscarded): + out.AlreadyTerminal++ + case state == string(StateDispatched): + return ImportResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: import: event %d is dispatched to a worker; a done decision cannot close it: %w", e.EventID, ErrDecisionRefused) + default: + moved, err := l.move(ctx, tx, transition{id: e.EventID, state: StateDiscarded, reason: ReasonImportedDone, + from: []RecordState{StateSeen, StateAdmitted, StateQueued, StateBlocked, StateHeld}, byOperator: true}) + if err != nil { + return ImportResult{}, err + } + if !moved { + return ImportResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: import: event %d (%s) cannot be closed: %w", e.EventID, state, ErrDecisionRefused) + } + out.Tombstoned++ + } + // As a discard does: what the connector would still have said about + // a record a person closed is not said. + if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, ` +UPDATE outbox SET state = 'canceled', finished_at = ?, note = 'discarded by a person' +WHERE event_id = ? AND state = 'pending' AND kind IN ('guard_ack', 'holding_reply')`, now, e.EventID); err != nil { + return ImportResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: cancel lifecycle messages for %d: %w", e.EventID, err) + } + if !recorded { + if err := recordDecision(ctx, tx, decision{action: "import", eventID: e.EventID, by: by, at: now, + fromState: RecordState(state), toState: toState, note: "done"}); err != nil { + return ImportResult{}, err + } + } + case DecisionHeld: + if missing { + return ImportResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: import: event %d is not in the ledger, so it cannot be held for review: %w", e.EventID, ErrDecisionRefused) + } + } + importStep("entry") + } + + var waiting int + if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM events WHERE state IN ('admitted', 'queued')`).Scan(&waiting); err != nil { + return ImportResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: import: %w", err) + } + // Everything not decided done waits for a person: tagging holds a waiting + // record in the same statement (invariant 1), and leaves every other + // record's state and reason as they are. + res, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, ` +UPDATE events SET review = 1, authorized_at = NULL, authorized_by = '' +WHERE state NOT IN ('completed', 'discarded')`) + if err != nil { + return ImportResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: import: tag for review: %w", err) + } + tagged, err := res.RowsAffected() + if err != nil { + return ImportResult{}, err + } + // As a hold does: a redispatch still waiting for its task was authorized + // before the cutover review, and waits for that review too. + if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, ` +UPDATE events SET redispatch_decision = NULL, authorized_at = NULL, authorized_by = '' +WHERE state = 'completed' AND redispatch_decision IS NOT NULL`); err != nil { + return ImportResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: import: withdraw waiting redispatches: %w", err) + } + out.Tagged, out.Held = int(tagged), waiting + importStep("tagged") + if err := recordDecision(ctx, tx, decision{action: "import", by: by, at: now, + note: fmt.Sprintf("%d entries; %d tombstoned, %d tombstones inserted, %d tagged for review", len(r.Entries), out.Tombstoned, out.Inserted, out.Tagged)}); err != nil { + return ImportResult{}, err + } + if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil { + return ImportResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: commit import: %w", err) + } + return out, nil +} diff --git a/internal/connector/ledger_status.go b/internal/connector/ledger_status.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..877c861b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/ledger_status.go @@ -0,0 +1,669 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "database/sql" + "errors" + "fmt" + "path/filepath" + "strings" + "time" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" +) + +// OpenLedgerReadOnly opens an existing ledger for reading only: no migration, +// no write to the database, no lock. status uses it beside a running connector +// (invariant 8). SQLite may create the WAL sidecars of a cleanly closed ledger +// to read it; they sit in the ledger's private directory. +// +// The file must already exist, and it is refused unless it is private, as +// OpenLedger refuses it. A ledger an older binary wrote, which the running +// connector has not yet migrated, is refused: its columns are not the ones +// this build reads. +func OpenLedgerReadOnly(ctx context.Context, path string) (*Ledger, error) { + if path == "" { + return nil, errors.New("connector: ledger path is required") + } + if isInMemory(path) || strings.ContainsAny(path, "?#%") { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: ledger path %q cannot be opened as a file", path) + } + abs, err := filepath.Abs(path) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: ledger path %q: %w", path, err) + } + // Vetted as the writer's open vets it, through the same per-file entry and + // without creating the file: a ledger that vanishes under a reader (a + // promote renaming it) is not recreated empty. The entry matters even for + // a reader — the privacy check opens a descriptor and closes it, and that + // close drops every lock this process holds on the file, including the + // ones a Ledger open beside it is holding. Going through claimLedger runs + // the descriptor check once per file per process and verifies every later + // open with Stat instead. + file := claimLedger(abs) + if file.key != abs { + releaseLedger(file) + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: %s and %s are one file: %w", abs, file.key, ErrLedgerUnderAnotherName) + } + if err := checkLedgerFile(file, path, abs, false); err != nil { + releaseLedger(file) + return nil, err + } + dsn := "file:" + path + "?mode=ro&_pragma=busy_timeout(5000)&_pragma=query_only(1)" + db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", dsn) + if err != nil { + releaseLedger(file) + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: open ledger: %w", err) + } + db.SetMaxOpenConns(1) + l := &Ledger{db: db, file: file, now: time.Now} + version, err := l.SchemaVersion(ctx) + if err != nil { + _ = l.Close() + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: read the ledger's schema: %w", err) + } + switch { + case version < len(migrations): + _ = l.Close() + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: the ledger is at schema %d and this build reads %d: %w", version, len(migrations), ErrLedgerOutOfDate) + case version > len(migrations): + // A newer build wrote it: its columns are not this build's to read, + // and no decision of this build's may be written into it. + _ = l.Close() + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: ledger at schema %d, this basecamp writes %d: %w", version, len(migrations), ErrLedgerSchema) + } + return l, nil +} + +// ErrLedgerOutOfDate is a ledger an older binary wrote, which this build has +// not migrated. Starting the connector migrates it. +var ErrLedgerOutOfDate = errors.New("the ledger is older than this build; start the connector once to bring it up to date") + +// StatusLimit is how many dispatches status lists. +const StatusLimit = 20 + +// Status is what `basecamp connect status` shows. Every field is ids, states, +// counts and timestamps: no content, no feed position, no token or token hash +// (invariant 8). +type Status struct { + SchemaVersion int `json:"schema_version"` + // Connection is the last run's own record, if one ran on this build. + Connection *ConnectionStatus `json:"connection,omitempty"` + // Hold is the standing hold marker. + Hold *HoldStatus `json:"hold,omitempty"` + Generation int64 `json:"generation"` + + Positions []PositionStatus `json:"positions"` + Gaps []GapStatus `json:"gaps"` + Losses []LossStatus `json:"open_losses"` + Unrecovered int `json:"unrecovered_ids"` + + // Queues counts records by state; Blocked counts blocked records by reason. + Queues map[string]int `json:"queues"` + Blocked map[string]int `json:"blocked"` + // Review counts records tagged for review that have not reached a + // person yet, and Authorized those a person authorized that have not run. + Review int `json:"review_tagged"` + AuthorizedBlocked int `json:"authorized_blocked"` + RedispatchPending int `json:"redispatch_pending"` + + Tasks []TaskStatus `json:"live_tasks"` + Worktrees []WorktreeStatus `json:"retained_worktrees"` + // WorktreesKnown is false when the retained worktrees could not be + // listed: they are unavailable, not known to be none. + WorktreesKnown bool `json:"worktrees_known"` + // WorktreesUnavailable is why, when a listing was tried and failed. + WorktreesUnavailable string `json:"worktrees_unavailable,omitempty"` + Indeterminate []IntentStatus `json:"indeterminate_intents"` + Held []HeldStatus `json:"held_records"` + Dispatches []DispatchStatus `json:"dispatches"` +} + +// ConnectionStatus is the run command's own record of its last run: running +// as its parts start, stopped when it exited. It is not the feed +// socket's state, which intake does not report. +type ConnectionStatus struct { + State string `json:"state"` + PID int `json:"pid"` + ChangedAt time.Time `json:"changed_at"` + Detail string `json:"detail,omitempty"` +} + +// HoldStatus is the hold marker. +type HoldStatus struct { + Generation int64 `json:"generation"` + Cause string `json:"cause"` + HeldBy string `json:"held_by"` + HeldAt time.Time `json:"held_at"` +} + +// PositionStatus is one feed checkpoint: whether a position is held, never +// the position itself, which resumes the account's feed. +type PositionStatus struct { + Filters string `json:"filters"` + HasPosition bool `json:"has_position"` + LastPollServedID int64 `json:"last_poll_served_id"` + UpdatedAt time.Time `json:"updated_at"` +} + +// GapStatus is one recorded 410. +type GapStatus struct { + ID int64 `json:"id"` + DetectedAt time.Time `json:"detected_at"` + Class string `json:"class"` + EpochAfterID *int64 `json:"epoch_after_id,omitempty"` + EntryClass string `json:"entry_class,omitempty"` +} + +// LossStatus is an overflow still being reconciled. +type LossStatus struct { + ID int64 `json:"id"` + DetectedAt time.Time `json:"detected_at"` + Dropped int `json:"dropped"` + Missing int `json:"missing"` + DeadlineAt time.Time `json:"deadline_at"` +} + +// TaskStatus is a live task and its attempt. +type TaskStatus struct { + TaskID int64 `json:"task_id"` + AttemptID string `json:"attempt_id"` + State string `json:"state"` + Driver string `json:"driver"` + WorkDir string `json:"work_dir"` + PID int `json:"pid,omitempty"` + PGID int `json:"pgid,omitempty"` + // ProcessStartedAt is the start time recorded with the pid: with it, the + // pid is an identity (driver.OwnsWorker). + ProcessStartedAt *time.Time `json:"process_started_at,omitempty"` + // TakerPID, TakerPGID and TakerStartedAt are the process the task token + // went to, where one took it: a worker's MCP server, which lives in a + // process group of its own. + TakerPID int `json:"taker_pid,omitempty"` + TakerPGID int `json:"taker_pgid,omitempty"` + TakerStartedAt *time.Time `json:"taker_started_at,omitempty"` + // TakerUnaccounted is the case the zero taker cannot express: the token + // was delivered and the connector could not name the process that took + // it, or the kernel stopped answering whether it is gone. The attempt is + // held for it, and a person reading this status is the one who settles + // it, so it is never shown as nothing having taken the token. + TakerUnaccounted bool `json:"taker_unaccounted,omitempty"` + // Worker and Taker are whether each recorded process is still this task's, + // as the caller established it; the ledger read leaves them empty. + Worker string `json:"worker,omitempty"` + Taker string `json:"taker,omitempty"` + LaunchedAt time.Time `json:"launched_at"` + DeadlineAt *time.Time `json:"deadline_at,omitempty"` + EventIDs []int64 `json:"event_ids"` +} + +// WorkerIdentity is the attempt's recorded worker, for the one-owner rule. +func (t TaskStatus) WorkerIdentity() driver.Process { + return statusIdentity(t.PID, t.PGID, t.ProcessStartedAt) +} + +// TakerIdentity is the process the task token went to, for the same rule. +// It says nothing about TakerUnaccounted, which is a fact of the ledger and +// not a question for the kernel: a caller asks that first. +func (t TaskStatus) TakerIdentity() driver.Process { + return statusIdentity(t.TakerPID, t.TakerPGID, t.TakerStartedAt) +} + +func statusIdentity(pid, pgid int, started *time.Time) driver.Process { + if started == nil { + return driver.Process{PID: pid, PGID: pgid} + } + return recordedIdentity(pid, pgid, *started) +} + +// WorktreeStatus is a retained worktree, as the worktree lister reports it. +type WorktreeStatus struct { + Path string `json:"path"` + Branch string `json:"branch,omitempty"` + TaskID int64 `json:"task_id,omitempty"` + Reason string `json:"reason,omitempty"` +} + +// IntentStatus is a lifecycle message waiting for a person. The body is not +// shown. +type IntentStatus struct { + ID int64 `json:"id"` + Kind string `json:"kind"` + EventID int64 `json:"event_id,omitempty"` + AttemptID string `json:"attempt_id,omitempty"` + BucketID int64 `json:"bucket_id"` + MessageKind string `json:"message_kind"` + RecordingID int64 `json:"recording_id"` + SendingAt *time.Time `json:"sending_at,omitempty"` + Note string `json:"note,omitempty"` +} + +// HeldStatus is a held record. +type HeldStatus struct { + EventID int64 `json:"event_id"` + EventType string `json:"event_type"` + Trigger string `json:"trigger,omitempty"` + BucketID int64 `json:"bucket_id"` + RecordingURL string `json:"recording_url,omitempty"` + Reason string `json:"reason,omitempty"` + Generation int64 `json:"generation"` + UpdatedAt time.Time `json:"updated_at"` +} + +// DispatchStatus is one attempt and the outcomes of the events on its task. +type DispatchStatus struct { + TaskID int64 `json:"task_id"` + AttemptID string `json:"attempt_id"` + State string `json:"state"` + StopReason string `json:"stop_reason,omitempty"` + LaunchedAt time.Time `json:"launched_at"` + EndedAt *time.Time `json:"ended_at,omitempty"` + Events []DispatchedEvent `json:"events"` +} + +// DispatchedEvent is one event's delivery and outcome on a task. +type DispatchedEvent struct { + EventID int64 `json:"event_id"` + Delivery string `json:"delivery"` + Outcome string `json:"outcome,omitempty"` + ReplyID *int64 `json:"reply_id,omitempty"` + // Withdrawn is an exposure taken back after a start that ran nothing. + Withdrawn bool `json:"withdrawn,omitempty"` +} + +// WorktreeLister lists retained worktrees for status. Ledger.RetainedWorktreeStatus +// is the one status and doctor run; nil means the caller cannot say whether +// any are retained — which status reports as unavailable, never as none, as +// it does a listing that fails. +type WorktreeLister func(ctx context.Context) ([]WorktreeStatus, error) + +// Status reads everything the ledger's own status shows in one read +// transaction, so the numbers agree with each other, and then asks the +// worktree lister. The lister runs after that transaction ends, never +// inside it: the ledger holds one connection, and a lister that reads the +// ledger too would wait for the connection the transaction holds. +func (l *Ledger) Status(ctx context.Context, worktrees WorktreeLister) (Status, error) { + s, err := l.status(ctx) + if err != nil { + return Status{}, err + } + if worktrees != nil { + if s.Worktrees, err = worktrees(ctx); err != nil { + // A status that cannot list them says so and is still worth + // reading; what it never does is call them none. + s.Worktrees, s.WorktreesUnavailable = nil, err.Error() + } else { + s.WorktreesKnown = true + } + } + if s.Worktrees == nil { + s.Worktrees = []WorktreeStatus{} + } + return s, nil +} + +func (l *Ledger) status(ctx context.Context) (Status, error) { + tx, err := l.db.BeginTx(ctx, &sql.TxOptions{ReadOnly: true}) + if err != nil { + return Status{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: begin status: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }() + + s := Status{Queues: map[string]int{}, Blocked: map[string]int{}} + if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COALESCE(MAX(version), 0) FROM schema_migrations`).Scan(&s.SchemaVersion); err != nil { + return Status{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: status schema: %w", err) + } + if err := statusConnection(ctx, tx, &s); err != nil { + return Status{}, err + } + hold, ok, err := readHold(ctx, tx) + if err != nil { + return Status{}, err + } + if ok { + s.Hold = &HoldStatus{Generation: hold.Generation, Cause: string(hold.Cause), HeldBy: hold.HeldBy, HeldAt: hold.HeldAt} + } + if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COALESCE(MAX(id), 0) FROM generations`).Scan(&s.Generation); err != nil { + return Status{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: status generation: %w", err) + } + for _, step := range []func(context.Context, *sql.Tx, *Status) error{ + statusPositions, statusGaps, statusQueues, statusTasks, statusIntents, statusHeld, statusDispatches, + } { + if err := step(ctx, tx, &s); err != nil { + return Status{}, err + } + } + return s, nil +} + +func statusConnection(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, s *Status) error { + var ( + c ConnectionStatus + changed string + ) + err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT state, pid, changed_at, detail FROM connection WHERE id = 1`).Scan(&c.State, &c.PID, &changed, &c.Detail) + switch { + case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows): + return nil + case err != nil: + return fmt.Errorf("connector: status connection: %w", err) + } + if c.ChangedAt, err = parseStamp(changed); err != nil { + return err + } + s.Connection = &c + return nil +} + +func statusPositions(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, s *Status) error { + rows, err := tx.QueryContext(ctx, `SELECT flat_key, position <> '', last_poll_served_id, updated_at FROM checkpoints ORDER BY updated_at DESC`) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: status positions: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }() + s.Positions = []PositionStatus{} + for rows.Next() { + var ( + p PositionStatus + updated string + ) + if err := rows.Scan(&p.Filters, &p.HasPosition, &p.LastPollServedID, &updated); err != nil { + return err + } + if p.UpdatedAt, err = parseStamp(updated); err != nil { + return err + } + s.Positions = append(s.Positions, p) + } + return rows.Err() +} + +func statusGaps(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, s *Status) error { + rows, err := tx.QueryContext(ctx, `SELECT id, detected_at, class, epoch_after_id, entry_class FROM gaps ORDER BY id`) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: status gaps: %w", err) + } + s.Gaps = []GapStatus{} + for rows.Next() { + var ( + g GapStatus + detected string + epoch sql.NullInt64 + ) + if err := rows.Scan(&g.ID, &detected, &g.Class, &epoch, &g.EntryClass); err != nil { + _ = rows.Close() + return err + } + if g.DetectedAt, err = parseStamp(detected); err != nil { + _ = rows.Close() + return err + } + if epoch.Valid { + id := epoch.Int64 + g.EpochAfterID = &id + } + s.Gaps = append(s.Gaps, g) + } + if err := rows.Close(); err != nil { + return err + } + + rows, err = tx.QueryContext(ctx, ` +SELECT l.id, l.detected_at, l.dropped_count, l.deadline_at, + (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM loss_ids i WHERE i.loss_id = l.id AND i.state = 'missing') +FROM losses l WHERE l.resolved_at IS NULL ORDER BY l.id`) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: status losses: %w", err) + } + s.Losses = []LossStatus{} + for rows.Next() { + var ( + loss LossStatus + detected, deadline string + ) + if err := rows.Scan(&loss.ID, &detected, &loss.Dropped, &deadline, &loss.Missing); err != nil { + _ = rows.Close() + return err + } + if loss.DetectedAt, err = parseStamp(detected); err != nil { + _ = rows.Close() + return err + } + if loss.DeadlineAt, err = parseStamp(deadline); err != nil { + _ = rows.Close() + return err + } + s.Losses = append(s.Losses, loss) + } + if err := rows.Close(); err != nil { + return err + } + return tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT event_id) FROM loss_ids WHERE state = 'unrecovered'`).Scan(&s.Unrecovered) +} + +func statusQueues(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, s *Status) error { + rows, err := tx.QueryContext(ctx, `SELECT state, reason, COUNT(*) FROM events WHERE state <> 'discarded' AND state <> 'completed' GROUP BY state, reason`) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: status queues: %w", err) + } + for rows.Next() { + var ( + state, reason string + n int + ) + if err := rows.Scan(&state, &reason, &n); err != nil { + _ = rows.Close() + return err + } + s.Queues[state] += n + if state == string(StateBlocked) { + s.Blocked[reason] += n + } + } + if err := rows.Close(); err != nil { + return err + } + return tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, ` +SELECT + (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM events WHERE review = 1 AND state IN ('seen', 'blocked', 'dispatched') + AND NOT (authorized_at IS NOT NULL AND (state <> 'blocked' OR authorized_at >= blocked_at))), + (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM events WHERE state = 'blocked' AND authorized_at >= blocked_at), + (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM events WHERE redispatch_decision IS NOT NULL)`).Scan(&s.Review, &s.AuthorizedBlocked, &s.RedispatchPending) +} + +func statusTasks(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, s *Status) error { + rows, err := tx.QueryContext(ctx, ` +SELECT t.id, a.id, a.state, a.driver, t.work_dir, COALESCE(a.pid, 0), COALESCE(a.pgid, 0), a.process_started, + COALESCE(a.taker_pid, 0), COALESCE(a.taker_pgid, 0), a.taker_started, a.taker_unaccounted, a.launched_at, t.deadline_at +FROM attempts a JOIN tasks t ON t.id = a.task_id +WHERE a.state <> 'ended' ORDER BY a.launched_at, a.id`) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: status tasks: %w", err) + } + s.Tasks = []TaskStatus{} + for rows.Next() { + var ( + t TaskStatus + launched string + deadline sql.NullString + started sql.NullString + taken sql.NullString + ) + if err := rows.Scan(&t.TaskID, &t.AttemptID, &t.State, &t.Driver, &t.WorkDir, &t.PID, &t.PGID, &started, + &t.TakerPID, &t.TakerPGID, &taken, &t.TakerUnaccounted, &launched, &deadline); err != nil { + _ = rows.Close() + return err + } + for _, stamped := range []struct { + raw sql.NullString + to **time.Time + }{{started, &t.ProcessStartedAt}, {taken, &t.TakerStartedAt}} { + if !stamped.raw.Valid { + continue + } + at, err := parseStamp(stamped.raw.String) + if err != nil { + _ = rows.Close() + return err + } + *stamped.to = &at + } + if t.LaunchedAt, err = parseStamp(launched); err != nil { + _ = rows.Close() + return err + } + if deadline.Valid { + at, err := parseStamp(deadline.String) + if err != nil { + _ = rows.Close() + return err + } + t.DeadlineAt = &at + } + s.Tasks = append(s.Tasks, t) + } + if err := rows.Close(); err != nil { + return err + } + for i := range s.Tasks { + ids, err := taskEventIDs(ctx, tx, s.Tasks[i].TaskID) + if err != nil { + return err + } + s.Tasks[i].EventIDs = ids + } + return nil +} + +func taskEventIDs(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, taskID int64) ([]int64, error) { + rows, err := tx.QueryContext(ctx, `SELECT event_id FROM task_events WHERE task_id = ? AND withdrawn_at IS NULL ORDER BY event_id`, taskID) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: status task %d: %w", taskID, err) + } + defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }() + ids := []int64{} + for rows.Next() { + var id int64 + if err := rows.Scan(&id); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ids = append(ids, id) + } + return ids, rows.Err() +} + +func statusIntents(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, s *Status) error { + rows, err := tx.QueryContext(ctx, selectIntents+` WHERE state = 'indeterminate' ORDER BY id`) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: status intents: %w", err) + } + intents, err := scanIntents(rows) + if err != nil { + return err + } + s.Indeterminate = make([]IntentStatus, 0, len(intents)) + for _, in := range intents { + s.Indeterminate = append(s.Indeterminate, IntentStatus{ + ID: in.ID, Kind: string(in.Kind), EventID: in.EventID, AttemptID: in.AttemptID, + BucketID: in.Destination.BucketID, MessageKind: string(in.Destination.Kind), RecordingID: in.Destination.RecordingID, + SendingAt: in.SendingAt, Note: in.Note, + }) + } + return nil +} + +func statusHeld(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, s *Status) error { + rows, err := tx.QueryContext(ctx, ` +SELECT id, event_type, trigger_name, bucket_id, recording_url, reason, generation, updated_at +FROM events WHERE state = 'held' ORDER BY id`) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: status held records: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }() + s.Held = []HeldStatus{} + for rows.Next() { + var ( + h HeldStatus + updated string + ) + if err := rows.Scan(&h.EventID, &h.EventType, &h.Trigger, &h.BucketID, &h.RecordingURL, &h.Reason, &h.Generation, &updated); err != nil { + return err + } + if h.UpdatedAt, err = parseStamp(updated); err != nil { + return err + } + s.Held = append(s.Held, h) + } + return rows.Err() +} + +func statusDispatches(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, s *Status) error { + rows, err := tx.QueryContext(ctx, ` +SELECT task_id, id, state, stop_reason, launched_at, ended_at FROM attempts +ORDER BY launched_at DESC, id DESC LIMIT ?`, StatusLimit) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: status dispatches: %w", err) + } + s.Dispatches = []DispatchStatus{} + for rows.Next() { + var ( + d DispatchStatus + launched string + ended sql.NullString + ) + if err := rows.Scan(&d.TaskID, &d.AttemptID, &d.State, &d.StopReason, &launched, &ended); err != nil { + _ = rows.Close() + return err + } + if d.LaunchedAt, err = parseStamp(launched); err != nil { + _ = rows.Close() + return err + } + if ended.Valid { + at, err := parseStamp(ended.String) + if err != nil { + _ = rows.Close() + return err + } + d.EndedAt = &at + } + s.Dispatches = append(s.Dispatches, d) + } + if err := rows.Close(); err != nil { + return err + } + for i := range s.Dispatches { + events, err := dispatchedEvents(ctx, tx, s.Dispatches[i].TaskID) + if err != nil { + return err + } + s.Dispatches[i].Events = events + } + return nil +} + +func dispatchedEvents(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, taskID int64) ([]DispatchedEvent, error) { + rows, err := tx.QueryContext(ctx, ` +SELECT event_id, delivery, outcome, COALESCE(reply_id, adopted_reply_id), withdrawn_at IS NOT NULL +FROM task_events WHERE task_id = ? ORDER BY event_id`, taskID) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: status task %d events: %w", taskID, err) + } + defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }() + out := []DispatchedEvent{} + for rows.Next() { + var ( + e DispatchedEvent + reply sql.NullInt64 + ) + if err := rows.Scan(&e.EventID, &e.Delivery, &e.Outcome, &reply, &e.Withdrawn); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if reply.Valid { + id := reply.Int64 + e.ReplyID = &id + } + out = append(out, e) + } + return out, rows.Err() +} diff --git a/internal/connector/ledger_tasks.go b/internal/connector/ledger_tasks.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8bf215834 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/ledger_tasks.go @@ -0,0 +1,1311 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/rand" + "database/sql" + "encoding/hex" + "errors" + "fmt" + "slices" + "strings" + "time" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" +) + +// Tasks and attempts: the dispatcher's half of the ledger. +// +// A task is one conversation's work, bound to a token; an attempt is one +// worker run under it. The basecamp_connect domain (ledger_dispatch.go) is +// the worker's view of the same rows. +// +// # Invariants +// +// Each is held by the database where SQL can say it, and by a test that fails +// without it (ledger_tasks_test.go). +// +// 1. Exposure before hand-off. An attempt is written launching in the same +// transaction that writes its originating event exposed and moves the +// record to dispatched, and before the driver is asked to start anything. +// A follow-up is written exposed (ExposeEvent) before a prompt about it is +// sent. +// 2. One live task per conversation, one per working directory, one live +// attempt per task, and (migration 5's task_events_one_live_task) one live +// task per event. Unique partial indexes, so two dispatchers on one ledger +// cannot both win. +// 3. An ended task has no valid token and no live events. Ending a task, +// superseding its token and retiring its events are one transaction, and +// a trigger refuses the end without the supersession, so a worker that +// outlives its task is refused by basecamp_connect. +// 4. Automatic retry is bounded and proven. An exposure is withdrawn — the +// record back to admitted — only when the attempt that wrote it ended with +// the driver's report that no worker process existed, and only for the +// event's first such withdrawal (withdrawn_at, kept on the retired row, +// is that budget); a second is blocked(spawn_failed), which +// waits for a person. Anything else that ends an exposed, unreported event +// makes it completed with outcome unknown. +// 5. Outcomes and stop reasons are separate. A stop reason is written on the +// attempt, an outcome on the task event; neither is computed from the +// other, and settlement never overwrites a reported outcome. +// 6. An adopted reply is a link, never an outcome: AdoptReply writes a reply +// id beside an unknown outcome and leaves the outcome unknown. +// 7. Attempt states move forward only: launching → running → ended, or +// launching → ended. +const migrationTasksAndAttempts = ` +ALTER TABLE tasks ADD COLUMN conversation_key TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''; +ALTER TABLE tasks ADD COLUMN route TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''; +ALTER TABLE tasks ADD COLUMN work_dir TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''; +ALTER TABLE tasks ADD COLUMN driver TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''; +ALTER TABLE tasks ADD COLUMN originating_event_id INTEGER; +ALTER TABLE tasks ADD COLUMN deadline_at TEXT; +ALTER TABLE tasks ADD COLUMN ended_at TEXT; + +CREATE UNIQUE INDEX tasks_live_conversation ON tasks (conversation_key) + WHERE ended_at IS NULL AND conversation_key <> ''; +CREATE UNIQUE INDEX tasks_live_work_dir ON tasks (work_dir) + WHERE ended_at IS NULL AND work_dir <> ''; + +CREATE TRIGGER tasks_end_supersedes +BEFORE UPDATE OF ended_at ON tasks +WHEN NEW.ended_at IS NOT NULL AND NEW.superseded_at IS NULL +BEGIN + SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'a task ends with its token superseded'); +END; + +ALTER TABLE task_events ADD COLUMN exposed_attempt_id TEXT; +ALTER TABLE task_events ADD COLUMN adopted_reply_id INTEGER; + +CREATE TABLE attempts ( + id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, + task_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES tasks (id), + seq INTEGER NOT NULL, + driver TEXT NOT NULL, + state TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (state IN ('launching', 'running', 'ended')), + pid INTEGER, + pgid INTEGER, + process_started TEXT, + session_id TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', + launched_at TEXT NOT NULL, + running_at TEXT, + ended_at TEXT, + stop_reason TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '' + CHECK (stop_reason IN ('', 'finished', 'failed', 'deadline', 'shutdown', 'lost')), + spawn_failed INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, + refusals INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, + progress_at TEXT, + still_running INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, + -- The process the task token went to: the worker's MCP server, which an + -- agent may start in a process group of its own, so a restart can end it + -- too rather than leave a process of the connector's holding the token. + taker_pid INTEGER, + taker_pgid INTEGER, + taker_started TEXT, + -- The token went out and the process holding it could not be accounted + -- for: its identity could not be read, or the kernel stopped answering + -- whether it is gone. Nothing is released around such an attempt, here or + -- after a restart. + taker_unaccounted INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, + UNIQUE (task_id, seq), + CHECK ((state = 'ended') = (stop_reason <> '')) +); +CREATE UNIQUE INDEX attempts_live_per_task ON attempts (task_id) WHERE state <> 'ended'; +CREATE INDEX attempts_state ON attempts (state); + +CREATE TRIGGER attempts_state_moves_forward +BEFORE UPDATE OF state ON attempts +WHEN (CASE NEW.state WHEN 'launching' THEN 0 WHEN 'running' THEN 1 ELSE 2 END) + < (CASE OLD.state WHEN 'launching' THEN 0 WHEN 'running' THEN 1 ELSE 2 END) + OR (OLD.state = 'ended' AND NEW.state = 'ended' AND NEW.stop_reason <> OLD.stop_reason) +BEGIN + SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'an attempt state never goes back'); +END; +` + +// AttemptState is where an attempt is. +type AttemptState string + +const ( + // AttemptLaunching is written before the driver is asked to start a + // worker. Found after a crash it is treated as running: the worker may + // exist. + AttemptLaunching AttemptState = "launching" + // AttemptRunning has its process or session id. + AttemptRunning AttemptState = "running" + // AttemptEnded has a stop reason. + AttemptEnded AttemptState = "ended" +) + +// StopReason is why an attempt ended. It is not an outcome. +type StopReason string + +const ( + // StopFinished is a clean stop: the turn ended and the worker exited 0. + StopFinished StopReason = "finished" + // StopFailed is a refusal, a stop the connector did not ask for, a + // non-zero exit, or a worker that could not be started. + StopFailed StopReason = "failed" + // StopDeadline is the task's deadline. + StopDeadline StopReason = "deadline" + // StopShutdown is the connector shutting down. + StopShutdown StopReason = "shutdown" + // StopLost is a worker that went away with a turn in flight, or one a + // restarted connector found. + StopLost StopReason = "lost" +) + +// OutcomeUnknown is an event that was exposed to a worker and never +// reported: whatever ended the attempt, the worker may have acted on it. +const OutcomeUnknown Outcome = "unknown" + +// ReasonSpawnFailed blocks an event whose worker could not be started a +// second time. It waits for a person's redispatch. +const ReasonSpawnFailed = "spawn_failed" + +// Errors from the task ledger. +var ( + // ErrNotStartable is a launch for a record that is not waiting for a + // worker: not admitted or queued, without its snapshot or route, on a + // conversation or working directory that already has a live task. + ErrNotStartable = errors.New("the record is not waiting for a worker") + // ErrWorkDirMismatch is a launch naming a working directory the record + // does not carry. + ErrWorkDirMismatch = errors.New("the working directory is not the one the record carries") + // ErrNoLiveAttempt is a write for an attempt that has ended or never was. + ErrNoLiveAttempt = errors.New("no live attempt by that id") +) + +// Tx is a ledger transaction a hook writes in, so what the hook writes (an +// outbox intent) commits or rolls back with the transition that called for +// it. +type Tx interface { + ExecContext(ctx context.Context, query string, args ...any) (sql.Result, error) + QueryRowContext(ctx context.Context, query string, args ...any) *sql.Row + QueryContext(ctx context.Context, query string, args ...any) (*sql.Rows, error) +} + +// Hooks run inside the transactions of the ledger's lifecycle transitions. +// A hook's error rolls the transition back. Set them once, before the ledger +// is used. +type Hooks struct { + // VerdictCommitted runs in admission's verdict transaction, after the + // verdict is written: where the guard acknowledgement and the holding + // reply are called for. + VerdictCommitted func(ctx context.Context, tx Tx, v CommittedVerdict) error + // TaskLaunched runs in LaunchTask's transaction. + TaskLaunched func(ctx context.Context, tx Tx, launch Launch) error + // AttemptEnded runs in EndAttempt's transaction, after every event is + // settled: where the attempt's completion message is called for. + AttemptEnded func(ctx context.Context, tx Tx, s Settlement) error + // StillRunning runs in StillRunning's transaction. + StillRunning func(ctx context.Context, tx Tx, tick StillRunningTick) error +} + +// SetHooks installs hooks. Not safe concurrently with ledger use. +func (l *Ledger) SetHooks(h Hooks) { l.hooks = h } + +// CommittedVerdict is what VerdictCommitted is told. +type CommittedVerdict struct { + EventID int64 + State RecordState + Reason string + Trigger string + Acknowledge bool + ReplyKind string + // ReplyRecordingID is where a reply to the event goes. + ReplyRecordingID int64 +} + +// LaunchSpec asks for a task and its first attempt. +type LaunchSpec struct { + // EventID is the originating event: an admitted or queued record. + EventID int64 + // Route is the approved directory; it must be the route the record + // carries. + Route string + // WorkDir is the directory the worker works in: Route itself, or a + // directory made for the task from it (a git worktree). Empty means + // Route. One live task holds a working directory. + WorkDir string + // Driver is the driver's name. + Driver string + // Deadline is how long the task may run; zero for none. + Deadline time.Duration +} + +// Launch is a task written launching. +type Launch struct { + TaskID int64 + // Token binds the worker to the task. It is returned once and stored + // only as a hash. + Token string + AttemptID string + // EventIDs are the task's events, originating first. Only the originating + // event is exposed; the rest wait at delivery admitted. + EventIDs []int64 + ConversationKey string + Route string + WorkDir string + Driver string + LaunchedAt time.Time + // DeadlineAt is zero when the task has no deadline. + DeadlineAt time.Time +} + +// LaunchTask writes a task, its first attempt as launching, and its +// originating event exposed, in one transaction (invariant 1). Records on the +// same conversation that wait for a worker join the task at delivery +// admitted. +func (l *Ledger) LaunchTask(ctx context.Context, spec LaunchSpec) (Launch, error) { + if spec.WorkDir == "" { + spec.WorkDir = spec.Route + } + if spec.Route == "" || spec.Driver == "" { + return Launch{}, errors.New("connector: a launch needs a route and a driver") + } + attemptID, err := newAttemptID() + if err != nil { + return Launch{}, err + } + var out Launch + err = retryBusy(func() error { + var err error + out, err = l.launchTask(ctx, spec, attemptID) + return err + }) + return out, err +} + +func (l *Ledger) launchTask(ctx context.Context, spec LaunchSpec, attemptID string) (Launch, error) { + tx, err := l.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil) + if err != nil { + return Launch{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: begin launch: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }() + + record, err := loadRecord(ctx, tx, spec.EventID) + if err != nil { + return Launch{}, err + } + switch { + case record.State != StateAdmitted && record.State != StateQueued, + record.ContentDropped, len(record.Decision.Snapshot) == 0, + !record.Decision.Routed, record.Decision.ConversationKey == "": + return Launch{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: launch event %d (%s): %w", spec.EventID, record.State, ErrNotStartable) + case record.Decision.Route != spec.Route: + return Launch{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: launch event %d in %q: %w", spec.EventID, spec.Route, ErrWorkDirMismatch) + } + var busy bool + if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, ` +SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM tasks WHERE ended_at IS NULL AND (conversation_key = ? OR work_dir = ?)) + OR EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM task_events WHERE event_id = ? AND retired_at IS NULL)`, + record.Decision.ConversationKey, spec.WorkDir, spec.EventID).Scan(&busy); err != nil { + return Launch{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: launch event %d: %w", spec.EventID, err) + } + if busy { + return Launch{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: launch event %d: a live task holds its conversation or working directory: %w", spec.EventID, ErrNotStartable) + } + + now := l.now() + nowStamp := stamp(now) + var deadline any + var deadlineAt time.Time + if spec.Deadline > 0 { + deadlineAt = now.Add(spec.Deadline) + deadline = stamp(deadlineAt) + } + // The originating event first, then every other record on the + // conversation that waits for a worker. createTask dispatches them all + // and refuses an event a live task already carries. + joinable, err := joinableOn(ctx, tx, record.Decision.ConversationKey, spec.Route, spec.EventID) + if err != nil { + return Launch{}, err + } + grant, err := l.createTask(ctx, tx, append([]int64{spec.EventID}, joinable...)) + if err != nil { + return Launch{}, err + } + taskID := grant.ID + if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, ` +UPDATE tasks SET conversation_key = ?, route = ?, work_dir = ?, driver = ?, originating_event_id = ?, deadline_at = ? +WHERE id = ?`, record.Decision.ConversationKey, spec.Route, spec.WorkDir, spec.Driver, spec.EventID, deadline, taskID); err != nil { + return Launch{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: create task for %d: %w", spec.EventID, err) + } + if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, ` +INSERT INTO attempts (id, task_id, seq, driver, state, launched_at) VALUES (?, ?, 1, ?, 'launching', ?)`, + attemptID, taskID, spec.Driver, nowStamp); err != nil { + return Launch{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: write attempt for %d: %w", spec.EventID, err) + } + // The prompt names the originating event's recording, so it is exposed + // before the driver is asked for anything. + if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, ` +UPDATE task_events SET delivery = 'exposed', exposed_at = ?, exposed_attempt_id = ? +WHERE task_id = ? AND event_id = ?`, nowStamp, attemptID, taskID, spec.EventID); err != nil { + return Launch{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: expose event %d: %w", spec.EventID, err) + } + joined := joinable + token := grant.Token + + out := Launch{ + TaskID: taskID, + Token: token, + AttemptID: attemptID, + EventIDs: append([]int64{spec.EventID}, joined...), + ConversationKey: record.Decision.ConversationKey, + Route: spec.Route, + WorkDir: spec.WorkDir, + Driver: spec.Driver, + LaunchedAt: now, + DeadlineAt: deadlineAt, + } + if l.hooks.TaskLaunched != nil { + if err := l.hooks.TaskLaunched(ctx, tx, out); err != nil { + return Launch{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: launch hook for %d: %w", spec.EventID, err) + } + } + if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil { + return Launch{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: commit launch of %d: %w", spec.EventID, err) + } + return out, nil +} + +func guardFor(acknowledge bool) string { + if acknowledge { + return "armed" + } + return "" +} + +// startableFrom is the SQL condition for a record waiting for a worker: it +// carries what a dispatch needs and no live task holds it. +const startableCondition = ` +e.state IN ('admitted', 'queued') AND e.content_dropped = 0 AND e.snapshot IS NOT NULL +AND e.routed = 1 AND e.conversation_key <> '' +AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM task_events te WHERE te.event_id = e.id AND te.retired_at IS NULL)` + +// joinableOn lists the records on key, other than except, that wait for a +// worker and carry route, oldest first. A record admitted under another route +// (connect.json changed while a task ran) waits for a task in its own +// directory rather than riding along in this one. +func joinableOn(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, key, route string, except int64) ([]int64, error) { + rows, err := tx.QueryContext(ctx, `SELECT e.id FROM events e WHERE e.conversation_key = ? AND e.route = ? AND e.id <> ? AND `+startableCondition+` ORDER BY e.id`, key, route, except) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: find follow-ups on %s: %w", key, err) + } + defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }() + var ids []int64 + for rows.Next() { + var id int64 + if err := rows.Scan(&id); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ids = append(ids, id) + } + return ids, rows.Err() +} + +// joinConversation puts every record on key that waits for a worker onto the +// live task taskID at delivery admitted, dispatched, as createTask would have, +// and returns their ids, oldest first. +func (l *Ledger) joinConversation(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, taskID int64, key, route string) ([]int64, error) { + ids, err := joinableOn(ctx, tx, key, route, 0) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + for _, id := range ids { + var acknowledge bool + if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT acknowledge FROM events WHERE id = ?`, id).Scan(&acknowledge); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: join event %d to task %d: %w", id, taskID, err) + } + if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO task_events (task_id, event_id, guard) VALUES (?, ?, ?)`, taskID, id, guardFor(acknowledge)); err != nil { + if isConstraint(err) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: join event %d to task %d: %w", id, taskID, ErrEventOnLiveTask) + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: join event %d to task %d: %w", id, taskID, err) + } + moved, err := l.move(ctx, tx, transition{id: id, state: StateDispatched, from: []RecordState{StateAdmitted, StateQueued}}) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if !moved { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: join event %d to task %d: %w", id, taskID, ErrNotStartable) + } + } + return ids, nil +} + +// JoinConversation puts the records on a live task's conversation that wait +// for a worker onto the task, at delivery admitted, and returns their ids. A +// task that has ended takes none: they start a task of their own. Nor does a +// task a redispatch superseded while it runs: its worker's token is refused, +// so what joined it could only end unknown. Nor does any task while the hold +// marker stands: joining is a hand-off to a worker (ledger_hold.go). +func (l *Ledger) JoinConversation(ctx context.Context, taskID int64) ([]int64, error) { + var out []int64 + err := retryBusy(func() error { + tx, err := l.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: begin join: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }() + var key, route string + switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT conversation_key, route FROM tasks WHERE id = ? AND ended_at IS NULL AND superseded_at IS NULL + AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM hold_marker)`, taskID).Scan(&key, &route); { + case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows): + out = nil + return nil + case err != nil: + return fmt.Errorf("connector: join task %d: %w", taskID, err) + } + if key == "" { + out = nil + return nil + } + ids, err := l.joinConversation(ctx, tx, taskID, key, route) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: commit join of task %d: %w", taskID, err) + } + out = ids + return nil + }) + return out, err +} + +// UnexposedEvents are the events on a task still at delivery admitted, oldest +// first: the follow-ups a live session has not been prompted with. +func (l *Ledger) UnexposedEvents(ctx context.Context, taskID int64) ([]int64, error) { + rows, err := l.db.QueryContext(ctx, ` +SELECT event_id FROM task_events WHERE task_id = ? AND delivery = 'admitted' AND retired_at IS NULL ORDER BY event_id`, taskID) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: unexposed events of task %d: %w", taskID, err) + } + defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }() + var ids []int64 + for rows.Next() { + var id int64 + if err := rows.Scan(&id); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ids = append(ids, id) + } + return ids, rows.Err() +} + +// ExposeEvent writes a follow-up exposed by the live attempt, and moves its +// record to dispatched, before a prompt about it is sent (invariant 1). It +// reports false when the event was already exposed — by get_dispatch, say — +// which is not an error. +func (l *Ledger) ExposeEvent(ctx context.Context, attemptID string, eventID int64) (bool, error) { + var exposed bool + err := retryBusy(func() error { + tx, err := l.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: begin expose: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }() + taskID, err := liveAttemptTask(ctx, tx, attemptID) + if err != nil { + return err + } + var delivery string + switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT delivery FROM task_events WHERE task_id = ? AND event_id = ? AND retired_at IS NULL`, taskID, eventID).Scan(&delivery); { + case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows): + return fmt.Errorf("connector: expose event %d: %w", eventID, ErrNotOnTask) + case err != nil: + return fmt.Errorf("connector: expose event %d: %w", eventID, err) + } + if Delivery(delivery) != DeliveryAdmitted { + exposed = false + return nil + } + moved, err := l.move(ctx, tx, transition{id: eventID, state: StateDispatched, from: []RecordState{StateAdmitted, StateQueued, StateDispatched}}) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if !moved { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: expose event %d: %w", eventID, ErrNotDispatchable) + } + if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, ` +UPDATE task_events SET delivery = 'exposed', exposed_at = ?, exposed_attempt_id = ? +WHERE task_id = ? AND event_id = ? AND delivery = 'admitted'`, l.timestamp(), attemptID, taskID, eventID); err != nil { + // A hold refuses a first hand-off (ledger_hold.go). That is not a + // failure of the task: nothing more is handed over until release. + if held, holdErr := isHeld(ctx, tx); holdErr == nil && held { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: expose event %d: %w", eventID, ErrHeld) + } + return fmt.Errorf("connector: expose event %d: %w", eventID, err) + } + if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: commit exposure of %d: %w", eventID, err) + } + exposed = true + return nil + }) + return exposed, err +} + +func liveAttemptTask(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, attemptID string) (int64, error) { + var taskID int64 + switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT task_id FROM attempts WHERE id = ? AND state <> 'ended'`, attemptID).Scan(&taskID); { + case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows): + return 0, fmt.Errorf("connector: attempt %s: %w", attemptID, ErrNoLiveAttempt) + case err != nil: + return 0, fmt.Errorf("connector: attempt %s: %w", attemptID, err) + } + return taskID, nil +} + +// AttemptProcess is what MarkRunning records: the worker's process, where +// there is one, and its session id. +// +// Only an identity the kernel gave is written. A start time the connector +// guessed cannot tell a pid from a later process that reused it, so it is +// left out of the record rather than written as if it could, and a record +// with a pid and no start time is one a later process signals nothing on +// (driver.ErrIdentityUnknown). What the ledger holds is therefore exact by +// construction, which is why Identity reads it back as exact. +type AttemptProcess struct { + PID int + PGID int + StartedAt time.Time + // StartedExact says StartedAt is the kernel's own start time for the pid + // (driver.Process.StartedExact). Only then is it written. + StartedExact bool + SessionID string +} + +// recordedProcess is p as the ledger records it. +func recordedProcess(p driver.Process, sessionID string) AttemptProcess { + return AttemptProcess{PID: p.PID, PGID: p.PGID, StartedAt: p.StartedAt, StartedExact: p.StartedExact, SessionID: sessionID} +} + +// Identity is the process the record names, for the one-owner rule. A start +// time in the ledger is the kernel's, since nothing else is written. +func (p AttemptProcess) Identity() driver.Process { + return recordedIdentity(p.PID, p.PGID, p.StartedAt) +} + +// recordedIdentity is the one way a process read back out of the ledger +// becomes an identity the one-owner rule can act on (driver.OwnsWorker). +// +// The exactness bit is not stored beside the stamp and does not need to be: +// startedStamp writes a start time only when the kernel gave it, so a stamp +// that came back out of the ledger is the kernel's by construction and a +// record with no stamp has no identity at all. Every read-back path goes +// through here — the attempt's worker, a redispatch's live worker, status's +// worker and taker — because a path that rebuilds driver.Process by hand +// drops StartedExact, and a record without it is neither gone nor running +// (driver.ErrIdentityUnknown): status would call every live worker +// "unverified" and a redispatch would refuse to stop the worker it replaces. +func recordedIdentity(pid, pgid int, started time.Time) driver.Process { + return driver.Process{PID: pid, PGID: pgid, StartedAt: started, StartedExact: !started.IsZero()} +} + +// startedStamp is the start time as the ledger writes it: the kernel's, or +// nothing at all. +func (p AttemptProcess) startedStamp() any { + if !p.StartedExact || p.StartedAt.IsZero() { + return nil + } + return stamp(p.StartedAt) +} + +// RecordTaker records the process that took the attempt's task token — the +// worker's MCP server, which an agent may have started in a process group of +// its own. A restart ends it by this record, as it ends the worker by the +// worker's. +func (l *Ledger) RecordTaker(ctx context.Context, attemptID string, p AttemptProcess) error { + return retryBusy(func() error { + started := p.startedStamp() + res, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, ` +UPDATE attempts SET taker_pid = ?, taker_pgid = ?, taker_started = ? WHERE id = ? AND state <> 'ended'`, + nullableInt(p.PID), nullableInt(p.PGID), started, attemptID) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: record the process that took the token of %s: %w", attemptID, err) + } + n, err := res.RowsAffected() + if err != nil { + return nil //nolint:nilerr // the write is committed + } + if n == 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: record the process that took the token of %s: %w", attemptID, ErrNoLiveAttempt) + } + return nil + }) +} + +// MarkTakerUnaccounted records that the attempt's task token was delivered +// and the process holding it cannot be accounted for. It is the ledger's +// half of the same rule the socket holds in memory: a restart must not read +// an attempt with no taker recorded as an attempt whose token nobody took, +// and settle around a process that may still have it. +func (l *Ledger) MarkTakerUnaccounted(ctx context.Context, attemptID string) error { + return retryBusy(func() error { + res, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, + `UPDATE attempts SET taker_unaccounted = 1 WHERE id = ? AND state <> 'ended'`, attemptID) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: record the unaccounted token holder of %s: %w", attemptID, err) + } + n, err := res.RowsAffected() + if err != nil { + return nil //nolint:nilerr // the write is committed + } + if n == 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: record the unaccounted token holder of %s: %w", attemptID, ErrNoLiveAttempt) + } + return nil + }) +} + +// MarkRunning moves a launching attempt to running with its process and +// session. +func (l *Ledger) MarkRunning(ctx context.Context, attemptID string, p AttemptProcess) error { + return retryBusy(func() error { + started := p.startedStamp() + res, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, ` +UPDATE attempts SET state = 'running', running_at = ?, pid = ?, pgid = ?, process_started = ?, session_id = ? +WHERE id = ? AND state = 'launching'`, + l.timestamp(), nullableInt(p.PID), nullableInt(p.PGID), started, p.SessionID, attemptID) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: mark attempt %s running: %w", attemptID, err) + } + n, err := res.RowsAffected() + if err != nil { + return err + } + if n == 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: mark attempt %s running: %w", attemptID, ErrNoLiveAttempt) + } + return nil + }) +} + +func nullableInt(v int) any { + if v == 0 { + return nil + } + return v +} + +// AttemptEnd is how an attempt ended. +type AttemptEnd struct { + AttemptID string + Stop StopReason + // SpawnFailed is the driver's report that no worker process ever existed + // (driver.ErrNotStarted). Nothing else makes an exposure withdrawable. + SpawnFailed bool + // NoAutomaticRetry refuses the withdrawal even then: a task under the + // sandbox launcher is never retried automatically. + NoAutomaticRetry bool + // UnrecordedRefusals are refusals RecordRefusal could not write when they + // happened, settled here with the attempt. Refusals it did write are + // already on the attempt. + UnrecordedRefusals int +} + +// Settlement is what ending an attempt did to its task. +type Settlement struct { + TaskID int64 + AttemptID string + Stop StopReason + // SpawnFailed repeats AttemptEnd.SpawnFailed. + SpawnFailed bool + // OriginatingEventID is the task's originating event. + OriginatingEventID int64 + Events []SettledEvent +} + +// SettledEvent is one event's state after its task ended. +type SettledEvent struct { + EventID int64 + // Outcome is the reported outcome, or unknown for an event exposed and + // never reported. Empty for an event never exposed, or withdrawn. + Outcome Outcome + // Reported is whether the outcome is the worker's own report. + Reported bool + ReplyID *int64 + // Returned is an event never exposed: it waits for a task of its own. + Returned bool + // Withdrawn is an exposure withdrawn after a start that ran nothing; the + // record is admitted again, or blocked(spawn_failed) when it already was + // once. + Withdrawn bool + // Blocked is a withdrawal refused a second automatic retry. + Blocked bool + // Decided is a record a person has already redispatched or discarded, so + // the completion notice asks nothing of them. + Decided bool +} + +// EndAttempt ends a live attempt with its stop reason, supersedes the task's +// token, settles every event on the task, and ends the task, in one +// transaction (invariants 3 to 5). Ending an attempt that already ended is +// ErrNoLiveAttempt. +func (l *Ledger) EndAttempt(ctx context.Context, end AttemptEnd) (Settlement, error) { + switch end.Stop { + case StopFinished, StopFailed, StopDeadline, StopShutdown, StopLost: + default: + return Settlement{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: %q is not a stop reason", end.Stop) + } + if end.SpawnFailed && end.Stop != StopFailed { + return Settlement{}, errors.New("connector: a worker that was never started stops as failed") + } + var out Settlement + err := retryBusy(func() error { + var err error + out, err = l.endAttempt(ctx, end) + return err + }) + return out, err +} + +func (l *Ledger) endAttempt(ctx context.Context, end AttemptEnd) (Settlement, error) { + tx, err := l.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil) + if err != nil { + return Settlement{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: begin end of attempt: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }() + taskID, err := liveAttemptTask(ctx, tx, end.AttemptID) + if err != nil { + return Settlement{}, err + } + now := l.timestamp() + if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, ` +UPDATE attempts SET state = 'ended', ended_at = ?, stop_reason = ?, spawn_failed = ?, refusals = refusals + ? WHERE id = ?`, + now, string(end.Stop), end.SpawnFailed, end.UnrecordedRefusals, end.AttemptID); err != nil { + return Settlement{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: end attempt %s: %w", end.AttemptID, err) + } + + settlement := Settlement{TaskID: taskID, AttemptID: end.AttemptID, Stop: end.Stop, SpawnFailed: end.SpawnFailed} + var originating sql.NullInt64 + if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT originating_event_id FROM tasks WHERE id = ?`, taskID).Scan(&originating); err != nil { + return Settlement{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: settle task %d: %w", taskID, err) + } + settlement.OriginatingEventID = originating.Int64 + + type row struct { + eventID int64 + delivery Delivery + outcome string + replyID sql.NullInt64 + exposedBy sql.NullString + } + rows, err := tx.QueryContext(ctx, ` +SELECT event_id, delivery, outcome, reply_id, exposed_attempt_id FROM task_events +WHERE task_id = ? AND retired_at IS NULL ORDER BY event_id`, taskID) + if err != nil { + return Settlement{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: settle task %d: %w", taskID, err) + } + var events []row + for rows.Next() { + var r row + var delivery string + if err := rows.Scan(&r.eventID, &delivery, &r.outcome, &r.replyID, &r.exposedBy); err != nil { + _ = rows.Close() + return Settlement{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: settle task %d: %w", taskID, err) + } + r.delivery = Delivery(delivery) + events = append(events, r) + } + if err := rows.Close(); err != nil { + return Settlement{}, err + } + + // Withdrawals wait for the supersession: #736's withdrawExposure takes an + // exposure only on a task already superseded. + var withdrawals []int + for _, r := range events { + se := SettledEvent{EventID: r.eventID} + switch { + case r.delivery == DeliveryCompleted: + // A reported outcome stands (invariant 5). + se.Outcome, se.Reported = Outcome(r.outcome), r.outcome != string(OutcomeUnknown) + if r.replyID.Valid { + id := r.replyID.Int64 + se.ReplyID = &id + } + case r.delivery == DeliveryAdmitted: + // Never exposed: supersedeTask below returns it to admitted, to + // wait for a task of its own. + se.Returned = true + case end.SpawnFailed && r.exposedBy.Valid && r.exposedBy.String == end.AttemptID: + // Exposed by this attempt, whose driver proved nothing ran + // (invariant 4): withdrawn once the task is superseded, below. + withdrawals = append(withdrawals, len(settlement.Events)) + default: + moved, err := l.move(ctx, tx, transition{id: r.eventID, state: StateCompleted, from: []RecordState{StateDispatched}}) + if err != nil { + return Settlement{}, err + } + if !moved { + // #736's invariant 4: a record a worker was handed leaves + // dispatched only to completed, so nothing else can have moved + // it. Reaching here is a ledger someone wrote by hand. + return Settlement{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: settle event %d: %w", r.eventID, ErrNotDispatchable) + } + if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, ` +UPDATE task_events SET delivery = 'completed', completed_at = ?, outcome = ? WHERE task_id = ? AND event_id = ?`, + now, string(OutcomeUnknown), taskID, r.eventID); err != nil { + return Settlement{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: settle event %d: %w", r.eventID, err) + } + se.Outcome = OutcomeUnknown + } + settlement.Events = append(settlement.Events, se) + } + + // #736's supersession: the token refused, every row retired, and the + // never-exposed events returned to admitted. Then the task ends; the + // trigger refuses an end the supersession did not precede. + if err := l.supersedeTask(ctx, tx, taskID); err != nil { + return Settlement{}, err + } + for _, i := range withdrawals { + if err := l.withdraw(ctx, tx, taskID, settlement.Events[i].EventID, end.NoAutomaticRetry, &settlement.Events[i]); err != nil { + return Settlement{}, err + } + } + if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE tasks SET ended_at = ? WHERE id = ?`, now, taskID); err != nil { + return Settlement{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: end task %d: %w", taskID, err) + } + if l.hooks.AttemptEnded != nil { + if err := l.hooks.AttemptEnded(ctx, tx, settlement); err != nil { + return Settlement{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: attempt-ended hook for %s: %w", end.AttemptID, err) + } + } + if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil { + return Settlement{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: commit end of attempt %s: %w", end.AttemptID, err) + } + return settlement, nil +} + +// withdraw takes back an exposure whose worker never existed: once, the record +// returns to admitted; a second time, or with automatic retry refused, it is +// blocked(spawn_failed). +func (l *Ledger) withdraw(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, taskID, eventID int64, noRetry bool, se *SettledEvent) error { + var earlier int + if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM task_events WHERE event_id = ? AND withdrawn_at IS NOT NULL`, eventID).Scan(&earlier); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: withdraw event %d: %w", eventID, err) + } + to, reason := StateAdmitted, "" + if earlier > 0 || noRetry { + to, reason = StateBlocked, ReasonSpawnFailed + se.Blocked = true + } + // #736's one withdrawal: the marker, then the record's move, refused by + // the database for anything but a launch exposure no worker pulled. + if err := l.withdrawExposure(ctx, tx, taskID, eventID, to, reason); err != nil { + return err + } + se.Withdrawn = true + return nil +} + +// LiveAttempt is an attempt that has not ended. +type LiveAttempt struct { + AttemptID string + TaskID int64 + State AttemptState + Driver string + Route string + WorkDir string + ConversationKey string + Process AttemptProcess + // Taker is the process the task token went to, where one took it. Its + // PID is zero when none did. + Taker AttemptProcess + // TakerUnaccounted is a token that went out to a process this attempt + // could not account for. Its PID is zero too, and the difference + // matters: nothing of such an attempt is released. + TakerUnaccounted bool + LaunchedAt time.Time + // DeadlineAt is zero when the task has none. + DeadlineAt time.Time +} + +// LiveAttempts lists every attempt not ended, oldest first. On start they are +// all a previous process's: launching is read as running, because the worker +// may exist. +func (l *Ledger) LiveAttempts(ctx context.Context) ([]LiveAttempt, error) { + rows, err := l.db.QueryContext(ctx, ` +SELECT a.id, a.task_id, a.state, a.driver, t.route, t.work_dir, t.conversation_key, + COALESCE(a.pid, 0), COALESCE(a.pgid, 0), a.process_started, a.session_id, a.launched_at, t.deadline_at, + COALESCE(a.taker_pid, 0), COALESCE(a.taker_pgid, 0), a.taker_started, a.taker_unaccounted +FROM attempts a JOIN tasks t ON t.id = a.task_id +WHERE a.state <> 'ended' ORDER BY a.launched_at, a.id`) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: live attempts: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }() + var out []LiveAttempt + for rows.Next() { + var ( + a LiveAttempt + state, launched string + started, deadline, took sql.NullString + ) + if err := rows.Scan(&a.AttemptID, &a.TaskID, &state, &a.Driver, &a.Route, &a.WorkDir, &a.ConversationKey, + &a.Process.PID, &a.Process.PGID, &started, &a.Process.SessionID, &launched, &deadline, + &a.Taker.PID, &a.Taker.PGID, &took, &a.TakerUnaccounted); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: live attempts: %w", err) + } + if took.Valid { + if a.Taker.StartedAt, err = parseStamp(took.String); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + a.State = AttemptState(state) + if a.LaunchedAt, err = parseStamp(launched); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if started.Valid { + if a.Process.StartedAt, err = parseStamp(started.String); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + if deadline.Valid { + if a.DeadlineAt, err = parseStamp(deadline.String); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + out = append(out, a) + } + return out, rows.Err() +} + +// StartableRecords returns up to limit records waiting for a worker, the +// oldest per conversation, oldest first, whatever their route. While the hold +// marker stands there are none: the database would refuse their launch +// (ledger_hold.go). +func (l *Ledger) StartableRecords(ctx context.Context, limit int) ([]Record, error) { + return l.startable(ctx, "", nil, limit) +} + +// StartableFilter narrows StartableRecordsWhere to what the dispatcher can +// start now, in the query itself: a record it would skip must never take a +// place in the window, or a backlog it cannot start starves everything behind +// it. +type StartableFilter struct { + // Routes are the approved directories by project, connect.json's as they + // are now, already narrowed to --project. A record whose (project, route) + // is not among them is not startable. Empty means nothing is. + Routes map[int64]string + // RouteHeld: a route with a live task holds its directory, so a record on + // it waits. False when every task gets a directory of its own. + RouteHeld bool + Limit int +} + +// StartableRecordsWhere is StartableRecords narrowed by f. +func (l *Ledger) StartableRecordsWhere(ctx context.Context, f StartableFilter) ([]Record, error) { + if len(f.Routes) == 0 { + return nil, nil + } + buckets := make([]int64, 0, len(f.Routes)) + for bucket := range f.Routes { + buckets = append(buckets, bucket) + } + slices.Sort(buckets) + var where strings.Builder + var args []any + where.WriteString(" AND (") + for i, bucket := range buckets { + if i > 0 { + where.WriteString(" OR ") + } + where.WriteString("(e.bucket_id = ? AND e.route = ?)") + args = append(args, bucket, f.Routes[bucket]) + } + where.WriteString(")") + if f.RouteHeld { + where.WriteString(" AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM tasks h WHERE h.ended_at IS NULL AND h.route = e.route)") + } + return l.startable(ctx, where.String(), args, f.Limit) +} + +// startable runs the startable query with an extra condition. extra is built +// from this package's constants and placeholders only. +func (l *Ledger) startable(ctx context.Context, extra string, args []any, limit int) ([]Record, error) { + //nolint:gosec // G202: extra is this package's constants and placeholders, never a value + query := ` +SELECT MIN(e.id) FROM events e +WHERE ` + startableCondition + extra + ` + AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM tasks t WHERE t.ended_at IS NULL AND t.conversation_key = e.conversation_key) + AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM hold_marker) +GROUP BY e.conversation_key ORDER BY MIN(e.id) LIMIT ?` + rows, err := l.db.QueryContext(ctx, query, append(args, limit)...) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: startable records: %w", err) + } + var ids []int64 + for rows.Next() { + var id int64 + if err := rows.Scan(&id); err != nil { + _ = rows.Close() + return nil, err + } + ids = append(ids, id) + } + if err := rows.Close(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + out := make([]Record, 0, len(ids)) + for _, id := range ids { + r, ok, err := l.Get(ctx, id) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if ok { + out = append(out, r) + } + } + return out, nil +} + +// StrandedRecords counts the records waiting for a worker whose (project, +// route) no approved pair covers: work admitted under a route connect.json no +// longer has, which nothing will start until a person routes it again or +// discards it. +// buckets is the run's --project scope: work in a project this run does not +// hear is another run's to dispatch, not stranded, so it is not counted. +func (l *Ledger) StrandedRecords(ctx context.Context, approved map[int64]string, buckets []int64) (int, error) { + var where strings.Builder + args := make([]any, 0, 2*len(approved)+len(buckets)) + for bucket, route := range approved { + where.WriteString(" AND NOT (e.bucket_id = ? AND e.route = ?)") + args = append(args, bucket, route) + } + if len(buckets) > 0 { + where.WriteString(" AND e.bucket_id IN (" + strings.TrimSuffix(strings.Repeat("?, ", len(buckets)), ", ") + ")") + for _, bucket := range buckets { + args = append(args, bucket) + } + } + //nolint:gosec // G202: the condition is this package's constants and placeholders, never a value + query := `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM events e WHERE ` + startableCondition + where.String() + var n int + if err := l.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, query, args...).Scan(&n); err != nil { + return 0, fmt.Errorf("connector: count stranded records: %w", err) + } + return n, nil +} + +// RecordRefusal records one refusal on a live attempt, at the moment the +// driver made or observed it (driver's "Refusals"). An attempt that has ended +// is ErrNoLiveAttempt: its count was settled with it. +func (l *Ledger) RecordRefusal(ctx context.Context, attemptID string) error { + return retryBusy(func() error { + res, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE attempts SET refusals = refusals + 1 WHERE id = ? AND state <> 'ended'`, attemptID) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: record refusal on %s: %w", attemptID, err) + } + n, err := res.RowsAffected() + if err != nil { + // The write is already committed; a driver that cannot say how + // many rows it touched is not a reason to count the refusal + // again at settlement. + return nil //nolint:nilerr // the write is committed, so the refusal is recorded + } + if n == 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: record refusal on %s: %w", attemptID, ErrNoLiveAttempt) + } + return nil + }) +} + +// RecordProgress stamps the live attempt's last progress, which still-running +// reads. +func (l *Ledger) RecordProgress(ctx context.Context, attemptID string) error { + return retryBusy(func() error { + _, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE attempts SET progress_at = ? WHERE id = ? AND state <> 'ended'`, l.timestamp(), attemptID) + return err + }) +} + +// StillRunningTick is one still-running occurrence of a live attempt. +type StillRunningTick struct { + AttemptID string + TaskID int64 + // Occurrence counts from 1 per attempt. + Occurrence int + // ProgressAt is the attempt's last progress; zero when none was seen. + ProgressAt time.Time +} + +// StillRunning counts one more still-running occurrence for a live attempt, +// running the StillRunning hook in the same transaction. +func (l *Ledger) StillRunning(ctx context.Context, attemptID string) (StillRunningTick, error) { + var out StillRunningTick + err := retryBusy(func() error { + tx, err := l.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: begin still-running: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }() + taskID, err := liveAttemptTask(ctx, tx, attemptID) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE attempts SET still_running = still_running + 1 WHERE id = ?`, attemptID); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: still-running %s: %w", attemptID, err) + } + tick := StillRunningTick{AttemptID: attemptID, TaskID: taskID} + var progress sql.NullString + if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT still_running, progress_at FROM attempts WHERE id = ?`, attemptID).Scan(&tick.Occurrence, &progress); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: still-running %s: %w", attemptID, err) + } + if progress.Valid { + if tick.ProgressAt, err = parseStamp(progress.String); err != nil { + return err + } + } + if l.hooks.StillRunning != nil { + if err := l.hooks.StillRunning(ctx, tx, tick); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: still-running hook for %s: %w", attemptID, err) + } + } + if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: commit still-running %s: %w", attemptID, err) + } + out = tick + return nil + }) + return out, err +} + +// AdoptionCandidate is an event whose worker's report was lost after it +// acknowledged: settled unknown, delivered, and with no reply of its own. +type AdoptionCandidate struct { + TaskID int64 + EventID int64 + ReplyKind string + ReplyRecordingID int64 + // DeliveredAt is the event's ack_dispatch. + DeliveredAt time.Time + // NextAckAt is the first acknowledgement of a later instruction on the + // CONVERSATION, which may be on a task started after this one ended; + // zero when there is none. + NextAckAt time.Time + // AckID is the worker's own acknowledgement, which is never its reply + // however the clocks compare. + AckID int64 +} + +// AdoptionCandidates lists a settled task's events a reply could be adopted +// for. +func (l *Ledger) AdoptionCandidates(ctx context.Context, taskID int64) ([]AdoptionCandidate, error) { + rows, err := l.db.QueryContext(ctx, ` +SELECT te.event_id, e.reply_kind, e.reply_recording_id, te.delivered_at, te.ack_id, + -- The boundary is the conversation's, not this task's: settlement ends + -- the task and adoption runs after it, so the next instruction may + -- already be on a task of its own, and its reply is not this event's + -- (Copilot). + (SELECT MIN(later.delivered_at) FROM task_events later + JOIN tasks lt ON lt.id = later.task_id + WHERE lt.conversation_key = t.conversation_key + AND later.event_id > te.event_id AND later.delivered_at IS NOT NULL) +FROM task_events te JOIN events e ON e.id = te.event_id JOIN tasks t ON t.id = te.task_id +WHERE te.task_id = ? AND te.outcome = 'unknown' AND te.delivered_at IS NOT NULL + AND te.reply_id IS NULL AND te.adopted_reply_id IS NULL +ORDER BY te.event_id`, taskID) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: adoption candidates of task %d: %w", taskID, err) + } + defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }() + var out []AdoptionCandidate + for rows.Next() { + c := AdoptionCandidate{TaskID: taskID} + var delivered string + var next sql.NullString + var ackID sql.NullInt64 + if err := rows.Scan(&c.EventID, &c.ReplyKind, &c.ReplyRecordingID, &delivered, &ackID, &next); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if c.DeliveredAt, err = parseStamp(delivered); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if next.Valid { + if c.NextAckAt, err = parseStamp(next.String); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + if ackID.Valid { + c.AckID = ackID.Int64 + } + out = append(out, c) + } + return out, rows.Err() +} + +// AgentReply is a comment or chat line by the agent at a destination. +type AgentReply struct { + ID int64 + CreatedAt time.Time +} + +// AdoptableReply applies the adopted-reply rule: exactly one reply by the +// agent at the destination after the event's acknowledgement, not after a +// later instruction's acknowledgement, and not one of the connector's own +// lifecycle messages. +func AdoptableReply(c AdoptionCandidate, replies []AgentReply, lifecycle func(id int64) bool) (int64, bool) { + var found []int64 + for _, r := range replies { + if r.ID == c.AckID { + // The worker's acknowledgement is not the worker's reply, and + // the server's clock is not this machine's. + continue + } + if !r.CreatedAt.After(c.DeliveredAt) { + continue + } + if !c.NextAckAt.IsZero() && !r.CreatedAt.Before(c.NextAckAt) { + continue + } + if lifecycle != nil && lifecycle(r.ID) { + continue + } + found = append(found, r.ID) + } + if len(found) != 1 { + return 0, false + } + return found[0], true +} + +// AdoptReply links a reply to an event whose outcome is unknown. The outcome +// stays unknown (invariant 6). +func (l *Ledger) AdoptReply(ctx context.Context, taskID, eventID, replyID int64) error { + if replyID <= 0 { + return errors.New("connector: adopt a reply by its id") + } + return retryBusy(func() error { + res, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, ` +UPDATE task_events SET adopted_reply_id = ? +WHERE task_id = ? AND event_id = ? AND outcome = 'unknown' AND reply_id IS NULL AND adopted_reply_id IS NULL`, + replyID, taskID, eventID) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: adopt reply for %d: %w", eventID, err) + } + if n, err := res.RowsAffected(); err != nil { + return err + } else if n == 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: adopt reply for %d: the event is not unknown, or already has a reply", eventID) + } + return nil + }) +} + +// AttemptIDLength is how long an attempt id is: "att_" and 12 random bytes in +// hex. Anything that has to know whether a path built from one fits (a unix +// socket's 103 bytes) asks here rather than guessing. +const AttemptIDLength = 4 + 24 + +func newAttemptID() (string, error) { + raw := make([]byte, 12) + if _, err := rand.Read(raw); err != nil { + return "", fmt.Errorf("connector: attempt id: %w", err) + } + return "att_" + strings.ToLower(hex.EncodeToString(raw)), nil +} diff --git a/internal/connector/ledger_tasks_test.go b/internal/connector/ledger_tasks_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..571b3bcc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/ledger_tasks_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,521 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +const testRoute = "/work/connector" + +// admitOn writes an admitted record on a conversation key. +func admitOn(t *testing.T, ledger *Ledger, id int64, key string) { + t.Helper() + seenRecord(t, ledger, id) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(context.Background(), admittedVerdict(id, 0, key)) + require.NoError(t, err) +} + +func launch(t *testing.T, ledger *Ledger, id int64) Launch { + t.Helper() + l, err := ledger.LaunchTask(context.Background(), LaunchSpec{EventID: id, Route: testRoute, Driver: "fake", Deadline: time.Hour}) + require.NoError(t, err) + return l +} + +type attemptRow struct { + State, StopReason string + SpawnFailed bool +} + +func readAttempt(t *testing.T, ledger *Ledger, id string) attemptRow { + t.Helper() + var r attemptRow + require.NoError(t, ledger.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT state, stop_reason, spawn_failed FROM attempts WHERE id = ?`, id).Scan(&r.State, &r.StopReason, &r.SpawnFailed)) + return r +} + +type taskEventState struct { + Delivery, Outcome string + ExposedBy *string + Withdrawn *string + Adopted *int64 +} + +func readTaskEvent(t *testing.T, ledger *Ledger, taskID, eventID int64) taskEventState { + t.Helper() + var s taskEventState + require.NoError(t, ledger.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT delivery, outcome, exposed_attempt_id, withdrawn_at, adopted_reply_id FROM task_events WHERE task_id = ? AND event_id = ?`, + taskID, eventID).Scan(&s.Delivery, &s.Outcome, &s.ExposedBy, &s.Withdrawn, &s.Adopted)) + return s +} + +// Ledger invariant 1: launching, the originating exposure and the record's +// move are one transaction. +func TestLaunchWritesLaunchingAndExposureTogether(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + admitOn(t, ledger, 2, "recording:1") + + l := launch(t, ledger, 1) + assert.Equal(t, []int64{1, 2}, l.EventIDs) + assert.Equal(t, "launching", readAttempt(t, ledger, l.AttemptID).State) + + origin := readTaskEvent(t, ledger, l.TaskID, 1) + assert.Equal(t, "exposed", origin.Delivery) + require.NotNil(t, origin.ExposedBy) + assert.Equal(t, l.AttemptID, *origin.ExposedBy) + assert.Equal(t, StateDispatched, getRecord(t, ledger, 1).State) + + follow := readTaskEvent(t, ledger, l.TaskID, 2) + assert.Equal(t, "admitted", follow.Delivery, "a joined follow-up is not exposed by the launch") + assert.Equal(t, StateDispatched, getRecord(t, ledger, 2).State, "a record on a task has left the queue") +} + +func TestALaunchHookFailureLeavesNothingWritten(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + ledger.SetHooks(Hooks{TaskLaunched: func(context.Context, Tx, Launch) error { return errors.New("outbox refused") }}) + + _, err := ledger.LaunchTask(context.Background(), LaunchSpec{EventID: 1, Route: testRoute, Driver: "fake"}) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, getRecord(t, ledger, 1).State) + var tasks, attempts int + require.NoError(t, ledger.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM tasks), (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM attempts)`).Scan(&tasks, &attempts)) + assert.Zero(t, tasks) + assert.Zero(t, attempts) +} + +func TestALaunchMustNameTheRecordsRoute(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + _, err := ledger.LaunchTask(context.Background(), LaunchSpec{EventID: 1, Route: "/somewhere/else", Driver: "fake"}) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrWorkDirMismatch) + assert.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, getRecord(t, ledger, 1).State) +} + +// Ledger invariant 2. +func TestOneLiveTaskPerConversationAndPerWorkingDirectory(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + launch(t, ledger, 1) + + admitOn(t, ledger, 3, "recording:3") + _, err := ledger.LaunchTask(ctx, LaunchSpec{EventID: 3, Route: testRoute, Driver: "fake"}) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNotStartable, "the working directory is busy") + + // The database holds it too, whatever the code checks first. + _, err = ledger.db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `INSERT INTO tasks (token_sha256, created_at, conversation_key, work_dir) VALUES ('x', 'now', 'recording:9', ?)`, testRoute) + require.Error(t, err) + _, err = ledger.db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `INSERT INTO tasks (token_sha256, created_at, conversation_key, work_dir) VALUES ('y', 'now', 'recording:1', '/other')`) + require.Error(t, err) +} + +func TestAnEventIsOnAtMostOneLiveTask(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, ledger, 1) + _, err := ledger.db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `INSERT INTO tasks (token_sha256, created_at) VALUES ('z', 'now')`) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = ledger.db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `INSERT INTO task_events (task_id, event_id) VALUES (?, 1)`, l.TaskID+1) + assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "UNIQUE constraint failed") +} + +// Ledger invariant 3. +func TestAnEndedTaskHasNoValidToken(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, ledger, 1) + d, err := ledger.Dispatch(context.Background(), l.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, ok, err := d.Get(ctx, 1) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok) + + _, err = ledger.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: l.AttemptID, Stop: StopFinished}) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, _, err = d.Get(ctx, 1) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTaskTokenRefused) + + admitOn(t, ledger, 2, "recording:2") + l2 := launch(t, ledger, 2) + _, err = ledger.db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `UPDATE tasks SET ended_at = 'now' WHERE id = ?`, l2.TaskID) + assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "superseded") +} + +// Ledger invariant 4: a proven spawn failure withdraws once. +func TestASpawnFailureIsRetriedOnceThenBlocked(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + + first := launch(t, ledger, 1) + s, err := ledger.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: first.AttemptID, Stop: StopFailed, SpawnFailed: true}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, s.Events, 1) + assert.True(t, s.Events[0].Withdrawn) + assert.False(t, s.Events[0].Blocked) + assert.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, getRecord(t, ledger, 1).State) + assert.NotNil(t, readTaskEvent(t, ledger, first.TaskID, 1).Withdrawn) + + second := launch(t, ledger, 1) + s, err = ledger.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: second.AttemptID, Stop: StopFailed, SpawnFailed: true}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, s.Events[0].Blocked) + record := getRecord(t, ledger, 1) + assert.Equal(t, StateBlocked, record.State) + assert.Equal(t, ReasonSpawnFailed, record.Reason) +} + +func TestNoAutomaticRetryBlocksTheFirstSpawnFailure(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, ledger, 1) + _, err := ledger.EndAttempt(context.Background(), AttemptEnd{AttemptID: l.AttemptID, Stop: StopFailed, SpawnFailed: true, NoAutomaticRetry: true}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StateBlocked, getRecord(t, ledger, 1).State) +} + +func TestAWorkerThatRanMakesItsExposedEventsUnknown(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, ledger, 1) + require.NoError(t, ledger.MarkRunning(ctx, l.AttemptID, AttemptProcess{PID: 4242, PGID: 4242, SessionID: "s"})) + + s, err := ledger.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: l.AttemptID, Stop: StopLost}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, OutcomeUnknown, s.Events[0].Outcome) + assert.False(t, s.Events[0].Withdrawn) + assert.Equal(t, StateCompleted, getRecord(t, ledger, 1).State) +} + +func TestASpawnFailureNeverWithdrawsAnExposureTheWorkerMade(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + admitOn(t, ledger, 2, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, ledger, 1) + d, err := ledger.Dispatch(context.Background(), l.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, _, err = d.Get(ctx, 2) + require.NoError(t, err) + + s, err := ledger.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: l.AttemptID, Stop: StopFailed, SpawnFailed: true}) + require.NoError(t, err) + byID := map[int64]SettledEvent{} + for _, e := range s.Events { + byID[e.EventID] = e + } + assert.True(t, byID[1].Withdrawn) + assert.Equal(t, OutcomeUnknown, byID[2].Outcome, "get_dispatch's exposure is not the launch's to withdraw") +} + +// Ledger invariant 5 and the sibling rule. +func TestSettlementKeepsReportsAndReturnsWhatWasNeverExposed(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + for _, id := range []int64{1, 2, 3} { + admitOn(t, ledger, id, "recording:1") + } + l := launch(t, ledger, 1) + d, err := ledger.Dispatch(context.Background(), l.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + reply := int64(99) + // A worker completes what it pulled (#736). + _, _, err = d.Get(ctx, 1) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = d.Complete(ctx, 1, Completion{Outcome: OutcomeFailed, ReplyID: &reply}) + require.NoError(t, err) + exposed, err := ledger.ExposeEvent(ctx, l.AttemptID, 2) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, exposed) + + s, err := ledger.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: l.AttemptID, Stop: StopFinished}) + require.NoError(t, err) + byID := map[int64]SettledEvent{} + for _, e := range s.Events { + byID[e.EventID] = e + } + assert.Equal(t, OutcomeFailed, byID[1].Outcome, "a reported outcome stands, whatever the stop reason") + assert.True(t, byID[1].Reported) + assert.Equal(t, OutcomeUnknown, byID[2].Outcome) + assert.True(t, byID[3].Returned) + assert.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, getRecord(t, ledger, 3).State) + assert.Equal(t, "finished", readAttempt(t, ledger, l.AttemptID).StopReason) + + // A returned follow-up starts a task of its own. + startable, err := ledger.StartableRecords(ctx, 10) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, startable, 1) + assert.Equal(t, int64(3), startable[0].ID) +} + +func TestExposeEventIsWrittenOnceAndOnlyForALiveAttempt(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + admitOn(t, ledger, 2, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, ledger, 1) + + exposed, err := ledger.ExposeEvent(ctx, l.AttemptID, 2) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, exposed) + exposed, err = ledger.ExposeEvent(ctx, l.AttemptID, 2) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.False(t, exposed) + + _, err = ledger.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: l.AttemptID, Stop: StopShutdown}) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = ledger.ExposeEvent(ctx, l.AttemptID, 2) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNoLiveAttempt) + _, err = ledger.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: l.AttemptID, Stop: StopShutdown}) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNoLiveAttempt) +} + +func TestJoinConversationTakesLaterFollowUpsOnlyWhileTheTaskIsLive(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, ledger, 1) + admitOn(t, ledger, 2, "recording:1") + assert.Equal(t, StateQueued, getRecord(t, ledger, 2).State) + + joined, err := ledger.JoinConversation(ctx, l.TaskID) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, []int64{2}, joined) + pending, err := ledger.UnexposedEvents(ctx, l.TaskID) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, []int64{2}, pending) + + _, err = ledger.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: l.AttemptID, Stop: StopFinished}) + require.NoError(t, err) + admitOn(t, ledger, 3, "recording:1") + joined, err = ledger.JoinConversation(ctx, l.TaskID) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, joined) +} + +// Ledger invariant 7. +func TestAttemptStatesMoveForwardOnly(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, ledger, 1) + require.NoError(t, ledger.MarkRunning(ctx, l.AttemptID, AttemptProcess{PID: 1234, PGID: 1234, SessionID: "s"})) + _, err := ledger.db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `UPDATE attempts SET state = 'launching' WHERE id = ?`, l.AttemptID) + assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "never goes back") + assert.ErrorIs(t, ledger.MarkRunning(ctx, l.AttemptID, AttemptProcess{}), ErrNoLiveAttempt) + _, err = ledger.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: l.AttemptID, Stop: StopDeadline}) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = ledger.db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `UPDATE attempts SET stop_reason = 'finished', state = 'ended' WHERE id = ?`, l.AttemptID) + assert.Error(t, err, "an ended attempt's stop reason is not rewritten") +} + +func TestLiveAttemptsIncludesLaunching(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, ledger, 1) + live, err := ledger.LiveAttempts(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, live, 1) + assert.Equal(t, AttemptLaunching, live[0].State) + assert.Equal(t, l.AttemptID, live[0].AttemptID) + assert.Equal(t, testRoute, live[0].WorkDir) +} + +func TestAHookFailureRollsTheTransitionBack(t *testing.T) { + t.Run("attempt ended", func(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, ledger, 1) + ledger.SetHooks(Hooks{AttemptEnded: func(context.Context, Tx, Settlement) error { return errors.New("no") }}) + _, err := ledger.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: l.AttemptID, Stop: StopFinished}) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "launching", readAttempt(t, ledger, l.AttemptID).State) + assert.Equal(t, StateDispatched, getRecord(t, ledger, 1).State) + }) + t.Run("verdict", func(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + seenRecord(t, ledger, 1) + ledger.SetHooks(Hooks{VerdictCommitted: func(context.Context, Tx, CommittedVerdict) error { return errors.New("no") }}) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, admittedVerdict(1, 0, "recording:1")) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StateSeen, getRecord(t, ledger, 1).State) + }) + t.Run("still running", func(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, ledger, 1) + ledger.SetHooks(Hooks{StillRunning: func(context.Context, Tx, StillRunningTick) error { return errors.New("no") }}) + _, err := ledger.StillRunning(ctx, l.AttemptID) + require.Error(t, err) + ledger.SetHooks(Hooks{}) + tick, err := ledger.StillRunning(ctx, l.AttemptID) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, 1, tick.Occurrence, "the refused occurrence was not counted") + }) +} + +// Ledger invariant 6. +func TestAnAdoptedReplyNeverMakesAnOutcome(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, ledger, 1) + d, err := ledger.Dispatch(context.Background(), l.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + // A worker acknowledges what it pulled (#736): get_dispatch first. + _, _, err = d.Get(ctx, 1) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = d.Ack(ctx, 1, nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = ledger.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: l.AttemptID, Stop: StopLost}) + require.NoError(t, err) + + candidates, err := ledger.AdoptionCandidates(ctx, l.TaskID) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, candidates, 1) + require.NoError(t, ledger.AdoptReply(ctx, l.TaskID, 1, 555)) + row := readTaskEvent(t, ledger, l.TaskID, 1) + assert.Equal(t, "unknown", row.Outcome) + require.NotNil(t, row.Adopted) + assert.Equal(t, int64(555), *row.Adopted) + assert.Error(t, ledger.AdoptReply(ctx, l.TaskID, 1, 556), "one adoption") +} + +func TestAdoptableReplyRule(t *testing.T) { + acked := time.Date(2026, 9, 17, 10, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC) + c := AdoptionCandidate{DeliveredAt: acked, NextAckAt: acked.Add(10 * time.Minute)} + at := func(m int) time.Time { return acked.Add(time.Duration(m) * time.Minute) } + + id, ok := AdoptableReply(c, []AgentReply{{ID: 1, CreatedAt: at(-1)}, {ID: 2, CreatedAt: at(1)}, {ID: 3, CreatedAt: at(11)}}, nil) + assert.True(t, ok) + assert.Equal(t, int64(2), id, "only a reply after the ack and before a later instruction's ack") + + _, ok = AdoptableReply(c, []AgentReply{{ID: 2, CreatedAt: at(1)}, {ID: 4, CreatedAt: at(2)}}, nil) + assert.False(t, ok, "two candidates adopt nothing") + + _, ok = AdoptableReply(c, []AgentReply{{ID: 2, CreatedAt: at(1)}}, func(id int64) bool { return id == 2 }) + assert.False(t, ok, "a lifecycle message is never adopted") +} + +// Copilot: a follow-up admitted under another route waits for its own task. +func TestAFollowUpOnAnotherRouteDoesNotJoinTheTask(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, ledger, 1) + seenRecord(t, ledger, 2) + v := admittedVerdict(2, 0, "recording:1") + v.Route = "/work/moved" + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, v) + require.NoError(t, err) + + joined, err := ledger.JoinConversation(ctx, l.TaskID) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, joined) +} + +// Review r2: work no approved route covers is counted, not silently stuck. +func TestStrandedRecordsCountsWorkNoRouteCovers(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + seenRecord(t, ledger, 2) + moved := admittedVerdict(2, 0, "recording:2") + moved.Route = "/work/moved" + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, moved) + require.NoError(t, err) + + stranded, err := ledger.StrandedRecords(ctx, map[int64]string{adapterBucketID: testRoute}, nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, 1, stranded, "the record admitted under a route connect.json no longer has") + + stranded, err = ledger.StrandedRecords(ctx, map[int64]string{adapterBucketID: testRoute, adapterBucketID + 1: "/work/moved"}, nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, 1, stranded, "the route must be approved for the record's own project") + + stranded, err = ledger.StrandedRecords(ctx, map[int64]string{adapterBucketID + 5: testRoute}, []int64{adapterBucketID + 5}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Zero(t, stranded, "work in a project this run does not hear is another run's, not stranded") +} + +// Review r2: the worker's acknowledgement is never adopted as its reply. +func TestAnAcknowledgementIsNeverAdoptedAsTheReply(t *testing.T) { + acked := time.Date(2026, 9, 17, 10, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC) + c := AdoptionCandidate{DeliveredAt: acked, AckID: 7} + // The ack comment's server timestamp is after this machine's + // delivered_at, so time alone would adopt it. + _, ok := AdoptableReply(c, []AgentReply{{ID: 7, CreatedAt: acked.Add(time.Second)}}, nil) + assert.False(t, ok) +} + +// The refusal rule (driver's "Refusals"): a refusal is on the attempt's row +// the moment it is recorded, and settled with the attempt. +func TestARefusalIsRecordedOnTheLiveAttemptAndSettledWithIt(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + l := launch(t, ledger, 1) + refusals := func() int { + var n int + require.NoError(t, ledger.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT refusals FROM attempts WHERE id = ?`, l.AttemptID).Scan(&n)) + return n + } + + require.NoError(t, ledger.RecordRefusal(context.Background(), l.AttemptID)) + require.NoError(t, ledger.RecordRefusal(context.Background(), l.AttemptID)) + assert.Equal(t, 2, refusals(), "written as they happen, not at the end") + + _, err := ledger.EndAttempt(context.Background(), AttemptEnd{AttemptID: l.AttemptID, Stop: StopLost, UnrecordedRefusals: 1}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, 3, refusals(), "what could not be written then is settled with the attempt") + + assert.ErrorIs(t, ledger.RecordRefusal(context.Background(), l.AttemptID), ErrNoLiveAttempt) + assert.Equal(t, 3, refusals(), "an ended attempt's count is final") +} + +// Copilot: settlement ends a task and adoption runs after it, so the next +// instruction on the conversation can already be on a task of its own. Its +// acknowledgement still bounds what the old event may adopt. +func TestTheAdoptionBoundaryIsTheConversationsNotTheTasks(t *testing.T) { + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + admitOn(t, ledger, 1, "recording:1") + first := launch(t, ledger, 1) + d, err := ledger.Dispatch(ctx, first.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, _, err = d.Get(ctx, 1) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = d.Ack(ctx, 1, nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = ledger.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: first.AttemptID, Stop: StopLost}) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // The next instruction on the same conversation, on a task of its own. + admitOn(t, ledger, 2, "recording:1") + second := launch(t, ledger, 2) + d2, err := ledger.Dispatch(ctx, second.