The original solid-macro was authored during OSCP study to demonstrate a
chain of evasion and injection techniques in a single VBA file. v1 is
preserved at git tag v1 for reference; it was a sketch, not a working
artifact, and a code review surfaced multiple critical issues:
CallPointerrelied onCreateObject("Thread"), a COM ProgID that does not exist on any Windows install; the function short-circuited silently.- Assembly-stream building used VBA
Stringconcatenation (UTF-16), producing48 00 B9 00 ...byte sequences instead of the intended x64 opcodes. Pack()read 8 bytes from aVariantstarting at offset 0 (capturing the VT type tag) instead of offset 8 (the value).GetProcAddressandGetModuleHandleAwere called but not declared, preventingOption Explicitcompilation.- The "fresh" ntdll for unhooking was fetched via
LoadLibrary, which on an already-loaded module returns the same hooked base address. AES_Decryptwas an XOR placeholder; the embedded ciphertext was a repeating decorative hex pattern, not real encrypted data.
v2 is a multi-file repo built around a modular VBA project, Python build
tooling, and ISO/LNK delivery wrappers. Technique selection is current to
mid-2026: HellsGate-style indirect syscalls, hardware-breakpoint AMSI
bypass, per-thread ETW kill, PPID-spoofed EarlyBird APC into a dllhost.exe
child.
The functional level is "polished sketch": the chain is end-to-end correct, but the shellcode itself is user-supplied. The repo does not ship a working weaponized artifact.
The detection profile is documented honestly in threat-model.md: the chain will be caught by a tuned MDE in 2026, and that is expected. The artifact's value is demonstrating mastery of modern technique selection, not undetectability against a defended target.