diff --git a/fastembed/common/model_management.py b/fastembed/common/model_management.py
index 35e68236..7919eb9e 100644
--- a/fastembed/common/model_management.py
+++ b/fastembed/common/model_management.py
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 import shutil
 import tarfile
 from copy import deepcopy
-from pathlib import Path
+from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath, PureWindowsPath
 from typing import Any, TypeVar, Generic
 
 import requests
@@ -304,20 +304,77 @@ def decompress_to_cache(cls, targz_path: str, cache_dir: str) -> str:
         try:
             # Open the tar.gz file
             with tarfile.open(targz_path, "r:gz") as tar:
-                # Extract all files into the cache directory
-                tar.extractall(
-                    path=cache_dir,
-                )
-        except tarfile.TarError as e:
+                if hasattr(tarfile, "data_filter"):
+                    # PEP 706 extraction filter: rejects absolute paths, traversal and
+                    # escaping links while extracting, so symlinks planted earlier in the
+                    # archive cannot be used to redirect later members.
+                    tar.extractall(path=cache_dir, filter="data")
+                else:
+                    # Python 3.10.0 - 3.10.11 ship no extraction filter, so vet the members
+                    # by hand before writing anything to disk.
+                    members = tar.getmembers()
+                    for member in members:
+                        cls._validate_tar_member(member)
+                    tar.extractall(path=cache_dir, members=members)
+        except (tarfile.TarError, ValueError) as e:
             # If any error occurs while opening or extracting the tar.gz file,
             # delete the cache directory (if it was created in this function)
             # and raise the error again
-            if "tmp" in cache_dir:
+            if "tmp" in cache_dir and os.path.exists(cache_dir):
                 shutil.rmtree(cache_dir)
-            raise ValueError(f"An error occurred while decompressing {targz_path}: {e}")
+            raise ValueError(f"An error occurred while decompressing {targz_path}: {e}") from e
 
         return cache_dir
 
+    @staticmethod
+    def _is_unsafe_tar_path(path: str) -> bool:
+        """Checks whether a tar path may point outside the directory it is extracted into.
+
+        The check is deliberately lexical. Resolving the path against the extraction
+        directory would be unsound before extraction: a member such as `link/../escape`
+        looks harmless while `link` does not exist yet, and only escapes once an earlier
+        member has been written as a symlink. Any `..` component is therefore rejected
+        outright, which keeps every member and link target under the extraction directory.
+
+        Args:
+            path (str): A tar member name or link target.
+
+        Returns:
+            bool: True if the path is absolute, drive-qualified or contains a `..` component.
+        """
+        # Tar names use POSIX separators, but a crafted archive may carry Windows-style
+        # names ("C:\\evil", "..\\evil") that os.path.join would honour on Windows.
+        windows_path = PureWindowsPath(path)
+        return (
+            PurePosixPath(path).is_absolute()
+            or windows_path.is_absolute()
+            or bool(windows_path.drive)
+            or ".." in windows_path.parts
+        )
+
+    @classmethod
+    def _validate_tar_member(cls, member: tarfile.TarInfo) -> None:
+        """Rejects a tar member that could write outside the extraction directory.
+
+        Only used on interpreters without PEP 706 extraction filters, which do this (and
+        more) themselves.
+
+        Args:
+            member (tarfile.TarInfo): The member about to be extracted.
+
+        Raises:
+            ValueError: If the member path, its link target, or its type is unsafe.
+        """
+        if cls._is_unsafe_tar_path(member.name):
+            raise ValueError(f"Unsafe tar member path: {member.name}")
+
+        if member.issym() or member.islnk():
+            if cls._is_unsafe_tar_path(member.linkname):
+                raise ValueError(f"Unsafe tar link target: {member.name} -> {member.linkname}")
+        elif not (member.isfile() or member.isdir()):
+            # Devices, fifos and the like have no place in a model archive.
+            raise ValueError(f"Unsupported tar member type: {member.name}")
+
     @classmethod
     def retrieve_model_gcs(
         cls,