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, _, err = d2.Get(ctx, 2) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = d2.Ack(ctx, 2, nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + + candidates, err := ledger.AdoptionCandidates(ctx, first.TaskID) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, candidates, 1) + assert.False(t, candidates[0].NextAckAt.IsZero(), + "the later task's acknowledgement bounds what the lost event may adopt") + assert.False(t, candidates[0].NextAckAt.Before(candidates[0].DeliveredAt)) +} diff --git a/internal/connector/ledger_worktrees.go b/internal/connector/ledger_worktrees.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b598c74e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/ledger_worktrees.go @@ -0,0 +1,390 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "database/sql" + "errors" + "fmt" + "time" +) + +// Worktrees in the ledger: every git worktree the connector made for a task, +// from the moment it decided to make one until it is gone. +// +// A row is written creating before `git worktree add` runs, so a crash at any +// point leaves a row that says a directory may exist; live once the worktree +// is there; retained, with a reason, when the task ended and the worktree +// held work that was not safe to remove; removing while a removal holds the +// worktrees lock; removed at the end, with who removed it (straight from any +// open state when the directory is found gone). The states move along those +// edges only, held by a trigger. +const migrationWorktrees = ` +CREATE TABLE worktrees ( + id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, + path TEXT NOT NULL, + work_dir TEXT NOT NULL, + route TEXT NOT NULL, + repository TEXT NOT NULL, + branch TEXT NOT NULL, + base_commit TEXT NOT NULL, + originating_event_id INTEGER NOT NULL, + branch_created INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, + admin_dir TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', + task_id INTEGER REFERENCES tasks (id), + state TEXT NOT NULL + CHECK (state IN ('creating', 'live', 'retained', 'removing', 'removed')), + retained_reason TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '' + CHECK (retained_reason IN ('', 'dirty', 'unpushed', 'locked', 'moved', 'unverified', 'finished', 'orphaned')), + created_at TEXT NOT NULL, + finished_at TEXT, + retained_at TEXT, + removed_at TEXT, + removed_by TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '' + CHECK (removed_by IN ('', 'prune', 'prune_forced', 'missing', 'never_created')), + CHECK (state <> 'retained' OR retained_reason <> ''), + CHECK ((state = 'removed') = (removed_by <> '')) +); +CREATE UNIQUE INDEX worktrees_open_path ON worktrees (path) WHERE state <> 'removed'; +CREATE UNIQUE INDEX worktrees_open_work_dir ON worktrees (work_dir) WHERE state <> 'removed'; +CREATE INDEX worktrees_state ON worktrees (state); + +CREATE TRIGGER worktrees_state_edges +BEFORE UPDATE OF state ON worktrees +WHEN NEW.state <> OLD.state AND NOT ( + (OLD.state = 'creating' AND NEW.state IN ('live', 'retained', 'removing', 'removed')) + OR (OLD.state = 'live' AND NEW.state IN ('retained', 'removing', 'removed')) + OR (OLD.state = 'retained' AND NEW.state IN ('removing', 'removed')) + OR (OLD.state = 'removing' AND NEW.state IN ('retained', 'removed'))) +BEGIN + SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'a worktree state moves along its edges only'); +END; +` + +// WorktreeState is where a task's worktree is. +type WorktreeState string + +const ( + WorktreeCreating WorktreeState = "creating" + WorktreeLive WorktreeState = "live" + WorktreeRetained WorktreeState = "retained" + WorktreeRemoving WorktreeState = "removing" + WorktreeRemoved WorktreeState = "removed" +) + +// RetainedReason is why a worktree was kept. +type RetainedReason string + +const ( + // RetainedDirty is uncommitted work: modified or untracked files, or a + // merge, rebase, cherry-pick, revert or bisect in progress. + RetainedDirty RetainedReason = "dirty" + // RetainedUnpushed is a commit no remote branch and no other local branch + // holds. + RetainedUnpushed RetainedReason = "unpushed" + // RetainedLocked is a worktree someone locked with `git worktree lock`. + RetainedLocked RetainedReason = "locked" + // RetainedUnverified is a worktree whose state could not be read. It is + // kept, because a check that failed proves nothing is safe to delete. + RetainedUnverified RetainedReason = "unverified" + // RetainedMoved is a worktree that is no longer where the ledger says: + // someone moved it, and its files are theirs to deal with. + RetainedMoved RetainedReason = "moved" + // RetainedOrphaned is a worktree whose directory something outside the + // connector removed. Git's record of it and the task branch are still + // there, reaching whatever they reach; the connector neither judges that + // nor deletes any of it. An operator's explicit discard does, and is + // told what goes. + RetainedOrphaned RetainedReason = "orphaned" + // RetainedFinished is a worktree whose task ended. Nothing the connector + // does removes a worktree, so this is why most kept worktrees are kept: + // the work is done with, and an operator says when it goes. + RetainedFinished RetainedReason = "finished" +) + +// RemovedBy is who removed a worktree. +type RemovedBy string + +const ( + // There is no connector: nothing the connector does of its own accord + // removes a worktree. + RemovedByPrune RemovedBy = "prune" + RemovedByPruneForced RemovedBy = "prune_forced" + RemovedMissing RemovedBy = "missing" + RemovedNeverCreated RemovedBy = "never_created" +) + +// Worktree is a worktree's ledger row. +type Worktree struct { + ID int64 + // Path is the worktree's root; WorkDir is where the task worked in it, + // the route's place inside the repository. + Path string + WorkDir string + Route string + Repository string + Branch string + BaseCommit string + OriginatingEventID int64 + // BranchCreated is this row's proof that the connector made the task + // branch, so deleting it can never delete someone else's. + BranchCreated bool + // AdminDir is the repository's own record of this worktree + // (<repo>/.git/worktrees/<name>), which says where it is even after + // someone moves it or changes what it has checked out. + AdminDir string + // TaskID is the task that last worked in it; zero before one launched. + TaskID int64 + State WorktreeState + RetainedReason RetainedReason + CreatedAt time.Time + FinishedAt time.Time + RetainedAt time.Time + RemovedAt time.Time + RemovedBy RemovedBy +} + +const worktreeColumns = `id, path, work_dir, route, repository, branch, base_commit, originating_event_id, branch_created, admin_dir, COALESCE(task_id, 0), +state, retained_reason, created_at, finished_at, retained_at, removed_at, removed_by` + +func scanWorktree(row interface{ Scan(...any) error }) (Worktree, error) { + var ( + w Worktree + state, reason, removedBy, created string + finished, retained, removed sql.NullString + ) + if err := row.Scan(&w.ID, &w.Path, &w.WorkDir, &w.Route, &w.Repository, &w.Branch, &w.BaseCommit, &w.OriginatingEventID, &w.BranchCreated, &w.AdminDir, &w.TaskID, + &state, &reason, &created, &finished, &retained, &removed, &removedBy); err != nil { + return Worktree{}, err + } + w.State, w.RetainedReason, w.RemovedBy = WorktreeState(state), RetainedReason(reason), RemovedBy(removedBy) + var err error + if w.CreatedAt, err = parseStamp(created); err != nil { + return Worktree{}, err + } + for _, f := range []struct { + src sql.NullString + dst *time.Time + }{{finished, &w.FinishedAt}, {retained, &w.RetainedAt}, {removed, &w.RemovedAt}} { + if f.src.Valid { + if *f.dst, err = parseStamp(f.src.String); err != nil { + return Worktree{}, err + } + } + } + return w, nil +} + +// ErrWorktreeState is a worktree transition from a state it cannot leave that +// way, or for a row that is not there. +var ErrWorktreeState = errors.New("the worktree is not in a state that allows this") + +// BeginWorktree records a worktree about to be created. Nothing is on disk +// yet. +func (l *Ledger) BeginWorktree(ctx context.Context, w Worktree) (int64, error) { + if w.Path == "" || w.WorkDir == "" || w.Route == "" || w.Repository == "" || w.Branch == "" || w.BaseCommit == "" { + return 0, errors.New("connector: a worktree needs its path, working directory, route, repository, branch and base commit") + } + var id int64 + err := retryBusy(func() error { + res, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, ` +INSERT INTO worktrees (path, work_dir, route, repository, branch, base_commit, originating_event_id, state, created_at) +VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 'creating', ?)`, + w.Path, w.WorkDir, w.Route, w.Repository, w.Branch, w.BaseCommit, w.OriginatingEventID, l.timestamp()) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: record worktree %s: %w", w.Path, err) + } + id, err = res.LastInsertId() + return err + }) + return id, err +} + +// WorktreeBranchCreated records that the connector created the task branch +// for a worktree, which is what lets it be deleted again. +func (l *Ledger) WorktreeBranchCreated(ctx context.Context, id int64) error { + return retryBusy(func() error { + _, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE worktrees SET branch_created = 1 WHERE id = ?`, id) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: worktree %d: %w", id, err) + } + return nil + }) +} + +// WorktreeAdminDir records the repository's directory for a worktree. +func (l *Ledger) WorktreeAdminDir(ctx context.Context, id int64, dir string) error { + return retryBusy(func() error { + _, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE worktrees SET admin_dir = ? WHERE id = ?`, dir, id) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: worktree %d: %w", id, err) + } + return nil + }) +} + +// MoveWorktree moves a worktree from one of from to state. It reports +// ErrWorktreeState when the row is in none of them. +func (l *Ledger) MoveWorktree(ctx context.Context, id int64, state WorktreeState, from ...WorktreeState) error { + return l.moveWorktree(ctx, id, state, "", "", from) +} + +// RetainWorktree keeps a worktree, with the reason, from one of from. +func (l *Ledger) RetainWorktree(ctx context.Context, id int64, reason RetainedReason, from ...WorktreeState) error { + if reason == "" { + return errors.New("connector: a retained worktree needs a reason") + } + return l.moveWorktree(ctx, id, WorktreeRetained, reason, "", from) +} + +// RemovedWorktree records a worktree gone, and by whom, from one of from. +func (l *Ledger) RemovedWorktree(ctx context.Context, id int64, by RemovedBy, from ...WorktreeState) error { + if by == "" { + return errors.New("connector: a removed worktree needs who removed it") + } + return l.moveWorktree(ctx, id, WorktreeRemoved, "", by, from) +} + +func (l *Ledger) moveWorktree(ctx context.Context, id int64, state WorktreeState, reason RetainedReason, by RemovedBy, from []WorktreeState) error { + if len(from) == 0 { + return errors.New("connector: a worktree transition names the states it leaves") + } + return retryBusy(func() error { + tx, err := l.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: begin worktree update: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }() + var ( + current, workDir string + finished sql.NullString + ) + switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT state, work_dir, finished_at FROM worktrees WHERE id = ?`, id).Scan(¤t, &workDir, &finished); { + case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows): + return fmt.Errorf("connector: worktree %d: %w", id, ErrWorktreeState) + case err != nil: + return fmt.Errorf("connector: worktree %d: %w", id, err) + } + allowed := false + for _, f := range from { + allowed = allowed || WorktreeState(current) == f + } + if !allowed { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: worktree %d is %s: %w", id, current, ErrWorktreeState) + } + now := l.timestamp() + // The task that last worked in the directory, for status. + var taskID sql.NullInt64 + if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT MAX(id) FROM tasks WHERE work_dir = ?`, workDir).Scan(&taskID); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: worktree %d: %w", id, err) + } + switch state { + case WorktreeRetained: + _, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, ` +UPDATE worktrees SET state = 'retained', retained_reason = ?, retained_at = ?, finished_at = COALESCE(finished_at, ?), + task_id = COALESCE(?, task_id) WHERE id = ?`, string(reason), now, now, taskID, id) + case WorktreeRemoved: + _, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, ` +UPDATE worktrees SET state = 'removed', removed_by = ?, removed_at = ?, finished_at = COALESCE(finished_at, ?), + task_id = COALESCE(?, task_id) WHERE id = ?`, string(by), now, now, taskID, id) + case WorktreeRemoving: + _, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, ` +UPDATE worktrees SET state = 'removing', finished_at = COALESCE(finished_at, ?), task_id = COALESCE(?, task_id) WHERE id = ?`, now, taskID, id) + default: + _, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE worktrees SET state = ? WHERE id = ?`, string(state), id) + } + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: worktree %d to %s: %w", id, state, err) + } + return tx.Commit() + }) +} + +// WorktreeByWorkDir is the open (not removed) worktree a task works in. +func (l *Ledger) WorktreeByWorkDir(ctx context.Context, workDir string) (Worktree, bool, error) { + row := l.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT `+worktreeColumns+` FROM worktrees WHERE work_dir = ? AND state <> 'removed'`, workDir) + w, err := scanWorktree(row) + switch { + case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows): + return Worktree{}, false, nil + case err != nil: + return Worktree{}, false, fmt.Errorf("connector: worktree for %s: %w", workDir, err) + } + return w, true, nil +} + +// Worktrees lists worktrees in the given states, oldest first; every state +// when none is given. +func (l *Ledger) Worktrees(ctx context.Context, states ...WorktreeState) ([]Worktree, error) { + query := `SELECT ` + worktreeColumns + ` FROM worktrees` + var args []any + if len(states) > 0 { + query += ` WHERE state IN (` + for i, s := range states { + if i > 0 { + query += `, ` + } + query += `?` + args = append(args, string(s)) + } + query += `)` + } + rows, err := l.db.QueryContext(ctx, query+` ORDER BY id`, args...) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: list worktrees: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }() + var out []Worktree + for rows.Next() { + w, err := scanWorktree(rows) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: list worktrees: %w", err) + } + out = append(out, w) + } + return out, rows.Err() +} + +// RetainedWorktrees are the worktrees kept for a person to deal with. +func (l *Ledger) RetainedWorktrees(ctx context.Context) ([]Worktree, error) { + return l.Worktrees(ctx, WorktreeRetained) +} + +// RetainedWorktreeStatus is the WorktreeLister that status and doctor run: +// the worktrees kept for a person to deal with, as `connect worktrees list` +// counts them — retained, and removing, which a prune is part way through. +// The path, branch, task and reason are the row's; nothing here walks the +// disk, so a status never waits on a worktree that cannot be read. +func (l *Ledger) RetainedWorktreeStatus(ctx context.Context) ([]WorktreeStatus, error) { + records, err := l.Worktrees(ctx, WorktreeRetained, WorktreeRemoving) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + out := make([]WorktreeStatus, 0, len(records)) + for _, r := range records { + out = append(out, WorktreeStatus{Path: r.Path, Branch: r.Branch, TaskID: r.TaskID, Reason: string(r.RetainedReason)}) + } + return out, nil +} + +// UnfinishedWorktrees are worktrees a crash left between their creation and +// their task's end: creating, live or removing, with no live task working in +// them. +func (l *Ledger) UnfinishedWorktrees(ctx context.Context) ([]Worktree, error) { + rows, err := l.db.QueryContext(ctx, `SELECT `+worktreeColumns+` FROM worktrees w +WHERE state IN ('creating', 'live', 'removing') + AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM tasks t WHERE t.ended_at IS NULL AND t.work_dir = w.work_dir) +ORDER BY id`) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: unfinished worktrees: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }() + var out []Worktree + for rows.Next() { + w, err := scanWorktree(rows) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: unfinished worktrees: %w", err) + } + out = append(out, w) + } + return out, rows.Err() +} diff --git a/internal/connector/lifecycle.go b/internal/connector/lifecycle.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..801ce8d37 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/lifecycle.go @@ -0,0 +1,384 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "database/sql" + "errors" + "fmt" + "html" + "regexp" + "strconv" + "strings" + "time" +) + +// Lifecycle messages are fixed forms. Every word comes from this file; every +// value comes from a ledger record — ids, states, stop reasons, times. None +// comes from content, from a worker or from a model, so a message can be +// rendered again from the records alone and matched against what Basecamp +// holds. + +// GuardAckBody is the guard acknowledgement: a boost on the recording that +// asked. It carries no event id, because a boost is a few characters; two +// guards on one recording are therefore ambiguous to reconciliation, which +// leaves them indeterminate rather than guess. +const GuardAckBody = "👀 received" + +// lifecycleSignature ends every comment and chat line the connector posts, so +// a person can tell a notice from the agent's own words. +const lifecycleSignature = "automatic notice from basecamp connect" + +// renderHoldingReply is the reply to a mention or assignment in a project that +// has no route. +func renderHoldingReply(kind MessageKind, eventID int64) string { + lines := []string{ + "I can't start on this here yet: this project has no working directory set up for me on the connector's machine, so nothing was run.", + "Once the project is added to connect.json, a person can run it with: basecamp connect redispatch " + strconv.FormatInt(eventID, 10), + "", + "Event " + strconv.FormatInt(eventID, 10) + " · " + lifecycleSignature, + } + return renderLines(kind, lines) +} + +// renderStillRunning is one still-running notice. +func renderStillRunning(kind MessageKind, taskID int64, attemptID string, occurrence int, launchedAt, progressAt time.Time) string { + progress := "No progress has been reported yet." + if !progressAt.IsZero() { + progress = "Last progress at " + clock(progressAt) + "." + } + lines := []string{ + "Still working on this: task " + strconv.FormatInt(taskID, 10) + " started at " + clock(launchedAt) + ". " + progress, + "", + "Attempt " + attemptID + ", update " + strconv.Itoa(occurrence) + " · " + lifecycleSignature, + } + return renderLines(kind, lines) +} + +// CompletionNeeded reports whether an attempt's settlement calls for a +// completion notice: an event failed or unknown, succeeded with no reply +// reported, or blocked from a further automatic start. Events that all +// succeeded with replies get none, and neither do events returned to wait for +// a task of their own or withdrawn for their one automatic retry. +func CompletionNeeded(s Settlement) bool { + for _, e := range s.Events { + if completionLine(e) != "" { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +// completionLine is what the notice says about one event; empty when it says +// nothing. +func completionLine(e SettledEvent) string { + id := strconv.FormatInt(e.EventID, 10) + redispatch := " Needs a person: basecamp connect redispatch " + id + if e.Decided { + // A person already redispatched or discarded it: the notice says what + // happened, and asks for nothing. + redispatch = "" + } + switch { + case e.Blocked: + return "Event " + id + ": the worker could not be started." + redispatch + case e.Withdrawn, e.Returned: + return "" + case e.Outcome == OutcomeFailed: + return "Event " + id + ": failed." + redispatch + case e.Outcome == OutcomeUnknown: + return "Event " + id + ": unknown, the worker did not report on it." + redispatch + case e.Outcome == OutcomeSucceeded && e.ReplyID == nil: + return "Event " + id + ": succeeded, with no reply reported." + } + return "" +} + +// stopSentence says how an attempt stopped. +func stopSentence(stop StopReason) string { + switch stop { + case StopFinished: + return "the worker finished" + case StopFailed: + return "the worker failed" + case StopDeadline: + return "the worker was stopped at the task's deadline" + case StopShutdown: + return "the connector shut down and stopped the worker" + case StopLost: + return "the worker was lost" + } + return "the worker stopped" +} + +// renderCompletion is an attempt's completion notice, or "" when the +// settlement calls for none. +func renderCompletion(kind MessageKind, s Settlement) string { + if !CompletionNeeded(s) { + return "" + } + lines := []string{"Task " + strconv.FormatInt(s.TaskID, 10) + " ended: " + stopSentence(s.Stop) + "."} + for _, e := range s.Events { + if line := completionLine(e); line != "" { + lines = append(lines, line) + } + } + lines = append(lines, "", "Attempt "+s.AttemptID+" · "+lifecycleSignature) + return renderLines(kind, lines) +} + +// renderLines lays lines out for the message kind: rich text for a comment, +// plain text for a chat line. Every line is escaped, though no line holds +// anything but this file's words and record values. +func renderLines(kind MessageKind, lines []string) string { + if kind == MessageComment { + escaped := make([]string, len(lines)) + for i, line := range lines { + escaped[i] = html.EscapeString(line) + } + return "<div>" + strings.Join(escaped, "<br>") + "</div>" + } + return strings.Join(lines, "\n") +} + +func clock(t time.Time) string { return t.UTC().Format("15:04 UTC") } + +var ( + breakTag = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)<br\s*/?>|</(div|p|li|h[1-6])>`) + anyTag = regexp.MustCompile(`<[^>]*>`) + spaceRuns = regexp.MustCompile(`\s+`) +) + +// MessageText is a message reduced to what reconciliation compares: tags +// dropped (a line break is a space), entities decoded, whitespace collapsed. +// Basecamp may wrap or re-attribute rich text it stores; the words stay. +func MessageText(content string) string { + text := breakTag.ReplaceAllString(content, " ") + text = anyTag.ReplaceAllString(text, "") + text = html.UnescapeString(text) + return strings.TrimSpace(spaceRuns.ReplaceAllString(text, " ")) +} + +// destinationKind maps a record's reply kind to the message a comment-shaped +// notice is posted as. +func destinationKind(replyKind string) (MessageKind, bool) { + switch replyKind { + case "comment": + return MessageComment, true + case "chat_line": + return MessageChatLine, true + } + return "", false +} + +// LifecycleOptions tunes the hooks. +type LifecycleOptions struct { + // GuardDelay is how long a worker has to call get_dispatch before the + // guard acknowledges; DefaultGuardDelay when zero. + GuardDelay time.Duration +} + +// DefaultGuardDelay is the guard's wait. +const DefaultGuardDelay = 30 * time.Second + +// LifecycleHooks are the ledger hooks that write the outbox's intents, each in +// its transition's transaction (invariant 1). Install them with +// Ledger.SetHooks. A connector running --shadow installs none: it posts +// nothing, and a shadow ledger promoted later must not carry intents to send. +func LifecycleHooks(l *Ledger, opts LifecycleOptions) Hooks { + if opts.GuardDelay <= 0 { + opts.GuardDelay = DefaultGuardDelay + } + return Hooks{ + VerdictCommitted: func(ctx context.Context, tx Tx, v CommittedVerdict) error { + return verdictIntents(ctx, tx, l.now(), opts.GuardDelay, v) + }, + AttemptEnded: func(ctx context.Context, tx Tx, s Settlement) error { + return completionIntent(ctx, tx, l.now(), s) + }, + StillRunning: func(ctx context.Context, tx Tx, tick StillRunningTick) error { + return stillRunningIntent(ctx, tx, l.now(), tick) + }, + } +} + +// verdictIntents writes the guard for an admitted request and the holding +// reply for an unrouted one. +func verdictIntents(ctx context.Context, tx Tx, now time.Time, guardDelay time.Duration, v CommittedVerdict) error { + if !v.Acknowledge { + // Subscribed and completed are not requests: no guard, no holding + // reply. + return nil + } + var bucketID, recordingID int64 + switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT bucket_id, recording_id FROM events WHERE id = ?`, v.EventID).Scan(&bucketID, &recordingID); { + case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows): + return fmt.Errorf("connector: lifecycle for event %d: %w", v.EventID, ErrNoSuchRecord) + case err != nil: + return fmt.Errorf("connector: lifecycle for event %d: %w", v.EventID, err) + } + switch { + case v.State == StateAdmitted || v.State == StateQueued: + err := writeIntent(ctx, tx, now, newIntent{ + key: guardKey(v.EventID), + kind: IntentGuardAck, + eventID: v.EventID, + destination: Destination{BucketID: bucketID, Kind: MessageBoost, RecordingID: recordingID}, + body: GuardAckBody, + notBefore: now.Add(guardDelay), + }) + return err + case v.State == StateBlocked && v.Reason == "no_route": + kind, ok := destinationKind(v.ReplyKind) + if !ok || v.ReplyRecordingID <= 0 { + return nil + } + err := writeIntent(ctx, tx, now, newIntent{ + key: holdingKey(v.EventID), + kind: IntentHoldingReply, + eventID: v.EventID, + destination: Destination{BucketID: bucketID, Kind: kind, RecordingID: v.ReplyRecordingID}, + body: renderHoldingReply(kind, v.EventID), + }) + return err + } + return nil +} + +// originDestination is where a task's notices go: the reply destination of +// its originating event. +func originDestination(ctx context.Context, tx Tx, taskID int64) (Destination, bool, error) { + var ( + bucketID, replyRecordingID int64 + replyKind string + ) + err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, ` +SELECT e.bucket_id, e.reply_kind, e.reply_recording_id +FROM tasks t JOIN events e ON e.id = t.originating_event_id WHERE t.id = ?`, taskID).Scan(&bucketID, &replyKind, &replyRecordingID) + switch { + case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows): + return Destination{}, false, nil + case err != nil: + return Destination{}, false, fmt.Errorf("connector: destination of task %d: %w", taskID, err) + } + kind, ok := destinationKind(replyKind) + if !ok || replyRecordingID <= 0 { + return Destination{}, false, nil + } + return Destination{BucketID: bucketID, Kind: kind, RecordingID: replyRecordingID}, true, nil +} + +func completionIntent(ctx context.Context, tx Tx, now time.Time, s Settlement) error { + // The notice is rendered from the rows the settlement wrote, not from the + // Settlement handed to the hook: what is posted is what the ledger says. + settled, err := settlementFromRecords(ctx, tx, s.AttemptID) + if err != nil { + return err + } + dest, ok, err := originDestination(ctx, tx, settled.TaskID) + if err != nil || !ok { + return err + } + // A settlement that calls for no notice renders nothing, and nothing is + // written. + err = writeIntent(ctx, tx, now, newIntent{ + key: completionKey(settled.AttemptID), + kind: IntentCompletion, + taskID: settled.TaskID, + attemptID: settled.AttemptID, + destination: dest, + body: renderCompletion(dest.Kind, settled), + }) + return err +} + +// settlementFromRecords reads an ended attempt's settlement back from the +// ledger: the attempt's stop reason, and each event's delivery, outcome, +// reply and withdrawal on its task. +func settlementFromRecords(ctx context.Context, q Tx, attemptID string) (Settlement, error) { + s := Settlement{AttemptID: attemptID} + var ( + stop string + spawnFailed bool + originating sql.NullInt64 + ) + err := q.QueryRowContext(ctx, ` +SELECT a.task_id, a.stop_reason, a.spawn_failed, t.originating_event_id +FROM attempts a JOIN tasks t ON t.id = a.task_id WHERE a.id = ? AND a.state = 'ended'`, attemptID).Scan(&s.TaskID, &stop, &spawnFailed, &originating) + switch { + case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows): + return Settlement{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: settlement of %s: %w", attemptID, ErrNoLiveAttempt) + case err != nil: + return Settlement{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: settlement of %s: %w", attemptID, err) + } + s.Stop, s.SpawnFailed, s.OriginatingEventID = StopReason(stop), spawnFailed, originating.Int64 + + // Decided is a person's decision this settlement's notice would otherwise + // ask for: the record left the state the notice describes, a redispatch + // waits on it, or an authorization was made strictly after this attempt + // ended. An authorization from before — a redispatch that led to this + // attempt — answered for an earlier outcome, not this one, and a stamp + // equal to the attempt's end is not evidence that it came after: the + // notice asks again, which is the safe direction. + rows, err := q.QueryContext(ctx, ` +SELECT te.event_id, te.delivery, te.outcome, te.reply_id, te.withdrawn_at IS NOT NULL, e.state, e.reason, + e.state NOT IN ('completed', 'blocked') OR e.redispatch_decision IS NOT NULL + OR COALESCE(e.authorized_at > (SELECT ended_at FROM attempts WHERE id = ?2), 0) +FROM task_events te JOIN events e ON e.id = te.event_id +WHERE te.task_id = ?1 AND (te.withdrawn_at IS NULL OR te.exposed_attempt_id = ?2) +ORDER BY te.event_id`, s.TaskID, attemptID) + if err != nil { + return Settlement{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: settlement of %s: %w", attemptID, err) + } + defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }() + for rows.Next() { + var ( + e SettledEvent + delivery, outcome, state string + reason string + reply sql.NullInt64 + ) + if err := rows.Scan(&e.EventID, &delivery, &outcome, &reply, &e.Withdrawn, &state, &reason, &e.Decided); err != nil { + return Settlement{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: settlement of %s: %w", attemptID, err) + } + switch { + case e.Withdrawn: + e.Blocked = RecordState(state) == StateBlocked && reason == ReasonSpawnFailed + case Delivery(delivery) == DeliveryCompleted: + e.Outcome = Outcome(outcome) + e.Reported = e.Outcome != OutcomeUnknown + if reply.Valid { + id := reply.Int64 + e.ReplyID = &id + } + default: + e.Returned = true + } + s.Events = append(s.Events, e) + } + return s, rows.Err() +} + +func stillRunningIntent(ctx context.Context, tx Tx, now time.Time, tick StillRunningTick) error { + dest, ok, err := originDestination(ctx, tx, tick.TaskID) + if err != nil || !ok { + return err + } + var launched string + if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT launched_at FROM attempts WHERE id = ?`, tick.AttemptID).Scan(&launched); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: still-running for %s: %w", tick.AttemptID, err) + } + launchedAt, err := parseStamp(launched) + if err != nil { + return err + } + err = writeIntent(ctx, tx, now, newIntent{ + key: stillRunningKey(tick.AttemptID, tick.Occurrence), + kind: IntentStillRunning, + taskID: tick.TaskID, + attemptID: tick.AttemptID, + occurrence: tick.Occurrence, + destination: dest, + body: renderStillRunning(dest.Kind, tick.TaskID, tick.AttemptID, tick.Occurrence, launchedAt, tick.ProgressAt), + }) + return err +} diff --git a/internal/connector/lifecycle_test.go b/internal/connector/lifecycle_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..aa202f04a --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/lifecycle_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,267 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "strconv" + "strings" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/admission" +) + +func id64(v int64) *int64 { return &v } + +// Done when: each template renders from records alone. The body written with +// the intent is the one rendered again from the ledger's rows after commit. +func TestLifecycleTemplatesRenderFromRecordsAlone(t *testing.T) { + t.Run("completion", func(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + obAdmit(t, ledger, 1, "recording:10304028989") + l := obLaunch(t, ledger, 1) + obAdmit(t, ledger, 2, "recording:10304028989") + _, err := ledger.JoinConversation(ctx, l.TaskID) + require.NoError(t, err) + clock.Advance(5 * time.Minute) + settlement, err := ledger.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: l.AttemptID, Stop: StopDeadline}) + require.NoError(t, err) + + in := obIntent(t, ledger, completionKey(l.AttemptID)) + fromRows, err := settlementFromRecords(ctx, ledger.db, l.AttemptID) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, in.Body, renderCompletion(in.Destination.Kind, fromRows)) + assert.Equal(t, in.Body, renderCompletion(in.Destination.Kind, settlement), "the ledger and the settlement agree") + assert.Equal(t, Destination{BucketID: adapterBucketID, Kind: MessageComment, RecordingID: obReplyRecording}, in.Destination) + assert.Equal(t, + "<div>Task "+itoa(l.TaskID)+" ended: the worker was stopped at the task's deadline.<br>"+ + "Event 1: unknown, the worker did not report on it. Needs a person: basecamp connect redispatch 1<br>"+ + "<br>Attempt "+l.AttemptID+" · automatic notice from basecamp connect</div>", + in.Body, "event 2 was never exposed: it waits for a task of its own and is not named") + }) + + t.Run("still running", func(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + obAdmit(t, ledger, 1, "recording:10304028989") + l := obLaunch(t, ledger, 1) + clock.Advance(3 * time.Minute) + require.NoError(t, ledger.RecordProgress(ctx, l.AttemptID)) + clock.Advance(7 * time.Minute) + tick, err := ledger.StillRunning(ctx, l.AttemptID) + require.NoError(t, err) + + in := obIntent(t, ledger, stillRunningKey(l.AttemptID, 1)) + assert.Equal(t, IntentStillRunning, in.Kind) + assert.Equal(t, renderStillRunning(MessageComment, l.TaskID, l.AttemptID, 1, l.LaunchedAt, tick.ProgressAt), in.Body) + assert.Equal(t, + "<div>Still working on this: task "+itoa(l.TaskID)+" started at 12:00 UTC. Last progress at 12:03 UTC.<br><br>"+ + "Attempt "+l.AttemptID+", update 1 · automatic notice from basecamp connect</div>", in.Body) + }) + + t.Run("holding reply in a Campfire", func(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + ledger, _ := obLedger(t) + seenRecord(t, ledger, 1) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(1, 0, admission.ReplyDestination{Kind: admission.ReplyChatLine, RecordingID: obCampfire})) + require.NoError(t, err) + in := obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)) + assert.Equal(t, Destination{BucketID: adapterBucketID, Kind: MessageChatLine, RecordingID: obCampfire}, in.Destination) + assert.Equal(t, renderHoldingReply(MessageChatLine, 1), in.Body) + assert.NotContains(t, in.Body, "<", "a chat line is plain text") + assert.True(t, in.NotBefore.Equal(in.CreatedAt), "a holding reply is due at once") + }) + + t.Run("guard", func(t *testing.T) { + ledger, _ := obLedger(t) + obAdmit(t, ledger, 1, "recording:10304028989") + in := obIntent(t, ledger, guardKey(1)) + assert.Equal(t, GuardAckBody, in.Body) + assert.Equal(t, DefaultGuardDelay, in.NotBefore.Sub(in.CreatedAt)) + }) +} + +func itoa(v int64) string { return strconv.FormatInt(v, 10) } + +// No template carries anything a person or worker wrote: the snapshot's +// content never reaches a lifecycle message. +func TestLifecycleMessagesCarryNoContent(t *testing.T) { + ledger, _ := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + seenRecord(t, ledger, 1) + v := admittedVerdict(1, 0, "recording:10304028989") + v.Snapshot.Title = "SECRET-TITLE" + v.Snapshot.Content = "<div>SECRET-CONTENT</div>" + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, v) + require.NoError(t, err) + l := obLaunch(t, ledger, 1) + _, err = ledger.StillRunning(ctx, l.AttemptID) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = ledger.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: l.AttemptID, Stop: StopFailed}) + require.NoError(t, err) + seenRecord(t, ledger, 2) + _, err = ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(2, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + + intents := obIntents(t, ledger) + require.Len(t, intents, 4) + for _, in := range intents { + assert.NotContains(t, in.Body, "SECRET", in.Key) + assert.NotContains(t, in.Body, "https://", in.Key) + } +} + +// Completion: one notice per attempt, when anything is not succeeded with a +// reply; the notice names what needs redispatch. +func TestCompletionNoticeRule(t *testing.T) { + cases := []struct { + name string + events []SettledEvent + want []string + }{ + {name: "all succeeded with replies", events: []SettledEvent{ + {EventID: 1, Outcome: OutcomeSucceeded, Reported: true, ReplyID: id64(5)}, + {EventID: 2, Outcome: OutcomeSucceeded, Reported: true, ReplyID: id64(6)}, + }}, + {name: "succeeded without a reply", events: []SettledEvent{ + {EventID: 1, Outcome: OutcomeSucceeded, Reported: true}, + }, want: []string{"Event 1: succeeded, with no reply reported."}}, + {name: "failed and unknown need redispatch", events: []SettledEvent{ + {EventID: 1, Outcome: OutcomeSucceeded, Reported: true, ReplyID: id64(5)}, + {EventID: 2, Outcome: OutcomeFailed, Reported: true, ReplyID: id64(6)}, + {EventID: 3, Outcome: OutcomeUnknown}, + }, want: []string{ + "Event 2: failed. Needs a person: basecamp connect redispatch 2", + "Event 3: unknown, the worker did not report on it. Needs a person: basecamp connect redispatch 3", + }}, + {name: "only returned or withdrawn for a retry", events: []SettledEvent{ + {EventID: 1, Withdrawn: true}, + {EventID: 2, Returned: true}, + }}, + {name: "blocked after a second failed start", events: []SettledEvent{ + {EventID: 1, Withdrawn: true, Blocked: true}, + }, want: []string{"Event 1: the worker could not be started. Needs a person: basecamp connect redispatch 1"}}, + } + for _, tc := range cases { + t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { + s := Settlement{TaskID: 9, AttemptID: "att_x", Stop: StopFinished, Events: tc.events} + body := renderCompletion(MessageChatLine, s) + assert.Equal(t, len(tc.want) > 0, CompletionNeeded(s)) + if len(tc.want) == 0 { + assert.Empty(t, body) + return + } + assert.Equal(t, "Task 9 ended: the worker finished.\n"+strings.Join(tc.want, "\n")+"\n\nAttempt att_x · automatic notice from basecamp connect", body) + }) + } +} + +// Every stop reason reads as itself; a failure is never called a cancel. +func TestCompletionNamesEachStopReason(t *testing.T) { + seen := map[string]bool{} + for _, stop := range []StopReason{StopFinished, StopFailed, StopDeadline, StopShutdown, StopLost} { + sentence := stopSentence(stop) + assert.NotEqual(t, "the worker stopped", sentence, stop) + assert.NotContains(t, sentence, "cancel", stop) + assert.False(t, seen[sentence], stop) + seen[sentence] = true + } +} + +// An attempt whose events all succeeded with replies posts nothing. +func TestCompletionIsNotWrittenWhenEverythingSucceededWithAReply(t *testing.T) { + ledger, _ := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + obAdmit(t, ledger, 1, "recording:10304028989") + l := obLaunch(t, ledger, 1) + d, err := ledger.Dispatch(ctx, l.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + obPull(t, d, 1) + _, err = d.Complete(ctx, 1, Completion{Outcome: OutcomeSucceeded, ReplyID: id64(4242)}) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = ledger.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: l.AttemptID, Stop: StopFinished}) + require.NoError(t, err) + for _, in := range obIntents(t, ledger) { + assert.NotEqual(t, IntentCompletion, in.Kind) + } +} + +// Reconciliation compares words, not markup Basecamp may rewrite. +func TestMessageTextComparesWordsNotMarkup(t *testing.T) { + body := renderHoldingReply(MessageComment, 7) + stored := `<div dir="auto">` + strings.ReplaceAll(body, "<br>", "<br />\n") + `</div>` + assert.Equal(t, MessageText(body), MessageText(stored)) + assert.Equal(t, MessageText(renderHoldingReply(MessageChatLine, 7)), MessageText(body), "a line and a comment say the same words") + assert.NotEqual(t, MessageText(body), MessageText(renderHoldingReply(MessageComment, 8))) + assert.Equal(t, "a & b", MessageText("<p>a &\n b</p>")) +} + +// The dispatch prompt's first instruction for a request is the worker's own +// acknowledgement, before any work, reported through ack_dispatch. +func TestDispatchPromptAcknowledgesFirst(t *testing.T) { + record := Record{ID: 17, Decision: Decision{Trigger: "mentioned", Acknowledge: true, RecordingURL: "https://app.basecamp.com/2914079/buckets/1/recordings/2"}} + prompt := DispatchPrompt(Launch{TaskID: 3}, record) + ack := strings.Index(prompt, "acknowledge first") + work := strings.Index(prompt, "Do the work") + require.Positive(t, ack) + require.Positive(t, work) + assert.Less(t, ack, work) + assert.Contains(t, prompt, "ack_dispatch") + assert.Contains(t, prompt, "guard_acknowledged") +} + +// A second failed start is read back from the ledger as blocked, and named. +func TestOutboxCompletionReadsBlockedBack(t *testing.T) { + ledger, _ := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + obAdmit(t, ledger, 1, "recording:10304028989") + for range 2 { + l := obLaunch(t, ledger, 1) + _, err := ledger.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: l.AttemptID, Stop: StopFailed, SpawnFailed: true}) + require.NoError(t, err) + } + require.Equal(t, StateBlocked, getRecord(t, ledger, 1).State) + completions, err := ledger.Intents(ctx, IntentFilter{Kinds: []IntentKind{IntentCompletion}}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, completions, 1, "the first withdrawal retries quietly; the second needs a person") + assert.Contains(t, completions[0].Body, "Event 1: the worker could not be started. Needs a person: basecamp connect redispatch 1") +} + +// The holding reply answers only a request blocked for want of a route. +func TestOutboxHoldingReplyOnlyForNoRoute(t *testing.T) { + ledger, _ := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + seenRecord(t, ledger, 1) + v := obNoRouteVerdict(1, 0, obCommentReply) + v.Reason = admission.ReasonReadFailed + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, v) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, obIntents(t, ledger), "a failed read is not answered") + + _, err = ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(1, getRecord(t, ledger, 1).Revision, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + in := obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)) + assert.Equal(t, Destination{BucketID: adapterBucketID, Kind: MessageComment, RecordingID: obReplyRecording}, in.Destination) +} + +// The dispatcher's adopted-reply rule never adopts a lifecycle message. +func TestOutboxLifecycleMessagesAreRecognized(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + seenRecord(t, ledger, 1) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(1, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + ob := obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp) + require.NoError(t, ob.Flush(ctx)) + receipt := *obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)).ReceiptID + + assert.True(t, ob.IsLifecycleMessage(receipt)) + assert.False(t, ob.IsLifecycleMessage(receipt+1)) + id, ok := AdoptableReply(AdoptionCandidate{DeliveredAt: clock.Now().Add(-time.Minute)}, + []AgentReply{{ID: receipt, CreatedAt: clock.Now()}}, ob.IsLifecycleMessage) + assert.False(t, ok, "adopted %d", id) +} diff --git a/internal/connector/lock.go b/internal/connector/lock.go index 4a99c4119..f153542b8 100644 --- a/internal/connector/lock.go +++ b/internal/connector/lock.go @@ -105,3 +105,29 @@ func describeHolder(path string) string { } return fmt.Sprintf("held by pid %d since %s", holder.PID, holder.StartedAt) } + +// InstanceHolderInfo is what a running connector wrote beside its lock. +type InstanceHolderInfo struct { + PID int + StartedAt string +} + +// InstanceHolder reads what a connector holding the lock in dir wrote about +// itself, without taking the lock: status must not make a starting connector +// find its own lock held. It is diagnostic, and can be stale after a crash. +func InstanceHolder(dir, accountID string, agentPersonID int64) (InstanceHolderInfo, bool) { + account, err := strconv.ParseUint(accountID, 10, 64) + if err != nil || account == 0 || agentPersonID <= 0 { + return InstanceHolderInfo{}, false + } + path := filepath.Join(dir, "instance-"+strconv.FormatUint(account, 10)+"-"+strconv.FormatInt(agentPersonID, 10)+".lock.json") + raw, err := os.ReadFile(path) + if err != nil { + return InstanceHolderInfo{}, false + } + var holder instanceHolder + if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &holder); err != nil || holder.PID <= 0 { + return InstanceHolderInfo{}, false + } + return InstanceHolderInfo{PID: holder.PID, StartedAt: holder.StartedAt}, true +} diff --git a/internal/connector/operator_invariants_test.go b/internal/connector/operator_invariants_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..179f92482 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/operator_invariants_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,1130 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "path/filepath" + "strconv" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/admission" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" +) + +// The operator decisions and the hold (ledger_hold.go). Each test names the +// invariant it holds. + +const ( + opRoute = "/work/connector" + opBy = "local:tester" +) + +// opAdmit writes id seen and commits an admitted verdict on conversation key, +// returning the state the ledger wrote. +func opAdmit(t *testing.T, l *Ledger, id int64, key string) RecordState { + t.Helper() + ctx := context.Background() + record := seenRecord(t, l, id) + v := admittedVerdict(id, record.Revision, key) + v.Route = opRoute + state, err := l.Admission().Commit(ctx, v) + require.NoError(t, err) + return RecordState(state) +} + +func launchOf(t *testing.T, l *Ledger, id int64) Launch { + t.Helper() + launch, err := l.LaunchTask(context.Background(), LaunchSpec{EventID: id, Route: opRoute, Driver: "claude"}) + require.NoError(t, err) + return launch +} + +func stateOf(t *testing.T, l *Ledger, id int64) RecordState { + t.Helper() + return getRecord(t, l, id).State +} + +func decisionsFor(t *testing.T, l *Ledger, id int64) int { + t.Helper() + var n int + require.NoError(t, l.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM decisions WHERE event_id = ?`, id).Scan(&n)) + return n +} + +// unknownOutcome takes a fresh record to completed(unknown): launched, running, +// lost. +func unknownOutcome(t *testing.T, l *Ledger, id int64) Launch { + t.Helper() + ctx := context.Background() + require.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, opAdmit(t, l, id, "recording:"+strconv.FormatInt(id, 10))) + launch := launchOf(t, l, id) + require.NoError(t, l.MarkRunning(ctx, launch.AttemptID, AttemptProcess{PID: 4242, PGID: 4242, StartedAt: time.Now()})) + _, err := l.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, Stop: StopLost}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Equal(t, StateCompleted, stateOf(t, l, id)) + return launch +} + +// Done when: redispatch of completed(unknown) admits the record, supersedes +// the task's token and records who authorized it. +func TestRedispatchAdmitsAnUnknownOutcome(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + launch := unknownOutcome(t, l, 1) + + got, err := l.Redispatch(ctx, 1, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, got.Admitted) + assert.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, got.State) + assert.Equal(t, OutcomeUnknown, got.FromOutcome) + assert.Equal(t, 1, decisionsFor(t, l, 1)) + + var by string + require.NoError(t, l.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT authorized_by FROM events WHERE id = 1`).Scan(&by)) + assert.Equal(t, opBy, by) + _, err = l.Dispatch(ctx, launch.Token, adapterAgentID) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTaskTokenRefused, "the replaced task's token is refused") + + startable, err := l.StartableRecords(ctx, 10) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, startable, 1) + second := launchOf(t, l, 1) + assert.NotEqual(t, launch.TaskID, second.TaskID) +} + +// Done when: redispatch of completed(failed) admits it. +func TestRedispatchAdmitsAFailedOutcome(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + require.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1")) + launch := launchOf(t, l, 1) + d, err := l.Dispatch(ctx, launch.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + pulled(t, d, 1) + _, err = d.Complete(ctx, 1, Completion{Outcome: OutcomeFailed}) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, Stop: StopFinished}) + require.NoError(t, err) + + got, err := l.Redispatch(ctx, 1, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, got.Admitted) + assert.Equal(t, OutcomeFailed, got.FromOutcome) + assert.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, stateOf(t, l, 1)) +} + +// Invariant 5: an event whose task is still live is not admitted until the +// task ends, so two workers never run for it. +func TestRedispatchOnALiveTaskWaitsForItsEnd(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + require.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:9")) + require.Equal(t, StateQueued, opAdmit(t, l, 2, "recording:9")) + launch := launchOf(t, l, 1) + started := time.Now().Add(-time.Minute).UTC() + require.NoError(t, l.MarkRunning(ctx, launch.AttemptID, AttemptProcess{PID: 4242, PGID: 4242, StartedAt: started})) + d, err := l.Dispatch(ctx, launch.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + pulled(t, d, 1) + _, err = d.Complete(ctx, 1, Completion{Outcome: OutcomeFailed}) + require.NoError(t, err) + + got, err := l.Redispatch(ctx, 1, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, got.Pending) + assert.False(t, got.Admitted) + assert.Equal(t, launch.TaskID, got.SupersededTaskID) + require.NotNil(t, got.Worker, "the live worker is handed back to be terminated") + assert.Equal(t, 4242, got.Worker.PGID) + assert.Equal(t, StateCompleted, stateOf(t, l, 1)) + + _, _, err = d.Get(ctx, 2) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTaskTokenRefused, "the old worker is refused at once") + _, err = l.LaunchTask(ctx, LaunchSpec{EventID: 1, Route: opRoute, Driver: "claude"}) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNotStartable, "no second task while the first is live") + startable, err := l.StartableRecords(ctx, 10) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, startable) + + _, err = l.Redispatch(ctx, 1, opBy) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrDecisionRefused, "a second redispatch while the first waits") + + _, err = l.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, Stop: StopLost}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, stateOf(t, l, 1), "admitted in the transaction that ended the task") + var consumed bool + require.NoError(t, l.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT redispatch_decision IS NULL FROM events WHERE id = 1`).Scan(&consumed)) + assert.True(t, consumed, "the task's end consumed the redispatch") + second := launchOf(t, l, 1) + assert.NotEqual(t, launch.TaskID, second.TaskID) +} + +// Invariant 6: refused for succeeded, discarded and anything live, and a +// refusal writes nothing. +// +//nolint:contextcheck // subtests build their fixtures on background contexts +func TestRedispatchRefusesWhatItMustNotRun(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + cases := map[string]func(t *testing.T, l *Ledger){ + "seen": func(t *testing.T, l *Ledger) { seenRecord(t, l, 1) }, + "admitted": func(t *testing.T, l *Ledger) { opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") }, + "queued": func(t *testing.T, l *Ledger) { + opAdmit(t, l, 7, "recording:1") + require.Equal(t, StateQueued, opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1")) + }, + "dispatched": func(t *testing.T, l *Ledger) { + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + launchOf(t, l, 1) + }, + "discarded": func(t *testing.T, l *Ledger) { + seenRecord(t, l, 1) + require.NoError(t, l.SetState(ctx, 1, StateDiscarded, "untrusted_author")) + }, + "succeeded": func(t *testing.T, l *Ledger) { + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + launch := launchOf(t, l, 1) + d, err := l.Dispatch(ctx, launch.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + pulled(t, d, 1) + _, err = d.Complete(ctx, 1, Completion{Outcome: OutcomeSucceeded}) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, Stop: StopFinished}) + require.NoError(t, err) + }, + } + for name, arrange := range cases { + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + arrange(t, l) + before := getRecord(t, l, 1) + + _, err := l.Redispatch(ctx, 1, opBy) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrDecisionRefused) + after := getRecord(t, l, 1) + assert.Equal(t, before.State, after.State) + assert.Equal(t, before.Revision, after.Revision) + assert.Zero(t, decisionsFor(t, l, 1)) + }) + } +} + +// Done when: a blocked record keeps its state with the authorization +// recorded, and is admitted the moment its prerequisite succeeds. +func TestRedispatchOfABlockedRecordRerunsItsPrerequisite(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + seenRecord(t, l, 1) + _, err := l.Admission().Commit(ctx, blockedVerdict(1, 0, admission.ReasonReadFailed)) + require.NoError(t, err) + // A hold before the redispatch: the authorization is what lets it through. + _, err = l.SetHold(ctx, opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + + got, err := l.Redispatch(ctx, 1, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, got.Rerun) + assert.True(t, got.Held) + assert.Equal(t, StateBlocked, got.State) + ids, err := l.AuthorizedBlocked(ctx, 10) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, []int64{1}, ids) + + ev, ok, err := l.Admission().LoadUndecided(ctx, 1) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok) + v := admittedVerdict(1, ev.Revision, "recording:1") + v.Route = opRoute + written, err := l.Admission().Commit(ctx, v) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, admission.StateAdmitted, written, "authorized, so admitted though tagged for review") + + // Under the hold it is authorized and not launched. + _, err = l.LaunchTask(ctx, LaunchSpec{EventID: 1, Route: opRoute, Driver: "claude"}) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "held") + _, err = l.Release(ctx, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + launchOf(t, l, 1) +} + +// Done when: a held record with its snapshot and route is admitted at once. +func TestRedispatchAdmitsAHeldRecord(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + res, err := l.SetHold(ctx, opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, 1, res.Held) + require.Equal(t, StateHeld, stateOf(t, l, 1)) + + got, err := l.Redispatch(ctx, 1, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, got.Admitted) + assert.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, stateOf(t, l, 1)) +} + +// A held record over a blocking reason runs what blocked it again. +func TestRedispatchOfARecordHeldOverAReasonRerunsIt(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + _, err := l.SetHold(ctx, opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `UPDATE events SET reason = 'no_route' WHERE id = 1`) + require.NoError(t, err) + + got, err := l.Redispatch(ctx, 1, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, got.Rerun) + record := getRecord(t, l, 1) + assert.Equal(t, StateBlocked, record.State) + assert.Equal(t, "no_route", record.Reason) + assert.Nil(t, record.Decision.Snapshot, "a blocked record carries no content") +} + +// Done when: a review-tagged seen record becomes held, not dispatched — and +// the verdict says so, so no guard acknowledgement is called for. +func TestInvariant1AReviewTaggedSeenRecordIsHeldNotDispatched(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + l.SetHooks(LifecycleHooks(l, LifecycleOptions{})) + ctx := context.Background() + seenRecord(t, l, 1) + _, err := l.SetHold(ctx, opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + + state := opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + assert.Equal(t, StateHeld, state) + assert.Equal(t, StateHeld, stateOf(t, l, 1)) + startable, err := l.StartableRecords(ctx, 10) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, startable) + intents, err := l.Intents(ctx, IntentFilter{EventID: 1}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, intents, "a held record calls for no guard acknowledgement") + + _, err = l.Release(ctx, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StateHeld, stateOf(t, l, 1), "held records stay held on release") + startable, err = l.StartableRecords(ctx, 10) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, startable) +} + +// Records of the generation a hold opened are not tagged, and dispatch once +// the hold is released. +func TestANewGenerationIsNotTagged(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + _, err := l.SetHold(ctx, opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1")) + _, err = l.Release(ctx, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + launchOf(t, l, 1) +} + +// Invariant 1, for every path to admitted: a tagged sibling a task's end +// returns is held. +func TestInvariant1ATaggedSiblingReturnedByATaskIsHeld(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:9") + require.Equal(t, StateQueued, opAdmit(t, l, 2, "recording:9")) + launch := launchOf(t, l, 1) + _, err := l.SetHold(ctx, opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Equal(t, StateDispatched, stateOf(t, l, 2)) + + settlement, err := l.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, Stop: StopShutdown}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, settlement.Events, 2) + assert.True(t, settlement.Events[1].Returned) + assert.Equal(t, StateHeld, stateOf(t, l, 2)) +} + +// Invariant 1, at the database: any write of admitted onto a tagged, +// unauthorized record lands held. +func TestInvariant1TheDatabaseHoldsATaggedRecord(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + _, err := l.db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `UPDATE events SET state = 'blocked', reason = 'x' WHERE id = 1`) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `UPDATE events SET review = 1 WHERE id = 1`) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `UPDATE events SET state = 'admitted', reason = '' WHERE id = 1`) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StateHeld, stateOf(t, l, 1)) +} + +// Done when: a held ledger survives restart until release, and the database +// refuses a launch while it stands. +func TestInvariant2AHeldLedgerSurvivesRestartUntilRelease(t *testing.T) { + path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "state", LedgerFile) + ctx := context.Background() + l, err := OpenLedger(path) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.SetHold(ctx, opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, l.Close()) + + l, err = OpenLedger(path) + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = l.Close() }) + held, err := l.Held(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, held) + // A record of the new generation, which a person need not review, still + // does not launch while the marker stands. + assert.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1")) + startable, err := l.StartableRecords(ctx, 10) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, startable, "the dispatcher is offered nothing while the hold stands") + _, err = l.LaunchTask(ctx, LaunchSpec{EventID: 1, Route: opRoute, Driver: "claude"}) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, stateOf(t, l, 1), "the refused launch rolled back") + + released, err := l.Release(ctx, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, released.Released) + held, err = l.Held(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.False(t, held) + launchOf(t, l, 1) +} + +// Invariant 2: nothing moves to sending under the hold. +func TestInvariant2NothingIsPostedUnderTheHold(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + l.SetHooks(LifecycleHooks(l, LifecycleOptions{})) + ctx := context.Background() + seenRecord(t, l, 1) + v := blockedVerdict(1, 0, admission.ReasonNoRoute) + v.Trigger, v.Acknowledge = admission.TriggerMentioned, true + v.Reply = &admission.ReplyDestination{Kind: admission.ReplyComment, RecordingID: 10304028989} + _, err := l.Admission().Commit(ctx, v) + require.NoError(t, err) + pending, err := l.Intents(ctx, IntentFilter{States: []IntentState{IntentPending}}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, pending, 1) + + _, err = l.SetHold(ctx, opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, _, err = l.claimIntent(ctx) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "held") + + _, err = l.Release(ctx, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + claimed, ok, err := l.claimIntent(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok) + assert.Equal(t, IntentSending, claimed.State) +} + +// A held record's pending guard acknowledgement is not sent later. +func TestHoldingARecordCancelsItsPendingGuard(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + l.SetHooks(LifecycleHooks(l, LifecycleOptions{})) + ctx := context.Background() + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + guards, err := l.Intents(ctx, IntentFilter{Kinds: []IntentKind{IntentGuardAck}, States: []IntentState{IntentPending}}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, guards, 1) + + _, err = l.SetHold(ctx, opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + guard, err := l.Intent(ctx, guards[0].ID) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, IntentCanceled, guard.State) +} + +// Invariant 4: a terminal record leaves its state only with a decision +// written in the same statement. +// +//nolint:contextcheck // subtests build their fixtures on background contexts +func TestInvariant4TheDatabaseRefusesATerminalMoveWithoutADecision(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + t.Run("completed to admitted without a redispatch", func(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + unknownOutcome(t, l, 1) + _, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE events SET state = 'admitted' WHERE id = 1`) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "terminal") + }) + t.Run("a redispatch of a success", func(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + unknownOutcome(t, l, 1) + decision := rawDecision(t, l, 1, "redispatch", "9999-01-01T00:00:00.000000000Z") + _, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE task_events SET outcome = 'succeeded' WHERE event_id = 1`) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE events SET redispatch_decision = ? WHERE id = 1`, decision) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE events SET state = 'admitted', redispatch_decision = NULL WHERE id = 1`) + require.Error(t, err) + }) + t.Run("a redispatch naming another event's decision", func(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + unknownOutcome(t, l, 1) + seenRecord(t, l, 2) + decision := rawDecision(t, l, 2, "redispatch", "9999-01-01T00:00:00.000000000Z") + _, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE events SET redispatch_decision = ? WHERE id = 1`, decision) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE events SET state = 'admitted', redispatch_decision = NULL WHERE id = 1`) + require.Error(t, err) + }) + t.Run("a redispatch decided before the outcome settled", func(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + unknownOutcome(t, l, 1) + decision := rawDecision(t, l, 1, "redispatch", "2000-01-01T00:00:00.000000000Z") + _, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE events SET redispatch_decision = ? WHERE id = 1`, decision) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE events SET state = 'admitted', redispatch_decision = NULL WHERE id = 1`) + require.Error(t, err) + }) + t.Run("a discard with no decision", func(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + unknownOutcome(t, l, 1) + // Decisions that are not this record's discard do not stand in for one. + seenRecord(t, l, 2) + rawDecision(t, l, 2, "discard", "9999-01-01T00:00:00.000000000Z") + rawDecision(t, l, 1, "redispatch", "9999-01-01T00:00:00.000000000Z") + _, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE events SET state = 'discarded', reason = 'by_operator' WHERE id = 1`) + require.Error(t, err) + }) + t.Run("a discard decided before the outcome settled", func(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + unknownOutcome(t, l, 1) + rawDecision(t, l, 1, "discard", "2000-01-01T00:00:00.000000000Z") + _, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE events SET state = 'discarded', reason = 'by_operator' WHERE id = 1`) + require.Error(t, err) + }) + t.Run("discarded never leaves", func(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + seenRecord(t, l, 1) + require.NoError(t, l.SetState(ctx, 1, StateDiscarded, ReasonByOperator)) + decision := rawDecision(t, l, 1, "redispatch", "9999-01-01T00:00:00.000000000Z") + _, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE events SET redispatch_decision = ? WHERE id = 1`, decision) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE events SET state = 'admitted', redispatch_decision = NULL WHERE id = 1`) + require.Error(t, err) + }) + t.Run("an unknown outcome discarded for another reason", func(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + unknownOutcome(t, l, 1) + rawDecision(t, l, 1, "discard", "9999-01-01T00:00:00.000000000Z") + _, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE events SET state = 'discarded', reason = 'untrusted_author' WHERE id = 1`) + require.Error(t, err) + }) +} + +// Done when: discard closes held, blocked and unknown records as +// discarded(by_operator), and refuses the rest. +// +//nolint:contextcheck // subtests build their fixtures on background contexts +func TestDiscard(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + accepted := map[string]func(t *testing.T, l *Ledger){ + "held": func(t *testing.T, l *Ledger) { + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + _, err := l.SetHold(ctx, opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + }, + "blocked": func(t *testing.T, l *Ledger) { + seenRecord(t, l, 1) + _, err := l.Admission().Commit(ctx, blockedVerdict(1, 0, admission.ReasonReadFailed)) + require.NoError(t, err) + }, + "unknown": func(t *testing.T, l *Ledger) { unknownOutcome(t, l, 1) }, + } + for name, arrange := range accepted { + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + arrange(t, l) + got, err := l.Discard(ctx, 1, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.False(t, got.Already) + record := getRecord(t, l, 1) + assert.Equal(t, StateDiscarded, record.State) + assert.Equal(t, ReasonByOperator, record.Reason) + assert.Equal(t, 1, decisionsFor(t, l, 1)) + + again, err := l.Discard(ctx, 1, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, again.Already) + _, err = l.Redispatch(ctx, 1, opBy) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrDecisionRefused) + }) + } + refused := map[string]func(t *testing.T, l *Ledger){ + "seen": func(t *testing.T, l *Ledger) { seenRecord(t, l, 1) }, + "admitted": func(t *testing.T, l *Ledger) { opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") }, + "dispatched": func(t *testing.T, l *Ledger) { + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + launchOf(t, l, 1) + }, + "failed": func(t *testing.T, l *Ledger) { + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + launch := launchOf(t, l, 1) + d, err := l.Dispatch(ctx, launch.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + pulled(t, d, 1) + _, err = d.Complete(ctx, 1, Completion{Outcome: OutcomeFailed}) + require.NoError(t, err) + }, + "discarded by admission": func(t *testing.T, l *Ledger) { + seenRecord(t, l, 1) + require.NoError(t, l.SetState(ctx, 1, StateDiscarded, "untrusted_author")) + }, + } + for name, arrange := range refused { + t.Run("refuses "+name, func(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + arrange(t, l) + before := getRecord(t, l, 1) + _, err := l.Discard(ctx, 1, opBy) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrDecisionRefused) + assert.Equal(t, before.State, stateOf(t, l, 1)) + assert.Zero(t, decisionsFor(t, l, 1)) + }) + } +} + +// A discard cancels the lifecycle messages still pending for the record. +func TestDiscardCancelsAPendingHoldingReply(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + l.SetHooks(LifecycleHooks(l, LifecycleOptions{})) + ctx := context.Background() + seenRecord(t, l, 1) + v := blockedVerdict(1, 0, admission.ReasonNoRoute) + v.Trigger, v.Acknowledge = admission.TriggerMentioned, true + v.Reply = &admission.ReplyDestination{Kind: admission.ReplyComment, RecordingID: 10304028989} + _, err := l.Admission().Commit(ctx, v) + require.NoError(t, err) + + got, err := l.Discard(ctx, 1, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, 1, got.Canceled) + pending, err := l.Intents(ctx, IntentFilter{States: []IntentState{IntentPending}}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, pending) +} + +// rawDecision writes a decisions row directly, as something other than this +// package could. +func rawDecision(t *testing.T, l *Ledger, eventID int64, action, at string) int64 { + t.Helper() + res, err := l.db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `INSERT INTO decisions (action, event_id, decided_by, decided_at) VALUES (?, ?, 'raw', ?)`, action, eventID, at) + require.NoError(t, err) + id, err := res.LastInsertId() + require.NoError(t, err) + return id +} + +// pulled hands the worker its dispatch for eventID, as a real worker does +// before it acknowledges or completes: a record is exposed at launch, but the +// ledger refuses an acknowledgement or a completion until the worker has +// pulled it. +func pulled(t *testing.T, d *TaskDispatch, eventID int64) { + t.Helper() + _, ok, err := d.Get(context.Background(), eventID) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok, "the worker is handed event %d", eventID) +} + +// pendingRedispatch leaves event 1 completed(failed) on a live task with a +// redispatch waiting for the task to end, and returns the task's launch. +func pendingRedispatch(t *testing.T, l *Ledger) Launch { + t.Helper() + ctx := context.Background() + require.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:9")) + launch := launchOf(t, l, 1) + d, err := l.Dispatch(ctx, launch.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + pulled(t, d, 1) + _, err = d.Complete(ctx, 1, Completion{Outcome: OutcomeFailed}) + require.NoError(t, err) + got, err := l.Redispatch(ctx, 1, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, got.Pending) + return launch +} + +// Retention never strands a waiting redispatch: the record keeps what its +// admission needs, and the task's end is never refused. +func TestRetentionKeepsARecordAWaitingRedispatchNeeds(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + launch := pendingRedispatch(t, l) + dropped, err := l.DropContent(ctx, time.Now().Add(24*time.Hour), time.Now().Add(24*time.Hour)) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Zero(t, dropped) + + _, err = l.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, Stop: StopLost}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, stateOf(t, l, 1)) +} + +// A task's end never fails for a waiting redispatch whose record cannot be +// admitted: it stays completed. +func TestATaskEndIsNeverRefusedForAWaitingRedispatch(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + launch := pendingRedispatch(t, l) + _, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE events SET content_dropped = 1, snapshot = NULL WHERE id = 1`) + require.NoError(t, err) + + _, err = l.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, Stop: StopLost}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StateCompleted, stateOf(t, l, 1)) +} + +// Invariant 3: a hold withdraws a redispatch still waiting for its task. +func TestInvariant3AHoldWithdrawsAWaitingRedispatch(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + launch := pendingRedispatch(t, l) + _, err := l.SetHold(ctx, opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + + _, err = l.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, Stop: StopLost}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StateCompleted, stateOf(t, l, 1), "the authorization did not survive the hold") + _, err = l.Redispatch(ctx, 1, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err, "a person can authorize it again") +} + +// An import withdraws a waiting redispatch, whether the file says the entry is +// done or does not name it. +func TestImportWithdrawsAWaitingRedispatch(t *testing.T) { + for name, c := range map[string]struct { + entries []ReconciliationEntry + want RecordState + }{ + "done": {entries: []ReconciliationEntry{{EventID: 1, Decision: DecisionDone}}, want: StateDiscarded}, + "unnamed": {want: StateCompleted}, + } { + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + launch := pendingRedispatch(t, l) + _, err := l.Import(ctx, Reconciliation{Version: 1, Entries: c.entries}, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + + _, err = l.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, Stop: StopLost}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, c.want, stateOf(t, l, 1), "never admitted by the withdrawn redispatch") + }) + } +} + +// A task a redispatch superseded while it runs takes no follow-up: the event +// waits for the task to end and starts its own. +func TestASupersededTaskTakesNoFollowUp(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + launch := pendingRedispatch(t, l) + require.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, opAdmit(t, l, 2, "recording:9"), "the conversation's task is superseded, so a new event is admitted") + + joined, err := l.JoinConversation(ctx, launch.TaskID) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, joined) + _, err = l.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, Stop: StopLost}) + require.NoError(t, err) + startable, err := l.StartableRecords(ctx, 10) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, startable, 1) + second := launchOf(t, l, 1) + assert.ElementsMatch(t, []int64{1, 2}, second.EventIDs) +} + +// A held record redispatched onto a live conversation is queued, as admission +// would write it. +func TestRedispatchQueuesAHeldRecordBehindALiveConversation(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:9") + _, err := l.SetHold(ctx, opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, opAdmit(t, l, 2, "recording:9"), "a new generation's record on the same conversation") + + got, err := l.Redispatch(ctx, 1, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StateQueued, got.State) + assert.False(t, got.Admitted) +} + +// A completion notice asks nothing of a person who has already decided the +// record: the notice says what happened, and no more. +func TestACompletionNoticeAsksNothingOfADecidedRecord(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + l.SetHooks(LifecycleHooks(l, LifecycleOptions{})) + ctx := context.Background() + launch := pendingRedispatch(t, l) + + _, err := l.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, Stop: StopLost}) + require.NoError(t, err) + intents, err := l.Intents(ctx, IntentFilter{Kinds: []IntentKind{IntentCompletion}}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, intents, 1) + assert.Contains(t, intents[0].Body, "Event 1: failed") + assert.NotContains(t, intents[0].Body, "redispatch 1", "a person already redispatched it") +} + +// An import that closes a record does not leave it a lifecycle message that +// asks for a redispatch the ledger would refuse. +func TestImportCancelsTheMessagesOfARecordItCloses(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + l.SetHooks(LifecycleHooks(l, LifecycleOptions{})) + ctx := context.Background() + seenRecord(t, l, 1) + v := blockedVerdict(1, 0, admission.ReasonNoRoute) + v.Trigger, v.Acknowledge = admission.TriggerMentioned, true + v.Reply = &admission.ReplyDestination{Kind: admission.ReplyComment, RecordingID: 10304028989} + _, err := l.Admission().Commit(ctx, v) + require.NoError(t, err) + + _, err = l.Import(ctx, Reconciliation{Version: 1, Entries: []ReconciliationEntry{{EventID: 1, Decision: DecisionDone}}}, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + pending, err := l.Intents(ctx, IntentFilter{States: []IntentState{IntentPending}}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, pending, "nothing is posted about a record a person closed") +} + +// A completion notice waiting in the outbox is rendered again when it is +// claimed: a record a person decided in between asks nothing of them. +func TestACompletionNoticeIsRenderedAgainWhenItIsClaimed(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + l.SetHooks(LifecycleHooks(l, LifecycleOptions{})) + ctx := context.Background() + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + launch := launchOf(t, l, 1) + _, err := l.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, Stop: StopLost}) + require.NoError(t, err) + notices, err := l.Intents(ctx, IntentFilter{Kinds: []IntentKind{IntentCompletion}}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, notices, 1) + require.Contains(t, notices[0].Body, "redispatch 1") + + _, err = l.Discard(ctx, 1, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + claimed, ok, err := l.claimIntent(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok) + assert.Equal(t, IntentSending, claimed.State) + assert.Contains(t, claimed.Body, "Event 1: unknown") + assert.NotContains(t, claimed.Body, "redispatch 1", "a person already decided it") +} + +// Invariant 2, at the database: a task takes no follow-up while the hold +// marker stands, however the hold arrived. +func TestInvariant2ATaskTakesNoFollowUpUnderTheHold(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:9") + launch := launchOf(t, l, 1) + _, err := l.SetHold(ctx, opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Equal(t, StateQueued, opAdmit(t, l, 2, "recording:9"), "a new generation's record on the live conversation") + + joined, err := l.JoinConversation(ctx, launch.TaskID) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, joined) + assert.Equal(t, StateQueued, stateOf(t, l, 2)) +} + +// A record a person authorized is decided too, though it stays blocked until +// its prerequisite runs: the notice claimed meanwhile asks nothing more. +func TestACompletionNoticeAsksNothingOfAnAuthorizedBlockedRecord(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + l.SetHooks(LifecycleHooks(l, LifecycleOptions{})) + ctx := context.Background() + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + for range 2 { + launch := launchOf(t, l, 1) + _, err := l.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, Stop: StopFailed, SpawnFailed: true}) + require.NoError(t, err) + } + require.Equal(t, StateBlocked, stateOf(t, l, 1)) + notices, err := l.Intents(ctx, IntentFilter{Kinds: []IntentKind{IntentCompletion}}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, notices, 1) + require.Contains(t, notices[0].Body, "redispatch 1") + + got, err := l.Redispatch(ctx, 1, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, got.Rerun) + claimed, ok, err := l.claimIntent(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok) + assert.NotContains(t, claimed.Body, "redispatch 1") +} + +// An authorization answers for the outcome it was made on. When the attempt it +// led to ends unknown again, or cannot start, the notice asks again. +func TestAnEarlierAuthorizationDoesNotSilenceALaterNotice(t *testing.T) { + for name, second := range map[string]func(t *testing.T, l *Ledger){ + "unknown again": func(t *testing.T, l *Ledger) { + launch := launchOf(t, l, 1) + _, err := l.EndAttempt(context.Background(), AttemptEnd{AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, Stop: StopLost}) + require.NoError(t, err) + }, + "blocked on its start": func(t *testing.T, l *Ledger) { + for range 2 { + launch := launchOf(t, l, 1) + _, err := l.EndAttempt(context.Background(), AttemptEnd{AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, Stop: StopFailed, SpawnFailed: true}) + require.NoError(t, err) + } + ids, err := l.AuthorizedBlocked(context.Background(), 10) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, ids, "the old authorization does not stand for the new block") + }, + } { + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + l.SetHooks(LifecycleHooks(l, LifecycleOptions{})) + ctx := context.Background() + first := unknownOutcome(t, l, 1) + _, err := l.Redispatch(ctx, 1, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + second(t, l) + + notices, err := l.Intents(ctx, IntentFilter{Kinds: []IntentKind{IntentCompletion}}) + require.NoError(t, err) + var latest Intent + for _, n := range notices { + if n.AttemptID != first.AttemptID { + latest = n + break + } + } + require.NotZero(t, latest.ID) + assert.Contains(t, latest.Body, "redispatch 1", "a person is asked again") + }) + } +} + +// An import's done decision closes an unknown or failed outcome for good: no +// redispatch is accepted for it and no notice asks for one. A success stays +// as it was. +func TestImportDoneClosesAnOutcomeThatWaitedForAPerson(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + l.SetHooks(LifecycleHooks(l, LifecycleOptions{})) + ctx := context.Background() + unknownOutcome(t, l, 1) + opAdmit(t, l, 2, "recording:2") + launch := launchOf(t, l, 2) + d, err := l.Dispatch(ctx, launch.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + pulled(t, d, 2) + reply := int64(77) + _, err = d.Complete(ctx, 2, Completion{Outcome: OutcomeSucceeded, ReplyID: &reply}) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, Stop: StopFinished}) + require.NoError(t, err) + + got, err := l.Import(ctx, Reconciliation{Version: 1, Entries: []ReconciliationEntry{ + {EventID: 1, Decision: DecisionDone}, {EventID: 2, Decision: DecisionDone}, + }}, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, 1, got.Tombstoned) + assert.Equal(t, 1, got.AlreadyTerminal) + + one := getRecord(t, l, 1) + assert.Equal(t, StateDiscarded, one.State) + assert.Equal(t, ReasonImportedDone, one.Reason) + assert.Equal(t, StateCompleted, stateOf(t, l, 2)) + var recordedAs string + require.NoError(t, l.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT to_state FROM decisions WHERE event_id = 2 AND action = 'import'`).Scan(&recordedAs)) + assert.Equal(t, string(StateCompleted), recordedAs, "the audit says what happened, not what would have") + _, err = l.Redispatch(ctx, 1, opBy) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrDecisionRefused) + claimed, ok, err := l.claimIntent(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + if ok { + assert.NotContains(t, claimed.Body, "redispatch 1") + } +} + +// A record held over a blocking reason and redispatched is authorized for the +// block that redispatch put it in, though the move stamps the block after the +// authorization's own time was taken. +func TestARedispatchOntoBlockedIsAuthorizedForThatBlock(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + _, err := l.SetHold(ctx, opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE events SET reason = 'no_route' WHERE id = 1`) + require.NoError(t, err) + base := time.Now() + calls := 0 + l.now = func() time.Time { calls++; return base.Add(time.Duration(calls) * time.Second) } // each stamp later than the last + + _, err = l.Redispatch(ctx, 1, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + ids, err := l.AuthorizedBlocked(ctx, 10) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, []int64{1}, ids) +} + +// A person who redispatches and then discards the same record has decided +// twice: the discard stands, and the redispatch waiting for the task's end is +// withdrawn with it. +func TestADiscardWithdrawsARedispatchWaitingForItsTask(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + launch := pendingRedispatch(t, l) + _, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE task_events SET outcome = 'unknown' WHERE event_id = 1`) + require.NoError(t, err) + + _, err = l.Discard(ctx, 1, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: launch.AttemptID, Stop: StopLost}) + require.NoError(t, err) + record := getRecord(t, l, 1) + assert.Equal(t, StateDiscarded, record.State, "the task's end does not reopen what a person closed") + assert.Equal(t, ReasonByOperator, record.Reason) + var waiting bool + require.NoError(t, l.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT redispatch_decision IS NOT NULL FROM events WHERE id = 1`).Scan(&waiting)) + assert.False(t, waiting, "the authorization went with the record") +} + +// A canceled guard is finished like every other intent the ledger closes. +func TestAHeldRecordsCanceledGuardIsFinished(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + l.SetHooks(LifecycleHooks(l, LifecycleOptions{})) + ctx := context.Background() + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + guards, err := l.Intents(ctx, IntentFilter{Kinds: []IntentKind{IntentGuardAck}}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, guards, 1) + + _, err = l.SetHold(ctx, opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + guard, err := l.Intent(ctx, guards[0].ID) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, IntentCanceled, guard.State) + assert.NotNil(t, guard.FinishedAt, "a canceled intent says when it was finished") +} + +// Invariant 2, for the worker a crashed connector left running: while the hold +// stands, get_dispatch hands out nothing it had not already handed out. +func TestInvariant2AWorkerIsHandedNothingNewUnderTheHold(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:9") + require.Equal(t, StateQueued, opAdmit(t, l, 2, "recording:9")) + launch := launchOf(t, l, 1) + d, err := l.Dispatch(ctx, launch.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + first, ok, err := d.Get(ctx, 1) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok) + + _, err = l.SetHold(ctx, opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // The instruction it already holds is answered again; the sibling it never + // pulled is not handed over. + repeat, ok, err := d.Get(ctx, 1) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok) + assert.Equal(t, first.EventID, repeat.EventID) + _, _, err = d.Get(ctx, 2) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "held") + _, err = l.ExposeEvent(ctx, launch.AttemptID, 2) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "held") + + _, err = l.Release(ctx, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, ok, err = d.Get(ctx, 2) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, ok, "released, the follow-up is handed over") +} + +// A hold arriving mid-task is not a failure of that task: the exposure is +// refused as held, and the dispatcher's follow-up loop stops asking. +func TestAHoldRefusesAnExposureAsHeldNotAsAFailure(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:9") + require.Equal(t, StateQueued, opAdmit(t, l, 2, "recording:9")) + launch := launchOf(t, l, 1) + _, err := l.SetHold(ctx, opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + + _, err = l.ExposeEvent(ctx, launch.AttemptID, 2) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrHeld) +} + +// Through the dispatcher: a hold that lands while a task runs withholds the +// next instruction and lets the task finish, rather than failing it. +// +//nolint:contextcheck // the harness builds its fixtures on background contexts +func TestAHoldWithholdsTheNextInstructionWithoutFailingTheTask(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + release := make(chan struct{}) + fake := newFakeDriver() + var h *dispatchHarness + fake.turn = func(_ *fakeSession, n int, _ string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + if n == 1 { + <-release + } + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnEndTurn}, nil + } + h = newDispatchHarness(t, fake, nil) + opAdmit(t, h.ledger, 1, "recording:1") + h.run(t) + s := <-fake.made + opAdmit(t, h.ledger, 2, "recording:1") + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { + var n int + _ = h.ledger.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM task_events WHERE event_id = 2`).Scan(&n) + return n == 1 + }, 5*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond, "the follow-up joined the task") + + _, err := h.ledger.SetHold(ctx, opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + close(release) + + rows := h.attemptsEnded(t, 1) + assert.Equal(t, "finished", rows[0].StopReason, "a held connector is not a failed task") + assert.Len(t, s.promptList(), 1, "nothing more was handed over") + assert.Equal(t, StateHeld, stateOf(t, h.ledger, 2), "the follow-up waits for a person") +} + +// Invariant 2: an event the launch exposed carries only a pointer until a +// worker pulls its instruction, so the hold refuses that first pull too — +// the case a crash during launch and a restart under --hold leaves behind. +func TestInvariant2AFirstPullIsRefusedUnderTheHold(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + launch := launchOf(t, l, 1) + d, err := l.Dispatch(ctx, launch.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.SetHold(ctx, opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + + _, _, err = d.Get(ctx, 1) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrHeld, "the instruction is not handed over under the hold") + + _, err = l.Release(ctx, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + first, ok, err := d.Get(ctx, 1) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok) + + // Pulled once, a repeat is answered even if a hold lands after it. + _, err = l.SetHold(ctx, opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + repeat, ok, err := d.Get(ctx, 1) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok) + assert.Equal(t, first.EventID, repeat.EventID) +} diff --git a/internal/connector/operator_migration_test.go b/internal/connector/operator_migration_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2ccb12b22 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/operator_migration_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,451 @@ +//go:build unix + +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "fmt" + "os" + "os/exec" + "path/filepath" + "strconv" + "strings" + "syscall" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +// Shadow promote and import (invariant 7), with a real process killed at every +// step. + +const ( + opAccount = "2914079" + opAgent = adapterAgentID +) + +// shadowFixture is a shadow state directory whose ledger holds an admitted +// record (1), a seen record (2), a blocked record (3) and a discarded one (4), +// and the empty normal state directory beside it. +func shadowFixture(t *testing.T) (shadowDir, stateDir string) { + t.Helper() + root := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "basecamp") + shadowDir = filepath.Join(root, "connect-shadow", StateDirName(opAccount, opAgent)) + stateDir = filepath.Join(root, "connect", StateDirName(opAccount, opAgent)) + for _, dir := range []string{root, filepath.Dir(shadowDir), filepath.Dir(stateDir)} { + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o700)) + require.NoError(t, os.Chmod(dir, 0o700)) + } + l, err := OpenLedger(filepath.Join(shadowDir, LedgerFile)) + require.NoError(t, err) + ctx := context.Background() + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + seenRecord(t, l, 2) + seenRecord(t, l, 3) + _, err = l.Admission().Commit(ctx, blockedVerdict(3, 0, "read_failed")) + require.NoError(t, err) + seenRecord(t, l, 4) + require.NoError(t, l.SetState(ctx, 4, StateDiscarded, "untrusted_author")) + require.NoError(t, l.Close()) + return shadowDir, stateDir +} + +func promoteOptions(shadowDir, stateDir string) PromoteOptions { + return PromoteOptions{ShadowDir: shadowDir, StateDir: stateDir, AccountID: opAccount, AgentID: opAgent, By: opBy} +} + +// Done when: shadow promote yields a held ledger at the normal path, with every +// non-terminal record tagged and the waiting one held. +func TestShadowPromoteYieldsAHeldLedger(t *testing.T) { + shadowDir, stateDir := shadowFixture(t) + ctx := context.Background() + + got, err := PromoteShadow(ctx, promoteOptions(shadowDir, stateDir)) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, HoldByPromote, got.Hold.Cause) + assert.Equal(t, 3, got.Tagged) + assert.Equal(t, 1, got.Held) + _, err = os.Lstat(filepath.Join(shadowDir, LedgerFile)) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, os.ErrNotExist, "the shadow ledger moved") + + l, err := OpenLedger(filepath.Join(stateDir, LedgerFile)) + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = l.Close() }) + held, err := l.Held(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, held) + assert.Equal(t, StateHeld, stateOf(t, l, 1)) + assert.Equal(t, StateHeld, admitSeen(t, l, 2), "a shadow record mid-read becomes held when admitted") + + again, err := PromoteShadow(ctx, promoteOptions(shadowDir, stateDir)) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, again.Already) +} + +func admitSeen(t *testing.T, l *Ledger, id int64) RecordState { + t.Helper() + record := getRecord(t, l, id) + v := admittedVerdict(id, record.Revision, "recording:"+strconv.FormatInt(id, 10)) + state, err := l.Admission().Commit(context.Background(), v) + require.NoError(t, err) + return RecordState(state) +} + +//nolint:contextcheck // subtests build their fixtures on background contexts +func TestShadowPromoteRefusesARunningShadowOrAnExistingLedger(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + t.Run("the shadow is running", func(t *testing.T) { + shadowDir, stateDir := shadowFixture(t) + lock, err := AcquireInstanceLock(shadowDir, opAccount, opAgent, timeNow()) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer func() { _ = lock.Release() }() + _, err = PromoteShadow(ctx, promoteOptions(shadowDir, stateDir)) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAlreadyRunning) + assertUntouchedShadow(t, shadowDir) + }) + t.Run("the connector is running", func(t *testing.T) { + shadowDir, stateDir := shadowFixture(t) + lock, err := AcquireInstanceLock(stateDir, opAccount, opAgent, timeNow()) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer func() { _ = lock.Release() }() + _, err = PromoteShadow(ctx, promoteOptions(shadowDir, stateDir)) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAlreadyRunning) + assertUntouchedShadow(t, shadowDir) + }) + t.Run("a ledger is already there", func(t *testing.T) { + shadowDir, stateDir := shadowFixture(t) + l, err := OpenLedger(filepath.Join(stateDir, LedgerFile)) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, l.Close()) + _, err = PromoteShadow(ctx, promoteOptions(shadowDir, stateDir)) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrLedgerExists) + assertUntouchedShadow(t, shadowDir) + }) +} + +// assertUntouchedShadow checks the shadow ledger is where it was, unheld, its +// records as the fixture left them. +func assertUntouchedShadow(t *testing.T, shadowDir string) { + t.Helper() + l, err := OpenLedgerReadOnly(context.Background(), filepath.Join(shadowDir, LedgerFile)) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer func() { _ = l.Close() }() + held, err := l.Held(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.False(t, held) + assert.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, stateOf(t, l, 1)) +} + +// crashEnv names the step a helper process kills itself at. +const crashEnv = "BASECAMP_CONNECTOR_CRASH_AT" + +// TestCrashHelper is not a test: it is the process the crash tests start and +// kill. It runs promote or import against the directories in its environment +// and SIGKILLs itself at the named step. +func TestCrashHelper(t *testing.T) { + at := os.Getenv(crashEnv) + if at == "" { + t.Skip("run by the crash tests") + } + op, step, _ := strings.Cut(at, ":") + kill := func(name string) { + if name == step { + _ = syscall.Kill(os.Getpid(), syscall.SIGKILL) + select {} + } + } + promoteStep, holdStep, importStep = kill, kill, kill + ctx := context.Background() + switch op { + case "promote": + _, err := PromoteShadow(ctx, promoteOptions(os.Getenv("SHADOW_DIR"), os.Getenv("STATE_DIR"))) + require.NoError(t, err) + case "import": + l, err := OpenLedger(os.Getenv("LEDGER")) + require.NoError(t, err) + var r Reconciliation + require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(os.Getenv("RECONCILIATION")), &r)) + _, err = l.Import(ctx, r, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + } + t.Fatal("the helper reached its end without being killed at " + step) +} + +func runKilled(t *testing.T, at string, env ...string) { + t.Helper() + cmd := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), os.Args[0], "-test.run=^TestCrashHelper$", "-test.count=1") + cmd.Env = append(append(os.Environ(), crashEnv+"="+at), env...) + out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput() + var exit *exec.ExitError + require.True(t, errors.As(err, &exit), "the helper must die: %v\n%s", err, out) + status, ok := exit.Sys().(syscall.WaitStatus) + require.True(t, ok) + require.True(t, status.Signaled() && status.Signal() == syscall.SIGKILL, "killed at %s, got %v\n%s", at, err, out) +} + +// Invariant 7: a crash at any point of promote leaves either the untouched +// shadow or a held ledger — never an unheld ledger at the normal path, never +// two ledgers and never none — and promote run again finishes. +// +//nolint:contextcheck // subtests build their fixtures on background contexts +func TestInvariant7PromoteSurvivesAKillAtEveryStep(t *testing.T) { + if testing.Short() { + t.Skip("starts processes") + } + type crash struct { + step string + // preHeld is a shadow already run with --hold, whose marker keeps + // that cause through the promote. + preHeld bool + } + steps := []string{"locked", "marker", "tagged", "held", "checkpointed", "renamed", "synced"} + crashes := make([]crash, 0, len(steps)+2) + crashes = append(crashes, crash{step: "renamed", preHeld: true}, crash{step: "synced", preHeld: true}) + for _, step := range steps { + crashes = append(crashes, crash{step: step}) + } + for _, c := range crashes { + step := c.step + name := step + if c.preHeld { + name += " of a held shadow" + } + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + shadowDir, stateDir := shadowFixture(t) + if c.preHeld { + l, err := OpenLedger(filepath.Join(shadowDir, LedgerFile)) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.SetHold(context.Background(), opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, l.Close()) + } + runKilled(t, "promote:"+step, "SHADOW_DIR="+shadowDir, "STATE_DIR="+stateDir) + + shadowLedger := filepath.Join(shadowDir, LedgerFile) + stateLedger := filepath.Join(stateDir, LedgerFile) + _, shadowErr := os.Lstat(shadowLedger) + _, stateErr := os.Lstat(stateLedger) + require.True(t, (shadowErr == nil) != (stateErr == nil), "exactly one ledger exists (shadow: %v, normal: %v)", shadowErr, stateErr) + + if stateErr == nil { + assertHeld(t, stateLedger) + } else if c.preHeld || ledgerIsHeld(t, shadowLedger) { + assertHeld(t, shadowLedger) + } else { + assertUntouchedShadow(t, shadowDir) + } + + got, err := PromoteShadow(context.Background(), promoteOptions(shadowDir, stateDir)) + require.NoError(t, err, "promote run again finishes") + if !c.preHeld { + assert.Equal(t, HoldByPromote, got.Hold.Cause) + } + assertHeld(t, stateLedger) + }) + } +} + +func ledgerIsHeld(t *testing.T, path string) bool { + t.Helper() + l, err := OpenLedgerReadOnly(context.Background(), path) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer func() { _ = l.Close() }() + held, err := l.Held(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + return held +} + +func assertHeld(t *testing.T, path string) { + t.Helper() + l, err := OpenLedger(path) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer func() { _ = l.Close() }() + held, err := l.Held(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, held, "%s is held", path) + assert.Equal(t, StateHeld, stateOf(t, l, 1), "the waiting record is held") + var untagged int + require.NoError(t, l.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM events WHERE state NOT IN ('completed', 'discarded') AND review = 0`).Scan(&untagged)) + assert.Zero(t, untagged, "every non-terminal record is tagged") +} + +// Done when: import applies a reconciliation in one transaction — tombstones +// only for done entries, everything else tagged, states and reasons kept. +func TestImportTombstonesDoneAndTagsTheRest(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + seenRecord(t, l, 2) + seenRecord(t, l, 3) + _, err := l.Admission().Commit(ctx, blockedVerdict(3, 0, "read_failed")) + require.NoError(t, err) + seenRecord(t, l, 5) + + got, err := l.Import(ctx, Reconciliation{Version: 1, Entries: []ReconciliationEntry{ + {EventID: 2, Decision: DecisionDone}, + {EventID: 99, Decision: DecisionDone}, + {EventID: 3, Decision: DecisionHeld}, + }}, opBy) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, 1, got.Tombstoned) + assert.Equal(t, 1, got.Inserted) + assert.Equal(t, 3, got.Tagged) + assert.Equal(t, 1, got.Held) + + assert.Equal(t, StateHeld, stateOf(t, l, 1)) + two := getRecord(t, l, 2) + assert.Equal(t, StateDiscarded, two.State) + assert.Equal(t, ReasonImportedDone, two.Reason) + three := getRecord(t, l, 3) + assert.Equal(t, StateBlocked, three.State) + assert.Equal(t, "read_failed", three.Reason, "the blocking reason is kept") + assert.Equal(t, StateSeen, stateOf(t, l, 5)) + + fresh, err := l.RecordSeen(ctx, testEvent(99), LanePoll) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.False(t, fresh, "an imported tombstone is never new work") + assert.Equal(t, StateHeld, admitSeen(t, l, 5), "an unmapped record is tagged too") +} + +//nolint:contextcheck // subtests build their fixtures on background contexts +func TestImportRefusesAFileItCannotApplyWhole(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + for name, entries := range map[string][]ReconciliationEntry{ + "held for an unseen event": {{EventID: 2, Decision: DecisionDone}, {EventID: 404, Decision: DecisionHeld}}, + "done for a dispatched event": {{EventID: 2, Decision: DecisionDone}, {EventID: 1, Decision: DecisionDone}}, + } { + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + launchOf(t, l, 1) + seenRecord(t, l, 2) + + _, err := l.Import(ctx, Reconciliation{Version: 1, Entries: entries}, opBy) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrDecisionRefused) + assert.Equal(t, StateSeen, stateOf(t, l, 2), "nothing was applied") + var tagged int + require.NoError(t, l.