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v1 (preserved at git tag v1)

The original solid-macro was authored during OSCP study to demonstrate a chain of evasion and injection techniques in a single VBA file. v1 is preserved at git tag v1 for reference; it was a sketch, not a working artifact, and a code review surfaced multiple critical issues:

  • CallPointer relied on CreateObject("Thread"), a COM ProgID that does not exist on any Windows install; the function short-circuited silently.
  • Assembly-stream building used VBA String concatenation (UTF-16), producing 48 00 B9 00 ... byte sequences instead of the intended x64 opcodes.
  • Pack() read 8 bytes from a Variant starting at offset 0 (capturing the VT type tag) instead of offset 8 (the value).
  • GetProcAddress and GetModuleHandleA were called but not declared, preventing Option Explicit compilation.
  • The "fresh" ntdll for unhooking was fetched via LoadLibrary, which on an already-loaded module returns the same hooked base address.
  • AES_Decrypt was an XOR placeholder; the embedded ciphertext was a repeating decorative hex pattern, not real encrypted data.

v2 (this rewrite)

v2 is a multi-file repo built around a modular VBA project, Python build tooling, and ISO/LNK delivery wrappers. Technique selection is current to mid-2026: HellsGate-style indirect syscalls, hardware-breakpoint AMSI bypass, per-thread ETW kill, PPID-spoofed EarlyBird APC into a dllhost.exe child.

The functional level is "polished sketch": the chain is end-to-end correct, but the shellcode itself is user-supplied. The repo does not ship a working weaponized artifact.

The detection profile is documented honestly in threat-model.md: the chain will be caught by a tuned MDE in 2026, and that is expected. The artifact's value is demonstrating mastery of modern technique selection, not undetectability against a defended target.