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM events WHERE review = 1`).Scan(&tagged)) + assert.Zero(t, tagged) + }) + } +} + +func TestParseReconciliationIsStrict(t *testing.T) { + for name, body := range map[string]string{ + "unknown field": `{"version":1,"entries":[{"event_id":1,"decision":"done","note":"x"}]}`, + "other decision": `{"version":1,"entries":[{"event_id":1,"decision":"maybe"}]}`, + "duplicate": `{"version":1,"entries":[{"event_id":1,"decision":"done"},{"event_id":1,"decision":"held"}]}`, + "no id": `{"version":1,"entries":[{"decision":"done"}]}`, + "other version": `{"version":2,"entries":[]}`, + "trailing value": `{"version":1,"entries":[]} {}`, + "trailing brace": `{"version":1,"entries":[]} }`, + "trailing bracket": `{"version":1,"entries":[]} ]`, + "trailing text": `{"version":1,"entries":[]} done`, + } { + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + _, err := ParseReconciliation([]byte(body)) + assert.Error(t, err) + }) + } + r, err := ParseReconciliation([]byte(`{"version":1,"entries":[{"event_id":7,"decision":"held"}]}`)) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, []ReconciliationEntry{{EventID: 7, Decision: DecisionHeld}}, r.Entries) +} + +// Invariant 7: an import killed mid-transaction applied nothing. +// +//nolint:contextcheck // subtests build their fixtures on background contexts +func TestInvariant7ImportSurvivesAKillAtEveryStep(t *testing.T) { + if testing.Short() { + t.Skip("starts processes") + } + for _, step := range []string{"entry", "tagged"} { + t.Run(step, func(t *testing.T) { + path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "state", LedgerFile) + l, err := OpenLedger(path) + require.NoError(t, err) + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + seenRecord(t, l, 2) + require.NoError(t, l.Close()) + file := `{"version":1,"entries":[{"event_id":2,"decision":"done"},{"event_id":1,"decision":"held"}]}` + + runKilled(t, "import:"+step, "LEDGER="+path, "RECONCILIATION="+file) + + l, err = OpenLedger(path) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer func() { _ = l.Close() }() + assert.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, stateOf(t, l, 1)) + assert.Equal(t, StateSeen, stateOf(t, l, 2)) + var decisions int + require.NoError(t, l.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM decisions`).Scan(&decisions)) + assert.Zero(t, decisions, fmt.Sprintf("killed at %s: nothing recorded", step)) + }) + } +} + +func timeNow() time.Time { return time.Now() } + +// A promote run again after its rename finishes the move rather than refusing +// it, and does not mind a shadow directory a person has cleared away. +func TestPromoteRunAgainFinishesAMoveWithoutItsShadow(t *testing.T) { + shadowDir, stateDir := shadowFixture(t) + ctx := context.Background() + _, err := PromoteShadow(ctx, promoteOptions(shadowDir, stateDir)) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(shadowDir)) + + got, err := PromoteShadow(ctx, promoteOptions(shadowDir, stateDir)) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, got.Already) + assertHeld(t, filepath.Join(stateDir, LedgerFile)) +} + +// Import validates the reconciliation it is handed, not only the file it was +// parsed from: a caller that built the value itself meets the same rules. +// +//nolint:contextcheck // subtests build their fixtures on background contexts +func TestImportValidatesWhatItIsHanded(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + for name, r := range map[string]Reconciliation{ + "another version": {Version: ReconciliationVersion + 1}, + "unknown decision": {Version: ReconciliationVersion, Entries: []ReconciliationEntry{{EventID: 1, Decision: "maybe"}}}, + "no event": {Version: ReconciliationVersion, Entries: []ReconciliationEntry{{Decision: DecisionDone}}}, + "one event twice": {Version: ReconciliationVersion, Entries: []ReconciliationEntry{{EventID: 1, Decision: DecisionDone}, {EventID: 1, Decision: DecisionHeld}}}, + } { + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + l := newTestLedger(t) + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + + _, err := l.Import(ctx, r, opBy) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, stateOf(t, l, 1), "nothing was tagged or closed") + var tagged int + require.NoError(t, l.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM events WHERE review = 1`).Scan(&tagged)) + assert.Zero(t, tagged) + }) + } +} + +// A promote run again takes the connector's lock even when there is no shadow +// state left to stop: it never reports on a ledger a connector is running on. +func TestPromoteRunAgainStillNeedsTheConnectorStopped(t *testing.T) { + shadowDir, stateDir := shadowFixture(t) + ctx := context.Background() + _, err := PromoteShadow(ctx, promoteOptions(shadowDir, stateDir)) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(shadowDir)) + + lock, err := AcquireInstanceLock(stateDir, opAccount, opAgent, timeNow()) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = PromoteShadow(ctx, promoteOptions(shadowDir, stateDir)) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAlreadyRunning) + require.NoError(t, lock.Release()) + + got, err := PromoteShadow(ctx, promoteOptions(shadowDir, stateDir)) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, got.Already) +} diff --git a/internal/connector/operator_status_test.go b/internal/connector/operator_status_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7e89be879 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/operator_status_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,233 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +// Invariant 8: status reads beside a writer, writes nothing, and shows no +// content, position or token. +func TestInvariant8StatusReadsBesideAWriterAndShowsNoSecrets(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "state", LedgerFile) + l, err := OpenLedger(path) + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = l.Close() }) + l.SetHooks(LifecycleHooks(l, LifecycleOptions{})) + + const position = "signed-position-not-real-7f3a" + require.NoError(t, l.Save(ctx, testKey(), position)) + require.NoError(t, l.NotePollServed(ctx, testKey(), 41)) + require.NoError(t, l.NoteConnection(ctx, ConnectionRunning, "")) + + unknownOutcome(t, l, 2) + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + launch := launchOf(t, l, 1) + require.NoError(t, l.MarkRunning(ctx, launch.AttemptID, AttemptProcess{PID: 4242, PGID: 4242, StartedAt: time.Now()})) + seenRecord(t, l, 5) + _, err = l.Admission().Commit(ctx, blockedVerdict(5, 0, "read_failed")) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `UPDATE outbox SET state = 'sending', sending_at = ? WHERE event_id = 1`, stamp(time.Now())) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `UPDATE outbox SET state = 'indeterminate', note = 'two candidates' WHERE event_id = 1`) + require.NoError(t, err) + l.SetHooks(Hooks{}) + opAdmit(t, l, 3, "recording:3") + seenRecord(t, l, 4) + _, err = l.SetHold(ctx, opBy, HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // A writer holds the write lock while status reads. + writer, err := l.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = writer.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE events SET updated_at = updated_at WHERE id = 4`) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer func() { _ = writer.Rollback() }() + + reader, err := OpenLedgerReadOnly(context.Background(), path) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer func() { _ = reader.Close() }() + s, err := reader.Status(ctx, nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + + require.NotNil(t, s.Hold) + assert.Equal(t, "hold", s.Hold.Cause) + require.NotNil(t, s.Connection) + assert.Equal(t, ConnectionRunning, s.Connection.State) + require.Len(t, s.Positions, 1) + assert.True(t, s.Positions[0].HasPosition) + assert.Equal(t, int64(41), s.Positions[0].LastPollServedID) + require.Len(t, s.Tasks, 1) + assert.Equal(t, launch.TaskID, s.Tasks[0].TaskID) + assert.Equal(t, 4242, s.Tasks[0].PID) + require.Len(t, s.Held, 1) + assert.Equal(t, int64(3), s.Held[0].EventID) + assert.Equal(t, 1, s.Queues["held"]) + assert.Equal(t, 1, s.Queues["seen"]) + assert.Equal(t, 3, s.Review, "the seen, the blocked and the dispatched record wait for review") + assert.Equal(t, map[string]int{"read_failed": 1}, s.Blocked) + require.Len(t, s.Indeterminate, 1) + assert.Equal(t, int64(1), s.Indeterminate[0].EventID) + require.Len(t, s.Dispatches, 2) + assert.False(t, s.WorktreesKnown) + + raw, err := json.Marshal(s) + require.NoError(t, err) + out := string(raw) + assert.NotContains(t, out, position) + assert.NotContains(t, out, "please look", "no snapshot content") + assert.NotContains(t, out, tokenHash(launch.Token)) + assert.NotContains(t, out, launch.Token) +} + +func TestOpenLedgerReadOnlyCreatesNothing(t *testing.T) { + dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "state") + _, err := OpenLedgerReadOnly(context.Background(), filepath.Join(dir, LedgerFile)) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, os.ErrNotExist) + _, err = os.Lstat(dir) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, os.ErrNotExist) + + l, err := OpenLedger(filepath.Join(dir, "other.db")) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, l.Close()) + _, err = OpenLedgerReadOnly(context.Background(), filepath.Join(dir, LedgerFile)) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, os.ErrNotExist, "a ledger gone from a private directory") + _, err = os.Lstat(filepath.Join(dir, LedgerFile)) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, os.ErrNotExist, "is not recreated by a reader") + + l, err = OpenLedger(filepath.Join(dir, LedgerFile)) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, l.Close()) + reader, err := OpenLedgerReadOnly(context.Background(), filepath.Join(dir, LedgerFile)) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer func() { _ = reader.Close() }() + _, err = reader.db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `DELETE FROM events`) + assert.Error(t, err, "a read-only ledger refuses writes") +} + +// A ledger a newer build wrote is not this build's to read or decide in. +func TestOpenLedgerReadOnlyRefusesANewerSchema(t *testing.T) { + path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "state", LedgerFile) + l, err := OpenLedger(path) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `INSERT INTO schema_migrations (version, applied_at) VALUES (?, ?)`, len(migrations)+1, stamp(time.Now())) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, l.Close()) + + _, err = OpenLedgerReadOnly(context.Background(), path) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrLedgerSchema) + assert.NotErrorIs(t, err, ErrLedgerOutOfDate) +} + +// The connector's own open refuses a ledger a newer build wrote too: an older +// binary rolled back onto it must not run over rules it does not know. +func TestOpenLedgerRefusesANewerSchema(t *testing.T) { + path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "state", LedgerFile) + l, err := OpenLedger(path) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `INSERT INTO schema_migrations (version, applied_at) VALUES (?, ?)`, len(migrations)+1, stamp(time.Now())) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, l.Close()) + + _, err = OpenLedger(path) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrLedgerSchema) +} + +// Status reports the retained worktrees the lister gives it. The lister card +// 19's ledger provides reads the same ledger, which holds one connection, so +// a listing made inside status's own read transaction would wait for the +// connection that transaction holds. +func TestStatusListsTheRetainedWorktrees(t *testing.T) { + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second) + defer cancel() + l, err := OpenLedger(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "state", LedgerFile)) + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = l.Close() }) + + id, err := l.BeginWorktree(ctx, Worktree{ + Path: "/w/one", WorkDir: "/w/one/app", Route: "app", + Repository: "/repo", Branch: "basecamp-connect/1-a1b2c3", BaseCommit: "abc", + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, l.MoveWorktree(ctx, id, WorktreeLive, WorktreeCreating)) + require.NoError(t, l.RetainWorktree(ctx, id, RetainedDirty, WorktreeLive)) + + s, err := l.Status(ctx, l.RetainedWorktreeStatus) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, s.WorktreesKnown, "a status given a lister says what it knows") + assert.Empty(t, s.WorktreesUnavailable) + require.Len(t, s.Worktrees, 1) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeStatus{Path: "/w/one", Branch: "basecamp-connect/1-a1b2c3", Reason: "dirty"}, s.Worktrees[0]) +} + +// A listing that fails leaves the retained worktrees unavailable, with why: +// the rest of the status is still worth reading, and "unavailable" is never +// read as "none". +func TestStatusReportsAWorktreeListingThatFailedAsUnavailable(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + l, err := OpenLedger(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "state", LedgerFile)) + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = l.Close() }) + + s, err := l.Status(ctx, func(context.Context) ([]WorktreeStatus, error) { + return nil, errors.New("the worktrees table cannot be read") + }) + require.NoError(t, err, "one unreadable listing does not blank the whole status") + assert.False(t, s.WorktreesKnown) + assert.Contains(t, s.WorktreesUnavailable, "the worktrees table cannot be read") + assert.Empty(t, s.Worktrees) +} + +// Every process read back out of the ledger is an identity the one-owner +// rule will answer about. The stamp stored is the kernel's — startedStamp +// writes no other — so each read-back path marks it exact. A path that +// rebuilds driver.Process by hand loses that bit, and the rule then calls a +// live worker neither gone nor running (driver.ErrIdentityUnknown): status +// reported every worker "unverified" and a redispatch refused to stop the +// worker it replaced. +func TestEveryProcessReadBackOutOfTheLedgerIsAnIdentity(t *testing.T) { + at := time.Now().UTC() + assert.True(t, AttemptProcess{PID: 7, PGID: 7, StartedAt: at, StartedExact: true}.Identity().StartedExact) + assert.True(t, LiveWorker{PID: 7, PGID: 7, StartedAt: at}.Identity().StartedExact) + assert.True(t, TaskStatus{PID: 7, PGID: 7, ProcessStartedAt: &at}.WorkerIdentity().StartedExact) + assert.True(t, TaskStatus{TakerPID: 7, TakerPGID: 7, TakerStartedAt: &at}.TakerIdentity().StartedExact) + + // And a record with no stamp is no identity at all, rather than one the + // rule would answer about. + assert.False(t, AttemptProcess{PID: 7, PGID: 7}.Identity().StartedExact) + assert.False(t, TaskStatus{PID: 7, PGID: 7}.WorkerIdentity().StartedExact) + assert.False(t, TaskStatus{TakerPID: 7, TakerPGID: 7}.TakerIdentity().StartedExact) +} + +// A token whose holder could not be accounted for is held, and status is +// where the person who must settle it reads that. The zero taker cannot say +// it: "nothing took the token" and "the token is out and nobody can name who +// has it" are opposite facts, and the ledger carries the difference the +// release point acts on (TokenHolder.Unaccounted) all the way out. +func TestStatusCarriesATokenHolderThatCannotBeAccountedFor(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + l := newTestLedger(t) + opAdmit(t, l, 1, "recording:1") + launch := launchOf(t, l, 1) + require.NoError(t, l.MarkRunning(ctx, launch.AttemptID, AttemptProcess{PID: 4242, PGID: 4242, StartedAt: time.Now(), StartedExact: true})) + + before, err := l.Status(ctx, nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, before.Tasks, 1) + assert.False(t, before.Tasks[0].TakerUnaccounted, "nothing has taken the token yet") + + require.NoError(t, l.MarkTakerUnaccounted(ctx, launch.AttemptID)) + after, err := l.Status(ctx, nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, after.Tasks, 1) + assert.True(t, after.Tasks[0].TakerUnaccounted, "the held attempt says its token is out") + assert.Zero(t, after.Tasks[0].TakerPID, "and there is no process to name") +} diff --git a/internal/connector/outbox.go b/internal/connector/outbox.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f3f8d6ea3 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/outbox.go @@ -0,0 +1,574 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "database/sql" + "errors" + "fmt" + "strconv" + "strings" + "time" +) + +// The outbox: every message the connector itself posts to Basecamp — the +// guard acknowledgement, the holding reply, still-running and the completion +// notice — goes through one table with one rule. +// +// # Invariants +// +// Each is held by the database where SQL can say it, and by a test that fails +// without it (outbox_invariants_test.go). +// +// 1. An intent is written in the transaction of the transition that calls +// for it, through the ledger's hooks, so the two commit or roll back +// together. +// 2. One intent per thing answered for: the key is the guard or holding +// reply per event, the completion per attempt, still-running per attempt +// and occurrence. A second write for a key writes nothing. +// 3. Nothing is sent without a durable sending row. The only path to a +// request claims the intent — pending to sending, committed — first. +// 4. Nothing sending is sent again automatically. A request is made only for +// an intent this process just claimed from pending. A sending intent is +// reconciled by listing the destination, never by posting. +// 5. Reconciliation adopts only an unambiguous candidate: exactly one of the +// agent's messages at the destination since the intent went sending +// matches its body, the message is not a worker's own acknowledgement or +// reply, no other intent owns it, and no other intent at the destination +// whose own message may exist unreceipted — pending, sending, +// indeterminate, or abandoned by a person who could not prove it absent — +// has the same body. Anything else is indeterminate, for a person. +// 6. A receipt belongs to exactly one intent, and once written it never +// changes. A unique index and a trigger. +// 7. States move along the lifecycle's edges only: pending → sending | +// canceled; sending → sent | indeterminate, or canceled when Basecamp +// answered the request by refusing it, which creates nothing; and +// indeterminate → sent | abandoned | pending, those three only by a +// person, as is refused → pending once a person has fixed the cause. +// 8. get_dispatch cancels the guard: a trigger moves the guard intent from +// pending to canceled in get_dispatch's own transaction, and a guard that +// already went out marks every task event it answers for as fired, so a +// worker is told the connector acknowledged. +// 9. A guard is reported fired from the moment it is claimed, and that is +// final: #736's task_events_guard_settles_once lets a guard move only +// from armed. The claim marks its task events fired in the claim's own +// transaction, so no worker asking while the request is in flight +// acknowledges a second time. If Basecamp then refuses the request, the +// intent is canceled — nothing was created — but its task events stay +// fired, so that task's workers do not acknowledge either: the +// acknowledgement is missing, never doubled, the spec's own preference. +// A later task for the event (a person's redispatch) has its guard armed, +// and the worker acknowledges itself: the intent is canceled, so nothing +// remains to fire that guard, and get_dispatch cancels it. This is the spec's rule: a +// missing acknowledgement costs less than a double one. A refusal here is +// Basecamp refusing the connector's own lifecycle request, recorded on +// the outbox row; a worker's permission refusals are another matter. +// 10. Reconciliation never holds up sending for long. A running connector +// sends a batch, then lists at most one due destination; each listing is +// bounded in time; each failure backs its intent off, doubling, and the +// intent is indeterminate after MaxReconcileFailures, with that count +// recorded. Start is the exception by design: it reconciles everything +// due before it sends, within the bound its caller sets, and stops +// sending at the first send that may not have landed. +const migrationOutbox = ` +CREATE TABLE outbox ( + id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, + intent_key TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE, + kind TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (kind IN ('guard_ack', 'holding_reply', 'still_running', 'completion')), + state TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'pending' + CHECK (state IN ('pending', 'sending', 'sent', 'indeterminate', 'canceled', 'abandoned')), + event_id INTEGER REFERENCES events (id), + task_id INTEGER REFERENCES tasks (id), + attempt_id TEXT REFERENCES attempts (id), + occurrence INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, + bucket_id INTEGER NOT NULL, + message_kind TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (message_kind IN ('boost', 'comment', 'chat_line')), + recording_id INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (recording_id > 0), + body TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (body <> ''), + created_at TEXT NOT NULL, + not_before TEXT NOT NULL, + sending_at TEXT, + finished_at TEXT, + receipt_id INTEGER, + note TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', + resolved_by TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', + -- A reconciliation listing that failed is tried again at reconcile_at, + -- backing off; reconcile_failures counts the failures. + reconcile_failures INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, + reconcile_at TEXT, + CHECK ((state = 'sent') = (receipt_id IS NOT NULL)), + CHECK (state IN ('pending', 'canceled') OR sending_at IS NOT NULL) +); +CREATE UNIQUE INDEX outbox_receipt ON outbox (message_kind, receipt_id) WHERE receipt_id IS NOT NULL; +CREATE INDEX outbox_due ON outbox (state, not_before); +CREATE INDEX outbox_destination ON outbox (message_kind, recording_id, state); +CREATE INDEX outbox_event ON outbox (event_id, kind); + +CREATE TRIGGER outbox_state_edges +BEFORE UPDATE OF state ON outbox +WHEN NEW.state <> OLD.state AND NOT ( + (OLD.state = 'pending' AND NEW.state IN ('sending', 'canceled')) + OR (OLD.state = 'sending' AND NEW.state IN ('sent', 'indeterminate', 'canceled')) + OR (OLD.state = 'indeterminate' AND NEW.state IN ('sent', 'abandoned', 'pending')) + OR (OLD.state = 'canceled' AND NEW.state = 'pending' AND OLD.note = 'the request was refused; no message was created') +) +BEGIN + SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'an outbox intent never moves along that edge'); +END; + +CREATE TRIGGER outbox_receipt_is_final +BEFORE UPDATE OF receipt_id ON outbox +WHEN OLD.receipt_id IS NOT NULL AND (NEW.receipt_id IS NULL OR NEW.receipt_id <> OLD.receipt_id) +BEGIN + SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'a receipt never changes'); +END; + +CREATE TRIGGER outbox_guard_canceled_by_get_dispatch +AFTER UPDATE OF guard ON task_events +WHEN OLD.guard = 'armed' AND NEW.guard = 'canceled' +BEGIN + UPDATE outbox SET state = 'canceled', note = 'get_dispatch', + finished_at = strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%f000000Z', 'now') + WHERE intent_key = 'guard_ack:event:' || NEW.event_id AND state = 'pending'; +END; + +CREATE TRIGGER outbox_guard_fired_before_task +AFTER INSERT ON task_events +WHEN NEW.guard = 'armed' AND EXISTS ( + SELECT 1 FROM outbox + WHERE intent_key = 'guard_ack:event:' || NEW.event_id AND state IN ('sending', 'sent', 'indeterminate', 'abandoned') +) +BEGIN + UPDATE task_events SET guard = 'fired' WHERE task_id = NEW.task_id AND event_id = NEW.event_id; +END; +` + +// IntentKind is what a lifecycle message answers for. +type IntentKind string + +const ( + // IntentGuardAck is the fixed-form acknowledgement a guard posts when no + // worker called get_dispatch in time. One per event. + IntentGuardAck IntentKind = "guard_ack" + // IntentHoldingReply answers a mention or assignment in a project with no + // route. One per event. + IntentHoldingReply IntentKind = "holding_reply" + // IntentStillRunning is one still-running notice. One per attempt and + // occurrence. + IntentStillRunning IntentKind = "still_running" + // IntentCompletion is an attempt's completion notice. One per attempt. + IntentCompletion IntentKind = "completion" +) + +// IntentState is where an intent is. +type IntentState string + +const ( + // IntentPending is written and not yet asked for. + IntentPending IntentState = "pending" + // IntentSending was claimed for a request; the request may or may not + // have reached Basecamp. + IntentSending IntentState = "sending" + // IntentSent has its receipt. + IntentSent IntentState = "sent" + // IntentIndeterminate could not be reconciled unambiguously. It is never + // sent again automatically; a person decides. + IntentIndeterminate IntentState = "indeterminate" + // IntentCanceled was never sent: nothing called for it any more (a guard + // get_dispatch canceled), or Basecamp refused the request, which creates + // nothing. + IntentCanceled IntentState = "canceled" + // IntentAbandoned is an indeterminate intent a person decided not to + // send. + IntentAbandoned IntentState = "abandoned" +) + +// MessageKind is the kind of Basecamp message an intent posts. +type MessageKind string + +const ( + // MessageBoost is a boost on Destination.RecordingID. + MessageBoost MessageKind = "boost" + // MessageComment is a comment on Destination.RecordingID. + MessageComment MessageKind = "comment" + // MessageChatLine is a line in the Campfire Destination.RecordingID. + MessageChatLine MessageKind = "chat_line" +) + +// Destination is where a lifecycle message goes. +type Destination struct { + BucketID int64 + Kind MessageKind + RecordingID int64 +} + +// Intent is one lifecycle message. +type Intent struct { + ID int64 + Key string + Kind IntentKind + State IntentState + // EventID is the event a guard or holding reply answers for; zero for a + // per-attempt intent. + EventID int64 + // TaskID and AttemptID are set on per-attempt intents. + TaskID int64 + AttemptID string + Occurrence int + + Destination Destination + // Body is the message exactly as it is posted, rendered from records when + // the intent was written. + Body string + + CreatedAt time.Time + NotBefore time.Time + SendingAt *time.Time + FinishedAt *time.Time + ReceiptID *int64 + // Note says why an intent is canceled or indeterminate. + Note string + // ResolvedBy names the person who resolved an indeterminate intent. + ResolvedBy string + // ReconcileFailures counts listings that failed for a sending intent; + // ReconcileAt is when the next is due, nil when none failed. + ReconcileFailures int + ReconcileAt *time.Time +} + +// Intent keys. +func guardKey(eventID int64) string { + return string(IntentGuardAck) + ":event:" + strconv.FormatInt(eventID, 10) +} + +func holdingKey(eventID int64) string { + return string(IntentHoldingReply) + ":event:" + strconv.FormatInt(eventID, 10) +} + +func completionKey(attemptID string) string { + return string(IntentCompletion) + ":attempt:" + attemptID +} + +func stillRunningKey(attemptID string, occurrence int) string { + return string(IntentStillRunning) + ":attempt:" + attemptID + ":" + strconv.Itoa(occurrence) +} + +// Errors from the outbox. +var ( + // ErrNoSuchIntent is an intent id the ledger does not hold. + ErrNoSuchIntent = errors.New("no such outbox intent") + // ErrNotIndeterminate is a person's resolution for an intent that is not + // indeterminate. + ErrNotIndeterminate = errors.New("the intent is not indeterminate") + // ErrReceiptOwned is a receipt another intent already owns. + ErrReceiptOwned = errors.New("the receipt belongs to another intent") +) + +// newIntent is an intent a hook writes. +type newIntent struct { + key string + kind IntentKind + eventID int64 + taskID int64 + attemptID string + occurrence int + destination Destination + body string + notBefore time.Time +} + +// writeIntent inserts an intent in tx unless its key already exists. +func writeIntent(ctx context.Context, tx Tx, now time.Time, in newIntent) error { + if in.destination.RecordingID <= 0 || in.body == "" { + return nil + } + if in.notBefore.IsZero() { + in.notBefore = now + } + _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, ` +INSERT INTO outbox (intent_key, kind, event_id, task_id, attempt_id, occurrence, bucket_id, message_kind, recording_id, body, created_at, not_before) +VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?) +ON CONFLICT (intent_key) DO NOTHING`, + in.key, string(in.kind), nullableID64(in.eventID), nullableID64(in.taskID), nullableString(in.attemptID), in.occurrence, + in.destination.BucketID, string(in.destination.Kind), in.destination.RecordingID, in.body, stamp(now), stamp(in.notBefore)) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: write outbox intent %s: %w", in.key, err) + } + return nil +} + +func nullableID64(id int64) any { + if id == 0 { + return nil + } + return id +} + +func nullableString(s string) any { + if s == "" { + return nil + } + return s +} + +const selectIntents = ` +SELECT id, intent_key, kind, state, COALESCE(event_id, 0), COALESCE(task_id, 0), COALESCE(attempt_id, ''), occurrence, + bucket_id, message_kind, recording_id, body, created_at, not_before, sending_at, finished_at, receipt_id, note, resolved_by, + reconcile_failures, reconcile_at +FROM outbox` + +func scanIntents(rows *sql.Rows) ([]Intent, error) { + defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }() + var out []Intent + for rows.Next() { + var ( + in Intent + kind, state, messageKind string + created, notBefore string + sendingAt, finishedAt sql.NullString + reconcileAt sql.NullString + receipt sql.NullInt64 + ) + if err := rows.Scan(&in.ID, &in.Key, &kind, &state, &in.EventID, &in.TaskID, &in.AttemptID, &in.Occurrence, + &in.Destination.BucketID, &messageKind, &in.Destination.RecordingID, &in.Body, &created, ¬Before, + &sendingAt, &finishedAt, &receipt, &in.Note, &in.ResolvedBy, &in.ReconcileFailures, &reconcileAt); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: read outbox: %w", err) + } + in.Kind, in.State, in.Destination.Kind = IntentKind(kind), IntentState(state), MessageKind(messageKind) + var err error + if in.CreatedAt, err = parseStamp(created); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if in.NotBefore, err = parseStamp(notBefore); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if in.SendingAt, err = parseNullStamp(sendingAt); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if in.FinishedAt, err = parseNullStamp(finishedAt); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if in.ReconcileAt, err = parseNullStamp(reconcileAt); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if receipt.Valid { + id := receipt.Int64 + in.ReceiptID = &id + } + out = append(out, in) + } + return out, rows.Err() +} + +func parseNullStamp(s sql.NullString) (*time.Time, error) { + if !s.Valid { + return nil, nil + } + t, err := parseStamp(s.String) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &t, nil +} + +// IntentFilter selects intents. Zero values select everything. +type IntentFilter struct { + States []IntentState + Kinds []IntentKind + EventID int64 + // Limit is the most returned, newest first; zero for all. + Limit int +} + +// Intents lists outbox intents, newest first. It only reads. +func (l *Ledger) Intents(ctx context.Context, f IntentFilter) ([]Intent, error) { + var out []Intent + err := retryBusy(func() error { + var err error + out, err = l.intents(ctx, f) + return err + }) + return out, err +} + +func (l *Ledger) intents(ctx context.Context, f IntentFilter) ([]Intent, error) { + var ( + where []string + args []any + ) + if len(f.States) > 0 { + where = append(where, "state IN ("+placeholders(len(f.States))+")") + for _, s := range f.States { + args = append(args, string(s)) + } + } + if len(f.Kinds) > 0 { + where = append(where, "kind IN ("+placeholders(len(f.Kinds))+")") + for _, k := range f.Kinds { + args = append(args, string(k)) + } + } + if f.EventID != 0 { + where = append(where, "event_id = ?") + args = append(args, f.EventID) + } + query := selectIntents + if len(where) > 0 { + query += " WHERE " + strings.Join(where, " AND ") + } + query += " ORDER BY id DESC" + if f.Limit > 0 { + query += " LIMIT ?" + args = append(args, f.Limit) + } + rows, err := l.db.QueryContext(ctx, query, args...) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: list outbox: %w", err) + } + return scanIntents(rows) +} + +// Intent reads one intent by id. +func (l *Ledger) Intent(ctx context.Context, id int64) (Intent, error) { + var intents []Intent + err := retryBusy(func() error { + rows, err := l.db.QueryContext(ctx, selectIntents+` WHERE id = ?`, id) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: read outbox intent %d: %w", id, err) + } + intents, err = scanIntents(rows) + return err + }) + if err != nil { + return Intent{}, err + } + if len(intents) == 0 { + return Intent{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: outbox intent %d: %w", id, ErrNoSuchIntent) + } + return intents[0], nil +} + +func placeholders(n int) string { + return strings.TrimSuffix(strings.Repeat("?, ", n), ", ") +} + +// IsLifecycleReceipt reports whether a message id is the receipt of one of the +// connector's own lifecycle messages of that kind. +func (l *Ledger) IsLifecycleReceipt(ctx context.Context, kind MessageKind, id int64) (bool, error) { + var found bool + err := retryBusy(func() error { + return l.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM outbox WHERE message_kind = ? AND receipt_id = ?)`, string(kind), id).Scan(&found) + }) + if err != nil { + return false, fmt.Errorf("connector: lifecycle receipt %d: %w", id, err) + } + return found, nil +} + +// Resolution is a person's decision on an indeterminate intent. +type Resolution string + +const ( + // ResolveSent says the message is in Basecamp: ReceiptID names it. + ResolveSent Resolution = "sent" + // ResolveAbandon says it is not to be sent. + ResolveAbandon Resolution = "abandon" + // ResolveResend authorizes sending it again: the intent returns to + // pending. Only a person may choose this; nothing automatic does. + ResolveResend Resolution = "resend" +) + +// IntentResolution is a person's decision and who made it. +type IntentResolution struct { + Resolution Resolution + // ReceiptID is the message a ResolveSent names. + ReceiptID int64 + // By names who decided, for the record. Required. + By string +} + +// ResolveIntent applies a person's decision to an indeterminate intent. +func (l *Ledger) ResolveIntent(ctx context.Context, id int64, r IntentResolution) error { + if strings.TrimSpace(r.By) == "" { + return errors.New("connector: a resolution records who decided") + } + now := l.timestamp() + var ( + query string + args []any + ) + switch r.Resolution { + case ResolveSent: + if r.ReceiptID <= 0 { + return errors.New("connector: a sent resolution names the message") + } + query = `UPDATE outbox SET state = 'sent', receipt_id = ?, finished_at = ?, resolved_by = ?, note = ? WHERE id = ? AND state = 'indeterminate'` + args = []any{r.ReceiptID, now} + case ResolveAbandon: + query = `UPDATE outbox SET state = 'abandoned', finished_at = ?, resolved_by = ?, note = ? WHERE id = ? AND state = 'indeterminate'` + args = []any{now} + case ResolveResend: + // A refused request created nothing, so a person may send it again + // once the cause is fixed, as they may an indeterminate one. + query = `UPDATE outbox SET state = 'pending', sending_at = NULL, finished_at = NULL, reconcile_failures = 0, reconcile_at = NULL, not_before = ?, resolved_by = ?, note = ? +WHERE id = ? AND (state = 'indeterminate' OR (state = 'canceled' AND note = '` + RefusedNote + `'))` + args = []any{now} + default: + return fmt.Errorf("connector: %q is not a resolution", r.Resolution) + } + return retryBusy(func() error { + res, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, query, append(args, r.By, "resolved: "+string(r.Resolution), id)...) + if err != nil { + if isUniqueViolation(err) { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: resolve intent %d: %w", id, ErrReceiptOwned) + } + return fmt.Errorf("connector: resolve intent %d: %w", id, err) + } + n, err := res.RowsAffected() + if err != nil { + return err + } + if n == 0 { + if _, err := l.Intent(ctx, id); err != nil { + return err + } + return fmt.Errorf("connector: resolve intent %d: %w", id, ErrNotIndeterminate) + } + return nil + }) +} + +// RefusedNote is the note on an intent Basecamp refused. +const RefusedNote = "the request was refused; no message was created" + +// refuse settles a sending intent Basecamp refused. The request created +// nothing, so the intent is canceled rather than left uncertain, and no later +// task event is written fired for it. Task events the claim already marked +// fired stay fired (invariant 9). +func (l *Ledger) refuse(ctx context.Context, in Intent, note string) (Intent, error) { + err := retryBusy(func() error { + tx, err := l.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: begin refusal of %d: %w", in.ID, err) + } + defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }() + res, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE outbox SET state = 'canceled', finished_at = ?, note = ? WHERE id = ? AND state = 'sending'`, + l.timestamp(), note, in.ID) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: refuse intent %d: %w", in.ID, err) + } + if n, err := res.RowsAffected(); err != nil { + return err + } else if n == 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: refuse intent %d: it is not sending", in.ID) + } + return tx.Commit() + }) + if err != nil { + return Intent{}, err + } + return l.Intent(ctx, in.ID) +} + +func isUniqueViolation(err error) bool { + return err != nil && strings.Contains(err.Error(), "UNIQUE constraint failed") +} diff --git a/internal/connector/outbox_basecamp.go b/internal/connector/outbox_basecamp.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..28278177e --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/outbox_basecamp.go @@ -0,0 +1,160 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "time" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-sdk/go/pkg/basecamp" +) + +// BasecampPoster posts lifecycle messages through the SDK as the agent: the +// account client must be the agent's own, so every message is the agent's. +// +// A create is not idempotent, and the SDK's generated create path makes one +// attempt at it whatever its retry settings, so Post is one request. (The SDK +// does replay a mutation once after a 401 refreshes the token, which creates +// nothing.) The client given should carry no retries of its own around that. +type BasecampPoster struct { + account *basecamp.AccountClient + agentID int64 +} + +// NewBasecampPoster builds a poster over the agent's account client. agentID +// is the agent's Person id: List answers only its messages. +func NewBasecampPoster(account *basecamp.AccountClient, agentID int64) (*BasecampPoster, error) { + if account == nil { + return nil, errors.New("connector: the poster needs the agent's account client") + } + if agentID <= 0 { + return nil, errors.New("connector: the poster needs the agent's Person id") + } + return &BasecampPoster{account: account, agentID: agentID}, nil +} + +var _ Poster = (*BasecampPoster)(nil) + +// Post creates the message. +func (p *BasecampPoster) Post(ctx context.Context, dest Destination, body string) (int64, error) { + id, err := p.post(ctx, dest, body) + if err == nil { + return id, nil + } + if e := basecamp.AsError(err); e != nil && (e.Code == basecamp.CodeNotFound || e.Code == basecamp.CodeForbidden || e.Code == basecamp.CodeValidation) { + // Basecamp answered, and its answer is that it created nothing. + return 0, fmt.Errorf("connector: post %s at %d: %w: %w", dest.Kind, dest.RecordingID, ErrNotPosted, err) + } + return id, err +} + +func (p *BasecampPoster) post(ctx context.Context, dest Destination, body string) (int64, error) { + switch dest.Kind { + case MessageBoost: + boost, err := p.account.Boosts().CreateRecording(ctx, dest.RecordingID, body) + if err != nil { + return 0, err + } + return boost.ID, nil + case MessageComment: + comment, err := p.account.Comments().Create(ctx, dest.RecordingID, &basecamp.CreateCommentRequest{Content: body}) + if err != nil { + return 0, err + } + return comment.ID, nil + case MessageChatLine: + line, err := p.account.Campfires().CreateLine(ctx, dest.RecordingID, body) + if err != nil { + return 0, err + } + return line.ID, nil + } + return 0, fmt.Errorf("connector: %q is not a message kind", dest.Kind) +} + +// linePageLimit bounds how far back a chat listing pages, for both callers: +// reconciliation, which reaches back to a send made minutes ago, and the +// adopted-reply rule, which reaches back to an acknowledgement a task-length +// ago. A Campfire busier than this leaves the intent unreconciled and the +// reply unadopted — an error, not a shorter answer that would read as +// "nothing was posted". +const linePageLimit = 200 + +// List answers the agent's messages at the destination since the time given. +// Boosts and comments are listed whole; chat lines newest first, page by page, +// until a page reaches back past since. +func (p *BasecampPoster) List(ctx context.Context, dest Destination, since time.Time) ([]PostedMessage, error) { + out, err := p.list(ctx, dest, since) + if err == nil { + return out, nil + } + if e := basecamp.AsError(err); e != nil && (e.Code == basecamp.CodeNotFound || e.Code == basecamp.CodeForbidden) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: list %s at %d: %w: %w", dest.Kind, dest.RecordingID, ErrUnlistable, err) + } + return out, err +} + +func (p *BasecampPoster) list(ctx context.Context, dest Destination, since time.Time) ([]PostedMessage, error) { + var out []PostedMessage + // Newest-first paging shifts lines across pages as new ones arrive, so + // one line can be served twice; it is one message. + seen := map[int64]bool{} + keep := func(creator *basecamp.Person, id int64, created time.Time, content string) { + if creator != nil && creator.ID == p.agentID && !created.Before(since) && !seen[id] { + seen[id] = true + out = append(out, PostedMessage{ID: id, CreatedAt: created, Content: content}) + } + } + switch dest.Kind { + case MessageBoost: + result, err := p.account.Boosts().ListRecording(ctx, dest.RecordingID, &basecamp.BoostListOptions{Limit: -1}) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if result.Meta.Truncated { + // A truncated listing is the SDK's page cap, which waiting does not + // raise: the same class as a Campfire too deep to page. + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: the boost listing was truncated: %w", ErrUnlistable) + } + for _, b := range result.Boosts { + keep(b.Booster, b.ID, b.CreatedAt, b.Content) + } + return out, nil + case MessageComment: + result, err := p.account.Comments().List(ctx, dest.RecordingID, &basecamp.CommentListOptions{Limit: -1}) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if result.Meta.Truncated { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: the comment listing was truncated: %w", ErrUnlistable) + } + for _, c := range result.Comments { + keep(c.Creator, c.ID, c.CreatedAt, c.Content) + } + return out, nil + case MessageChatLine: + for page := 1; page <= linePageLimit; page++ { + result, err := p.account.Campfires().ListLines(ctx, dest.RecordingID, &basecamp.CampfireLineListOptions{ + Sort: "created_at", Direction: "desc", Page: page, + }) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if len(result.Lines) == 0 { + return out, nil + } + reachedBack := false + for _, l := range result.Lines { + keep(l.Creator, l.ID, l.CreatedAt, l.Content) + if l.CreatedAt.Before(since) { + reachedBack = true + } + } + if reachedBack { + return out, nil + } + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: the Campfire listing did not reach back to %s within %d pages: %w", since.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339), linePageLimit, ErrUnlistable) + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: %q is not a message kind", dest.Kind) +} diff --git a/internal/connector/outbox_basecamp_test.go b/internal/connector/outbox_basecamp_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f000abf9f --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/outbox_basecamp_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,365 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "net/http" + "net/http/httptest" + "regexp" + "sort" + "strconv" + "sync" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-sdk/go/pkg/basecamp" +) + +// obServer is enough of Basecamp's API for the poster: boosts and comments on +// a recording, lines in a Campfire, each created by whoever the test says. +type obServer struct { + *httptest.Server + + mu sync.Mutex + nextID int64 + messages map[Destination][]obServerMessage + posts int + // onPost runs after a message is stored and before the answer is + // written; a non-zero status answers with it instead. + onPost func(r *http.Request, id int64) int + // beforeStore runs before a message is stored; a non-zero status answers + // with it and stores nothing. + beforeStore func(r *http.Request) int + pageSize int + pageHook func(page int) + truncated bool +} + +type obServerMessage struct { + ID int64 + Content string + CreatedAt time.Time + Creator int64 +} + +var obServerPath = regexp.MustCompile(`^/999/(recordings|chats)/(\d+)/(boosts|comments|lines)\.json$`) + +func newOBServer(t *testing.T) *obServer { + t.Helper() + s := &obServer{nextID: 70000, messages: map[Destination][]obServerMessage{}, pageSize: 2} + s.Server = httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(s.serve)) + t.Cleanup(s.Close) + return s +} + +func (s *obServer) serve(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + m := obServerPath.FindStringSubmatch(r.URL.Path) + if m == nil { + http.NotFound(w, r) + return + } + recording, _ := strconv.ParseInt(m[2], 10, 64) + kind := map[string]MessageKind{"boosts": MessageBoost, "comments": MessageComment, "lines": MessageChatLine}[m[3]] + dest := Destination{Kind: kind, RecordingID: recording} + + switch r.Method { + case http.MethodPost: + var body struct { + Content string `json:"content"` + } + if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil { + http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + s.mu.Lock() + s.posts++ + before := s.beforeStore + s.mu.Unlock() + if before != nil { + if status := before(r); status != 0 { + w.WriteHeader(status) + return + } + } + id := s.add(dest, adapterAgentID, body.Content) + s.mu.Lock() + hook := s.onPost + s.mu.Unlock() + if hook != nil { + if status := hook(r, id); status != 0 { + w.WriteHeader(status) + return + } + } + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated) + _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(s.render(kind, s.find(dest, id))) + case http.MethodGet: + s.mu.Lock() + all := append([]obServerMessage(nil), s.messages[dest]...) + pageSize, hook := s.pageSize, s.pageHook + s.mu.Unlock() + if hook != nil && kind == MessageChatLine { + page, _ := strconv.Atoi(r.URL.Query().Get("page")) + defer hook(page) + } + if kind == MessageChatLine { + sort.Slice(all, func(i, j int) bool { return all[i].CreatedAt.After(all[j].CreatedAt) }) + page, _ := strconv.Atoi(r.URL.Query().Get("page")) + if page < 1 { + page = 1 + } + start := (page - 1) * pageSize + switch { + case start >= len(all): + all = nil + case start+pageSize < len(all): + all = all[start : start+pageSize] + default: + all = all[start:] + } + } + out := make([]any, 0, len(all)) + for _, msg := range all { + out = append(out, s.render(kind, msg)) + } + s.mu.Lock() + truncated := s.truncated + s.mu.Unlock() + if truncated { + // More pages than the SDK will follow: it answers Truncated. + w.Header().Set("Link", `<`+s.URL+r.URL.Path+`?page=2>; rel="next"`) + } + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") + _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(out) + default: + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed) + } +} + +func (s *obServer) setOnPost(fn func(r *http.Request, id int64) int) { + s.mu.Lock() + s.onPost = fn + s.mu.Unlock() +} + +func (s *obServer) setTruncated(v bool) { + s.mu.Lock() + s.truncated = v + s.mu.Unlock() +} + +func (s *obServer) setPageHook(fn func(page int)) { + s.mu.Lock() + s.pageHook = fn + s.mu.Unlock() +} + +func (s *obServer) setPageSize(n int) { + s.mu.Lock() + s.pageSize = n + s.mu.Unlock() +} + +func (s *obServer) add(dest Destination, creator int64, content string) int64 { + return s.addAt(dest, creator, content, time.Now().UTC()) +} + +func (s *obServer) addAt(dest Destination, creator int64, content string, at time.Time) int64 { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + s.nextID++ + key := Destination{Kind: dest.Kind, RecordingID: dest.RecordingID} + s.messages[key] = append(s.messages[key], obServerMessage{ID: s.nextID, Content: content, CreatedAt: at, Creator: creator}) + return s.nextID +} + +func (s *obServer) find(dest Destination, id int64) obServerMessage { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + for _, m := range s.messages[Destination{Kind: dest.Kind, RecordingID: dest.RecordingID}] { + if m.ID == id { + return m + } + } + return obServerMessage{} +} + +func (s *obServer) at(dest Destination) []obServerMessage { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + return append([]obServerMessage(nil), s.messages[Destination{Kind: dest.Kind, RecordingID: dest.RecordingID}]...) +} + +func (s *obServer) postCount() int { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + return s.posts +} + +func (s *obServer) render(kind MessageKind, m obServerMessage) map[string]any { + person := map[string]any{"id": m.Creator, "name": "Person " + strconv.FormatInt(m.Creator, 10)} + out := map[string]any{"id": m.ID, "content": m.Content, "created_at": m.CreatedAt.Format(time.RFC3339Nano)} + if kind == MessageBoost { + out["booster"] = person + } else { + out["creator"] = person + out["status"] = "active" + } + return out +} + +func (s *obServer) poster(t *testing.T) *BasecampPoster { + t.Helper() + client := basecamp.NewClient(&basecamp.Config{BaseURL: s.URL}, &basecamp.StaticTokenProvider{Token: "test-token-not-real"}) + poster, err := NewBasecampPoster(client.ForAccount("999"), adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + return poster +} + +func TestBasecampPosterPostsEachKindAsTheAgent(t *testing.T) { + server := newOBServer(t) + poster := server.poster(t) + ctx := context.Background() + + for _, dest := range []Destination{ + {Kind: MessageBoost, RecordingID: obEventRecording}, + {Kind: MessageComment, RecordingID: obReplyRecording}, + {Kind: MessageChatLine, RecordingID: obCampfire}, + } { + id, err := poster.Post(ctx, dest, "body for "+string(dest.Kind)) + require.NoError(t, err, dest.Kind) + stored := server.at(dest) + require.Len(t, stored, 1, dest.Kind) + assert.Equal(t, stored[0].ID, id) + assert.Equal(t, "body for "+string(dest.Kind), stored[0].Content) + } +} + +// A create is one request: a failed answer is never retried by the SDK, since +// a retry would be a second message. +func TestBasecampPosterMakesOneRequestPerPost(t *testing.T) { + server := newOBServer(t) + server.setOnPost(func(*http.Request, int64) int { return http.StatusServiceUnavailable }) + poster := server.poster(t) + + for _, kind := range []MessageKind{MessageBoost, MessageComment, MessageChatLine} { + before := server.postCount() + _, err := poster.Post(context.Background(), Destination{Kind: kind, RecordingID: 5}, "x") + require.Error(t, err, kind) + assert.Equal(t, before+1, server.postCount(), kind) + } +} + +func TestBasecampPosterListsOnlyTheAgentsMessagesSince(t *testing.T) { + server := newOBServer(t) + poster := server.poster(t) + ctx := context.Background() + since := time.Date(2026, 9, 17, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC) + + for _, kind := range []MessageKind{MessageBoost, MessageComment, MessageChatLine} { + dest := Destination{Kind: kind, RecordingID: 42} + server.addAt(dest, adapterAgentID, "old", since.Add(-time.Hour)) + server.addAt(dest, obOtherPersonID, "someone else", since.Add(time.Minute)) + want := server.addAt(dest, adapterAgentID, "mine", since.Add(2*time.Minute)) + server.addAt(dest, obOtherPersonID, "someone else again", since.Add(3*time.Minute)) + server.addAt(dest, obOtherPersonID, "and again", since.Add(4*time.Minute)) + + listed, err := poster.List(ctx, dest, since) + require.NoError(t, err, kind) + require.Len(t, listed, 1, kind) + assert.Equal(t, want, listed[0].ID, kind) + assert.Equal(t, "mine", listed[0].Content, kind) + } +} + +// A Campfire listing that cannot reach back to the sending time is an error, +// never a shorter answer that would read as "nothing was posted". +func TestBasecampPosterRefusesAShortCampfireListing(t *testing.T) { + server := newOBServer(t) + server.setPageSize(1) + poster := server.poster(t) + dest := Destination{Kind: MessageChatLine, RecordingID: obCampfire} + since := time.Date(2026, 9, 17, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC) + for i := range linePageLimit + 1 { + server.addAt(dest, obOtherPersonID, "chatter", since.Add(time.Duration(i+1)*time.Second)) + } + _, err := poster.List(context.Background(), dest, since) + require.Error(t, err) +} + +// A line served on two pages is one message. +func TestBasecampPosterListsALineOnce(t *testing.T) { + server := newOBServer(t) + server.setPageSize(1) + dest := Destination{Kind: MessageChatLine, RecordingID: obCampfire} + since := time.Date(2026, 9, 17, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC) + server.addAt(dest, obOtherPersonID, "before", since.Add(-time.Minute)) + id := server.addAt(dest, adapterAgentID, "mine", since.Add(time.Minute)) + server.setPageHook(func(page int) { + if page == 1 { + // A line arrives between pages, pushing "mine" onto page 2. + server.addAt(dest, obOtherPersonID, "late", since.Add(2*time.Minute)) + } + }) + listed, err := server.poster(t).List(context.Background(), dest, since) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, listed, 1) + assert.Equal(t, id, listed[0].ID) +} + +// A destination that is gone or forbidden is unlistable, not a failure to +// try again. +func TestBasecampPosterMarksAGoneDestinationUnlistable(t *testing.T) { + server := newOBServer(t) + poster := server.poster(t) + _, err := poster.List(context.Background(), Destination{Kind: MessageComment, RecordingID: 1}, time.Now()) + require.NoError(t, err, "an empty listing is an answer") + + gone := httptest.NewServer(http.NotFoundHandler()) + t.Cleanup(gone.Close) + client := basecamp.NewClient(&basecamp.Config{BaseURL: gone.URL}, &basecamp.StaticTokenProvider{Token: "test-token-not-real"}) + p, err := NewBasecampPoster(client.ForAccount("999"), adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = p.List(context.Background(), Destination{Kind: MessageComment, RecordingID: 1}, time.Now()) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUnlistable) +} + +// Basecamp refusing a create is an answer: the message was not created. +func TestBasecampPosterRefusalIsNotPosted(t *testing.T) { + server := newOBServer(t) + server.beforeStore = func(*http.Request) int { return http.StatusForbidden } + _, err := server.poster(t).Post(context.Background(), Destination{Kind: MessageComment, RecordingID: 5}, "x") + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNotPosted) + + server.beforeStore = func(*http.Request) int { return http.StatusServiceUnavailable } + _, err = server.poster(t).Post(context.Background(), Destination{Kind: MessageComment, RecordingID: 5}, "x") + require.Error(t, err) + assert.NotErrorIs(t, err, ErrNotPosted, "a 503 may or may not have created it") +} + +// A listing the SDK truncated at its page cap will not grow shorter by +// waiting: it is unlistable, not a failure to retry for hours. +func TestBasecampPosterTreatsATruncatedListingAsUnlistable(t *testing.T) { + server := newOBServer(t) + poster := server.poster(t) + since := time.Date(2026, 9, 17, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC) + for _, kind := range []MessageKind{MessageBoost, MessageComment} { + dest := Destination{Kind: kind, RecordingID: 77} + server.setTruncated(true) + _, err := poster.List(context.Background(), dest, since) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUnlistable, kind) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "truncated", kind) + } +} + +// Basecamp rejecting a create as invalid created nothing, like a 403. +func TestBasecampPosterTreatsAValidationRefusalAsNotPosted(t *testing.T) { + server := newOBServer(t) + server.beforeStore = func(*http.Request) int { return http.StatusUnprocessableEntity } + _, err := server.poster(t).Post(context.Background(), Destination{Kind: MessageComment, RecordingID: 5}, "x") + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNotPosted) +} diff --git a/internal/connector/outbox_fakes_test.go b/internal/connector/outbox_fakes_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..31a64069f --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/outbox_fakes_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,206 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "sort" + "sync" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/admission" +) + +// Test fixtures for the outbox. Names carry an "ob" prefix so they never +// collide with the dispatcher's own test helpers. + +const ( + obRoute = "/work/connector" + obEventRecording = int64(10304028972) // testEvent's recording + obReplyRecording = int64(10304028989) // admittedVerdict's reply destination + obCampfire = int64(10304030000) + obOtherPersonID = int64(1001) + obUnreachableNote = "listing refused" +) + +// obClock is a settable clock shared by a ledger. +type obClock struct { + mu sync.Mutex + now time.Time +} + +func (c *obClock) Now() time.Time { + c.mu.Lock() + defer c.mu.Unlock() + return c.now +} + +func (c *obClock) Advance(d time.Duration) { + c.mu.Lock() + c.now = c.now.Add(d) + c.mu.Unlock() +} + +// obLedger is a ledger with the lifecycle hooks installed and a settable +// clock. +func obLedger(t *testing.T) (*Ledger, *obClock) { + t.Helper() + ledger := newTestLedger(t) + clock := &obClock{now: time.Date(2026, 9, 17, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)} + ledger.now = clock.Now + ledger.SetHooks(LifecycleHooks(ledger, LifecycleOptions{})) + return ledger, clock +} + +func obAdmit(t *testing.T, ledger *Ledger, id int64, key string) { + t.Helper() + seenRecord(t, ledger, id) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(context.Background(), admittedVerdict(id, 0, key)) + require.NoError(t, err) +} + +// obNoRouteVerdict is a mention in a project with no route. +func obNoRouteVerdict(id, revision int64, reply admission.ReplyDestination) admission.Verdict { + v := admittedVerdict(id, revision, "recording:10304028989") + v.State, v.Reason = admission.StateBlocked, admission.ReasonNoRoute + v.Routed, v.Route, v.Class, v.Snapshot = false, "", "", nil + v.Reply = &reply + return v +} + +func obLaunch(t *testing.T, ledger *Ledger, id int64) Launch { + t.Helper() + l, err := ledger.LaunchTask(context.Background(), LaunchSpec{EventID: id, Route: obRoute, Driver: "fake", Deadline: time.Hour}) + require.NoError(t, err) + return l +} + +// obPull is get_dispatch. A worker reports only what it pulled — exposure at +// launch is not the pull — so a test that acknowledges or completes an event +// pulls it first, as a worker does. +func obPull(t *testing.T, d *TaskDispatch, id int64) { + t.Helper() + _, ok, err := d.Get(context.Background(), id) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok) +} + +func obIntent(t *testing.T, ledger *Ledger, key string) Intent { + t.Helper() + intents, err := ledger.Intents(context.Background(), IntentFilter{}) + require.NoError(t, err) + for _, in := range intents { + if in.Key == key { + return in + } + } + t.Fatalf("no intent %s", key) + return Intent{} +} + +func obIntents(t *testing.T, ledger *Ledger) []Intent { + t.Helper() + intents, err := ledger.Intents(context.Background(), IntentFilter{}) + require.NoError(t, err) + return intents +} + +// fakeBasecamp is Basecamp as the outbox sees it: messages at destinations, +// each with its creator. +type fakeBasecamp struct { + mu sync.Mutex + nextID int64 + messages map[Destination][]fakeMessage + posts int + lists int + + // beforePost runs before a message is created; an error fails the post + // with nothing created. + beforePost func(dest Destination, body string) error + // afterPost runs after a message is created; an error fails the post + // with the message already created. + afterPost func(dest Destination, id int64) error + listErr error + clock func() time.Time +} + +type fakeMessage struct { + PostedMessage + creator int64 +} + +func newFakeBasecamp(clock func() time.Time) *fakeBasecamp { + return &fakeBasecamp{nextID: 90000, messages: map[Destination][]fakeMessage{}, clock: clock} +} + +func obKey(d Destination) Destination { return Destination{Kind: d.Kind, RecordingID: d.RecordingID} } + +// add puts a message at a destination as if someone had posted it. +func (f *fakeBasecamp) add(dest Destination, creator int64, content string) int64 { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + f.nextID++ + f.messages[obKey(dest)] = append(f.messages[obKey(dest)], fakeMessage{ + PostedMessage: PostedMessage{ID: f.nextID, CreatedAt: f.clock(), Content: content}, creator: creator, + }) + return f.nextID +} + +func (f *fakeBasecamp) Post(_ context.Context, dest Destination, body string) (int64, error) { + f.mu.Lock() + f.posts++ + before, after := f.beforePost, f.afterPost + f.mu.Unlock() + if before != nil { + if err := before(dest, body); err != nil { + return 0, err + } + } + id := f.add(dest, adapterAgentID, body) + if after != nil { + if err := after(dest, id); err != nil { + return 0, err + } + } + return id, nil +} + +func (f *fakeBasecamp) List(_ context.Context, dest Destination, since time.Time) ([]PostedMessage, error) { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + f.lists++ + if f.listErr != nil { + return nil, f.listErr + } + var out []PostedMessage + for _, m := range f.messages[obKey(dest)] { + if m.creator == adapterAgentID && !m.CreatedAt.Before(since) { + out = append(out, m.PostedMessage) + } + } + sort.Slice(out, func(i, j int) bool { return out[i].ID < out[j].ID }) + return out, nil +} + +func (f *fakeBasecamp) at(dest Destination) []fakeMessage { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + return append([]fakeMessage(nil), f.messages[obKey(dest)]...) +} + +func (f *fakeBasecamp) postCount() int { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + return f.posts +} + +var errWire = errors.New("connection reset by peer") + +func obOutbox(t *testing.T, ledger *Ledger, poster Poster) *Outbox { + t.Helper() + ob, err := NewOutbox(OutboxOptions{Ledger: ledger, Poster: poster}) + require.NoError(t, err) + return ob +} diff --git a/internal/connector/outbox_invariants_test.go b/internal/connector/outbox_invariants_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e8d8c7230 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/outbox_invariants_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,1500 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + "path/filepath" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/admission" +) + +// The outbox's invariants (outbox.go), one test or group each. + +var obCommentReply = admission.ReplyDestination{Kind: admission.ReplyComment, RecordingID: obReplyRecording} + +// Invariant 1: an intent and its transition commit or roll back together. An +// intent that cannot be written takes the verdict down with it. +func TestOutboxIntentRollsBackWithItsTransition(t *testing.T) { + ledger, _ := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + seenRecord(t, ledger, 1) + _, err := ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `CREATE TRIGGER refuse_outbox BEFORE INSERT ON outbox BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'injected'); END`) + require.NoError(t, err) + + _, err = ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(1, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StateSeen, getRecord(t, ledger, 1).State, "the verdict rolled back with its intent") + assert.Empty(t, obIntents(t, ledger)) +} + +// Invariant 1, the other direction: a transition that fails after its intent +// was written leaves no intent. +func TestOutboxIntentRollsBackWhenTheTransitionFails(t *testing.T) { + ledger, _ := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + obAdmit(t, ledger, 1, "recording:10304028989") + l := obLaunch(t, ledger, 1) + + hooks := LifecycleHooks(ledger, LifecycleOptions{}) + written := hooks.AttemptEnded + hooks.AttemptEnded = func(ctx context.Context, tx Tx, s Settlement) error { + if err := written(ctx, tx, s); err != nil { + return err + } + return errWire + } + ledger.SetHooks(hooks) + _, err := ledger.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: l.AttemptID, Stop: StopLost}) + require.Error(t, err) + + for _, in := range obIntents(t, ledger) { + assert.NotEqual(t, IntentCompletion, in.Kind, "the completion rolled back with the settlement") + } + live, err := ledger.LiveAttempts(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Len(t, live, 1) +} + +// Invariant 2: one intent per thing answered for. +func TestOutboxOneIntentPerKey(t *testing.T) { + ledger, _ := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + + // A no_route record is decided again every time it is retried. + seenRecord(t, ledger, 1) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(1, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(1, getRecord(t, ledger, 1).Revision, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + + obAdmit(t, ledger, 2, "recording:10304028989") + l := obLaunch(t, ledger, 2) + for range 2 { + _, err := ledger.StillRunning(ctx, l.AttemptID) + require.NoError(t, err) + } + + count := map[IntentKind]int{} + for _, in := range obIntents(t, ledger) { + count[in.Kind]++ + } + assert.Equal(t, 1, count[IntentHoldingReply], "one holding reply per event however often it is decided") + assert.Equal(t, 1, count[IntentGuardAck]) + assert.Equal(t, 2, count[IntentStillRunning], "one per occurrence") + obIntent(t, ledger, stillRunningKey(l.AttemptID, 1)) + obIntent(t, ledger, stillRunningKey(l.AttemptID, 2)) +} + +// sendingChecker is a poster that, when asked to post, reads the intent from a +// second ledger handle: what another process would find if this one died now. +type sendingChecker struct { + *fakeBasecamp + t *testing.T + other *Ledger + states []IntentState +} + +func (s *sendingChecker) Post(ctx context.Context, dest Destination, body string) (int64, error) { + intents, err := s.other.Intents(ctx, IntentFilter{}) + require.NoError(s.t, err) + for _, in := range intents { + if in.Body == body { + s.states = append(s.states, in.State) + } + } + return s.fakeBasecamp.Post(ctx, dest, body) +} + +// Invariant 3: the sending row is durable before the request. +func TestOutboxNothingIsSentWithoutADurableSendingRow(t *testing.T) { + path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "state", "connector.db") + ledger, err := OpenLedger(path) + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = ledger.Close() }) + ledger.SetHooks(LifecycleHooks(ledger, LifecycleOptions{})) + ctx := context.Background() + + seenRecord(t, ledger, 1) + _, err = ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(1, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + + other, err := OpenLedger(path) + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = other.Close() }) + poster := &sendingChecker{fakeBasecamp: newFakeBasecamp(time.Now), t: t, other: other} + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, poster).Flush(ctx)) + require.Equal(t, []IntentState{IntentSending}, poster.states, "another handle saw the intent sending while the request was made") + assert.Equal(t, IntentSent, obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)).State) +} + +// Invariant 4: a request that fails leaves the intent sending, and nothing +// automatic posts it again — not the next flush, not a restart. +func TestOutboxNeverResendsASendingIntent(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + seenRecord(t, ledger, 1) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(1, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.beforePost = func(Destination, string) error { return errWire } + ob := obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp) + require.NoError(t, ob.Flush(ctx)) + assert.Equal(t, 1, basecamp.postCount()) + assert.Equal(t, IntentSending, obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)).State) + + basecamp.beforePost = nil + require.NoError(t, ob.Flush(ctx)) + clock.Advance(time.Hour) + require.NoError(t, ob.Flush(ctx)) + restarted := obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp) + require.NoError(t, restarted.Recover(ctx)) + require.NoError(t, restarted.Flush(ctx)) + + assert.Equal(t, 1, basecamp.postCount(), "one request, ever") + in := obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)) + assert.Equal(t, IntentIndeterminate, in.State, "nothing matched, so a person decides") + assert.Empty(t, basecamp.at(in.Destination)) +} + +// Invariant 4: a stale sending intent is reconciled by the running process +// too, never posted. +func TestOutboxReconcilesAStaleSendingIntentWithoutPosting(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + seenRecord(t, ledger, 1) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(1, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // The request landed, but its answer was lost on the wire. + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.afterPost = func(Destination, int64) error { return errWire } + ob := obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp) + require.NoError(t, ob.Flush(ctx)) + require.Equal(t, IntentSending, obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)).State) + + settled, err := ob.reconcileStale(ctx, ob.opts.ReconcileAfter) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Zero(t, settled, "a request just made is given time to land") + + clock.Advance(2 * time.Minute) + settled, err = ob.reconcileStale(ctx, ob.opts.ReconcileAfter) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, 1, settled) + in := obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)) + require.Equal(t, IntentSent, in.State) + messages := basecamp.at(in.Destination) + require.Len(t, messages, 1) + assert.Equal(t, messages[0].ID, *in.ReceiptID) + assert.Equal(t, 1, basecamp.postCount()) +} + +// sendingHolding writes a holding reply intent and moves it to sending as a +// crashed process would have left it. +func sendingHolding(t *testing.T, ledger *Ledger, id int64, reply admission.ReplyDestination) Intent { + t.Helper() + ctx := context.Background() + seenRecord(t, ledger, id) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(id, 0, reply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + claimed, ok, err := ledger.claimIntent(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok) + require.Equal(t, holdingKey(id), claimed.Key) + return claimed +} + +// Invariant 5: reconciliation adopts only an unambiguous candidate. +func TestOutboxReconciliationAdoptsOnlyTheUnambiguous(t *testing.T) { + t.Run("exactly one match is adopted", func(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + in := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, obCommentReply) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.add(in.Destination, adapterAgentID, "<div>Working on it now</div>") // the worker's own words + basecamp.add(in.Destination, obOtherPersonID, in.Body) // someone quoting it + posted := basecamp.add(in.Destination, adapterAgentID, `<div dir="auto">`+in.Body+`</div>`) + + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Recover(ctx)) + got := obIntent(t, ledger, in.Key) + require.Equal(t, IntentSent, got.State) + assert.Equal(t, posted, *got.ReceiptID) + assert.Zero(t, basecamp.postCount()) + }) + + t.Run("two matches are indeterminate", func(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + in := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, obCommentReply) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.add(in.Destination, adapterAgentID, in.Body) + basecamp.add(in.Destination, adapterAgentID, in.Body) + + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Recover(ctx)) + got := obIntent(t, ledger, in.Key) + assert.Equal(t, IntentIndeterminate, got.State) + assert.Nil(t, got.ReceiptID) + assert.Zero(t, basecamp.postCount()) + }) + + t.Run("a match another intent owns is not a candidate", func(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + // Two guards on one recording: the same boost body, the same + // destination. The first went out and has its receipt. + obAdmit(t, ledger, 1, "recording:10304028989") + obAdmit(t, ledger, 2, "recording:10304028989") + clock.Advance(DefaultGuardDelay) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + first, ok, err := ledger.claimIntent(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok) + receipt := basecamp.add(first.Destination, adapterAgentID, first.Body) + _, err = ledger.recordReceipt(ctx, first.ID, receipt) + require.NoError(t, err) + second, ok, err := ledger.claimIntent(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok) + + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Recover(ctx)) + got := obIntent(t, ledger, second.Key) + assert.Equal(t, IntentIndeterminate, got.State, "the only matching boost is the first guard's") + assert.Equal(t, receipt, *obIntent(t, ledger, first.Key).ReceiptID) + }) + + t.Run("a match another unfinished intent could claim is indeterminate", func(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + obAdmit(t, ledger, 1, "recording:10304028989") + obAdmit(t, ledger, 2, "recording:10304028989") + clock.Advance(DefaultGuardDelay) + first, ok, err := ledger.claimIntent(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.add(first.Destination, adapterAgentID, first.Body) + + // The second guard is still pending: it could have been the one sent. + ob := obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp) + _, err = ob.reconcileStale(ctx, 0) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, IntentIndeterminate, obIntent(t, ledger, first.Key).State) + assert.Zero(t, basecamp.postCount()) + }) + + t.Run("a listing that fails settles nothing", func(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + in := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, obCommentReply) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.add(in.Destination, adapterAgentID, in.Body) + basecamp.listErr = errWire + + require.Error(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Recover(ctx)) + assert.Equal(t, IntentSending, obIntent(t, ledger, in.Key).State, "tried again later, still never posted") + assert.Zero(t, basecamp.postCount()) + }) +} + +// Invariant 6: a receipt belongs to one intent and never changes. +func TestOutboxAReceiptBelongsToOneIntent(t *testing.T) { + ledger, _ := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + a := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, obCommentReply) + b := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 2, obCommentReply) + + _, err := ledger.recordReceipt(ctx, a.ID, 777) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = ledger.recordReceipt(ctx, b.ID, 777) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrReceiptOwned) + assert.Equal(t, IntentSending, obIntent(t, ledger, b.Key).State) + + _, err = ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE outbox SET receipt_id = 778 WHERE id = ?`, a.ID) + require.Error(t, err, "a receipt never changes") +} + +// Invariant 7: states move along the lifecycle's edges only. +func TestOutboxIntentStatesMoveAlongTheirEdges(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + in := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, obCommentReply) + + _, err := ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE outbox SET state = 'pending' WHERE id = ?`, in.ID) + require.Error(t, err, "sending never returns to pending by itself") + + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now)).Recover(ctx)) + require.Equal(t, IntentIndeterminate, obIntent(t, ledger, in.Key).State) + + err = ledger.ResolveIntent(ctx, in.ID, IntentResolution{Resolution: ResolveResend}) + require.Error(t, err, "a resolution names who decided") + require.NoError(t, ledger.ResolveIntent(ctx, in.ID, IntentResolution{Resolution: ResolveAbandon, By: "person:26909558"})) + got := obIntent(t, ledger, in.Key) + assert.Equal(t, IntentAbandoned, got.State) + assert.Equal(t, "person:26909558", got.ResolvedBy) + require.ErrorIs(t, ledger.ResolveIntent(ctx, in.ID, IntentResolution{Resolution: ResolveResend, By: "person:26909558"}), ErrNotIndeterminate) + + // A person's decision reaches an indeterminate intent, and nothing else: + // a sent one is settled, whatever a person says about it. + sent := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 2, obCommentReply) + _, err = ledger.recordReceipt(ctx, sent.ID, 4242) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.ErrorIs(t, ledger.ResolveIntent(ctx, sent.ID, IntentResolution{Resolution: ResolveAbandon, By: "person:26909558"}), ErrNotIndeterminate) + assert.Equal(t, IntentSent, obIntent(t, ledger, sent.Key).State) + _, err = ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE outbox SET state = 'pending' WHERE id = ?`, in.ID) + require.Error(t, err, "abandoned is final") +} + +// A person's resend is the only way an intent goes out a second time. +func TestOutboxAPersonMayResendAnIndeterminateIntent(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + in := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, obCommentReply) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + ob := obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp) + require.NoError(t, ob.Recover(ctx)) + require.NoError(t, ob.Flush(ctx)) + require.Zero(t, basecamp.postCount()) + + require.NoError(t, ledger.ResolveIntent(ctx, in.ID, IntentResolution{Resolution: ResolveResend, By: "person:26909558"})) + require.NoError(t, ob.Flush(ctx)) + assert.Equal(t, 1, basecamp.postCount()) + assert.Equal(t, IntentSent, obIntent(t, ledger, in.Key).State) +} + +// Invariant 8: get_dispatch within the delay cancels the guard in its own +// transaction, and the guard never posts. +func TestOutboxGetDispatchCancelsTheGuard(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + obAdmit(t, ledger, 1, "recording:10304028989") + l := obLaunch(t, ledger, 1) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + ob := obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp) + + clock.Advance(20 * time.Second) + require.NoError(t, ob.Flush(ctx)) + require.Zero(t, basecamp.postCount(), "not due yet") + + d, err := ledger.Dispatch(ctx, l.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + instruction, ok, err := d.Get(ctx, 1) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok) + assert.False(t, instruction.GuardAcknowledged) + assert.Equal(t, IntentCanceled, obIntent(t, ledger, guardKey(1)).State, "canceled in get_dispatch's transaction") + + clock.Advance(time.Minute) + require.NoError(t, ob.Flush(ctx)) + assert.Zero(t, basecamp.postCount()) +} + +// Invariant 8: a guard that fired is reported to the worker, whether its task +// existed when it fired or was created after. +func TestOutboxAFiredGuardIsReportedToTheWorker(t *testing.T) { + t.Run("task live when the guard fires", func(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + obAdmit(t, ledger, 1, "recording:10304028989") + l := obLaunch(t, ledger, 1) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + clock.Advance(DefaultGuardDelay) + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Flush(ctx)) + require.Equal(t, 1, basecamp.postCount()) + + guard := obIntent(t, ledger, guardKey(1)) + assert.Equal(t, IntentSent, guard.State) + assert.Equal(t, Destination{BucketID: adapterBucketID, Kind: MessageBoost, RecordingID: obEventRecording}, guard.Destination) + d, err := ledger.Dispatch(ctx, l.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + instruction, _, err := d.Get(ctx, 1) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, instruction.GuardAcknowledged) + }) + + t.Run("task created after the guard fired", func(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + obAdmit(t, ledger, 1, "recording:10304028989") + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + clock.Advance(DefaultGuardDelay) + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Flush(ctx)) + require.Equal(t, 1, basecamp.postCount(), "a slow launch is what the guard is for") + + l := obLaunch(t, ledger, 1) + d, err := ledger.Dispatch(ctx, l.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + instruction, _, err := d.Get(ctx, 1) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, instruction.GuardAcknowledged) + }) + + t.Run("follow-up joined after its guard fired", func(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + obAdmit(t, ledger, 1, "recording:10304028989") + l := obLaunch(t, ledger, 1) + obAdmit(t, ledger, 2, "recording:10304028989") + require.Equal(t, StateQueued, getRecord(t, ledger, 2).State) + d, err := ledger.Dispatch(ctx, l.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, _, err = d.Get(ctx, 1) + require.NoError(t, err) + + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + clock.Advance(DefaultGuardDelay) + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Flush(ctx)) + require.Equal(t, 1, basecamp.postCount(), "only the follow-up's guard: the first was canceled") + + joined, err := ledger.JoinConversation(ctx, l.TaskID) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Equal(t, []int64{2}, joined) + instruction, _, err := d.Get(ctx, 2) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, instruction.GuardAcknowledged) + }) +} + +// The guard arms only for a request, and stands down for a record that left +// the path to a worker. +func TestOutboxTheGuardArmsOnlyForRequestsStillWaiting(t *testing.T) { + t.Run("no guard for a trigger that is not a request", func(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + ledger, _ := obLedger(t) + seenRecord(t, ledger, 1) + v := admittedVerdict(1, 0, "recording:10304028989") + v.Trigger, v.Acknowledge = admission.TriggerCompleted, false + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, v) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, obIntents(t, ledger)) + }) + + t.Run("a record discarded before the guard is due", func(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + obAdmit(t, ledger, 1, "recording:10304028989") + _, err := ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE events SET state = 'discarded', reason = 'by_operator' WHERE id = 1`) + require.NoError(t, err) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + clock.Advance(DefaultGuardDelay) + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Flush(ctx)) + assert.Zero(t, basecamp.postCount()) + assert.Equal(t, IntentCanceled, obIntent(t, ledger, guardKey(1)).State) + }) +} + +// The hold marker holds sending; what was sent is still reconciled. +func TestOutboxPausedHoldsSending(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + in := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, obCommentReply) + seenRecord(t, ledger, 2) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(2, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.add(in.Destination, adapterAgentID, in.Body) + ob, err := NewOutbox(OutboxOptions{Ledger: ledger, Poster: basecamp, Paused: func(context.Context) (bool, error) { return true, nil }}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, ob.Recover(ctx)) + require.NoError(t, ob.Flush(ctx)) + assert.Zero(t, basecamp.postCount()) + assert.Equal(t, IntentSent, obIntent(t, ledger, in.Key).State) + assert.Equal(t, IntentPending, obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(2)).State) +} + +// Invariant 4, defended in the sender too: should an intent it already +// claimed ever come back as pending within one flush, the flush leaves it for +// the next rather than post it a second time. +func TestOutboxFlushNeverClaimsAnIntentTwice(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + seenRecord(t, ledger, 1) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(1, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `DROP TRIGGER outbox_state_edges`) + require.NoError(t, err) + + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + reset := false + basecamp.beforePost = func(Destination, string) error { + if !reset { + // Something outside the rules puts the row back to pending + // mid-send, once. + reset = true + _, err := ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE outbox SET state = 'pending', sending_at = NULL WHERE intent_key = ?`, holdingKey(1)) + require.NoError(t, err) + } + return errWire + } + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Flush(ctx)) + assert.Equal(t, 1, basecamp.postCount()) + assert.Equal(t, IntentPending, obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)).State, "left for the next flush, not claimed again in this one") +} + +// A listing that keeps failing backs off, and gives up as indeterminate — +// never a request a second, never a resend. +func TestOutboxAFailingListingBacksOffThenGivesUp(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + in := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, obCommentReply) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.listErr = errWire + ob := obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp) + + lists := func() int { basecamp.mu.Lock(); defer basecamp.mu.Unlock(); return basecamp.lists } + require.Error(t, ob.Recover(ctx)) + require.Equal(t, 1, lists()) + for range 5 { + _, _ = ob.reconcileStale(ctx, 0) + } + assert.Equal(t, 1, lists(), "not tried again before its backoff") + got := obIntent(t, ledger, in.Key) + require.Equal(t, IntentSending, got.State) + require.NotNil(t, got.ReconcileAt) + assert.Equal(t, DefaultReconcileBackoff, got.ReconcileAt.Sub(clock.Now())) + + for i := 2; i <= MaxReconcileFailures; i++ { + clock.Advance(MaxReconcileBackoff) + _, _ = ob.reconcileStale(ctx, 0) + assert.Equal(t, i, lists()) + } + got = obIntent(t, ledger, in.Key) + assert.Equal(t, IntentIndeterminate, got.State) + assert.Equal(t, MaxReconcileFailures, got.ReconcileFailures, "the count that gave up is the count recorded") + assert.Zero(t, basecamp.postCount()) +} + +// A destination that cannot be listed settles at once as indeterminate. +func TestOutboxAnUnlistableDestinationIsIndeterminate(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + in := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, obCommentReply) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.listErr = fmt.Errorf("gone: %w", ErrUnlistable) + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Recover(ctx)) + got := obIntent(t, ledger, in.Key) + assert.Equal(t, IntentIndeterminate, got.State) + assert.Equal(t, "destination cannot be listed", got.Note) + assert.Equal(t, 1, got.ReconcileFailures) +} + +// On start, a sending intent younger than ReconcileAfter is left to land. +func TestOutboxRunLeavesAYoungSendingIntentToLand(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + in := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, obCommentReply) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + ob, err := NewOutbox(OutboxOptions{Ledger: ledger, Poster: basecamp, Tick: time.Millisecond}) + require.NoError(t, err) + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 50*time.Millisecond) + defer cancel() + require.NoError(t, ob.Run(ctx)) + assert.Zero(t, basecamp.lists) + assert.Equal(t, IntentSending, obIntent(t, ledger, in.Key).State) +} + +// Rivals: an intent left indeterminate or abandoned at the destination with +// the same body may own the only match, so nothing is adopted. +func TestOutboxUnsettledRivalsBlockAdoption(t *testing.T) { + for _, rivalState := range []IntentState{IntentIndeterminate, IntentAbandoned} { + t.Run(string(rivalState), func(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + obAdmit(t, ledger, 1, "recording:10304028989") + obAdmit(t, ledger, 2, "recording:10304028989") + clock.Advance(DefaultGuardDelay) + first, ok, err := ledger.claimIntent(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + // The first guard's request never got an answer; nothing listed yet. + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Recover(ctx)) + require.Equal(t, IntentIndeterminate, obIntent(t, ledger, first.Key).State) + if rivalState == IntentAbandoned { + require.NoError(t, ledger.ResolveIntent(ctx, first.ID, IntentResolution{Resolution: ResolveAbandon, By: "person:26909558"})) + } + + // The first boost shows up late; the second guard went sending. + second, ok, err := ledger.claimIntent(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok) + basecamp.add(second.Destination, adapterAgentID, second.Body) + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Recover(ctx)) + assert.Equal(t, IntentIndeterminate, obIntent(t, ledger, second.Key).State) + }) + } +} + +// A lifecycle message whose receipt the ledger does not hold yet is not +// adopted as the worker's reply; it is recognized by its words at its own +// destination, so a notice in flight elsewhere, or one left for a person, +// never hides a reply. +func TestOutboxAnUnreceiptedNoticeIsNeverAdopted(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + in := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, obCommentReply) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + since := clock.Now().Add(-time.Minute) + landed := basecamp.add(in.Destination, adapterAgentID, `<div dir="auto">`+in.Body+`</div>`) + reply := basecamp.add(in.Destination, adapterAgentID, "<div>Done: the fix is on the branch.</div>") + replies := LifecycleFilteredReplies{Lister: basecamp, Ledger: ledger} + + listed, err := replies.AgentReplies(ctx, adapterBucketID, "comment", obReplyRecording, since) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, listed, 1, "the sending notice is left out by its words") + assert.Equal(t, reply, listed[0].ID) + + // Elsewhere, an abandoned notice hides nothing. + other := admission.ReplyDestination{Kind: admission.ReplyComment, RecordingID: 555} + abandoned := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 2, other) + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now)).Recover(ctx)) + require.NoError(t, ledger.ResolveIntent(ctx, abandoned.ID, IntentResolution{Resolution: ResolveAbandon, By: "person:26909558"})) + listed, err = replies.AgentReplies(ctx, adapterBucketID, "comment", obReplyRecording, since) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, listed, 1) + + // That recovery listed an empty Basecamp, so the first notice is + // indeterminate too, and still left out by its words. A person then finds + // it and records its receipt, which identifies it from then on. + require.Equal(t, IntentIndeterminate, obIntent(t, ledger, in.Key).State) + require.NoError(t, ledger.ResolveIntent(ctx, in.ID, IntentResolution{Resolution: ResolveSent, ReceiptID: landed, By: "person:26909558"})) + assert.True(t, IsLifecycleMessageIn(ledger)(landed)) + assert.False(t, IsLifecycleMessageIn(ledger)(reply)) + id, ok := AdoptableReply(AdoptionCandidate{DeliveredAt: since}, []AgentReply{{ID: landed, CreatedAt: clock.Now()}}, IsLifecycleMessageIn(ledger)) + assert.False(t, ok, "adopted %d", id) +} + +// blockingPoster answers nothing until its request's context ends. +type blockingPoster struct{ *fakeBasecamp } + +func (b blockingPoster) Post(ctx context.Context, _ Destination, _ string) (int64, error) { + <-ctx.Done() + return 0, ctx.Err() +} + +// A flush with a deadline — the shutdown's — is not held past it by a request, +// and claims nothing it has no time left to send. +func TestOutboxFlushHonoursItsDeadline(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + for _, id := range []int64{1, 2} { + seenRecord(t, ledger, id) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(context.Background(), obNoRouteVerdict(id, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + } + // The first claim has half a second of slack; once its request is cut off + // at PostTimeout, less than PostTimeout is left, so nothing more is + // claimed. + ob, err := NewOutbox(OutboxOptions{Ledger: ledger, Poster: blockingPoster{newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now)}, PostTimeout: time.Second}) + require.NoError(t, err) + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 1500*time.Millisecond) + defer cancel() + started := time.Now() + _ = ob.Flush(ctx) + assert.Less(t, time.Since(started), 5*time.Second) + assert.Equal(t, IntentSending, obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)).State, "cut off mid-flight: reconciled later, never resent") + assert.Equal(t, IntentPending, obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(2)).State, "not claimed with too little time left") +} + +// A person's resend starts the request's reconciliation afresh: the failures +// of the listing before it are not counted against it. +func TestOutboxAResendStartsReconciliationAfresh(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + in := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, obCommentReply) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.listErr = errWire + ob := obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp) + for range MaxReconcileFailures { + _, _ = ob.reconcileStale(ctx, 0) + clock.Advance(MaxReconcileBackoff) + } + require.Equal(t, IntentIndeterminate, obIntent(t, ledger, in.Key).State) + + require.NoError(t, ledger.ResolveIntent(ctx, in.ID, IntentResolution{Resolution: ResolveResend, By: "person:26909558"})) + got := obIntent(t, ledger, in.Key) + assert.Zero(t, got.ReconcileFailures) + assert.Nil(t, got.ReconcileAt) + + basecamp.beforePost = func(Destination, string) error { return errWire } + require.NoError(t, ob.Flush(ctx)) + _, _ = ob.reconcileStale(ctx, 0) + assert.Equal(t, IntentSending, obIntent(t, ledger, in.Key).State, "one failed listing is the first of a fresh budget") +} + +// A request that failed — a timeout, say — is given ReconcileAfter from its +// failure to land, not from its claim. +func TestOutboxAFailedPostIsGivenTimeToLand(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + seenRecord(t, ledger, 1) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(1, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.beforePost = func(Destination, string) error { + clock.Advance(DefaultPostTimeout) // the request ran out its whole timeout + return context.DeadlineExceeded + } + ob := obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp) + require.NoError(t, ob.Flush(ctx)) + _, _ = ob.reconcileStale(ctx, ob.opts.ReconcileAfter) + assert.Zero(t, basecamp.lists, "not listed straight after the failure") + assert.Equal(t, IntentSending, obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)).State) +} + +// A request claimed with time left is still cut off at the flush's deadline, +// not at its own longer timeout. +func TestOutboxFlushCapsARequestAtItsDeadline(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + seenRecord(t, ledger, 1) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(context.Background(), obNoRouteVerdict(1, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + ob, err := NewOutbox(OutboxOptions{Ledger: ledger, Poster: blockingPoster{newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now)}, PostTimeout: time.Minute}) + require.NoError(t, err) + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), MinPostWindow+500*time.Millisecond) + defer cancel() + started := time.Now() + _ = ob.Flush(ctx) + assert.Less(t, time.Since(started), MinPostWindow+5*time.Second) + assert.Equal(t, IntentSending, obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)).State) +} + +// A queue of intents arriving as fast as they can be sent does not starve +// reconciliation: the running connector sends in batches. +func TestOutboxRunReconcilesWhileSendsKeepArriving(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + stale := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, obCommentReply) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.add(stale.Destination, adapterAgentID, stale.Body) + + // Every send admits another request, so there is always one more to send. + next := int64(100) + admit := func() { + next++ + seenRecord(t, ledger, next) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(context.Background(), obNoRouteVerdict(next, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + } + basecamp.beforePost = func(Destination, string) error { + admit() + return nil + } + clock.Advance(2 * DefaultReconcileAfter) + seenRecord(t, ledger, 2) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(2, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + + ob, err := NewOutbox(OutboxOptions{Ledger: ledger, Poster: basecamp, Tick: time.Millisecond}) + require.NoError(t, err) + // Cancel without a deadline: a flush with one claims nothing, and this + // run must actually be sending while reconciliation is due. The run is + // stopped once the stale intent settles, or after a bound generous enough + // for a loaded race-detector runner; a drain that starves reconciliation + // never settles it. + runCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx) + defer cancel() + done := make(chan error, 1) + go func() { done <- ob.Run(runCtx) }() + deadline := time.Now().Add(30 * time.Second) + for time.Now().Before(deadline) { + if in, err := ledger.Intent(ctx, stale.ID); err == nil && in.State != IntentSending { + break + } + time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond) + } + cancel() + require.NoError(t, <-done) + assert.Equal(t, IntentSent, obIntent(t, ledger, stale.Key).State, "the stale sending intent was reconciled") +} + +// A holding reply is never posted about work the connector went on to run: it +// stands down when its record leaves blocked(no_route). +func TestOutboxAHoldingReplyStandsDownWhenTheRouteArrives(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + seenRecord(t, ledger, 1) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(1, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // connect.json gains the route: the record is decided again and dispatched. + _, err = ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, admittedVerdict(1, getRecord(t, ledger, 1).Revision, "recording:10304028989")) + require.NoError(t, err) + obLaunch(t, ledger, 1) + + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Flush(ctx)) + assert.Zero(t, basecamp.postCount()) + got := obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)) + assert.Equal(t, IntentCanceled, got.State) + assert.Equal(t, "no longer called for", got.Note) +} + +// A message the worker reported as its own acknowledgement or reply is the +// worker's, whatever it says: the guard's fixed form is short enough to +// collide with an acknowledgement in the worker's own words. +func TestOutboxNeverAdoptsAWorkersOwnMessage(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + obAdmit(t, ledger, 1, "recording:10304028989") + l := obLaunch(t, ledger, 1) + clock.Advance(DefaultGuardDelay) + claimed, ok, err := ledger.claimIntent(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok) + + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + workersOwn := basecamp.add(claimed.Destination, adapterAgentID, GuardAckBody) + d, err := ledger.Dispatch(ctx, l.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + obPull(t, d, 1) + _, err = d.Ack(ctx, 1, &workersOwn) + require.NoError(t, err) + + clock.Advance(2 * time.Minute) + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Recover(ctx)) + got := obIntent(t, ledger, guardKey(1)) + assert.Equal(t, IntentIndeterminate, got.State) + assert.Nil(t, got.ReceiptID) +} + +// A request Basecamp refused created nothing, and says so: no listing, no +// backoff, and a note a person can act on. +func TestOutboxARefusedRequestSaysNoMessageExists(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + seenRecord(t, ledger, 1) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(1, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.beforePost = func(Destination, string) error { return fmt.Errorf("404: %w", ErrNotPosted) } + + ob := obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp) + require.NoError(t, ob.Flush(ctx)) + got := obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)) + assert.Equal(t, IntentCanceled, got.State, "refused is not uncertain: nothing was created") + assert.Equal(t, "the request was refused; no message was created", got.Note) + assert.Zero(t, basecamp.lists, "nothing to look for") + require.NoError(t, ob.Flush(ctx)) + assert.Equal(t, 1, basecamp.postCount(), "never asked again") +} + +// A reconciliation listing is bounded in time: a destination that pages +// forever cannot hold up the sending of what is due. +func TestOutboxReconciliationListingIsBounded(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + in := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, obCommentReply) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + ob, err := NewOutbox(OutboxOptions{Ledger: ledger, Poster: hangingLister{basecamp}, Tick: time.Millisecond}) + require.NoError(t, err) + + started := time.Now() + _, err = ob.reconcileStale(ctx, 0) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Less(t, time.Since(started), AdoptionScanTimeout+5*time.Second) + assert.Equal(t, IntentSending, obIntent(t, ledger, in.Key).State, "a listing cut short is a failed listing") + assert.NotNil(t, obIntent(t, ledger, in.Key).ReconcileAt) +} + +// hangingLister answers a listing only when its request's context ends. +type hangingLister struct{ *fakeBasecamp } + +func (h hangingLister) List(ctx context.Context, _ Destination, _ time.Time) ([]PostedMessage, error) { + <-ctx.Done() + return nil, ctx.Err() +} + +// A guard or holding reply whose record is gone is canceled, not claimed +// again on every tick behind everything else waiting to be sent. +func TestOutboxAnIntentWithNoRecordIsCanceled(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + seenRecord(t, ledger, 1) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(1, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `PRAGMA foreign_keys = off`) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM events WHERE id = 1`) + require.NoError(t, err) + + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Flush(ctx)) + assert.Equal(t, IntentCanceled, obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)).State) + assert.Zero(t, basecamp.postCount()) +} + +// A guard Basecamp refused created nothing, so its intent is canceled. Task +// events the claim marked fired stay fired — #736 settles a guard once — so +// the acknowledgement is missing, never doubled; a task created afterwards +// arms afresh. +func TestOutboxARefusedGuardIsMissingNeverDoubled(t *testing.T) { + t.Run("task live when the guard is refused", func(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + obAdmit(t, ledger, 1, "recording:10304028989") + l := obLaunch(t, ledger, 1) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.beforePost = func(Destination, string) error { return fmt.Errorf("403: %w", ErrNotPosted) } + clock.Advance(DefaultGuardDelay) + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Flush(ctx)) + assert.Equal(t, IntentCanceled, obIntent(t, ledger, guardKey(1)).State) + + d, err := ledger.Dispatch(ctx, l.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + instruction, ok, err := d.Get(ctx, 1) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok) + assert.True(t, instruction.GuardAcknowledged, "settled once: missing rather than doubled") + }) + + t.Run("task created after the guard was refused", func(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + obAdmit(t, ledger, 1, "recording:10304028989") + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.beforePost = func(Destination, string) error { return fmt.Errorf("403: %w", ErrNotPosted) } + clock.Advance(DefaultGuardDelay) + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Flush(ctx)) + + l := obLaunch(t, ledger, 1) + d, err := ledger.Dispatch(ctx, l.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + instruction, _, err := d.Get(ctx, 1) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.False(t, instruction.GuardAcknowledged, "nothing was acknowledged, so the worker does") + }) +} + +// Slow destinations cannot hold up a guard that is due: the running connector +// lists one destination between sends. +func TestOutboxSlowDestinationsDoNotHoldUpSending(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + for id := int64(1); id <= 3; id++ { + sendingHolding(t, ledger, id, admission.ReplyDestination{Kind: admission.ReplyComment, RecordingID: 900 + id}) + } + clock.Advance(2 * DefaultReconcileAfter) + seenRecord(t, ledger, 9) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(9, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + + lister := &countingHangingLister{fakeBasecamp: newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now)} + ob, err := NewOutbox(OutboxOptions{Ledger: ledger, Poster: lister, Tick: time.Millisecond}) + require.NoError(t, err) + listCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx) + defer cancel() + lister.cancelAfterFirst = cancel + require.NoError(t, ob.Run(listCtx)) + assert.Equal(t, 1, lister.calls, "one listing per pass") + assert.Equal(t, IntentSent, obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(9)).State, "the due intent went out before any listing") +} + +// countingHangingLister fails every listing, and ends the run after the first. +type countingHangingLister struct { + *fakeBasecamp + calls int + cancelAfterFirst func() +} + +func (c *countingHangingLister) List(context.Context, Destination, time.Time) ([]PostedMessage, error) { + c.calls++ + if c.calls == 1 { + c.cancelAfterFirst() + } + return nil, errWire +} + +// A refused request created nothing, so once a person has fixed the cause +// they may send it again; nothing else ever takes a canceled intent back. +func TestOutboxAPersonMayResendARefusedIntent(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + seenRecord(t, ledger, 1) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(1, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.beforePost = func(Destination, string) error { return fmt.Errorf("403: %w", ErrNotPosted) } + ob := obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp) + require.NoError(t, ob.Flush(ctx)) + in := obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)) + require.Equal(t, IntentCanceled, in.State) + + basecamp.beforePost = nil + require.NoError(t, ledger.ResolveIntent(ctx, in.ID, IntentResolution{Resolution: ResolveResend, By: "person:26909558"})) + require.NoError(t, ob.Flush(ctx)) + assert.Equal(t, IntentSent, obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)).State) + assert.Equal(t, 2, basecamp.postCount()) + + // A guard get_dispatch canceled is not refused, and is not resendable. + obAdmit(t, ledger, 2, "recording:10304028989") + l := obLaunch(t, ledger, 2) + d, err := ledger.Dispatch(ctx, l.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, _, err = d.Get(ctx, 2) + require.NoError(t, err) + guard := obIntent(t, ledger, guardKey(2)) + require.Equal(t, IntentCanceled, guard.State) + require.ErrorIs(t, ledger.ResolveIntent(ctx, guard.ID, IntentResolution{Resolution: ResolveResend, By: "person:26909558"}), ErrNotIndeterminate) + _, err = ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE outbox SET state = 'pending' WHERE id = ?`, guard.ID) + require.Error(t, err, "the database refuses it too") +} + +// A person's resend that lands while a flush is still draining waits for the +// next flush: this one never claims the intent again, so it is not left +// sending with no request made. +func TestOutboxAResendDuringAFlushWaitsForTheNext(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + for _, id := range []int64{1, 2} { + seenRecord(t, ledger, id) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(id, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + } + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + firstID := obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)).ID + refused := false + basecamp.beforePost = func(Destination, string) error { + if !refused { + refused = true + return fmt.Errorf("403: %w", ErrNotPosted) + } + // The second intent's request: meanwhile a person resends the first. + require.NoError(t, ledger.ResolveIntent(context.Background(), firstID, IntentResolution{Resolution: ResolveResend, By: "person:26909558"})) + return nil + } + ob := obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp) + require.NoError(t, ob.Flush(ctx)) + assert.Equal(t, IntentPending, obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)).State, "not claimed twice in one flush") + + basecamp.beforePost = nil + require.NoError(t, ob.Flush(ctx)) + assert.Equal(t, IntentSent, obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)).State) + assert.Equal(t, 3, basecamp.postCount()) +} + +// Invariant 9: a worker that asks while a guard is in flight is told the +// connector acknowledged, and that stands if Basecamp then refuses it. +func TestOutboxAGuardIsFiredFromItsClaim(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + obAdmit(t, ledger, 1, "recording:10304028989") + l := obLaunch(t, ledger, 1) + d, err := ledger.Dispatch(ctx, l.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + var inFlight Instruction + basecamp.beforePost = func(Destination, string) error { + var err error + inFlight, _, err = d.Get(context.Background(), 1) + require.NoError(t, err) + return fmt.Errorf("404: %w", ErrNotPosted) + } + clock.Advance(DefaultGuardDelay) + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Flush(ctx)) + assert.True(t, inFlight.GuardAcknowledged, "no double acknowledgement while the guard may land") + + after, _, err := d.Get(ctx, 1) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, after.GuardAcknowledged, "a guard settles once") +} + +// orderedPoster records the order of listings and posts. +type orderedPoster struct { + *fakeBasecamp + calls []string +} + +func (o *orderedPoster) Post(ctx context.Context, dest Destination, body string) (int64, error) { + o.calls = append(o.calls, "post") + return o.fakeBasecamp.Post(ctx, dest, body) +} + +func (o *orderedPoster) List(ctx context.Context, dest Destination, since time.Time) ([]PostedMessage, error) { + o.calls = append(o.calls, "list") + return o.fakeBasecamp.List(ctx, dest, since) +} + +// On start: what a previous process left sending is reconciled, then what is +// due is sent, all before Start returns and so before anything else runs — +// except an intent that went sending too recently to have landed, which waits. +func TestOutboxStartSettlesWhatAPreviousProcessLeftBeforeSending(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + stale := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, admission.ReplyDestination{Kind: admission.ReplyComment, RecordingID: 901}) + basecamp := &orderedPoster{fakeBasecamp: newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now)} + landed := basecamp.add(stale.Destination, adapterAgentID, stale.Body) + + clock.Advance(10 * time.Minute) // the previous process died a while ago + young := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 2, admission.ReplyDestination{Kind: admission.ReplyComment, RecordingID: 902}) + seenRecord(t, ledger, 3) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(3, 0, admission.ReplyDestination{Kind: admission.ReplyComment, RecordingID: 903})) + require.NoError(t, err) + + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Start(ctx)) + got := obIntent(t, ledger, stale.Key) + require.Equal(t, IntentSent, got.State, "reconciled on start") + assert.Equal(t, landed, *got.ReceiptID) + assert.Equal(t, IntentSending, obIntent(t, ledger, young.Key).State, "a request that may still be landing waits") + assert.Equal(t, IntentSent, obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(3)).State, "what was due went out on start") + assert.Equal(t, []string{"list", "post"}, basecamp.calls, "reconcile, then send") +} + +// A ledger that cannot settle what a previous process left stops the start: +// nothing is sent past an intent that could not be reconciled. +func TestOutboxStartStopsOnALedgerThatCannotReconcile(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + stale := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, admission.ReplyDestination{Kind: admission.ReplyComment, RecordingID: 901}) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.add(stale.Destination, adapterAgentID, stale.Body) + clock.Advance(10 * time.Minute) + seenRecord(t, ledger, 2) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(2, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // Adoption reads task_events; the ledger now cannot. + _, err = ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `ALTER TABLE task_events RENAME TO task_events_gone`) + require.NoError(t, err) + + require.Error(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Start(ctx)) + assert.Zero(t, basecamp.postCount(), "nothing sent past it") + assert.Equal(t, IntentPending, obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(2)).State) +} + +// A listing that failed and backed off is not a reason to stop starting: +// Run tries it again, and what is due goes out now. +func TestOutboxStartCarriesOnPastABackedOffListing(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + stale := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, admission.ReplyDestination{Kind: admission.ReplyComment, RecordingID: 901}) + clock.Advance(10 * time.Minute) + seenRecord(t, ledger, 2) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(2, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.listErr = errWire + + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Start(ctx)) + got := obIntent(t, ledger, stale.Key) + assert.Equal(t, IntentSending, got.State) + assert.NotNil(t, got.ReconcileAt, "backed off") + assert.Equal(t, IntentSent, obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(2)).State) +} + +// The start's sending stops at the first send that may not have landed: the +// next is likely to meet the same Basecamp, and the connector's start should +// not wait out a timeout per notice. Run carries on. +func TestOutboxStartStopsSendingAtTheFirstUncertainSend(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + for _, id := range []int64{1, 2, 3} { + seenRecord(t, ledger, id) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(id, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + } + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.beforePost = func(Destination, string) error { return context.DeadlineExceeded } + + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Start(ctx)) + assert.Equal(t, 1, basecamp.postCount()) + assert.Equal(t, IntentPending, obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(3)).State) +} + +// failingAt fails listings at one destination only. +type failingAt struct { + *fakeBasecamp + recording int64 +} + +func (f failingAt) List(ctx context.Context, dest Destination, since time.Time) ([]PostedMessage, error) { + if dest.RecordingID == f.recording { + return nil, errWire + } + return f.fakeBasecamp.List(ctx, dest, since) +} + +// A hard failure is not hidden behind a listing that merely backed off +// earlier in the same pass. +func TestOutboxStartSeesAHardErrorAfterABackedOffListing(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, admission.ReplyDestination{Kind: admission.ReplyComment, RecordingID: 901}) + second := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 2, admission.ReplyDestination{Kind: admission.ReplyComment, RecordingID: 902}) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.add(second.Destination, adapterAgentID, second.Body) + clock.Advance(10 * time.Minute) + _, err := ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `ALTER TABLE task_events RENAME TO task_events_gone`) + require.NoError(t, err) + + require.Error(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, failingAt{basecamp, 901}).Start(ctx)) +} + +// A ledger that cannot record what a send settled — a receipt, or a +// refusal — is an error wherever it happens: a start stops on it and sends +// nothing more, and the intent stays sending for reconciliation to settle. +func TestOutboxALedgerFailureAfterASendStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) { + for _, tc := range []struct { + name string + trigger string + postErr error + }{ + {name: "receipt", trigger: `CREATE TRIGGER refuse_receipt BEFORE UPDATE OF receipt_id ON outbox WHEN NEW.receipt_id IS NOT NULL BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'injected'); END`}, + {name: "refusal", trigger: `CREATE TRIGGER refuse_cancel BEFORE UPDATE OF state ON outbox WHEN NEW.state = 'canceled' BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'injected'); END`, postErr: fmt.Errorf("403: %w", ErrNotPosted)}, + } { + t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + for _, id := range []int64{1, 2} { + seenRecord(t, ledger, id) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(id, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + } + _, err := ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, tc.trigger) + require.NoError(t, err) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.beforePost = func(Destination, string) error { return tc.postErr } + + require.Error(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Start(ctx)) + assert.Equal(t, 1, basecamp.postCount(), "nothing sent past the failure") + assert.Equal(t, IntentSending, obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)).State, "left for reconciliation") + assert.Equal(t, IntentPending, obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(2)).State) + }) + } +} + +// hangingAt blocks listings at one destination until ctx ends. +type hangingAt struct { + *fakeBasecamp + recording int64 +} + +func (h hangingAt) List(ctx context.Context, dest Destination, since time.Time) ([]PostedMessage, error) { + if dest.RecordingID == h.recording { + <-ctx.Done() + return nil, ctx.Err() + } + return h.fakeBasecamp.List(ctx, dest, since) +} + +// A ledger failure met during the start's reconciliation stops the start even +// when the start's bound runs out later in the same pass. +func TestOutboxStartStopsOnALedgerFailureWhateverTheBoundDoesAfter(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + first := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, admission.ReplyDestination{Kind: admission.ReplyComment, RecordingID: 902}) + sendingHolding(t, ledger, 2, admission.ReplyDestination{Kind: admission.ReplyComment, RecordingID: 901}) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.add(first.Destination, adapterAgentID, first.Body) + clock.Advance(10 * time.Minute) + _, err := ledger.db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `ALTER TABLE task_events RENAME TO task_events_gone`) + require.NoError(t, err) + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second) + defer cancel() + started := time.Now() + require.Error(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, hangingAt{basecamp, 901}).Start(ctx)) + assert.Less(t, time.Since(started), 2500*time.Millisecond, "the pass stops at the failure rather than spending the bound") +} + +// A ledger that cannot even list what is sending stops the start before +// anything is sent. +func TestOutboxStartStopsWhenTheLedgerCannotListSendingIntents(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + stale := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, admission.ReplyDestination{Kind: admission.ReplyComment, RecordingID: 901}) + clock.Advance(10 * time.Minute) + seenRecord(t, ledger, 2) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(2, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + // A row the ledger cannot read back. + _, err = ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE outbox SET reconcile_at = 'garbage' WHERE id = ?`, stale.ID) + require.NoError(t, err) + + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + require.Error(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Start(ctx)) + assert.Zero(t, basecamp.postCount()) +} + +// cancelingLister ends its caller's context as it answers, as a shutdown +// arriving mid-reconciliation would. +type cancelingLister struct { + *fakeBasecamp + cancel func() +} + +func (c cancelingLister) List(ctx context.Context, dest Destination, since time.Time) ([]PostedMessage, error) { + out, err := c.fakeBasecamp.List(ctx, dest, since) + c.cancel() + return out, err +} + +// A ledger failure is marked where it happens: a context that ends at the +// same moment does not hide it from a start. +func TestOutboxALedgerFailureIsNotHiddenByAnEndingContext(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + stale := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, admission.ReplyDestination{Kind: admission.ReplyComment, RecordingID: 901}) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.add(stale.Destination, adapterAgentID, stale.Body) + clock.Advance(10 * time.Minute) + _, err := ledger.db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `ALTER TABLE task_events RENAME TO task_events_gone`) + require.NoError(t, err) + + ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background()) + defer cancel() + require.Error(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, cancelingLister{basecamp, cancel}).Start(ctx)) +} + +// A worker's message is its own by kind as well as by id: a boost id that +// happens to equal some comment's id is a different message, and does not +// stop a guard adopting its own boost. +func TestOutboxAWorkersMessageIsMatchedByKindToo(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + obAdmit(t, ledger, 1, "recording:10304028989") + l := obLaunch(t, ledger, 1) + clock.Advance(DefaultGuardDelay) + claimed, ok, err := ledger.claimIntent(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok) + + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + boost := basecamp.add(claimed.Destination, adapterAgentID, claimed.Body) + // The worker's reply is a comment whose id is the same number as the + // guard's boost. + d, err := ledger.Dispatch(ctx, l.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + obPull(t, d, 1) + _, err = d.Complete(ctx, 1, Completion{Outcome: OutcomeSucceeded, ReplyID: &boost}) + require.NoError(t, err) + + clock.Advance(2 * time.Minute) + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Recover(ctx)) + got := obIntent(t, ledger, claimed.Key) + require.Equal(t, IntentSent, got.State, "a comment id is not a boost id") + assert.Equal(t, boost, *got.ReceiptID) +} + +// A still-running notice says the worker is still working. If its attempt has +// ended before the notice goes out, it is not sent: the connector's last word +// on finished work is never "still working on this". +func TestOutboxAStillRunningNoticeIsNotPostedAfterTheAttemptEnded(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + obAdmit(t, ledger, 1, "recording:10304028989") + l := obLaunch(t, ledger, 1) + _, err := ledger.StillRunning(ctx, l.AttemptID) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // The worker finishes and reports before the notice is sent, so the + // settlement calls for no completion notice either. + d, err := ledger.Dispatch(ctx, l.Token, adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + obPull(t, d, 1) + _, err = d.Complete(ctx, 1, Completion{Outcome: OutcomeSucceeded, ReplyID: id64(4242)}) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = ledger.EndAttempt(ctx, AttemptEnd{AttemptID: l.AttemptID, Stop: StopFinished}) + require.NoError(t, err) + + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Flush(ctx)) + assert.Zero(t, basecamp.postCount(), "nothing says the worker is still working") + got := obIntent(t, ledger, stillRunningKey(l.AttemptID, 1)) + assert.Equal(t, IntentCanceled, got.State) + assert.Equal(t, "the attempt ended before the notice went out", got.Note) +} + +// A still-running notice whose attempt is not in the ledger at all is +// canceled too, as a holding reply is when its record is gone. +func TestOutboxAStillRunningNoticeWithNoAttemptIsCanceled(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + obAdmit(t, ledger, 1, "recording:10304028989") + l := obLaunch(t, ledger, 1) + _, err := ledger.StillRunning(ctx, l.AttemptID) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `PRAGMA foreign_keys = off`) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM attempts WHERE id = ?`, l.AttemptID) + require.NoError(t, err) + + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Flush(ctx)) + assert.Zero(t, basecamp.postCount()) + assert.Equal(t, IntentCanceled, obIntent(t, ledger, stillRunningKey(l.AttemptID, 1)).State) +} + +// A ledger failure while sending stops the start even when the start's bound +// runs out in the same breath. +func TestOutboxALedgerFailureWhileSendingIsNotHiddenByAnEndingBound(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + for _, id := range []int64{1, 2} { + seenRecord(t, ledger, id) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(id, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + } + _, err := ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `CREATE TRIGGER refuse_receipt BEFORE UPDATE OF receipt_id ON outbox WHEN NEW.receipt_id IS NOT NULL BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'injected'); END`) + require.NoError(t, err) + + startCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx) + defer cancel() + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.afterPost = func(Destination, int64) error { + cancel() // the start's bound runs out as the request is answered + return nil + } + require.Error(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Start(startCtx)) +} + +// A canceled intent posted nothing, so its words do not hide a worker's reply +// that happens to read the same. +func TestOutboxACanceledNoticeDoesNotHideAReply(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + seenRecord(t, ledger, 1) + _, err := ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(1, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + in := obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + basecamp.beforePost = func(Destination, string) error { return fmt.Errorf("403: %w", ErrNotPosted) } + require.NoError(t, obOutbox(t, ledger, basecamp).Flush(ctx)) + require.Equal(t, IntentCanceled, obIntent(t, ledger, in.Key).State) + + // A worker's reply that reads exactly like the notice nobody posted. + since := clock.Now().Add(-time.Minute) + reply := basecamp.add(in.Destination, adapterAgentID, in.Body) + listed, err := LifecycleFilteredReplies{Lister: basecamp, Ledger: ledger}. + AgentReplies(ctx, adapterBucketID, "comment", obReplyRecording, since) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, listed, 1, "nothing of ours is there to hide it") + assert.Equal(t, reply, listed[0].ID) +} + +// A receipt identifies the connector's message whatever its intent's state, +// and since the dispatcher is given no id-only predicate beside this filter, +// that is the whole of the spec's "not one of the connector's own lifecycle +// messages" for a notice the ledger has a receipt for. +func TestOutboxASentNoticeIsLeftOutByItsReceipt(t *testing.T) { + ledger, clock := obLedger(t) + ctx := context.Background() + in := sendingHolding(t, ledger, 1, obCommentReply) + basecamp := newFakeBasecamp(clock.Now) + since := clock.Now().Add(-time.Minute) + landed := basecamp.add(in.Destination, adapterAgentID, `<div dir="auto">`+in.Body+`</div>`) + reply := basecamp.add(in.Destination, adapterAgentID, "<div>Done: the fix is on the branch.</div>") + _, err := ledger.recordReceipt(ctx, in.ID, landed) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Equal(t, IntentSent, obIntent(t, ledger, in.Key).State) + + listed, err := LifecycleFilteredReplies{Lister: basecamp, Ledger: ledger}. + AgentReplies(ctx, adapterBucketID, "comment", obReplyRecording, since) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, listed, 1, "the sent notice is left out by its receipt") + assert.Equal(t, reply, listed[0].ID) +} diff --git a/internal/connector/outbox_kill_unix_test.go b/internal/connector/outbox_kill_unix_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3739dc307 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/outbox_kill_unix_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +//go:build unix + +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "net/http" + "os" + "os/exec" + "path/filepath" + "syscall" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-sdk/go/pkg/basecamp" +) + +// Done when: a kill between sending and the receipt, then a restart, yields +// exactly one message or an indeterminate intent — with a real process, +// killed by SIGKILL, not a simulated error. + +const ( + obKillHelperEnv = "BASECAMP_CONNECT_OUTBOX_KILL_HELPER" + obKillLedgerEnv = "BASECAMP_CONNECT_OUTBOX_KILL_LEDGER" + obKillServerEnv = "BASECAMP_CONNECT_OUTBOX_KILL_SERVER" + obKillMarkerEnv = "BASECAMP_CONNECT_OUTBOX_KILL_MARKER" +) + +// TestOutboxKillHelperProcess is the process that gets killed. It does +// nothing unless started by the kill test. +func TestOutboxKillHelperProcess(t *testing.T) { + if os.Getenv(obKillHelperEnv) == "" { + t.Skip("helper process for the outbox kill test") + } + ledger, err := OpenLedger(os.Getenv(obKillLedgerEnv)) + require.NoError(t, err) + client := basecamp.NewClient(&basecamp.Config{BaseURL: os.Getenv(obKillServerEnv)}, &basecamp.StaticTokenProvider{Token: "test-token-not-real"}) + poster, err := NewBasecampPoster(client.ForAccount("999"), adapterAgentID) + require.NoError(t, err) + + var p Poster = poster + if marker := os.Getenv(obKillMarkerEnv); marker != "" { + // Stop between the committed sending row and the request. + p = stallingPoster{Poster: poster, marker: marker} + } + ob, err := NewOutbox(OutboxOptions{Ledger: ledger, Poster: p}) + require.NoError(t, err) + _ = ob.Flush(context.Background()) + select {} // never exits on its own: it is killed +} + +type stallingPoster struct { + Poster + marker string +} + +func (s stallingPoster) Post(context.Context, Destination, string) (int64, error) { + _ = os.WriteFile(s.marker, []byte("sending"), 0o600) + select {} +} + +func TestOutboxKillBetweenSendingAndReceipt(t *testing.T) { + cases := []struct { + name string + // landed: the request reached Basecamp before the kill. + landed bool + }{ + {name: "the request landed", landed: true}, + {name: "the request never left", landed: false}, + } + for _, tc := range cases { + t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "state", "connector.db") + ledger, err := OpenLedger(path) + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = ledger.Close() }) + ledger.SetHooks(LifecycleHooks(ledger, LifecycleOptions{})) + seenRecord(t, ledger, 1) + _, err = ledger.Admission().Commit(ctx, obNoRouteVerdict(1, 0, obCommentReply)) + require.NoError(t, err) + + server := newOBServer(t) + stored := make(chan struct{}, 1) + release := make(chan struct{}) + server.setOnPost(func(r *http.Request, _ int64) int { + // Answer nothing until the client is gone: the receipt never + // reaches the process. + stored <- struct{}{} + select { + case <-r.Context().Done(): + case <-release: + } + return http.StatusServiceUnavailable + }) + t.Cleanup(func() { close(release) }) + + marker := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "sending") + cmd := exec.CommandContext(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), os.Args[0], "-test.run=^TestOutboxKillHelperProcess$", "-test.count=1") + cmd.Env = []string{ + obKillHelperEnv + "=1", + obKillLedgerEnv + "=" + path, + obKillServerEnv + "=" + server.URL, + "HOME=" + os.Getenv("HOME"), + "PATH=" + os.Getenv("PATH"), + } + if !tc.landed { + cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, obKillMarkerEnv+"="+marker) + } + require.NoError(t, cmd.Start()) + // Signaled through os.Process, which refuses a process already + // reaped: the pid is never signaled after it could be reused. + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cmd.Process.Kill(); _ = cmd.Wait() }) + + deadline := time.After(30 * time.Second) + if tc.landed { + select { + case <-stored: + case <-deadline: + t.Fatal("the helper never made its request") + } + } else { + for { + if _, err := os.Stat(marker); err == nil { + break + } + select { + case <-deadline: + t.Fatal("the helper never reached its request") + case <-time.After(10 * time.Millisecond): + } + } + } + // The helper is between its durable sending row and a receipt. + require.Equal(t, IntentSending, obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)).State) + require.NoError(t, cmd.Process.Signal(syscall.SIGKILL)) + waitErr := cmd.Wait() + var exitErr *exec.ExitError + require.ErrorAs(t, waitErr, &exitErr) + require.Equal(t, syscall.SIGKILL, exitErr.Sys().(syscall.WaitStatus).Signal()) + + // Restart: a fresh ledger handle, opened after the killed process + // is gone — as a restarted connector would — and a fresh outbox + // on it, Basecamp answering normally now. Every assertion below + // reads through this handle. + require.NoError(t, ledger.Close()) + ledger, err = OpenLedger(path) + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = ledger.Close() }) + server.setOnPost(nil) + postsBefore := server.postCount() + restarted, err := NewOutbox(OutboxOptions{Ledger: ledger, Poster: server.poster(t)}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, restarted.Recover(ctx)) + require.NoError(t, restarted.Flush(ctx)) + + assert.Equal(t, postsBefore, server.postCount(), "the restart posted nothing") + in := obIntent(t, ledger, holdingKey(1)) + messages := server.at(in.Destination) + if tc.landed { + require.Len(t, messages, 1, "exactly one message") + require.Equal(t, IntentSent, in.State) + assert.Equal(t, messages[0].ID, *in.ReceiptID) + } else { + assert.Empty(t, messages) + assert.Equal(t, IntentIndeterminate, in.State, "never resent: a person decides") + } + }) + } +} diff --git a/internal/connector/outbox_run.go b/internal/connector/outbox_run.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7a09682da --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/outbox_run.go @@ -0,0 +1,945 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "database/sql" + "errors" + "fmt" + "log/slog" + "strconv" + "sync" + "time" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/ndjson" +) + +// Poster is how the outbox reaches Basecamp, as the agent. +type Poster interface { + // Post creates one message and returns its id. It makes at most one + // request: a retry is a second message. + Post(ctx context.Context, dest Destination, body string) (int64, error) + // List returns every message of dest.Kind the agent created at dest since + // since, exhaustively: a listing that could not reach back that far is an + // error, never a shorter answer. An error wrapping ErrUnlistable says no + // later listing will answer either. + List(ctx context.Context, dest Destination, since time.Time) ([]PostedMessage, error) +} + +// errLedger marks a reconciliation that failed in the ledger, not at +// Basecamp: a start never proceeds past one. +var errLedger = errors.New("the ledger could not settle a lifecycle message") + +// errBackedOff marks a listing failure whose backoff was recorded: the intent +// is tried again later, and nothing about the ledger is wrong. +var errBackedOff = errors.New("listing failed; backed off") + +// ErrNotPosted is a request Basecamp answered by refusing it: the message was +// not created, so there is nothing to find and nothing to resend without a +// person. +var ErrNotPosted = errors.New("the message was not created") + +// ErrUnlistable is a destination that cannot be listed and will not become +// listable by waiting: gone, forbidden, or too busy to reach back to the +// sending time. An intent whose destination is unlistable is indeterminate. +var ErrUnlistable = errors.New("the destination cannot be listed") + +// PostedMessage is one of the agent's messages at a destination. +type PostedMessage struct { + ID int64 + CreatedAt time.Time + Content string +} + +// Outbox defaults. +const ( + DefaultOutboxTick = time.Second + // DefaultReconcileAfter is how long a sending intent this process is not + // sending is left before it is reconciled: long enough for a request that + // failed on the wire to have landed, if it was going to. + DefaultReconcileAfter = time.Minute + // DefaultReconcileSlack widens a reconciliation listing back past the + // sending time, for clock skew between this machine and Basecamp. + DefaultReconcileSlack = 2 * time.Minute + // DefaultPostTimeout bounds one request. + DefaultPostTimeout = time.Minute + // A listing that fails is tried again after DefaultReconcileBackoff, + // doubling up to MaxReconcileBackoff, and after MaxReconcileFailures the + // intent is indeterminate. + DefaultReconcileBackoff = 30 * time.Second + MaxReconcileBackoff = 30 * time.Minute + MaxReconcileFailures = 10 + // MinPostWindow is the least time a flush with a deadline needs left to + // claim another intent. + MinPostWindow = 5 * time.Second + // RunBatch is how many intents a running connector sends between + // reconciliation passes, and RunReconcileBatch how many destinations it + // lists in one pass. + RunBatch = 16 + RunReconcileBatch = 1 +) + +// OutboxOptions configures the outbox's sender. +type OutboxOptions struct { + Ledger *Ledger + Poster Poster + // Paused, when set and true, holds sending (the hold marker). Reconciling + // what was already sent goes on, since it only reads and adopts. + Paused func(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) + + Lines *ndjson.Writer + Logger *slog.Logger + + Tick time.Duration + ReconcileAfter time.Duration + ReconcileSlack time.Duration + PostTimeout time.Duration +} + +// Outbox sends lifecycle intents and reconciles the ones a request left +// uncertain. One Outbox per ledger. +type Outbox struct { + opts OutboxOptions + ledger *Ledger + log *slog.Logger + + // mu serializes sending and reconciling, so an intent this process is + // sending is never reconciled under it. + mu sync.Mutex +} + +// OutboxLine is the stdout line for an intent's transitions: ids and states, +// never a body. +type OutboxLine struct { + Type string `json:"type"` + IntentID int64 `json:"intent_id"` + Kind string `json:"kind"` + State string `json:"state"` + EventID int64 `json:"event_id,omitempty"` + AttemptID string `json:"attempt_id,omitempty"` + ReceiptID int64 `json:"receipt_id,omitempty"` +} + +// NewOutbox builds the sender. +func NewOutbox(opts OutboxOptions) (*Outbox, error) { + switch { + case opts.Ledger == nil: + return nil, errors.New("connector: the outbox needs the ledger") + case opts.Poster == nil: + return nil, errors.New("connector: the outbox needs a poster") + } + if opts.Logger == nil { + opts.Logger = slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler) + } + if opts.Tick <= 0 { + opts.Tick = DefaultOutboxTick + } + if opts.ReconcileAfter <= 0 { + opts.ReconcileAfter = DefaultReconcileAfter + } + if opts.ReconcileSlack <= 0 { + opts.ReconcileSlack = DefaultReconcileSlack + } + if opts.PostTimeout <= 0 { + opts.PostTimeout = DefaultPostTimeout + } + return &Outbox{opts: opts, ledger: opts.Ledger, log: opts.Logger}, nil +} + +// Run sends due intents and reconciles sending ones until ctx ends. On start +// every sending intent is a previous process's; each is reconciled once it is +// ReconcileAfter old, so a request that was still landing when that process +// died has landed. It does not flush on the way out: call Flush once whatever +// settles attempts on shutdown is done, so their completion notices go out. +func (o *Outbox) Run(ctx context.Context) error { + ticker := time.NewTicker(o.opts.Tick) + defer ticker.Stop() + for { + if err := o.flushSome(ctx, RunBatch, false); err != nil && ctx.Err() == nil { + o.log.Warn("connector: outbox", "error", err) + } + if ctx.Err() != nil { + return nil + } + if _, err := o.reconcileSome(ctx, o.opts.ReconcileAfter, RunReconcileBatch); err != nil && ctx.Err() == nil { + o.log.Warn("connector: outbox reconciliation", "error", err) + } + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + return nil + case <-ticker.C: + } + } +} + +// Start is the outbox's part of a connector's start, run before anything else +// transitions: every sending intent a previous process left is reconciled, +// then due pending intents are sent. +// +// An error Start returns is one the connector must not start past: the ledger +// could not read or settle an intent. Everything else is left to Run, which +// carries on from where Start stopped: +// - a listing that failed has backed its intent off; +// - a send that may or may not have landed ends the start's sending, since +// the next is likely to meet the same Basecamp; +// - a ctx that ends — a bound the caller sets, or shutdown — ends Start. +// +// One wait a start cannot skip: an intent that went sending less than +// ReconcileAfter ago may still be landing, and listing it now could only make +// it indeterminate for want of patience. A supervisor that restarts a crashed +// connector within the minute meets exactly this case; Run reconciles the +// intent once it comes of age. +func (o *Outbox) Start(ctx context.Context) error { + if _, err := o.reconcileStale(ctx, o.opts.ReconcileAfter); err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, errLedger) { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: reconcile lifecycle messages on start: %w", err) + } + // A listing that backed off, or one the bound or shutdown cut short: + // Run carries on with it. + if ctx.Err() != nil { + return nil //nolint:nilerr // not a failure of the ledger + } + o.log.Warn("connector: a lifecycle message's listing failed on start; it is tried again", "error", err) + } + if err := o.flushSome(ctx, 0, true); err != nil && (errors.Is(err, errLedger) || ctx.Err() == nil) { + // A ledger failure stops the start whenever it happened, even if the + // bound ran out in the same breath. + return fmt.Errorf("connector: send lifecycle messages on start: %w", err) + } + return nil +} + +// Recover reconciles every sending intent whose listing is due, whatever its +// age. A connector does not call it on start — Start does, honoring the wait +// for a request still landing. It is here for a caller that knows the wait +// has already passed: a test with a killed process, say. +func (o *Outbox) Recover(ctx context.Context) error { + _, err := o.reconcileStale(ctx, 0) + return err +} + +// Flush sends every intent that is due, one at a time, and returns when none +// is left or ctx ends. One flush claims an intent at most once: an intent a +// person sent back to pending while the flush drains waits for the next one. +func (o *Outbox) Flush(ctx context.Context) error { return o.flushSome(ctx, 0, false) } + +// flushSome sends at most limit intents, or every due one when limit is zero. +// The running connector sends in batches so that a queue arriving as fast as +// it can be posted cannot starve reconciliation; only the shutdown flush +// drains. +func (o *Outbox) flushSome(ctx context.Context, limit int, stopWhenUncertain bool) error { + claimed := map[int64]bool{} + for ctx.Err() == nil { + if limit > 0 && len(claimed) >= limit { + return nil + } + if o.opts.Paused != nil { + paused, err := o.opts.Paused(ctx) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if paused { + return nil + } + } + if deadline, ok := ctx.Deadline(); ok && time.Until(deadline) < min(MinPostWindow, o.opts.PostTimeout) { + // Too little time left for a request to be answered: a claim now + // would only leave the intent for a person. It stays pending and + // goes out on the next start. + return nil + } + id, uncertain, err := o.sendNext(ctx, claimed) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if id == 0 || (uncertain && stopWhenUncertain) { + return nil + } + } + return nil +} + +// sendNext claims the oldest due intent and sends it. It returns the id it +// claimed, zero when none was due. +func (o *Outbox) sendNext(ctx context.Context, claimed map[int64]bool) (int64, bool, error) { + o.mu.Lock() + defer o.mu.Unlock() + skip := make([]int64, 0, len(claimed)) + for id := range claimed { + skip = append(skip, id) + } + intent, ok, err := o.ledger.claimIntent(ctx, skip...) + if err != nil || !ok { + return 0, false, err + } + if claimed[intent.ID] { + // Unreachable while the claim's query skips these ids; kept so a + // broken query stops the flush rather than sending twice. + return 0, false, fmt.Errorf("connector: outbox intent %d was claimed twice in one flush; not sending it again", intent.ID) + } + claimed[intent.ID] = true + o.line(intent) + if intent.State != IntentSending { + // Claiming canceled it. + return intent.ID, false, nil + } + + // Invariant 3: the sending row is committed; only now is a request made. + // A request is not abandoned because ctx ends mid-flight — its answer is + // the receipt — but it is bounded, and never outlives a deadline ctx + // carries (the shutdown flush's). + timeout := o.opts.PostTimeout + if deadline, ok := ctx.Deadline(); ok { + timeout = min(timeout, time.Until(deadline)) + } + postCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), timeout) + receipt, postErr := o.opts.Poster.Post(postCtx, intent.Destination, intent.Body) + cancel() + if errors.Is(postErr, ErrNotPosted) { + // Basecamp refused the request, so no message exists to find: nothing + // to reconcile. The intent is canceled (invariant 9). + settled, err := o.ledger.refuse(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), intent, RefusedNote) + if err != nil { + // The ledger failed, not Basecamp: either the refusal was not + // written, and the intent stays sending for reconciliation to + // settle, finding nothing; or it was written and could not be read + // back. Either way it is an error wherever it happens, so a start + // stops on it. + return intent.ID, false, fmt.Errorf("%w: record or read back the refusal of lifecycle message %d: %w", errLedger, intent.ID, err) + } + o.log.Warn("connector: a lifecycle message was refused", "intent_id", intent.ID, "kind", string(intent.Kind), "error", postErr) + o.line(settled) + return intent.ID, false, nil + } + if postErr != nil { + // The request may have reached Basecamp. The intent stays sending and + // is reconciled once it has had time to land — counted from now, not + // from the claim, since a request that timed out may land later + // still; it is never posted again (invariant 4). + o.ledger.deferReconcile(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), intent.ID, o.opts.ReconcileAfter) + o.log.Warn("connector: a lifecycle message may not have been posted; it will be reconciled, not resent", + "intent_id", intent.ID, "kind", string(intent.Kind), "error", postErr) + return intent.ID, true, nil + } + if receipt <= 0 { + o.log.Warn("connector: a lifecycle message was posted without an id; it will be reconciled", "intent_id", intent.ID) + return intent.ID, true, nil + } + recorded, err := o.ledger.recordReceipt(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), intent.ID, receipt) + if err != nil { + // The message exists. Either the receipt was not written, and + // reconciliation will find the message by its body, or it was written + // and could not be read back. The ledger failed either way: that is an + // error wherever it happens, so a start stops on it. + return intent.ID, false, fmt.Errorf("%w: record or read back the receipt of lifecycle message %d: %w", errLedger, intent.ID, err) + } + o.line(recorded) + return intent.ID, false, nil +} + +// claimIntent moves the oldest due pending intent to sending and commits, or, +// for a guard that no longer applies, to canceled. It is the only way to +// sending. +func (l *Ledger) claimIntent(ctx context.Context, skip ...int64) (Intent, bool, error) { + var ( + out Intent + ok bool + ) + err := retryBusy(func() error { + tx, err := l.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: begin outbox claim: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }() + now := l.timestamp() + // A flush never claims an intent it already claimed: one a person sent + // back to pending meanwhile waits for the next flush rather than being + // claimed, marked sending, and left with no request. + query, args := selectIntents+` WHERE state = 'pending' AND not_before <= ?`, []any{now} + if len(skip) > 0 { + query += ` AND id NOT IN (` + placeholders(len(skip)) + `)` + for _, id := range skip { + args = append(args, id) + } + } + rows, err := tx.QueryContext(ctx, query+` ORDER BY not_before, id LIMIT 1`, args...) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: outbox claim: %w", err) + } + intents, err := scanIntents(rows) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if len(intents) == 0 { + ok = false + return nil + } + in := intents[0] + + next, note := IntentSending, "" + if in.Kind == IntentCompletion { + // A person can decide an event between the settlement that wrote + // the notice and the send. One indexed read says whether anyone + // did; only then is the notice rendered again from the records, so + // it never asks for what is already done. + decided, err := decidedSince(ctx, tx, in.AttemptID) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if decided { + settled, err := settlementFromRecords(ctx, tx, in.AttemptID) + if err != nil { + return err + } + switch body := renderCompletion(in.Destination.Kind, settled); { + case !CompletionNeeded(settled): + next, note = IntentCanceled, "every event it named was decided" + case body != in.Body: + if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE outbox SET body = ? WHERE id = ? AND state = 'pending'`, body, in.ID); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: outbox claim completion %d: %w", in.ID, err) + } + in.Body = body + } + } + } + if in.Kind == IntentHoldingReply { + // The reply answers a record with no route. If the route arrived + // and the record moved on — it may be running now — the answer is + // wrong, so it is never sent. + var stillBlocked bool + switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT state = 'blocked' AND reason = 'no_route' FROM events WHERE id = ?`, in.EventID).Scan(&stillBlocked); { + case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows): + // No record, nothing to answer for. Canceled rather than + // left to be claimed again on every tick. + stillBlocked = false + case err != nil: + return fmt.Errorf("connector: outbox claim holding reply %d: %w", in.ID, err) + } + if !stillBlocked { + next, note = IntentCanceled, "no longer called for" + } + } + if in.Kind == IntentStillRunning { + // The notice says the worker is still working. If its attempt has + // ended in the meantime — behind a slow send, or a listing in + // front of it — that is no longer true, and the completion notice, + // if the settlement called for one, is the connector's last word. + // A crashed process's attempt is not ended yet when a start + // flushes: the dispatcher's recovery settles it just after, and + // that settlement's notice follows this one. + var live bool + switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT state <> 'ended' FROM attempts WHERE id = ?`, in.AttemptID).Scan(&live); { + case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows): + live = false + case err != nil: + return fmt.Errorf("connector: outbox claim still-running %d: %w", in.ID, err) + } + if !live { + next, note = IntentCanceled, "the attempt ended before the notice went out" + } + } + if in.Kind == IntentGuardAck { + var stillCalledFor bool + switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, ` +SELECT e.acknowledge = 1 AND e.state IN ('admitted', 'queued', 'dispatched') + AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM task_events te + WHERE te.event_id = e.id AND (te.guard = 'canceled' OR te.delivery IN ('delivered', 'completed'))) +FROM events e WHERE e.id = ?`, in.EventID).Scan(&stillCalledFor); { + case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows): + stillCalledFor = false + case err != nil: + return fmt.Errorf("connector: outbox claim guard %d: %w", in.ID, err) + } + if !stillCalledFor { + next, note = IntentCanceled, "no longer called for" + } else if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE task_events SET guard = 'fired' WHERE event_id = ? AND guard = 'armed'`, in.EventID); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: outbox claim guard %d: %w", in.ID, err) + } + } + var res sql.Result + if next == IntentSending { + res, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE outbox SET state = 'sending', sending_at = ? WHERE id = ? AND state = 'pending'`, now, in.ID) + } else { + res, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE outbox SET state = 'canceled', finished_at = ?, note = ? WHERE id = ? AND state = 'pending'`, now, note, in.ID) + } + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: outbox claim %d: %w", in.ID, err) + } + // The select and this update share one immediate transaction, so the + // row cannot have moved; checked rather than reasoned, because + // invariant 3 rests on it. + if n, err := res.RowsAffected(); err != nil { + return err + } else if n == 0 { + ok = false + return nil + } + if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: commit outbox claim %d: %w", in.ID, err) + } + in.State, in.Note = next, note + if next == IntentSending { + t, _ := parseStamp(now) + in.SendingAt = &t + } + out, ok = in, true + return nil + }) + return out, ok, err +} + +// recordReceipt moves a sending intent to sent with its receipt. +func (l *Ledger) recordReceipt(ctx context.Context, id, receipt int64) (Intent, error) { + err := retryBusy(func() error { + res, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE outbox SET state = 'sent', receipt_id = ?, finished_at = ? WHERE id = ? AND state = 'sending'`, + receipt, l.timestamp(), id) + if err != nil { + if isUniqueViolation(err) { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: receipt %d for intent %d: %w", receipt, id, ErrReceiptOwned) + } + return fmt.Errorf("connector: receipt for intent %d: %w", id, err) + } + if n, err := res.RowsAffected(); err != nil { + return err + } else if n == 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: receipt for intent %d: it is not sending", id) + } + return nil + }) + if err != nil { + return Intent{}, err + } + return l.Intent(ctx, id) +} + +// reconcileStale reconciles every sending intent whose sending time is at +// least age ago. It returns how many it settled. +func (o *Outbox) reconcileStale(ctx context.Context, age time.Duration) (int, error) { + return o.reconcileSome(ctx, age, 0) +} + +// reconcileSome reconciles at most limit due sending intents — every one when +// limit is zero — and returns how many it settled. Each listing is bounded, +// but sending waits for the pass, so the running connector lists one +// destination per tick: a guard due in thirty seconds waits at most one +// listing, however many destinations are slow. A listing that fails backs +// its intent off, so the next tick reaches the next one. +func (o *Outbox) reconcileSome(ctx context.Context, age time.Duration, limit int) (int, error) { + o.mu.Lock() + defer o.mu.Unlock() + intents, err := o.ledger.Intents(ctx, IntentFilter{States: []IntentState{IntentSending}}) + if err != nil { + if ctx.Err() != nil { + return 0, err + } + return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errLedger, err) + } + now := o.ledger.now() + cutoff := now.Add(-age) + settled, listed := 0, 0 + var firstErr, hardErr error + for i := len(intents) - 1; i >= 0; i-- { + if limit > 0 && listed >= limit { + break + } + in := intents[i] + if in.SendingAt != nil && in.SendingAt.After(cutoff) { + continue + } + if in.ReconcileAt != nil && in.ReconcileAt.After(now) { + continue + } + listed++ + done, err := o.reconcile(ctx, in) + if err != nil { + o.log.Warn("connector: reconciling a lifecycle message", "intent_id", in.ID, "error", err) + if firstErr == nil { + firstErr = err + } + if errors.Is(err, errLedger) { + // The ledger failed. The pass stops here: nothing it does + // afterwards — nor a bound running out meanwhile — may hide + // that from a start. The intent is put back a little, best + // effort, so a running connector does not list the same + // destination on every tick while the ledger recovers. + o.ledger.deferReconcile(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), in.ID, DefaultReconcileBackoff) + hardErr = err + break + } + continue + } + if done { + settled++ + } + } + if hardErr != nil { + return settled, hardErr + } + return settled, firstErr +} + +// reconcile settles one sending intent by listing its destination (invariant +// 5). A listing that fails leaves it sending, to try again; a listing that +// answers settles it as sent or indeterminate. +func (o *Outbox) reconcile(ctx context.Context, in Intent) (bool, error) { + since := in.CreatedAt + if in.SendingAt != nil { + since = *in.SendingAt + } + since = since.Add(-o.opts.ReconcileSlack) + // Bounded like every other listing: Run sends and reconciles in one + // sequence, and a Campfire deep enough to page for minutes would hold up + // a guard that is due in thirty seconds. A listing cut short is a failed + // listing, which backs off. + listCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, AdoptionScanTimeout) + defer cancel() + listed, err := o.opts.Poster.List(listCtx, in.Destination, since) + // From here on the ledger is written without ctx: a listing that answered + // is settled even as shutdown begins, and so every error below is the + // ledger's own, marked where it happens rather than guessed from ctx. + ledgerCtx := context.WithoutCancel(ctx) + if err != nil { + if ctx.Err() != nil { + // Cut short by the bound or shutdown: not a failure of Basecamp's + // nor the ledger's, and nothing is recorded. + return false, err + } + updated, settled, recErr := o.ledger.listingFailed(ledgerCtx, in, err) + if recErr != nil { + return false, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errLedger, recErr) + } + if settled { + o.line(updated) + return true, nil + } + return false, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errBackedOff, err) + } + candidate, note, err := o.ledger.adoptable(ledgerCtx, in, listed) + if err != nil { + return false, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errLedger, err) + } + updated, err := o.ledger.settleReconciled(ledgerCtx, in.ID, candidate, note) + if err != nil { + return false, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errLedger, err) + } + o.line(updated) + return true, nil +} + +// deferReconcile makes a sending intent's first reconciliation due after wait +// from now. Best effort: without it the intent is reconciled a little early, +// which can only make it indeterminate, never send it. +func (l *Ledger) deferReconcile(ctx context.Context, id int64, wait time.Duration) { + _ = retryBusy(func() error { + _, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE outbox SET reconcile_at = ? WHERE id = ? AND state = 'sending'`, stamp(l.now().Add(wait)), id) + return err + }) +} + +// listingFailed records a failed listing: the next is due after a backoff, +// and an unlistable destination or too many failures make the intent +// indeterminate. It reports whether the intent was settled. +func (l *Ledger) listingFailed(ctx context.Context, in Intent, listErr error) (Intent, bool, error) { + failures := in.ReconcileFailures + 1 + if errors.Is(listErr, ErrUnlistable) || failures >= MaxReconcileFailures { + note := "listing failed " + strconv.Itoa(failures) + " times" + if errors.Is(listErr, ErrUnlistable) { + note = "destination cannot be listed" + } + updated, err := l.giveUpReconciling(ctx, in.ID, failures, note) + return updated, err == nil, err + } + backoff := DefaultReconcileBackoff << (failures - 1) + if backoff <= 0 || backoff > MaxReconcileBackoff { + backoff = MaxReconcileBackoff + } + err := retryBusy(func() error { + _, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE outbox SET reconcile_failures = ?, reconcile_at = ? WHERE id = ? AND state = 'sending'`, + failures, stamp(l.now().Add(backoff)), in.ID) + return err + }) + return Intent{}, false, err +} + +// adoptable picks the one message a sending intent may adopt, or says why +// there is none. +func (l *Ledger) adoptable(ctx context.Context, in Intent, listed []PostedMessage) (int64, string, error) { + want := MessageText(in.Body) + var matches []int64 + seen := map[int64]bool{} + for _, m := range listed { + if seen[m.ID] || MessageText(m.Content) != want { + continue + } + seen[m.ID] = true + owned, err := l.receiptOwnedByOther(ctx, in.ID, in.Destination.Kind, m.ID) + if err != nil { + return 0, "", err + } + if owned { + continue + } + // A worker's own acknowledgement or reply is the worker's, however + // alike the words: the guard's fixed form is short enough to collide. + workers, err := l.workerMessage(ctx, in.Destination.Kind, m.ID) + if err != nil { + return 0, "", err + } + if !workers { + matches = append(matches, m.ID) + } + } + if len(matches) != 1 { + return 0, strconv.Itoa(len(matches)) + " matching messages at the destination", nil + } + rivals, err := l.unsettledAt(ctx, in.Destination) + if err != nil { + return 0, "", err + } + for _, r := range rivals { + if r.ID != in.ID && MessageText(r.Body) == want { + return 0, "intent " + strconv.FormatInt(r.ID, 10) + " could claim the same message", nil + } + } + return matches[0], "", nil +} + +// workerMessage reports whether a message id is one a worker reported as its +// own acknowledgement or reply. +func (l *Ledger) workerMessage(ctx context.Context, kind MessageKind, id int64) (bool, error) { + // Scoped by kind, as receipt ownership is: a boost id and a comment id + // are different numbers in different spaces, and a worker acknowledges + // with either while its reply is always a comment or a line. + query := `SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM task_events WHERE ack_id = ?)` + if kind != MessageBoost { + query = `SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM task_events WHERE ack_id = ? OR reply_id = ? OR adopted_reply_id = ?)` + } + args := []any{id} + if kind != MessageBoost { + args = append(args, id, id) + } + var found bool + err := retryBusy(func() error { + return l.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, query, args...).Scan(&found) + }) + return found, err +} + +// unsettledAt lists the intents at a destination whose message may exist +// without a receipt: not yet sent, sending, or never settled — abandoned +// included, since a person abandoning one did not prove it absent. +func (l *Ledger) unsettledAt(ctx context.Context, dest Destination) ([]Intent, error) { + var out []Intent + err := retryBusy(func() error { + rows, err := l.db.QueryContext(ctx, selectIntents+` +WHERE message_kind = ? AND recording_id = ? AND state IN ('pending', 'sending', 'indeterminate', 'abandoned')`, + string(dest.Kind), dest.RecordingID) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: intents at %d: %w", dest.RecordingID, err) + } + out, err = scanIntents(rows) + return err + }) + return out, err +} + +func (l *Ledger) receiptOwnedByOther(ctx context.Context, id int64, kind MessageKind, receipt int64) (bool, error) { + var owned bool + err := retryBusy(func() error { + return l.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM outbox WHERE message_kind = ? AND receipt_id = ? AND id <> ?)`, + string(kind), receipt, id).Scan(&owned) + }) + return owned, err +} + +// giveUpReconciling settles a sending intent indeterminate after its last +// failed listing, recording that failure in the same write so the count a +// person reads is the count that gave up. +func (l *Ledger) giveUpReconciling(ctx context.Context, id int64, failures int, note string) (Intent, error) { + err := retryBusy(func() error { + res, err := l.db.ExecContext(ctx, ` +UPDATE outbox SET state = 'indeterminate', finished_at = ?, note = ?, reconcile_failures = ?, reconcile_at = NULL +WHERE id = ? AND state = 'sending'`, l.timestamp(), note, failures, id) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: give up reconciling intent %d: %w", id, err) + } + if n, err := res.RowsAffected(); err != nil { + return err + } else if n == 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: give up reconciling intent %d: it is no longer sending", id) + } + return nil + }) + if err != nil { + return Intent{}, err + } + return l.Intent(ctx, id) +} + +// settleReconciled writes a reconciliation's answer onto a still-sending +// intent: sent with the adopted receipt, or indeterminate with why. +func (l *Ledger) settleReconciled(ctx context.Context, id, receipt int64, note string) (Intent, error) { + err := retryBusy(func() error { + var ( + res sql.Result + err error + ) + now := l.timestamp() + if receipt > 0 { + res, err = l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE outbox SET state = 'sent', receipt_id = ?, finished_at = ?, note = 'adopted by reconciliation' WHERE id = ? AND state = 'sending'`, + receipt, now, id) + } else { + res, err = l.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE outbox SET state = 'indeterminate', finished_at = ?, note = ? WHERE id = ? AND state = 'sending'`, + now, note, id) + } + if err != nil { + if isUniqueViolation(err) { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: reconcile intent %d: %w", id, ErrReceiptOwned) + } + return fmt.Errorf("connector: reconcile intent %d: %w", id, err) + } + if n, err := res.RowsAffected(); err != nil { + return err + } else if n == 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: reconcile intent %d: it is no longer sending", id) + } + return nil + }) + if err != nil { + return Intent{}, err + } + return l.Intent(ctx, id) +} + +// IsLifecycleMessage says whether a comment or chat line id is the receipt of +// one of the connector's own lifecycle messages, for the adopted-reply rule. +// A notice whose receipt the ledger does not hold yet is recognized by its +// words instead, where the replies are listed: LifecycleFilteredReplies. An +// error answers yes: a reply is not adopted on a guess. +func (o *Outbox) IsLifecycleMessage(id int64) bool { + return IsLifecycleMessageIn(o.ledger)(id) +} + +// IsLifecycleMessageIn is IsLifecycleMessage over a ledger, for a dispatcher +// built without a sender. +func IsLifecycleMessageIn(l *Ledger) func(id int64) bool { + return func(id int64) bool { + ctx := context.Background() + for _, kind := range []MessageKind{MessageComment, MessageChatLine} { + found, err := l.IsLifecycleReceipt(ctx, kind, id) + if err != nil || found { + return true + } + } + return false + } +} + +// LifecycleFilteredReplies lists the agent's replies at a destination for the +// adopted-reply rule, without the connector's own notices: a message is left +// out when its id is a lifecycle receipt, or when its words are those of a +// comment or chat line intent at the same destination that has no receipt — +// one still sending, say, or left for a person. Notice bodies name their event +// or attempt, so the match is exact and scoped to the destination; a notice in +// flight elsewhere never hides a reply here. +type LifecycleFilteredReplies struct { + // Lister lists the agent's messages with their content (a Poster does). + Lister interface { + List(ctx context.Context, dest Destination, since time.Time) ([]PostedMessage, error) + } + Ledger *Ledger +} + +var _ ReplyLister = LifecycleFilteredReplies{} + +// AgentReplies implements ReplyLister. +func (r LifecycleFilteredReplies) AgentReplies(ctx context.Context, bucketID int64, kind string, recordingID int64, since time.Time) ([]AgentReply, error) { + messageKind, ok := destinationKind(kind) + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: no reply listing for %q", kind) + } + dest := Destination{BucketID: bucketID, Kind: messageKind, RecordingID: recordingID} + // The bound is the listing's alone: the ledger read that follows is + // short, and a listing that used nearly all of it must not leave the + // ledger no time and be reported as a listing that failed. + listCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, AdoptionScanTimeout) + defer cancel() + listed, err := r.Lister.List(listCtx, dest, since) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + receipts := map[int64]bool{} + unreceipted := map[string]bool{} + if err := retryBusy(func() error { + clear(receipts) + clear(unreceipted) + // A receipt names the connector's message whatever state its intent + // is in. A body stands in for a message only while one may exist + // unreceipted: a canceled intent posted nothing, so its words are the + // worker's if they appear. + rows, err := r.Ledger.db.QueryContext(ctx, ` +SELECT receipt_id, body, state IN ('pending', 'sending', 'indeterminate', 'abandoned') +FROM outbox WHERE message_kind = ? AND recording_id = ?`, string(messageKind), recordingID) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }() + for rows.Next() { + var ( + receipt sql.NullInt64 + body string + unsettled bool + ) + if err := rows.Scan(&receipt, &body, &unsettled); err != nil { + return err + } + switch { + case receipt.Valid: + receipts[receipt.Int64] = true + case unsettled: + unreceipted[MessageText(body)] = true + } + } + return rows.Err() + }); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: lifecycle messages at %d: %w", recordingID, err) + } + out := make([]AgentReply, 0, len(listed)) + for _, m := range listed { + if receipts[m.ID] || unreceipted[MessageText(m.Content)] { + continue + } + out = append(out, AgentReply{ID: m.ID, CreatedAt: m.CreatedAt}) + } + return out, nil +} + +func (o *Outbox) line(in Intent) { + if o.opts.Lines == nil { + return + } + line := OutboxLine{Type: "outbox", IntentID: in.ID, Kind: string(in.Kind), State: string(in.State), EventID: in.EventID, AttemptID: in.AttemptID} + if in.ReceiptID != nil { + line.ReceiptID = *in.ReceiptID + } + if err := o.opts.Lines.WriteLine(line); err != nil { + o.log.Warn("connector: outbox line", "error", err) + } +} + +// decidedSince reports whether any event on an attempt's task has left the +// state its completion notice was rendered from — a person redispatched or +// discarded it. It is one indexed read, so the ordinary claim, where nobody +// decided anything, does not pay for a full re-render. +func decidedSince(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, attemptID string) (bool, error) { + var decided bool + if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, ` +SELECT EXISTS ( + SELECT 1 FROM task_events te JOIN events e ON e.id = te.event_id + WHERE te.task_id = (SELECT task_id FROM attempts WHERE id = ?1) + AND (te.delivery = 'completed' OR (te.withdrawn_at IS NOT NULL AND te.exposed_attempt_id = ?1)) + AND (e.state NOT IN ('completed', 'blocked') OR e.redispatch_decision IS NOT NULL + OR COALESCE(e.authorized_at > (SELECT ended_at FROM attempts WHERE id = ?1), 0)))`, attemptID).Scan(&decided); err != nil { + return false, fmt.Errorf("connector: outbox claim completion for %s: %w", attemptID, err) + } + return decided, nil +} diff --git a/internal/connector/policy.go b/internal/connector/policy.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b4955cc14 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/policy.go @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "io/fs" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "slices" + "strings" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" +) + +// Policy is the connector's v1 permission policy: work in the working +// directory and the agent's Basecamp MCP tools are allowed, and the rest is +// refused without asking anyone. It is policy, not containment: the worker +// runs with the operator's ambient authority, as it does today, and a +// sandbox launcher is what contains it. +type Policy struct { + WorkDir string +} + +var _ driver.PermissionPolicy = Policy{} + +// DefaultPolicy is the v1 policy for a working directory. +func DefaultPolicy(workDir string) Policy { return Policy{WorkDir: workDir} } + +// policyAllowedKinds are what a worker does without asking, besides edits +// inside the working directory. +var policyAllowedKinds = []driver.ToolKind{driver.ToolRead, driver.ToolSearch, driver.ToolThink} + +// Rules implements driver.PermissionPolicy. +func (p Policy) Rules() driver.PermissionRules { + return driver.PermissionRules{ + Mode: driver.ModeEditsInWorkDir, + WorkDir: p.WorkDir, + AllowKinds: slices.Clone(policyAllowedKinds), + AllowMCPServers: []string{MCPServerName}, + } +} + +// Decide implements driver.PermissionPolicy. +func (p Policy) Decide(_ context.Context, req driver.PermissionRequest) driver.PermissionDecision { + if strings.HasPrefix(req.Tool, "mcp__"+MCPServerName+"__") { + return driver.PermissionDecision{Allow: true} + } + switch { + case req.Kind == driver.ToolThink: + // The only allowed kind that touches no file. + return driver.PermissionDecision{Allow: true} + case slices.Contains(policyAllowedKinds, req.Kind), req.Kind == driver.ToolEdit: + // A call on the filesystem that names no path is one the policy + // cannot place inside the working directory, so it is refused. + return driver.PermissionDecision{Allow: len(req.Locations) > 0 && p.inside(req.Locations)} + } + return driver.PermissionDecision{Allow: false} +} + +// maxLinkHops bounds how many links one path may be resolved through, as the +// kernel's ELOOP does. A loop of links names no file, and a path this cannot +// resolve is refused rather than guessed at. +const maxLinkHops = 32 + +// resolveExisting resolves the symlinks in the longest existing prefix of an +// absolute path and appends the rest, which does not exist yet and so cannot +// be a link. +// +// It walks the components itself rather than leaning on EvalSymlinks alone, +// because EvalSymlinks answers ENOENT to two opposite questions: a component +// that is not there, and a symlink that IS there and points at something +// that is not. Treating the second as a name yet to be created approved a +// write to <workdir>/link when the link pointed at /elsewhere/missing — +// which is where the write would land, creating a file outside the working +// directory (Copilot on #738). A link that exists is followed to wherever it +// points, existing or not, and a link that cannot be read resolves to +// nothing. +func resolveExisting(path string) (string, bool) { + return resolveHops(path, maxLinkHops) +} + +func resolveHops(path string, hops int) (string, bool) { + if hops <= 0 || !filepath.IsAbs(path) { + return "", false + } + rest := "" + for current := filepath.Clean(path); ; { + info, err := os.Lstat(current) + switch { + case err == nil && info.Mode()&fs.ModeSymlink != 0: + // A link that is there. Where it points is where a write to this + // path lands, whether or not anything is there yet. + target, err := os.Readlink(current) + if err != nil { + return "", false + } + if !filepath.IsAbs(target) { + target = filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(current), target) + } + resolved, ok := resolveHops(target, hops-1) + if !ok { + return "", false + } + return filepath.Join(resolved, rest), true + case err == nil: + // Something that is there and is not a link; the links above it + // are what is left to resolve. + resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(current) + if err != nil { + return "", false + } + return filepath.Join(resolved, rest), true + case errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist): + parent := filepath.Dir(current) + if parent == current { + return "", false + } + rest = filepath.Join(filepath.Base(current), rest) + current = parent + default: + return "", false + } + } +} + +// inside reports whether every location is within the working directory, as +// the filesystem resolves it: a symlink inside the directory that points out +// of it is outside. +func (p Policy) inside(locations []string) bool { + root, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(filepath.Clean(p.WorkDir)) + if err != nil { + return false + } + for _, loc := range locations { + if strings.TrimSpace(loc) == "" { + // A location that names nothing resolves to the working directory + // itself, which would let a request that named no path pass as one + // inside it. + return false + } + if !filepath.IsAbs(loc) { + loc = filepath.Join(p.WorkDir, loc) + } + resolved, ok := resolveExisting(filepath.Clean(loc)) + if !ok { + return false + } + rel, err := filepath.Rel(root, resolved) + if err != nil || rel == ".." || strings.HasPrefix(rel, ".."+string(filepath.Separator)) { + return false + } + } + return true +} diff --git a/internal/connector/policy_test.go b/internal/connector/policy_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7bcc2980a --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/policy_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "math" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "strings" + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/admission" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" +) + +func TestThePolicyAllowsWorkInTheDirectoryAndTheAgentsToolsOnly(t *testing.T) { + root := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "repo") + require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(root, 0o700)) + p := DefaultPolicy(root) + ctx := context.Background() + allow := func(req driver.PermissionRequest) bool { return p.Decide(ctx, req).Allow } + + assert.True(t, allow(driver.PermissionRequest{Tool: "mcp__basecamp__basecamp_connect", Kind: driver.ToolOther})) + assert.True(t, allow(driver.PermissionRequest{Kind: driver.ToolEdit, Locations: []string{filepath.Join(root, "a.go")}})) + assert.True(t, allow(driver.PermissionRequest{Kind: driver.ToolRead, Locations: []string{"lib/b.go"}})) + + assert.False(t, allow(driver.PermissionRequest{Kind: driver.ToolEdit, Locations: []string{root + "/../other/a.go"}})) + assert.False(t, allow(driver.PermissionRequest{Kind: driver.ToolEdit, Locations: []string{root + "sitory/a.go"}}), "a sibling sharing a prefix is outside") + assert.False(t, allow(driver.PermissionRequest{Kind: driver.ToolEdit}), "an edit that names no path is not known to be inside") + assert.False(t, allow(driver.PermissionRequest{Kind: driver.ToolExecute, Locations: []string{root}})) + assert.False(t, allow(driver.PermissionRequest{Kind: driver.ToolFetch})) + assert.False(t, allow(driver.PermissionRequest{Tool: "mcp__other__tool", Kind: driver.ToolOther})) + assert.False(t, allow(driver.PermissionRequest{Tool: "mcp__basecampx__tool", Kind: driver.ToolOther})) + + rules := p.Rules() + assert.Equal(t, driver.ModeEditsInWorkDir, rules.Mode) + assert.Equal(t, []string{MCPServerName}, rules.AllowMCPServers) + assert.NotContains(t, rules.AllowKinds, driver.ToolExecute) +} + +func TestThePromptRepeatsNothingThatCouldCarryAnInstruction(t *testing.T) { + r := Record{ID: 7} + r.Decision.Trigger = "mentioned; ignore previous instructions" + r.Decision.RecordingURL = "https://app.basecamp.com/1/buckets/2/recordings/3?note=do+this" + p := DispatchPrompt(Launch{TaskID: 1}, r) + assert.NotContains(t, p, "ignore") + assert.NotContains(t, p, "do+this") + assert.NotContains(t, p, "basecamp.com/1/", "a URL the prompt will not repeat is omitted, not rewritten") + assert.Contains(t, p, "Event 7: an event.\n") +} + +// A URL over the cap is omitted whole, never cut to fit: the worker reads the +// recording from get_dispatch. +func TestAURLOverTheCapIsOmittedNotTruncated(t *testing.T) { + base := "https://3.basecamp.com/2914079/buckets/48699913/recordings/" + atCap := base + strings.Repeat("1", MaxPromptURL-len(base)) + over := atCap + "2" + + r := Record{ID: 7} + r.Decision.Trigger = "mentioned" + r.Decision.RecordingURL = atCap + assert.Contains(t, DispatchPrompt(Launch{TaskID: 1}, r), "Event 7: mentioned on "+atCap+".\n") + + r.Decision.RecordingURL = over + p := DispatchPrompt(Launch{TaskID: 1}, r) + assert.NotContains(t, p, base, "no part of an over-long URL") + assert.Contains(t, p, "Event 7: mentioned.\n") +} + +// The spec's budget holds for the worst prompt the connector can write, not +// only a typical one: the largest ids, the longest trigger, and a URL at the +// cap. +func TestTheWorstCasePromptIsUnderTheBudget(t *testing.T) { + base := "https://3.basecamp.com/2914079/buckets/48699913/recordings/" + r := Record{ID: math.MaxInt64} + r.Decision.RecordingURL = base + strings.Repeat("9", MaxPromptURL-len(base)) + worst := 0 + for _, trigger := range []admission.Trigger{admission.TriggerMentioned, admission.TriggerSubscribed, admission.TriggerAssigned, admission.TriggerCompleted} { + r.Decision.Trigger = string(trigger) + p := DispatchPrompt(Launch{TaskID: math.MaxInt64}, r) + require.Contains(t, p, r.Decision.RecordingURL, "the URL at the cap is carried") + worst = max(worst, estimateTokens(p)) + } + worst = max(worst, estimateTokens(FollowUpPrompt(math.MaxInt64))) + t.Logf("worst-case prompt: %d tokens by the upper bound", worst) + assert.LessOrEqual(t, worst, 450, "margin under the budget") + assert.Less(t, worst, MaxPromptTokens) +} + +// Copilot: containment is decided on the resolved path. +func TestThePolicyResolvesSymlinksOutOfTheDirectory(t *testing.T) { + root := t.TempDir() + outside := t.TempDir() + require.NoError(t, os.Symlink(outside, filepath.Join(root, "link"))) + p := DefaultPolicy(root) + edit := func(loc string) bool { + return p.Decide(context.Background(), driver.PermissionRequest{Kind: driver.ToolEdit, Locations: []string{loc}}).Allow + } + assert.False(t, edit(filepath.Join(root, "link", "secret.txt")), "through a link that leaves the directory") + assert.False(t, edit("link/new/dir/file.txt"), "a path not created yet, under that link") + assert.True(t, edit(filepath.Join(root, "new", "file.txt")), "a file not created yet, inside") +} + +// Copilot r3: a call on the filesystem that names no path cannot be placed +// inside the working directory. +func TestThePolicyRefusesFilesystemCallsWithNoPath(t *testing.T) { + root := t.TempDir() + p := DefaultPolicy(root) + allow := func(kind driver.ToolKind) bool { + return p.Decide(context.Background(), driver.PermissionRequest{Kind: kind}).Allow + } + assert.False(t, allow(driver.ToolRead)) + assert.False(t, allow(driver.ToolSearch)) + assert.False(t, allow(driver.ToolEdit)) + assert.True(t, allow(driver.ToolThink), "the one allowed kind that touches no file") +} + +// A location that names nothing is not a location inside the working +// directory: it would otherwise resolve to the directory itself and pass. +func TestPolicyRefusesAnEditThatNamesNoPath(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + p := DefaultPolicy(dir) + for _, loc := range []string{"", " "} { + decision := p.Decide(context.Background(), driver.PermissionRequest{ + Tool: "Edit", Kind: driver.ToolEdit, Locations: []string{loc}, + }) + assert.False(t, decision.Allow, "an edit whose location is %q", loc) + } + allowed := p.Decide(context.Background(), driver.PermissionRequest{ + Tool: "Edit", Kind: driver.ToolEdit, Locations: []string{filepath.Join(dir, "file.go")}, + }) + assert.True(t, allowed.Allow) +} + +// Copilot on #738: a symlink that exists and points at something that does +// not is not a name yet to be created. Opening it creates the file it points +// at, which is wherever the link says — so the policy resolves the link +// rather than reading the kernel's ENOENT as "nothing here yet". +func TestADanglingLinkIsResolvedToWhereItPoints(t *testing.T) { + root := t.TempDir() + outside := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "missing") + require.NoError(t, os.Symlink(outside, filepath.Join(root, "dangling"))) + require.NoError(t, os.Symlink(filepath.Join(root, "inside-missing"), filepath.Join(root, "inward"))) + require.NoError(t, os.Symlink(filepath.Join(root, "loop"), filepath.Join(root, "loop"))) + p := DefaultPolicy(root) + edit := func(loc string) bool { + return p.Decide(context.Background(), driver.PermissionRequest{Kind: driver.ToolEdit, Locations: []string{loc}}).Allow + } + + assert.False(t, edit(filepath.Join(root, "dangling")), "writing it creates a file outside the working directory") + assert.False(t, edit(filepath.Join(root, "dangling", "under.txt")), "and so does writing under it") + assert.False(t, edit(filepath.Join(root, "loop")), "a path that resolves to nothing is refused, not guessed at") + assert.True(t, edit(filepath.Join(root, "inward")), "a link to a name inside the directory is still inside") + assert.True(t, edit(filepath.Join(root, "new", "file.txt")), "and a file not created yet, inside, is unaffected") +} diff --git a/internal/connector/promote.go b/internal/connector/promote.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dc7c6d1e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/promote.go @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "database/sql" + "errors" + "fmt" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "strings" + "time" +) + +// PromoteOptions names the two state directories of one account and agent. +type PromoteOptions struct { + // ShadowDir is the shadow run's state directory, StateDir the normal + // one. Both must be on one filesystem: the ledger moves by rename. + ShadowDir string + StateDir string + AccountID string + AgentID int64 + // By records who promoted. + By string +} + +// PromoteResult is what a promote did. +type PromoteResult struct { + // Already says an earlier promote finished: the normal ledger stands + // under its hold and there was no shadow ledger left to move. + Already bool `json:"already_promoted,omitempty"` + Hold Hold `json:"hold"` + Tagged int `json:"tagged_for_review"` + Held int `json:"held"` + // Ledger is the promoted ledger's path. + Ledger string `json:"ledger"` +} + +// Errors from promote. +var ( + // ErrNoShadowLedger is a shadow directory without a ledger. + ErrNoShadowLedger = errors.New("there is no shadow ledger to promote") + // ErrLedgerExists is a normal state directory that already has a ledger. + ErrLedgerExists = errors.New("the connector already has a ledger") +) + +// promoteStep is a test seam: a crash test kills the process at a named step. +var promoteStep = func(string) {} + +// PromoteShadow turns a shadow run's ledger into the connector's, held +// (invariant 7). In order: +// +// 1. Both instance locks are taken, the shadow's and the connector's: no +// shadow writer and no connector is running. +// 2. In the shadow ledger, in one transaction: the hold marker, a new +// generation, every non-terminal record tagged for review, waiting +// records held. +// 3. The shadow ledger is checkpointed into its single database file. +// 4. That file is renamed into the connector's state directory, which +// exposes it; the directory is synced. +// +// A crash before 2 commits leaves the untouched shadow. After it, the ledger +// at either path is held, and running promote again finishes the move. The +// hold is committed before the rename, so no unheld ledger is ever at the +// normal path. +func PromoteShadow(ctx context.Context, opts PromoteOptions) (PromoteResult, error) { + switch { + case opts.ShadowDir == "" || opts.StateDir == "": + return PromoteResult{}, errors.New("connector: promote needs the shadow and the normal state directory") + case filepath.Clean(opts.ShadowDir) == filepath.Clean(opts.StateDir): + return PromoteResult{}, errors.New("connector: the shadow and the normal state directory are the same directory") + case strings.TrimSpace(opts.By) == "": + return PromoteResult{}, errors.New("connector: a promote records who promoted") + } + shadowPath := filepath.Join(opts.ShadowDir, LedgerFile) + statePath := filepath.Join(opts.StateDir, LedgerFile) + + if _, err := os.Lstat(opts.ShadowDir); err != nil { + if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + return PromoteResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: inspect the shadow state: %w", err) + } + // No shadow state at all: this can only be a promote run again, and + // it still says so under the connector's own lock. + stateLock, err := AcquireInstanceLock(opts.StateDir, opts.AccountID, opts.AgentID, time.Now()) + if err != nil { + return PromoteResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: the connector must be stopped first: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = stateLock.Release() }() + return promoted(ctx, opts, statePath) + } + shadowLock, err := AcquireInstanceLock(opts.ShadowDir, opts.AccountID, opts.AgentID, time.Now()) + if err != nil { + return PromoteResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: the shadow connector must be stopped first: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = shadowLock.Release() }() + stateLock, err := AcquireInstanceLock(opts.StateDir, opts.AccountID, opts.AgentID, time.Now()) + if err != nil { + return PromoteResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: the connector must be stopped first: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = stateLock.Release() }() + promoteStep("locked") + + if _, err := os.Lstat(shadowPath); err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + return promoted(ctx, opts, statePath) + } + return PromoteResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: inspect the shadow ledger: %w", err) + } + for _, p := range []string{statePath, statePath + "-wal", statePath + "-shm", statePath + "-journal"} { + switch _, err := os.Lstat(p); { + case err == nil: + return PromoteResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: %s: %w", p, ErrLedgerExists) + case !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist): + return PromoteResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: inspect %s: %w", p, err) + } + } + + ledger, err := OpenLedger(shadowPath) //nolint:contextcheck // OpenLedger migrates on its own context + if err != nil { + return PromoteResult{}, err + } + closed := false + defer func() { + if !closed { + _ = ledger.Close() + } + }() + held, err := ledger.SetHold(ctx, opts.By, HoldByPromote) + if err != nil { + return PromoteResult{}, err + } + promoteStep("held") + + // One file, so one rename moves all of it: the WAL is folded into the + // database and the journal mode leaves no sidecar behind. + if err := checkpointToOneFile(ctx, ledger.db); err != nil { + return PromoteResult{}, err + } + if err := ledger.Close(); err != nil { + return PromoteResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: close the shadow ledger: %w", err) + } + closed = true + for _, p := range []string{shadowPath + "-wal", shadowPath + "-shm", shadowPath + "-journal"} { + switch _, err := os.Lstat(p); { + case err == nil: + return PromoteResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: the shadow ledger still has %s after its checkpoint; it is held, run promote again", filepath.Base(p)) + case !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist): + return PromoteResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: inspect %s: %w", p, err) + } + } + promoteStep("checkpointed") + + if err := os.Rename(shadowPath, statePath); err != nil { + return PromoteResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: move the shadow ledger: %w", err) + } + promoteStep("renamed") + if err := syncDirectory(opts.StateDir); err != nil { + return PromoteResult{}, err + } + if err := syncDirectory(opts.ShadowDir); err != nil { + return PromoteResult{}, err + } + promoteStep("synced") + + // Opened once more the normal way, which vets the file where it now is + // and puts it back in WAL mode, and read: the hold must stand. + moved, err := OpenLedger(statePath) //nolint:contextcheck // OpenLedger migrates on its own context + if err != nil { + return PromoteResult{}, err + } + defer func() { _ = moved.Close() }() + hold, ok, err := moved.HoldMarker(ctx) + if err != nil { + return PromoteResult{}, err + } + if !ok { + return PromoteResult{}, errors.New("connector: the promoted ledger has no hold marker") + } + return PromoteResult{Hold: hold, Tagged: held.Tagged, Held: held.Held, Ledger: statePath}, nil +} + +// promoted answers a promote with no shadow ledger left: an earlier promote +// finished when the normal ledger stands under a promote's hold. It finishes +// what that promote may not have: a crash after the rename leaves the move +// without its durability barrier, so both directories are synced again before +// this says it is done. +func promoted(ctx context.Context, opts PromoteOptions, statePath string) (PromoteResult, error) { + if _, err := os.Lstat(statePath); err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + return PromoteResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: %w", ErrNoShadowLedger) + } + return PromoteResult{}, err + } + ledger, err := OpenLedgerReadOnly(ctx, statePath) + if err != nil { + return PromoteResult{}, err + } + defer func() { _ = ledger.Close() }() + hold, ok, err := ledger.HoldMarker(ctx) + if err != nil { + return PromoteResult{}, err + } + // The promote's own decision is the mark, not the hold's cause: a shadow + // already held by --hold keeps its first cause through the promote. + var promotedHere bool + if err := ledger.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM decisions WHERE action = 'shadow_promote')`).Scan(&promotedHere); err != nil { + return PromoteResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: read the ledger's promote: %w", err) + } + if !ok || !promotedHere { + return PromoteResult{}, fmt.Errorf("connector: %w", ErrNoShadowLedger) + } + for _, dir := range []string{opts.StateDir, opts.ShadowDir} { + if err := syncDirectory(dir); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + return PromoteResult{}, err + } + } + return PromoteResult{Already: true, Hold: hold, Ledger: statePath}, nil +} + +func checkpointToOneFile(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB) error { + var busy, logged, checkpointed int + if err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE)`).Scan(&busy, &logged, &checkpointed); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: checkpoint the shadow ledger: %w", err) + } + if busy != 0 { + return errors.New("connector: the shadow ledger is in use; stop whatever holds it and run promote again") + } + var mode string + if err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `PRAGMA journal_mode = DELETE`).Scan(&mode); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: leave WAL mode: %w", err) + } + if !strings.EqualFold(mode, "delete") { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: the shadow ledger stayed in %s mode; it is held, run promote again", mode) + } + return nil +} + +func syncDirectory(dir string) error { + f, err := os.Open(dir) + if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + // A shadow directory a person has already cleared away. + return err + } + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: sync %s: %w", dir, err) + } + defer f.Close() + if err := f.Sync(); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: sync %s: %w", dir, err) + } + return nil +} diff --git a/internal/connector/recovery_acp_test.go b/internal/connector/recovery_acp_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e8c90bf4d --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/recovery_acp_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,265 @@ +//go:build unix + +package connector + +import ( + "bufio" + "context" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "os" + "strings" + "sync" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver/acp" +) + +// The ACP driver's row: one adapter process per session, spoken to in +// newline-delimited JSON-RPC 2.0 on its stdio. +// +// The adapter it runs is the pinned claude-agent-acp, and the fake reports +// that adapter's own package and version (acp.ClaudeAgentACP), so a version +// bump cannot leave the row claiming to be an adapter the driver would +// refuse. The row does not locate an installed adapter: the fake agent is +// the executable, which is what Locate would otherwise decide, and that is +// the same seam the spawn rows use. +func init() { + registerHarnessDriver(harnessDriver{ + Name: acp.Name, + FollowUps: true, + New: func(agent string) driver.Driver { + d, err := acp.New(acp.Options{ + Adapter: acp.ClaudeAgentACP, + Binary: agent, + Lookup: func(string) (string, bool) { return "", false }, + }) + if err != nil { + panic("recovery harness: the acp row: " + err.Error()) + } + return d + }, + Agent: fakeACPAdapter, + }) +} + +// fakeACPAdapter is claude-agent-acp's side of the wire: initialize, a +// session, its asking mode, the adapter's own answer to the MCP read-back, +// and a turn per prompt. +// +// What it answers is what the driver's own rules demand of a real adapter — +// the pinned package and version, an asking mode it offers and then confirms, +// Claude Code's init forwarded with every MCP server connected, and a /mcp +// answer that counts the servers the session declared — so a session reaching +// the fake worker has passed the same handshake a real one does. +func fakeACPAdapter(w *fakeWorker) int { + adapter := acp.ClaudeAgentACP + askMode := adapter.Modes[driver.ModeEditsInWorkDir] + const sessionID = "recovery-harness" + + out := bufio.NewWriter(os.Stdout) + var mu sync.Mutex + send := func(v any) { + data, err := json.Marshal(v) + if err != nil { + return + } + mu.Lock() + defer mu.Unlock() + _, _ = out.Write(append(data, '\n')) + _ = out.Flush() + } + reply := func(id json.RawMessage, result any) { + send(map[string]any{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": id, "result": result}) + } + fail := func(id json.RawMessage, message string) { + send(map[string]any{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": id, "error": map[string]any{"code": -32603, "message": message}}) + } + notify := func(method string, params any) { + send(map[string]any{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": method, "params": params}) + } + + var ( + servers []string + declared *driver.MCPServer + once sync.Once + bindErr error + ) + bound := make(chan struct{}) + badMode := w.BadMode() + + // When the session's MCP servers come up, and so when the connector's + // bridge dials the task token's socket: as the handshake ends, and apart + // from the wire, so the adapter goes on answering while its server + // starts. + // + // It matters which side of the handshake that is. The connector arms the + // socket for the worker's process group only once Driver.NewSession has + // returned (Dispatcher.dispatch, TokenSocket.AllowGroup on + // session.Process()), and for this driver the whole handshake — the + // adapter's own MCP read-back turn included — runs inside NewSession. A + // connection that arrives before the socket is armed waits in the + // listener's backlog, which is what that backlog is for, so arriving + // early is fine; waiting for the token before answering is not. An + // adapter whose handshake cannot finish until its MCP servers have + // connected would wait on a socket the connector cannot arm until that + // handshake finishes, and both sides would sit there until the bridge's + // 30-second dial or the driver's 2-minute handshake ran out. Nothing in + // the connector prevents that; it is the adapters that do not do it. + starting := false + startBind := func() { + once.Do(func() { + starting = true + go func() { + defer close(bound) + if declared != nil { + bindErr = w.Bind(context.Background(), *declared) + } + }() + }) + } + // A server that was starting when the connector died still says what + // became of its token: the parent checks that every worker either took + // one or said why it could not, and a process that exited with the bind + // still in flight would answer neither. + defer func() { + if starting { + <-bound + } + }() + awaitBind := func() error { + startBind() + <-bound + return bindErr + } + + in := bufio.NewScanner(os.Stdin) + in.Buffer(make([]byte, 64<<10), 16<<20) + for in.Scan() { + var m struct { + ID json.RawMessage `json:"id"` + Method string `json:"method"` + Params json.RawMessage `json:"params"` + } + if json.Unmarshal(in.Bytes(), &m) != nil { + continue + } + switch m.Method { + case "initialize": + reply(m.ID, map[string]any{ + "protocolVersion": acp.ProtocolVersion, + "agentCapabilities": map[string]any{"loadSession": adapter.LoadSession}, + "agentInfo": map[string]any{"name": adapter.Package, "version": adapter.Version}, + }) + + case "session/new": + var p struct { + MCPServers []struct { + Name string `json:"name"` + Command string `json:"command"` + Args []string `json:"args"` + Env []struct { + Name string `json:"name"` + Value string `json:"value"` + } `json:"env"` + } `json:"mcpServers"` + } + if json.Unmarshal(m.Params, &p) != nil { + fail(m.ID, "unreadable session/new") + return 11 + } + for _, s := range p.MCPServers { + servers = append(servers, s.Name) + if s.Name != MCPServerName { + continue + } + env := make(map[string]string, len(s.Env)) + for _, e := range s.Env { + env[e.Name] = e.Value + } + // Kept, not started: the declaration carries the server's + // whole environment, and the server itself comes up on the + // first turn the session is given. See declared, below. + declared = &driver.MCPServer{Name: s.Name, Command: s.Command, Args: s.Args, Env: env} + } + reply(m.ID, map[string]any{ + "sessionId": sessionID, + "modes": map[string]any{ + // Opened in another of the adapter's modes, so the mode + // the driver confirms is one it set. + "currentModeId": "acceptEdits", + "availableModes": []map[string]string{{"id": askMode}, {"id": "acceptEdits"}}, + }, + }) + + case "session/set_mode": + reply(m.ID, nil) + reported := askMode + if badMode { + // It reports a mode other than the one asked for, and the + // driver ends the session before it is ever prompted. The + // handshake ends here, before the read-back and so before + // the session's MCP servers would start: this worker never + // asks for a task token, and says so rather than leaving the + // parent's credential check a worker it cannot account for. + reported = "bypassPermissions" + w.log(0, 0, "bad-mode") + w.log(0, 0, "bind-failed: the session ended in its handshake, before its MCP servers started") + } + notify("session/update", map[string]any{"sessionId": sessionID, + "update": map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "current_mode_update", "currentModeId": reported}}) + + case "session/prompt": + var p struct { + Prompt []struct { + Text string `json:"text"` + } `json:"prompt"` + } + if json.Unmarshal(m.Params, &p) != nil { + fail(m.ID, "unreadable session/prompt") + continue + } + var text strings.Builder + for _, block := range p.Prompt { + text.WriteString(block.Text) + } + if text.String() == adapter.Readback.Command { + // The adapter answers its own read-back, with no model: its + // account of the session's MCP servers, and Claude Code's + // init forwarded, which is how this adapter says they + // connected (acp.MCPStatusInit). + statuses := make([]map[string]string, 0, len(servers)) + for _, name := range servers { + statuses = append(statuses, map[string]string{"name": name, "status": "connected"}) + } + notify("_claude/sdkMessage", map[string]any{"sessionId": sessionID, + "message": map[string]any{"type": "system", "subtype": "init", "mcp_servers": statuses}}) + notify("session/update", map[string]any{"sessionId": sessionID, + "update": map[string]any{"sessionUpdate": "agent_message_chunk", + "content": map[string]any{"type": "text", + "text": fmt.Sprintf("%d MCP server(s): %d connected, 0 not connected, 0 disabled.", len(servers), len(servers))}}}) + reply(m.ID, map[string]any{"stopReason": "end_turn"}) + // The handshake is over with this answer: the session's MCP + // servers start now, and the connector is about to arm their + // socket. + startBind() + continue + } + if err := awaitBind(); err != nil { + fail(m.ID, "the session's MCP server did not start") + continue + } + if err := w.Turn(context.Background(), text.String()); err != nil { + fail(m.ID, "the turn failed") + continue + } + reply(m.ID, map[string]any{"stopReason": "end_turn", + "usage": map[string]any{"inputTokens": 1, "outputTokens": 1}}) + + case "session/cancel": + // A notification: the turn in flight is the connector's to end, + // and this process ends with the group it leads. + } + } + return 0 +} diff --git a/internal/connector/recovery_claude_test.go b/internal/connector/recovery_claude_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..76baff81e --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/recovery_claude_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +//go:build unix + +package connector + +import ( + "bufio" + "context" + "encoding/json" + "os" + "slices" + "time" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver/claude" +) + +// The Claude Code spawn driver's row: `claude -p` speaking stream-json. +func init() { + registerHarnessDriver(harnessDriver{ + Name: claude.Name, + FollowUps: true, + New: func(agent string) driver.Driver { + return claude.New(claude.Options{Binary: agent, CloseGrace: 5 * time.Second, Lookup: func(string) (string, bool) { return "", false }}) + }, + Agent: fakeClaude, + }) + if os.Getenv(harnessRealEnv) != "" { + // The real Claude Code on PATH, for TestRecoveryAgainstRealAgents. + registerHarnessDriver(harnessDriver{ + Name: claude.Name + "-real", + Real: true, + New: func(string) driver.Driver { return claude.New(claude.Options{}) }, + }) + } +} + +// fakeClaude is `claude -p --input-format stream-json --output-format +// stream-json`: one process per session, a user message per prompt, the init +// message before the first result, and a result per turn. +func fakeClaude(w *fakeWorker) int { + args := os.Args[1:] + flag := func(name string) string { + i := slices.Index(args, name) + if i < 0 || i+1 >= len(args) { + return "" + } + return args[i+1] + } + // The server declaration is read before the init message: the driver + // removes the file once the agent reports its servers started. + var config struct { + MCPServers map[string]struct { + Command string `json:"command"` + Args []string `json:"args"` + Env map[string]string `json:"env"` + } `json:"mcpServers"` + } + data, err := os.ReadFile(flag("--mcp-config")) + if err != nil { + return 10 + } + if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &config); err != nil { + return 11 + } + names := make([]string, 0, len(config.MCPServers)) + for name, s := range config.MCPServers { + names = append(names, name) + if name == MCPServerName { + if err := w.Bind(context.Background(), driver.MCPServer{Name: name, Command: s.Command, Args: s.Args, Env: s.Env}); err != nil { + return 12 + } + } + } + + sessionID := flag("--session-id") + if sessionID == "" { + sessionID = flag("--resume") + } + mode := flag("--permission-mode") + badMode := w.BadMode() + if badMode { + mode = "bypassPermissions" + } + + out := bufio.NewWriter(os.Stdout) + emit := func(v any) { + data, _ := json.Marshal(v) + _, _ = out.Write(append(data, '\n')) + _ = out.Flush() + } + in := bufio.NewScanner(os.Stdin) + in.Buffer(make([]byte, 64<<10), 16<<20) + inited := false + for in.Scan() { + var msg struct { + Type string `json:"type"` + Message struct { + Content string `json:"content"` + } `json:"message"` + } + if json.Unmarshal(in.Bytes(), &msg) != nil { + continue + } + switch msg.Type { + case "control_request": + emit(map[string]any{"type": "result", "subtype": "error_during_execution", "is_error": true, "session_id": sessionID}) + continue + case "user": + default: + continue + } + if !inited { + inited = true + servers := make([]map[string]string, 0, len(names)) + for _, name := range names { + servers = append(servers, map[string]string{"name": name, "status": "connected"}) + } + emit(map[string]any{"type": "system", "subtype": "init", "session_id": sessionID, "permissionMode": mode, "mcp_servers": servers}) + if badMode { + // It reported the wrong mode and waits to be ended. Whether a + // real agent would already have acted is exactly what the + // connector cannot know; this one acting would only race the + // driver's kill. + w.log(0, 0, "bad-mode") + time.Sleep(2 * time.Minute) + return 9 + } + } + if err := w.Turn(context.Background(), msg.Message.Content); err != nil { + emit(map[string]any{"type": "result", "subtype": "error_during_execution", "is_error": true, "session_id": sessionID}) + continue + } + emit(map[string]any{"type": "result", "subtype": "success", "stop_reason": "end_turn", "is_error": false, "session_id": sessionID, + "usage": map[string]any{"input_tokens": 1, "output_tokens": 1}}) + } + return 0 +} diff --git a/internal/connector/recovery_codex_test.go b/internal/connector/recovery_codex_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7ae33dc21 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/recovery_codex_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,216 @@ +//go:build unix + +package connector + +import ( + "bufio" + "context" + "crypto/rand" + "encoding/hex" + "encoding/json" + "io" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "regexp" + "strings" + "time" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver/codex" +) + +// The Codex spawn driver's row: `codex exec --json`, one process per turn. +// +// Codex takes no follow-up prompt (driver.Capabilities), so the harness's +// follow-up cases run against this row in the shape the dispatcher gives them +// here: an event that arrives mid-turn is admitted and waits for a task of +// its own, rather than being exposed to the worker in hand. forEachDriver +// hands each case the row, and harnessDriver.FollowUps says which shape to +// expect. +// +// CODEX_HOME is the harness's own: the driver reads the policy Codex applied +// out of the rollout Codex writes under it, so a row that left it unset would +// have the fake writing into the operator's ~/.codex. +func init() { + registerHarnessDriver(harnessDriver{ + Name: codex.Name, + FollowUps: false, + New: func(agent string) driver.Driver { + home := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(agent), "codex") + return codex.New(codex.Options{ + Binary: agent, + CloseGrace: 5 * time.Second, + Lookup: func(name string) (string, bool) { + if name == "CODEX_HOME" { + return home, true + } + return "", false + }, + }) + }, + Agent: fakeCodex, + }) +} + +// fakeCodex is `codex exec --json … -`: one process per turn, the prompt read +// from stdin to the end, the thread announced on stdout, and the policy Codex +// applied written to the thread's rollout — which is where the driver reads it +// back (codex's invariant 3), so the fake writes it before it says anything. +func fakeCodex(w *fakeWorker) int { + args := os.Args[1:] + for _, server := range codexMCPServers(args) { + if server.Name != MCPServerName { + continue + } + if err := w.Bind(context.Background(), server); err != nil { + return 12 + } + } + + home := os.Getenv("CODEX_HOME") + if home == "" { + return 10 + } + cwd, err := os.Getwd() + if err != nil { + return 10 + } + thread, err := fakeThreadID() + if err != nil { + return 10 + } + // Where findRollout looks: sessions/YYYY/MM/DD/rollout-*-<thread>.jsonl. + rollout := filepath.Join(home, "sessions", "2026", "09", "18", "rollout-2026-09-18T00-00-00-"+thread+".jsonl") + if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(rollout), 0o700); err != nil { + return 10 + } + badMode := w.BadMode() + appendRollout(rollout, "session_meta", map[string]any{"id": thread}) + appendRollout(rollout, "turn_context", codexTurnContext(cwd, badMode)) + + // The prompt is read from stdin, never argv, and the driver closes stdin + // behind it. + prompt, err := io.ReadAll(os.Stdin) + if err != nil { + return 13 + } + + out := bufio.NewWriter(os.Stdout) + emit := func(v any) { + data, _ := json.Marshal(v) + _, _ = out.Write(append(data, '\n')) + _ = out.Flush() + } + emit(map[string]any{"type": "thread.started", "thread_id": thread}) + if badMode { + // The rollout says a policy other than the one the flags asked for. + // The driver ends the session; this process waits to be ended, as the + // Claude row's does, rather than racing that kill with work of its + // own. + w.log(0, 0, "bad-mode") + time.Sleep(2 * time.Minute) + return 9 + } + if err := w.Turn(context.Background(), string(prompt)); err != nil { + emit(map[string]any{"type": "turn.failed"}) + return 0 + } + emit(map[string]any{"type": "turn.completed", "usage": map[string]any{"input_tokens": 1, "output_tokens": 1}}) + return 0 +} + +// codexTurnContext is the policy record the driver checks. bad reports a +// sandbox other than the one the flags asked for, which is this driver's +// equivalent of an agent that reports the wrong permission mode. +func codexTurnContext(cwd string, bad bool) map[string]any { + approval := "never" + if bad { + approval = "on-request" + } + return map[string]any{ + "cwd": cwd, + "approval_policy": approval, + "sandbox_policy": map[string]any{ + "type": "workspace-write", "network_access": false, + "exclude_slash_tmp": true, "exclude_tmpdir_env_var": true, + "writable_roots": []string{}, + }, + "file_system_sandbox_policy": map[string]any{ + "kind": "restricted", + "entries": []map[string]any{ + {"path": map[string]any{"type": "path", "path": cwd}, "access": "read-write"}, + }, + }, + } +} + +func appendRollout(path, kind string, payload map[string]any) { + line, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"type": kind, "payload": payload}) + if err != nil { + return + } + f, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE, 0o600) + if err != nil { + return + } + _, _ = f.Write(append(line, '\n')) + _ = f.Close() +} + +func fakeThreadID() (string, error) { + var b [16]byte + if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil { + return "", err + } + b[6] = (b[6] & 0x0f) | 0x40 + b[8] = (b[8] & 0x3f) | 0x80 + s := hex.EncodeToString(b[:]) + return s[0:8] + "-" + s[8:12] + "-" + s[12:16] + "-" + s[16:20] + "-" + s[20:32], nil +} + +// codexTOMLPair is one "key"="value" of an inline TOML table. +var codexTOMLPair = regexp.MustCompile(`("(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*")=("(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*")`) + +// codexMCPServers reads the MCP server declarations back out of argv, where +// the driver puts them as `-c mcp_servers.<name>.<field>=<TOML>`. The values +// are the JSON-compatible subset of TOML the driver writes. +func codexMCPServers(argv []string) []driver.MCPServer { + servers := map[string]*driver.MCPServer{} + order := []string{} + get := func(name string) *driver.MCPServer { + if servers[name] == nil { + servers[name] = &driver.MCPServer{Name: name, Env: map[string]string{}} + order = append(order, name) + } + return servers[name] + } + for i := 0; i+1 < len(argv); i++ { + if argv[i] != "-c" { + continue + } + key, value, _ := strings.Cut(argv[i+1], "=") + rest, ok := strings.CutPrefix(key, "mcp_servers.") + if !ok { + continue + } + name, field, _ := strings.Cut(rest, ".") + switch field { + case "command": + _ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(value), &get(name).Command) + case "args": + _ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(value), &get(name).Args) + case "env": + for _, m := range codexTOMLPair.FindAllStringSubmatch(value, -1) { + var k, v string + if json.Unmarshal([]byte(m[1]), &k) == nil && json.Unmarshal([]byte(m[2]), &v) == nil { + get(name).Env[k] = v + } + } + } + } + out := make([]driver.MCPServer, 0, len(order)) + for _, name := range order { + out = append(out, *servers[name]) + } + return out +} diff --git a/internal/connector/recovery_connector_test.go b/internal/connector/recovery_connector_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..55ba2fcb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/recovery_connector_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,640 @@ +//go:build unix + +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "fmt" + "log/slog" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "strconv" + "strings" + "sync" + "syscall" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-sdk/go/pkg/basecamp/eventfeed" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-sdk/go/pkg/basecamp/eventfeed/feedtest" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/admission" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/ndjson" +) + +// The connector process the recovery harness starts and kills: its kill points, +// its composition, and the ledger predicates a surviving run stops at. + +// killSpec is a run's kill point: "<point>", or "<point>#<n>" to kill at the +// n-th time the point is reached rather than the first. Line points are +// "line:<type>:<state>". +type killSpec struct { + point string + nth int + + mu sync.Mutex + count int +} + +func parseKill(raw string) *killSpec { + if raw == "" { + return &killSpec{} + } + k := &killSpec{point: raw, nth: 1} + if i := strings.LastIndex(raw, "#"); i > 0 { + if n, err := strconv.Atoi(raw[i+1:]); err == nil { + k.point, k.nth = raw[:i], n + } + } + return k +} + +// at reports whether this is the time point is to kill. +func (k *killSpec) at(point string) bool { + if k == nil || k.point != point { + return false + } + k.mu.Lock() + defer k.mu.Unlock() + k.count++ + return k.count == k.nth +} + +// die is SIGKILL, the one death nothing in the process can intercept. +func die() { + _ = syscall.Kill(os.Getpid(), syscall.SIGKILL) + select {} +} + +// killingLines is the connector's stdout: every line is kept for the parent, +// and the named line is the last thing the process does. +type killingLines struct { + mu sync.Mutex + f *os.File + kill *killSpec +} + +func (w *killingLines) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + w.mu.Lock() + defer w.mu.Unlock() + n, err := w.f.Write(p) + if err != nil { + return n, err + } + var line struct { + Type string `json:"type"` + State string `json:"state"` + } + if json.Unmarshal(p, &line) == nil { + if line.Type == "" { + line.Type = "pointer" + } + if w.kill.at("line:" + line.Type + ":" + line.State) { + die() + } + } + return n, nil +} + +// harnessLine is one connector stdout line, as the parent reads it back. +type harnessLine struct { + Type string `json:"type"` + State string `json:"state"` + EventID int64 `json:"event_id"` + TaskID int64 `json:"task_id"` + AttemptID string `json:"attempt_id"` + EventIDs []int64 `json:"event_ids"` + StopReason string `json:"stop_reason"` + Kind string `json:"kind"` + IntentID int64 `json:"intent_id"` +} + +func (h *harness) lines() []harnessLine { + h.t.Helper() + var out []harnessLine + require.NoError(h.t, readJSONLines(filepath.Join(h.dir, linesFile), func(line []byte) error { + var l harnessLine + if err := json.Unmarshal(line, &l); err != nil { + return err + } + out = append(out, l) + return nil + })) + return out +} + +// ---- the connector process ---- + +// TestRecoveryConnector is not a test: it is the connector the harness starts +// and kills. +func TestRecoveryConnector(t *testing.T) { + if os.Getenv(harnessConnectorEnv) == "" { + t.Skip("started by the recovery harness") + } + dir := os.Getenv(harnessDirEnv) + if err := runHarnessConnector(dir); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } +} + +func runHarnessConnector(dir string) error { + sc, err := readScenario(dir) + if err != nil { + return err + } + d, ok := harnessDriverNamed(sc.Driver) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("no driver %q registered", sc.Driver) + } + kill := parseKill(os.Getenv(harnessKillEnv)) + logger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug})) + stateDir := os.Getenv(harnessStateEnv) + if stateDir == "" { + stateDir = dir + } + shadow := os.Getenv(harnessShadowEnv) == "true" + + // One connector per account and agent, as the run command takes it. + lock, err := AcquireInstanceLock(stateDir, harnessAccount, harnessAgent, time.Now()) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer func() { _ = lock.Release() }() + ledger, err := OpenLedger(filepath.Join(stateDir, LedgerFile)) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer func() { _ = ledger.Close() }() + // The guard is an hour out unless a scenario asks for it: a test that is + // not about the guard must not have one fire in the middle of it. + guardDelay := sc.GuardDelay + if guardDelay <= 0 { + guardDelay = time.Hour + } + hooks := LifecycleHooks(ledger, LifecycleOptions{GuardDelay: guardDelay}) + // Every task token this connector mints, kept for the parent's + // credential check — which then covers a real agent's run as well as a + // fake worker's, and a run whose worker never took its token. + launched := hooks.TaskLaunched + hooks.TaskLaunched = func(ctx context.Context, tx Tx, launch Launch) error { + if launched != nil { + if err := launched(ctx, tx, launch); err != nil { + return err + } + } + return recordTaskToken(dir, launch.AttemptID, launch.Token) + } + ended := hooks.AttemptEnded + hooks.AttemptEnded = func(ctx context.Context, tx Tx, s Settlement) error { + if err := ended(ctx, tx, s); err != nil { + return err + } + if kill.at("tx:attempt-ended") { + die() + } + return nil + } + verdict := hooks.VerdictCommitted + hooks.VerdictCommitted = func(ctx context.Context, tx Tx, v CommittedVerdict) error { + if err := verdict(ctx, tx, v); err != nil { + return err + } + if kill.at("tx:verdict") { + die() + } + return nil + } + if !shadow { + // A shadow run posts nothing, so it writes no intents. + ledger.SetHooks(hooks) + } + + out, err := os.OpenFile(filepath.Join(dir, linesFile), os.O_WRONLY|os.O_APPEND, 0o600) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer out.Close() + lines := ndjson.NewWriter(&killingLines{f: out, kill: kill}) + + warn, pause := sc.QueueWarn, sc.QueuePause + if warn <= 0 { + warn = DefaultBacklogWarn + } + if pause <= 0 { + pause = DefaultBacklogPause + } + queue, err := NewQueue(warn, pause) + if err != nil { + return err + } + transport := feedtest.NewTransport() + minter := feedtest.NewMinter() + for range 100 { + minter.ScriptTicket(eventfeed.StreamTicket{Ticket: "test-ticket-not-real", ExpiresIn: 120, URL: "wss://cable.basecamp.com/cable?ticket=test-ticket-not-real"}) + } + var filters eventfeed.Filters + if raw := os.Getenv(harnessFiltersEnv); raw != "" { + if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(raw), &filters); err != nil { + return err + } + } + window := sc.RepairWindow + if window <= 0 { + window = time.Minute + } + intake, err := New(Options{ + Origin: harnessOrigin, AccountID: harnessAccount, ConsumerNamespace: harnessNamespace, + Filters: filters, Ledger: ledger, Queue: queue, Minter: minter, + PollsFor: pollsFor(dir, ledger, kill, os.Getenv(harnessFaultEnv)), + Lines: lines, + Logger: logger, + Transport: transport, + RepairInterval: 50 * time.Millisecond, + RepairWindow: window, + }) + if err != nil { + return err + } + intake.repairSweep = 50 * time.Millisecond + + // Two routed projects, each its own working directory, so a test can show + // the dispatcher still runs work in one while the other's is held. + work := filepath.Join(dir, "work") + routes := map[int64]admission.Route{ + harnessBucket: {Path: work, Class: "internal"}, + harnessOtherBucket: {Path: filepath.Join(dir, "work-other"), Class: "internal"}, + } + reads := storeReads{dir: dir, gate: sc.ReadGate, kill: kill} + admitter, err := admission.NewAdmitter(admission.Policy{ + AgentID: harnessAgent, + Trust: admission.Trust{Mode: admission.TrustOperator, OperatorID: harnessOperator}, + Projects: routes, + }, admission.Reads{Summaries: reads, Subscriptions: reads, Assignments: reads}) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + mcp := WorkerMCP{Command: filepath.Join(dir, "basecamp"), Profile: "agent", StateDir: stateDir} + // Generous: a loaded box (the harness runs its own tests concurrently in + // CI, and a mutation sweep runs dozens at once) must fail on what the + // ledger says, never on how long the machine took. + runFor := harnessRunFor + if d.Real { + runFor = harnessRealRunFor + // The real `basecamp mcp`, holding a task token that reaches no + // Basecamp: the worker's basecamp_connect calls are real, its + // Basecamp calls fail. It gets no BASECAMP_TOKEN — MCPServerEnv + // leaves that name out deliberately, and the bridge rebuilds the + // server's environment from that list, so naming it here never did + // anything. + mcp.Command = os.Getenv(harnessRealBasecampEnv) + } + failures, _ := strconv.Atoi(os.Getenv(harnessSpawnFailEnv)) + working := d.New(filepath.Join(dir, "agent")) + worker := &failingSpawns{Driver: working, broken: d.New(filepath.Join(dir, "no-such-agent")), failures: failures} + dispatcher, err := NewDispatcher(DispatcherOptions{ + Ledger: ledger, Driver: worker, + Routes: func() map[int64]admission.Route { return routes }, + Concurrency: 2, + Deadline: time.Hour, + MCP: mcp, + PrivateDir: filepath.Join(dir, "sessions"), + // As the run command wires it: the agent's replies, lifecycle + // messages filtered out by the ledger. + Replies: LifecycleFilteredReplies{Lister: storePoster{dir: dir, kill: &killSpec{}}, Ledger: ledger}, + // Not in the run command, which passes none: a task works in its + // route either way. The harness's records when a directory is + // prepared and released, for the one-owner rule's assertions. + Workspaces: &harnessWorkspaces{dir: dir}, + StillRunning: DefaultStillRunning, + IsLifecycleMessage: IsLifecycleMessageIn(ledger), + Lines: lines, + Logger: logger, + Tick: 20 * time.Millisecond, + CancelGrace: 5 * time.Second, + }) + if err != nil { + return err + } + outbox, err := NewOutbox(OutboxOptions{ + Ledger: ledger, Poster: storePoster{dir: dir, kill: kill}, + Paused: ledger.Held, Lines: lines, Logger: logger, + // A sending intent a previous process left is reconciled once it is + // this old, so a restart settles it rather than waiting out the + // production minute. + Tick: 20 * time.Millisecond, ReconcileAfter: harnessReconcileAfter, + }) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + // Who is running, for a fake worker that is to kill it: written before + // anything can be dispatched, removed when this process leaves cleanly. + // + // The start time is the kernel's own, as a real recorded worker's is. + // A wall-clock stamp is not an identity — the one-owner rule answers + // driver.ErrIdentityUnknown to it — so a fixture that wrote one could + // never be confirmed, and the worker that is to kill this connector + // would refuse to signal it. + self, err := driver.LookupProcess(os.Getpid()) + if err != nil { + return err + } + identity, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"pid": self.PID, "started_at": self.StartedAt.UTC()}) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, connectorFile), identity, 0o600); err != nil { + return err + } + defer func() { _ = os.Remove(filepath.Join(dir, connectorFile)) }() + + ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background()) + defer cancel() + pushed := map[int64]bool{} + if err := readJSONLines(filepath.Join(dir, liveFile), func(line []byte) error { + var ids []int64 + if err := json.Unmarshal(line, &ids); err != nil { + return err + } + for _, id := range ids { + pushed[id] = true + } + return nil + }); err != nil { + return err + } + go (&cable{transport: transport, dir: dir, served: pushed}).run(ctx) + + var ( + wg sync.WaitGroup + errMu sync.Mutex + firstErr error + ) + part := func(name string, fn func(context.Context) error) { + wg.Go(func() { + err := fn(ctx) + if ctx.Err() == nil { + // As the run command holds it: a part that stops while the + // others run, failed or not, is a connector doing half its + // job. + if err == nil { + err = errors.New("stopped on its own") + } + errMu.Lock() + if firstErr == nil { + firstErr = fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", name, err) + } + errMu.Unlock() + } + cancel() + }) + } + // In the run command's order: status learns the connector stopped + // however it ends; the outbox settles what a previous process left and + // sends what is due before anything transitions; only then do the parts + // start. + defer func() { _ = ledger.NoteConnection(context.Background(), ConnectionStopped, "") }() + dispatching := !shadow && os.Getenv(harnessNoDispatchEnv) != "true" + posting := dispatching && os.Getenv(harnessNoOutboxEnv) != "true" + if posting { + startCtx, stopStart := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 2*time.Minute) + err := outbox.Start(startCtx) + stopStart() + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + if err := ledger.NoteConnection(ctx, ConnectionRunning, ""); err != nil { + logger.Warn("recovery harness: note connection", "error", err) + } + part("intake", intake.Run) + part("admission", func(ctx context.Context) error { + return RunAdmission(ctx, AdmissionOptions{Ledger: ledger, Queue: queue, Admitter: admitter, Lines: lines, Logger: logger}) + }) + if dispatching { + part("dispatch", dispatcher.Run) + } + if posting { + part("outbox", outbox.Run) + } + + until := os.Getenv(harnessUntilEnv) + deadline := time.Now().Add(runFor) + for ctx.Err() == nil { + if kill.point == "paused" && queue.Paused() { + die() + } + if kill.point == "get-dispatch" { + // A worker has called get_dispatch: it cancels the guard. + var n int + if err := ledger.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM task_events WHERE guard = 'canceled'`).Scan(&n); err == nil && n > 0 { + die() + } + } + done, err := harnessPredicate(ctx, dir, ledger, until) + if err != nil { + logger.Warn("recovery harness: predicate", "error", err) + } + if done { + logger.Info("recovery harness: the ledger reached its predicate", "until", until, "state", unsettled(ctx, ledger)) + break + } + if time.Now().After(deadline) { + return fmt.Errorf("the ledger never reached %q; %s", until, unsettled(ctx, ledger)) + } + time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond) + } + cancel() + wg.Wait() + flushCtx, stop := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second) + defer stop() + if posting { + if err := outbox.Flush(flushCtx); err != nil { + return err + } + } + return firstErr +} + +// failingSpawns starts its first workers with an agent binary that does not +// exist, so the driver itself reports a start that ran nothing. +type failingSpawns struct { + driver.Driver + broken driver.Driver + mu sync.Mutex + failures int +} + +func (f *failingSpawns) NewSession(ctx context.Context, cfg driver.SessionConfig) (driver.Session, error) { + f.mu.Lock() + fail := f.failures > 0 + if fail { + f.failures-- + } + f.mu.Unlock() + if fail { + return f.broken.NewSession(ctx, cfg) + } + return f.Driver.NewSession(ctx, cfg) +} + +// harnessPredicate is the ledger state a surviving run stops at; predicates +// joined by commas must all hold. +func harnessPredicate(ctx context.Context, dir string, l *Ledger, until string) (bool, error) { + if strings.Contains(until, ",") { + for _, one := range strings.Split(until, ",") { + ok, err := harnessPredicate(ctx, dir, l, one) + if err != nil || !ok { + return false, err + } + } + return true, nil + } + switch until { + case "", "settled": + return ledgerSettled(ctx, dir, l) + case "never": + return false, nil + } + if arg, ok := strings.CutPrefix(until, "state:"); ok { + // "state:<id>=<state>", or "state:<id>" for any state. + id, state, _ := strings.Cut(arg, "=") + n, err := strconv.ParseInt(id, 10, 64) + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + r, found, err := l.Get(ctx, n) + return found && (state == "" || string(r.State) == state), err + } + if until == "losses-closed" { + settled, err := ledgerSettled(ctx, dir, l) + if err != nil || !settled { + return false, err + } + open, err := l.OpenLosses(ctx) + return len(open) == 0, err + } + return false, fmt.Errorf("unknown predicate %q", until) +} + +// How long a run may take before it fails on its predicate, and how long the +// harness waits for the process itself. A real agent calls a model, so it +// gets longer; the harness's own cap is longer than either, so a run always +// fails on what the ledger says. +const ( + harnessRunFor = 2 * time.Minute + harnessRealRunFor = 5 * time.Minute + harnessRunCap = 7 * time.Minute +) + +// harnessReconcileAfter is how old a sending intent must be before it is +// reconciled: the production minute, shortened so a restart can settle one. +const harnessReconcileAfter = 200 * time.Millisecond + +// recordTaskToken writes a task's token where the parent's credential check +// reads it. The file is outside every directory that check scans. +func recordTaskToken(dir, attemptID, token string) error { + if token == "" { + return errors.New("recovery harness: a launch with no token") + } + tokens := filepath.Join(dir, tokensDir) + if err := os.MkdirAll(tokens, 0o700); err != nil { + return err + } + return os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(tokens, attemptID+".token"), []byte(token), 0o600) +} + +// harnessWorkspaces is the working directory a task gets: the route itself, +// as the run command's default does. It records every preparation and every +// release, so a test can say whether a directory was released — which the +// one-owner rule allows only once a worker's process group is gone. +type harnessWorkspaces struct{ dir string } + +type workspaceEvent struct { + Step string `json:"step"` + Route string `json:"route"` + WorkDir string `json:"work_dir"` + EventID int64 `json:"event_id,omitempty"` +} + +func (w *harnessWorkspaces) Prepare(_ context.Context, route string, eventID int64) (string, error) { + return route, appendJSONLine(filepath.Join(w.dir, workspaceFile), workspaceEvent{Step: "prepare", Route: route, WorkDir: route, EventID: eventID}) +} + +func (w *harnessWorkspaces) Finish(_ context.Context, route, workDir string) error { + return appendJSONLine(filepath.Join(w.dir, workspaceFile), workspaceEvent{Step: "finish", Route: route, WorkDir: workDir}) +} + +// unsettled says what a run that never reached its predicate was still +// holding, so a failure names it rather than the timeout alone. +func unsettled(ctx context.Context, l *Ledger) string { + var out []string + rows, err := l.db.QueryContext(ctx, `SELECT state, COUNT(*) FROM events GROUP BY state`) + if err != nil { + return "the ledger could not be read: " + err.Error() + } + for rows.Next() { + var state string + var n int + if rows.Scan(&state, &n) == nil { + out = append(out, fmt.Sprintf("%s=%d", state, n)) + } + } + _ = rows.Close() + attempts, _ := l.LiveAttempts(ctx) + intents, _ := l.Intents(ctx, IntentFilter{States: []IntentState{IntentPending, IntentSending}}) + for _, in := range intents { + out = append(out, fmt.Sprintf("intent %d %s %s not_before=%s", in.ID, in.Kind, in.State, in.NotBefore.Format(time.RFC3339))) + } + return fmt.Sprintf("records %v, live attempts %d", out, len(attempts)) +} + +// ledgerSettled is a connector with nothing left to do: every event the feed +// serves is in the ledger, nothing waits for admission or a worker, no +// attempt is live, and no due lifecycle message is unsent. +func ledgerSettled(ctx context.Context, dir string, l *Ledger) (bool, error) { + entries, err := readFeed(dir) + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + // One query for the whole feed rather than a read per event: the overflow + // scenario publishes ten thousand of them, and this runs on a timer. + repairPolls := countRepairPolls(dir) + var want, lowest, highest int64 + for _, e := range entries { + if e.FromRepairPoll > repairPolls || e.Never { + continue + } + want++ + if lowest == 0 || e.Event.ID < lowest { + lowest = e.Event.ID + } + highest = max(highest, e.Event.ID) + } + if want > 0 { + var have int64 + if err := l.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM events WHERE id BETWEEN ? AND ?`, lowest, highest).Scan(&have); err != nil { + return false, err + } + if have < want { + return false, nil + } + } + var busy int + err = l.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, ` +SELECT (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM events WHERE state IN ('seen', 'admitted', 'queued', 'dispatched') + AND NOT (state IN ('admitted', 'queued') AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM hold_marker))) + + (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM attempts WHERE state <> 'ended') + + (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM outbox WHERE state = 'sending' + OR (state = 'pending' AND not_before <= ? AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM hold_marker)))`, l.timestamp()).Scan(&busy) + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + return busy == 0, nil +} diff --git a/internal/connector/recovery_dispatch_test.go b/internal/connector/recovery_dispatch_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a64552a2c --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/recovery_dispatch_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,768 @@ +//go:build unix + +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "database/sql" + "math" + "os" + "os/exec" + "slices" + "strconv" + "strings" + "syscall" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver/drivertest" +) + +// Dispatch, acknowledgement and completion, with the connector killed at every +// ledger state an event passes through on its way to a worker and back. + +// harnessAttempt is an attempts row. +type harnessAttempt struct { + ID string + TaskID int64 + State string + StopReason string + SpawnFailed bool +} + +func harnessAttempts(t *testing.T, l *Ledger) []harnessAttempt { + t.Helper() + rows, err := l.db.QueryContext(context.Background(), `SELECT id, task_id, state, COALESCE(stop_reason, ''), spawn_failed FROM attempts ORDER BY launched_at, rowid`) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer rows.Close() + var out []harnessAttempt + for rows.Next() { + var a harnessAttempt + require.NoError(t, rows.Scan(&a.ID, &a.TaskID, &a.State, &a.StopReason, &a.SpawnFailed)) + out = append(out, a) + } + require.NoError(t, rows.Err()) + return out +} + +// outcomeOf is the outcome on the event's latest task. +func outcomeOf(t *testing.T, l *Ledger, eventID int64) string { + t.Helper() + var outcome string + require.NoError(t, l.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), + `SELECT COALESCE(outcome, '') FROM task_events WHERE event_id = ? ORDER BY task_id DESC LIMIT 1`, eventID).Scan(&outcome)) + return outcome +} + +// handed counts the times a worker was prompted with the event, across every +// agent process of the harness. +func (h *harness) handed(eventID int64) int { + n := 0 + for _, e := range h.agentLog() { + if e.Event == eventID && e.Step == "prompt" { + n++ + } + } + return n +} + +// agentStarts counts the agent processes that started. +func (h *harness) agentStarts() int { + n := 0 + for _, e := range h.agentLog() { + if e.Step == "start" { + n++ + } + } + return n +} + +// recordedWorkers is the worker processes the ledger recorded, which is all a +// restart has to end them by. +func recordedWorkers(t *testing.T, l *Ledger) []int { + t.Helper() + rows, err := l.db.QueryContext(context.Background(), `SELECT pid FROM attempts WHERE pid IS NOT NULL AND pid > 0`) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer rows.Close() + var out []int + for rows.Next() { + var pid int + require.NoError(t, rows.Scan(&pid)) + out = append(out, pid) + } + require.NoError(t, rows.Err()) + return out +} + +// notices are the connector's completion notices naming the event. +func (h *harness) notices(eventID int64) []storedMessage { + var out []storedMessage + for _, m := range h.connectorPosts() { + if strings.Contains(m.Content, "automatic notice") && strings.Contains(m.Content, "Event "+strconv.FormatInt(eventID, 10)+":") { + out = append(out, m) + } + } + return out +} + +// processGone says pid no longer runs: it does not exist, or it is a zombie +// nobody has reaped yet. The state comes from /proc where there is one, and +// from ps elsewhere (macOS), since a zombie still answers kill(pid, 0). +func processGone(ctx context.Context, pid int) bool { + if err := syscall.Kill(pid, 0); err != nil { + return true + } + if stat, err := os.ReadFile("/proc/" + strconv.Itoa(pid) + "/stat"); err == nil { + // The state follows the parenthesised command name. + fields := strings.Fields(string(stat[strings.LastIndexByte(string(stat), ')')+1:])) + return len(fields) > 0 && (fields[0] == "Z" || fields[0] == "X") + } + out, err := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "ps", "-o", "stat=", "-p", strconv.Itoa(pid)).Output() + state := strings.TrimSpace(string(out)) + if err != nil && state == "" { + // ps exits non-zero when the pid names no process. + return true + } + return strings.HasPrefix(state, "Z") +} + +// completedWork is a worker that does the whole job. +var completedWork = []string{"get", "ack", "reply", "complete"} + +// crashRow is one kill point in an event's life. +type crashRow struct { + name string + // kill is where the connector kills itself; empty when the plan's worker + // kills it. + kill string + // plan is the worker's script for the event's first prompt. + plan []string + + // handed is how many times a worker was given the event, in all. + handed int + // outcome is the event's outcome once recovered. + outcome Outcome + // stop is the one attempt's stop reason once recovered. + stop StopReason + // notices is how many completion notices name the event. + notices int + // indeterminate is how many lifecycle messages wait for a person. + indeterminate int + // race marks the rows that also run under the race detector. + race bool + // noDispatch kills a connector running without its dispatcher, so the + // record is left admitted rather than racing a launch. + noDispatch bool + // noOutbox kills a connector running without its outbox, so a notice + // the settlement wrote is left pending rather than racing its claim. + noOutbox bool +} + +var crashRows = []crashRow{ + {name: "seen, the read in flight", kill: "read:5001", plan: completedWork, + handed: 1, outcome: OutcomeSucceeded, stop: StopFinished}, + {name: "seen, the verdict not committed", kill: "tx:verdict", plan: completedWork, + handed: 1, outcome: OutcomeSucceeded, stop: StopFinished}, + {name: "admitted", kill: "line:event:admitted", plan: completedWork, noDispatch: true, + handed: 1, outcome: OutcomeSucceeded, stop: StopFinished}, + {name: "dispatched, attempt running before the prompt", kill: "line:dispatch:running", plan: completedWork, + handed: 0, outcome: OutcomeUnknown, stop: StopLost, notices: 1}, + {name: "exposed by get_dispatch", plan: []string{"get", "grandchild", "kill", "linger"}, + handed: 1, outcome: OutcomeUnknown, stop: StopLost, notices: 1, race: true}, + {name: "delivered by ack_dispatch", plan: []string{"get", "ack", "grandchild", "kill", "linger"}, + handed: 1, outcome: OutcomeUnknown, stop: StopLost, notices: 1}, + {name: "completed by complete_dispatch", plan: []string{"get", "ack", "reply", "complete", "grandchild", "kill", "linger"}, + handed: 1, outcome: OutcomeSucceeded, stop: StopLost}, + {name: "worker gone, settlement not committed", kill: "tx:attempt-ended", plan: completedWork, + handed: 1, outcome: OutcomeSucceeded, stop: StopLost}, + {name: "settled, completion notice due", kill: "line:dispatch:ended", plan: []string{"get", "ack", "fail"}, noOutbox: true, + handed: 1, outcome: OutcomeFailed, stop: StopFinished, notices: 1}, + {name: "completion notice sending, not posted", kill: "post-before", plan: []string{"get", "ack", "fail"}, + handed: 1, outcome: OutcomeFailed, stop: StopFinished, indeterminate: 1}, + {name: "completion notice posted, receipt not recorded", kill: "post-after", plan: []string{"get", "ack", "fail"}, + handed: 1, outcome: OutcomeFailed, stop: StopFinished, notices: 1, race: true}, +} + +// Recovery never re-runs an instruction a worker may have seen, never resends +// a lifecycle message, and leaves an intent it cannot settle indeterminate and +// visible; everything the crash interrupted before a worker existed runs once. +func TestRecoveryAtEveryLedgerState(t *testing.T) { + forEachDriver(t, func(t *testing.T, d harnessDriver) { + for _, row := range crashRows { + t.Run(row.name, func(t *testing.T) { + raceSubset(t, row.race) + h := newHarness(t, d, harnessScenario{Plans: map[string][]string{"101#1": row.plan}}) + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(101, 5001)}) + h.run(harnessRun{Kill: row.kill, Killed: true, NoDispatch: row.noDispatch, NoOutbox: row.noOutbox}) + if kind, ok := strings.CutPrefix(row.kill, "line:"); ok { + lines := h.lines() + require.NotEmpty(t, lines) + last := lines[len(lines)-1] + assert.Equal(t, kind, last.Type+":"+last.State, "the connector's last word was the line it was killed at") + } + var lingering []int + if slices.Contains(row.plan, "linger") { + // The crash left a worker running: it is the restart's to + // end, by the process group the ledger recorded. + lingering = recordedWorkers(t, h.ledger()) + require.NotEmpty(t, lingering, "the crash left a worker the ledger recorded") + for _, pid := range lingering { + assert.False(t, processGone(context.Background(), pid), "the worker outlived the connector, pid %d", pid) + } + } + + children := h.children() + h.run(harnessRun{}) + h.assertRecovered(row) + for _, pid := range lingering { + assert.True(t, processGone(context.Background(), pid), "the restart ended the worker the crash left, pid %d", pid) + } + // The worker's own child too: it is ended as a group, not as + // a pid. + for _, child := range children { + assert.True(t, processGone(context.Background(), child.PID), "the restart ended the worker's child, pid %d", child.PID) + } + + // A second restart finds nothing to do and sends nothing. + posts := len(h.connectorPosts()) + h.run(harnessRun{}) + h.assertRecovered(row) + assert.Len(t, h.connectorPosts(), posts, "recovery never resends a lifecycle message") + h.assertNoWorkerOutlivedItsRecord() + }) + } + }) +} + +// assertNoWorkerOutlivedItsRecord holds the one-owner rule on every attempt +// the ledger settled: the worker it recorded is not the process running under +// that pid, and its process group has no members left. A settled record with +// any of its tree still running would be work going on with nobody owning it. +func (h *harness) assertNoWorkerOutlivedItsRecord() { + t := h.t + t.Helper() + for _, a := range recordedAttempts(t, h.ledger()) { + if a.state != string(AttemptEnded) { + continue + } + owns, err := driver.OwnsWorker(a.process) + assert.False(t, owns, "attempt %s is ended, but its worker (pid %d) still runs", a.id, a.process.PID) + assert.NoError(t, err, "attempt %s is ended, but its process group %d still has members", a.id, a.process.PGID) + } +} + +type recordedAttempt struct { + id, state string + process driver.Process +} + +// recordedAttempts is every attempt whose worker the ledger recorded: pid, +// group and start time, the identity the one-owner rule acts on. +func recordedAttempts(t *testing.T, l *Ledger) []recordedAttempt { + t.Helper() + rows, err := l.db.QueryContext(context.Background(), `SELECT id, state, pid, pgid, process_started FROM attempts WHERE pid IS NOT NULL AND pid > 0`) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer rows.Close() + var out []recordedAttempt + for rows.Next() { + var ( + a recordedAttempt + started sql.NullString + ) + require.NoError(t, rows.Scan(&a.id, &a.state, &a.process.PID, &a.process.PGID, &started)) + if started.Valid { + a.process.StartedAt, err = parseStamp(started.String) + require.NoError(t, err) + } + out = append(out, a) + } + require.NoError(t, rows.Err()) + return out +} + +func (h *harness) assertRecovered(row crashRow) { + t := h.t + t.Helper() + l := h.ledger() + assert.Equal(t, row.handed, h.handed(101), "times a worker was given the event") + assert.Equal(t, StateCompleted, stateOf(t, l, 101)) + assert.Equal(t, string(row.outcome), outcomeOf(t, l, 101)) + attempts := harnessAttempts(t, l) + if assert.Len(t, attempts, 1, "no second attempt") { + assert.Equal(t, string(row.stop), attempts[0].StopReason) + } + assert.Len(t, h.notices(101), row.notices, "completion notices") + + status, err := l.Status(context.Background(), nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Len(t, status.Indeterminate, row.indeterminate, "indeterminate lifecycle messages in status") + for _, in := range status.Indeterminate { + assert.Equal(t, string(IntentCompletion), in.Kind) + } +} + +// An unknown outcome is posted as needing a person, and a person's redispatch +// runs the event again, once. +func TestRecoveryPostsUnknownAndRedispatchRunsItAgain(t *testing.T) { + forEachDriver(t, func(t *testing.T, d harnessDriver) { + raceSubset(t, false) + h := newHarness(t, d, harnessScenario{Plans: map[string][]string{"101#1": {"get", "ack", "kill", "linger"}}}) + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(101, 5001)}) + h.run(harnessRun{Killed: true}) + h.run(harnessRun{}) + + notices := h.notices(101) + require.Len(t, notices, 1) + assert.Contains(t, notices[0].Content, "Event 101: unknown") + assert.Contains(t, notices[0].Content, "basecamp connect redispatch 101") + assert.Equal(t, int64(5001), notices[0].RecordingID, "on the recording that asked") + + l := h.ledger() + got, err := l.Redispatch(context.Background(), 101, "operator") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.False(t, got.Held) + h.run(harnessRun{}) + + assert.Equal(t, 2, h.handed(101), "once before the crash, once by the redispatch") + assert.Equal(t, string(OutcomeSucceeded), outcomeOf(t, l, 101)) + attempts := harnessAttempts(t, l) + require.Len(t, attempts, 2) + assert.NotEqual(t, attempts[0].TaskID, attempts[1].TaskID, "a redispatch is a new task") + assert.Equal(t, string(StopFinished), attempts[1].StopReason) + assert.Len(t, h.notices(101), 1, "the redispatch succeeded with a reply: no second notice") + + h.run(harnessRun{}) + assert.Equal(t, 2, h.handed(101), "a restart after the redispatch runs nothing again") + }) +} + +// A start that ran nothing is retried once, across a restart as well, and a +// second failure blocks the record; a start whose process existed is never +// retried. +func TestRecoveryRetriesASpawnErrorOnce(t *testing.T) { + forEachDriver(t, func(t *testing.T, d harnessDriver) { + raceSubset(t, false) + t.Run("twice in one run", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, d, harnessScenario{}) + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(101, 5001)}) + h.run(harnessRun{SpawnFail: 2}) + l := h.ledger() + assertSpawnBlocked(t, h, l) + }) + t.Run("the retry after a restart runs", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, d, harnessScenario{}) + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(101, 5001)}) + h.run(harnessRun{SpawnFail: 1, Kill: "line:dispatch:ended", Killed: true}) + l := h.ledger() + assert.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, stateOf(t, l, 101), "the withdrawn exposure is durable") + + h.run(harnessRun{}) + assert.Equal(t, 1, h.handed(101)) + assert.Equal(t, string(OutcomeSucceeded), outcomeOf(t, l, 101)) + attempts := harnessAttempts(t, l) + require.Len(t, attempts, 2) + assert.True(t, attempts[0].SpawnFailed) + assert.False(t, attempts[1].SpawnFailed) + }) + t.Run("the retry budget survives a restart", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, d, harnessScenario{}) + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(101, 5001)}) + h.run(harnessRun{SpawnFail: 1, Kill: "line:dispatch:ended", Killed: true}) + h.run(harnessRun{SpawnFail: 1}) + l := h.ledger() + assertSpawnBlocked(t, h, l) + h.run(harnessRun{}) + assert.Len(t, harnessAttempts(t, l), 2, "a blocked record is not started again by a restart") + }) + t.Run("a start that failed its handshake", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, d, harnessScenario{BadModeStarts: 1}) + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(101, 5001)}) + h.run(harnessRun{}) + h.run(harnessRun{}) + l := h.ledger() + assert.Equal(t, StateCompleted, stateOf(t, l, 101)) + assert.Equal(t, string(OutcomeUnknown), outcomeOf(t, l, 101), "a process existed: it may have acted") + attempts := harnessAttempts(t, l) + require.Len(t, attempts, 1, "never retried") + assert.False(t, attempts[0].SpawnFailed) + assert.Equal(t, string(StopFailed), attempts[0].StopReason) + assert.Equal(t, 1, h.agentStarts()) + assert.Len(t, h.notices(101), 1) + }) + }) +} + +func assertSpawnBlocked(t *testing.T, h *harness, l *Ledger) { + t.Helper() + record := getRecord(t, l, 101) + assert.Equal(t, StateBlocked, record.State) + assert.Equal(t, ReasonSpawnFailed, record.Reason) + attempts := harnessAttempts(t, l) + require.Len(t, attempts, 2, "one automatic retry, no third start") + for _, a := range attempts { + assert.True(t, a.SpawnFailed) + } + assert.Zero(t, h.agentStarts(), "no worker process ever existed") + notices := h.notices(101) + require.Len(t, notices, 1) + assert.Contains(t, notices[0].Content, "could not be started") +} + +// Follow-ups and their siblings survive a task's end, a crash included: each +// event is settled on its own, an event never handed to a worker waits for a +// task of its own, and an exposed one is never run again. +func TestRecoveryFollowUpsSurviveTheirTasksEnd(t *testing.T) { + forEachDriver(t, func(t *testing.T, d harnessDriver) { + requireFollowUps(t, d) + raceSubset(t, false) + t.Run("a follow-up arrives, the task ends", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, d, harnessScenario{Plans: map[string][]string{ + "101#1": {"get", "arrive:102", "await:102=dispatched", "ack", "reply", "complete"}, + }}) + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(101, 5001)}) + h.run(harnessRun{}) + l := h.ledger() + for _, id := range []int64{101, 102} { + assert.Equal(t, 1, h.handed(id), "event %d", id) + assert.Equal(t, string(OutcomeSucceeded), outcomeOf(t, l, id), "event %d", id) + } + assert.Empty(t, h.connectorPosts()) + }) + t.Run("the connector dies before the follow-up is handed over", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, d, harnessScenario{Plans: map[string][]string{ + "101#1": {"get", "arrive:102", "await:102=dispatched", "kill", "linger"}, + }}) + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(101, 5001)}) + h.run(harnessRun{Killed: true}) + h.run(harnessRun{}) + l := h.ledger() + assert.Equal(t, 1, h.handed(101)) + assert.Equal(t, string(OutcomeUnknown), outcomeOf(t, l, 101)) + assert.Equal(t, 1, h.handed(102), "the follow-up was never exposed, so it runs as a task of its own") + assert.Equal(t, string(OutcomeSucceeded), outcomeOf(t, l, 102)) + assert.Len(t, harnessAttempts(t, l), 2) + assert.Len(t, h.notices(101), 1) + assert.Empty(t, h.notices(102)) + }) + t.Run("the connector dies with the follow-up exposed", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, d, harnessScenario{Plans: map[string][]string{ + "101#1": {"get", "arrive:102", "await:102=dispatched", "ack", "reply", "complete"}, + "102#1": {"get", "kill", "linger"}, + }}) + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(101, 5001)}) + h.run(harnessRun{Killed: true}) + h.run(harnessRun{}) + l := h.ledger() + assert.Equal(t, 1, h.handed(101)) + assert.Equal(t, 1, h.handed(102), "exposed: never run again") + assert.Equal(t, string(OutcomeSucceeded), outcomeOf(t, l, 101), "a reported outcome stands") + assert.Equal(t, StateCompleted, stateOf(t, l, 102)) + assert.Equal(t, string(OutcomeUnknown), outcomeOf(t, l, 102)) + assert.Empty(t, h.notices(101)) + assert.Len(t, h.notices(102), 1) + }) + }) +} + +// measuredDispatchPromptTokens is the production-sized dispatch prompt below +// counted by a real tokenizer, once: Claude Opus 5 counted it at 296 tokens — +// Claude Code's reported input usage for the prompt, minus the same session +// with a one-character prompt (2809 - 2513), on 2026-09-17, at 810 bytes. +// Other agents' tokenizers are not measured. The test cannot re-derive it; +// estimateTokens is the bound the budget is asserted on, and it has to stay +// above this. +const measuredDispatchPromptTokens = 296 + +// The dispatch prompt is measured as the worker received it, through each +// driver's wire, at production-sized ids, and at its worst case: the largest +// ids and the longest recording URL the prompt repeats. +func TestRecoveryTheDispatchPromptIsUnderBudget(t *testing.T) { + const ( + event = int64(17_099_838_500) + followUp = int64(17_099_838_501) + recording = int64(10_304_029_146) + ) + forEachDriver(t, func(t *testing.T, d harnessDriver) { + raceSubset(t, false) + // The follow-up prompt is a second prompt on a live session, so it is + // measured on the drivers that have one. On a one-shot driver the + // same event arrives as another task's dispatch prompt, which is the + // prompt already being measured here. + plan := []string{"get", "ack", "reply", "complete"} + if d.FollowUps { + plan = []string{"get", "arrive:" + strconv.FormatInt(followUp, 10), + "await:" + strconv.FormatInt(followUp, 10) + "=dispatched", "ack", "reply", "complete"} + } + h := newHarness(t, d, harnessScenario{Plans: map[string][]string{ + strconv.FormatInt(event, 10) + "#1": plan, + }}) + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(event, recording)}) + h.run(harnessRun{}) + + prompts := map[int64]string{} + for _, e := range h.agentLog() { + if e.Step == "prompt" { + prompts[e.Event] = e.Prompt + } + } + require.Contains(t, prompts, event) + if d.FollowUps { + require.Contains(t, prompts, followUp) + } + for id, prompt := range prompts { + tokens := estimateTokens(prompt) + t.Logf("%s: prompt for event %d: %d bytes, %d tokens by the bound, budget %d", d.Name, id, len(prompt), tokens, MaxPromptTokens) + assert.Less(t, tokens, MaxPromptTokens) + if id == event { + assert.Greater(t, tokens, measuredDispatchPromptTokens, "the bound is above what a real tokenizer counted for this prompt") + } + assert.NotContains(t, prompt, "please do the thing", "no content in the prompt") + } + if out := os.Getenv("BASECAMP_RECOVERY_PROMPT_OUT"); out != "" { + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(out, []byte(prompts[event]), 0o600)) + } + }) + + t.Run("worst case", func(t *testing.T) { + // The most the prompt can carry: ids at the end of their range, and a + // recording URL at the longest the prompt repeats. A longer one is + // omitted whole, so it cannot be the worst case. + longest := "https://app.basecamp.com/" + strings.Repeat("9", MaxPromptURL-len("https://app.basecamp.com/")) + record := Record{ID: math.MaxInt64, Decision: Decision{Trigger: "completed", RecordingURL: longest}} + prompt := DispatchPrompt(Launch{TaskID: math.MaxInt64}, record) + require.Contains(t, prompt, longest, "the longest URL the prompt repeats") + tokens := estimateTokens(prompt) + t.Logf("worst-case dispatch prompt: %d bytes, %d tokens by the bound, budget %d", len(prompt), tokens, MaxPromptTokens) + assert.Less(t, tokens, MaxPromptTokens) + + tooLong := longest + "9" + assert.NotContains(t, DispatchPrompt(Launch{TaskID: math.MaxInt64}, + Record{ID: math.MaxInt64, Decision: Decision{Trigger: "completed", RecordingURL: tooLong}}), + tooLong, "a URL past the cap is omitted, not carried") + + followUp := FollowUpPrompt(math.MaxInt64) + assert.Less(t, estimateTokens(followUp), MaxPromptTokens) + }) +} + +// An attempt whose worker the connector cannot identify is held, not settled: +// it stays live in the ledger, its conversation and its working directory +// stay its own, and no restart runs anything for it — while the dispatcher +// goes on running work that does not need them. +// +// The crash here is at launching, just after the attempt is written and +// before the driver is asked for anything. No process exists, but the ledger +// cannot know that: from the ledger it is the same as a crash between the +// spawn and the write of the worker's pid, which is the case the rule is for. +// That window itself cannot be hit deterministically from outside. +func TestRecoveryHoldsAnAttemptItCannotIdentify(t *testing.T) { + forEachDriver(t, func(t *testing.T, d harnessDriver) { + raceSubset(t, false) + h := newHarness(t, d, harnessScenario{Plans: map[string][]string{"101#1": completedWork}}) + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(101, 5001)}) + h.run(harnessRun{Kill: "line:dispatch:launching", Killed: true}) + + l := h.ledger() + attempts := harnessAttempts(t, l) + require.Len(t, attempts, 1) + assert.Equal(t, string(AttemptLaunching), attempts[0].State, "killed before the worker's process was recorded") + + // However often it restarts. Each restart runs until work in the + // other project has been dispatched and finished: proof that its + // recovery returned and its dispatcher went on, not merely that it + // logged a decision. + // A further event in the held project, on another recording, needs the + // held directory: it waits. + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(104, 5004)}) + for i, other := range []int64{105, 106} { + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: otherTodoEvent(other, 6001+int64(i))}) + h.run(harnessRun{Until: "state:" + strconv.FormatInt(other, 10) + "=completed", + RequireLog: "cannot be identified"}) + assert.Equal(t, string(OutcomeSucceeded), outcomeOf(t, l, other)) + } + assert.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, stateOf(t, l, 104), "nothing new starts in the held directory") + assert.Equal(t, 0, h.handed(104)) + assert.Equal(t, StateDispatched, stateOf(t, l, 101), "the record stays live: nobody may act on it but a person") + assert.Equal(t, 0, h.handed(101), "no worker was ever given the event") + attempts = harnessAttempts(t, l) + require.Len(t, attempts, 3, "the held attempt, and one for each event in the other project") + assert.Equal(t, string(AttemptLaunching), attempts[0].State) + assert.Empty(t, attempts[0].StopReason) + assert.False(t, h.releasedDir(h.workDir()), "the held task's working directory is not released") + assert.Empty(t, h.notices(101), "an attempt that is still live has no completion to post") + }) +} + +// The guard acknowledgement is the connector's own message, and a crash around +// its post leaves it sent once or indeterminate — never twice. +func TestRecoveryTheGuardAcknowledgementIsPostedAtMostOnce(t *testing.T) { + forEachDriver(t, func(t *testing.T, d harnessDriver) { + raceSubset(t, false) + for _, row := range []struct { + name string + kill string + boosts int + waiting int + }{ + {name: "posted, receipt not recorded", kill: "post-after", boosts: 1}, + {name: "sending, not posted", kill: "post-before", waiting: 1}, + } { + t.Run(row.name, func(t *testing.T) { + // A worker that never calls get_dispatch is what the guard is + // for: the acknowledgement falls to the connector. + h := newHarness(t, d, harnessScenario{ + GuardDelay: 50 * time.Millisecond, + Plans: map[string][]string{"101#1": {"linger"}}, + }) + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(101, 5001)}) + h.run(harnessRun{Kill: row.kill, Killed: true}) + h.run(harnessRun{}) + h.run(harnessRun{}) + + var boosts []storedMessage + for _, m := range h.connectorPosts() { + if m.Kind == MessageBoost { + boosts = append(boosts, m) + } + } + assert.Len(t, boosts, row.boosts, "guard acknowledgements posted") + for _, boost := range boosts { + assert.Equal(t, GuardAckBody, boost.Content) + assert.Equal(t, int64(5001), boost.RecordingID) + } + status, err := h.ledger().Status(context.Background(), nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + waiting := 0 + for _, in := range status.Indeterminate { + if in.Kind == string(IntentGuardAck) { + waiting++ + } + } + assert.Equal(t, row.waiting, waiting, "guard acknowledgements waiting for a person") + }) + } + }) +} + +// One owner, one release point: a worker's tree that outlives it keeps its +// attempt live, its record non-terminal and its working directory unreleased, +// through any number of restarts, because recovery holds an attempt whose +// worker it cannot verify rather than settling around it — while it goes on +// running work that does not need that directory. Once the tree is gone, the +// next restart settles the attempt and releases the directory. +func TestRecoveryAWorkersSurvivingTreeKeepsItsAttempt(t *testing.T) { + forEachDriver(t, func(t *testing.T, d harnessDriver) { + raceSubset(t, false) + h := newHarness(t, d, harnessScenario{Plans: map[string][]string{"101#1": {"get", "grandchild", "kill", "exit:0"}}}) + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(101, 5001)}) + h.run(harnessRun{Killed: true}) + + children := h.children() + require.Len(t, children, 1, "the worker started its grandchild") + grandchild := children[0] + l := h.ledger() + attempts := recordedAttempts(t, l) + require.Len(t, attempts, 1) + worker := attempts[0].process + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second) + defer cancel() + // Exited and reaped, not a zombie: a zombie still has the start time + // the ledger recorded, and recovery would rightly take it for the + // worker. + require.NoError(t, waitFor(ctx, func() (bool, error) { return syscall.Kill(worker.PID, 0) != nil, nil }), "the worker itself exited and was reaped") + require.False(t, processGone(context.Background(), grandchild.PID), "its grandchild did not") + drivertest.RequireGroupHeld(t, worker) + + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(104, 5004)}) + for i, other := range []int64{105, 106} { + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: otherTodoEvent(other, 6001+int64(i))}) + h.run(harnessRun{Until: "state:" + strconv.FormatInt(other, 10) + "=completed", + RequireLog: "could not verify whether a previous worker still runs"}) + assert.Equal(t, string(OutcomeSucceeded), outcomeOf(t, l, other), "work that does not need the held directory still runs") + assert.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, stateOf(t, l, 104), "nothing new starts in the held directory") + + assert.Equal(t, string(AttemptRunning), attemptState(t, l, attempts[0].id), "the attempt stays live while its tree runs") + assert.Equal(t, StateDispatched, stateOf(t, l, 101), "the record is not made terminal") + assert.False(t, h.releasedDir(h.workDir()), "the working directory is not released") + assert.Empty(t, h.notices(101), "an attempt that is still live has no completion to post") + assert.False(t, processGone(context.Background(), grandchild.PID), "recovery does not signal a group whose leader it cannot verify") + _, err := driver.OwnsWorker(worker) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, driver.ErrGroupOutlivedLeader) + } + + // The tree ends; the next restart may settle and release. + killRecorded(t, grandchild) + // Reaped, not merely dead: a zombie is still a member of the group. + require.NoError(t, waitFor(ctx, func() (bool, error) { return syscall.Kill(grandchild.PID, 0) != nil, nil })) + h.run(harnessRun{}) + assert.Equal(t, string(AttemptEnded), attemptState(t, l, attempts[0].id)) + assert.Equal(t, StateCompleted, stateOf(t, l, 101)) + assert.Equal(t, string(OutcomeUnknown), outcomeOf(t, l, 101)) + assert.True(t, h.releasedDir(h.workDir()), "released once the tree is gone") + assert.Len(t, h.notices(101), 1) + assert.Equal(t, 1, h.handed(101), "and never run again") + assert.Equal(t, 1, h.handed(104), "the directory released, the waiting event runs") + h.assertNoWorkerOutlivedItsRecord() + }) +} + +// On start, the outbox settles what a previous process left sending before +// anything else runs: a notice whose receipt the crash lost is adopted before +// the restarted connector dispatches new work. +func TestRecoveryReconcilesLifecycleMessagesBeforeAnythingRuns(t *testing.T) { + forEachDriver(t, func(t *testing.T, d harnessDriver) { + raceSubset(t, false) + h := newHarness(t, d, harnessScenario{Plans: map[string][]string{"101#1": {"get", "ack", "fail"}}}) + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(101, 5001)}) + h.run(harnessRun{Kill: "post-after", Killed: true}) + + // A start leaves a request younger than ReconcileAfter to land; this + // one is older, so the start must settle it. + l := h.ledger() + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second) + defer cancel() + require.NoError(t, waitFor(ctx, func() (bool, error) { + sending, err := l.Intents(ctx, IntentFilter{States: []IntentState{IntentSending}}) + return len(sending) == 1 && sending[0].SendingAt != nil && time.Since(*sending[0].SendingAt) > harnessReconcileAfter, err + })) + + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: otherTodoEvent(102, 6001)}) + before := len(h.lines()) + h.run(harnessRun{}) + + lines := h.lines()[before:] + reconciled, launched := -1, -1 + for i, line := range lines { + if line.Type == "outbox" && line.Kind == string(IntentCompletion) && line.State == string(IntentSent) && reconciled < 0 { + reconciled = i + } + if line.Type == "dispatch" && line.State == string(AttemptLaunching) && slices.Contains(line.EventIDs, 102) && launched < 0 { + launched = i + } + } + require.GreaterOrEqual(t, reconciled, 0, "the notice was adopted") + require.GreaterOrEqual(t, launched, 0, "the new event ran") + assert.Less(t, reconciled, launched, "the notice was settled before anything new was dispatched") + assert.Len(t, h.notices(101), 1, "adopted, not posted again") + }) +} + +func attemptState(t *testing.T, l *Ledger, id string) string { + t.Helper() + var state string + require.NoError(t, l.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT state FROM attempts WHERE id = ?`, id).Scan(&state)) + return state +} + +// killRecorded SIGKILLs a process the harness recorded, only while it is still +// that process. +func killRecorded(t *testing.T, p driver.Process) { + t.Helper() + if owns, err := driver.OwnsWorker(identityOf(p.PID, p.PID, p.StartedAt)); err == nil && owns { + require.NoError(t, syscall.Kill(p.PID, syscall.SIGKILL)) + } +} diff --git a/internal/connector/recovery_fakes_test.go b/internal/connector/recovery_fakes_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..576cd612a --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/recovery_fakes_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,592 @@ +//go:build unix + +package connector + +import ( + "bufio" + "cmp" + "context" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "io" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "runtime" + "slices" + "strconv" + "strings" + "sync" + "syscall" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-sdk/go/pkg/basecamp" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-sdk/go/pkg/basecamp/eventfeed" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-sdk/go/pkg/basecamp/eventfeed/feedtest" +) + +// The recovery harness's fake account: the feed (both lanes) and Basecamp +// (messages the agent created, and admission's reads). + +// feedEntry is one event the fake account holds. +type feedEntry struct { + Event eventfeed.Event `json:"event"` + // FromRepairPoll hides the event from every repair poll before the n-th, + // the way the poll lane's safety delay withholds a committing event. + FromRepairPoll int `json:"from_repair_poll,omitempty"` + // Live is also pushed on the socket, as soon as a connection confirms. + Live bool `json:"live,omitempty"` + // Never is never served by a poll: a recording deleted before it became + // poll-visible. + Never bool `json:"never,omitempty"` +} + +// todoEvent is a to-do created by the operator that mentions the agent. A +// to-do is its own conversation, so events on one recording queue behind each +// other. +func todoEvent(id, recording int64) eventfeed.Event { + return eventfeed.Event{ + ID: id, Kind: "todo_created", EventType: "todo.created", Action: "created", + CreatedAt: time.Date(2026, 9, 17, 9, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC), + BucketID: harnessBucket, CreatorID: harnessOperator, RecordingID: recording, + } +} + +// otherTodoEvent is todoEvent in the second routed project. +func otherTodoEvent(id, recording int64) eventfeed.Event { + e := todoEvent(id, recording) + e.BucketID = harnessOtherBucket + return e +} + +// publish adds events to the fake account's feed. +func (h *harness) publish(entries ...feedEntry) { + h.t.Helper() + require.NoError(h.t, appendFeed(h.dir, entries...)) +} + +func appendFeed(dir string, entries ...feedEntry) error { + return withLockedFile(filepath.Join(dir, feedFile), func(f *os.File) error { + for _, e := range entries { + data, err := json.Marshal(e) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := f.Write(append(data, '\n')); err != nil { + return err + } + } + return nil + }) +} + +// feedCache keeps the last parse of a feed file by its size: the file is only +// ever appended to, and a burst of ten thousand events is read on every poll. +var feedCache struct { + sync.Mutex + path string + size int64 + entries []feedEntry +} + +func readFeed(dir string) ([]feedEntry, error) { + path := filepath.Join(dir, feedFile) + info, err := os.Stat(path) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + feedCache.Lock() + defer feedCache.Unlock() + if feedCache.path == path && feedCache.size == info.Size() { + return feedCache.entries, nil + } + var out []feedEntry + err = readJSONLines(path, func(line []byte) error { + var e feedEntry + if err := json.Unmarshal(line, &e); err != nil { + return err + } + out = append(out, e) + return nil + }) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + slices.SortFunc(out, func(a, b feedEntry) int { return cmp.Compare(a.Event.ID, b.Event.ID) }) + feedCache.path, feedCache.size, feedCache.entries = path, info.Size(), out + return out, nil +} + +// withLockedFile runs fn with the file open for appending under an exclusive +// flock: the connector and the fake agents write the same files. +func withLockedFile(path string, fn func(f *os.File) error) error { + f, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_RDWR|os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE, 0o600) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer f.Close() + if err := syscall.Flock(int(f.Fd()), syscall.LOCK_EX); err != nil { + return err + } + defer func() { _ = syscall.Flock(int(f.Fd()), syscall.LOCK_UN) }() + return fn(f) +} + +func readJSONLines(path string, fn func(line []byte) error) error { + f, err := os.Open(path) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer f.Close() + if err := syscall.Flock(int(f.Fd()), syscall.LOCK_SH); err != nil { + return err + } + defer func() { _ = syscall.Flock(int(f.Fd()), syscall.LOCK_UN) }() + scanner := bufio.NewScanner(f) + scanner.Buffer(make([]byte, 64<<10), 16<<20) + for scanner.Scan() { + if len(scanner.Bytes()) == 0 { + continue + } + if err := fn(scanner.Bytes()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + return scanner.Err() +} + +func appendJSONLine(path string, v any) error { + data, err := json.Marshal(v) + if err != nil { + return err + } + return withLockedFile(path, func(f *os.File) error { + _, err := f.Write(append(data, '\n')) + return err + }) +} + +// pollLog is one poll the connector made. +type pollLog struct { + Repair bool `json:"repair"` + Since string `json:"since,omitempty"` + Position string `json:"position,omitempty"` + Served []int64 `json:"served"` + Stalled bool `json:"stalled,omitempty"` +} + +func (h *harness) polls() []pollLog { + h.t.Helper() + var out []pollLog + require.NoError(h.t, readJSONLines(filepath.Join(h.dir, pollsFile), func(line []byte) error { + var p pollLog + if err := json.Unmarshal(line, &p); err != nil { + return err + } + out = append(out, p) + return nil + })) + return out +} + +// filePolls is the poll lane over the feed file, one per walk: the feed's +// connection or a loss's repair walk. Positions are "feed-<id>" and +// "repair-<id>", both meaning "after id". +type filePolls struct { + dir string + ledger *Ledger + kill *killSpec + fault string + repair bool + + mu sync.Mutex + polled bool +} + +// pollsFor hands intake a poll source per walk, telling a repair walk from +// the feed's connection by who asked. +func pollsFor(dir string, ledger *Ledger, kill *killSpec, fault string) func() eventfeed.PollSource { + return func() eventfeed.PollSource { + pcs := make([]uintptr, 32) + frames := runtime.CallersFrames(pcs[:runtime.Callers(2, pcs)]) + repair := false + for { + frame, more := frames.Next() + if strings.HasSuffix(frame.Function, ".(*Intake).runRepair") { + repair = true + } + if !more { + break + } + } + return &filePolls{dir: dir, ledger: ledger, kill: kill, fault: fault, repair: repair} + } +} + +const maxHarnessPage = 500 + +func (p *filePolls) Poll(ctx context.Context, cursor eventfeed.Cursor, _ eventfeed.Filters) (eventfeed.PollPage, error) { + if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil { + return eventfeed.PollPage{}, err + } + p.mu.Lock() + first := !p.polled + p.polled = true + p.mu.Unlock() + logPath := filepath.Join(p.dir, pollsFile) + if p.repair { + if err := p.awaitLosses(ctx); err != nil { + return eventfeed.PollPage{}, err + } + if p.kill.at("repair-poll") { + die() + } + if p.fault == "repair-stall" { + if err := appendJSONLine(logPath, pollLog{Repair: true, Since: cursor.Since, Position: cursor.Position, Stalled: true}); err != nil { + return eventfeed.PollPage{}, err + } + <-ctx.Done() + return eventfeed.PollPage{}, ctx.Err() + } + } else { + if p.kill.at("feed-poll") { + die() + } + if p.fault == "stall-catch-up" && first { + // The feed's first walk is held while the socket's burst piles up + // in the live buffer behind it, until the overflow is on disk. + if err := p.awaitLosses(ctx); err != nil { + return eventfeed.PollPage{}, err + } + } + } + entries, err := readFeed(p.dir) + if err != nil { + return eventfeed.PollPage{}, err + } + var after int64 + switch { + case strings.HasPrefix(cursor.Position, "feed-"), strings.HasPrefix(cursor.Position, "repair-"): + _, n, _ := strings.Cut(cursor.Position, "-") + after, _ = strconv.ParseInt(n, 10, 64) + case cursor.Position != "": + return eventfeed.PollPage{}, fmt.Errorf("a position this feed never issued: %q", cursor.Position) + case cursor.Since == "now": + for _, e := range entries { + after = max(after, e.Event.ID) + } + case cursor.Since != "": + after, _ = strconv.ParseInt(cursor.Since, 10, 64) + } + // The safety delay is counted in repair polls, for both walks: the n-th + // repair poll, and every poll after it, sees what it sees. + repairPolls := countRepairPolls(p.dir) + if p.repair { + repairPolls++ + } + page := eventfeed.PollPage{} + last := after + for _, e := range entries { + if e.Event.ID <= after || e.Never { + continue + } + if e.FromRepairPoll > repairPolls { + // Still inside the safety delay: withheld, and so is everything + // after it, since a page never skips a committing event. + break + } + if len(page.Events) == maxHarnessPage { + break + } + page.Events = append(page.Events, e.Event) + last = e.Event.ID + } + prefix := "feed-" + if p.repair { + prefix = "repair-" + } + page.Position = prefix + strconv.FormatInt(last, 10) + served := make([]int64, 0, len(page.Events)) + for _, e := range page.Events { + served = append(served, e.ID) + } + if err := appendJSONLine(logPath, pollLog{Repair: p.repair, Since: cursor.Since, Position: cursor.Position, Served: served}); err != nil { + return eventfeed.PollPage{}, err + } + return page, nil +} + +// awaitLosses holds a poll until the scenario's overflow losses are all on +// disk, so a kill in the walk never races the signal that records the next. +func (p *filePolls) awaitLosses(ctx context.Context) error { + sc, err := readScenario(p.dir) + if err != nil || sc.OverflowLosses == 0 { + return err + } + return waitFor(ctx, func() (bool, error) { + var n int + err := p.ledger.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM losses`).Scan(&n) + return n >= sc.OverflowLosses, err + }) +} + +func countRepairPolls(dir string) int { + n := 0 + _ = readJSONLines(filepath.Join(dir, pollsFile), func(line []byte) error { + var l pollLog + if json.Unmarshal(line, &l) == nil && l.Repair && !l.Stalled { + n++ + } + return nil + }) + return n +} + +// cable answers every connection's subscription, and serves the feed's +// live-only events on the first connection that confirms. +type cable struct { + transport *feedtest.Transport + dir string + served map[int64]bool +} + +func (c *cable) run(ctx context.Context) { + type connState struct { + welcomed bool + identifier string + } + conns := map[*feedtest.Conn]*connState{} + ticker := time.NewTicker(5 * time.Millisecond) + defer ticker.Stop() + for { + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + return + case <-ticker.C: + } + for _, conn := range c.transport.Conns() { + s := conns[conn] + if s == nil { + s = &connState{} + conns[conn] = s + } + if conn.Closed() { + continue + } + if !s.welcomed { + // Action Cable greets first; the subscribe follows. + conn.Serve([]byte(`{"type":"welcome"}`)) + s.welcomed = true + } + if s.identifier == "" { + for _, w := range conn.Writes() { + var command struct { + Command string `json:"command"` + Identifier string `json:"identifier"` + } + if json.Unmarshal(w, &command) == nil && command.Command == "subscribe" && command.Identifier != "" { + frame, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"type": "confirm_subscription", "identifier": command.Identifier}) + conn.Serve(frame) + s.identifier = command.Identifier + break + } + } + } + if s.identifier == "" { + continue + } + entries, err := readFeed(c.dir) + if err != nil { + continue + } + var fresh []int64 + for _, e := range entries { + if !e.Live || c.served[e.Event.ID] { + continue + } + c.served[e.Event.ID] = true + conn.Serve(liveFrame(s.identifier, e.Event)) + fresh = append(fresh, e.Event.ID) + } + if len(fresh) > 0 { + // A push happens once in the world: a restarted connector's + // socket does not hear it again. + _ = appendJSONLine(filepath.Join(c.dir, liveFile), fresh) + } + } + } +} + +func liveFrame(identifier string, event eventfeed.Event) []byte { + payload, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{ + "id": event.ID, "kind": event.Kind, "event_type": event.EventType, "action": event.Action, + "created_at": event.CreatedAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339), "bucket_id": event.BucketID, + "creator_id": event.CreatorID, "performed_by_id": nil, "actor_type": "person", + "recording_id": event.RecordingID, "visible_to_clients": true, + }) + id, _ := json.Marshal(identifier) + frame, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]json.RawMessage{"identifier": id, "message": payload}) + return frame +} + +// ---- the fake Basecamp ---- + +// storedMessage is a boost, comment or chat line the agent created: by the +// connector's outbox, or by a worker. +type storedMessage struct { + ID int64 `json:"id"` + Kind MessageKind `json:"kind"` + BucketID int64 `json:"bucket_id"` + RecordingID int64 `json:"recording_id"` + Content string `json:"content"` + // By is "connector" or "worker". + By string `json:"by"` + At time.Time `json:"at"` +} + +func postMessage(dir string, m storedMessage) (int64, error) { + var id int64 + err := withLockedFile(filepath.Join(dir, storeFile), func(f *os.File) error { + n := 0 + if _, err := f.Seek(0, io.SeekStart); err != nil { + return err + } + scanner := bufio.NewScanner(f) + scanner.Buffer(make([]byte, 64<<10), 16<<20) + for scanner.Scan() { + n++ + } + if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil { + return err + } + id = 7_000_000 + int64(n) + 1 + m.ID, m.At = id, time.Now().UTC() + data, err := json.Marshal(m) + if err != nil { + return err + } + _, err = f.Write(append(data, '\n')) + return err + }) + return id, err +} + +func storedMessages(dir string) ([]storedMessage, error) { + var out []storedMessage + err := readJSONLines(filepath.Join(dir, storeFile), func(line []byte) error { + var m storedMessage + if err := json.Unmarshal(line, &m); err != nil { + return err + } + out = append(out, m) + return nil + }) + return out, err +} + +func (h *harness) messages() []storedMessage { + h.t.Helper() + out, err := storedMessages(h.dir) + require.NoError(h.t, err) + return out +} + +// connectorPosts are the lifecycle messages the connector posted. +func (h *harness) connectorPosts() []storedMessage { + h.t.Helper() + var out []storedMessage + for _, m := range h.messages() { + if m.By == "connector" { + out = append(out, m) + } + } + return out +} + +// storePoster is the outbox's Basecamp. +type storePoster struct { + dir string + kill *killSpec +} + +func (p storePoster) Post(ctx context.Context, dest Destination, body string) (int64, error) { + if p.kill.at("post-before") { + die() + } + id, err := postMessage(p.dir, storedMessage{Kind: dest.Kind, BucketID: dest.BucketID, RecordingID: dest.RecordingID, Content: body, By: "connector"}) + if err != nil { + return 0, err + } + if p.kill.at("post-after") { + die() + } + return id, nil +} + +func (p storePoster) List(_ context.Context, dest Destination, since time.Time) ([]PostedMessage, error) { + all, err := storedMessages(p.dir) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + var out []PostedMessage + for _, m := range all { + if m.Kind == dest.Kind && m.RecordingID == dest.RecordingID && !m.At.Before(since) { + out = append(out, PostedMessage{ID: m.ID, CreatedAt: m.At, Content: m.Content}) + } + } + return out, nil +} + +// storeReads answers admission: every recording is a to-do the operator wrote +// that mentions the agent. +type storeReads struct { + dir string + gate []int64 + kill *killSpec +} + +func (r storeReads) Summarize(ctx context.Context, ref basecamp.RecordingRef) (*basecamp.RecordingSummary, error) { + if r.kill.at("read:" + strconv.FormatInt(ref.RecordingID, 10)) { + die() + } + if slices.Contains(r.gate, ref.RecordingID) { + waiting := filepath.Join(r.dir, "read-waiting-"+strconv.FormatInt(ref.RecordingID, 10)) + release := filepath.Join(r.dir, "read-release-"+strconv.FormatInt(ref.RecordingID, 10)) + _ = os.WriteFile(waiting, nil, 0o600) + if err := awaitFile(ctx, release); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + id := strconv.FormatInt(ref.RecordingID, 10) + return &basecamp.RecordingSummary{ + ID: ref.RecordingID, Status: "active", Type: "Todo", Title: "To-do " + id, + AppURL: "https://app.basecamp.com/" + harnessAccount + "/buckets/" + strconv.FormatInt(ref.BucketID, 10) + "/todos/" + id, + Bucket: &basecamp.Bucket{ID: ref.BucketID}, + Creator: &basecamp.Person{ID: harnessOperator}, + Content: mentionMarkup(harnessAgent) + " please do the thing", + MentionedPersonIDs: []int64{harnessAgent}, + UpdatedAt: time.Date(2026, 9, 17, 9, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC), + }, nil +} + +func (storeReads) Subscribed(context.Context, int64) (bool, error) { return false, nil } + +func (storeReads) AddedPersonIDs(context.Context, int64, int64) ([]int64, bool, error) { + return nil, false, nil +} + +// awaitFile waits for path to exist. It is how a process waits on a step +// another process takes. +func awaitFile(ctx context.Context, path string) error { + for { + if _, err := os.Stat(path); err == nil { + return nil + } + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + return ctx.Err() + case <-time.After(5 * time.Millisecond): + } + } +} diff --git a/internal/connector/recovery_harness_test.go b/internal/connector/recovery_harness_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..951601983 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/recovery_harness_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,917 @@ +//go:build unix + +package connector + +import ( + "bytes" + "context" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "io/fs" + "os" + "os/exec" + "path/filepath" + "strconv" + "strings" + "sync" + "syscall" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver/acp" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver/drivertest" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver/spawn" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/setup" +) + +// The integrated recovery harness (plan step 22). +// +// The connector under test is a real process: this test binary, started as +// TestRecoveryConnector, composed the way the run command composes it — +// intake on the feed's run loop, admission, the dispatcher with a real driver, +// and the outbox with the lifecycle hooks — over a ledger file. A test kills +// that process with SIGKILL at an injected point, starts it again over the +// same ledger, lets it run until the ledger is settled, and asserts on the +// ledger and on what reached the fake Basecamp. +// +// Nothing in the connector's own code knows about the harness, and the harness +// adds no seam to it. The kill points are: +// +// - after a commit: the connector's own stdout lines are written after the +// transaction they report, and the harness's line writer kills the process +// once it has written the line named; +// - inside a transaction: a ledger hook that kills before returning, so the +// transaction never commits; +// - in Basecamp: the fake poster kills before or after the message exists, +// the fake reads kill mid-read, the fake feed kills in a repair walk; +// - in the worker: the fake agent kills its parent, the connector, between +// get_dispatch, ack_dispatch and complete_dispatch; +// - in shadow promote and import: the named steps their own crash tests +// already kill at (TestCrashHelper). +// +// # Drivers +// +// Each driver the connector can start workers with registers a row +// (registerHarnessDriver): how to build the driver with a fake agent as its +// binary, and the fake agent's side of the driver's wire. There are three — +// the Claude Code spawn driver, the Codex spawn driver and the acp driver, +// each in its own recovery_<driver>_test.go — and +// TestEveryDriverTheConnectorStartsHasAHarnessRow holds that list to the +// drivers the run command can actually start, so a fourth cannot be added +// without a row. The fake agent is this test binary behind a small exec +// wrapper, so the dispatcher's environment allowlist is never widened for +// the harness. Whatever the wire, the fake agent's work is the same +// fakeWorker: it binds to its task through the MCP server declaration the +// driver handed it (the state directory and the task token) and calls the +// ledger exactly as `basecamp mcp --connect-state` does. Every dispatch test +// runs once per registered driver. +// +// Recovery is where the drivers differ most — each leaves a different +// process tree behind, and each says the worker is gone in its own way — so +// each kill point is worth its three runs. A row costs seconds, not minutes: +// adding the Codex and acp rows took this package from 108 to 134 seconds. +// +// # What the harness does not cover +// +// A driver row builds its driver directly, where the run command goes through +// spawn.New(connect.json's worker): the registry that maps a worker name to a +// driver is that package's own test's. The fake agent is the driver's binary, +// which is what the registry would otherwise decide. +// +// A case about a second prompt on a live session runs only on the drivers +// whose sessions take one (requireFollowUps): a Codex process is one turn, +// and what the dispatcher does with a follow-up it cannot hand over is +// TestAFollowUpForAOneShotDriverStartsATaskOfItsOwn, in dispatcher_test.go. +// +// TestRecoveryAgainstRealAgents runs the Claude Code spawn driver and no +// other: its rows are registered in recovery_claude_test.go, and no real row +// is registered for Codex or for an ACP adapter. So what is proven against +// a real agent binary — a real `basecamp mcp` behind a real MCP client, a +// real model's turn — is proven for Claude Code alone; for the other two, +// what is proven is the connector's side of their wire. +// +// # Synchronization +// +// No test sleeps for an outcome. The connector runs until a predicate over the +// ledger holds; the fake agent waits on ledger state; the parent waits on +// process exit. Every wait has a deadline that fails the test rather than +// hanging it. + +// harnessDriver is one row of the driver table. +type harnessDriver struct { + // Name is the row's name in test names. + Name string + // New builds the driver under test with agent as its agent executable. + New func(agent string) driver.Driver + // Agent is the fake agent: it speaks the driver's wire on stdin and + // stdout, binds w to the MCP server declaration it was given, calls + // w.Turn for each prompt, and returns the process's exit code. + Agent func(w *fakeWorker) int + // FollowUps is the driver's driver.Capabilities.FollowUpPrompts: whether + // a session takes a second prompt, which is what decides whether an event + // arriving mid-turn is exposed to the worker in hand or waits for a task + // of its own. TestHarnessRowsSayWhatTheirDriversDo holds it to the + // driver's own answer. + FollowUps bool + // Real rows start the real agent binary with the real `basecamp mcp`: + // they run only in TestRecoveryAgainstRealAgents, opted into locally. + Real bool +} + +var harnessDrivers []harnessDriver + +// registerHarnessDriver adds a driver row. Call it from an init function in +// the driver's own recovery_<driver>_test.go. +func registerHarnessDriver(d harnessDriver) { + for _, have := range harnessDrivers { + if have.Name == d.Name { + panic("recovery harness: driver " + d.Name + " registered twice") + } + } + harnessDrivers = append(harnessDrivers, d) +} + +// requireFollowUps skips a case that is about a second prompt on a live +// session, for a driver whose sessions take one. The case is not a weaker +// guarantee on such a driver, it is a different one: the event arriving +// mid-turn waits for a task of its own, and which state it waits in, and for +// how long, is the dispatcher's to decide, not something the worker can be +// scripted around. That path is TestAFollowUpForAOneShotDriverStartsATaskOfItsOwn +// in dispatcher_test.go, against a one-shot driver in this process. +func requireFollowUps(t *testing.T, d harnessDriver) { + t.Helper() + if !d.FollowUps { + t.Skip("a session of this driver takes one prompt: no follow-up is ever handed to a live worker") + } +} + +func harnessDriverNamed(name string) (harnessDriver, bool) { + for _, d := range harnessDrivers { + if d.Name == name { + return d, true + } + } + return harnessDriver{}, false +} + +// forEachDriver runs fn as a subtest per registered driver. +func forEachDriver(t *testing.T, fn func(t *testing.T, d harnessDriver)) { + t.Helper() + require.NotEmpty(t, harnessDrivers, "no driver registered with the recovery harness") + for _, d := range harnessDrivers { + if d.Real { + continue + } + t.Run(d.Name, func(t *testing.T) { + if testing.Short() { + t.Skip("starts processes") + } + fn(t, d) + }) + } +} + +// The harness runs every driver the connector can start a worker with: each +// spawn driver connect.json's workers resolve to, and the acp driver. A +// driver with no row is a driver whose recovery — the process trees it +// leaves, and what a restart can read back about them — nothing proves. +func TestEveryDriverTheConnectorStartsHasAHarnessRow(t *testing.T) { + want := map[string]bool{acp.Name: false} + for _, worker := range setup.Workers { + d, err := spawn.New(worker, spawn.Options{}) + require.NoError(t, err, worker) + want[d.Name()] = false + } + for _, d := range harnessDrivers { + if d.Real { + continue + } + if _, ok := want[d.Name]; ok { + want[d.Name] = true + } + } + for name, has := range want { + assert.True(t, has, "the recovery harness has no row for the %q driver", name) + } +} + +// A row says what its driver does. FollowUps decides the shape the follow-up +// cases expect, so a row that drifts from its driver would quietly stop +// proving anything about either shape. +func TestHarnessRowsSayWhatTheirDriversDo(t *testing.T) { + agent := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "agent") + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(agent, []byte("#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n"), 0o700)) //nolint:gosec // an executable stub + for _, d := range harnessDrivers { + if d.Real { + continue + } + t.Run(d.Name, func(t *testing.T) { + built := d.New(agent) + require.NotNil(t, built, "the row builds its driver") + assert.Equal(t, d.Name, built.Name()) + assert.Equal(t, d.FollowUps, built.Capabilities().FollowUpPrompts) + }) + } +} + +// raceSubset skips a harness case under the race detector unless it is one of +// the representative few. A race-instrumented test binary takes over a second +// to start, and the harness starts one per connector run and per worker, so +// the whole table runs in the ordinary test job and the race job runs enough +// of it to race-check the composed connector across a kill and a restart. +func raceSubset(t *testing.T, representative bool) { + t.Helper() + if harnessUnderRace && !representative { + t.Skip("under -race the recovery harness runs its representative cases; the full table runs without it") + } +} + +// Environment of the harness's processes. +const ( + harnessConnectorEnv = "BASECAMP_RECOVERY_CONNECTOR" + harnessAgentEnv = "BASECAMP_RECOVERY_AGENT" + harnessDirEnv = "BASECAMP_RECOVERY_DIR" + harnessKillEnv = "BASECAMP_RECOVERY_KILL" + harnessUntilEnv = "BASECAMP_RECOVERY_UNTIL" + harnessSpawnFailEnv = "BASECAMP_RECOVERY_SPAWN_FAIL" + harnessFiltersEnv = "BASECAMP_RECOVERY_FILTERS" + harnessStateEnv = "BASECAMP_RECOVERY_STATE" + harnessShadowEnv = "BASECAMP_RECOVERY_SHADOW" + harnessFaultEnv = "BASECAMP_RECOVERY_FAULT" + harnessNoDispatchEnv = "BASECAMP_RECOVERY_NO_DISPATCH" + harnessNoOutboxEnv = "BASECAMP_RECOVERY_NO_OUTBOX" + harnessScanEnv = "BASECAMP_RECOVERY_SECRET_SCAN" + // harnessRealEnv opts into the run against the real agent binaries, and + // harnessRealBasecampEnv names the basecamp binary built from this tree + // whose `mcp` the real workers start. + harnessRealEnv = "BASECAMP_RECOVERY_REAL_AGENTS" + harnessRealBasecampEnv = "BASECAMP_RECOVERY_BASECAMP" +) + +// The test binary doubles as a fake agent: started through the wrapper a +// harness writes, it speaks the wire of the driver it names and exits. +func TestMain(m *testing.M) { + if name := os.Getenv(harnessAgentEnv); name != "" { + os.Exit(runFakeAgent(name)) + } + if os.Getenv(harnessScanEnv) != "" { + os.Exit(runSecretScan(os.Args[1:])) + } + os.Exit(m.Run()) +} + +func runFakeAgent(name string) int { + d, ok := harnessDriverNamed(name) + if !ok { + fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "recovery harness: no fake agent for driver", name) + return 97 + } + w, err := newFakeWorker(os.Getenv(harnessDirEnv)) + if err != nil { + fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "recovery harness:", err) + return 98 + } + defer w.close() + return d.Agent(w) +} + +// Scenario constants: one account, one agent, one operator, one routed project. +const ( + harnessAccount = "2914079" + harnessAgent = adapterAgentID + harnessOperator = adapterOperatorID + harnessBucket = adapterBucketID + // harnessOtherBucket is a second routed project with its own directory. + harnessOtherBucket = int64(48929974) + harnessOrigin = "https://3.basecampapi.com" + harnessNamespace = "basecamp-connect-recovery" +) + +// harnessScenario is what every process of one harness reads: the connector, +// the fake agent and the parent. +type harnessScenario struct { + Driver string `json:"driver"` + // Plans script the fake worker per event and per time it was prompted + // with that event: "<event id>#<n>", n from 1. A missing plan is the + // ordinary worker: get, ack, reply, complete. + Plans map[string][]string `json:"plans"` + // BadModeStarts is how many agent processes report a permission mode + // other than the one asked for. + BadModeStarts int `json:"bad_mode_starts"` + // QueueWarn and QueuePause size the backlog; the defaults when zero. + QueueWarn int `json:"queue_warn"` + QueuePause int `json:"queue_pause"` + // ReadGate names recordings whose admission read waits for the parent. + ReadGate []int64 `json:"read_gate"` + // GuardDelay is how long a worker has to call get_dispatch before the + // guard acknowledges; an hour when zero, so no guard fires in a test that + // is not about it. + GuardDelay time.Duration `json:"guard_delay"` + // RepairWindow is the loss window; a minute when zero. + RepairWindow time.Duration `json:"repair_window"` + // OverflowLosses is how many losses the scenario's overflow records: the + // feed's catch-up and the repair walks wait for all of them. + OverflowLosses int `json:"overflow_losses"` +} + +// harness is one scenario's directory: the connector's state directory, the +// fake Basecamp, the feed, and every process's log. +type harness struct { + t *testing.T + dir string + // watching is the parent's watch for each task token, for the run in + // flight; watchStop ends it. + watchMu sync.Mutex + watching map[string]func() []string + watchStop chan struct{} + // state is the connector's state directory, under this harness's own + // XDG_STATE_HOME and named as the connector names it, so a worker's MCP + // server resolves it exactly as `basecamp mcp --connect-state` does. + state string + agent string + driver harnessDriver + sc harnessScenario +} + +func newHarness(t *testing.T, d harnessDriver, sc harnessScenario) *harness { + t.Helper() + // Not t.TempDir: its name carries the test's, and the attempt's token + // socket lives under it — a unix socket path is 103 characters, and the + // connector refuses a longer one. + dir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "bcrh") + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(dir) }) + require.NoError(t, os.Chmod(dir, 0o700)) + require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(filepath.Join(dir, "sessions"), 0o700)) + require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(filepath.Join(dir, "work"), 0o700)) + require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(filepath.Join(dir, "work-other"), 0o700)) + sc.Driver = d.Name + h := &harness{t: t, dir: dir, state: harnessStateDir(t, dir), driver: d, sc: sc} + h.writeScenario() + + exe, exeErr := os.Executable() + require.NoError(t, exeErr) + h.agent = filepath.Join(dir, "agent") + wrapper := "#!/bin/sh\n" + + harnessAgentEnv + "=" + shellQuote(d.Name) + " " + harnessDirEnv + "=" + shellQuote(dir) + " exec " + shellQuote(exe) + ` "$@"` + "\n" + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(h.agent, []byte(wrapper), 0o700)) //nolint:gosec // the fake agent's wrapper must be executable + for _, name := range []string{feedFile, storeFile, linesFile, pollsFile, agentLogFile, liveFile, workspaceFile} { + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, name), nil, 0o600)) + } + t.Cleanup(h.killAgents) + return h +} + +// harnessStateDir is the connector's state directory for this harness: +// <dir>/state/basecamp/connect/<account>-<agent>, which is what +// connector.StateRoot resolves to with XDG_STATE_HOME set to <dir>/state. +// The location and the name are both part of what a worker's MCP server +// checks, so the harness's directory is the real shape, not a temp name. +func harnessStateDir(t *testing.T, dir string) string { + t.Helper() + state := filepath.Join(dir, "state", "basecamp", "connect", StateDirName(harnessAccount, harnessAgent)) + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(state, 0o700)) + for d := state; d != dir; d = filepath.Dir(d) { + require.NoError(t, os.Chmod(d, 0o700)) + } + return state +} + +func shellQuote(s string) string { return "'" + strings.ReplaceAll(s, "'", `'\''`) + "'" } + +func (h *harness) writeScenario() { + data, err := json.Marshal(h.sc) + require.NoError(h.t, err) + require.NoError(h.t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(h.dir, scenarioFile), data, 0o600)) +} + +// Files in a harness directory. +const ( + scenarioFile = "scenario.json" + feedFile = "feed.jsonl" + storeFile = "basecamp.jsonl" + linesFile = "lines.jsonl" + pollsFile = "polls.jsonl" + agentLogFile = "agent.jsonl" + liveFile = "live.jsonl" + workspaceFile = "workspaces.jsonl" + // tokensDir holds the task tokens the fake workers were handed, so the + // parent can look for them everywhere a token must not be. + tokensDir = "tokens" + // connectorFile is the running connector's own identity: the pid a fake + // worker kills, so no process this harness did not start is signaled. + connectorFile = "connector.json" +) + +func readScenario(dir string) (harnessScenario, error) { + var sc harnessScenario + data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, scenarioFile)) + if err != nil { + return sc, err + } + return sc, json.Unmarshal(data, &sc) +} + +// harnessRun is one start of the connector. +type harnessRun struct { + // Kill names where the connector kills itself; empty runs it to Until. + Kill string + // Until is the ledger predicate a surviving run stops at: "settled" + // when empty. + Until string + // SpawnFail is how many of this run's worker starts fail before any + // process exists. + SpawnFail int + // Filters is the feed filter set, as JSON; none when empty. + Filters string + // Killed says the run is expected to die by SIGKILL, from the connector + // itself or from the fake agent. + Killed bool + // StateDir is the connector's state directory; the harness's own + // (harness.state) when empty. + StateDir string + // Fault is a standing misbehavior of the fake Basecamp for the run: + // "stall-catch-up" holds the feed's first poll until the socket has + // served every live event; "repair-stall" never answers a repair poll. + Fault string + // Env is added to the connector's environment. + Env []string + // NoDispatch runs intake, admission and hooks but no dispatcher or + // outbox: a connector that dies after admitting, before its dispatcher + // could have seen the record, without racing one that might. + NoDispatch bool + // NoOutbox runs the dispatcher without the outbox: a connector that dies + // after settling an attempt, before anything could have claimed its + // notice. + NoOutbox bool + // RequireLog is a line the connector must have written by the end of the + // run: what it decided, where the ledger cannot show that it decided + // anything (a held attempt is indistinguishable from one recovery never + // looked at). + RequireLog string + // Shadow runs intake and admission only, and installs no hooks: a + // `--shadow` run. + Shadow bool +} + +// run starts the connector and waits for it to end as expected. +func (h *harness) run(r harnessRun) { + h.t.Helper() + cmd, out := h.start(r) + h.wait(cmd, out, r) +} + +// defaults fills a run in the same way for whoever starts it and whoever +// waits for it. +func (h *harness) defaults(r harnessRun) harnessRun { + if r.Killed && r.Until == "" { + // A run that is to die runs until it does. + r.Until = "never" + } + if r.StateDir == "" { + r.StateDir = h.state + } + return r +} + +func (h *harness) start(r harnessRun) (*exec.Cmd, *lockedBuffer) { + h.t.Helper() + r = h.defaults(r) + // Longer than any run's own deadline (runHarnessConnector's runFor), so + // a connector that overruns fails saying the ledger never got there + // rather than being killed by this timeout — which wait would otherwise + // be unable to tell from the kill a row asked for. + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), harnessRunCap) + h.t.Cleanup(cancel) + cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, os.Args[0], "-test.run=^TestRecoveryConnector$", "-test.count=1", "-test.v") + cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), + harnessConnectorEnv+"=1", + harnessDirEnv+"="+h.dir, + harnessKillEnv+"="+r.Kill, + harnessUntilEnv+"="+r.Until, + harnessSpawnFailEnv+"="+strconv.Itoa(r.SpawnFail), + harnessFiltersEnv+"="+r.Filters, + harnessStateEnv+"="+r.StateDir, + "XDG_STATE_HOME="+filepath.Join(h.dir, "state"), + harnessShadowEnv+"="+strconv.FormatBool(r.Shadow), + harnessFaultEnv+"="+r.Fault, + harnessNoDispatchEnv+"="+strconv.FormatBool(r.NoDispatch), + harnessNoOutboxEnv+"="+strconv.FormatBool(r.NoOutbox), + ) + cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, r.Env...) + out := &lockedBuffer{} + cmd.Stdout, cmd.Stderr = out, out + require.NoError(h.t, cmd.Start()) + h.watchForTokenFiles() + return cmd, out +} + +func (h *harness) wait(cmd *exec.Cmd, out *lockedBuffer, r harnessRun) { + h.t.Helper() + r = h.defaults(r) + started := time.Now() + err := cmd.Wait() + // exec.CommandContext kills with SIGKILL as well, and wait must not read + // that as the kill a row asked for. + require.Less(h.t, time.Since(started), harnessRunCap, "the connector outran the harness's own deadline\n%s", out.String()) + defer h.requireNoTaskTokenLeaked(out, r.StateDir) + if path := os.Getenv("BASECAMP_RECOVERY_DEBUG"); path != "" { + // Appended: a test is several runs, and the one that matters is + // rarely the last. + if f, openErr := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY|os.O_APPEND, 0o600); openErr == nil { + _, _ = f.WriteString(out.String()) + _ = f.Close() + } + } + if r.Killed { + var exit *exec.ExitError + require.True(h.t, errors.As(err, &exit), "the connector must die (kill %q): %v\n%s", r.Kill, err, out.String()) + status, ok := exit.Sys().(syscall.WaitStatus) + require.True(h.t, ok) + require.True(h.t, status.Signaled() && status.Signal() == syscall.SIGKILL, "killed at %q, got %v\n%s", r.Kill, err, out.String()) + return + } + require.NoError(h.t, err, "the connector must run to %q and stop cleanly\n%s", r.Until, out.String()) + if r.RequireLog != "" { + require.Contains(h.t, out.String(), r.RequireLog, "the connector said what it decided") + } +} + +type lockedBuffer struct { + mu sync.Mutex + buf []byte +} + +func (b *lockedBuffer) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + b.mu.Lock() + defer b.mu.Unlock() + b.buf = append(b.buf, p...) + return len(p), nil +} + +func (b *lockedBuffer) String() string { + b.mu.Lock() + defer b.mu.Unlock() + return string(b.buf) +} + +// identityOf is a process the agent log recorded, as the one-owner rule +// takes it. The stamp written there is the kernel's (kernelStart) or nothing +// at all, exactly as the ledger writes a worker's, so the rule can tell the +// process recorded from a later one the kernel gave the same pid — and +// without that bit it would answer neither, and the harness would signal +// nothing it started. +func identityOf(pid, pgid int, started time.Time) driver.Process { + return driver.Process{PID: pid, PGID: pgid, StartedAt: started, StartedExact: !started.IsZero()} +} + +// killAgents ends every fake agent a harness started that is still alive, so +// a failed test leaves nothing behind. It signals by the identity the agent +// recorded — pid, group and start time — through the same call the connector +// uses, so the harness never signals a pid the kernel has since reused. +func (h *harness) killAgents() { + for _, entry := range h.agentLog() { + if entry.Step != "start" || entry.PID <= 0 || entry.PGID <= 0 { + continue + } + _, _ = driver.TerminateRecorded(identityOf(entry.PID, entry.PGID, entry.StartedAt), time.Second) + } + // A worker's own children, which a group signal cannot reach once the + // worker that led the group is gone. + for _, child := range h.children() { + if owns, err := driver.OwnsWorker(identityOf(child.PID, child.PID, child.StartedAt)); err == nil && owns { + _ = syscall.Kill(child.PID, syscall.SIGKILL) + } + } +} + +// watchForTokenFiles watches, for the rest of this run, every place a task +// token must never be written, for every token a worker takes while it runs. +// The workers watch too, but a worker the connector ends never reports; this +// watcher is the parent's, and always does. +func (h *harness) watchForTokenFiles() { + h.t.Helper() + h.watchMu.Lock() + defer h.watchMu.Unlock() + if h.watching == nil { + h.watching = map[string]func() []string{} + } + stop := make(chan struct{}) + h.watchStop = stop + go func() { + for { + select { + case <-stop: + return + case <-time.After(5 * time.Millisecond): + } + for _, token := range h.knownTokens() { + h.watchMu.Lock() + if _, ok := h.watching[token]; !ok { + h.watching[token] = drivertest.WatchForSecretFiles(token, + h.workDir(), filepath.Join(h.dir, "work-other"), filepath.Join(h.dir, "sessions")) + } + h.watchMu.Unlock() + } + } + }() +} + +// knownTokens reads the tokens the workers have taken so far, ignoring a +// directory that does not exist yet. +func (h *harness) knownTokens() []string { + entries, err := os.ReadDir(filepath.Join(h.dir, tokensDir)) + if err != nil { + return nil + } + var out []string + for _, e := range entries { + if token, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(h.dir, tokensDir, e.Name())); err == nil && len(token) > 0 { + out = append(out, string(token)) + } + } + return out +} + +// stopWatchingForTokenFiles ends the watchers and reports what they saw. +func (h *harness) stopWatchingForTokenFiles() int { + h.watchMu.Lock() + defer h.watchMu.Unlock() + if h.watchStop != nil { + close(h.watchStop) + h.watchStop = nil + } + watched := len(h.watching) + for token, stop := range h.watching { + for _, found := range stop() { + h.t.Errorf("a task token was written to %s while the connector ran", found) + } + delete(h.watching, token) + } + return watched +} + +// requireNoTaskTokenLeaked holds every run to the credential rule, for every +// task token any worker was handed so far: not in an agent's argv or +// environment, not in anything the connector wrote (its stdout lines, its +// log, the lifecycle messages it posted, the polls it made, the workspace +// records), not in any file under a working directory or the state directory +// — and no worker saw one appear in those files while it ran. +func (h *harness) requireNoTaskTokenLeaked(out *lockedBuffer, stateDir string) { + t := h.t + t.Helper() + watched := h.stopWatchingForTokenFiles() + tokens := h.taskTokens() + log := h.agentLog() + // A worker that bound to its task took a token, and the harness kept it. + // If it did not, this check has nothing to look for, and says so rather + // than passing. + bound, unbound := 0, 0 + var places drivertest.Places + for _, e := range log { + places.Env = append(places.Env, e.Env...) + places.Args = append(places.Args, e.Args...) + switch { + case e.Step == "bound": + bound++ + case strings.HasPrefix(e.Step, "bind-failed:"): + unbound++ + case strings.HasPrefix(e.Step, "secret-file:"): + t.Errorf("a worker saw a task token written to %s", strings.TrimPrefix(e.Step, "secret-file:")) + case strings.HasPrefix(e.Step, "secret-declared:"): + t.Errorf("a worker's MCP server declaration carried the task token in %s", strings.TrimPrefix(e.Step, "secret-declared:")) + } + } + // Every task the connector launched minted a token and is checked here, + // whoever its worker was — a fake one, or a real agent through the + // bridge, which leaves no agent log at all. + require.Len(t, tokens, h.tasksLaunched(stateDir), "every task the connector launched left its token for this check") + require.Equal(t, h.workersStarted(), bound+unbound, + "every worker that started either took its task's token or said why it could not") + for _, token := range h.takenTokens() { + require.Contains(t, tokens, token, "a worker took a token the connector did not mint for its task") + } + if len(tokens) == 0 { + require.Zero(t, watched, "nothing was watched, because no task was launched") + // Nothing to check is a fact about the run, not a pass: a run with + // no worker (a kill before the spawn, a start that ran nothing) is + // the only way here. + require.Equal(t, h.workersStarted(), unbound, + "a worker that started either took a token or said why it could not") + return + } + places.Texts = append(places.Texts, out.String()) + for _, name := range []string{linesFile, storeFile, pollsFile, workspaceFile, agentLogFile} { + data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(h.dir, name)) + require.NoError(t, err) + places.Texts = append(places.Texts, string(data)) + } + files := 0 + for _, token := range tokens { + // Env, argv and everything the connector wrote, in this process. + drivertest.RequireNoSecret(t, token, places) + // Every file under the working, session and state directories, read + // by a process of its own, which reports what it could not read. The + // state directory holds a ledger this test may have open. + found, read := scanForSecret(t, token, h.workDir(), filepath.Join(h.dir, "work-other"), + filepath.Join(h.dir, "sessions"), filepath.Join(h.dir, "state")) + for _, path := range found { + t.Errorf("a task token is in a file: %s", path) + } + require.Positive(t, read, "the scan read files; a scan that read nothing has cleared nothing") + files += read + } + t.Logf("credential check: %d task tokens, %d files read, %d watched while the run went on", len(tokens), files, watched) +} + +// taskTokens is every token the connector minted for a task, as its launch +// hook recorded it. +func (h *harness) taskTokens() []string { return h.tokenFiles("*.token", "taken-") } + +// takenTokens is every token a fake worker took over the socket. +func (h *harness) takenTokens() []string { return h.tokenFiles("taken-*.token", "") } + +func (h *harness) tokenFiles(pattern, exclude string) []string { + h.t.Helper() + paths, err := filepath.Glob(filepath.Join(h.dir, tokensDir, pattern)) + require.NoError(h.t, err) + var out []string + for _, path := range paths { + if exclude != "" && strings.HasPrefix(filepath.Base(path), exclude) { + continue + } + token, err := os.ReadFile(path) + require.NoError(h.t, err) + require.NotEmpty(h.t, token) + out = append(out, string(token)) + } + return out +} + +// tasksLaunched is how many tasks the ledger in dir says were launched, each +// with a token of its own. The ledger is read as it is: a run that made none +// (a shadow, a crash before the first launch) leaves none to open, and this +// must not be what creates one. +func (h *harness) tasksLaunched(dir string) int { + h.t.Helper() + ctx := context.Background() + l, err := OpenLedgerReadOnly(ctx, filepath.Join(dir, LedgerFile)) + if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + return 0 + } + require.NoError(h.t, err) + defer func() { _ = l.Close() }() + var n int + require.NoError(h.t, l.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM tasks`).Scan(&n)) + return n +} + +// workersStarted counts the worker processes that reached their agent, which +// is every worker that could have been handed a token. +func (h *harness) workersStarted() int { + n := 0 + for _, e := range h.agentLog() { + if e.Step == "start" { + n++ + } + } + return n +} + +// scanForSecret reads every file under dirs, in a process of its own, and +// reports what it found and how much it read. A scan that could not read +// something says so, and the caller fails on it: a check that skips is not a +// check that passed. +// +// A process of its own because reading a SQLite database's files by another +// descriptor in a process that holds the database open drops SQLite's POSIX +// advisory locks on them; another process closing the database then resets +// the WAL under the held handle, which reads stale or fails. The secret goes +// over stdin, never argv. +func scanForSecret(t *testing.T, secret string, dirs ...string) (found []string, read int) { + t.Helper() + cmd := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), os.Args[0], dirs...) + cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), harnessScanEnv+"=1") + cmd.Stdin = strings.NewReader(secret) + out, err := cmd.Output() + require.NoError(t, err, "the secret scan ran") + read = -1 + for line := range strings.SplitSeq(strings.TrimSpace(string(out)), "\n") { + kind, rest, ok := strings.Cut(line, "\t") + if !ok { + continue + } + switch kind { + case "found": + found = append(found, rest) + case "unreadable": + t.Errorf("the token scan could not read %s, so it cleared nothing there", rest) + case "read": + n, convErr := strconv.Atoi(rest) + require.NoError(t, convErr) + read = n + } + } + require.GreaterOrEqual(t, read, 0, "the scan reported what it read") + return found, read +} + +// runSecretScan is the scanning process: the secret on stdin, the directories +// as arguments, a path per line for every file that contains the secret. +func runSecretScan(dirs []string) int { + secret, err := io.ReadAll(os.Stdin) + if err != nil || len(secret) == 0 { + return 2 + } + read := 0 + for _, dir := range dirs { + if err := filepath.WalkDir(dir, func(path string, d fs.DirEntry, err error) error { + switch { + case errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist): + // It was there when the directory was read and gone when the + // walk reached it. The parent's watcher is what covers a file + // that only exists for a moment. + return nil + case err != nil: + // A place the scan could not look is not a place it has + // cleared: the caller is told, and fails. The walk goes on, + // so one unreadable entry does not hide the rest. + fmt.Println("unreadable\t" + path + ": " + err.Error()) + return nil //nolint:nilerr // reported to the caller, which fails on it + case d.Type().IsRegular(): + data, err := os.ReadFile(path) + if errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) { + return nil + } else if err != nil { + fmt.Println("unreadable\t" + path + ": " + err.Error()) + return nil //nolint:nilerr // reported to the caller, which fails on it + } + read++ + if bytes.Contains(data, secret) { + fmt.Println("found\t" + path) + } + } + return nil + }); err != nil { + fmt.Println("unreadable\t" + dir + ": " + err.Error()) + } + } + fmt.Println("read\t" + strconv.Itoa(read)) + return 0 +} + +// workspaces is every preparation and release of a task's working directory. +func (h *harness) workspaces() []workspaceEvent { + h.t.Helper() + var out []workspaceEvent + require.NoError(h.t, readJSONLines(filepath.Join(h.dir, workspaceFile), func(line []byte) error { + var e workspaceEvent + if err := json.Unmarshal(line, &e); err != nil { + return err + } + out = append(out, e) + return nil + })) + return out +} + +// releasedDir says a task's working directory was handed back, which the +// one-owner rule allows only once its worker's process group is gone. +func (h *harness) releasedDir(dir string) bool { + for _, e := range h.workspaces() { + if e.Step == "finish" && e.WorkDir == dir { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +// workDir is the first routed project's working directory. +func (h *harness) workDir() string { return filepath.Join(h.dir, "work") } + +// children is every process a fake worker started of its own, with the time +// it started, so it can be signaled only while it is still that process. +func (h *harness) children() []driver.Process { + var out []driver.Process + for _, e := range h.agentLog() { + if e.Step == "grandchild" && e.Child > 0 { + out = append(out, identityOf(e.Child, e.PGID, e.ChildStartedAt)) + } + } + return out +} + +// ledger opens the harness's ledger. The connector need not be stopped. +func (h *harness) ledger() *Ledger { + h.t.Helper() + l, err := OpenLedger(filepath.Join(h.state, LedgerFile)) + require.NoError(h.t, err) + h.t.Cleanup(func() { _ = l.Close() }) + return l +} diff --git a/internal/connector/recovery_hold_test.go b/internal/connector/recovery_hold_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..14cd6c62b --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/recovery_hold_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +//go:build unix + +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +// The hold and the cutover: a record still being read when the hold is set, +// or when a shadow is promoted, becomes held rather than dispatched, a crash +// anywhere in shadow promote or import leaves the untouched shadow or a held +// ledger, and no restart dispatches a held record. + +// awaitHarnessFile waits for a file a connector process writes. +func (h *harness) awaitFile(name string) { + h.t.Helper() + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second) + defer cancel() + require.NoError(h.t, awaitFile(ctx, filepath.Join(h.dir, name)), "waiting for %s", name) +} + +func (h *harness) release(name string) { + h.t.Helper() + require.NoError(h.t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(h.dir, name), nil, 0o600)) +} + +// assertNothingDispatched checks no attempt was ever made and no worker ever +// ran, and that each record is held. +func (h *harness) assertNothingDispatched(l *Ledger, held ...int64) { + t := h.t + t.Helper() + assert.Empty(t, harnessAttempts(t, l), "no attempt") + assert.Zero(t, h.agentStarts(), "no worker process") + for _, id := range held { + assert.Equal(t, StateHeld, stateOf(t, l, id), "event %d", id) + } + assert.Empty(t, h.connectorPosts(), "nothing posted under the hold") +} + +func TestRecoveryARecordReadDuringTheHoldIsHeld(t *testing.T) { + forEachDriver(t, func(t *testing.T, d harnessDriver) { + raceSubset(t, false) + for _, crash := range []bool{false, true} { + name := "the read completes" + if crash { + name = "the connector is killed mid-read and restarted" + } + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, d, harnessScenario{ReadGate: []int64{5001}}) + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(101, 5001)}) + run := harnessRun{Until: "state:101=held"} + if crash { + run = harnessRun{Until: "never", Killed: true} + } + cmd, out := h.start(run) + h.awaitFile("read-waiting-5001") + + l := h.ledger() + _, err := l.SetHold(context.Background(), "operator", HoldByOperator) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StateSeen, stateOf(t, l, 101), "the read is still in flight at the hold") + if crash { + require.NoError(t, cmd.Process.Kill()) + } else { + h.release("read-release-5001") + } + h.wait(cmd, out, run) + if crash { + h.sc.ReadGate = nil + h.writeScenario() + } + + // A supervisor restart, however many times. + h.run(harnessRun{}) + h.run(harnessRun{}) + h.assertNothingDispatched(l, 101) + + // Released, a held record stays held; a new one runs. + _, err = l.Release(context.Background(), "operator") + require.NoError(t, err) + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(102, 5002)}) + h.run(harnessRun{}) + assert.Equal(t, StateHeld, stateOf(t, l, 101)) + assert.Equal(t, 0, h.handed(101)) + assert.Equal(t, 1, h.handed(102), "the connector does dispatch what the hold does not hold") + assert.Equal(t, string(OutcomeSucceeded), outcomeOf(t, l, 102)) + }) + } + }) +} + +// cutover is a shadow run's state directory and the normal one beside it. +type cutover struct { + shadowDir, stateDir string +} + +// newCutover lays the two directories out under the harness's own state home, +// where the connector puts them, so a worker's MCP server would resolve the +// promoted one exactly as it resolves an ordinary run's. +func newCutover(h *harness) cutover { + t := h.t + t.Helper() + root := filepath.Join(h.dir, "state", "basecamp") + c := cutover{ + shadowDir: filepath.Join(root, "connect-shadow", StateDirName(harnessAccount, harnessAgent)), + stateDir: filepath.Join(root, "connect", StateDirName(harnessAccount, harnessAgent)), + } + for _, dir := range []string{root, filepath.Dir(c.shadowDir), filepath.Dir(c.stateDir), c.shadowDir, c.stateDir} { + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o700)) + require.NoError(t, os.Chmod(dir, 0o700)) + } + return c +} + +// shadowLedger runs a shadow connector that admits event 101 and is stopped +// while event 102's read is in flight. +func (h *harness) shadowLedger(c cutover) { + h.t.Helper() + h.sc.ReadGate = []int64{5002} + h.writeScenario() + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(101, 5001)}) + h.run(harnessRun{Shadow: true, StateDir: c.shadowDir, Until: "state:101=admitted"}) + + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(102, 5002)}) + run := harnessRun{Shadow: true, StateDir: c.shadowDir, Until: "never", Killed: true} + cmd, out := h.start(run) + h.awaitFile("read-waiting-5002") + require.NoError(h.t, cmd.Process.Kill()) + h.wait(cmd, out, run) + + h.sc.ReadGate = nil + h.writeScenario() +} + +func (c cutover) normalLedgerExists() bool { + _, err := os.Lstat(filepath.Join(c.stateDir, LedgerFile)) + return err == nil +} + +func TestRecoveryACrashInShadowPromoteNeverDispatchesAHeldRecord(t *testing.T) { + forEachDriver(t, func(t *testing.T, d harnessDriver) { + raceSubset(t, false) + for _, step := range []string{"locked", "marker", "tagged", "held", "checkpointed", "renamed", "synced"} { + t.Run(step, func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, d, harnessScenario{}) + c := newCutover(h) + h.shadowLedger(c) + + runKilled(t, "promote:"+step, "SHADOW_DIR="+c.shadowDir, "STATE_DIR="+c.stateDir) + if c.normalLedgerExists() { + // The supervisor restarts the connector over whatever the + // crash left at the normal path. + t.Logf("killed at %q: the ledger is at the normal path, and a restart must dispatch nothing", step) + h.run(harnessRun{StateDir: c.stateDir}) + h.assertNothingDispatched(h.ledgerAt(c.stateDir), 101, 102) + } else { + t.Logf("killed at %q: the shadow is untouched or held, and there is nothing at the normal path to restart over", step) + assertUntouchedOrHeldShadow(t, c.shadowDir) + } + + got, err := PromoteShadow(context.Background(), PromoteOptions{ + ShadowDir: c.shadowDir, StateDir: c.stateDir, AccountID: harnessAccount, AgentID: harnessAgent, By: "operator", + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, HoldByPromote, got.Hold.Cause) + h.run(harnessRun{StateDir: c.stateDir}) + h.run(harnessRun{StateDir: c.stateDir}) + l := h.ledgerAt(c.stateDir) + h.assertNothingDispatched(l, 101, 102) + }) + } + }) +} + +func TestRecoveryACrashInImportNeverDispatchesAHeldRecord(t *testing.T) { + forEachDriver(t, func(t *testing.T, d harnessDriver) { + raceSubset(t, false) + for _, step := range []string{"entry", "tagged"} { + t.Run(step, func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, d, harnessScenario{}) + c := newCutover(h) + h.shadowLedger(c) + _, err := PromoteShadow(context.Background(), PromoteOptions{ + ShadowDir: c.shadowDir, StateDir: c.stateDir, AccountID: harnessAccount, AgentID: harnessAgent, By: "operator", + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + + file := `{"version":1,"entries":[{"event_id":102,"decision":"done"},{"event_id":101,"decision":"held"}]}` + runKilled(t, "import:"+step, "LEDGER="+filepath.Join(c.stateDir, LedgerFile), "RECONCILIATION="+file) + h.run(harnessRun{StateDir: c.stateDir}) + l := h.ledgerAt(c.stateDir) + h.assertNothingDispatched(l, 101, 102) + + // The import run again applies whole, and still nothing runs. + r, err := ParseReconciliation([]byte(file)) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = l.Import(context.Background(), r, "operator") + require.NoError(t, err) + h.run(harnessRun{StateDir: c.stateDir}) + assert.Empty(t, harnessAttempts(t, l)) + assert.Equal(t, StateHeld, stateOf(t, l, 101)) + assert.Equal(t, StateDiscarded, stateOf(t, l, 102)) + }) + } + }) +} + +// assertUntouchedOrHeldShadow is the other half of the promote rule: what the +// crash left is a shadow ledger, held or exactly as it was — never an unheld +// ledger at the normal path, which the caller has already established is not +// there. +func assertUntouchedOrHeldShadow(t *testing.T, shadowDir string) { + t.Helper() + l, err := OpenLedgerReadOnly(context.Background(), filepath.Join(shadowDir, LedgerFile)) + require.NoError(t, err, "the shadow ledger is still where it was") + defer func() { _ = l.Close() }() + held, err := l.Held(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + state := stateOf(t, l, 101) + if held { + assert.Equal(t, StateHeld, state, "a held shadow holds its waiting record") + } else { + assert.Equal(t, StateAdmitted, state, "an untouched shadow is as the crash found it") + } +} + +func (h *harness) ledgerAt(dir string) *Ledger { + h.t.Helper() + l, err := OpenLedger(filepath.Join(dir, LedgerFile)) + require.NoError(h.t, err) + h.t.Cleanup(func() { _ = l.Close() }) + return l +} diff --git a/internal/connector/recovery_intake_test.go b/internal/connector/recovery_intake_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2d962e5a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/recovery_intake_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,345 @@ +//go:build unix + +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "path/filepath" + "slices" + "strconv" + "strings" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-sdk/go/pkg/basecamp/eventfeed" +) + +// Intake's recovery, with the connector killed around the feed: a filter +// change, a saturated backlog, a live buffer overflow and a stalled repair +// walk. None of it depends on the driver, so these run once, with the first +// registered one. + +func intakeHarness(t *testing.T, sc harnessScenario) *harness { + t.Helper() + if testing.Short() { + t.Skip("starts processes") + } + raceSubset(t, false) + // Always the same row, whatever else registers: intake does not depend + // on the driver, and file order must not pick one silently. + d, ok := harnessDriverNamed("claude") + require.True(t, ok, "the intake tests run with the claude row") + return newHarness(t, d, sc) +} + +// strangerEvent is an event by someone the agent does not trust: intake records +// it and admission discards it without a read, so a test can push thousands. +func strangerEvent(id int64) eventfeed.Event { + e := todoEvent(id, 9000+id%1000) + e.CreatorID = 4242 + return e +} + +func strangers(from, to int64, tweak func(*feedEntry)) []feedEntry { + out := make([]feedEntry, 0, to-from+1) + for id := from; id <= to; id++ { + e := feedEntry{Event: strangerEvent(id)} + if tweak != nil { + tweak(&e) + } + out = append(out, e) + } + return out +} + +func (h *harness) feedKey(filters eventfeed.Filters) eventfeed.CheckpointKey { + h.t.Helper() + origin, err := eventfeed.CanonicalOrigin(harnessOrigin) + require.NoError(h.t, err) + return eventfeed.CheckpointKey{Origin: origin, AccountID: harnessAccount, ConsumerNamespace: harnessNamespace, FilterKey: filters.FilterKey()} +} + +// positionID is the id a stored feed position is after; zero for none. +func (h *harness) positionID(l *Ledger, filters eventfeed.Filters) int64 { + h.t.Helper() + position, ok, err := l.Load(context.Background(), h.feedKey(filters)) + require.NoError(h.t, err) + if !ok { + return 0 + } + require.True(h.t, strings.HasPrefix(position, "feed-"), "the feed's checkpoint is a feed position, never a repair walk's: %q", position) + id, err := strconv.ParseInt(strings.TrimPrefix(position, "feed-"), 10, 64) + require.NoError(h.t, err) + return id +} + +func (h *harness) feedPolls() []pollLog { + var out []pollLog + for _, p := range h.polls() { + if !p.Repair { + out = append(out, p) + } + } + return out +} + +// A filter change re-enters after the last poll-served id, not at the present, +// and a crash before the new filter set saves a position re-enters there again. +func TestRecoveryAFilterChangeResumesFromTheLastPollServedID(t *testing.T) { + h := intakeHarness(t, harnessScenario{}) + h.publish(strangers(101, 103, nil)...) + h.run(harnessRun{}) + + h.publish(strangers(104, 105, nil)...) + narrowed := eventfeed.Filters{Buckets: []int64{harnessBucket}} + raw, err := json.Marshal(narrowed) + require.NoError(t, err) + before := len(h.feedPolls()) + h.run(harnessRun{Filters: string(raw), Kill: "feed-poll", Killed: true}) + l := h.ledger() + assert.Zero(t, h.positionID(l, narrowed), "killed before the new filter set polled") + + h.run(harnessRun{Filters: string(raw)}) + polls := h.feedPolls()[before:] + require.NotEmpty(t, polls) + assert.Equal(t, "103", polls[0].Since, "entered after the last id the poll lane served under the old filters") + assert.Empty(t, polls[0].Position) + for _, id := range []int64{104, 105} { + _, ok, err := l.Get(context.Background(), id) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, ok, "event %d after the filter change is not skipped", id) + } + assert.Equal(t, int64(105), h.positionID(l, narrowed)) +} + +// A saturated backlog stops intake reading the feed without moving the +// checkpoint past what admission has not taken; a crash there loses nothing. +func TestRecoveryBacklogSaturationPausesTheFeedWithoutMovingTheCheckpoint(t *testing.T) { + var gate []int64 + var events []feedEntry + for id := int64(101); id <= 110; id++ { + recording := 5000 + id + gate = append(gate, recording) + events = append(events, feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(id, recording)}) + } + h := intakeHarness(t, harnessScenario{QueueWarn: 1, QueuePause: 2, ReadGate: gate}) + h.publish(events...) + h.run(harnessRun{Kill: "paused", Killed: true}) + + l := h.ledger() + assert.Zero(t, h.positionID(l, eventfeed.Filters{}), "the page behind the pause was never checkpointed") + served, err := l.LastPollServedID(context.Background(), h.feedKey(eventfeed.Filters{})) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Zero(t, served) + assert.Empty(t, harnessAttempts(t, l)) + + h.sc.ReadGate = nil + h.writeScenario() + h.run(harnessRun{}) + for _, e := range events { + assert.Equal(t, 1, h.handed(e.Event.ID), "event %d", e.Event.ID) + assert.Equal(t, string(OutcomeSucceeded), outcomeOf(t, l, e.Event.ID), "event %d", e.Event.ID) + } + assert.Equal(t, int64(110), h.positionID(l, eventfeed.Filters{})) +} + +// A live buffer overflow is on disk before it is accepted, the retained events +// are drained, and the repair walk recovers the dropped ids on its own cursor: +// the feed's checkpoint never moves to a live id, so the unpolled range behind +// it is still served; a crash between the signal and the walk resumes the walk +// on start; the walk repeats through the safety delay, and what it never +// serves is recorded unrecovered once the window closes. +func TestRecoveryABufferOverflowIsReconciledAcrossACrash(t *testing.T) { + // The buffer reports each drop as it happens: two drops, two losses. + h := intakeHarness(t, harnessScenario{RepairWindow: 1500 * time.Millisecond, OverflowLosses: 2}) + h.publish(strangers(101, 103, nil)...) + h.run(harnessRun{}) + + const ( + straggler = int64(60_001) // dropped; poll-visible from the third repair poll + deleted = int64(60_002) // dropped; never poll-visible + lastLive = int64(70_002) + ) + // Behind the live burst, an unpolled range the feed has not served yet. + behind := strangers(104, 106, func(e *feedEntry) { e.FromRepairPoll = 1 }) + // Ten thousand and two live events: the buffer holds ten thousand, and + // drops the two oldest. + burst := strangers(straggler, lastLive, func(e *feedEntry) { + e.Live, e.FromRepairPoll = true, 1 + switch e.Event.ID { + case straggler: + e.FromRepairPoll = 3 + case deleted: + e.Never = true + } + }) + h.publish(append(behind, burst...)...) + h.run(harnessRun{Fault: "stall-catch-up", Kill: "repair-poll", Killed: true}) + + l := h.ledger() + losses, err := l.OpenLosses(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, losses, 2, "the overflow was written down before the walk began") + var missing []int64 + for _, loss := range losses { + ids, err := l.MissingIDs(context.Background(), loss.ID, LossMissing) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, ids, 1) + assert.Equal(t, ids[0]-1, loss.RepairSince, "a walk enters just before its missing id") + missing = append(missing, ids...) + } + slices.Sort(missing) + assert.Equal(t, []int64{straggler, deleted}, missing) + assert.LessOrEqual(t, h.positionID(l, eventfeed.Filters{}), int64(103), "no live id moved the checkpoint") + + // Every checkpoint the ledger holds while the walk runs, not only the one + // it ends with: a walk that wrote its own cursor there would be overwritten + // by the feed's next page. + positions := h.watchCheckpoints() + h.run(harnessRun{Until: "losses-closed"}) + sampled := positions() + // The watcher must have been watching for the whole run, or it proves + // nothing: it saw the position the run started from and the one it ended + // at, both of which stand long enough to be seen, and positions between. + require.Contains(t, sampled, "feed-103", "the watcher saw the run start") + require.Contains(t, sampled, "feed-70002", "the watcher saw the run end") + require.Greater(t, len(sampled), 2, "the watcher saw the checkpoint move") + for _, position := range sampled { + assert.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(position, "feed-"), "the feed's checkpoint only ever holds a feed position, saw %q", position) + } + + for _, id := range []int64{104, 105, 106} { + r, ok, err := l.Get(context.Background(), id) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok, "event %d behind the live burst is still served", id) + assert.Equal(t, LanePoll, r.Lane, "event %d came from the feed's own walk", id) + } + _, ok, err := l.Get(context.Background(), straggler) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, ok, "the straggler was recovered") + unrecovered, err := l.UnrecoveredIDs(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, []int64{deleted}, unrecovered) + // The checkpoint is the feed's own walk, wherever the repair walk got to. + assert.Equal(t, lastLive, h.positionID(l, eventfeed.Filters{})) + + var walks, servedAt int + for _, p := range h.polls() { + if !p.Repair { + assert.False(t, strings.HasPrefix(p.Position, "repair-"), "the feed never walks from a repair cursor") + continue + } + walks++ + if slices.Contains(p.Served, straggler) && servedAt == 0 { + servedAt = walks + } + } + // The straggler is withheld until the third repair poll; that its loss + // is recovered rather than unrecovered is the walk having repeated + // through the safety delay, and a walk still polling after serving it + // is the walk repeating until the window closed for the id that never + // came. + assert.Greater(t, walks, max(servedAt, 1), "the walk repeated, and kept repeating until the window closed") + var recovered []int64 + for _, loss := range losses { + ids, err := l.MissingIDs(context.Background(), loss.ID, LossRecovered) + require.NoError(t, err) + recovered = append(recovered, ids...) + } + assert.Equal(t, []int64{straggler}, recovered, "the straggler's loss is recovered, whichever walk served it first") + + // The unpolled range behind the burst is served before anything from the + // burst: a checkpoint taken from a live id would have skipped it. + // In the order the feed's own walk served events, not by page: one page + // may carry both. + behindAt, aheadAt, n := -1, -1, 0 + for _, p := range h.feedPolls() { + for _, id := range p.Served { + if id == 106 && behindAt < 0 { + behindAt = n + } + if id >= straggler && aheadAt < 0 { + aheadAt = n + } + n++ + } + } + require.GreaterOrEqual(t, behindAt, 0, "the feed's own walk served the range behind the burst") + require.GreaterOrEqual(t, aheadAt, 0, "and went on past it") + assert.Less(t, behindAt, aheadAt, "the feed never jumped a live id ahead of the range behind it") +} + +// watchCheckpoints samples the feed's stored position until the returned +// function is called, which returns everything it saw. +func (h *harness) watchCheckpoints() func() []string { + stop := make(chan struct{}) + done := make(chan []string, 1) + go func() { + seen := map[string]bool{} + for { + select { + case <-stop: + out := make([]string, 0, len(seen)) + for position := range seen { + out = append(out, position) + } + done <- out + return + case <-time.After(2 * time.Millisecond): + } + l, err := OpenLedgerReadOnly(context.Background(), filepath.Join(h.state, LedgerFile)) + if err != nil { + continue + } + rows, err := l.db.QueryContext(context.Background(), `SELECT position FROM checkpoints`) + if err == nil { + for rows.Next() { + var position string + if rows.Scan(&position) == nil { + seen[position] = true + } + } + _ = rows.Close() + } + _ = l.Close() + } + }() + return func() []string { + close(stop) + select { + case out := <-done: + return out + case <-time.After(10 * time.Second): + h.t.Fatal("the checkpoint watcher did not stop") + return nil + } + } +} + +// A repair walk that never answers holds up nothing: live events still reach +// the ledger while the loss stays open. +func TestRecoveryAStalledRepairWalkDoesNotStopLiveIntake(t *testing.T) { + h := intakeHarness(t, harnessScenario{RepairWindow: time.Hour}) + h.publish(strangers(101, 101, nil)...) + h.run(harnessRun{}) + + l := h.ledger() + _, err := l.RecordLoss(context.Background(), []int64{90_001}, time.Now(), time.Hour, eventfeed.Filters{}) + require.NoError(t, err) + h.publish(strangers(90_005, 90_005, func(e *feedEntry) { e.Live, e.Never = true, true })...) + h.publish(strangers(102, 102, nil)...) + h.run(harnessRun{Fault: "repair-stall", Until: "state:90005,state:102"}) + + losses, err := l.OpenLosses(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Len(t, losses, 1, "the loss is still open") + stalled := false + for _, p := range h.polls() { + stalled = stalled || p.Stalled + } + assert.True(t, stalled, "the repair walk was running, and stalled") +} diff --git a/internal/connector/recovery_norace_test.go b/internal/connector/recovery_norace_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..24afde241 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/recovery_norace_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +//go:build unix && !race + +package connector + +const harnessUnderRace = false diff --git a/internal/connector/recovery_race_test.go b/internal/connector/recovery_race_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5a0ccc44f --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/recovery_race_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +//go:build unix && race + +package connector + +const harnessUnderRace = true diff --git a/internal/connector/recovery_real_test.go b/internal/connector/recovery_real_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..432eedd76 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/recovery_real_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +//go:build unix + +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "slices" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/auth" +) + +// TestRecoveryAgainstRealAgents runs the kill points the connector itself can +// reach against the real agent binaries, with the real `basecamp mcp` built +// from this tree as the workers' MCP server. The server holds a token that +// reaches no Basecamp, so the workers' basecamp_connect calls are real and +// their Basecamp calls fail; nothing is posted anywhere. A model is called, so +// it is opt-in: +// +// make build +// BASECAMP_RECOVERY_REAL_AGENTS=1 BASECAMP_RECOVERY_BASECAMP=$PWD/bin/basecamp \ +// go test ./internal/connector/ -run TestRecoveryAgainstRealAgents -v +// +// What a model does with its turn is not scripted, so the assertions are the +// guarantees that hold whatever it does. +func TestRecoveryAgainstRealAgents(t *testing.T) { + if os.Getenv(harnessRealEnv) == "" { + t.Skip("opt in with " + harnessRealEnv + "=1 and " + harnessRealBasecampEnv + "=<basecamp built from this tree>: it runs the real agents, which call their models") + } + basecampBinary := os.Getenv(harnessRealBasecampEnv) + require.NotEmpty(t, basecampBinary, harnessRealBasecampEnv+" names the basecamp binary built from this tree") + info, err := os.Stat(basecampBinary) + require.NoError(t, err, "the basecamp binary is where %s says", harnessRealBasecampEnv) + require.NotZero(t, info.Mode()&0o111, "%s is executable", basecampBinary) + rows := []struct { + name string + kill string + // lost says the attempt is lost: the kill left it live. + lost bool + // held says recovery cannot identify the worker, and holds the + // attempt rather than settling it. + held bool + }{ + {name: "no crash"}, + {name: "attempt launching", kill: "line:dispatch:launching", held: true}, + {name: "attempt running", kill: "line:dispatch:running", lost: true}, + {name: "after get_dispatch", kill: "get-dispatch", lost: true}, + } + ran := false + for _, d := range harnessDrivers { + if !d.Real { + continue + } + ran = true + t.Run(d.Name, func(t *testing.T) { + for _, row := range rows { + t.Run(row.name, func(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t, d, harnessScenario{}) + stateDir := h.state + config := filepath.Join(h.dir, "config", "basecamp") + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(config, 0o700)) + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(config, "config.json"), + []byte(`{"profiles":{"agent":{"base_url":"http://127.0.0.1:9","account_id":"`+harnessAccount+`"}}}`), 0o600)) + // The worker's MCP server is the real one, and it refuses + // to start without a credential. The bridge hands it no + // token from the environment — by design — so the profile + // gets a stored one, in this harness's own config + // directory, pointing at a closed port. + t.Setenv("BASECAMP_NO_KEYRING", "1") + require.NoError(t, auth.NewStore(config).Save(auth.ProfileCredentialKey("agent"), &auth.Credentials{ + AccessToken: "test-token-not-real", OAuthType: "bc5", + ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour).Unix(), + })) + // These are appended after os.Environ(), and the last + // duplicate wins in exec, so what the operator's own + // environment says is overridden rather than reaching the + // worker's MCP server: a real BASECAMP_TOKEN by the fake + // one, and a BASECAMP_BASE_URL — which the server's + // environment allowlist passes, and which outranks the + // profile — by the same closed port the profile names. No + // request the server makes can leave the machine. + const closedPort = "http://127.0.0.1:9" + env := []string{ + harnessRealBasecampEnv + "=" + basecampBinary, + "XDG_CONFIG_HOME=" + filepath.Join(h.dir, "config"), + "BASECAMP_TOKEN=test-token-not-real", + "BASECAMP_BASE_URL=" + closedPort, + "BASECAMP_NO_KEYRING=1", + } + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(101, 5001)}) + h.run(harnessRun{StateDir: stateDir, Env: env, Kill: row.kill, Killed: row.kill != ""}) + + l := h.ledgerAt(stateDir) + var pids []int + for _, a := range harnessAttempts(t, l) { + var pid int + require.NoError(t, l.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), `SELECT COALESCE(pid, 0) FROM attempts WHERE id = ?`, a.ID).Scan(&pid)) + if pid > 0 { + pids = append(pids, pid) + } + } + if row.held { + // The other project's attempt is a second one; the + // held attempt is the first. + // Run until a real worker has finished an event in the + // other project: recovery returned and the dispatcher + // went on around the held attempt. + h.publish(feedEntry{Event: otherTodoEvent(102, 6001)}) + h.run(harnessRun{StateDir: stateDir, Env: env, Until: "state:102=completed"}) + attempts := harnessAttempts(t, l) + require.NotEmpty(t, attempts) + assert.Equal(t, string(AttemptLaunching), attempts[0].State, "held, not settled") + assert.Equal(t, StateDispatched, stateOf(t, l, 101)) + assert.Empty(t, h.notices(101)) + return + } + for range 2 { + h.run(harnessRun{StateDir: stateDir, Env: env}) + } + + attempts := harnessAttempts(t, l) + require.Len(t, attempts, 1, "no second attempt, whatever the worker did") + // A real agent ran, or this row proved nothing about one: + // the ledger recorded its process. + require.NotEmpty(t, pids, "the real agent's process was recorded") + assert.Equal(t, StateCompleted, stateOf(t, l, 101)) + outcome := outcomeOf(t, l, 101) + assert.True(t, slices.Contains([]string{string(OutcomeUnknown), string(OutcomeSucceeded), string(OutcomeFailed)}, outcome), "outcome %q", outcome) + if row.lost { + assert.Equal(t, string(StopLost), attempts[0].StopReason) + } + if row.kill == "line:dispatch:running" { + assert.Equal(t, string(OutcomeUnknown), outcome, "never prompted, still unknown: a process may have existed") + } + assert.LessOrEqual(t, len(h.notices(101)), 1, "at most one completion notice") + if row.kill == "" { + // The whole chain ran: the agent started its MCP + // server, the bridge took the task token from the + // connector's socket, and the worker called + // get_dispatch, which cancels the guard. + var canceled int + require.NoError(t, l.db.QueryRowContext(context.Background(), + `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM task_events WHERE event_id = 101 AND guard = 'canceled'`).Scan(&canceled)) + assert.Equal(t, 1, canceled, "the real worker read its dispatch") + } + for _, pid := range pids { + assert.True(t, processGone(context.Background(), pid), "the worker the crash left is gone, pid %d", pid) + } + t.Logf("%s: outcome %s, stop %s, notices %d", row.name, outcome, attempts[0].StopReason, len(h.notices(101))) + }) + } + }) + } + require.True(t, ran, "no real agent registered") +} diff --git a/internal/connector/recovery_worker_test.go b/internal/connector/recovery_worker_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..212a0a011 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/recovery_worker_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,493 @@ +//go:build unix + +package connector + +import ( + "bufio" + "context" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "fmt" + "net" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "regexp" + "slices" + "strconv" + "strings" + "syscall" + "time" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" +) + +// The fake worker: what every fake agent does with a prompt, whatever its wire. + +// fakeWorker is what a worker does, whatever its wire: it reads its dispatch, +// acknowledges, replies and completes through the task token its MCP server +// declaration carries, as scripted per event. +type fakeWorker struct { + dir string + sc harnessScenario + ledger *Ledger + dispatch *TaskDispatch + + replies map[int64]int64 +} + +// agentLogEntry is one thing a fake agent did. +type agentLogEntry struct { + PID int `json:"pid"` + PGID int `json:"pgid"` + StartedAt time.Time `json:"started_at"` + Event int64 `json:"event,omitempty"` + N int `json:"n,omitempty"` + Step string `json:"step"` + // Args and Env are the agent's own, on its "start" entry. + Args []string `json:"args,omitempty"` + Env []string `json:"env,omitempty"` + // Child is the pid of the process a "grandchild" step started, and + // ChildStartedAt the kernel's start time for it. + Child int `json:"child,omitempty"` + ChildStartedAt time.Time `json:"child_started_at,omitempty"` + // Prompt is the prompt as the agent received it, on a "prompt" step. + Prompt string `json:"prompt,omitempty"` +} + +func newFakeWorker(dir string) (*fakeWorker, error) { + if dir == "" { + return nil, errors.New("no harness directory") + } + sc, err := readScenario(dir) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + w := &fakeWorker{dir: dir, sc: sc, replies: map[int64]int64{}} + pgid, _ := syscall.Getpgid(0) + // What this agent was started with, for the parent to check no task + // token is in either. + _ = appendJSONLine(filepath.Join(dir, agentLogFile), agentLogEntry{ + PID: os.Getpid(), PGID: pgid, StartedAt: time.Now(), Step: "start", Args: os.Args[1:], Env: os.Environ(), + }) + return w, nil +} + +func (w *fakeWorker) close() { + if w.ledger != nil { + _ = w.ledger.Close() + } +} + +func (w *fakeWorker) log(event int64, n int, step string) { + pgid, _ := syscall.Getpgid(0) + _ = appendJSONLine(filepath.Join(w.dir, agentLogFile), + agentLogEntry{PID: os.Getpid(), PGID: pgid, StartedAt: kernelStart(os.Getpid()), Event: event, N: n, Step: step}) +} + +// kernelStart is the kernel's own start time for pid, which is what makes a +// recorded pid an identity (driver.Process.StartedExact). Nothing else is +// written down: a wall-clock stamp is not an identity, the one-owner rule +// refuses to answer about one (driver.ErrIdentityUnknown), and a harness +// that recorded one could not signal what it started. A pid the kernel +// cannot be asked about is recorded with no start time, which reads back as +// no identity rather than a false one. +func kernelStart(pid int) time.Time { + p, err := driver.LookupProcess(pid) + if err != nil { + return time.Time{} + } + return p.StartedAt +} + +func (h *harness) agentLog() []agentLogEntry { + var out []agentLogEntry + _ = readJSONLines(filepath.Join(h.dir, agentLogFile), func(line []byte) error { + var e agentLogEntry + if json.Unmarshal(line, &e) == nil { + out = append(out, e) + } + return nil + }) + return out +} + +// BadMode says this agent process reports a permission mode other than the +// one asked for. +func (w *fakeWorker) BadMode() bool { + starts := 0 + _ = readJSONLines(filepath.Join(w.dir, agentLogFile), func(line []byte) error { + var e agentLogEntry + if json.Unmarshal(line, &e) == nil && e.Step == "start" { + starts++ + } + return nil + }) + return starts <= w.sc.BadModeStarts +} + +// Bind takes the worker's task from the MCP server declaration its driver +// handed the agent, as the two commands behind that declaration do: +// +// - the declaration must name the bridge (`basecamp connect worker-mcp`) +// with the agent's profile, its state directory and its token socket, +// since the real bridge refuses without any of them +// (internal/commands/connect_worker_mcp.go); +// - the task token comes from that one-use socket, never from the +// environment; +// - the state directory is resolved by location and name, which is where +// the agent's id comes from, and the ledger is opened as it is, never +// created and never migrated — the connector owns it +// (internal/commands/mcp.go). +func (w *fakeWorker) Bind(ctx context.Context, server driver.MCPServer) error { + // Bound or not, the parent is told which: a worker that started and took + // no token must not look to the credential check like a run with nothing + // to check. + err := w.bind(ctx, server) + if err != nil { + w.log(0, 0, "bind-failed: "+err.Error()) + } + return err +} + +func (w *fakeWorker) bind(ctx context.Context, server driver.MCPServer) error { + if server.Name != MCPServerName { + return fmt.Errorf("the MCP server is %q, not %q", server.Name, MCPServerName) + } + if len(server.Args) < 2 || server.Args[0] != "connect" || server.Args[1] != "worker-mcp" { + return fmt.Errorf("the MCP server is not the connector's bridge: %v", server.Args) + } + if profile := flagValue(server.Args, "--profile"); profile == "" { + return errors.New("the MCP server names no profile, which the bridge refuses to start without") + } + stateArg := flagValue(server.Args, "--connect-state") + if stateArg == "" { + return errors.New("the MCP server has no --connect-state") + } + stateDir := stateArg + // The server resolves the directory against its own state home, which + // is the environment the driver declared for it, not this agent's: a + // declaration without one would send the real server elsewhere. + home, ok := server.Env["XDG_STATE_HOME"] + if !ok || home == "" { + return errors.New("the MCP server's environment declares no XDG_STATE_HOME") + } + if err := os.Setenv("XDG_STATE_HOME", home); err != nil { + return err + } + _, agentID, err := ResolveStateDir(stateDir, harnessAccount) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + token, err := w.takeToken(ctx, server.Args) + if err != nil { + return err + } + // The socket is the token's one carriage: the declaration that named the + // socket must not also carry the token. + for key, value := range server.Env { + if strings.Contains(value, token) { + w.log(0, 0, "secret-declared:env "+key) + } + } + for _, arg := range server.Args { + if strings.Contains(arg, token) { + w.log(0, 0, "secret-declared:argv") + } + } + l, err := OpenExistingLedger(ctx, filepath.Join(stateDir, LedgerFile)) + if err != nil { + return err + } + d, err := l.Dispatch(ctx, token, agentID) + if err != nil { + _ = l.Close() + return err + } + w.ledger, w.dispatch = l, d + if err := w.watchToken(token); err != nil { + return err + } + // Said only once the token is on disk for the parent's check and the + // watch is running: a worker that bound without either would leave the + // parent nothing to check. + w.log(0, 0, "bound") + return nil +} + +// flagValue is the value after name in a command line, empty when it is not +// there. +func flagValue(args []string, name string) string { + i := slices.Index(args, name) + if i < 0 || i+1 >= len(args) { + return "" + } + return args[i+1] +} + +// takeToken takes the task token from the connector's one-use socket, as the +// bridge the connector names does (`basecamp connect worker-mcp`, see +// internal/commands/connect_worker_mcp.go): the socket path is in the +// server's arguments, the token is a line on the socket, and it is served +// only to the worker's own process group — which this agent leads. +func (w *fakeWorker) takeToken(ctx context.Context, args []string) (string, error) { + socket := flagValue(args, "--socket") + if socket == "" { + return "", errors.New("the MCP server has no --socket") + } + dialer := net.Dialer{Timeout: 30 * time.Second} + conn, err := dialer.DialContext(ctx, "unix", socket) + if err != nil { + return "", fmt.Errorf("the connector's token socket: %w", err) + } + defer func() { _ = conn.Close() }() + _ = conn.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(30 * time.Second)) + line, err := bufio.NewReaderSize(conn, 256).ReadString('\n') + token := strings.TrimSpace(line) + if token == "" { + if err == nil { + err = errors.New("empty") + } + return "", fmt.Errorf("the connector handed over no token: %w", err) + } + return token, nil +} + +// watchToken records that this worker took its token, and checks the one +// thing only the worker can: that the token it was handed is the one the +// connector minted for its attempt. +// +// The watch for a token in a file is the parent's, not this process's. A +// worker the connector ends by its process group takes any deferred report +// with it, and the crash rows end workers exactly that way; the parent is +// never killed, so it always reports. This process also holds the ledger +// open, and reading the ledger's own files here would drop SQLite's POSIX +// locks on them. +func (w *fakeWorker) watchToken(token string) error { + tokens := filepath.Join(w.dir, tokensDir) + if err := os.MkdirAll(tokens, 0o700); err != nil { + return err + } + f, err := os.CreateTemp(tokens, "taken-*.token") + if err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := f.WriteString(token); err != nil { + _ = f.Close() + return err + } + return f.Close() +} + +var promptEvent = regexp.MustCompile(`Event (\d+)`) + +// Turn does what the scenario scripts for the prompt's event. An error is a +// step that could not be done; the agent reports the turn failed. +func (w *fakeWorker) Turn(ctx context.Context, prompt string) error { + m := promptEvent.FindStringSubmatch(prompt) + if m == nil { + return errors.New("the prompt names no event") + } + event, _ := strconv.ParseInt(m[1], 10, 64) + n := w.prompted(event) + 1 + pgid, _ := syscall.Getpgid(0) + _ = appendJSONLine(filepath.Join(w.dir, agentLogFile), + agentLogEntry{PID: os.Getpid(), PGID: pgid, StartedAt: time.Now(), Event: event, N: n, Step: "prompt", Prompt: prompt}) + steps, ok := w.sc.Plans[m[1]+"#"+strconv.Itoa(n)] + if !ok { + steps = []string{"get", "ack", "reply", "complete"} + } + for _, step := range steps { + if err := w.step(ctx, event, n, step); err != nil { + w.log(event, n, "error:"+step) + return fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", step, err) + } + w.log(event, n, step) + } + return nil +} + +func (w *fakeWorker) prompted(event int64) int { + n := 0 + _ = readJSONLines(filepath.Join(w.dir, agentLogFile), func(line []byte) error { + var e agentLogEntry + if json.Unmarshal(line, &e) == nil && e.Event == event && e.Step == "prompt" { + n++ + } + return nil + }) + return n +} + +func (w *fakeWorker) step(ctx context.Context, event int64, n int, step string) error { + if w.dispatch == nil { + return errors.New("the worker was never bound to a task") + } + name, arg, _ := strings.Cut(step, ":") + switch name { + case "get": + in, ok, err := w.dispatch.Get(ctx, event) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if !ok || in.EventID != event { + return fmt.Errorf("get_dispatch did not return event %d", event) + } + case "ack": + in, _, err := w.dispatch.Get(ctx, event) + if err != nil { + return err + } + id, err := postMessage(w.dir, storedMessage{Kind: MessageBoost, BucketID: in.Recording.BucketID, RecordingID: in.Recording.RecordingID, Content: "on it", By: "worker"}) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := w.dispatch.Ack(ctx, event, &id); err != nil { + return err + } + case "reply": + in, _, err := w.dispatch.Get(ctx, event) + if err != nil { + return err + } + id, err := postMessage(w.dir, storedMessage{Kind: MessageComment, BucketID: in.Recording.BucketID, RecordingID: in.ReplyTo.RecordingID, + Content: "done: event " + strconv.FormatInt(event, 10) + " attempt " + strconv.Itoa(n), By: "worker"}) + if err != nil { + return err + } + w.replies[event] = id + case "complete", "fail": + outcome := OutcomeSucceeded + if name == "fail" { + outcome = OutcomeFailed + } + c := Completion{Outcome: outcome} + if id, ok := w.replies[event]; ok { + c.ReplyID = &id + } + if _, err := w.dispatch.Complete(ctx, event, c); err != nil { + return err + } + case "kill": + // The connector dies while this worker is mid-turn. + return w.killConnector(ctx) + case "linger": + // A worker the connector left behind: it stays until something ends + // its process group, which only the connector's restart may do. + w.log(event, n, "linger") + time.Sleep(2 * time.Minute) + os.Exit(9) + case "exit": + code, _ := strconv.Atoi(arg) + os.Exit(code) + case "grandchild": + // A process of the worker's own that outlives it, in its process + // group, holding its working directory: the tree the one-owner rule + // says nothing may be released around. + wd, err := os.Getwd() + if err != nil { + return err + } + pid, err := syscall.ForkExec("/bin/sleep", []string{"sleep", "300"}, &syscall.ProcAttr{Dir: wd, Env: []string{}}) + if err != nil { + return err + } + pgid, _ := syscall.Getpgid(0) + return appendJSONLine(filepath.Join(w.dir, agentLogFile), + agentLogEntry{PID: os.Getpid(), PGID: pgid, StartedAt: kernelStart(os.Getpid()), Event: event, N: n, + Step: "grandchild", Child: pid, ChildStartedAt: kernelStart(pid)}) + case "arrive": + // A further event on the conversation while this one is in hand. + id, err := strconv.ParseInt(arg, 10, 64) + if err != nil { + return err + } + in, _, err := w.dispatch.Get(ctx, event) + if err != nil { + return err + } + return appendFeed(w.dir, feedEntry{Event: todoEvent(id, in.Recording.RecordingID)}) + case "await": + // Wait for a record to reach a state: "await:<id>=<state>". + id, state, _ := strings.Cut(arg, "=") + n, err := strconv.ParseInt(id, 10, 64) + if err != nil { + return err + } + return waitFor(ctx, func() (bool, error) { + r, ok, err := w.ledger.Get(ctx, n) + return ok && slices.Contains(strings.Split(state, "|"), string(r.State)), err + }) + default: + return fmt.Errorf("unknown step %q", step) + } + return nil +} + +// killConnector SIGKILLs the connector and returns once it is gone, so the +// steps after it run in a world without a connector. +// +// The connector is the pid it wrote down when it started, not this process's +// parent: a worker started behind an adapter (ACP) has the adapter as its +// parent, and an orphan's parent is the subreaper, which may be pid 1. A pid +// this harness did not record is never signaled. +func (w *fakeWorker) killConnector(ctx context.Context) error { + running, err := harnessConnector(w.dir) + if err != nil { + return err + } + pid := running.PID + // Only while it is still the process that wrote the file: a pid is not an + // identity. + if owns, err := driver.OwnsWorker(running); err != nil || !owns { + if err == nil { + err = errors.New("its start time no longer matches") + } + return fmt.Errorf("the connector's pid %d is no longer the connector: %w", pid, err) + } + if err := syscall.Kill(pid, syscall.SIGKILL); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("kill the connector (pid %d): %w", pid, err) + } + return waitFor(ctx, func() (bool, error) { return processGone(ctx, pid), nil }) +} + +// harnessConnector reads the identity the connector wrote when it started. +func harnessConnector(dir string) (driver.Process, error) { + data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, connectorFile)) + if err != nil { + return driver.Process{}, err + } + var running struct { + PID int `json:"pid"` + StartedAt time.Time `json:"started_at"` + } + if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &running); err != nil { + return driver.Process{}, err + } + if running.PID <= 1 || running.StartedAt.IsZero() { + return driver.Process{}, fmt.Errorf("the connector recorded pid %d, which is nothing this harness may signal", running.PID) + } + // The group is only asked about when the process is gone; the kill is of + // the pid alone. The stamp is the kernel's, which is what makes this an + // identity the one-owner rule will answer about at all. + return driver.Process{PID: running.PID, PGID: running.PID, StartedAt: running.StartedAt, StartedExact: true}, nil +} + +func waitFor(ctx context.Context, cond func() (bool, error)) error { + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 30*time.Second) + defer cancel() + for { + ok, err := cond() + if err != nil { + return err + } + if ok { + return nil + } + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + return ctx.Err() + case <-time.After(5 * time.Millisecond): + } + } +} diff --git a/internal/connector/sdk_dispatch.go b/internal/connector/sdk_dispatch.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..84fb46a00 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/sdk_dispatch.go @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "time" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-sdk/go/pkg/basecamp" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/admission" +) + +// AdoptionScanLimit bounds a reply listing: the adopted-reply rule needs the +// replies after an acknowledgement, not a conversation's whole history, and a +// settlement must not page a busy Campfire from its beginning. +const AdoptionScanLimit = 500 + +// AdoptionScanTimeout bounds the listing in time as well, since settlement +// runs on a context a shutdown does not cancel. +const AdoptionScanTimeout = 30 * time.Second + +// ErrRepliesTruncated is a listing the scan limit cut short. The adopted-reply +// rule needs to know there is exactly one candidate, and a cut listing cannot +// say that, so nothing is adopted. +var ErrRepliesTruncated = errors.New("the reply listing was truncated") + +// SDKReplies lists the agent's replies at a destination through the SDK, for +// the adopted-reply rule. +type SDKReplies struct { + Client *basecamp.AccountClient + AgentID int64 +} + +var _ ReplyLister = SDKReplies{} + +// AgentReplies implements ReplyLister. The listing is exhaustive: the rule +// adopts only when exactly one reply matches, and a page left unread could +// hold the second. +func (r SDKReplies) AgentReplies(ctx context.Context, _ int64, kind string, recordingID int64, since time.Time) ([]AgentReply, error) { + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, AdoptionScanTimeout) + defer cancel() + var out []AgentReply + keep := func(id int64, creator *basecamp.Person, created time.Time) { + if creator != nil && creator.ID == r.AgentID && created.After(since) { + out = append(out, AgentReply{ID: id, CreatedAt: created}) + } + } + switch admission.ReplyKind(kind) { + case admission.ReplyComment: + result, err := r.Client.Comments().List(ctx, recordingID, &basecamp.CommentListOptions{Limit: AdoptionScanLimit}) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if result.Meta.Truncated { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: %w: %d comments on recording %d", ErrRepliesTruncated, AdoptionScanLimit, recordingID) + } + for _, c := range result.Comments { + keep(c.ID, c.Creator, c.CreatedAt) + } + case admission.ReplyChatLine: + // Newest first: the replies the rule cares about are the ones after + // the acknowledgement, not the beginning of the room. + result, err := r.Client.Campfires().ListLines(ctx, recordingID, &basecamp.CampfireLineListOptions{ + Limit: AdoptionScanLimit, Sort: "created_at", Direction: "desc", + }) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if result.Meta.Truncated { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: %w: %d lines in campfire %d", ErrRepliesTruncated, AdoptionScanLimit, recordingID) + } + for _, l := range result.Lines { + keep(l.ID, l.Creator, l.CreatedAt) + } + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: no reply listing for %q", kind) + } + return out, nil +} + +// SDKMembership lists the buckets the agent can see, for intake's reconnect. +type SDKMembership struct { + Client *basecamp.AccountClient +} + +var _ MembershipSource = SDKMembership{} + +// Buckets implements MembershipSource. +func (m SDKMembership) Buckets(ctx context.Context) ([]int64, error) { + result, err := m.Client.Projects().List(ctx, nil) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ids := make([]int64, 0, len(result.Projects)) + for _, p := range result.Projects { + ids = append(ids, p.ID) + } + return ids, nil +} diff --git a/internal/connector/sdk_dispatch_test.go b/internal/connector/sdk_dispatch_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..affbddb21 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/sdk_dispatch_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "net/http" + "net/http/httptest" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-sdk/go/pkg/basecamp" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/admission" +) + +// repliesServer serves n comments by the agent, newest last. +func repliesServer(t *testing.T, n int) *basecamp.AccountClient { + t.Helper() + server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) { + comments := make([]map[string]any, 0, n) + for i := range n { + comments = append(comments, map[string]any{ + "id": 100 + i, + "created_at": time.Date(2026, 9, 17, 12, i, 0, 0, time.UTC).Format(time.RFC3339), + "creator": map[string]any{"id": adapterAgentID}, + }) + } + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") + _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(comments) + })) + t.Cleanup(server.Close) + client := basecamp.NewClient(&basecamp.Config{BaseURL: server.URL}, &basecamp.StaticTokenProvider{Token: "test-token-not-real"}) + return client.ForAccount("2914079") +} + +// Copilot r3: a listing the scan limit cut short adopts nothing, because it +// cannot say there is exactly one candidate. +func TestATruncatedReplyListingIsRefused(t *testing.T) { + replies := SDKReplies{Client: repliesServer(t, AdoptionScanLimit+5), AgentID: adapterAgentID} + _, err := replies.AgentReplies(context.Background(), adapterBucketID, string(admission.ReplyComment), 10304028989, time.Time{}) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrRepliesTruncated) + + replies = SDKReplies{Client: repliesServer(t, 3), AgentID: adapterAgentID} + found, err := replies.AgentReplies(context.Background(), adapterBucketID, string(admission.ReplyComment), 10304028989, time.Time{}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Len(t, found, 3) +} diff --git a/internal/connector/setup/apply.go b/internal/connector/setup/apply.go index 105db6eba..1261e0735 100644 --- a/internal/connector/setup/apply.go +++ b/internal/connector/setup/apply.go @@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ type Changes struct { // Remove drops projects' routes. Remove []int64 - Driver string + Driver string + // Worker is the coding agent, "" to keep the file's. + Worker string Concurrency int Deadline time.Duration // Worktrees is nil to keep the file's value. @@ -95,6 +97,12 @@ func Apply(f File, ch Changes) (File, error) { if ch.Driver != "" { out.Driver = ch.Driver } + if ch.Worker != "" { + if !slices.Contains(Workers, ch.Worker) { + return File{}, fmt.Errorf("worker %q is not one of %s", ch.Worker, strings.Join(Workers, ", ")) + } + out.Worker = ch.Worker + } if ch.Concurrency != 0 { out.Concurrency = ch.Concurrency } diff --git a/internal/connector/setup/file.go b/internal/connector/setup/file.go index efe93b805..270269af9 100644 --- a/internal/connector/setup/file.go +++ b/internal/connector/setup/file.go @@ -35,7 +35,9 @@ import ( "io" "path/filepath" "regexp" + "slices" "strconv" + "strings" "time" "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/auth" @@ -54,8 +56,19 @@ const ( DriverACP = "acp" ) +// Workers: the coding agent a driver runs. +const ( + WorkerClaude = "claude" + WorkerCodex = "codex" +) + +// Workers is every worker connect.json may name. A worker is a row here plus +// its spawn constructor (internal/connector/driver/spawn). +var Workers = []string{WorkerClaude, WorkerCodex} + // Defaults, from the connector spec. const ( + DefaultWorker = WorkerClaude DefaultDriver = DriverSpawn DefaultConcurrency = 2 DefaultDeadline = 45 * time.Minute @@ -91,7 +104,11 @@ type File struct { Trust admission.Trust `json:"trust"` Projects map[int64]admission.Route `json:"projects"` - Driver string `json:"driver"` + Driver string `json:"driver"` + // Worker is the coding agent the driver runs: claude, or another row of + // Workers. Empty reads as DefaultWorker, so a file written before the + // field existed means what it meant. + Worker string `json:"worker,omitempty"` Concurrency int `json:"concurrency"` Deadline Duration `json:"deadline"` Worktrees bool `json:"worktrees"` @@ -140,6 +157,7 @@ func New(profile string) File { Trust: admission.Trust{Mode: admission.TrustOperator}, Projects: map[int64]admission.Route{}, Driver: DefaultDriver, + Worker: DefaultWorker, Concurrency: DefaultConcurrency, Deadline: Duration(DefaultDeadline), } @@ -227,6 +245,9 @@ func (f File) Validate() error { default: return fmt.Errorf("connect.json driver %q is not %q or %q", f.Driver, DriverSpawn, DriverACP) } + if f.Worker != "" && !slices.Contains(Workers, f.Worker) { + return fmt.Errorf("connect.json worker %q is not one of %s", f.Worker, strings.Join(Workers, ", ")) + } if f.Concurrency < 1 || f.Concurrency > MaxConcurrency { return fmt.Errorf("connect.json concurrency %d is outside 1..%d", f.Concurrency, MaxConcurrency) } @@ -236,6 +257,14 @@ func (f File) Validate() error { return nil } +// WorkerName is the worker the file names, the default when it names none. +func (f File) WorkerName() string { + if f.Worker == "" { + return DefaultWorker + } + return f.Worker +} + // Parse decodes connect.json strictly. It refuses what encoding/json would // quietly accept: an unknown key (a misspelled "watch_completion" ignored is // a project the operator believes is driven and is not), a key given twice diff --git a/internal/connector/setup/file_test.go b/internal/connector/setup/file_test.go index 02985305f..f813d90ed 100644 --- a/internal/connector/setup/file_test.go +++ b/internal/connector/setup/file_test.go @@ -264,3 +264,19 @@ func TestSaveRefusesAHoldOnAnotherProfile(t *testing.T) { _, statErr := os.Stat(path) assert.True(t, os.IsNotExist(statErr), "nothing is written") } + +func TestWorkerIsOneSetupKnowsAndDefaultsToClaude(t *testing.T) { + f := validFile(t) + assert.Equal(t, WorkerClaude, f.WorkerName()) + f.Worker = "" + require.NoError(t, f.Validate(), "a file written before the field existed") + assert.Equal(t, WorkerClaude, f.WorkerName()) + f.Worker = "gemini" + assert.Error(t, f.Validate()) + + _, err := Apply(validFile(t), Changes{Worker: "gemini"}) + assert.Error(t, err) + next, err := Apply(validFile(t), Changes{Worker: WorkerClaude}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, WorkerClaude, next.Worker) +} diff --git a/internal/connector/shutdown.go b/internal/connector/shutdown.go index 1e9299256..07dfad647 100644 --- a/internal/connector/shutdown.go +++ b/internal/connector/shutdown.go @@ -30,11 +30,16 @@ func ExitCodeForSignal(sig os.Signal) int { } } -// NotifyShutdown returns a channel carrying the first shutdown signal, and a -// stop function. Separated from the exit-code mapping so the mapping can be -// tested without sending real signals to the test binary. +// NotifyShutdown returns a channel carrying shutdown signals, and a stop +// function. Separated from the exit-code mapping so the mapping can be tested +// without sending real signals to the test binary. +// +// The channel holds two: the first asks for an orderly shutdown, and the +// second is a person who has waited long enough. A caller that takes only the +// first leaves the second in the buffer, where it would be dropped rather +// than heard, which is why the buffer is two and the run reads both. func NotifyShutdown() (<-chan os.Signal, func()) { - ch := make(chan os.Signal, 1) + ch := make(chan os.Signal, 2) signal.Notify(ch, os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM) return ch, func() { signal.Stop(ch) } } diff --git a/internal/connector/tokensocket.go b/internal/connector/tokensocket.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b718eb29c --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/tokensocket.go @@ -0,0 +1,719 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/sha256" + "encoding/hex" + "errors" + "fmt" + "math" + "net" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "sync" + "time" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/setup" +) + +// # The task token's carriage to the worker's MCP server +// +// The agent starts the worker's MCP server, not the connector, and an agent +// hands a stdio server only its standard I/O: there is no descriptor to put a +// token on, and the environment and argv are where a token must never be. So +// the MCP server the agent starts is the connector's own bridge (`basecamp +// connect worker-mcp`), and the token reaches it over a unix socket the +// connector serves for that one attempt: +// +// 1. The socket is bound in the attempt's owner-only (0700) session +// directory under the per-user runtime directory, so no other user can +// reach its path. +// 2. It serves ONE handoff per start of the worker's MCP server, up to +// MaxTokenHandoffs. An MCP host that restarts a stdio server re-runs its +// command, and the bridge takes the token again on every start, so a +// socket that closed after the first handoff would leave a restarted +// server with no Basecamp tools and no way to say so. Anything but a +// delivery — a peer that is not the worker's, a window that runs out — +// ends the socket there and then. +// 3. Between handoffs the socket does not accept. After a delivery it waits +// for the process that took the token to be gone before it will hand the +// token to anything again (ProcessGone on the recorded taker), because +// that is exactly what a restart is: while the server that holds the +// token lives, nothing else may ask for it. Seeing that process exit is +// the ONLY thing that arms the socket again. A holder whose identity +// could not be read, and a kernel that stops answering whether the +// holder is gone, both end the socket instead (HandoffUnaccounted) and +// hold the attempt: neither is evidence that the first holder let go, +// and arming on either is how two processes end up with one task token. +// 4. Before it writes anything it checks the peer's credentials with the +// kernel (SO_PEERCRED on Linux, LOCAL_PEERCRED and LOCAL_PEERPID on +// macOS), on every handoff and not only the first: the peer must be this +// user, and its process must belong to the worker — in the worker's +// process group, or a descendant of the worker process, since an agent +// may start its MCP servers in groups of their own (Codex does). +// Anything else is closed with no token. +// 5. It expires: if nothing connects within the window, it closes and +// unlinks, and nothing is handed over. The release point closes it too, +// so no handoff outlives its attempt. +// +// The bridge puts the token on a pipe and execs `basecamp mcp +// --connect-token-fd`, so after the handoff the token is in no environment, no +// argv and no file. A same-user process outside the worker's group that wins +// the race gets nothing and makes the real bridge fail, which the agent +// reports as a server that did not connect and the session ends as unsafe. +// +// Where this can still be broken: a process inside the worker's group can +// take the token — but that is the worker, which is who the token is for. An +// agent's own tools run in that group, so an agent that goes looking can ask +// for the token while the socket is armed: at the start of the session, and +// after its MCP server has died, which is the window rule (3) exists to keep +// short. What it gets is a token for the tools it already has. + +// errUnreadableDescriptor is a socket whose descriptor is not a number the +// syscall wrappers take. It cannot happen on any platform the connector runs +// on; the check is here so no conversion is made on an assumption. +var errUnreadableDescriptor = errors.New("connector: the socket's descriptor is out of range") + +// socketDescriptor is a raw connection's descriptor as the int the syscall +// wrappers take. A descriptor is a small non-negative index the kernel handed +// out, but Go hands it over as a uintptr, so the range is checked rather than +// assumed. +func socketDescriptor(fd uintptr) (int, bool) { + if fd > math.MaxInt32 { + return 0, false + } + return int(int32(fd)), true +} + +// DefaultTokenWindow is how long a task token's socket waits for the worker's +// MCP server once the worker exists. It covers an agent's start-up, not a +// task's life, and it does not start until AllowGroup names the worker: a +// launcher or a handshake that takes its time must not spend the window of +// the worker it is still starting (card 23's review). The socket waits the +// same window for the worker to be named at all, so nothing waits forever. +const DefaultTokenWindow = 2 * time.Minute + +// startWindows is how many windows the socket waits for the worker to be +// named at all. It is a backstop against a dispatcher that neither names a +// worker nor closes the socket, not a bound on a start: the dispatcher closes +// the socket on every path where a start fails. +const startWindows = 5 + +// TokenSocketName is the socket's name inside the attempt's session directory. +const TokenSocketName = "token.sock" + +// MaxSocketPath is the longest unix socket path every supported platform +// takes: macOS's sun_path is 104 bytes, Linux's 108, both with a NUL. +const MaxSocketPath = 103 + +// TokenSocketFits reports whether a token socket in dir has a path a unix +// socket can carry. +func TokenSocketFits(dir string) bool { + return len(filepath.Join(dir, TokenSocketName)) <= MaxSocketPath +} + +// TokenSocketDir is where an attempt's token socket goes: its own session +// directory when a socket path there fits, and otherwise a directory of its +// own under shortBase. A unix socket path is 103 bytes at most, and a long +// home, a deep XDG_RUNTIME_DIR or large ids can put a session directory past +// it — which would fail every dispatch rather than one (card 22's review), so +// the connector moves the socket instead of refusing the task. The directory +// it makes is the caller's to remove: temporary is true when it made one. +// +// shortBase is the connector's own (ShortSocketBase), owner-only and swept on +// start, so a directory a crash leaves behind is cleared rather than kept +// forever. Everything else about the socket is unchanged wherever it lands: +// the directory is owner-only, the socket is 0600, and the peer must still be +// this user's process in the worker's group or below it. +func TokenSocketDir(preferred, shortBase string) (dir string, temporary bool, err error) { + if TokenSocketFits(preferred) { + return preferred, false, nil + } + if shortBase == "" { + return "", false, fmt.Errorf("connector: a socket path under %s is longer than %d bytes and there is no short directory to use instead", preferred, MaxSocketPath) + } + // MkdirTemp makes it 0700, and the name is short on purpose. + made, err := os.MkdirTemp(shortBase, "s") + if err != nil { + return "", false, fmt.Errorf("connector: token socket directory: %w", err) + } + if !TokenSocketFits(made) { + _ = os.RemoveAll(made) + return "", false, fmt.Errorf("connector: no directory on this machine takes a token socket path of %d bytes or less; %s and %s are both too deep", MaxSocketPath, preferred, shortBase) + } + return made, true, nil +} + +// ShortSocketBase is the directory the connector keeps for token sockets that +// cannot live beside their session's own files: the per-user runtime +// directory where there is one, /tmp otherwise, under a short name of this +// connector's own (so two connectors never share one, and so a start can +// sweep what a crash left). It is created owner-only, through the same +// private-path check the session and state directories get. +// +// name is what makes it this connector's: the state directory's name, which +// carries the account and the agent. +func ShortSocketBase(name string, lookup func(string) (string, bool)) (string, error) { + if lookup == nil { + lookup = os.LookupEnv + } + // In order, and the first that takes a socket path wins: the per-user + // runtime directory is the right home, but a deep one is exactly the + // case this exists for, so /tmp remains the escape hatch. + var bases []string + if runtimeDir, ok := lookup("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR"); ok && filepath.IsAbs(runtimeDir) { + bases = append(bases, runtimeDir) + } + bases = append(bases, os.TempDir(), "/tmp") + + // Short on purpose: what is under it must still fit in 103 bytes. The + // name is a digest of the connector's own, not the ids themselves, which + // can be 19 digits each. + sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(name)) + short := "bcs-" + hex.EncodeToString(sum[:4]) + var last error + for _, base := range bases { + if info, err := os.Stat(base); err != nil || !info.IsDir() { + continue + } + dir := filepath.Join(base, short) + // MkdirTemp appends a random uint32 in decimal, so the longest name + // it can make under this prefix is "s" and ten digits. + if !TokenSocketFits(filepath.Join(dir, "s0123456789")) { + last = fmt.Errorf("connector: %s is too deep for a token socket path of %d bytes or less", dir, MaxSocketPath) + continue + } + if err := setup.EnsurePrivateDir(dir); err != nil { + last = fmt.Errorf("connector: the token socket directory cannot be used: %w", err) + continue + } + return dir, nil + } + if last == nil { + last = errors.New("connector: no directory on this machine can hold a token socket") + } + return "", last +} + +// Handoff says what became of a token socket. +type Handoff string + +const ( + // HandoffDelivered: the worker's MCP server took the token. + HandoffDelivered Handoff = "delivered" + // HandoffRefused: something connected that was not the worker's own + // process, and was given nothing. + HandoffRefused Handoff = "refused" + // HandoffExpired: nothing connected within the window. + HandoffExpired Handoff = "expired" + // HandoffClosed: the connector closed the socket first. + HandoffClosed Handoff = "closed" + // HandoffUndelivered: the peer was the worker's and the connector could + // not write the token to it — the host killed its server between the + // connect and the read, say. It is not a refusal (nothing untrusted + // asked) and not fatal: the socket arms again for the next start. + HandoffUndelivered Handoff = "undelivered" + // HandoffSpent: the worker's MCP server started more times than the + // connector serves its token (MaxTokenHandoffs). A start after this one + // comes up without a token, and its Basecamp tools fail; no adapter + // reports that on the wire (card 23 measured both), so this is the only + // place it can be seen. + HandoffSpent Handoff = "spent" + // HandoffUnaccounted: the token was delivered and the connector cannot + // account for the process holding it — its identity could not be read, + // or the kernel stopped answering whether it is gone. Nothing else is + // ever handed this token, and the attempt is held rather than released + // around a process that may still have it. + HandoffUnaccounted Handoff = "unaccounted" +) + +// TokenHolder is what the connector knows about the process holding an +// attempt's task token, and it is the whole of what the release point acts +// on. Unaccounted is the case the zero Process cannot express: a delivery +// was made and the connector cannot say who took it or whether they have +// gone, which is not the same as no delivery at all. +type TokenHolder struct { + // Process is the process that took the token, where it was identified. + Process driver.Process + // Unaccounted says the token is out and its holder cannot be accounted + // for. Nothing more is handed over, and nothing is released around it. + Unaccounted bool +} + +// Held reports whether an attempt must be held rather than released: its +// token is out and nothing here can prove who has it. +func (h TokenHolder) Held() bool { return h.Unaccounted } + +// PeerCredentials are what the kernel says about the other end of a unix +// socket connection. +type PeerCredentials struct { + PID int + UID int +} + +// TokenSocket serves one task token to the worker's own process group, once +// per start of the worker's MCP server. +type TokenSocket struct { + path string + token string + listener *net.UnixListener + + group chan int + setOnce sync.Once + // handoff is what became of the socket's first handoff, readable once + // done is closed; ended is closed when no handoff is in flight or to + // come. + handoff Handoff + firstOnce sync.Once + done chan struct{} + ended chan struct{} + stop chan struct{} + close sync.Once + + // peer, groupOf, parentOf and lookup read the kernel; test seams. + peer func(*net.UnixConn) (PeerCredentials, error) + groupOf func(pid int) (int, error) + parentOf func(pid int) (int, error) + lookup func(pid int) (driver.Process, error) + // gone answers whether the process that took the token has exited, and + // poll and pollMax are how often it is asked; test seams. + gone func(driver.Process) (bool, error) + poll time.Duration + pollMax time.Duration + + mu sync.Mutex + taker driver.Process + // unaccounted is the one rule's state: the token was delivered and the + // connector cannot account for the process holding it. Once true it + // stays true — a token that is out and unaccounted for is not made safe + // by anything that happens later. + unaccounted bool + onHandoff func(Handoff, driver.Process, bool) +} + +// ServeTaskToken binds the socket for token in dir, which must be the +// attempt's own owner-only directory, and serves it for window. +func ServeTaskToken(dir, token string, window time.Duration) (*TokenSocket, error) { + return serveTaskToken(dir, token, window, peerCredentials, processGroupOf) +} + +func serveTaskToken(dir, token string, window time.Duration, peer func(*net.UnixConn) (PeerCredentials, error), groupOf func(int) (int, error)) (*TokenSocket, error) { + return serveTaskTokenWith(dir, token, window, peer, groupOf, parentProcessOf, driver.LookupProcess) +} + +func serveTaskTokenWith(dir, token string, window time.Duration, peer func(*net.UnixConn) (PeerCredentials, error), groupOf, parentOf func(int) (int, error), lookup func(int) (driver.Process, error)) (*TokenSocket, error) { + if token == "" { + return nil, errors.New("connector: a token socket needs the token") + } + info, err := os.Lstat(dir) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: token socket directory: %w", err) + } + if !info.IsDir() || info.Mode().Perm()&0o077 != 0 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: token socket directory %s must be a directory only its owner can enter", dir) + } + path := filepath.Join(dir, TokenSocketName) + if len(path) > MaxSocketPath { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: token socket path %q is longer than a unix socket allows (%d)", path, MaxSocketPath) + } + listener, err := net.ListenUnix("unix", &net.UnixAddr{Name: path, Net: "unix"}) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: token socket: %w", err) + } + listener.SetUnlinkOnClose(true) + if err := os.Chmod(path, 0o600); err != nil { + _ = listener.Close() + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: token socket: %w", err) + } + s := &TokenSocket{ + path: path, token: token, listener: listener, + group: make(chan int, 1), done: make(chan struct{}), ended: make(chan struct{}), stop: make(chan struct{}), + peer: peer, groupOf: groupOf, parentOf: parentOf, lookup: lookup, + gone: driver.ProcessGone, poll: takerPoll, pollMax: takerPollMax, + } + go s.serve(window) + return s, nil +} + +// Path is where the bridge connects. It carries no secret. +func (s *TokenSocket) Path() string { return s.path } + +// AllowGroup names the worker once it exists, by its process group — which, +// for a worker the connector started, is also the worker's own pid, since the +// worker leads its group. Until it is named, a connection waits for it, +// within the window; a group of 1 or less is never allowed. +func (s *TokenSocket) AllowGroup(pgid int) { + s.setOnce.Do(func() { s.group <- pgid }) +} + +// Holder is what is known about the process holding this attempt's token: it +// is what the release point asks, because the zero Process alone cannot tell +// "nobody took it" from "somebody did and the connector cannot say who". +func (s *TokenSocket) Holder() TokenHolder { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + return TokenHolder{Process: s.taker, Unaccounted: s.unaccounted} +} + +// Taker is the process that took the token, once one has. It is the worker's +// MCP server, which an agent may have started in a process group of its own +// (Codex does), so the connector keeps its identity: it is a process of the +// connector's own making, holding the task's token, and the release point +// ends it along with the worker. +func (s *TokenSocket) Taker() (driver.Process, bool) { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + return s.taker, s.taker.PID > 0 +} + +// Close stops serving, if it still is. Idempotent. +func (s *TokenSocket) Close() { + s.close.Do(func() { + close(s.stop) + _ = s.listener.Close() + }) +} + +// MaxTokenHandoffs is how many times one attempt's token may be handed over. +// An MCP host that restarts a stdio server re-runs its command, and the +// bridge takes the token again on every start, so a socket that served once +// and closed would leave a restarted server with no Basecamp tools and no +// way to say so. +// +// Five, deliberately, and not more: the socket only arms again once the +// server that holds the token is gone, so the rate is already the rate at +// which that server dies, and this bound is not about rate. It is about when +// an attempt's socket ends. A server that has restarted five times in one +// task is not going to settle down, and the connector should stop offering +// its token rather than keep a socket armed for the rest of a long task — +// every moment it is armed is a moment the agent's own tools, which run in +// the worker's group, could ask for the token instead. +// +// Exhaustion is loud rather than quiet: no adapter tells its client that a +// restarted MCP server came up without a token (card 23 measured both), so +// the socket reports HandoffSpent and the connector warns against the +// attempt. A person sees a worker whose tools stopped working and why. +const MaxTokenHandoffs = 5 + +// Result waits for what became of the socket's FIRST handoff. Every caller +// gets the same answer, however many ask. Later handoffs are reported to the +// function OnHandoff was given. +func (s *TokenSocket) Result() Handoff { + <-s.done + return s.handoff +} + +// OnHandoff is called for every handoff the socket makes or refuses, with the +// process that took the token where one did. It is set before the worker is +// named, and is how the connector keeps up with a restarted MCP server. +func (s *TokenSocket) OnHandoff(f func(handoff Handoff, taker driver.Process, afterADelivery bool)) { + s.mu.Lock() + s.onHandoff = f + s.mu.Unlock() +} + +// Settled waits up to wait for the socket to be finished with for good — no +// handoff in flight and none to come — and reports whether it is. It is what +// a caller asks before it reads Taker: a handoff still deciding while the +// attempt is released would otherwise leave the process holding the token +// unknown to the release point. Close first, or this waits out the window. +func (s *TokenSocket) Settled(wait time.Duration) bool { + timer := time.NewTimer(wait) + defer timer.Stop() + select { + case <-s.ended: + return true + case <-timer.C: + return false + } +} + +// takerState is what the socket learned about the process it handed the +// token to. +type takerState int + +const ( + // takerIsGone: that process is gone, and the next start of the worker's + // MCP server is what the socket arms for. + takerIsGone takerState = iota + // takerSocketStopped: the socket was closed while waiting. + takerSocketStopped + // takerUnaccounted: the token is out and the connector can neither say + // who holds it nor prove that they have gone. + takerUnaccounted +) + +// waitForTakerGone waits for the process that took the token to be gone, +// which is what a restart of the worker's MCP server looks like from here. +// The wait itself has no deadline — MaxTokenHandoffs is what bounds the +// socket, not a clock. +// +// It is one half of the rule for a holder the connector cannot account for +// (the other is handed): no proof that the process holding this token has +// exited, no further handoff. A taker whose identity was never read cannot +// be waited for at all, and a kernel that stops answering leaves the +// question open however long it is asked — both end the socket rather than +// arm it, because arming it is what puts the same task token in a second +// process while the first may still be running. +func (s *TokenSocket) waitForTakerGone() takerState { + s.mu.Lock() + taker := s.taker + s.mu.Unlock() + if taker.PID <= 0 { + // A delivery was made to a process this connector could not name + // (handed). There is nothing to watch for, so nothing may be handed + // the token again. + s.markUnaccounted() + return takerUnaccounted + } + wait := s.poll + errors := 0 + for { + timer := time.NewTimer(wait) + select { + case <-s.stop: + timer.Stop() + return takerSocketStopped + case <-timer.C: + } + // The poll backs off: a task runs for hours, and asking the kernel + // about one process every second for all of it is a cost with no + // reader. + if wait < s.pollMax { + wait *= 2 + } + gone, err := s.gone(taker) + switch { + case err == nil && gone: + // The server that held the token is gone; the next start of it is + // what the socket arms for. + return takerIsGone + case err == nil: + errors = 0 + default: + // A kernel this process cannot read cannot answer whether that + // server is gone. Asking is bounded, and running out of tries is + // not an answer: the socket stops here, loudly, rather than arm + // on the assumption that a process it cannot see has exited. + errors++ + if errors >= takerErrorLimit { + s.markUnaccounted() + return takerUnaccounted + } + } + } +} + +// markUnaccounted records that this attempt's token is out and the process +// holding it cannot be accounted for. +func (s *TokenSocket) markUnaccounted() { + s.mu.Lock() + s.unaccounted = true + s.mu.Unlock() +} + +const ( + // takerPoll is how soon the socket first looks to see whether the process + // that took the token is gone, and takerPollMax how far that backs off. + takerPoll = time.Second + takerPollMax = 15 * time.Second + // takerErrorLimit is how many times running the question past the kernel + // may fail before the socket stops waiting for an answer. + takerErrorLimit = 10 +) + +// handed records one handoff: the first is what Result answers, and every one +// goes to OnHandoff's function. after says whether a delivery had already +// been made, so a terminal handoff on a healthy attempt is not reported as a +// worker that never took its token. +func (s *TokenSocket) handed(h Handoff, taker driver.Process, after bool) { + s.mu.Lock() + switch { + case taker.PID > 0: + s.taker = taker + case h == HandoffDelivered: + // The token is out and the connector could not say to whom: keeping + // the last taker would have the socket waiting on a process that is + // not the one holding the token, and the release point ending the + // wrong thing (Opus r9). Nothing is better than something wrong — + // but nothing is not the same as no delivery, which is what the zero + // taker used to read as here (Copilot on #738), so the socket + // remembers that its token is out and unaccounted for. + s.taker = driver.Process{} + s.unaccounted = true + } + f := s.onHandoff + s.mu.Unlock() + s.firstOnce.Do(func() { + s.handoff = h + close(s.done) + }) + if f != nil { + f(h, taker, after) + } +} + +func (s *TokenSocket) serve(window time.Duration) { + defer close(s.ended) + // Nothing is offered before the worker exists, and the window does not + // run while it is being started. A connection that arrives first waits in + // the listener's backlog, which is where the kernel keeps it. + select { + case want := <-s.group: + s.group <- want + case <-s.stop: + s.handed(HandoffClosed, driver.Process{}, false) + return + case <-time.After(startWindows * window): + s.Close() + s.handed(HandoffExpired, driver.Process{}, false) + return + } + // One handoff per start of the worker's MCP server, up to + // MaxTokenHandoffs: a host that restarts a stdio server re-runs it, and + // the bridge takes the token again. Each gets the same peer checks, and + // anything but a delivery ends the socket — a connection that is not the + // worker's is not something to wait past. + delivered := false + for range MaxTokenHandoffs { + if delivered { + switch s.waitForTakerGone() { + case takerIsGone: + // The server that held it has exited; the next start of it + // is what this window is for. + case takerSocketStopped: + // Closed, or the process that took the token is still + // running: nothing else may have it while that server lives. + return + case takerUnaccounted: + // The token is out and nothing here can prove who has it. + // The socket ends closed rather than armed, and says so: the + // attempt is held, not released around a process that may + // still hold its credential. + s.Close() + s.handed(HandoffUnaccounted, driver.Process{}, true) + return + } + } + h, taker := s.handOne(window) + s.handed(h, taker, delivered) + switch h { + case HandoffDelivered: + delivered = true + case HandoffUndelivered: + // Nothing was handed over and nothing untrusted asked: the next + // start of the server is still owed its token. + default: + s.Close() + return + } + } + // The budget is spent: a worker whose MCP server restarts more often than + // this is not one the connector keeps handing its token to, and the next + // start of it will have no Basecamp tools. Nothing else would say so. + s.handed(HandoffSpent, driver.Process{}, true) + s.Close() +} + +// handOne waits for one connection within its own window and hands the token +// over, or says why it did not. +func (s *TokenSocket) handOne(window time.Duration) (Handoff, driver.Process) { + deadline := time.Now().Add(window) + _ = s.listener.SetDeadline(deadline) + conn, err := s.listener.AcceptUnix() + if err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, os.ErrDeadlineExceeded) { + return HandoffExpired, driver.Process{} + } + return HandoffClosed, driver.Process{} + } + defer func() { _ = conn.Close() }() + _ = conn.SetDeadline(deadline) + if !s.trusted(conn, deadline) { + return HandoffRefused, driver.Process{} + } + if _, err := conn.Write([]byte(s.token + "\n")); err != nil { + // The peer was the worker's; the write is what failed. On a unix + // socket a peer that has gone makes this EPIPE at once. + return HandoffUndelivered, driver.Process{} + } + return HandoffDelivered, s.takerOfConn(conn) +} + +// allowedGroup is the worker's process group, or 0 before it is named. +func (s *TokenSocket) allowedGroup() int { + select { + case want := <-s.group: + s.group <- want + return want + default: + return 0 + } +} + +// trusted reports whether the peer is this user's process in the worker's +// own process group. +func (s *TokenSocket) trusted(conn *net.UnixConn, deadline time.Time) bool { + cred, err := s.peer(conn) + if err != nil || cred.UID != os.Getuid() || cred.PID <= 0 { + return false + } + ctx, cancel := context.WithDeadline(context.Background(), deadline) + defer cancel() + var want int + select { + case want = <-s.group: + s.group <- want + case <-ctx.Done(): + return false + } + if want <= 1 { + return false + } + if got, err := s.groupOf(cred.PID); err == nil && got == want { + return true + } + return s.descendsFrom(cred.PID, want) +} + +// maxAncestry bounds the walk up a peer's parents. +const maxAncestry = 64 + +// descendsFrom reports whether pid is a descendant of ancestor. +func (s *TokenSocket) descendsFrom(pid, ancestor int) bool { + for range maxAncestry { + parent, err := s.parentOf(pid) + if err != nil || parent <= 1 { + return false + } + if parent == ancestor { + return true + } + pid = parent + } + return false +} + +// takerOfConn is the identity of the process the token just went to, so the +// release point can end it: it is outside the worker's process group whenever +// the agent started it in one of its own. A restarted MCP server is a new +// process, and the newest is the one holding the token. +func (s *TokenSocket) takerOfConn(conn *net.UnixConn) driver.Process { + cred, err := s.peer(conn) + if err != nil || cred.PID <= 0 { + return driver.Process{} + } + taker, err := s.lookup(cred.PID) + if err != nil { + return driver.Process{} + } + // The group read here is the one the release point would signal, and it + // is a second reading of the kernel: it must still satisfy the rule the + // peer passed, or this attempt does not own it (Opus r8). + want := s.allowedGroup() + if want <= 1 || (taker.PGID != want && !s.descendsFrom(taker.PID, want)) { + return driver.Process{} + } + return taker +} diff --git a/internal/connector/tokensocket_darwin.go b/internal/connector/tokensocket_darwin.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c2e09369c --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/tokensocket_darwin.go @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "net" + + "golang.org/x/sys/unix" +) + +// peerCredentials asks the kernel who is at the other end: LOCAL_PEERCRED for +// the user, LOCAL_PEERPID for the process. +func peerCredentials(conn *net.UnixConn) (PeerCredentials, error) { + raw, err := conn.SyscallConn() + if err != nil { + return PeerCredentials{}, err + } + var ( + cred *unix.Xucred + pid int + credOK error + pidOK error + ) + if err := raw.Control(func(fd uintptr) { + socket, ok := socketDescriptor(fd) + if !ok { + credOK = errUnreadableDescriptor + return + } + cred, credOK = unix.GetsockoptXucred(socket, unix.SOL_LOCAL, unix.LOCAL_PEERCRED) + pid, pidOK = unix.GetsockoptInt(socket, unix.SOL_LOCAL, unix.LOCAL_PEERPID) + }); err != nil { + return PeerCredentials{}, err + } + if credOK != nil { + return PeerCredentials{}, credOK + } + if pidOK != nil { + return PeerCredentials{}, pidOK + } + return PeerCredentials{PID: pid, UID: int(cred.Uid)}, nil +} + +func processGroupOf(pid int) (int, error) { return unix.Getpgid(pid) } + +// parentProcessOf reads a process's parent from kern.proc.pid. +func parentProcessOf(pid int) (int, error) { + info, err := unix.SysctlKinfoProc("kern.proc.pid", pid) + if err != nil { + return 0, err + } + return int(info.Eproc.Ppid), nil +} diff --git a/internal/connector/tokensocket_linux.go b/internal/connector/tokensocket_linux.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..64689f237 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/tokensocket_linux.go @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "errors" + "net" + "os" + "strconv" + "strings" + + "golang.org/x/sys/unix" +) + +// peerCredentials asks the kernel who is at the other end: SO_PEERCRED. +func peerCredentials(conn *net.UnixConn) (PeerCredentials, error) { + raw, err := conn.SyscallConn() + if err != nil { + return PeerCredentials{}, err + } + var ( + cred *unix.Ucred + credOK error + ) + if err := raw.Control(func(fd uintptr) { + socket, ok := socketDescriptor(fd) + if !ok { + credOK = errUnreadableDescriptor + return + } + cred, credOK = unix.GetsockoptUcred(socket, unix.SOL_SOCKET, unix.SO_PEERCRED) + }); err != nil { + return PeerCredentials{}, err + } + if credOK != nil { + return PeerCredentials{}, credOK + } + return PeerCredentials{PID: int(cred.Pid), UID: int(cred.Uid)}, nil +} + +func processGroupOf(pid int) (int, error) { return unix.Getpgid(pid) } + +// parentProcessOf reads a process's parent from /proc/<pid>/stat. +func parentProcessOf(pid int) (int, error) { + raw, err := os.ReadFile("/proc/" + strconv.Itoa(pid) + "/stat") + if err != nil { + return 0, err + } + end := strings.LastIndexByte(string(raw), ')') + if end < 0 { + return 0, errors.New("connector: unreadable /proc stat") + } + fields := strings.Fields(string(raw)[end+1:]) + if len(fields) < 2 { + return 0, errors.New("connector: short /proc stat") + } + return strconv.Atoi(fields[1]) +} diff --git a/internal/connector/tokensocket_other.go b/internal/connector/tokensocket_other.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6c7d6f54d --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/tokensocket_other.go @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +//go:build !linux && !darwin + +package connector + +import ( + "errors" + "net" +) + +var errNoPeerCredentials = errors.New("connector: this platform cannot say who is at the other end of a socket, so no token is handed over") + +// peerCredentials cannot answer here, and a token is never handed to a peer +// nobody could identify. +func peerCredentials(*net.UnixConn) (PeerCredentials, error) { + return PeerCredentials{}, errNoPeerCredentials +} + +func processGroupOf(int) (int, error) { return 0, errNoPeerCredentials } + +func parentProcessOf(int) (int, error) { return 0, errNoPeerCredentials } diff --git a/internal/connector/tokensocket_test.go b/internal/connector/tokensocket_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..531d29461 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/tokensocket_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,528 @@ +//go:build linux || darwin + +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "io" + "log/slog" + "net" + "os" + "os/exec" + "path/filepath" + "strings" + "sync/atomic" + "syscall" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" +) + +const socketTestToken = "test-token-not-real" + +func tokenDir(t *testing.T) string { + t.Helper() + // Unix socket paths are short; a test's own temp directory may not be. + dir, err := os.MkdirTemp("/tmp", "bc-tok-") + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, os.Chmod(dir, 0o700)) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(dir) }) + return dir +} + +// fetch connects and reads whatever the socket hands over. +func fetch(t *testing.T, path string) (string, error) { + t.Helper() + dialer := net.Dialer{Timeout: 2 * time.Second} + conn, err := dialer.DialContext(context.Background(), "unix", path) + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + defer conn.Close() + _ = conn.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)) + data, err := io.ReadAll(conn) + return string(data), err +} + +func TestTheTokenGoesToTheWorkersOwnGroupOnly(t *testing.T) { + s, err := ServeTaskToken(tokenDir(t), socketTestToken, 5*time.Second) + require.NoError(t, err) + // This test process connects, so the worker's group here is its own. + s.AllowGroup(syscall.Getpgrp()) + + got, err := fetch(t, s.Path()) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, socketTestToken+"\n", got) + assert.Equal(t, HandoffDelivered, s.Result()) + + s.Close() + require.True(t, s.Settled(5*time.Second)) + _, err = os.Lstat(s.Path()) + assert.True(t, os.IsNotExist(err), "the socket is unlinked when the connector is done with it") + _, err = fetch(t, s.Path()) + assert.Error(t, err, "and nothing else is served") +} + +// An MCP host that restarts a stdio server re-runs its command, and the +// bridge takes the token again on every start: a socket that served once and +// closed would leave the restarted server with no Basecamp tools. Each start +// is a handoff of its own, with the same peer checks, up to a bound. +func TestARestartedMCPServerTakesTheTokenAgain(t *testing.T) { + // The taker this test reports is a pid that no longer exists, which is + // what the socket waits for between handoffs: a server that has gone. + s, err := serveTaskTokenWith(tokenDir(t), socketTestToken, 5*time.Second, peerCredentials, + processGroupOf, parentProcessOf, func(int) (driver.Process, error) { + // A pid above the kernel's maximum, in the worker's own group: it + // passes the trust rule and is gone the moment it is asked about. + return driver.Process{PID: 1 << 30, PGID: syscall.Getpgrp(), StartedAt: time.Now()}, nil + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + handoffs := make(chan Handoff, MaxTokenHandoffs+2) + s.OnHandoff(func(h Handoff, _ driver.Process, _ bool) { handoffs <- h }) + s.AllowGroup(syscall.Getpgrp()) + + for i := range MaxTokenHandoffs { + got, fetchErr := fetch(t, s.Path()) + require.NoErrorf(t, fetchErr, "handoff %d", i+1) + require.Equal(t, socketTestToken, strings.TrimSpace(got), "handoff %d", i+1) + assert.Equal(t, HandoffDelivered, <-handoffs) + taker, ok := s.Taker() + require.True(t, ok) + assert.Positive(t, taker.PID, "the newest server is the one holding the token") + } + + // The budget is spent, and that is said out loud: no adapter reports a + // server that came up without its token (card 23 measured both). + assert.Equal(t, HandoffSpent, <-handoffs) + require.True(t, s.Settled(5*time.Second), "the budget is spent and the socket is finished with") + _, err = fetch(t, s.Path()) + assert.Error(t, err, "a host that restarts its server more often than that is not served forever") + assert.Equal(t, HandoffDelivered, s.Result(), "the first handoff is still what Result says") +} + +// The peer check is per handoff, not only on the first: a stranger that +// connects after a legitimate restart gets nothing, and ends the socket. +func TestThePeerCheckAppliesToEveryHandoff(t *testing.T) { + // The first connection is the worker's; the second is a process of some + // other group, as the kernel reports it. The taker reported for the first + // is a pid that is gone, so the socket arms again at once. + var handoffCount atomic.Int64 + s, err := serveTaskTokenWith(tokenDir(t), socketTestToken, 5*time.Second, peerCredentials, + func(pid int) (int, error) { + if handoffCount.Add(1) > 1 { + return syscall.Getpgrp() + 100000, nil + } + return processGroupOf(pid) + }, + func(int) (int, error) { return 1, nil }, + func(int) (driver.Process, error) { + return driver.Process{PID: 1 << 30, PGID: syscall.Getpgrp(), StartedAt: time.Now()}, nil + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + handoffs := make(chan Handoff, 4) + s.OnHandoff(func(h Handoff, _ driver.Process, _ bool) { handoffs <- h }) + s.AllowGroup(syscall.Getpgrp()) + + got, err := fetch(t, s.Path()) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Equal(t, socketTestToken, strings.TrimSpace(got)) + assert.Equal(t, HandoffDelivered, <-handoffs) + + second, _ := fetch(t, s.Path()) + assert.Empty(t, strings.TrimSpace(second), "the second handoff is checked like the first") + assert.Equal(t, HandoffRefused, <-handoffs) + assert.True(t, s.Settled(5*time.Second), "and a refusal ends the socket") +} + +func TestAPeerOutsideTheWorkersGroupGetsNothing(t *testing.T) { + s, err := ServeTaskToken(tokenDir(t), socketTestToken, 5*time.Second) + require.NoError(t, err) + s.AllowGroup(syscall.Getpgrp() + 100000) + + got, _ := fetch(t, s.Path()) + assert.Empty(t, got) + assert.Equal(t, HandoffRefused, s.Result()) +} + +func TestAnotherUsersPeerGetsNothing(t *testing.T) { + other := func(conn *net.UnixConn) (PeerCredentials, error) { + cred, err := peerCredentials(conn) + cred.UID++ + return cred, err + } + s, err := serveTaskToken(tokenDir(t), socketTestToken, 5*time.Second, other, processGroupOf) + require.NoError(t, err) + s.AllowGroup(syscall.Getpgrp()) + + got, _ := fetch(t, s.Path()) + assert.Empty(t, got) + assert.Equal(t, HandoffRefused, s.Result()) +} + +func TestAWorkerGroupNeverNamedHandsNothingOver(t *testing.T) { + s, err := ServeTaskToken(tokenDir(t), socketTestToken, 100*time.Millisecond) + require.NoError(t, err) + got, _ := fetch(t, s.Path()) + assert.Empty(t, got, "there is no worker to trust a peer against") + // A worker that is never named leaves nothing to decide about the peer; + // the socket gives up on the worker, not on it. + assert.Equal(t, HandoffExpired, s.Result()) +} + +func TestATokenSocketNobodyUsesExpires(t *testing.T) { + s, err := ServeTaskToken(tokenDir(t), socketTestToken, 150*time.Millisecond) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, HandoffExpired, s.Result()) + _, err = os.Lstat(s.Path()) + assert.True(t, os.IsNotExist(err), "an expired socket is unlinked") + _, err = fetch(t, s.Path()) + assert.Error(t, err) +} + +func TestATokenSocketNeedsAPrivateDirectory(t *testing.T) { + dir := tokenDir(t) + require.NoError(t, os.Chmod(dir, 0o755)) + _, err := ServeTaskToken(dir, socketTestToken, time.Second) + assert.Error(t, err) + _, statErr := os.Lstat(filepath.Join(dir, TokenSocketName)) + assert.True(t, os.IsNotExist(statErr)) +} + +// Codex starts its MCP servers in process groups of their own, so a +// descendant of the worker in another group is the worker's too. +func TestAWorkersDescendantInItsOwnGroupGetsTheToken(t *testing.T) { + python, err := exec.LookPath("python3") + if err != nil { + t.Skip("python3 is needed for a child in a group of its own") + } + s, err := ServeTaskToken(tokenDir(t), socketTestToken, 10*time.Second) + require.NoError(t, err) + // This test process plays the worker; the child it starts is its + // descendant, in a new process group. + s.AllowGroup(os.Getpid()) + script := "import socket,sys\ns=socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX)\ns.connect(sys.argv[1])\nprint(s.recv(256).decode().strip())" + cmd := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), python, "-c", script, s.Path()) + cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setpgid: true} + out, err := cmd.Output() + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, socketTestToken, strings.TrimSpace(string(out))) + assert.Equal(t, HandoffDelivered, s.Result()) +} + +// Card 23's review: the window is the worker's MCP server's, and a slow +// launcher or a handshake that takes as long as the window must not spend it. +func TestTheWindowStartsWhenTheWorkerIsNamed(t *testing.T) { + window := 300 * time.Millisecond + s, err := ServeTaskToken(tokenDir(t), socketTestToken, window) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + + // A handshake as long as the whole window, and then the worker exists. + time.Sleep(window + 100*time.Millisecond) + s.AllowGroup(syscall.Getpgrp()) + + got, err := fetch(t, s.Path()) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, socketTestToken, strings.TrimSpace(got)) + assert.Equal(t, HandoffDelivered, s.Result()) +} + +// A worker that is never named does not hold the socket forever. +func TestASocketNoWorkerIsEverNamedForExpires(t *testing.T) { + s, err := ServeTaskToken(tokenDir(t), socketTestToken, 150*time.Millisecond) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, HandoffExpired, s.Result()) +} + +// Card 23's review: the connector keeps the identity of the process that took +// the token, because an agent may have started it outside the worker's group. +func TestTheSocketRemembersWhoTookTheToken(t *testing.T) { + s, err := ServeTaskToken(tokenDir(t), socketTestToken, time.Second) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + s.AllowGroup(syscall.Getpgrp()) + + _, ok := s.Taker() + assert.False(t, ok, "nobody has taken it yet") + + got, err := fetch(t, s.Path()) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Equal(t, socketTestToken, strings.TrimSpace(got)) + require.Equal(t, HandoffDelivered, s.Result()) + + taker, ok := s.Taker() + require.True(t, ok) + assert.Equal(t, os.Getpid(), taker.PID, "this test took it") + assert.Equal(t, syscall.Getpgrp(), taker.PGID) + assert.False(t, taker.StartedAt.IsZero(), "with the start time that tells it from a later pid") +} + +// Opus r7: the short base is chosen so that what MkdirTemp makes under it +// still fits, and a runtime directory too deep for one falls through to /tmp +// rather than leaving the connector with nowhere to put a socket. +func TestTheShortSocketBaseIsChosenSoTheSocketFits(t *testing.T) { + deep, err := os.MkdirTemp("/tmp", "bcrt-") + require.NoError(t, err) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(deep) }) + deep = filepath.Join(deep, strings.Repeat("d", 40), strings.Repeat("e", 40)) + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(deep, 0o700)) + + base, err := ShortSocketBase("2914079-52007412", func(k string) (string, bool) { + if k == "XDG_RUNTIME_DIR" { + return deep, true + } + return "", false + }) + require.NoError(t, err, "a runtime directory too deep is not the end of it") + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(base) }) + assert.False(t, strings.HasPrefix(base, deep), "the deep one is skipped") + + // Whatever MkdirTemp makes under it fits, with its longest possible name. + dir, temporary, err := TokenSocketDir(filepath.Join(deep, strings.Repeat("a", AttemptIDLength)), base) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, temporary) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(dir) }) + assert.True(t, TokenSocketFits(filepath.Join(base, "s0123456789")), "the longest name MkdirTemp can make") + assert.True(t, TokenSocketFits(dir)) + + socket, err := ServeTaskToken(dir, socketTestToken, time.Second) + require.NoError(t, err, "and a socket actually binds there") + socket.Close() +} + +// Opus r6/r7: a handoff in flight when an attempt ends is finished with +// before anything reads who took the token, so the release point never sees +// an empty taker for a token that was in fact handed over. +func TestAHandoffInFlightIsFinishedBeforeTheTakerIsRead(t *testing.T) { + // The identity lookup is where the handoff is slowest; hold it there. + slow := make(chan struct{}) + s, err := serveTaskTokenWith(tokenDir(t), socketTestToken, 2*time.Second, + peerCredentials, processGroupOf, parentProcessOf, + func(pid int) (driver.Process, error) { + <-slow + return driver.LookupProcess(pid) + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + s.AllowGroup(syscall.Getpgrp()) + + got := make(chan string, 1) + go func() { + token, _ := fetch(t, s.Path()) + got <- token + }() + require.Equal(t, socketTestToken, strings.TrimSpace(<-got), "the token is out before the taker is known") + _, ok := s.Taker() + require.False(t, ok, "the fixture must have the handoff still deciding") + + // The release point's move: stop the socket, wait for it, then read. + s.Close() + close(slow) + assert.True(t, s.Settled(5*time.Second), "the socket finishes what it was doing") + taker, ok := s.Taker() + require.True(t, ok, "and the process that took the token is known by then") + assert.Equal(t, os.Getpid(), taker.PID) + assert.Equal(t, HandoffDelivered, s.Result()) +} + +// Opus r8: after a delivery the socket does not arm again while the process +// that took the token is still running — a restart is that process ending — +// so the token is not there for the asking for the rest of the window. +func TestTheSocketDoesNotArmAgainWhileTheServerHoldingTheTokenLives(t *testing.T) { + // The taker reported is this test process, which is very much alive. + s, err := serveTaskTokenWith(tokenDir(t), socketTestToken, 300*time.Millisecond, peerCredentials, + processGroupOf, parentProcessOf, driver.LookupProcess) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + handoffs := make(chan Handoff, 4) + s.OnHandoff(func(h Handoff, _ driver.Process, _ bool) { handoffs <- h }) + s.AllowGroup(syscall.Getpgrp()) + + got, err := fetch(t, s.Path()) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Equal(t, socketTestToken, strings.TrimSpace(got)) + require.Equal(t, HandoffDelivered, <-handoffs) + taker, ok := s.Taker() + require.True(t, ok) + require.Equal(t, os.Getpid(), taker.PID) + + // Two windows' worth of asking, while the server that has the token runs. + for range 3 { + second, _ := fetch(t, s.Path()) + assert.Empty(t, strings.TrimSpace(second), "nothing is handed out while that server lives") + } + select { + case h := <-handoffs: + t.Fatalf("a second handoff was made while the first server was still running: %s", h) + default: + } + assert.False(t, s.Settled(100*time.Millisecond), "and the socket is still this attempt's, waiting") +} + +// Opus r9: a write that fails after the peer passed the checks is not a +// refusal and does not end the socket — the worker's next start is still owed +// its token. +func TestAWriteThatFailsIsNotARefusal(t *testing.T) { + s, err := serveTaskTokenWith(tokenDir(t), socketTestToken, 5*time.Second, peerCredentials, + processGroupOf, parentProcessOf, func(int) (driver.Process, error) { + return driver.Process{PID: 1 << 30, PGID: syscall.Getpgrp(), StartedAt: time.Now()}, nil + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + handoffs := make(chan Handoff, 4) + s.OnHandoff(func(h Handoff, _ driver.Process, _ bool) { handoffs <- h }) + s.AllowGroup(syscall.Getpgrp()) + + // Connect and go, the way a host that kills its server between the + // connect and the read does. + dialer := net.Dialer{Timeout: 2 * time.Second} + conn, err := dialer.DialContext(context.Background(), "unix", s.Path()) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, conn.(*net.UnixConn).CloseRead()) + require.NoError(t, conn.Close()) + + first := <-handoffs + if first == HandoffDelivered { + t.Skip("the kernel took the write before the peer's close landed; the race is the fixture's, not the rule's") + } + assert.Equal(t, HandoffUndelivered, first, "not a refusal: nothing untrusted asked") + + // And the socket is still this attempt's: the next start gets its token. + got, err := fetch(t, s.Path()) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, socketTestToken, strings.TrimSpace(got)) + assert.Equal(t, HandoffDelivered, <-handoffs) +} + +// A delivery the connector cannot attribute leaves no taker behind: waiting +// on the wrong process, or ending it, is worse than not knowing. +func TestADeliveryWithNoIdentityClearsTheTaker(t *testing.T) { + identify := make(chan struct{}) + s, err := serveTaskTokenWith(tokenDir(t), socketTestToken, 5*time.Second, peerCredentials, + processGroupOf, parentProcessOf, func(pid int) (driver.Process, error) { + select { + case <-identify: + return driver.Process{}, errors.New("the kernel would not say") + default: + return driver.Process{PID: 1 << 30, PGID: syscall.Getpgrp(), StartedAt: time.Now()}, nil + } + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + handoffs := make(chan Handoff, 4) + s.OnHandoff(func(h Handoff, _ driver.Process, _ bool) { handoffs <- h }) + s.AllowGroup(syscall.Getpgrp()) + + got, err := fetch(t, s.Path()) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Equal(t, socketTestToken, strings.TrimSpace(got)) + require.Equal(t, HandoffDelivered, <-handoffs) + taker, ok := s.Taker() + require.True(t, ok) + require.Equal(t, 1<<30, taker.PID) + + // The next handoff's identity cannot be read. + close(identify) + got, err = fetch(t, s.Path()) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Equal(t, socketTestToken, strings.TrimSpace(got), "the token still goes to a peer that passed") + require.Equal(t, HandoffDelivered, <-handoffs) + _, ok = s.Taker() + assert.False(t, ok, "and no stale taker is left standing for the release point to end") +} + +// Copilot on #738: running out of tries to see whether the process holding +// the token has exited is not the same as watching it exit. The socket used +// to arm again after ten unreadable answers, which puts the same task token +// in a second process while the first may still be running. +func TestAKernelThatStopsAnsweringNeverArmsTheSocketAgain(t *testing.T) { + asked := 0 + s := &TokenSocket{ + stop: make(chan struct{}), + // A taker of this process's own, so the wait has something real to + // watch, and a kernel that will not say whether it is gone. + taker: driver.Process{PID: os.Getpid(), PGID: syscall.Getpgrp(), StartedAt: time.Now(), StartedExact: true}, + poll: time.Millisecond, + pollMax: time.Millisecond, + gone: func(driver.Process) (bool, error) { + asked++ + return false, errors.New("the process table cannot be read") + }, + } + + assert.Equal(t, takerUnaccounted, s.waitForTakerGone(), "an unanswerable question is not an answer") + assert.Equal(t, takerErrorLimit, asked, "and it is asked the whole budget first") + assert.True(t, s.Holder().Unaccounted, "the attempt is held: its token is out and nobody can say where") + assert.True(t, s.Holder().Held()) +} + +// A delivery the connector could not attribute is not the same as no +// delivery, and used to be recorded as one: the zero taker armed the socket +// for another handoff and told the release point nothing was out. +func TestADeliveryToAnUnidentifiedProcessIsNotHandedAgain(t *testing.T) { + s, err := serveTaskTokenWith(tokenDir(t), socketTestToken, 2*time.Second, peerCredentials, + processGroupOf, parentProcessOf, func(int) (driver.Process, error) { + // The peer passed the trust rule, and then the kernel would not + // say who it was. + return driver.Process{}, errors.New("the process table cannot be read") + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer s.Close() + handoffs := make(chan Handoff, 4) + s.OnHandoff(func(h Handoff, _ driver.Process, _ bool) { handoffs <- h }) + s.AllowGroup(syscall.Getpgrp()) + + got, err := fetch(t, s.Path()) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Equal(t, socketTestToken, strings.TrimSpace(got), "the worker's own server is served") + assert.Equal(t, HandoffDelivered, <-handoffs) + + // Armed again, the socket would hand the same token to whatever asked + // next while the first holder may still be running. + second, _ := fetch(t, s.Path()) + assert.Empty(t, strings.TrimSpace(second), "nothing else is given this task's token") + assert.Equal(t, HandoffUnaccounted, <-handoffs, "and the socket ends there, loudly") + require.True(t, s.Settled(5*time.Second)) + + holder := s.Holder() + assert.True(t, holder.Held(), "the release point is told the token is out and unaccounted for") + assert.Zero(t, holder.Process.PID, "with no process to end, since none could be named") +} + +// Beyond Copilot's list, the same rule one step earlier: the release point +// closes the socket and waits for it to finish deciding, and a wait that +// runs out used to be a warning the release went ahead past. A handoff +// still in flight is a token that may cross to a process the attempt will +// never have recorded, which is a holder nobody can account for. +func TestAHandoffStillInFlightAtTheReleasePointHoldsTheAttempt(t *testing.T) { + blocked, release := make(chan struct{}, 1), make(chan struct{}) + s, err := serveTaskTokenWith(tokenDir(t), socketTestToken, time.Minute, + func(conn *net.UnixConn) (PeerCredentials, error) { + select { + case blocked <- struct{}{}: + default: + } + <-release + return peerCredentials(conn) + }, processGroupOf, parentProcessOf, driver.LookupProcess) + require.NoError(t, err) + defer func() { close(release); s.Close() }() + s.AllowGroup(syscall.Getpgrp()) + + go func() { _, _ = fetch(t, s.Path()) }() + select { + case <-blocked: + case <-time.After(10 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("the handoff never started") + } + + holder := settledTaker(s, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler), "att", 50*time.Millisecond) + assert.True(t, holder.Held(), "an attempt is not released around a handoff that is still deciding") +} diff --git a/internal/connector/worktrees.go b/internal/connector/worktrees.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..82fc906a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/worktrees.go @@ -0,0 +1,1904 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "bytes" + "context" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/sha256" + "encoding/hex" + "errors" + "fmt" + "log/slog" + "os" + "os/exec" + "path/filepath" + "regexp" + "slices" + "strconv" + "strings" + "sync" + "time" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/setup" +) + +// Worktrees is --worktrees: each task works in a git worktree of its own, +// branched from the route's HEAD, so tasks on one repository run side by +// side. When the task ends its worktree is kept, recorded in the ledger and +// listed by `basecamp connect status` and `basecamp connect worktrees list`, +// until an operator discards it with `basecamp connect worktrees prune`. +// +// # One worktree, one removal +// +// WHEN. Only an operator's `worktrees prune` removes a worktree. The +// connector never removes one of its own accord: a task's end (Finish, which +// the dispatcher calls at its release point, after the task has ended and +// ConfirmGroupGone has confirmed the worker's process group gone) and a +// start's recovery (Recover, before anything is dispatched) only ever keep +// it, whatever is in it. Prune touches only worktrees no live task holds, +// holds the worktrees lock, and goes through removeWorktree. Nothing else in +// the connector deletes a worktree's directory or git's record of it +// (<repo>/.git/worktrees/<name>), and nothing runs `git worktree remove`. +// +// A worktree whose directory something outside the connector removed is a +// case of its own: what is left — git's record and the task branch — reaches +// whatever it reaches, and the connector neither judges that nor deletes any +// of it. The row is kept, said to be orphaned, and listed with the record, so +// an operator sees it; naming its path in a force is what deletes the branch, +// and git's own `worktree prune` is what clears the record. Nothing about +// reachability is decided on that path at all. +// +// WHAT is work. Anything on the disk that is not a tracked file, unchanged: +// a modified, staged, untracked or ignored file, a directory git has no file +// in, anything inside a submodule's directory, an index entry that hides an +// edit. An operation in progress (merge, rebase, cherry-pick, revert, +// bisect). A lock someone set. A submodule's git data. And every commit the +// worktree reaches — HEAD, the task branch, their reflogs, per-worktree refs +// (refs/worktree, refs/bisect, refs/rewritten) — that no ref the connector +// keeps holds, a kept ref being a remote branch, a local branch that is not a +// task's, or a ref a forced removal of this worktree kept it under. The commit +// the worktree was made from is one of those commits: the route's branch +// usually holds it, and a route reset since is not evidence that it does. A +// stash +// is in refs/stash, which belongs to the repository and is never touched. +// +// WHAT happens to work. The connector never discards it. A prune without an +// operator's force keeps the worktree, with its reason, and lists it. With +// the force, every commit the worktree reaches that nothing holds is first +// kept under refs/basecamp-connect/retained/<name>/<commit>; +// a worktree whose work cannot be kept that way (submodule git data, a HEAD +// that cannot be read) is not removed. +// +// HOW the check holds until the removal. removeWorktree freezes the worktree +// before it judges anything: it locks git's record of it (as `git worktree +// lock` does, so git's own prune leaves the frozen record alone), renames the +// record and then the directory aside, each an atomic rename. From then on no git command can +// move its HEAD or commit in it (its .git file names a record that is not +// there), and nothing that reaches it by path can write to it. The evidence +// is judged on the frozen copy, and the frozen copy is what is deleted — or +// both names are restored and the worktree retained. What the judgment leans +// on outside the frozen copy — the refs that hold the commits it reaches — is +// verified again where it was found, in the one ref transaction that ends the +// task branch, immediately before the frozen copy is deleted: a fetch, a +// reset or a deleted branch since makes git refuse the transaction, and the +// worktree is kept instead. A crash while frozen leaves a removing row, and +// the next start restores the names and judges again. The one writer outside the rule is a process that escaped the +// task's process group and holds a descriptor inside the directory. +// +// WHO forces. Only an operator, naming the worktree's path in `basecamp +// connect worktrees prune --force <path>`. A force is a decision about work, +// not a judgment of it: it is the one thing that goes ahead where the rule +// above would keep a worktree, and what it can find is kept under refs first. +// +// # Invariants +// +// Each is held by a test in worktrees_test.go. +// +// 1. The rule above, the first half of it being that a task's end and a +// start's recovery keep every worktree they find. +// 2. The ledger first. A worktree is recorded creating before `git worktree +// add` runs, and removing before it is frozen, so a crash at any point +// leaves a row that says where a directory may be. +// 3. Nothing the repository, its configuration or a worker's files name +// runs: git never looks inside a submodule's directory (the disk is judged +// before git is asked anything that could recurse, and status ignores +// submodules), and every git call runs with hooks, the fsmonitor, +// signature verification and every content filter its configuration +// defines disabled, with a fixed environment. +// 4. A task branch is deleted only if this connector created it, and only in +// one ref transaction that deletes it at the commit judged held and +// verifies that every ref holding a commit the worktree reaches is still +// where the judgment found it. +// +// Placement goes through Options.Path, one function, because under the +// sandbox launcher (step 26) the working directory comes from broker-owned +// scopes instead. +type Worktrees struct { + ledger *Ledger + root string + git string + env []string + path func(root, repository, name string) string + log *slog.Logger + // red takes the connector's own paths and environment out of anything git + // says (the shared rule in driver/redact.go). + red *driver.Redactor + // walkLimit is WalkLimit; a test seam. + walkLimit time.Duration + // whileFrozen runs once a removal has frozen a worktree, before it is + // judged; a test seam. An error leaves it frozen, as a crash would. + whileFrozen func(dir string) error + now func() time.Time + + // Off leaves new tasks in their route; see WorktreesOptions.Off. + off bool + + mu sync.Mutex + failures map[string]prepareFailure +} + +var _ WaitingWorkspaces = (*Worktrees)(nil) + +// prepareFailure is a route that could not take a worktree, and when to try +// it again. +type prepareFailure struct { + count int + until time.Time +} + +// Prepare's backoff after a failure: doubling from the first, capped. +const ( + PrepareBackoff = time.Minute + PrepareBackoffMax = 30 * time.Minute +) + +// ErrPrepareBackoff is a Prepare on a route whose last worktree failed too +// recently to try again. +var ErrPrepareBackoff = errors.New("the last worktree on this route failed; waiting before trying again") + +// WorktreesOptions configures Worktrees. +type WorktreesOptions struct { + Ledger *Ledger + // Root is the owner-only directory worktrees are placed under: the + // connector state directory's worktrees/. + Root string + // Git is the git binary; "git" on PATH when empty. + Git string + // Lookup reads the connector's environment for git's; os.LookupEnv when + // nil. + Lookup func(string) (string, bool) + // Redaction is what is taken out of anything git says: the driver + // package's shared rule. + Redaction driver.Redaction + // Path places a task's worktree; DefaultWorktreePath when nil. + Path func(root, repository, name string) string + Logger *slog.Logger + // Off gives new tasks no worktree: they work in the route itself. The + // worktrees made while it was on are still settled and recovered, so + // switching worktrees off never strands one. + Off bool +} + +var ( + _ PerTaskWorkspaces = (*Worktrees)(nil) + _ RecoveringWorkspaces = (*Worktrees)(nil) +) + +// BranchPrefix names every task branch, so a task branch is never evidence +// that another task's commits are safe. +const BranchPrefix = "basecamp-connect/" + +// NewWorktrees builds Worktrees. +func NewWorktrees(opts WorktreesOptions) (*Worktrees, error) { + if opts.Ledger == nil || opts.Root == "" || !filepath.IsAbs(opts.Root) { + return nil, errors.New("connector: worktrees need the ledger and an absolute root") + } + if opts.Git == "" { + opts.Git = "git" + } + if opts.Lookup == nil { + opts.Lookup = os.LookupEnv + } + if opts.Path == nil { + opts.Path = DefaultWorktreePath + } + if opts.Logger == nil { + opts.Logger = slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler) + } + env := driver.BuildEnv(driver.BaseEnv, opts.Lookup, map[string]string{ + // Never ask anyone anything, never take an optional lock a person's + // own git in the checkout would then wait on. + "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0", + "GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS": "0", + "LC_ALL": "C", + }) + return &Worktrees{ + ledger: opts.Ledger, root: opts.Root, git: opts.Git, env: env, path: opts.Path, log: opts.Logger, + now: time.Now, off: opts.Off, walkLimit: WalkLimit, + red: driver.NewRedactor(opts.Redaction.With(driver.Redaction{Env: env, Dirs: []string{opts.Root}})), failures: map[string]prepareFailure{}, + }, nil +} + +// DefaultWorktreePath places a worktree under the connector's state +// directory, one directory per repository: never inside the checkout, where a +// task working in the route itself could edit another task's retained work, +// and `git add -A` in the checkout would pick it up. +func DefaultWorktreePath(root, repository, name string) string { + sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(repository)) + return filepath.Join(root, safeName(filepath.Base(repository))+"-"+hex.EncodeToString(sum[:4]), name) +} + +var unsafeNameRunes = regexp.MustCompile(`[^A-Za-z0-9._-]+`) + +func safeName(s string) string { + s = unsafeNameRunes.ReplaceAllString(s, "-") + s = strings.Trim(s, ".-") + if len(s) > 40 { + s = s[:40] + } + if s == "" { + return "repo" + } + return s +} + +// PerTaskDirs implements PerTaskWorkspaces. +func (w *Worktrees) PerTaskDirs() bool { return !w.off } + +// Prepare implements Workspaces: a new worktree on a new task branch at the +// route's HEAD, and the route's place inside it. +// +// A failure holds the route, not the event: what stops a worktree (a route +// that is not a repository, one with no commit, a full disk) stops every +// event on it. The route waits PrepareBackoff, doubling up to +// PrepareBackoffMax, and RoutesWaiting tells the dispatcher to leave its +// records out, so they neither fill the disk and the ledger nor the window +// other routes' records are started from. +func (w *Worktrees) Prepare(ctx context.Context, route string, originatingEventID int64) (string, error) { + if w.off { + return route, nil + } + w.mu.Lock() + failure, failed := w.failures[route] + w.mu.Unlock() + if failed && w.now().Before(failure.until) { + return "", fmt.Errorf("connector: event %d on %s: %w", originatingEventID, route, ErrPrepareBackoff) + } + workDir, err := w.prepare(ctx, route, originatingEventID) + w.mu.Lock() + defer w.mu.Unlock() + if err != nil { + failure.count++ + delay := PrepareBackoff << min(failure.count-1, 10) + failure.until = w.now().Add(min(delay, PrepareBackoffMax)) + w.failures[route] = failure + return "", err + } + delete(w.failures, route) + return workDir, nil +} + +// RoutesWaiting implements WaitingWorkspaces: the routes still in a Prepare +// backoff. +func (w *Worktrees) RoutesWaiting() []string { + w.mu.Lock() + defer w.mu.Unlock() + now := w.now() + var out []string + for route, f := range w.failures { + if now.Before(f.until) { + out = append(out, route) + } + } + return out +} + +func (w *Worktrees) prepare(ctx context.Context, route string, originatingEventID int64) (string, error) { + if !filepath.IsAbs(route) { + return "", fmt.Errorf("connector: route %q is not absolute", route) + } + top, err := w.gitOut(ctx, route, "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel") + if err != nil { + return "", fmt.Errorf("connector: route %s is not in a git repository: %w", route, err) + } + repository := filepath.Clean(top) + rel, err := filepath.Rel(realPath(repository), realPath(route)) + if err != nil || rel == ".." || strings.HasPrefix(rel, ".."+string(filepath.Separator)) { + return "", fmt.Errorf("connector: route %s is not inside its repository", route) + } + base, err := w.gitOut(ctx, repository, "rev-parse", "--verify", "--end-of-options", "HEAD^{commit}") + if err != nil { + return "", fmt.Errorf("connector: route %s has no commit to branch from: %w", route, err) + } + suffix := make([]byte, 3) + if _, err := rand.Read(suffix); err != nil { + return "", err + } + name := strconv.FormatInt(originatingEventID, 10) + "-" + hex.EncodeToString(suffix) + path := w.path(w.root, repository, name) + if !filepath.IsAbs(path) { + return "", fmt.Errorf("connector: worktree path %q is not absolute", path) + } + workDir := filepath.Join(path, rel) + record := Worktree{ + Path: path, WorkDir: workDir, Route: route, Repository: repository, + Branch: BranchPrefix + name, BaseCommit: base, OriginatingEventID: originatingEventID, + State: WorktreeCreating, + } + id, err := w.ledger.BeginWorktree(ctx, record) + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + record.ID = id + + err = w.add(ctx, &record) + if err == nil { + record.AdminDir, err = w.gitOut(ctx, record.Path, "rev-parse", "--absolute-git-dir") + } + if err == nil { + err = w.ledger.WorktreeAdminDir(ctx, id, record.AdminDir) + } + if err == nil { + err = w.ledger.MoveWorktree(ctx, id, WorktreeLive, WorktreeCreating) + } + if err != nil { + // Whatever git left is judged like any finished worktree; a lock not + // had leaves the row for the next start. + settleCtx := context.WithoutCancel(ctx) + if unlock, lockErr := w.lock(settleCtx); lockErr == nil { + w.settle(settleCtx, record) + unlock() + } + return "", fmt.Errorf("connector: create a worktree for event %d: %w", originatingEventID, err) + } + return workDir, nil +} + +func (w *Worktrees) add(ctx context.Context, r *Worktree) error { + if err := os.MkdirAll(w.root, 0o700); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := setup.EnsurePrivateDir(filepath.Dir(r.Path)); err != nil { + return err + } + // The branch is created before the worktree and only if it does not + // exist, so the row's branch is this task's and deleting it later can + // never delete a branch someone else made (invariant 1). + if _, err := w.gitOut(ctx, r.Repository, "update-ref", "--end-of-options", "refs/heads/"+r.Branch, r.BaseCommit, ""); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := w.ledger.WorktreeBranchCreated(ctx, r.ID); err != nil { + return err + } + // The caller settles this record if anything below fails, and only a + // record that says the branch is ours lets it be deleted again. + r.BranchCreated = true + // The checkout runs in the new worktree, so the filters blanked are the + // ones its own configuration defines (an include on its branch among + // them), not the checkout's the route is in. + if _, err := w.gitOut(ctx, r.Repository, "worktree", "add", "--no-checkout", "--end-of-options", r.Path, r.Branch); err != nil { + return err + } + _, err := w.gitOut(ctx, r.Path, "reset", "--quiet", "--hard", "--end-of-options", r.BaseCommit) + return err +} + +// Finish implements Workspaces: the worktree a task worked in is kept, +// whatever is in it, and recorded as kept so `worktrees list` shows it and a +// prune can judge it. Nothing here removes anything. A directory that is not +// one of this connector's worktrees is left alone. +func (w *Worktrees) Finish(ctx context.Context, _ string, workDir string) error { + record, ok, err := w.ledger.WorktreeByWorkDir(ctx, workDir) + if err != nil || !ok { + return err + } + if record.State != WorktreeCreating && record.State != WorktreeLive { + return nil + } + unlock, err := w.lock(ctx) + if err != nil { + // The worktree is kept either way, but it is said to be kept: a row + // left live is a directory `worktrees list` does not show and no + // prune touches until the next start settles it. + return errors.Join(err, w.keepUnjudged(ctx, record)) + } + defer unlock() + if after := w.settle(ctx, record); after.State != WorktreeRetained && after.State != WorktreeRemoved { + // The worktree is where it was; the ledger could not say so, and the + // row is not one `worktrees list` shows or a prune touches. The next + // start settles it. + return fmt.Errorf("connector: worktree %s is kept, but the ledger could not record it; the next start does", record.Path) + } + return nil +} + +// keepUnjudged retains a worktree the connector could not judge, so the +// operator sees it in `worktrees list` and a prune judges it later. +func (w *Worktrees) keepUnjudged(ctx context.Context, r Worktree) error { + // Waiting for the lock is what used the caller's deadline up: the row is + // still recorded, on a deadline of its own. + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), 10*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := w.ledger.RetainWorktree(ctx, r.ID, RetainedUnverified, r.State); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connector: worktree %s is kept, but the ledger could not record it; the next start does: %w", r.Path, err) + } + w.log.Info("connector: worktree retained", "path", r.Path, "branch", r.Branch, "reason", string(RetainedUnverified)) + return nil +} + +// Recover implements RecoveringWorkspaces: every worktree a crash left +// creating, live or removing with no live task in it is kept and recorded as +// kept, as a finished task's is, after a removal the crash interrupted has +// its names restored. It removes nothing. It runs in the connector that holds +// the instance lock, before anything is dispatched. +func (w *Worktrees) Recover(ctx context.Context) error { + unlock, err := w.lock(ctx) + if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) && ctx.Err() == nil { + // A prune holding the lock does not keep the connector from starting: + // what Recover would settle is no task's, nothing is dispatched into + // it, and the next start settles it. + w.log.Warn("connector: worktrees are locked by another process; recovery left for the next start") + return nil + } + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer unlock() + records, err := w.ledger.UnfinishedWorktrees(ctx) + if err != nil { + return err + } + var unrecorded []string + for _, r := range records { + if after := w.settle(ctx, r); after.State != WorktreeRetained && after.State != WorktreeRemoved { + unrecorded = append(unrecorded, r.Path) + } + } + if len(unrecorded) > 0 { + // Nothing was deleted — recovery deletes nothing — but the ledger + // does not say where these worktrees are, so nothing lists them and + // no prune touches them. Starting on that is starting blind. + return fmt.Errorf("connector: %d worktree(s) could not be recorded: %s", len(unrecorded), strings.Join(unrecorded, ", ")) + } + return nil +} + +// Retained lists the worktrees kept for the operator: those retained, and +// those a removal left mid-flight, which hold work until a start or a prune +// judges them again. +func (w *Worktrees) Retained(ctx context.Context) ([]Worktree, error) { + return w.ledger.Worktrees(ctx, WorktreeRetained, WorktreeRemoving) +} + +// PruneAction is what prune did with one retained worktree. +type PruneAction string + +const ( + PruneRemoved PruneAction = "removed" + PruneForced PruneAction = "forced" + PruneMissing PruneAction = "missing" + PruneKept PruneAction = "kept" +) + +// PruneResult is one retained worktree after prune. +type PruneResult struct { + Worktree Worktree + Action PruneAction + // Reason is why a kept worktree was kept. + Reason RetainedReason + // ForceRefused is a --force that could not go through: the worktree's + // work could not be kept by refs. + ForceRefused bool + // RetainedRefs are the refs a forced removal kept commits under. + RetainedRefs []string + // BranchDeletedAt is the commit the task branch stood at when a force on + // an orphaned worktree deleted it. Nothing judged what that branch + // reached, so this is what an operator needs to put it back + // (`git branch <name> <commit>`) before git's own prune clears the + // record. + BranchDeletedAt string +} + +// RetainedRefPrefix names the refs a forced removal keeps commits under: the +// operator is told about each one, and nothing here deletes them. +const RetainedRefPrefix = "refs/basecamp-connect/retained/" + +// RemovingRefPrefix names the refs a removal holds a worktree's commits under +// while it deletes it. They are the connector's own bookkeeping, let go when +// the removal is over, and never counted as holding a commit for anybody: one +// a crash left behind holds its commits without making the next judgment +// think someone else does. +const RemovingRefPrefix = "refs/basecamp-connect/removing/" + +// ErrNotRetained is a --force naming a path that is no retained worktree. +var ErrNotRetained = errors.New("not a retained worktree") + +// Prune removes the retained worktrees the operator has dealt with: those now +// clean, with every commit they reach held elsewhere. It is the only thing +// that removes a worktree. One still holding work is kept unless its path is +// in force, and so is one whose directory something else removed — that row +// is kept as orphaned, with git's record and the task branch left as they +// are, until its path is in force. A path in force that is no retained +// worktree refuses the whole prune before anything is removed. +func (w *Worktrees) Prune(ctx context.Context, force []string) ([]PruneResult, error) { + unlock, err := w.lock(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + defer unlock() + records, err := w.ledger.Worktrees(ctx, WorktreeRetained, WorktreeRemoving) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + forced := map[string]bool{} + for _, p := range force { + clean := filepath.Clean(p) + if !slices.ContainsFunc(records, func(r Worktree) bool { return r.Path == clean }) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: %s: %w", p, ErrNotRetained) + } + forced[clean] = true + } + out := make([]PruneResult, 0, len(records)) + for _, r := range records { + out = append(out, w.pruneOne(ctx, r, forced[r.Path])) + } + return out, nil +} + +func (w *Worktrees) pruneOne(ctx context.Context, r Worktree, force bool) PruneResult { + var refs []string + by := RemovedByPrune + if force { + by = RemovedByPruneForced + } + var at string + after := w.settleKeeping(ctx, r, by, force, &refs, &at) + result := PruneResult{Worktree: after, RetainedRefs: refs, BranchDeletedAt: at} + gone := after.State == WorktreeRemoving && !exists(after.Path) && !exists(frozenName(after.Path)) + switch { + case force && (after.State == WorktreeRemoved || gone): + result.Action = PruneForced + case after.State == WorktreeRemoved && after.RemovedBy == RemovedMissing: + result.Action = PruneMissing + case after.State == WorktreeRemoved || gone: + // Removing and gone is a removal the ledger could not record yet. + result.Action = PruneRemoved + default: + result.Action, result.Reason = PruneKept, after.RetainedReason + // A moved worktree has nothing here to force; anything else kept + // under a force is a force refused. + result.ForceRefused = force && after.RetainedReason != RetainedMoved + } + return result +} + +// settle is what the connector does with a worktree of its own accord, at the +// end of a task and at recovery: it keeps it. Nothing the connector does +// removes a worktree — only an operator's `worktrees prune` does — so this +// restores a removal a crash left frozen, reconciles a row whose directory is +// no longer there, and otherwise retains the row for the operator. The caller +// holds the lock. It returns the row as it now stands. +func (w *Worktrees) settle(ctx context.Context, r Worktree) Worktree { + from := []WorktreeState{r.State} + if restored, ok := w.unfreeze(r); !ok { + w.log.Warn("connector: a frozen worktree could not be restored; kept", "path", r.Path) + return w.retain(ctx, r, RetainedUnverified, from) + } else if restored { + w.log.Info("connector: restored a worktree a removal left frozen", "path", r.Path) + } + if !exists(r.Path) { + return w.forget(ctx, r, from, nil, nil) + } + return w.retain(ctx, r, RetainedFinished, from) +} + +// forget reconciles a row whose worktree is not on disk: something outside +// the connector removed the directory. What is left is git's record of the +// worktree and the task branch, which reach whatever they reach. The +// connector does not judge that and does not delete any of it — that is the +// class of defect this stopped trying to get right — so the row is kept, +// said to be orphaned, and listed with its record and the refs in it. Only an +// operator's explicit discard (`worktrees prune --force <path>`) deletes the +// branch, having been told what goes. +func (w *Worktrees) forget(ctx context.Context, r Worktree, from []WorktreeState, how *removal, at *string) Worktree { + if w.movedElsewhere(ctx, r) { + // Moved out from under the connector: its files are someone's. + return w.retain(ctx, r, RetainedMoved, from) + } + tip, err := w.branchTip(ctx, r) + if err != nil { + if how != nil && how.force { + // The repository cannot be read at all, so there is nothing here + // to delete and nothing to keep the row for: an operator who + // named it gets it closed rather than a row nothing can clear. + w.log.Warn("connector: a worktree's repository could not be read; the row is closed as the operator asked", "path", r.Path, "error", err) + return w.recordGone(ctx, r, from) + } + return w.retain(ctx, r, RetainedUnverified, from) + } + ours := tip != "" && r.BranchCreated && strings.HasPrefix(r.Branch, BranchPrefix) + if !ours { + // No branch of the connector's making is left. What may be left is + // git's record of the worktree, which reaches whatever it reaches: a + // row that never stored where that is asks the repository, and a row + // whose record cannot be looked for is kept, not closed. + record, err := w.findRecord(ctx, r) + switch { + case err != nil: + return w.retain(ctx, r, RetainedUnverified, from) + case record == "": + // Nothing of the connector's is left: no branch it made, no + // record. There is nothing to decide and nothing to delete. + return w.recordGone(ctx, r, from) + } + } + if how == nil || !how.force { + return w.retain(ctx, r, RetainedOrphaned, from) + } + // The operator named this worktree: the branch it made goes, at the + // commit it stands at, and git's record is left for `git worktree prune`. + // A branch that could not be deleted keeps the row, so nothing is left + // behind that nothing lists. + if ours { + if !w.deleteBranch(ctx, r, tip) { + return w.retain(ctx, r, RetainedOrphaned, from) + } + if at != nil { + *at = tip + } + } + return w.recordGone(ctx, r, from) +} + +// findRecord is git's record of this worktree — <repo>/.git/worktrees/<name> — +// found by the path it names, for a row that never stored where it is: "" when +// the repository has no record of this worktree. It answers where the record +// is and nothing about what it reaches. Anything unreadable is an error, never +// a "no". +func (w *Worktrees) findRecord(ctx context.Context, r Worktree) (string, error) { + if r.AdminDir != "" { + if _, err := os.Lstat(r.AdminDir); errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + return "", nil + } else if err != nil { + return "", err + } + return r.AdminDir, nil + } + common, err := w.gitOut(ctx, r.Repository, "rev-parse", "--path-format=absolute", "--git-common-dir") + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + dir := filepath.Join(common, "worktrees") + entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir) + if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + return "", nil + } + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + for _, entry := range entries { + if !entry.IsDir() { + continue + } + admin := filepath.Join(dir, entry.Name()) + at, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(admin, "gitdir")) + if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + continue + } + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + named := strings.TrimSpace(string(at)) + if !filepath.IsAbs(named) { + named = filepath.Join(admin, named) + } + if samePath(filepath.Dir(named), r.Path) { + return admin, nil + } + } + return "", nil +} + +// recordGone records a row whose worktree is not on disk and has nothing left +// to decide. +func (w *Worktrees) recordGone(ctx context.Context, r Worktree, from []WorktreeState) Worktree { + gone := RemovedMissing + if r.State == WorktreeCreating { + gone = RemovedNeverCreated + } + if err := w.ledger.RemovedWorktree(ctx, r.ID, gone, from...); err != nil { + w.log.Warn("connector: recording a worktree gone", "path", r.Path, "error", err) + return r + } + r.State, r.RemovedBy = WorktreeRemoved, gone + return r +} + +func (w *Worktrees) settleKeeping(ctx context.Context, r Worktree, by RemovedBy, force bool, refs *[]string, at *string) Worktree { + from := []WorktreeState{r.State} + // A removal a crash interrupted: its names come back first, and it is + // judged as it stands. + if restored, ok := w.unfreeze(r); !ok { + w.log.Warn("connector: a frozen worktree could not be restored; kept", "path", r.Path) + return w.retain(ctx, r, RetainedUnverified, from) + } else if restored { + w.log.Info("connector: restored a worktree a removal left frozen", "path", r.Path) + } + + if !exists(r.Path) { + return w.forget(ctx, r, from, &removal{force: force}, at) + } + return w.removeWorktree(ctx, r, by, removal{force: force}, refs) +} + +// removal is how removeWorktree judges. +type removal struct { + // force is an operator's explicit discard: unheld commits are kept under + // refs and the worktree goes. + force bool +} + +// RemovingSuffix is what a removal adds to a worktree's name and to its +// record's while it judges them: a directory under it is a removal that is +// running, or one a crash left for the next start to restore. +const RemovingSuffix = ".removing" + +// frozenName is where removeWorktree moves a name while it judges. +func frozenName(path string) string { return path + RemovingSuffix } + +// removeWorktree is the one removal (the rule, in the type's doc). It claims +// the row, freezes the worktree, judges it frozen, and deletes the frozen copy +// or restores it and retains the row. The caller holds the lock and has seen +// the directory there. +func (w *Worktrees) removeWorktree(ctx context.Context, r Worktree, by RemovedBy, how removal, refs *[]string) Worktree { + from := []WorktreeState{r.State} + admin := r.AdminDir + if admin == "" { + // A row whose record's place was never stored: found, proven to be + // this worktree's own record, and stored before anything is renamed. + found, err := w.recordOf(ctx, r) + if err != nil { + return w.retain(ctx, r, RetainedUnverified, from) + } + if err := w.ledger.WorktreeAdminDir(ctx, r.ID, found); err != nil { + return w.retain(ctx, r, RetainedUnverified, from) + } + admin, r.AdminDir = found, found + } + if r.State != WorktreeRemoving { + if err := w.ledger.MoveWorktree(ctx, r.ID, WorktreeRemoving, from...); err != nil { + w.log.Warn("connector: claiming a worktree for removal", "path", r.Path, "error", err) + return r + } + r.State = WorktreeRemoving + } + removing := []WorktreeState{WorktreeRemoving} + + // Freeze: lock the record, rename it, then the directory. The lock is + // git's own: a frozen record's gitdir names a directory that is not there, + // and git's prune deletes such a record unless it is locked. + switch taken, err := lockRecord(admin); { + case err != nil: + return w.retain(ctx, r, RetainedUnverified, removing) + case !taken: + return w.retain(ctx, r, RetainedLocked, removing) + } + v := view{dir: frozenName(r.Path), gitDir: frozenName(admin)} + if err := os.Rename(admin, v.gitDir); err != nil { + unlockRecord(admin) + return w.retain(ctx, r, RetainedUnverified, removing) + } + if err := os.Rename(r.Path, v.dir); err != nil { + if os.Rename(v.gitDir, admin) == nil { + unlockRecord(admin) + } else { + w.log.Warn("connector: a worktree's record could not be restored; the next start restores it", "path", r.Path) + return r + } + return w.retain(ctx, r, RetainedUnverified, removing) + } + if w.whileFrozen != nil { + if err := w.whileFrozen(v.dir); err != nil { + // A test standing in for a crash: names stay frozen. + return r + } + } + + judged := w.judge(ctx, r, v, how) + if judged.reason == "" && how.force && len(judged.unheld) > 0 { + // A force keeps what nothing holds before anything else happens, and + // those refs hold it from here on: the transaction below verifies + // them with every other holder. + kept, err := w.keepCommits(ctx, r, judged.unheld) + if err != nil { + judged.reason = RetainedUnverified + } else { + if refs != nil { + *refs = append(*refs, kept...) + } + for i, ref := range kept { + judged.holds = append(judged.holds, hold{ref: ref, oid: judged.unheld[i], commit: judged.unheld[i]}) + } + } + } + if judged.reason != "" { + if !w.restore(r, v, admin) { + w.log.Warn("connector: a frozen worktree could not be restored; the next start restores it", "path", r.Path) + return r + } + return w.retain(ctx, r, judged.reason, removing) + } + + // Every commit the worktree reaches is held under a ref of the + // connector's own before anything is deleted, and let go only once the + // removal is over. Whatever else holds those commits — a remote branch a + // fetch prunes, a branch someone deletes — may go while the removal runs: + // it takes nothing with it. These refs hold nothing for anybody else (see + // RemovingRefPrefix), so one left by a crash cannot pass for a holder. + if _, err := w.anchor(ctx, r, judged.tips); err != nil { + w.log.Warn("connector: a worktree's commits could not be held for its removal; kept", "path", r.Path, "error", err) + if w.restore(r, v, admin) { + return w.retain(ctx, r, RetainedUnverified, removing) + } + return r + } + // The branch goes first, in the transaction that proves the judgment + // still stands: every ref the judgment leaned on is verified where it was + // found, so a fetch, a reset or a branch deleted since makes git refuse + // the whole thing and the worktree is kept instead. It is deleted only at + // a commit judged held, so a crash between the two leaves nothing + // unreachable, while the other order would leave a branch nothing later + // settles. + if !w.endBranch(ctx, r, judged) { + // The removal does not happen: its anchors go, each only while what + // the judgment found still holds its commit. + w.dropAnchors(ctx, r, judged) + if w.restore(r, v, admin) { + return w.retain(ctx, r, RetainedUnverified, removing) + } + w.log.Warn("connector: a frozen worktree could not be restored; the next start restores it", "path", r.Path) + return r + } + // Delete the frozen copy: the directory, then the record. + if err := os.RemoveAll(v.dir); err != nil { + w.log.Warn("connector: a frozen worktree could not be deleted; kept", "path", r.Path, "error", err) + // The branch went first: a worktree that comes back comes back whole, + // checked out on the branch it was checked out on. + w.putBranchBack(ctx, r, judged.tip) + w.dropAnchors(ctx, r, judged) + if w.restore(r, v, admin) { + return w.retain(ctx, r, RetainedUnverified, removing) + } + return r + } + if err := os.RemoveAll(v.gitDir); err != nil { + // The directory is gone but git's record of it is not, and it is + // still frozen and locked. The row stays removing, which is a row the + // next start restores and judges again, rather than a removed row + // nothing lists and nothing reconciles. + w.log.Warn("connector: a worktree's record could not be deleted; the next start restores it", "path", r.Path, "error", err) + return r + } + // The worktree is gone: the anchors of its held commits are let go, each + // only while the ref the judgment found still holds its commit. One that + // moved keeps its anchor, and the operator is told which. + if left := w.dropAnchors(ctx, r, judged); len(left) > 0 && refs != nil { + *refs = append(*refs, left...) + } + if err := w.ledger.RemovedWorktree(ctx, r.ID, by, removing...); err != nil { + // The worktree is gone; the row still says removing, and the next + // settle records it missing. Nobody is told it was kept. + w.log.Warn("connector: a worktree was removed but the ledger could not record it", "path", r.Path, "error", err) + return r + } + r.State, r.RemovedBy = WorktreeRemoved, by + return r +} + +// restore gives a frozen worktree its names back: the directory, then the +// record. +func (w *Worktrees) restore(r Worktree, v view, admin string) bool { + if exists(v.dir) && os.Rename(v.dir, r.Path) != nil { + return false + } + if exists(v.gitDir) && os.Rename(v.gitDir, admin) != nil { + return false + } + unlockRecord(admin) + return true +} + +// recordLockReason marks a lock on git's record of a worktree as the +// connector's own, taken while a removal holds it frozen. +const recordLockReason = "basecamp-connect: removal in progress\n" + +// lockRecord locks git's record of a worktree for the connector, the way +// `git worktree lock` does, if nobody holds a lock on it. taken is false for a +// lock someone else holds. +func lockRecord(admin string) (taken bool, err error) { + f, err := os.OpenFile(filepath.Join(admin, "locked"), os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL, 0o600) + if errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) { + return ownRecordLock(filepath.Join(admin, "locked")), nil + } + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + if _, err := f.WriteString(recordLockReason); err != nil { + _ = f.Close() + _ = os.Remove(f.Name()) + return false, err + } + return true, f.Close() +} + +// ownRecordLock reports whether a record's lock file is the connector's. +func ownRecordLock(path string) bool { + content, err := os.ReadFile(path) + return err == nil && string(content) == recordLockReason +} + +// unlockRecord removes the connector's own lock on a record, never another's. +func unlockRecord(admin string) { + path := filepath.Join(admin, "locked") + if ownRecordLock(path) { + _ = os.Remove(path) + } +} + +// recordOf finds git's record of a worktree and proves it is this worktree's: +// under the repository's common directory's worktrees/, with a gitdir that +// names this worktree's .git. +func (w *Worktrees) recordOf(ctx context.Context, r Worktree) (string, error) { + admin, err := w.gitOut(ctx, r.Path, "rev-parse", "--absolute-git-dir") + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + common, err := w.gitOut(ctx, r.Repository, "rev-parse", "--path-format=absolute", "--git-common-dir") + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + if !samePath(filepath.Dir(admin), filepath.Join(common, "worktrees")) { + return "", fmt.Errorf("connector: %s is not a worktree record of %s", admin, r.Repository) + } + at, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(admin, "gitdir")) + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + named := strings.TrimSpace(string(at)) + if !filepath.IsAbs(named) { + named = filepath.Join(admin, named) + } + if !samePath(filepath.Dir(named), r.Path) { + return "", fmt.Errorf("connector: %s is another worktree's record", admin) + } + return admin, nil +} + +// unfreeze restores the names of a worktree a crash left frozen. It reports +// whether it restored anything, and false in ok when a frozen name is there +// but cannot be put back. +func (w *Worktrees) unfreeze(r Worktree) (restored, ok bool) { + pairs := [][2]string{{frozenName(r.Path), r.Path}} + if r.AdminDir != "" { + pairs = append(pairs, [2]string{frozenName(r.AdminDir), r.AdminDir}) + } + for _, p := range pairs { + if !exists(p[0]) { + continue + } + if exists(p[1]) || os.Rename(p[0], p[1]) != nil { + return restored, false + } + restored = true + } + if r.AdminDir != "" { + unlockRecord(r.AdminDir) + } + return restored, true +} + +// view is how git is pointed at a worktree: its directory, and, for a frozen +// one, git's record of it by its frozen name. +type view struct { + dir string + gitDir string +} + +func (v view) args(args ...string) []string { + if v.gitDir == "" { + return append([]string{"-C", v.dir}, args...) + } + return append([]string{"-C", v.dir, "--git-dir", v.gitDir, "--work-tree", v.dir}, args...) +} + +// hold is a ref the connector keeps, the commit it pointed at when a judgment +// leaned on it, and the commit of the worktree it was found to hold. +type hold struct{ ref, oid, commit string } + +// judgment is what judge decided about a frozen worktree: the reason to keep +// it, or "" with the task branch's tip ("" when the branch is gone), the refs +// that hold every commit the removal would forget, and, for a force, the +// commits nothing holds. +type judgment struct { + reason RetainedReason + tip string + // tips is every commit the worktree reaches that removing it would + // forget; unheld are the ones nothing else holds, which only a force + // reaches; holds are the refs that hold the rest. + tips []string + unheld []string + holds []hold +} + +// pseudoRefs are the record's own refs outside refs/: what a reset, a fetch or +// an operation in progress left in <repo>/.git/worktrees/<name>, and what goes +// with the record when it is deleted. +var pseudoRefs = []string{"ORIG_HEAD", "FETCH_HEAD", "MERGE_HEAD", "REBASE_HEAD", "CHERRY_PICK_HEAD", "REVERT_HEAD", "AUTO_MERGE", "BISECT_EXPECTED_REV", "MERGE_AUTOSTASH"} + +// autostashFiles are where a rebase keeps the commit it stashed away: not a +// ref, a file in the record naming one, and nothing else reaches it. +var autostashFiles = []string{filepath.Join("rebase-merge", "autostash"), filepath.Join("rebase-apply", "autostash")} + +// judge decides whether a frozen worktree holds anything that could be lost. +func (w *Worktrees) judge(ctx context.Context, r Worktree, v view, how removal) judgment { + gitPath := func(name string) string { return filepath.Join(v.gitDir, name) } + switch _, err := os.Lstat(gitPath("locked")); { + case err == nil && !ownRecordLock(gitPath("locked")): + return judgment{reason: RetainedLocked} + case err == nil: + case !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist): + return judgment{reason: RetainedUnverified} + } + // A submodule's git data is never lost, and never forced away: no ref + // here can keep it. + switch entries, err := os.ReadDir(gitPath("modules")); { + case err == nil && len(entries) > 0: + return judgment{reason: RetainedDirty} + case err != nil && !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist): + return judgment{reason: RetainedUnverified} + } + if !how.force { + for _, marker := range []string{"MERGE_HEAD", "CHERRY_PICK_HEAD", "REVERT_HEAD", "BISECT_LOG", "rebase-merge", "rebase-apply", "sequencer"} { + switch _, err := os.Lstat(gitPath(marker)); { + case err == nil: + return judgment{reason: RetainedDirty} + case !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist): + return judgment{reason: RetainedUnverified} + } + } + } + // The disk before any git command that could recurse: whatever is not a + // tracked file is work, and a submodule directory holding anything — a git + // directory and configuration a worker planted among it — is work git is + // never asked to look inside. + untracked, gitlinkContent, err := w.untrackedOnDisk(ctx, v) + switch { + case err != nil: + return judgment{reason: RetainedUnverified} + case gitlinkContent: + return judgment{reason: RetainedDirty} + case untracked && !how.force: + return judgment{reason: RetainedDirty} + } + // A checkout that never happened — a crash between `worktree add + // --no-checkout` and the checkout — holds git's .git file and nothing + // else, with an empty index. There is nothing in it to lose, though the + // rule below would read that index against HEAD as every file deleted. + bare, err := w.neverCheckedOut(ctx, v) + if err != nil { + return judgment{reason: RetainedUnverified} + } + if !how.force && !bare { + status, err := w.gitRawIn(ctx, v, "status", "--porcelain=v1", "-z", "--untracked-files=all", "--ignored=traditional", "--ignore-submodules=all") + if err != nil { + return judgment{reason: RetainedUnverified} + } + if len(status) > 0 { + return judgment{reason: RetainedDirty} + } + // An index entry marked skip-worktree or assume-unchanged hides its + // edits from status. + entries, err := w.gitRawIn(ctx, v, "ls-files", "-v", "-z") + if err != nil { + return judgment{reason: RetainedUnverified} + } + for entry := range strings.SplitSeq(string(entries), "\x00") { + if entry == "" { + continue + } + if tag := entry[0]; tag == 'S' || (tag >= 'a' && tag <= 'z') { + return judgment{reason: RetainedDirty} + } + } + } + + tip, err := w.branchTip(ctx, r) + if err != nil { + return judgment{reason: RetainedUnverified} + } + // Every commit the worktree or its branch reaches, and that removing it + // would forget: HEAD, the branch, their reflogs, per-worktree refs. + var tips []string + // A HEAD that names no commit — a worker's `checkout --orphan`, or an + // unborn branch — reaches nothing through HEAD, and that is an answer, + // not doubt: what HEAD stood at before is still read from its reflog + // below. `--quiet` says it with exit 1 and nothing else, so a git the + // connector could not run still leaves the worktree unjudged. + head, err := w.gitRawIn(ctx, v, "rev-parse", "--quiet", "--verify", "--end-of-options", "HEAD^{commit}") + unborn := false + switch { + case err == nil: + tips = append(tips, strings.TrimSpace(string(head))) + case noSuchRevision(err): + unborn = true + default: + return judgment{reason: RetainedUnverified} + } + if tip != "" { + tips = append(tips, tip) + out, err := w.gitOut(ctx, r.Repository, "reflog", "show", "--format=%H", "refs/heads/"+r.Branch, "--") + if err != nil { + return judgment{reason: RetainedUnverified} + } + tips = append(tips, strings.Fields(out)...) + } + // HEAD's reflog holds every commit it stood at, and an unborn HEAD is + // the one HEAD `reflog show` will not name — while the file still holds + // what it stood at before, which nothing else reaches. So it is read as + // the per-worktree reflogs below are, and an orphan loses no history. + if unborn { + logged, err := reflogFileTips(filepath.Join(v.gitDir, "logs", "HEAD")) + if err != nil { + return judgment{reason: RetainedUnverified} + } + tips = append(tips, logged...) + } else { + out, err := w.gitRawIn(ctx, v, "reflog", "show", "--format=%H", "HEAD", "--") + if err != nil { + return judgment{reason: RetainedUnverified} + } + tips = append(tips, strings.Fields(string(out))...) + } + perWorktree, err := w.gitRawIn(ctx, v, "for-each-ref", "--format=%(objectname)", "refs/worktree/", "refs/bisect/", "refs/rewritten/") + if err != nil { + return judgment{reason: RetainedUnverified} + } + tips = append(tips, strings.Fields(string(perWorktree))...) + // Those refs' own reflogs, when the repository keeps them: git logs ref + // updates under refs/ only with core.logAllRefUpdates=always, and a + // per-worktree ref's log lives in the record and goes with it. + for _, dir := range []string{"refs/worktree", "refs/bisect", "refs/rewritten"} { + logged, err := reflogDirTips(filepath.Join(v.gitDir, "logs", filepath.FromSlash(dir))) + if err != nil { + return judgment{reason: RetainedUnverified} + } + tips = append(tips, logged...) + } + // + // The record's pseudo-refs are its too, and go with it: ORIG_HEAD is what + // a reset left behind, and the rest are an operation's. They are read as + // the files they are, because some of them — FETCH_HEAD, and MERGE_HEAD + // in an octopus merge — name more than one commit, which `rev-parse` + // would reduce to the first. + named, err := pseudoRefTips(v.gitDir) + if err != nil { + return judgment{reason: RetainedUnverified} + } + tips = append(tips, named...) + stashed, err := autostashTips(v.gitDir) + if err != nil { + return judgment{reason: RetainedUnverified} + } + tips = append(tips, stashed...) + // A reflog that is not there is not a reflog that holds nothing: with + // core.logAllRefUpdates off, or after an expire, what the worktree + // reached is unreadable, and what cannot be read is not judged clean — + // unless an operator names this worktree and forces it, which is a + // decision about work, not a judgment. Every repository keeps reflogs by + // default; one that does not would otherwise leave rows nothing could + // ever clear. + if !bare && !how.force { + if _, err := os.Lstat(filepath.Join(v.gitDir, "logs", "HEAD")); err != nil { + return judgment{reason: RetainedUnverified} + } + } + slices.Sort(tips) + // Only commits: a pseudo-ref or a ref pointed at a tree or a blob names + // no history, and asking what contains one is a question git answers + // with an error — which would keep the worktree for ever. A conflicted + // merge leaves exactly that in AUTO_MERGE. + commits, err := w.commitsAmong(ctx, v, slices.Compact(tips)) + if err != nil { + return judgment{reason: RetainedUnverified} + } + decided := judgment{tip: tip, tips: commits} + for _, commit := range decided.tips { + // The ref that holds it, and where that ref stands: the removal + // verifies each one again, in the transaction that ends the branch, + // so a holder that moved in between stops the removal. + ref, oid, err := w.holder(ctx, r, commit) + switch { + case err != nil: + return judgment{reason: RetainedUnverified} + case ref == "": + if !how.force { + return judgment{reason: RetainedUnpushed} + } + decided.unheld = append(decided.unheld, commit) + default: + decided.holds = append(decided.holds, hold{ref: ref, oid: oid, commit: commit}) + } + } + return decided +} + +// dropAnchors lets go of the refs a removal held its commits under, each only +// while the ref the judgment found still holds that commit. It returns the +// anchors that stay, because what held their commits moved. +func (w *Worktrees) dropAnchors(ctx context.Context, r Worktree, judged judgment) []string { + var left []string + for _, h := range judged.holds { + anchor := anchorRef(r, h.commit) + stdin := "start\nverify " + h.ref + " " + h.oid + "\ndelete " + anchor + " " + h.commit + "\nprepare\ncommit\n" + if err := w.gitStdin(ctx, r.Repository, stdin, "update-ref", "--stdin"); err != nil { + w.log.Info("connector: a commit of a removed worktree is kept under a ref: what held it moved", "ref", anchor, "path", r.Path) + left = append(left, anchor) + } + } + return left +} + +// retainedRef is where a commit of this worktree is kept for the operator. +func retainedRef(r Worktree, commit string) string { + return RetainedRefPrefix + safeName(filepath.Base(r.Path)) + "/" + commit +} + +// anchorRef is where a removal holds a commit of this worktree while it runs. +func anchorRef(r Worktree, commit string) string { + return RemovingRefPrefix + safeName(filepath.Base(r.Path)) + "/" + commit +} + +// keepCommits keeps each commit under refs/basecamp-connect/retained/<name>/ +// <commit>, create-only; a ref already there at that commit is the same keep. +func (w *Worktrees) keepCommits(ctx context.Context, r Worktree, commits []string) ([]string, error) { + return w.holdUnder(ctx, r, commits, retainedRef) +} + +// anchor holds each commit under RemovingRefPrefix for as long as a removal +// runs. +func (w *Worktrees) anchor(ctx context.Context, r Worktree, commits []string) ([]string, error) { + return w.holdUnder(ctx, r, commits, anchorRef) +} + +func (w *Worktrees) holdUnder(ctx context.Context, r Worktree, commits []string, where func(Worktree, string) string) ([]string, error) { + refs := make([]string, 0, len(commits)) + var made []string + for _, commit := range commits { + ref := where(r, commit) + if _, err := w.gitOut(ctx, r.Repository, "update-ref", "--end-of-options", ref, commit, ""); err != nil { + at, atErr := w.gitOut(ctx, r.Repository, "rev-parse", "--verify", "--end-of-options", ref) + if atErr != nil || at != commit { + // Holding them all failed, so none is held: the ones this + // call made are let go again, and a ref that was already + // there — an earlier force's keep — is left alone. + for _, ref := range made { + if _, err := w.gitOut(ctx, r.Repository, "update-ref", "-d", "--end-of-options", ref); err != nil { + w.log.Warn("connector: a ref made to hold a commit could not be let go", "ref", ref, "error", err) + } + } + return nil, err + } + } else { + made = append(made, ref) + } + refs = append(refs, ref) + } + return refs, nil +} + +// movedElsewhere reports whether the repository still has a worktree on this +// row's branch somewhere else: someone moved it, and its files are work the +// connector neither judges nor forgets, so the row is kept. +func (w *Worktrees) movedElsewhere(ctx context.Context, r Worktree) bool { + // The repository's record of this worktree names where it is now, + // whatever it has checked out and whatever its branch is called. + if r.AdminDir != "" { + switch at, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(r.AdminDir, "gitdir")); { + case err == nil: + // The record is the worktree's .git file, absolute or — with + // worktree.useRelativePaths — relative to the admin directory. + path := strings.TrimSpace(string(at)) + if !filepath.IsAbs(path) { + path = filepath.Join(r.AdminDir, path) + } + path = filepath.Dir(path) + return !samePath(path, r.Path) && exists(path) + case !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist): + // The record cannot be read: assume it is still somewhere. + return true + } + return false + } + // A row from before the admin directory was recorded: its branch is the + // only handle left. + out, err := w.gitRaw(ctx, r.Repository, "worktree", "list", "--porcelain", "-z") + if err != nil { + return true + } + var current string + for field := range strings.SplitSeq(string(out), "\x00") { + switch { + case strings.HasPrefix(field, "worktree "): + current = strings.TrimPrefix(field, "worktree ") + case field == "branch refs/heads/"+r.Branch: + if !samePath(current, r.Path) && exists(current) { + return true + } + } + } + return false +} + +// reflogDirTips is every commit the reflogs under one directory of a record +// name. A directory that is not there is a repository that logs nothing +// there, which names nothing. +func reflogDirTips(dir string) ([]string, error) { + var tips []string + err := filepath.WalkDir(dir, func(path string, d os.DirEntry, err error) error { + switch { + case errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist): + return nil + case err != nil: + return err + case d.IsDir(): + return nil + } + logged, err := reflogFileTips(path) + if err != nil { + return err + } + tips = append(tips, logged...) + return nil + }) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return tips, nil +} + +// reflogFileTips is every commit a reflog file names, read as git writes it: +// one line per entry, the commit before it and the commit after it first. A +// reflog that is not there names nothing; one that cannot be read is an error, +// never an empty answer. +func reflogFileTips(path string) ([]string, error) { + data, err := os.ReadFile(path) + if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + return nil, nil + } + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + var tips []string + for line := range strings.SplitSeq(string(data), "\n") { + fields := strings.Fields(line) + // The two object names an entry starts with; the rest of the line is + // who, when and why, which name nothing. + for _, field := range fields[:min(2, len(fields))] { + if !isObjectName(field) { + continue + } + tips = append(tips, field) + } + } + return tips, nil +} + +// commitsAmong is the commits these object names reach: the name itself, or +// what an annotated tag points at, because that is the history the name +// keeps. A tree or a blob reaches no commit and neither does an object that +// is no longer there, and both are dropped — there is nothing in them to +// lose. Git answers once per name, in order; answering for fewer is an error, +// never a quiet drop. +func (w *Worktrees) commitsAmong(ctx context.Context, v view, oids []string) ([]string, error) { + if len(oids) == 0 { + return nil, nil + } + var asked strings.Builder + for _, oid := range oids { + asked.WriteString(oid + "^{commit}\n") + } + out, err := w.gitRawInStdin(ctx, v, asked.String(), "cat-file", "--batch-check=%(objectname) %(objecttype)") + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + answers := strings.Split(strings.TrimSuffix(string(out), "\n"), "\n") + if len(answers) != len(oids) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: git answered for %d of %d object names", len(answers), len(oids)) + } + commits := make([]string, 0, len(oids)) + for _, answer := range answers { + if name, kind, ok := strings.Cut(answer, " "); ok && kind == "commit" { + commits = append(commits, name) + } + } + slices.Sort(commits) + return slices.Compact(commits), nil +} + +// pseudoRefTips is every object name the record's pseudo-refs hold: one per +// line, first field, as git writes FETCH_HEAD and the rest. A file that is +// not there names nothing; one that cannot be read is an error. +func pseudoRefTips(gitDir string) ([]string, error) { + var tips []string + for _, name := range pseudoRefs { + data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(gitDir, name)) + switch { + case errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist): + continue + case err != nil: + return nil, err + } + for line := range strings.SplitSeq(string(data), "\n") { + fields := strings.Fields(line) + if len(fields) > 0 && isObjectName(fields[0]) { + tips = append(tips, fields[0]) + } + } + } + return tips, nil +} + +// autostashTips is every commit an operation in progress stashed away in a +// record: git writes the object name to a file, and nothing else names it. +func autostashTips(gitDir string) ([]string, error) { + var tips []string + for _, name := range autostashFiles { + data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(gitDir, name)) + switch { + case errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist): + continue + case err != nil: + return nil, err + } + if oid := strings.TrimSpace(string(data)); isObjectName(oid) { + tips = append(tips, oid) + } + } + return tips, nil +} + +// isGitDir reports whether a directory is a repository's git data: git's own +// test is a HEAD, an objects directory and a refs directory. +func isGitDir(path string) bool { + for _, name := range []string{"HEAD", "objects", "refs"} { + if _, err := os.Lstat(filepath.Join(path, name)); err != nil { + return false + } + } + return true +} + +// isObjectName reports whether a field is an object name and not the zero one. +func isObjectName(field string) bool { + return len(field) >= 40 && strings.Trim(field, "0123456789abcdef") == "" && strings.Trim(field, "0") != "" +} + +// noSuchRevision reports whether git said a revision does not resolve, which +// `rev-parse --quiet` says with exit 1 and nothing else. Any other failure is +// a git that could not be run, which is never an answer about work. +func noSuchRevision(err error) bool { + var exitErr *exec.ExitError + return errors.As(err, &exitErr) && exitErr.ExitCode() == 1 +} + +// exists reports whether a path is anything but proven absent: a path that +// cannot be read counts as there, because an error is not evidence that work +// is gone. +func exists(path string) bool { + _, err := os.Lstat(path) + return !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) +} + +func (w *Worktrees) retain(ctx context.Context, r Worktree, reason RetainedReason, from []WorktreeState) Worktree { + if err := w.ledger.RetainWorktree(ctx, r.ID, reason, from...); err != nil { + w.log.Warn("connector: recording a worktree retained", "path", r.Path, "error", err) + return r + } + w.log.Info("connector: worktree retained", "path", r.Path, "branch", r.Branch, "reason", string(reason)) + r.State, r.RetainedReason = WorktreeRetained, reason + return r +} + +// neverCheckedOut reports whether a worktree's directory holds nothing but +// git's .git file and its index is empty: `git worktree add --no-checkout` +// ran and the checkout that follows it did not. +func (w *Worktrees) neverCheckedOut(ctx context.Context, v view) (bool, error) { + entries, err := os.ReadDir(v.dir) + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + if len(entries) != 1 || entries[0].Name() != ".git" || entries[0].IsDir() { + return false, nil + } + index, err := w.gitRawIn(ctx, v, "ls-files", "--stage", "-z") + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + return len(strings.TrimSpace(string(index))) == 0, nil +} + +// untrackedOnDisk reports whether a worktree's directory holds anything that +// is not a file git tracks (an untracked or ignored file, a directory git has +// no file in), and separately whether a submodule's directory, which the +// checkout left empty, holds anything at all. Symlinks are not followed. +func (w *Worktrees) untrackedOnDisk(ctx context.Context, v view) (untracked, gitlinkContent bool, err error) { + out, err := w.gitRawIn(ctx, v, "ls-files", "--stage", "-z") + if err != nil { + return false, false, err + } + files, gitlinks, dirs := map[string]bool{}, map[string]bool{}, map[string]bool{".": true} + for entry := range strings.SplitSeq(string(out), "\x00") { + meta, path, ok := strings.Cut(entry, "\t") + if !ok { + continue + } + if strings.HasPrefix(meta, "160000 ") { + gitlinks[path] = true + } else { + files[path] = true + } + for dir := filepath.Dir(filepath.FromSlash(path)); dir != "."; dir = filepath.Dir(dir) { + dirs[filepath.ToSlash(dir)] = true + } + } + // Bounded: a tree too big to read in time, or a filesystem call that never + // returns (a mount a worker left), is not proven clean, and must not hold + // the connector's shutdown. The walk runs apart and is abandoned at the + // deadline; a call stuck in the kernel keeps only its own goroutine. + deadline := time.Now().Add(w.walkLimit) + type verdict struct { + untracked, gitlink bool + err error + } + walked := make(chan verdict, 1) + go func() { + var found verdict + found.err = filepath.WalkDir(v.dir, func(path string, d os.DirEntry, err error) error { + if err != nil { + return err + } + if ctx.Err() != nil { + return ctx.Err() + } + if time.Now().After(deadline) { + return errors.New("connector: the worktree could not be read in time") + } + rel, err := filepath.Rel(v.dir, path) + if err != nil { + return err + } + rel = filepath.ToSlash(rel) + switch { + case rel == ".git" && !d.IsDir(): + // The worktree's link to its repository. + return nil + case filepath.Base(rel) == ".git": + // Git data of a repository inside the worktree — a submodule + // git someone initialized, a repository a worker made, or a + // .git the worktree's own was replaced with. No ref here can + // keep its commits, so it is never removed, forced or not. + found.gitlink = true + return filepath.SkipAll + case gitlinks[rel]: + if !d.IsDir() { + found.gitlink = true + return filepath.SkipAll + } + entries, err := os.ReadDir(path) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if len(entries) > 0 { + found.gitlink = true + return filepath.SkipAll + } + return filepath.SkipDir + case d.IsDir(): + // A directory that is itself a repository — `git init --bare`, + // or a clone with no worktree — is git data like any other, + // wherever it is: no ref here can keep its commits, so it is + // never removed, forced or not. The worktree's own directory + // is one of these to look at: a worker can make a repository + // of the root it works in. + if isGitDir(path) { + found.gitlink = true + return filepath.SkipAll + } + if !dirs[rel] { + found.untracked = true + } + return nil + case !files[rel]: + found.untracked = true + } + return nil + }) + walked <- found + }() + timer := time.NewTimer(time.Until(deadline)) + defer timer.Stop() + select { + case found := <-walked: + return found.untracked, found.gitlink, found.err + case <-timer.C: + return false, false, errors.New("connector: the worktree could not be read in time") + case <-ctx.Done(): + return false, false, ctx.Err() + } +} + +// holder is a ref the connector keeps that contains commit, and the commit it +// points at; "" when there is none. +func (w *Worktrees) holder(ctx context.Context, r Worktree, commit string) (string, string, error) { + own := RetainedRefPrefix + safeName(filepath.Base(r.Path)) + "/" + out, err := w.gitOut(ctx, r.Repository, "for-each-ref", "--format=%(refname) %(objectname)", "--contains", commit, "refs/remotes", "refs/heads", own) + if err != nil { + return "", "", err + } + for line := range strings.SplitSeq(out, "\n") { + ref, oid, ok := strings.Cut(line, " ") + switch { + case !ok, strings.HasPrefix(ref, "refs/heads/"+BranchPrefix): + case strings.HasPrefix(ref, "refs/remotes/"), strings.HasPrefix(ref, "refs/heads/"), strings.HasPrefix(ref, own): + return ref, oid, nil + } + } + return "", "", nil +} + +func (w *Worktrees) branchTip(ctx context.Context, r Worktree) (string, error) { + out, err := w.gitRaw(ctx, r.Repository, "for-each-ref", "--format=%(objectname)", "refs/heads/"+r.Branch) + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + return strings.TrimSpace(string(out)), nil +} + +// putBranchBack makes the task branch again, at the commit it was deleted at, +// for a removal that could not go through: what came back must be what was +// there. +func (w *Worktrees) putBranchBack(ctx context.Context, r Worktree, commit string) { + if commit == "" || !r.BranchCreated || !strings.HasPrefix(r.Branch, BranchPrefix) { + return + } + if _, err := w.gitOut(ctx, r.Repository, "update-ref", "--end-of-options", "refs/heads/"+r.Branch, commit, ""); err != nil { + w.log.Warn("connector: a task branch could not be made again for a worktree that stayed", "branch", r.Branch, "error", err) + } +} + +// deleteBranch deletes the task branch of a worktree whose directory is gone, +// at the commit it stands at and only when this row made it. An operator +// asked for it by naming the worktree, and was told what goes; nothing here +// judges what the branch reaches. +func (w *Worktrees) deleteBranch(ctx context.Context, r Worktree, commit string) bool { + if commit == "" || !r.BranchCreated || !strings.HasPrefix(r.Branch, BranchPrefix) { + return true + } + stdin := "start\ndelete refs/heads/" + r.Branch + " " + commit + "\nprepare\ncommit\n" + if err := w.gitStdin(ctx, r.Repository, stdin, "update-ref", "--stdin"); err != nil { + w.log.Warn("connector: a task branch could not be deleted", "branch", r.Branch, "error", err) + return false + } + return true +} + +// endBranch is the last thing a removal does before the frozen copy goes: one +// ref transaction that verifies every ref the judgment leaned on is still +// where it was found and deletes the task branch at the tip judged held. Git +// refuses the whole transaction if any of them moved, and the removal stops. +// What it proves is that the judgment still stands when the deleting starts; +// what keeps standing while the deleting runs is the anchors. +// It reports whether the judgment still stands. +func (w *Worktrees) endBranch(ctx context.Context, r Worktree, judged judgment) bool { + stdin := "start\n" + seen := map[string]string{} + for _, h := range judged.holds { + // One verify line per ref: git refuses a transaction that names a ref + // twice. A ref found at two different commits while the judgment ran + // is a ref that moved, and one of the two cannot be verified, so the + // worktree is kept. + if at, ok := seen[h.ref]; ok { + if at != h.oid { + w.log.Warn("connector: a worktree is kept: what held its commits moved while it was judged", "path", r.Path, "ref", h.ref) + return false + } + continue + } + seen[h.ref] = h.oid + stdin += "verify " + h.ref + " " + h.oid + "\n" + } + deleting := judged.tip != "" && r.BranchCreated && strings.HasPrefix(r.Branch, BranchPrefix) + if deleting { + stdin += "delete refs/heads/" + r.Branch + " " + judged.tip + "\n" + } + if !deleting && len(seen) == 0 { + // Nothing held anything and no branch of this row's making: the + // judgment leans on nothing that could have moved. + return true + } + stdin += "prepare\ncommit\n" + if err := w.gitStdin(ctx, r.Repository, stdin, "update-ref", "--stdin"); err != nil { + w.log.Warn("connector: a worktree is kept: what held its commits moved while it was judged", "path", r.Path, "branch", r.Branch, "error", err) + return false + } + return true +} + +// WalkLimit bounds how long reading a worktree's files may take before it is +// kept as unverified. +const WalkLimit = 2 * time.Minute + +// LockWait bounds how long a settling worktree waits for another remover's +// lock. Longer than a removal takes, short enough that a stuck prune cannot +// hold a task's end, and so the connector's shutdown, open: the row is +// reconciled on the next start instead. +const LockWait = 2 * time.Minute + +// lock takes the worktrees lock (invariant 4), waiting up to LockWait for +// another holder. +func (w *Worktrees) lock(ctx context.Context) (func(), error) { + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, LockWait) + defer cancel() + if err := os.MkdirAll(w.root, 0o700); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if err := setup.EnsurePrivateDir(w.root); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + path := filepath.Join(w.root, ".lock") + for { + unlock, err := setup.TryLockPrivate(path) + switch { + case err == nil: + return func() { _ = unlock() }, nil + case !errors.Is(err, setup.ErrLockHeld): + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connector: worktrees lock: %w", err) + } + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + return nil, ctx.Err() + case <-time.After(100 * time.Millisecond): + } + } +} + +func (w *Worktrees) gitOut(ctx context.Context, dir string, args ...string) (string, error) { + out, err := w.gitRaw(ctx, dir, args...) + return strings.TrimSpace(string(out)), err +} + +// gitRaw runs git in dir with hooks, the fsmonitor and every configured +// content filter disabled, and a fixed environment (invariant 3). +func (w *Worktrees) gitRaw(ctx context.Context, dir string, args ...string) ([]byte, error) { + return w.gitRawIn(ctx, view{dir: dir}, args...) +} + +// gitRawIn is gitRaw for a view: a frozen worktree is reached through its +// record by its frozen name. +func (w *Worktrees) gitRawIn(ctx context.Context, v view, args ...string) ([]byte, error) { + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 2*time.Minute) + defer cancel() + guard, err := w.filterOverrides(ctx, v) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return w.run(ctx, guard, v.args(args...), args[0]) +} + +// safeGit is the configuration every git call runs with. +var safeGit = [][2]string{ + {"core.hooksPath", "/dev/null"}, + {"core.fsmonitor", "false"}, + // A reflog or log that verifies signatures runs gpg.program. + {"log.showSignature", "false"}, +} + +// filterOverrides blanks every content filter git's configuration defines +// for dir. A checkout runs a path's smudge, clean or process filter, which is +// a command from configuration a worker in the checkout could have edited; +// an empty command is no filter. Reading the configuration runs nothing. +// +// The overrides travel as GIT_CONFIG_KEY_n/GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_n, not `-c`, +// which splits at the first "=" and would miss a driver whose name has one. +func (w *Worktrees) filterOverrides(ctx context.Context, v view) ([][2]string, error) { + out, err := w.run(ctx, safeGit, v.args("config", "--name-only", "--get-regexp", `^filter\.`), "config") + var exitErr *exec.ExitError + if err != nil && (!errors.As(err, &exitErr) || exitErr.ExitCode() != 1) { + // Exit 1 is "no such keys"; anything else leaves filters unknown. + return nil, err + } + guard := slices.Clone(safeGit) + seen := map[string]bool{} + for key := range strings.SplitSeq(string(out), "\n") { + rest, ok := strings.CutPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(key), "filter.") + if !ok { + continue + } + i := strings.LastIndexByte(rest, '.') + if i <= 0 || seen[rest[:i]] { + continue + } + name := rest[:i] + seen[name] = true + for _, cmd := range []string{"clean", "smudge", "process"} { + guard = append(guard, [2]string{"filter." + name + "." + cmd, ""}) + } + // A blanked filter that is also required makes git die mid-checkout + // (git lfs install sets required for its own). + guard = append(guard, [2]string{"filter." + name + ".required", "false"}) + } + return guard, nil +} + +// gitStdin runs git in dir, guarded as gitRaw is, with input on stdin. +func (w *Worktrees) gitStdin(ctx context.Context, dir, input string, args ...string) error { + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 2*time.Minute) + defer cancel() + guard, err := w.filterOverrides(ctx, view{dir: dir}) + if err != nil { + return err + } + _, err = w.runInput(ctx, guard, view{dir: dir}.args(args...), args[0], input) + return err +} + +// gitRawInStdin is gitStdin for a view, and gives back what git wrote: a +// frozen worktree is reached through its record by its frozen name. +func (w *Worktrees) gitRawInStdin(ctx context.Context, v view, input string, args ...string) ([]byte, error) { + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 2*time.Minute) + defer cancel() + guard, err := w.filterOverrides(ctx, v) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return w.runInput(ctx, guard, v.args(args...), args[0], input) +} + +func (w *Worktrees) run(ctx context.Context, config [][2]string, args []string, what string) ([]byte, error) { + return w.runInput(ctx, config, args, what, "") +} + +func (w *Worktrees) runInput(ctx context.Context, config [][2]string, args []string, what, input string) ([]byte, error) { + cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, w.git, args...) //nolint:gosec // G204: git with the connector's own arguments + if input != "" { + cmd.Stdin = strings.NewReader(input) + } + env := slices.Clone(w.env) + env = append(env, "GIT_CONFIG_COUNT="+strconv.Itoa(len(config))) + for i, kv := range config { + env = append(env, "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_"+strconv.Itoa(i)+"="+kv[0], "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_"+strconv.Itoa(i)+"="+kv[1]) + } + cmd.Env = env + var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer + cmd.Stdout, cmd.Stderr = &stdout, &stderr + if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil { + msg := strings.TrimSpace(stderr.String()) + if len(msg) > 200 { + msg = msg[:200] + } + return stdout.Bytes(), fmt.Errorf("git %s: %w: %s", what, err, w.red.Sanitize(msg)) + } + return stdout.Bytes(), nil +} + +func realPath(p string) string { + if r, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(p); err == nil { + return r + } + return filepath.Clean(p) +} + +func samePath(a, b string) bool { + return a != "" && b != "" && realPath(a) == realPath(b) +} diff --git a/internal/connector/worktrees_test.go b/internal/connector/worktrees_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5b78e1cf1 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/connector/worktrees_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,1899 @@ +package connector + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "os" + "os/exec" + "path/filepath" + "strconv" + "strings" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/admission" + "github.com/basecamp/basecamp-cli/internal/connector/driver" +) + +// worktreeHarness is a repository with a bare remote, a ledger, and +// Worktrees placing worktrees under a private root. +type worktreeHarness struct { + t *testing.T + home string + repo string + remote string + root string + ledger *Ledger + wt *Worktrees +} + +func newWorktreeHarness(t *testing.T) *worktreeHarness { + t.Helper() + if _, err := exec.LookPath("git"); err != nil { + t.Skip("git is not installed") + } + dir := t.TempDir() + h := &worktreeHarness{ + t: t, + home: filepath.Join(dir, "home"), + repo: filepath.Join(dir, "repo"), + remote: filepath.Join(dir, "remote.git"), + root: filepath.Join(dir, "state", "worktrees"), + ledger: newTestLedger(t), + } + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(h.home, 0o700)) + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(h.repo, "app"), 0o700)) + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(h.root), 0o700)) + h.git(dir, "init", "-q", "--bare", "-b", "main", h.remote) + h.git(h.repo, "init", "-q", "-b", "main") + h.write(h.repo, "app/README", "hello\n") + h.git(h.repo, "add", ".") + h.git(h.repo, "commit", "-q", "-m", "init") + h.git(h.repo, "remote", "add", "origin", h.remote) + h.git(h.repo, "push", "-q", "origin", "main") + h.wt = h.worktrees("") + return h +} + +func (h *worktreeHarness) worktrees(gitBinary string) *Worktrees { + h.t.Helper() + w, err := NewWorktrees(WorktreesOptions{ + Ledger: h.ledger, + Root: h.root, + Git: gitBinary, + Lookup: h.lookup, + }) + require.NoError(h.t, err) + return w +} + +func (h *worktreeHarness) lookup(k string) (string, bool) { + switch k { + case "HOME": + return h.home, true + case "PATH": + return os.Getenv("PATH"), true + } + return "", false +} + +func (h *worktreeHarness) git(dir string, args ...string) string { + h.t.Helper() + cmd := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "git", append([]string{"-c", "user.name=Test", "-c", "user.email=test@example.invalid", "-c", "commit.gpgsign=false"}, args...)...) + cmd.Dir = dir + cmd.Env = []string{"HOME=" + h.home, "PATH=" + os.Getenv("PATH"), "GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM=1"} + out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput() + require.NoError(h.t, err, "git %v: %s", args, out) + return strings.TrimSpace(string(out)) +} + +// gitConflicting runs a git command that is meant to stop with a conflict: +// what it leaves in the record is the point, not its exit status. +func (h *worktreeHarness) gitConflicting(dir string, args ...string) { + h.t.Helper() + cmd := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "git", append([]string{"-c", "user.name=Test", "-c", "user.email=test@example.invalid", "-c", "commit.gpgsign=false"}, args...)...) + cmd.Dir = dir + cmd.Env = []string{"HOME=" + h.home, "PATH=" + os.Getenv("PATH"), "GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM=1"} + out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput() + require.Error(h.t, err, "git %v was meant to conflict: %s", args, out) +} + +func (h *worktreeHarness) write(dir, name, content string) { + h.t.Helper() + require.NoError(h.t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(filepath.Join(dir, name)), 0o700)) + require.NoError(h.t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, name), []byte(content), 0o600)) +} + +// prepare makes a worktree for the route "app" and returns the working +// directory and its row. +func (h *worktreeHarness) prepare(eventID int64) (string, Worktree) { + h.t.Helper() + workDir, err := h.wt.Prepare(context.Background(), filepath.Join(h.repo, "app"), eventID) + require.NoError(h.t, err) + row := h.row(workDir) + return workDir, row +} + +func (h *worktreeHarness) row(workDir string) Worktree { + h.t.Helper() + rows, err := h.ledger.Worktrees(context.Background()) + require.NoError(h.t, err) + for _, r := range rows { + if r.WorkDir == workDir { + return r + } + } + h.t.Fatalf("no worktree row for %s", workDir) + return Worktree{} +} + +// discard is what an operator does: the task ends (which only ever keeps the +// worktree), then `worktrees prune` judges it and removes what holds nothing. +func (h *worktreeHarness) discard(workDir string) Worktree { + h.t.Helper() + require.NoError(h.t, h.wt.Finish(context.Background(), filepath.Join(h.repo, "app"), workDir)) + _, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), nil) + require.NoError(h.t, err) + return h.row(workDir) +} + +func (h *worktreeHarness) finish(workDir string) Worktree { + h.t.Helper() + require.NoError(h.t, h.wt.Finish(context.Background(), filepath.Join(h.repo, "app"), workDir)) + return h.row(workDir) +} + +func (h *worktreeHarness) branchExists(branch string) bool { + h.t.Helper() + return h.git(h.repo, "for-each-ref", "refs/heads/"+branch) != "" +} + +func TestPrepareMakesAWorktreeOnATaskBranchOutsideTheCheckout(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(17) + + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeLive, row.State) + assert.Equal(t, filepath.Join(row.Path, "app"), workDir, "the route's place inside the repository") + assert.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(row.Path, h.root+string(filepath.Separator)), "placed under the connector's root") + assert.False(t, strings.HasPrefix(row.Path, h.repo), "never inside the checkout") + assert.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(row.Branch, BranchPrefix+"17-")) + assert.Equal(t, h.git(h.repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD"), row.BaseCommit) + assert.FileExists(t, filepath.Join(workDir, "README")) + assert.Empty(t, h.git(h.repo, "status", "--porcelain"), "the checkout sees nothing of it") + + info, err := os.Stat(filepath.Dir(row.Path)) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, os.FileMode(0o700), info.Mode().Perm()) +} + +// Invariant 1: a task's end keeps its worktree, whatever is in it; the +// operator's prune is what removes one with nothing to lose, with its branch. +func TestATasksEndKeepsItsWorktreeAndAPruneRemovesIt(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, _ := h.prepare(1) + + kept := h.finish(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, kept.State) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedFinished, kept.RetainedReason) + assert.True(t, exists(kept.Path), "the worktree is still there") + assert.True(t, h.branchExists(kept.Branch), "and so is its branch") + + row := h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRemoved, row.State) + assert.Equal(t, RemovedByPrune, row.RemovedBy) + assert.False(t, exists(row.Path)) + assert.False(t, h.branchExists(row.Branch)) +} + +// Invariant 1: uncommitted work survives the task's end and is listed as +// retained (the card's done-when). +func TestUncommittedWorkSurvivesTheTaskAndIsRetained(t *testing.T) { + for name, change := range map[string]func(h *worktreeHarness, workDir string){ + "modified": func(h *worktreeHarness, d string) { h.write(d, "README", "changed\n") }, + "untracked": func(h *worktreeHarness, d string) { h.write(d, "notes/new.txt", "draft\n") }, + "staged": func(h *worktreeHarness, d string) { + h.write(d, "staged.txt", "x\n") + h.git(d, "add", "staged.txt") + }, + "deleted": func(h *worktreeHarness, d string) { require.NoError(h.t, os.Remove(filepath.Join(d, "README"))) }, + "ignored": func(h *worktreeHarness, d string) { + exclude := h.git(d, "rev-parse", "--path-format=absolute", "--git-path", "info/exclude") + require.NoError(h.t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(exclude), 0o700)) + require.NoError(h.t, os.WriteFile(exclude, []byte("*.local\n"), 0o600)) + h.write(d, "report.local", "results\n") + }, + "skip-worktree": func(h *worktreeHarness, d string) { + h.git(d, "update-index", "--skip-worktree", "README") + h.write(d, "README", "hidden edit\n") + }, + "assume-unchanged": func(h *worktreeHarness, d string) { + h.git(d, "update-index", "--assume-unchanged", "README") + h.write(d, "README", "hidden edit\n") + }, + "merge in progress": func(h *worktreeHarness, d string) { + marker := h.git(d, "rev-parse", "--path-format=absolute", "--git-path", "MERGE_HEAD") + require.NoError(h.t, os.WriteFile(marker, []byte(h.git(d, "rev-parse", "HEAD")+"\n"), 0o600)) + }, + } { + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, _ := h.prepare(2) + change(h, workDir) + row := h.finish(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, row.State) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedFinished, row.RetainedReason) + // And an operator's prune keeps it too, now saying what is in it. + row = h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, row.State) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedDirty, row.RetainedReason) + assert.True(t, exists(workDir)) + assert.True(t, h.branchExists(row.Branch)) + + retained, err := h.wt.Retained(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, retained, 1) + assert.Equal(t, row.Path, retained[0].Path) + }) + } +} + +// Invariant 1: a commit only this worktree holds keeps it; one a remote or +// the main line holds does not; another task's branch is no evidence. +func TestCommitsAreKeptUntilHeldElsewhere(t *testing.T) { + commit := func(h *worktreeHarness, d, name string) string { + h.write(d, name, name+"\n") + h.git(d, "add", name) + h.git(d, "commit", "-q", "-m", name) + return h.git(d, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + } + t.Run("unpushed", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, _ := h.prepare(3) + commit(h, workDir, "work.txt") + row := h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedUnpushed, row.RetainedReason) + assert.True(t, exists(workDir)) + }) + t.Run("pushed", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(4) + commit(h, workDir, "work.txt") + h.git(workDir, "push", "-q", "origin", row.Branch) + row = h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRemoved, row.State) + assert.False(t, h.branchExists(row.Branch)) + }) + t.Run("merged", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(5) + commit(h, workDir, "work.txt") + h.git(h.repo, "merge", "-q", "--ff-only", row.Branch) + row = h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRemoved, row.State) + }) + t.Run("held only by another task's branch", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, _ := h.prepare(6) + sha := commit(h, workDir, "work.txt") + h.git(h.repo, "branch", BranchPrefix+"99-other", sha) + row := h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedUnpushed, row.RetainedReason) + }) + t.Run("detached away from an unpushed branch", func(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(7) + commit(h, workDir, "work.txt") + h.git(workDir, "checkout", "-q", "--detach", row.BaseCommit) + row = h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedUnpushed, row.RetainedReason, "the task branch's commits count, wherever HEAD is") + }) +} + +func TestALockedWorktreeIsRetained(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(8) + h.git(h.repo, "worktree", "lock", row.Path) + row = h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedLocked, row.RetainedReason) + assert.True(t, exists(workDir)) +} + +// fakeGit is a git that runs the real one, except where told to fail or to +// do something first. +func fakeGit(t *testing.T, script string) string { + t.Helper() + gitPath, err := exec.LookPath("git") + require.NoError(t, err) + path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "git") + body := "#!/bin/sh\nREAL=" + gitPath + "\n" + script + "\nexec \"$REAL\" \"$@\"\n" + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte(body), 0o700)) + return path +} + +// Invariant 1: a check that fails keeps the worktree. +func TestAFailedCheckRetains(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, _ := h.prepare(9) + h.wt = h.worktrees(fakeGit(t, `for a in "$@"; do [ "$a" = status ] && exit 128; done`)) + row := h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, row.State) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedUnverified, row.RetainedReason) + assert.True(t, exists(workDir)) +} + +// Invariant 2: the branch is deleted only while it still points at the commit +// that was verified. +func TestABranchThatMovedIsNotDeleted(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(11) + // Between the check and the branch's deletion someone commits onto the + // task branch from elsewhere. + other := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "other") + h.git(h.repo, "worktree", "add", "-q", "--detach", other, row.BaseCommit) + h.write(other, "moved.txt", "x\n") + h.git(other, "add", "moved.txt") + h.git(other, "commit", "-q", "-m", "moved") + moved := h.git(other, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + h.wt = h.worktrees(fakeGit(t, `case "$*" in *"update-ref --stdin"*) "$REAL" -C "`+h.repo+`" update-ref refs/heads/`+row.Branch+` `+moved+`;; esac`)) + row = h.discard(workDir) + // The judgment no longer stands, so the worktree is kept with it. + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, row.State) + assert.Equal(t, moved, h.git(h.repo, "rev-parse", "refs/heads/"+row.Branch)) + assert.True(t, exists(workDir), "the worktree is still there") +} + +// Invariant 6: the repository's hooks do not run. +func TestTheRepositorysHooksDoNotRun(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + marker := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "hook-ran") + hook := filepath.Join(h.repo, ".git", "hooks", "post-checkout") + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(hook, []byte("#!/bin/sh\ntouch "+marker+"\n"), 0o700)) + h.prepare(12) + assert.False(t, exists(marker)) +} + +// Invariant 1, on the disk itself: a file in a submodule's directory, which +// git neither reports nor refuses to remove, is work. +func TestWorkInASubmodulesDirectoryIsRetained(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + sub := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "sub") + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(sub, 0o700)) + h.git(sub, "init", "-q", "-b", "main") + h.write(sub, "lib.txt", "lib\n") + h.git(sub, "add", ".") + h.git(sub, "commit", "-q", "-m", "sub") + h.git(h.repo, "-c", "protocol.file.allow=always", "submodule", "add", "-q", sub, "app/vendor") + h.git(h.repo, "commit", "-q", "-m", "submodule") + + workDir, _ := h.prepare(14) + h.write(workDir, "vendor/notes.txt", "notes\n") + row := h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedDirty, row.RetainedReason) + assert.True(t, exists(filepath.Join(workDir, "vendor", "notes.txt"))) +} + +// Invariant 1: a commit only the worktree's reflog still reaches is work. +func TestACommitOnlyTheReflogReachesIsRetained(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(15) + h.git(workDir, "checkout", "-q", "--detach") + h.write(workDir, "c.txt", "c\n") + h.git(workDir, "add", "c.txt") + h.git(workDir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "moved away from") + h.git(workDir, "checkout", "-q", row.Branch) + row = h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedUnpushed, row.RetainedReason) +} + +// Invariant 6: a filter whose name git's -c could not carry, or that only +// the task branch's configuration defines, does not run either. +func TestFiltersOutOfReachOfAScanStillDoNotRun(t *testing.T) { + for name, configure := range map[string]func(h *worktreeHarness, marker string){ + "name with =": func(h *worktreeHarness, marker string) { + h.write(h.repo, ".gitattributes", "*.txt filter=a=b\n") + h.git(h.repo, "config", "filter.a=b.smudge", "touch "+marker+"; cat") + }, + "defined on the task branch": func(h *worktreeHarness, marker string) { + h.write(h.repo, ".gitattributes", "*.txt filter=probe\n") + include := filepath.Join(h.home, "branch-filter.gitconfig") + h.write(h.home, "branch-filter.gitconfig", "[filter \"probe\"]\n\tsmudge = touch "+marker+"; cat\n") + h.git(h.repo, "config", "includeIf.onbranch:"+BranchPrefix+"**.path", include) + }, + } { + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + marker := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "ran") + configure(h, marker) + h.write(h.repo, "app/data.txt", "data\n") + h.git(h.repo, "add", ".") + h.git(h.repo, "commit", "-q", "-m", "attributes") + h.prepare(16) + assert.False(t, exists(marker), "no filter ran") + }) + } +} + +// Invariant 6, at removal: git worktree remove reads the worktree's files +// under the task branch's own configuration, and a filter defined there does +// not run either. +func TestAFilterOnTheTaskBranchDoesNotRunAtRemoval(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + marker := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "ran") + h.write(h.repo, ".gitattributes", "*.txt filter=probe\n") + h.write(h.repo, "app/data.txt", "data\n") + h.git(h.repo, "add", ".") + h.git(h.repo, "commit", "-q", "-m", "attributes") + workDir, _ := h.prepare(96) + h.write(h.home, "branch-filter.gitconfig", "[filter \"probe\"]\n\tclean = touch "+marker+"; cat\n\tsmudge = touch "+marker+"; cat\n") + h.git(h.repo, "config", "includeIf.onbranch:"+BranchPrefix+"**.path", filepath.Join(h.home, "branch-filter.gitconfig")) + // A racy index entry makes status read the file through its clean filter. + require.NoError(t, os.Chtimes(filepath.Join(workDir, "data.txt"), time.Now().Add(time.Hour), time.Now().Add(time.Hour))) + + row := h.discard(workDir) + assert.False(t, exists(marker), "no filter ran") + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRemoved, row.State) +} + +// A filter git lfs marks required does not break the checkout once blanked. +func TestARequiredFilterDoesNotBreakTheCheckout(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + h.write(h.repo, ".gitattributes", "*.bin filter=lfsish\n") + h.write(h.repo, "app/blob.bin", "blob\n") + h.git(h.repo, "add", ".") + h.git(h.repo, "commit", "-q", "-m", "blob") + h.git(h.repo, "config", "filter.lfsish.smudge", "cat") + h.git(h.repo, "config", "filter.lfsish.clean", "cat") + h.git(h.repo, "config", "filter.lfsish.required", "true") + + workDir, row := h.prepare(97) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeLive, row.State) + assert.FileExists(t, filepath.Join(workDir, "blob.bin")) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRemoved, h.discard(workDir).State) +} + +// submoduleHarness is a worktree harness whose repository has a submodule at +// app/vendor, and the submodule's source. +func submoduleHarness(t *testing.T) (*worktreeHarness, string) { + t.Helper() + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + sub := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "sub") + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(sub, 0o700)) + h.git(sub, "init", "-q", "-b", "main") + h.write(sub, "lib.txt", "lib\n") + h.git(sub, "add", ".") + h.git(sub, "commit", "-q", "-m", "sub") + h.git(h.repo, "-c", "protocol.file.allow=always", "submodule", "add", "-q", sub, "app/vendor") + h.git(h.repo, "commit", "-q", "-m", "submodule") + return h, sub +} + +// Invariant 6 in a submodule's directory: a git directory and configuration a +// worker planted there never make the connector's git run a filter, because +// git is never asked to look inside it. +func TestAFilterPlantedInASubmoduleDoesNotRun(t *testing.T) { + h, sub := submoduleHarness(t) + workDir, _ := h.prepare(98) + marker := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "ran") + vendor := filepath.Join(workDir, "vendor") + clone := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "clone") + h.git(filepath.Dir(clone), "clone", "-q", sub, clone) + require.NoError(t, os.Rename(filepath.Join(clone, ".git"), filepath.Join(vendor, ".planted"))) + require.NoError(t, os.Rename(filepath.Join(clone, "lib.txt"), filepath.Join(vendor, "lib.txt"))) + h.write(vendor, ".git", "gitdir: .planted\n") + h.write(vendor, ".planted/info/attributes", "lib.txt filter=probe\n") + h.git(vendor, "config", "filter.probe.clean", "touch "+marker+"; cat") + require.NoError(t, os.Chtimes(filepath.Join(vendor, "lib.txt"), time.Now().Add(time.Hour), time.Now().Add(time.Hour))) + + row := h.discard(workDir) + assert.False(t, exists(marker), "no filter ran") + assert.Equal(t, RetainedDirty, row.RetainedReason) +} + +// Invariant 5 with a submodule: its commits live in git directories a forced +// removal would delete, so a worktree holding any is not forced. +func TestAForcedPruneKeepsASubmodulesCommits(t *testing.T) { + h, _ := submoduleHarness(t) + workDir, _ := h.prepare(99) + h.git(workDir, "-c", "protocol.file.allow=always", "submodule", "update", "-q", "--init") + vendor := filepath.Join(workDir, "vendor") + h.write(vendor, "more.txt", "more\n") + h.git(vendor, "add", ".") + h.git(vendor, "commit", "-q", "-m", "only copy") + subGitDir := h.git(vendor, "rev-parse", "--absolute-git-dir") + row := h.discard(workDir) + + results, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), []string{row.Path}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneKept, results[0].Action) + assert.True(t, results[0].ForceRefused) + assert.DirExists(t, subGitDir) +} + +// A checkout that never happened leaves nothing kept: an empty worktree is +// not work, and keeping it as dirty at every retry would fill the disk. +// A checkout that never happened is still not the connector's to delete: the +// row is kept, and the operator's prune removes it as a worktree holding +// nothing. +func TestAnUnpopulatedWorktreeIsKeptUntilAPrune(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + h.wt = h.worktrees(fakeGit(t, `case "$*" in *"reset --quiet --hard"*) exit 128;; esac`)) + _, err := h.wt.Prepare(context.Background(), filepath.Join(h.repo, "app"), 100) + require.Error(t, err) + rows, err := h.ledger.Worktrees(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, rows, 1) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, rows[0].State) + assert.True(t, exists(rows[0].Path)) + + h.wt = h.worktrees("") + results, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneRemoved, results[0].Action) + assert.False(t, exists(rows[0].Path)) + assert.False(t, h.branchExists(rows[0].Branch)) +} + +// A worktree whose directory was deleted is recorded missing, and the +// repository's own record of it is left for git: it can hold a submodule's +// only commits, a reflog, or a lock for a directory that is only away. +func TestAMissingWorktreesRepositoryRecordIsLeftAlone(t *testing.T) { + h, _ := submoduleHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(103) + h.git(workDir, "-c", "protocol.file.allow=always", "submodule", "update", "-q", "--init") + vendor := filepath.Join(workDir, "vendor") + h.write(vendor, "more.txt", "more\n") + h.git(vendor, "add", ".") + h.git(vendor, "commit", "-q", "-m", "only copy") + subGitDir := h.git(vendor, "rev-parse", "--absolute-git-dir") + require.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(row.Path)) + + row = h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, row.State, "a record holding a submodule's commits keeps the row") + assert.DirExists(t, row.AdminDir) + assert.DirExists(t, subGitDir, "the submodule's only commits survive") +} + +// A worktree someone moved is kept, not forgotten: its files are still +// somewhere, and the connector cannot judge them where it cannot find them. +func TestAMovedWorktreeIsKept(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(90) + moved := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "moved") + h.git(h.repo, "worktree", "move", row.Path, moved) + require.False(t, exists(workDir)) + + row = h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, row.State) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedMoved, row.RetainedReason) + assert.True(t, h.branchExists(row.Branch), "the branch the moved worktree has checked out") + assert.FileExists(t, filepath.Join(moved, "app", "README")) +} + +// A worktree moved with a detached HEAD is kept too: the repository's own +// record of it, not its branch, is what says where it is. +func TestAMovedWorktreeWithNoBranchIsKept(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(92) + h.git(workDir, "checkout", "-q", "--detach") + h.git(h.repo, "branch", "-q", "-D", row.Branch) + moved := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "moved") + h.git(h.repo, "worktree", "move", row.Path, moved) + + row = h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, row.State) + assert.FileExists(t, filepath.Join(moved, "app", "README")) +} + +// A worktree moved and then deleted is gone, not kept forever. +func TestAMovedWorktreeThatIsThenDeletedIsGone(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(91) + moved := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "moved") + h.git(h.repo, "worktree", "move", row.Path, moved) + require.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(moved)) + + row = h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, row.State) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedOrphaned, row.RetainedReason, "the connector deletes none of what is left") + assert.True(t, h.branchExists(row.Branch)) + + results, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), []string{row.Path}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneForced, results[0].Action, "the operator names it and is told what goes") + assert.False(t, h.branchExists(row.Branch)) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRemoved, h.row(workDir).State) +} + +// Invariant 1: a task branch the connector did not create is never deleted, +// however that worktree ends. +func TestABranchTheConnectorDidNotMakeIsNotDeleted(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + ctx := context.Background() + base := h.git(h.repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + branch := BranchPrefix + "80-taken" + h.git(h.repo, "branch", branch, base) + + record := Worktree{ + Path: filepath.Join(h.root, "repo", "80-taken"), WorkDir: filepath.Join(h.root, "repo", "80-taken"), + Route: filepath.Join(h.repo, "app"), Repository: h.repo, Branch: branch, BaseCommit: base, + OriginatingEventID: 80, State: WorktreeCreating, + } + id, err := h.ledger.BeginWorktree(ctx, record) + require.NoError(t, err) + record.ID = id + require.Error(t, h.wt.add(ctx, &record), "the branch is already someone's") + + unlock, err := h.wt.lock(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + settled := h.wt.settle(ctx, record) + unlock() + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRemoved, settled.State) + assert.True(t, h.branchExists(branch), "someone else's branch survives") + assert.False(t, h.row(record.WorkDir).BranchCreated) +} + +// A worktree that cannot be made is not attempted again at every dispatch +// tick: each failure leaves a row and maybe a partial checkout. +func TestAFailedPrepareBacksOff(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + h.wt = h.worktrees(fakeGit(t, `case "$*" in *"worktree add"*) exit 128;; esac`)) + clock := time.Date(2026, 9, 17, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC) + h.wt.now = func() time.Time { return clock } + route := filepath.Join(h.repo, "app") + ctx := context.Background() + + _, err := h.wt.Prepare(ctx, route, 70) + require.Error(t, err) + _, err = h.wt.Prepare(ctx, route, 70) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrPrepareBackoff) + rows, err := h.ledger.Worktrees(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Len(t, rows, 1, "the second call made nothing") + + clock = clock.Add(PrepareBackoff) + _, err = h.wt.Prepare(ctx, route, 70) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.NotErrorIs(t, err, ErrPrepareBackoff) + clock = clock.Add(PrepareBackoff) + _, err = h.wt.Prepare(ctx, route, 70) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrPrepareBackoff, "the wait doubles") + + _, err = h.wt.Prepare(ctx, route, 71) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrPrepareBackoff, "the route waits, whichever event asks") + assert.Equal(t, []string{route}, h.wt.RoutesWaiting()) + + clock = clock.Add(PrepareBackoffMax) + assert.Empty(t, h.wt.RoutesWaiting(), "a route whose wait is over is not held") +} + +// A route that cannot take a worktree never fills the window the dispatcher +// starts records from: a healthy route's record still starts. +func TestAFailingWorktreeRouteDoesNotStarveTheOthers(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + broken := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "not-a-repository") + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(broken, 0o700)) + healthy := filepath.Join(h.repo, "app") + const brokenBucket = 777 + fake := newFakeDriver() + d := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, func(o *DispatcherOptions) { + o.Ledger = h.ledger + o.Workspaces = h.wt + }) + d.ledger = h.ledger + d.mu.Lock() + d.routes = map[int64]admission.Route{adapterBucketID: {Path: healthy}, brokenBucket: {Path: broken}} + d.mu.Unlock() + admit := func(id, bucket int64, route string) { + event := testEvent(id) + event.BucketID = bucket + _, err := h.ledger.RecordSeen(context.Background(), event, LanePoll) + require.NoError(t, err) + v := admittedVerdict(id, 0, "recording:"+strconv.FormatInt(id, 10)) + v.BucketID, v.Route = bucket, route + _, err = h.ledger.Admission().Commit(context.Background(), v) + require.NoError(t, err) + } + for id := int64(100); id < 110; id++ { + admit(id, brokenBucket, broken) + } + admit(200, adapterBucketID, healthy) + d.run(t) + select { + case s := <-fake.made: + assert.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(s.cfg.Cwd, h.root), "the healthy route's record started in its worktree") + case <-time.After(10 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("a route that cannot take a worktree starved a healthy one") + } +} + +// With worktrees off, a new task works in its route, and a worktree made +// while they were on is still recovered. +func TestWorktreesOffStillRecoversWhatWasMade(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + ctx := context.Background() + workDir, _ := h.prepare(72) + h.write(workDir, "wip.txt", "wip\n") + + off, err := NewWorktrees(WorktreesOptions{Ledger: h.ledger, Root: h.root, Lookup: h.lookup, Off: true}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.False(t, off.PerTaskDirs()) + route := filepath.Join(h.repo, "app") + dir, err := off.Prepare(ctx, route, 73) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, route, dir) + require.NoError(t, off.Finish(ctx, route, route)) + + require.NoError(t, off.Recover(ctx)) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedFinished, h.row(workDir).RetainedReason) + assert.True(t, exists(filepath.Join(workDir, "wip.txt")), "the work is where it was") +} + +// Invariant 6: a content filter the repository's configuration defines does +// not run when the connector checks out or inspects a worktree. +func TestConfiguredContentFiltersDoNotRun(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + markers := t.TempDir() + h.write(h.repo, ".gitattributes", "*.txt filter=probe\n") + h.write(h.repo, "app/data.txt", "data\n") + h.git(h.repo, "add", ".") + h.git(h.repo, "commit", "-q", "-m", "attributes") + h.git(h.repo, "config", "filter.probe.smudge", "touch "+filepath.Join(markers, "smudge")+"; cat") + h.git(h.repo, "config", "filter.probe.clean", "touch "+filepath.Join(markers, "clean")+"; cat") + + workDir, _ := h.prepare(13) + h.write(workDir, "data.txt", "changed\n") + row := h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedDirty, row.RetainedReason) + entries, err := os.ReadDir(markers) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, entries, "no filter ran") +} + +// Invariant 3: every row a crash can leave is settled on the next start under +// the same rules, and a worktree a live task works in is not touched. +func TestRecoverSettlesWhatACrashLeft(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + ctx := context.Background() + + // Crashed before git ran: a row and nothing on disk. + never := Worktree{Path: filepath.Join(h.root, "x", "20-aaaaaa"), WorkDir: filepath.Join(h.root, "x", "20-aaaaaa", "app"), Route: filepath.Join(h.repo, "app"), + Repository: h.repo, Branch: BranchPrefix + "20-aaaaaa", BaseCommit: h.git(h.repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD"), OriginatingEventID: 20} + neverID, err := h.ledger.BeginWorktree(ctx, never) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // Crashed between git and live, with work in it. + dirtyDir, dirty := h.prepare(21) + h.write(dirtyDir, "wip.txt", "wip\n") + // Crashed mid-removal of a clean one (its names were not frozen). + cleanDir, clean := h.prepare(22) + require.NoError(t, h.ledger.MoveWorktree(ctx, clean.ID, WorktreeRemoving, WorktreeLive)) + // A live task still works in this one. + liveDir, _ := h.prepare(23) + admitOn(t, h.ledger, 23, "recording:23") + _, err = h.ledger.LaunchTask(ctx, LaunchSpec{EventID: 23, Route: testRoute, WorkDir: liveDir, Driver: "fake"}) + require.NoError(t, err) + + require.NoError(t, h.wt.Recover(ctx)) + + rows, err := h.ledger.Worktrees(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + byID := map[int64]Worktree{} + for _, r := range rows { + byID[r.ID] = r + } + // Nothing on disk to keep: the row is reconciled, nothing is deleted. + assert.Equal(t, RemovedNeverCreated, byID[neverID].RemovedBy) + // Everything that is on disk is kept, whatever is in it. + assert.Equal(t, RetainedFinished, byID[dirty.ID].RetainedReason) + assert.True(t, exists(filepath.Join(dirtyDir, "wip.txt"))) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, byID[clean.ID].State) + assert.True(t, exists(cleanDir), "a clean worktree a crash left is kept too") + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeLive, h.row(liveDir).State) +} + +// Invariant 4: a check-and-remove waits for the lock another remover holds. +func TestRemovalsTakeTheWorktreesLock(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, _ := h.prepare(30) + unlock, err := h.wt.lock(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 300*time.Millisecond) + defer cancel() + err = h.wt.Finish(ctx, filepath.Join(h.repo, "app"), workDir) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, context.DeadlineExceeded) + // A worktree that could not be judged is kept, and said to be: a row left + // live is a directory nothing lists and no prune touches. + row := h.row(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, row.State) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedUnverified, row.RetainedReason) + unlock() + retained, err := h.wt.Retained(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, retained, 1) + assert.Equal(t, row.Path, retained[0].Path) + // And the prune that follows judges it as any other kept worktree. + results, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneRemoved, results[0].Action) +} + +// Invariant 5: prune removes what the operator dealt with, keeps what still +// holds work, forces only what the operator names, and never reaches a +// worktree that is not retained. +func TestPruneRemovesOnlyWhatTheOperatorDealtWith(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + ctx := context.Background() + + dealtDir, dealt := h.prepare(40) + h.write(dealtDir, "done.txt", "x\n") + h.finish(dealtDir) + h.git(dealtDir, "add", "done.txt") + h.git(dealtDir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "done") + h.git(dealtDir, "push", "-q", "origin", dealt.Branch) + + keptDir, _ := h.prepare(41) + h.write(keptDir, "wip.txt", "wip\n") + h.finish(keptDir) + + goneDir, gone := h.prepare(42) + h.write(goneDir, "wip.txt", "wip\n") + h.finish(goneDir) + require.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(gone.Path)) + + forcedDir, forced := h.prepare(43) + h.write(forcedDir, "c.txt", "c\n") + h.git(forcedDir, "add", "c.txt") + h.git(forcedDir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "c") + h.write(forcedDir, "wip.txt", "wip\n") + h.finish(forcedDir) + + liveDir, live := h.prepare(44) + h.write(liveDir, "wip.txt", "wip\n") + + _, err := h.wt.Prune(ctx, []string{live.Path}) + require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNotRetained, "a live worktree is never prune's") + assert.True(t, exists(filepath.Join(liveDir, "wip.txt"))) + assert.True(t, exists(filepath.Join(forcedDir, "wip.txt")), "a refused prune removes nothing") + + results, err := h.wt.Prune(ctx, []string{forced.Path}) + require.NoError(t, err) + actions := map[string]PruneResult{} + for _, r := range results { + actions[r.Worktree.Path] = r + } + require.Len(t, actions, 4) + assert.Equal(t, PruneRemoved, actions[dealt.Path].Action) + assert.False(t, exists(dealt.Path)) + assert.Equal(t, PruneKept, actions[h.row(keptDir).Path].Action) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedDirty, actions[h.row(keptDir).Path].Reason) + assert.True(t, exists(filepath.Join(keptDir, "wip.txt"))) + // A directory something outside the connector removed: said to be + // orphaned, and nothing of what it left is touched. + assert.Equal(t, PruneKept, actions[gone.Path].Action) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedOrphaned, actions[gone.Path].Reason) + assert.Equal(t, PruneForced, actions[forced.Path].Action) + assert.NotEmpty(t, actions[forced.Path].RetainedRefs, "an unpushed commit is kept under a ref") + for _, ref := range actions[forced.Path].RetainedRefs { + assert.NotEmpty(t, h.git(h.repo, "for-each-ref", ref), "the kept ref is there") + } + assert.False(t, exists(forced.Path)) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeLive, h.row(liveDir).State) + assert.True(t, exists(filepath.Join(liveDir, "wip.txt"))) +} + +// Invariant 5: a forced prune keeps a commit only a detached HEAD holds, on a +// branch of its own. +func TestAForcedPruneKeepsADetachedHeadsCommit(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, _ := h.prepare(45) + h.git(workDir, "checkout", "-q", "--detach") + h.write(workDir, "c.txt", "c\n") + h.git(workDir, "add", "c.txt") + h.git(workDir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "detached") + commit := h.git(workDir, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + row := h.discard(workDir) + require.Equal(t, RetainedUnpushed, row.RetainedReason) + + results, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), []string{row.Path}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneForced, results[0].Action) + require.NotEmpty(t, results[0].RetainedRefs) + assert.Contains(t, h.git(h.repo, "for-each-ref", "--format=%(objectname)", RetainedRefPrefix), commit) + assert.False(t, exists(row.Path)) +} + +// The card's done-when, through the dispatcher: a worker leaves uncommitted +// work, its task ends, and the worktree is retained and listed. +func TestADispatchedTasksUncommittedWorkIsRetained(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + route := filepath.Join(h.repo, "app") + fake := newFakeDriver() + fake.turn = func(s *fakeSession, _ int, _ string) (driver.PromptResult, error) { + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(s.cfg.Cwd, "answer.txt"), []byte("work\n"), 0o600)) + return driver.PromptResult{Stop: driver.TurnEndTurn}, nil + } + d := newDispatchHarness(t, fake, func(o *DispatcherOptions) { + o.Ledger = h.ledger + o.Workspaces = h.wt + }) + d.ledger = h.ledger + d.routes = map[int64]admission.Route{adapterBucketID: {Path: route}} + for _, id := range []int64{50, 51} { + seenRecord(t, h.ledger, id) + v := admittedVerdict(id, 0, "recording:"+string(rune('a'+id-50))) + v.Route = route + _, err := h.ledger.Admission().Commit(context.Background(), v) + require.NoError(t, err) + } + stop := d.run(t) + a, b := <-fake.made, <-fake.made + assert.NotEqual(t, a.cfg.Cwd, b.cfg.Cwd, "two tasks on one route, each in its own worktree") + d.attemptsEnded(t, 2) + stop() + + retained, err := h.wt.Retained(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, retained, 2) + for _, r := range retained { + assert.Equal(t, RetainedFinished, r.RetainedReason) + assert.NotZero(t, r.TaskID) + content, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(r.WorkDir, "answer.txt")) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "work\n", string(content)) + } +} + +// Worktree states move along their edges only: nothing goes back to live, +// and nothing leaves removed. +func TestWorktreeStatesMoveAlongTheirEdgesOnly(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + ctx := context.Background() + _, row := h.prepare(60) + require.NoError(t, h.ledger.RetainWorktree(ctx, row.ID, RetainedDirty, WorktreeLive)) + _, err := h.ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE worktrees SET state = 'live' WHERE id = ?`, row.ID) + require.Error(t, err) + require.NoError(t, h.ledger.RemovedWorktree(ctx, row.ID, RemovedMissing, WorktreeRetained)) + _, err = h.ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE worktrees SET state = 'retained', removed_by = '', retained_reason = 'dirty' WHERE id = ?`, row.ID) + require.Error(t, err) + require.ErrorIs(t, h.ledger.MoveWorktree(ctx, row.ID, WorktreeRemoving, WorktreeRetained), ErrWorktreeState) +} + +// A path the connector cannot even look at is not proof that work is gone. +func TestAnUnreadablePathCountsAsThere(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + closed := filepath.Join(dir, "closed") + require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(closed, 0o700)) + inside := filepath.Join(closed, "worktree") + require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(inside, 0o700)) + require.NoError(t, os.Chmod(closed, 0o000)) + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.Chmod(closed, 0o700) }) + if _, err := os.Lstat(inside); err == nil { + t.Skip("this user can read through a closed directory") + } + + assert.True(t, exists(inside), "unreadable is not absent") + assert.False(t, exists(filepath.Join(dir, "never")), "absent is absent") +} + +// A moved worktree is found through the repository's record of it however +// that record spells the path. +func TestAMovedWorktreeIsFoundWithRelativePaths(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + h.git(h.repo, "config", "worktree.useRelativePaths", "true") + workDir, row := h.prepare(95) + moved := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "moved") + h.git(h.repo, "worktree", "move", row.Path, moved) + + row = h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedMoved, row.RetainedReason) + assert.True(t, h.branchExists(row.Branch)) + assert.FileExists(t, filepath.Join(moved, "app", "README")) +} + +// A moved worktree is not forced away either: there is nothing at the path to +// judge, and prune says so instead of trying. +func TestAMovedWorktreeIsNotForced(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(93) + moved := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "moved") + h.git(h.repo, "worktree", "move", row.Path, moved) + row = h.discard(workDir) + require.Equal(t, RetainedMoved, row.RetainedReason) + + results, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), []string{row.Path}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneKept, results[0].Action) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedMoved, results[0].Reason) + assert.False(t, results[0].ForceRefused, "prune says where it is, it does not try and fail") + assert.FileExists(t, filepath.Join(moved, "app", "README")) +} + +// A branch the connector made for a worktree that then failed to appear is +// its own to clean up. +// A `worktree add` that failed leaves a branch and no directory. The +// connector deletes neither: the row is kept, and an operator's prune clears +// both once the branch reaches nothing that is not held. +func TestAFailedAddKeepsItsBranchUntilAPrune(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + h.wt = h.worktrees(fakeGit(t, `case "$*" in *"worktree add"*) exit 128;; esac`)) + _, err := h.wt.Prepare(context.Background(), filepath.Join(h.repo, "app"), 94) + require.Error(t, err) + rows, err := h.ledger.Worktrees(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, rows, 1) + assert.True(t, rows[0].BranchCreated) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, rows[0].State) + assert.True(t, h.branchExists(rows[0].Branch), "the branch it made is not the connector's to delete") + + h.wt = h.worktrees("") + results, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneKept, results[0].Action) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedOrphaned, results[0].Reason) + assert.True(t, h.branchExists(rows[0].Branch), "a plain prune deletes nothing of it") + + forced, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), []string{rows[0].Path}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, forced, 1) + assert.False(t, h.branchExists(rows[0].Branch), "the operator naming it clears it") +} + +// A removal the ledger could not record is still reported as a removal, and +// Finish says it was not recorded, rather than anyone being told it was kept. +func TestARemovalTheLedgerCouldNotRecordIsNotReportedKept(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + ctx := context.Background() + workDir, _ := h.prepare(104) + require.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, h.finish(workDir).State) + _, err := h.ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `CREATE TRIGGER refuse_removed BEFORE UPDATE OF state ON worktrees +WHEN NEW.state = 'removed' BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'test: the ledger refuses'); END`) + require.NoError(t, err) + + results, err := h.wt.Prune(ctx, nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneRemoved, results[0].Action, "gone is not reported kept") + row := h.row(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRemoving, row.State) + assert.False(t, exists(row.Path)) +} + +// A missing worktree whose record in the repository still reaches a commit +// nothing else holds is kept, so the operator hears of it before git's own +// prune takes it; the connector deletes nothing either way. +func TestAMissingWorktreeWhoseRecordHoldsACommitIsKept(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(105) + h.git(workDir, "checkout", "-q", "--detach") + h.write(workDir, "c.txt", "c\n") + h.git(workDir, "add", "c.txt") + h.git(workDir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "reflog only") + h.git(workDir, "checkout", "-q", row.Branch) + require.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(row.Path)) + + row = h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, row.State) + assert.DirExists(t, row.AdminDir) +} + +// A forced removal the ledger could not record is still reported forced. +func TestAForcedRemovalTheLedgerCouldNotRecordIsReportedForced(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + ctx := context.Background() + workDir, _ := h.prepare(106) + h.write(workDir, "wip.txt", "wip\n") + row := h.discard(workDir) + require.Equal(t, RetainedDirty, row.RetainedReason) + _, err := h.ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `CREATE TRIGGER refuse_removed BEFORE UPDATE OF state ON worktrees +WHEN NEW.state = 'removed' BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'test: the ledger refuses'); END`) + require.NoError(t, err) + + results, err := h.wt.Prune(ctx, []string{row.Path}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneForced, results[0].Action) + assert.False(t, results[0].ForceRefused) + assert.False(t, exists(row.Path)) +} + +// The worktree rule ("One worktree, one removal"), case by case: what counts +// as work, what happens to it, and that the check still holds when something +// tries to land work between the check and the removal. +func TestTheWorktreeRule(t *testing.T) { + commit := func(h *worktreeHarness, dir, name string) string { + h.write(dir, name, name+"\n") + h.git(dir, "add", name) + h.git(dir, "commit", "-q", "-m", name) + return h.git(dir, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + } + type rowT struct { + name string + // work makes the worktree's state; it returns a commit that must + // survive, if any. + work func(h *worktreeHarness, dir string, row Worktree) string + // frozen runs after the removal has frozen the worktree. + frozen func(t *testing.T, h *worktreeHarness, dir string, row Worktree) + force bool + // want is the row's state after; reason when retained. + want WorktreeState + reason RetainedReason + } + rows := []rowT{ + {name: "clean", want: WorktreeRemoved}, + {name: "modified file", work: func(h *worktreeHarness, d string, _ Worktree) string { h.write(d, "README", "x\n"); return "" }, want: WorktreeRetained, reason: RetainedDirty}, + {name: "untracked file", work: func(h *worktreeHarness, d string, _ Worktree) string { h.write(d, "new.txt", "x\n"); return "" }, want: WorktreeRetained, reason: RetainedDirty}, + {name: "ignored file", work: func(h *worktreeHarness, d string, _ Worktree) string { + exclude := h.git(d, "rev-parse", "--path-format=absolute", "--git-path", "info/exclude") + require.NoError(h.t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(exclude), 0o700)) + require.NoError(h.t, os.WriteFile(exclude, []byte("*.local\n"), 0o600)) + h.write(d, "notes.local", "x\n") + return "" + }, want: WorktreeRetained, reason: RetainedDirty}, + {name: "unpushed commit", work: func(h *worktreeHarness, d string, _ Worktree) string { return commit(h, d, "c.txt") }, want: WorktreeRetained, reason: RetainedUnpushed}, + {name: "commit only the reflog reaches", work: func(h *worktreeHarness, d string, row Worktree) string { + h.git(d, "checkout", "-q", "--detach") + sha := commit(h, d, "c.txt") + h.git(d, "checkout", "-q", row.Branch) + return sha + }, want: WorktreeRetained, reason: RetainedUnpushed}, + {name: "commit a per-worktree ref holds", work: func(h *worktreeHarness, d string, row Worktree) string { + sha := commit(h, d, "c.txt") + h.git(d, "update-ref", "refs/worktree/keep", sha) + h.git(d, "reset", "-q", "--hard", row.BaseCommit) + h.git(d, "reflog", "expire", "--expire=now", "--all") + return sha + }, want: WorktreeRetained, reason: RetainedUnpushed}, + {name: "stash", work: func(h *worktreeHarness, d string, _ Worktree) string { + h.write(d, "README", "stashed\n") + h.git(d, "stash", "-q") + return h.git(d, "rev-parse", "refs/stash") + }, want: WorktreeRemoved}, + {name: "locked", work: func(h *worktreeHarness, _ string, row Worktree) string { + h.git(h.repo, "worktree", "lock", row.Path) + return "" + }, want: WorktreeRetained, reason: RetainedLocked}, + {name: "a commit tried between the check and the removal", frozen: func(t *testing.T, h *worktreeHarness, dir string, row Worktree) { + for _, at := range []string{filepath.Join(row.Path, "app"), filepath.Join(dir, "app")} { + cmd := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "git", "-c", "user.name=T", "-c", "user.email=t@example.invalid", "commit", "-q", "--allow-empty", "-m", "late") + cmd.Dir = at + cmd.Env = []string{"HOME=" + h.home, "PATH=" + os.Getenv("PATH")} + assert.Error(t, cmd.Run(), "no commit lands in a frozen worktree (%s)", at) + } + }, want: WorktreeRemoved}, + {name: "a file written by path between the check and the removal", frozen: func(t *testing.T, _ *worktreeHarness, _ string, row Worktree) { + assert.Error(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(row.Path, "app", "late.txt"), []byte("x"), 0o600), "the path does not reach a frozen worktree") + }, want: WorktreeRemoved}, + {name: "git's own prune while frozen", work: func(h *worktreeHarness, d string, row Worktree) string { + h.git(d, "checkout", "-q", "--detach") + sha := commit(h, d, "c.txt") + h.git(d, "checkout", "-q", row.Branch) + return sha + }, frozen: func(t *testing.T, h *worktreeHarness, _ string, _ Worktree) { + h.git(h.repo, "worktree", "prune", "--expire=now") + }, want: WorktreeRetained, reason: RetainedUnpushed}, + {name: "forced unpushed commit", work: func(h *worktreeHarness, d string, _ Worktree) string { return commit(h, d, "c.txt") }, force: true, want: WorktreeRemoved}, + {name: "forced commit only the reflog reaches", work: func(h *worktreeHarness, d string, row Worktree) string { + h.git(d, "checkout", "-q", "--detach") + sha := commit(h, d, "c.txt") + h.git(d, "checkout", "-q", row.Branch) + h.write(d, "wip.txt", "wip\n") + return sha + }, force: true, want: WorktreeRemoved}, + } + for _, tc := range rows { + t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + ctx := context.Background() + workDir, row := h.prepare(300) + var keep string + if tc.work != nil { + keep = tc.work(h, workDir, row) + } + if tc.frozen != nil { + h.wt.whileFrozen = func(dir string) error { tc.frozen(t, h, dir, row); return nil } + } + // The task's end only ever keeps the worktree; the rule is what + // the operator's prune goes by. + var after Worktree + if tc.force { + h.wt.whileFrozen = nil + require.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, h.finish(workDir).State) + results, err := h.wt.Prune(ctx, []string{row.Path}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + after = h.row(workDir) + } else { + require.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, h.finish(workDir).State, "a task's end keeps its worktree") + after = h.discard(workDir) + } + assert.Equal(t, tc.want, after.State) + if tc.reason != "" { + assert.Equal(t, tc.reason, after.RetainedReason) + } + if tc.force && after.State == WorktreeRemoved { + assert.Equal(t, RemovedByPruneForced, after.RemovedBy) + } + if tc.want == WorktreeRetained { + assert.DirExists(t, workDir, "a kept worktree is where it was") + assert.NoDirExists(t, frozenName(row.Path)) + } else { + assert.NoDirExists(t, row.Path) + assert.NoDirExists(t, frozenName(row.Path)) + assert.NoDirExists(t, frozenName(row.AdminDir)) + } + if keep != "" { + assert.NoError(t, exec.CommandContext(ctx, "git", "-C", h.repo, "cat-file", "-e", keep+"^{commit}").Run()) + if tc.want == WorktreeRemoved { + refs := h.git(h.repo, "for-each-ref", "--contains", keep, "--format=%(refname)") + assert.NotEmpty(t, refs, "the commit is still reachable from a ref") + } + } + }) + } +} + +// A crash while a worktree is frozen leaves a removing row and frozen names; +// the next start restores them and judges again. +func TestACrashWhileFrozenIsRestoredOnTheNextStart(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + ctx := context.Background() + workDir, row := h.prepare(301) + h.write(workDir, "wip.txt", "wip\n") + require.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, h.finish(workDir).State) + // The crash happens inside an operator's prune, the only thing that + // freezes a worktree. + h.wt.whileFrozen = func(string) error { return errors.New("crash") } + _, err := h.wt.Prune(ctx, nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.DirExists(t, frozenName(row.Path)) + require.Equal(t, WorktreeRemoving, h.row(workDir).State) + + h.wt.whileFrozen = nil + require.NoError(t, h.wt.Recover(ctx)) + after := h.row(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, after.State) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedFinished, after.RetainedReason) + assert.FileExists(t, filepath.Join(workDir, "wip.txt")) + assert.DirExists(t, row.AdminDir) + assert.NoDirExists(t, frozenName(row.Path)) +} + +// A row whose record's place was never stored has it found, proven and stored +// before anything is renamed, so a crash while frozen is restored too. +func TestACrashWhileFrozenWithoutAStoredRecordIsRestored(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + ctx := context.Background() + workDir, row := h.prepare(302) + _, err := h.ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE worktrees SET admin_dir = '' WHERE id = ?`, row.ID) + require.NoError(t, err) + h.write(workDir, "wip.txt", "wip\n") + require.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, h.finish(workDir).State) + h.wt.whileFrozen = func(string) error { return errors.New("crash") } + _, err = h.wt.Prune(ctx, nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NotEmpty(t, h.row(workDir).AdminDir, "stored before the freeze") + + h.wt.whileFrozen = nil + require.NoError(t, h.wt.Recover(ctx)) + after := h.row(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedFinished, after.RetainedReason) + assert.DirExists(t, row.AdminDir) + assert.NoFileExists(t, filepath.Join(row.AdminDir, "locked"), "the connector's lock goes with the freeze") +} + +// Invariant 3: configuration that verifies signatures does not make the +// connector's git run a program. +func TestSignatureVerificationDoesNotRun(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + marker := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "gpg-ran") + script := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "gpg") + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(script, []byte("#!/bin/sh\ntouch "+marker+"\nexit 1\n"), 0o700)) + h.git(h.repo, "config", "log.showSignature", "true") + h.git(h.repo, "config", "gpg.program", script) + workDir, row := h.prepare(303) + // A commit carrying a signature header, as a worker could hand-make. + tree := h.git(workDir, "rev-parse", "HEAD^{tree}") + body := "tree " + tree + "\nparent " + row.BaseCommit + "\nauthor T <t@example.invalid> 1 +0000\ncommitter T <t@example.invalid> 1 +0000\ngpgsig -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\n \n -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----\n\nsigned\n" + obj := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "commit") + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(obj, []byte(body), 0o600)) + signed := h.git(workDir, "hash-object", "-t", "commit", "-w", obj) + h.git(workDir, "reset", "-q", "--soft", signed) + + h.discard(workDir) + assert.NoFileExists(t, marker, "no signature program ran") +} + +// Invariant 4: a task branch is deleted in one ref transaction with a check +// that its holder has not moved; a holder moved in between keeps the branch. +// What holds a worktree's commits while it is being deleted is the +// connector's own refs, not someone else's: a branch deleted between the +// transaction and the deletion takes nothing with it. +func TestAHolderThatGoesWhileTheRemovalRunsTakesNothingWithIt(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(310) + h.git(workDir, "checkout", "-q", "--detach") + h.write(workDir, "c.txt", "c\n") + h.git(workDir, "add", "c.txt") + h.git(workDir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "c") + sha := h.git(workDir, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + h.git(workDir, "checkout", "-q", row.Branch) + // Only this branch holds that commit, and it goes the moment the + // removal's transaction is through — while the directory and the record + // are being deleted. + h.git(h.repo, "branch", "keeper", sha) + h.wt = h.worktrees(fakeGit(t, `case "$*" in *"update-ref --stdin"*) "$REAL" "$@"; rc=$?; "$REAL" -C "`+h.repo+`" branch -D keeper >/dev/null 2>&1; exit $rc;; esac`)) + + after := h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRemoved, after.State) + assert.False(t, exists(row.Path)) + assert.NoError(t, exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "git", "-C", h.repo, "cat-file", "-e", sha+"^{commit}").Run()) + refs := h.git(h.repo, "for-each-ref", "--contains", sha, "--format=%(refname)") + assert.Contains(t, refs, RemovingRefPrefix, "the commit is still held by a ref of the connector's own") +} + +// A repository a worker made is git data wherever it is, including the +// directory the task worked in: a force discards files, never commits. +func TestARepositoryMadeWhereGitTracksFilesIsNeverRemoved(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(321) + // A repository made where git tracks files: the worktree's own root, + // which the walk starts at and which is tracked by definition. + h.git(workDir, "init", "-q", "--bare", row.Path) + require.True(t, isGitDir(row.Path)) + require.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, h.finish(workDir).State) + + results, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), []string{row.Path}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneKept, results[0].Action) + assert.True(t, results[0].ForceRefused) + assert.True(t, exists(filepath.Join(row.Path, "objects")), "the repository a worker made is still there") +} + +// A row whose repository is gone: an operator who names it gets it closed, +// because there is nothing left anywhere to delete or to keep it for. +func TestAForceClosesARowWhoseRepositoryIsGone(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(322) + require.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, h.finish(workDir).State) + require.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(row.Path)) + require.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(h.repo)) + + results, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), []string{row.Path}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneForced, results[0].Action, "a row nothing can read is not a row nothing can close") + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRemoved, h.row(workDir).State) +} + +// A row that never stored where git's record is does not get closed on the +// strength of not knowing: the repository is asked, and a record that is +// there keeps the row. +func TestARowThatDoesNotKnowWhereItsRecordIsKeepsIt(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(323) + require.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, h.finish(workDir).State) + _, err := h.ledger.db.ExecContext(context.Background(), `UPDATE worktrees SET admin_dir = '' WHERE id = ?`, row.ID) + require.NoError(t, err) + // The directory and the branch go; git's record of the worktree stays. + require.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(row.Path)) + h.git(h.repo, "update-ref", "-d", "refs/heads/"+row.Branch) + + results, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneKept, results[0].Action) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedOrphaned, results[0].Reason, "the record is still there") +} + +// A force on an orphan says where the branch stood, because nothing worked +// out what it reached. +func TestAForcedOrphanSaysWhereItsBranchStood(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(324) + h.write(workDir, "c.txt", "c\n") + h.git(workDir, "add", "c.txt") + h.git(workDir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "c") + tip := h.git(workDir, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + require.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, h.finish(workDir).State) + require.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(row.Path)) + + results, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), []string{row.Path}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneForced, results[0].Action) + assert.Equal(t, tip, results[0].BranchDeletedAt, "what an operator needs to put it back") + assert.False(t, h.branchExists(row.Branch)) + assert.NoError(t, exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "git", "-C", h.repo, "cat-file", "-e", tip+"^{commit}").Run()) +} + +// A force on an orphan whose branch could not be deleted keeps the row: an +// operator is never left with something nothing lists. +func TestAnOrphanWhoseBranchStaysKeepsItsRow(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(320) + require.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, h.finish(workDir).State) + require.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(row.Path)) + h.wt = h.worktrees(fakeGit(t, `case "$*" in *"update-ref --stdin"*) exit 1;; esac`)) + + results, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), []string{row.Path}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneKept, results[0].Action) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedOrphaned, results[0].Reason) + assert.True(t, h.branchExists(row.Branch)) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, h.row(workDir).State, "still listed") +} + +// A pseudo-ref can name more than one commit — FETCH_HEAD does, and an +// octopus MERGE_HEAD does — and every one of them goes with the record. +func TestEveryCommitAPseudoRefNamesIsJudged(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(319) + first := h.git(h.repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + h.write(workDir, "c.txt", "c\n") + h.git(workDir, "add", "c.txt") + h.git(workDir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "c") + second := h.git(workDir, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + h.git(workDir, "reset", "-q", "--hard", row.BaseCommit) + h.git(workDir, "reflog", "expire", "--expire=now", "--all") + h.git(h.repo, "reflog", "expire", "--expire=now", "--all") + // Nothing else in the record names it: the reset's ORIG_HEAD goes. + origHead := h.git(workDir, "rev-parse", "--path-format=absolute", "--git-path", "ORIG_HEAD") + require.NoError(t, os.Remove(origHead)) + // A fetch's FETCH_HEAD: the held commit first, the unheld one after it. + fetchHead := h.git(workDir, "rev-parse", "--path-format=absolute", "--git-path", "FETCH_HEAD") + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(fetchHead, []byte(first+"\t\tbranch 'main' of origin\n"+second+"\tnot-for-merge\tbranch 'other' of origin\n"), 0o600)) + + after := h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, after.State) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedUnpushed, after.RetainedReason, "the second name is judged too") + assert.NoError(t, exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "git", "-C", h.repo, "cat-file", "-e", second+"^{commit}").Run()) +} + +// A bare repository a worker made inside its worktree is git data too: a +// force discards files, never commits, and no ref here could keep these. +func TestABareRepositoryTheWorkerMadeIsNeverRemoved(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(318) + bare := filepath.Join(workDir, "scratch.git") + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(bare, 0o700)) + h.git(workDir, "init", "-q", "--bare", bare) + require.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, h.finish(workDir).State) + + results, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), []string{row.Path}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneKept, results[0].Action) + assert.True(t, results[0].ForceRefused, "a force does not discard a repository's git data") + assert.True(t, exists(bare)) +} + +// A commit only an old per-worktree ref's reflog reaches, in a repository +// that logs every ref: the reflog lives in the record and goes with it. +func TestACommitOnlyAPerWorktreeRefsReflogReachesIsKept(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + h.git(h.repo, "config", "core.logAllRefUpdates", "always") + workDir, row := h.prepare(317) + h.write(workDir, "c.txt", "c\n") + h.git(workDir, "add", "c.txt") + h.git(workDir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "c") + sha := h.git(workDir, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + // A per-worktree ref pointed at it and was moved away; only its reflog + // reaches it now. + h.git(workDir, "update-ref", "refs/worktree/keep", sha) + h.git(workDir, "update-ref", "refs/worktree/keep", row.BaseCommit) + h.git(workDir, "reset", "-q", "--hard", row.BaseCommit) + h.git(workDir, "reflog", "expire", "--expire=now", "HEAD") + h.git(h.repo, "reflog", "expire", "--expire=now", "refs/heads/"+row.Branch) + + after := h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, after.State) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedUnpushed, after.RetainedReason) + assert.NoError(t, exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "git", "-C", h.repo, "cat-file", "-e", sha+"^{commit}").Run()) +} + +// A repository that keeps no reflogs tells the rule nothing about what a +// worktree reached: what cannot be read is not judged clean. +func TestAWorktreeWithNoReflogIsNotJudgedClean(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + h.git(h.repo, "config", "core.logAllRefUpdates", "false") + workDir, row := h.prepare(308) + // The commit only the reflog would reach, in a repository that keeps + // none: the worktree and its branch are all that hold it. + h.git(workDir, "checkout", "-q", "--detach") + h.write(workDir, "c.txt", "c\n") + h.git(workDir, "add", "c.txt") + h.git(workDir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "c") + sha := h.git(workDir, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + h.git(workDir, "checkout", "-q", row.Branch) + + after := h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, after.State) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedUnverified, after.RetainedReason) + assert.NoError(t, exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "git", "-C", h.repo, "cat-file", "-e", sha+"^{commit}").Run(), "the commit is still there") + + // And the operator can still get rid of it: a force is a decision, not a + // judgment, so a row nothing can read is not a row nothing can clear. In + // a repository that keeps no reflogs there is nothing left pointing at + // that commit for anyone — the connector included — to keep. + results, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), []string{after.Path}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneForced, results[0].Action) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRemoved, h.row(workDir).State) + assert.False(t, exists(after.Path)) +} + +// A commit only the record's ORIG_HEAD reaches goes with the record: it is +// judged like any other commit the worktree reaches. +func TestACommitOnlyOrigHeadReachesIsKept(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(309) + h.write(workDir, "c.txt", "c\n") + h.git(workDir, "add", "c.txt") + h.git(workDir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "c") + sha := h.git(workDir, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + h.git(workDir, "reset", "-q", "--hard", row.BaseCommit) + h.git(workDir, "reflog", "expire", "--expire=now", "--all") + require.Equal(t, sha, h.git(workDir, "rev-parse", "ORIG_HEAD")) + + after := h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, after.State) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedUnpushed, after.RetainedReason) + assert.NoError(t, exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "git", "-C", h.repo, "cat-file", "-e", sha+"^{commit}").Run(), "the commit is still there") +} + +// The judgment leans on every ref that holds a commit the worktree reaches, +// not only the one holding its branch tip: a holder that moves between the +// check and the removal keeps the worktree, commit and all. +func TestAHolderOffTheBranchTipMustNotMoveEither(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(305) + h.write(workDir, "off.txt", "off\n") + h.git(workDir, "add", "off.txt") + h.git(workDir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "off the tip") + off := h.git(workDir, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + // Another branch holds that commit, and the task branch is rolled back to + // its base: the commit is reachable from the worktree's reflogs, and what + // holds it is not the branch tip's holder. + h.git(h.repo, "branch", "keeper", off) + h.git(workDir, "reset", "-q", "--hard", row.BaseCommit) + // Just before the removal's transaction, keeper is moved off it. + h.wt = h.worktrees(fakeGit(t, `case "$*" in *"update-ref --stdin"*) "$REAL" -C "`+h.repo+`" update-ref refs/heads/keeper `+row.BaseCommit+`;; esac`)) + + after := h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, after.State, "the judgment no longer stands") + assert.True(t, exists(workDir), "the worktree is still there") + assert.Equal(t, off, h.git(workDir, "rev-parse", "HEAD@{1}"), "and the commit with it") + assert.Empty(t, h.git(h.repo, "for-each-ref", "--format=%(refname)", RetainedRefPrefix), + "a removal that did not happen leaves no ref of the connector's own behind") +} + +// The commit a worktree was made from is judged like any other: the route's +// branch usually holds it, but a route reset since is not evidence that it +// does, and the task branch is then the only thing reaching it. +func TestTheBaseCommitIsNotAssumedHeld(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + // A commit on the route's branch that was never pushed, and the worktree + // made from it. + h.write(h.repo, "app/base.txt", "base\n") + h.git(h.repo, "add", ".") + h.git(h.repo, "commit", "-q", "-m", "base") + base := h.git(h.repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + workDir, row := h.prepare(307) + require.Equal(t, base, row.BaseCommit) + // The route's branch is reset away: nothing but the task branch reaches + // that commit any more. + h.git(h.repo, "reset", "-q", "--hard", "HEAD~1") + + after := h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, after.State) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedUnpushed, after.RetainedReason) + assert.True(t, h.branchExists(row.Branch), "the branch reaching the commit is kept") + assert.Equal(t, base, h.git(h.repo, "rev-parse", "refs/heads/"+row.Branch)) +} + +// The commits are held before the branch that reaches them goes, not after: +// nothing between the two can leave a commit with no ref at all. +func TestTheCommitsAreHeldBeforeTheBranchGoes(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(314) + h.git(workDir, "checkout", "-q", "--detach") + h.write(workDir, "c.txt", "c\n") + h.git(workDir, "add", "c.txt") + h.git(workDir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "c") + sha := h.git(workDir, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + h.git(workDir, "checkout", "-q", row.Branch) + h.git(h.repo, "branch", "keeper", sha) + // The moment the branch's transaction runs, every commit must already be + // held by a ref of the connector's own. + // Only the first transaction is looked at: that is the branch's. + held := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "held") + h.wt = h.worktrees(fakeGit(t, `case "$*" in *"update-ref --stdin"*) [ -f `+held+` ] || "$REAL" -C "`+h.repo+`" for-each-ref --contains `+sha+` --format='%(refname)' refs/basecamp-connect/removing/ > `+held+`;; esac`)) + + after := h.discard(workDir) + require.Equal(t, WorktreeRemoved, after.State) + data, err := os.ReadFile(held) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, string(data), RemovingRefPrefix, "the commit was held when the branch's transaction ran") +} + +// A worktree whose directory something outside the connector removed: the +// row says so, git's record and the task branch are left exactly as they are, +// and nothing about what they reach is judged. An operator who names it is +// told what goes and it goes. +func TestADirectoryRemovedFromUnderTheConnectorIsOrphanedNotJudged(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(315) + h.write(workDir, "c.txt", "c\n") + h.git(workDir, "add", "c.txt") + h.git(workDir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "c") + sha := h.git(workDir, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + h.git(workDir, "reset", "-q", "--hard", row.BaseCommit) + require.Equal(t, sha, h.git(workDir, "rev-parse", "ORIG_HEAD")) + require.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, h.finish(workDir).State) + require.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(row.Path)) + + results, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneKept, results[0].Action) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedOrphaned, results[0].Reason) + assert.True(t, h.branchExists(row.Branch), "the branch is left alone") + assert.True(t, exists(row.AdminDir), "and so is git's record of the worktree") + assert.NoError(t, exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "git", "-C", h.repo, "cat-file", "-e", sha+"^{commit}").Run()) + + // The explicit discard, naming it: the branch goes, the record is left + // for `git worktree prune`, and the row is closed. + forced, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), []string{row.Path}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, forced, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneForced, forced[0].Action) + assert.False(t, h.branchExists(row.Branch)) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRemoved, h.row(workDir).State) +} + +// The connector deletes no ref of its own accord either: a task whose +// directory is gone keeps its branch, and with it the commits only that +// branch's reflog reaches. +func TestATaskEndDeletesNoBranchOfItsOwnAccord(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(312) + h.write(workDir, "c.txt", "c\n") + h.git(workDir, "add", "c.txt") + h.git(workDir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "c") + sha := h.git(workDir, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + // The branch is back at its base, and only its own reflog reaches that + // commit; the directory is gone when the task ends. + h.git(h.repo, "update-ref", "refs/heads/"+row.Branch, row.BaseCommit) + require.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(row.Path)) + + after := h.finish(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, after.State) + assert.True(t, h.branchExists(row.Branch), "the branch is the operator's to lose, not the connector's") + assert.NoError(t, exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), "git", "-C", h.repo, "cat-file", "-e", sha+"^{commit}").Run()) + assert.Equal(t, sha, h.git(h.repo, "rev-parse", row.Branch+"@{1}"), "its reflog still reaches the commit") +} + +// A prune of the same worktree is judged on what holds its commits, not on +// what a removal that stopped halfway left behind. +func TestAnAbandonedRemovalsRefsDoNotPassTheNextJudgment(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(313) + h.write(workDir, "c.txt", "c\n") + h.git(workDir, "add", "c.txt") + h.git(workDir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "c") + sha := h.git(workDir, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + require.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, h.finish(workDir).State) + // A removal that got as far as holding the commits and then stopped: the + // refs it made are still there. + held, err := h.wt.anchor(context.Background(), row, []string{sha}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, held, 1) + require.Equal(t, sha, h.git(h.repo, "rev-parse", held[0])) + + results, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneKept, results[0].Action, "the commit is still unpushed") + assert.Equal(t, RetainedUnpushed, results[0].Reason, "a ref the connector left behind holds nothing for anybody else") + assert.True(t, exists(row.Path)) +} + +func TestABranchWhoseHolderMovedIsNotDeleted(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(304) + h.write(workDir, "c.txt", "c\n") + h.git(workDir, "add", "c.txt") + h.git(workDir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "c") + h.git(workDir, "push", "-q", "origin", row.Branch) + // Just before the transaction, the only holder, the remote-tracking ref, + // is reset away. + h.wt = h.worktrees(fakeGit(t, `case "$*" in *"update-ref --stdin"*) "$REAL" -C "`+h.repo+`" update-ref refs/remotes/origin/`+row.Branch+` `+row.BaseCommit+`;; esac`)) + after := h.discard(workDir) + // Nothing holds the commit any more: the worktree and its branch stay. + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, after.State) + assert.True(t, h.branchExists(row.Branch), "the branch holding the commit alone is kept") + assert.True(t, exists(workDir), "the worktree the branch is checked out in is kept") +} + +// Git data of a repository inside the worktree — one a worker made, not a +// submodule of the route's — is work no ref can keep: never removed, and a +// force is refused. +func TestARepositoryTheWorkerMadeIsNeverRemoved(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + ctx := context.Background() + workDir, _ := h.prepare(400) + nested := filepath.Join(workDir, "vendor", "lib") + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(nested, 0o700)) + h.git(nested, "init", "-q", "-b", "main") + h.write(nested, "lib.txt", "lib\n") + h.git(nested, "add", ".") + h.git(nested, "commit", "-q", "-m", "only copy") + commit := h.git(nested, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + + row := h.discard(workDir) + require.Equal(t, RetainedDirty, row.RetainedReason) + results, err := h.wt.Prune(ctx, []string{row.Path}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneKept, results[0].Action) + assert.True(t, results[0].ForceRefused) + assert.DirExists(t, filepath.Join(nested, ".git")) + assert.NoError(t, exec.CommandContext(ctx, "git", "-C", nested, "cat-file", "-e", commit+"^{commit}").Run()) +} + +// A crash between `worktree add --no-checkout` and the checkout leaves a +// directory that was never checked out: nothing in it to lose. +func TestAWorktreeThatWasNeverCheckedOutIsKeptThenPruned(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + ctx := context.Background() + base := h.git(h.repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + path := filepath.Join(h.root, "repo", "401-abcdef") + record := Worktree{ + Path: path, WorkDir: filepath.Join(path, "app"), Route: filepath.Join(h.repo, "app"), Repository: h.repo, + Branch: BranchPrefix + "401-abcdef", BaseCommit: base, OriginatingEventID: 401, State: WorktreeCreating, + } + id, err := h.ledger.BeginWorktree(ctx, record) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o700)) + h.git(h.repo, "update-ref", "refs/heads/"+record.Branch, base, "") + require.NoError(t, h.ledger.WorktreeBranchCreated(ctx, id)) + h.git(h.repo, "worktree", "add", "--no-checkout", "-q", path, record.Branch) + require.FileExists(t, filepath.Join(path, ".git")) + + // Recovery keeps it, as it keeps everything on disk. + require.NoError(t, h.wt.Recover(ctx)) + rows, err := h.ledger.Worktrees(ctx) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, rows, 1) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, rows[0].State) + assert.True(t, exists(path)) + + // The operator's prune reads it for what it is: a checkout that never + // happened, holding nothing. + results, err := h.wt.Prune(ctx, nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneRemoved, results[0].Action) + assert.False(t, exists(path)) +} + +// A frozen name already taken keeps the worktree, untouched. +func TestAFrozenNameAlreadyTakenKeepsTheWorktree(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(402) + require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(frozenName(row.Path), 0o700)) + + after := h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, after.State) + assert.Equal(t, RetainedUnverified, after.RetainedReason) + assert.DirExists(t, workDir) + assert.NoFileExists(t, filepath.Join(row.AdminDir, "locked"), "no lock is left on the record") +} + +// A row without a stored record, in a repository that writes relative worktree +// paths, is still proven and removed. +func TestALegacyRowWithRelativePathsIsRemoved(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + ctx := context.Background() + h.git(h.repo, "config", "worktree.useRelativePaths", "true") + workDir, row := h.prepare(403) + _, err := h.ledger.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE worktrees SET admin_dir = '' WHERE id = ?`, row.ID) + require.NoError(t, err) + + after := h.discard(workDir) + assert.Equal(t, WorktreeRemoved, after.State) + assert.False(t, exists(row.Path)) + assert.NoDirExists(t, row.AdminDir) +} + +// A conflicted merge leaves AUTO_MERGE naming the tree ort merged to, which +// is an object no ref can be asked to contain. A force must still go through: +// a tree names no history, so there is nothing there to keep. +func TestAForcedPruneIsNotStoppedByAPseudoRefNamingATree(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(325) + h.git(h.repo, "branch", "theirs") + h.git(h.repo, "checkout", "-q", "theirs") + h.write(h.repo, "app/README", "theirs\n") + h.git(h.repo, "commit", "-q", "-am", "theirs") + h.git(h.repo, "checkout", "-q", "main") + h.write(workDir, "README", "ours\n") + h.git(workDir, "commit", "-q", "-am", "ours") + h.gitConflicting(workDir, "merge", "theirs") + autoMerge, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(row.AdminDir, "AUTO_MERGE")) + require.NoError(t, err, "the conflicted merge left AUTO_MERGE in the record") + require.Equal(t, "tree", h.git(h.repo, "cat-file", "-t", strings.TrimSpace(string(autoMerge)))) + require.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, h.finish(workDir).State) + + results, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), []string{row.Path}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneForced, results[0].Action, "reason: %s", results[0].Reason) + assert.False(t, exists(row.Path)) +} + +// A HEAD that names no commit — a worker's `checkout --orphan` — reaches +// nothing through HEAD. That is not a git the connector could not run, and a +// force is not refused over it: the worktree would otherwise be one no +// command could ever remove. +func TestAWorktreeWhoseHeadNamesNoCommitIsStillForced(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(326) + h.git(workDir, "checkout", "-q", "--detach") + h.write(workDir, "c.txt", "c\n") + h.git(workDir, "add", "c.txt") + h.git(workDir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "detached") + commit := h.git(workDir, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + h.git(workDir, "checkout", "-q", "--orphan", "fresh") + require.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, h.finish(workDir).State) + + results, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), []string{row.Path}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneForced, results[0].Action, "reason: %s", results[0].Reason) + assert.False(t, exists(row.Path)) + assert.Contains(t, h.git(h.repo, "for-each-ref", "--format=%(objectname)", RetainedRefPrefix), commit, + "what HEAD stood at before the orphan is kept: only its reflog still reaches it") +} + +// A per-worktree ref names whatever a worker put under it, and the judgment +// is about the commit that reaches: an annotated tag is history to keep, +// which is what asking git what contains it used to say. +func TestAPerWorktreeRefAtAnAnnotatedTagKeepsItsCommit(t *testing.T) { + h := newWorktreeHarness(t) + workDir, row := h.prepare(327) + // A commit nothing else reaches: its branch and its tag ref are gone, + // and the tag object is left only under the worktree's own ref. + h.git(h.repo, "checkout", "-q", "-b", "temp") + h.write(h.repo, "app/t.txt", "t\n") + h.git(h.repo, "add", "app/t.txt") + h.git(h.repo, "commit", "-q", "-m", "tagged") + tagged := h.git(h.repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + h.git(h.repo, "tag", "-a", "-m", "kept", "kept") + tag := h.git(h.repo, "rev-parse", "kept") + h.git(h.repo, "checkout", "-q", "main") + h.git(h.repo, "branch", "-q", "-D", "temp") + h.git(h.repo, "tag", "-d", "kept") + h.git(workDir, "update-ref", "refs/worktree/kept", tag) + require.Equal(t, WorktreeRetained, h.finish(workDir).State) + + results, err := h.wt.Prune(context.Background(), []string{row.Path}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, PruneForced, results[0].Action, "reason: %s", results[0].Reason) + assert.Contains(t, h.git(h.repo, "for-each-ref", "--format=%(objectname)", RetainedRefPrefix), tagged, + "the tag's commit is kept, not dropped with the tag") +} diff --git a/scripts/check-bare-groups.sh b/scripts/check-bare-groups.sh index d5467e4e6..0911555b1 100755 --- a/scripts/check-bare-groups.sh +++ b/scripts/check-bare-groups.sh @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ ALLOWLIST=( NewAssignmentsCmd # shortcut: shows assignments NewNotificationsCmd # shortcut: lists notifications NewEventsCmd # shortcut: one recording's history, plus the account feed's subcommands + NewConnectCmd # runs the connector; setup is its subcommand ) is_allowed() { diff --git a/skills/basecamp-connect/SKILL.md b/skills/basecamp-connect/SKILL.md index e3899af6f..23d20308d 100644 --- a/skills/basecamp-connect/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/basecamp-connect/SKILL.md @@ -5,11 +5,14 @@ description: | connector's setup: the agent's credential (basecamp auth agent connect), connect.json (who may drive the agent, which project routes to which directory), and readiness (basecamp connect setup). Explains every setup - result and failure. Starting and supervising the connector is not in this - skill yet. + result and failure. Also reads what the connector ran (status, doctor) and + carries out a person's decisions on its records (redispatch, discard, + release, the cutover's shadow promote and import). Starting and supervising + the connector is not in this skill yet. Use when asked to connect an agent, set up or change the connector, add or - remove a project, change who can drive the agent, or find out why setup - says the connector is not ready. + remove a project, change who can drive the agent, find out why setup says + the connector is not ready, or see, retry, close or release what the + connector holds. triggers: - /basecamp-connect - connect an agent @@ -20,6 +23,11 @@ triggers: - route a project to a directory - who can drive the agent - connector not ready + - basecamp connect status + - basecamp connect doctor + - redispatch an event + - held records + - release the hold --- # Basecamp connector: connect an agent and manage its setup @@ -70,7 +78,8 @@ explain the result. This skill is the reference you do that from. computer. Show them in this conversation only; never post them to Basecamp, chat, a file or anywhere else. Whoever approves that code chooses which agent this computer acts as. -- Setup and the connection refuse to run while `BASECAMP_TOKEN` is set. Tell the +- Setup, the connection, doctor and redispatch refuse to run while + `BASECAMP_TOKEN` is set. Tell the person to unset it in their shell; do not set, print or work around it. **Identity.** Never set up a profile whose identity you have not confirmed with @@ -111,7 +120,7 @@ the link and code while it waits; then wait for it to finish. | Credential | The CLI's credential store, under the profile. `basecamp auth status -P '<profile>' --json` describes it (see Inspecting). Never open it. | | connect.json | `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/basecamp/connect/<profile>/connect.json`, default `~/.config/basecamp/connect/<profile>/connect.json`. Setup's JSON result gives the exact `path`. | | Setup lock | `.connect.lock` beside connect.json. One setup per profile at a time. | -| Connector runtime state (ledger, checkpoint, lock) | Does not exist yet: it comes with the connector run (card 24, behind step 21). Do not look for it. | +| Connector runtime state (ledger, checkpoint, lock) | `$XDG_STATE_HOME/basecamp/connect/<account>-<agent person id>/`, default under `~/.local/state`; a shadow run's is under `connect-shadow/` instead. Read it only through `basecamp connect status` and `basecamp connect doctor`; never open or copy the files. | The CLI's configuration, its profiles and (when it uses files) its credential store also live under `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/basecamp`, so pointing @@ -137,6 +146,7 @@ widens trust. "222": { "path": "/home/me/Work/app", "class": "internal", "watch_completions": true } }, "driver": "spawn", + "worker": "claude", "concurrency": 2, "deadline": "45m0s", "worktrees": false @@ -155,9 +165,10 @@ widens trust. | `projects.<id>.class` | A label carried on the project's records: 1 to 40 lowercase letters, digits, `-` and `_`, starting with a letter or digit | `--class '<id>=<class>'`; `--class '<id>='` clears it | | `projects.<id>.watch_completions` | Every trusted completion in the project reaches the agent, without assigning it | `--watch-completions <id>`, `--no-watch-completions <id>` | | `driver` | How workers are run: `spawn` (default) or `acp` | `--driver` | +| `worker` | Which coding agent a spawn worker is: `claude` (default) or `codex` | `--worker` | | `concurrency` | Workers at once, 1 to 32 (default 2) | `--concurrency` | | `deadline` | Time limit per task, 1m to 24h (default 45m) | `--deadline 90m` | -| `worktrees` | Each task gets its own git worktree of the routed directory | `--worktrees`, `--worktrees=false` | +| `worktrees` | Each task gets its own git worktree of the routed directory, kept when the task ends and removed only by `connect worktrees prune` | `--worktrees`, `--worktrees=false` | **Never edit connect.json by hand.** It is the trust anchor: setup verifies every person and route before writing it, writes it owner-only, and parses it @@ -312,7 +323,7 @@ project names up the same way as on first setup, and quote values by the Shell q | Trust only the operator, or project members | `--trust operator` / `--trust project` (leaving allowlist mode drops the list) | | Trust specific people | `--allow <person-id>` for each; the list you pass **replaces** the old one, so pass everyone who stays | | Change the operator | `--operator-profile '<profile>'` | -| Change workers | `--driver`, `--concurrency`, `--deadline`, `--worktrees` / `--worktrees=false` | +| Change workers | `--driver`, `--worker claude` / `--worker codex`, `--concurrency`, `--deadline`, `--worktrees` / `--worktrees=false` | | Replace the agent's credential (only with the person's consent: it rotates the secret) | `basecamp auth agent connect -P '<profile>'`, then setup with no flags to re-check | A class or watch setting needs the project routed first, in the same run or an @@ -393,14 +404,55 @@ is bound to account X, and this command named account Y* (drop `--account`), and *Profile holds a person's login, not an Agent's credential* (either it is a bot user and needs `--expect-identity`, or the wrong login is stored: ask). -## Not built yet - -Setup is all there is today. These come with card 24, behind step 21, and do not -exist in the CLI yet, so do not try them or look for flags for them: - -- starting and supervising the connector, and reading its pointer lines; -- a `service install` subcommand that keeps it running under systemd or launchd; -- status, doctor and redispatch commands for the connector; +## Seeing and deciding what the connector ran + +These read or change the connector's own ledger for a set-up profile. They are +the person's decisions, so run the deciding ones only when the person asks for +that record or that step. + +- `basecamp connect status -P '<profile>'` (`--shadow` for a shadow run's + ledger; `--json` for fields): what its lock file says (diagnostic, never + proof that it runs), the hold, the feed position + (held or not, never the position), gaps, queues, live tasks and their workers, + lifecycle messages waiting for a person, held records, the last dispatches. + Read-only and safe while the connector runs. It shows no content. +- `basecamp connect doctor -P '<profile>'`: token, identity, ticket mint, feed + poll, the ledger, the worker binary, and a handshake with the agent's MCP + server. It writes nothing to the ledger and posts nothing to Basecamp, + though it may renew the profile's credential as any command does. +- `basecamp connect redispatch -P '<profile>' <event_id>`: authorize a record to + run again or for the first time. Accepted for an unknown or failed outcome + (one whose task is still running waits for that task to end), a blocked + record and a held one; refused for a success, a discarded record and a record + that is itself still on its way to a worker. It stops the replaced worker + only when that process is provably still it, and says what became of it. +- `basecamp connect discard -P '<profile>' <event_id>`: close a held, blocked + or unknown record without running it. +- `basecamp connect release -P '<profile>'`: clear the hold that a start with + `--hold` or a shadow promote set. Held records stay held until each is + redispatched or discarded. +- Cutover only: `basecamp connect shadow promote -P '<profile>'` makes the + shadow ledger the connector's, held, and needs both the shadow run and the + connector stopped; `basecamp connect import -P '<profile>' <file>` applies a + reconciliation file and needs the connector stopped. Run these only when the + person is doing a cutover and asks for them. + +Doctor exits `not_ready` (exit 7) when a check fails; explain each failed check. +Follow a hint from these commands only as the rules above allow: one that says +to reconnect the agent's profile rotates its secret and needs the person's +consent, and one that says to run or stop the connector is the person's to do, +since starting it is not part of this skill. + +## Not this skill's to do yet + +These come with card 24. Do not start, supervise or watch the connector from +here, and do not look for flags for it: + +- starting and supervising the connector, and reading the NDJSON pointer lines + it writes while it runs (the command writes them today; using them is not + this skill's yet); +- a `service install` subcommand that keeps it running under systemd or + launchd, which does not exist in the CLI; - the Claude Code and Codex plugins that start it. When the person asks to start the connector, say plainly that setup is done (or diff --git a/skills/basecamp/SKILL.md b/skills/basecamp/SKILL.md index d53358857..d4d41a281 100644 --- a/skills/basecamp/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/basecamp/SKILL.md @@ -1454,7 +1454,32 @@ basecamp auth login --with-token -P bot --account <id> # Import a personal acce basecamp auth login --with-client-credentials --client-id <id> -P agent --account <id> # Authenticate as a Basecamp agent: client secret on stdin, self-token minted on demand (no refresh token) basecamp auth agent connect -P agent # Connect this computer to a Basecamp agent: approve it in a browser and its OAuth client is stored — nothing to paste basecamp connect setup -P agent --operator-profile <me> --route <project-id>=<dir> # Set up a local agent connector on a connected profile (run `auth agent connect` first): verifies trust, checks token, identity, scope, ticket mint and project reads, then writes connect.json -``` +basecamp connect -P agent # Run the connector in the foreground: hear the agent's events, admit what a trusted person asks, and hand the work to a local coding agent that replies as the agent +basecamp connect -P agent --project <id> --shadow # Narrow it to one project, and watch without acting: an isolated state directory, nothing dispatched and nothing posted +basecamp connect setup -P agent --worker codex --worktrees # Run workers with Codex instead of Claude Code, and give each task its own git worktree +basecamp connect worktrees list -P agent --json # The worktrees the connector kept: every task's, with its size on disk, git's record of it, and why it is kept (finished, dirty, unpushed, locked, moved, unverified, orphaned) +basecamp connect worktrees prune -P agent # The only thing that removes a worktree: removes the kept ones that hold no work; --force <path> removes one that does (on disk: every commit it reaches is kept under refs/basecamp-connect/retained/; orphaned: the task branch goes and the commit it stood at is reported) +``` + +`basecamp connect` runs until it is stopped: it is not a command to call for an +answer. Stdout is a wire of one JSON object per line (events seen, verdicts, +dispatches — ids and states, never content) and the logs are on stderr, so read +the lines rather than the log. SIGINT and SIGTERM cancel whatever workers are +running, settle them, and exit 130 and 143. It runs on Linux only: the task +token's hand-over onto a descriptor the next program inherits is sealed only +there. It refuses a second connector for the same agent, and takes `--project` +(repeatable) to hear and dispatch only those projects. Run it under a +supervisor rather than from a session you will close. + +With worktrees on, a task's worktree is kept when the task ends — the connector +removes none of its own accord — and listed by `connect worktrees list` with its +size. Removing them is the operator's call: `connect worktrees prune` removes +those that hold no work, and never pass `--force` for a path the operator did not +name. A worktree whose directory something else removed is reported as +`orphaned`: the connector leaves git's record of it and the task branch exactly +as they are, and only a force on its path deletes the branch. A Codex worker cannot commit (its sandbox cannot write the +worktree's git data), so with Codex every task that edits files leaves a kept +worktree. **Before running ANY of the logins above, check `oauth_type`.** `basecamp auth status --json` reports it, and `agent` means the profile is a Basecamp agent: a