fix(security): block direct active SSO provider inserts by riderx · Pull Request #3095 · Cap-go/capgo.app

riderx · 2026-08-16T20:19:36Z

Summary (AI generated)

Close GHSA-xg7v-83qv-qfff: org admins with org.update_settings can no longer insert an already-active / enforce_sso row into public.sso_providers through PostgREST.
INSERT RLS now allows only pending_verification rows with enforce_sso false and no dns_verified_at, which matches the private create path in providers.ts (user JWT client).
An UPDATE trigger blocks client writes that skip DNS verification (pending → active, stamping dns_verified_at, or enabling enforce_sso on a non-active provider). service_role / postgres keep the verify-dns and test fixtures working.

Motivation (AI generated)

A forged active + enforce_sso provider is trusted by get_sso_enforcement_by_domain and /private/sso/check-domain. That lets an org admin force SSO enforcement for a domain without the Enterprise + Management API + DNS TXT lifecycle.

Business Impact (AI generated)

Stops a privilege-escalation path that could lock users into SSO on a domain the org does not actually control. Legitimate Enterprise SSO setup is unchanged: pending insert, DNS verify, then private API promotion.

Test Plan (AI generated)

pgTAP 71_test_sso_providers_block_direct_active_insert.sql: org admin PostgREST INSERT of active + enforce_sso is rejected
Same suite: pending_verification insert still works
Same suite: pending → active and dns_verified_at updates are rejected
Same suite: service_role can still insert a legitimate active provider
CI supabase test db on this branch

Screenshots (AI generated)

Not applicable. Database RLS / trigger change only.

Checklist (AI generated)

My code follows the code style of this project and passes bun run lint:backend && bun run lint.
My change requires a change to the documentation.
I have updated the documentation accordingly.
My change has adequate E2E test coverage.
I have tested my code manually, and I have provided steps how to reproduce my tests

Generated with AI

Made with Cursor

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Summary by CodeRabbit

Security
- Strengthened SSO provider protections against unauthorized activation, enforcement, DNS verification, and domain changes.
- Restricted client-created providers to pending, non-enforced, and unverified states.
- Preserved approved internal workflows for creating and managing active providers.
Bug Fixes
- Ensured authorized SSO provider updates continue to work correctly through approved administrative workflows.
Tests
- Added coverage for permitted and blocked SSO provider insert and update scenarios.

coderabbitai · 2026-08-16T20:19:47Z

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📒 Files selected for processing (2)

supabase/migrations/20260826100000_sso_providers_block_direct_active_insert.sql
supabase/tests/71_test_sso_providers_block_direct_active_insert.sql

📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

The migration restricts client SSO provider inserts and updates through RLS and a security-definer trigger. Backend provider updates use the service-role client. The pgTAP test validates rejected client writes, allowed pending inserts, and service-role writes.

Changes

SSO provider write protections

Layer / File(s)	Summary
SSO provider insert and update enforcement `supabase/migrations/20260816201747_sso_providers_block_direct_active_insert.sql`	Client inserts require organization-settings update permission and create pending, non-enforced, DNS-unverified providers. The update guard rejects client changes to `dns_verified_at`, `domain`, `status`, and `enforce_sso`. Service-role execution remains unrestricted.
Trusted backend provider updates `supabase/functions/_backend/private/sso/providers.ts`	The provider update operation uses `supabaseAdmin(c)` instead of the authenticated Supabase client.
Write protection regression coverage `supabase/tests/71_test_sso_providers_block_direct_active_insert.sql`	The pgTAP test validates rejected active or pre-verified client inserts, allowed pending inserts, rejected client updates, and successful service-role provider creation.

Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes

Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to eca6d

The SSO provider security rules are tightened, but the new database test suite currently has an assertion-count mismatch that will fail validation until corrected. SQL formatting and required query validation also need follow-up, so merge should wait for the test-plan issue to be fixed.

Sequence Diagram(s)

sequenceDiagram
  participant OrgAdmin
  participant PostgREST
  participant sso_providers
  participant SSOBackend
  participant service_role
  OrgAdmin->>PostgREST: Insert or update provider
  PostgREST->>sso_providers: Apply RLS and update trigger
  sso_providers-->>PostgREST: Allow pending write or reject invalid change
  SSOBackend->>service_role: Update provider with supabaseAdmin(c)
  service_role->>sso_providers: Apply internal provider update
  sso_providers-->>service_role: Allow internal write

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5

✅ Passed checks (5 passed)

Check name	Status	Explanation
Docstring Coverage	✅ Passed	No functions found in the changed files to evaluate docstring coverage. Skipping docstring coverage check. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 0 functions across 1…
Linked Issues check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Title check	✅ Passed	The title clearly identifies the primary security change: blocking direct active SSO provider inserts. It is concise and specific.
Description check	✅ Passed	The description includes the required Summary, Test plan, Screenshots, and Checklist sections. It explains the security issue, implementation, impact, and regression coverage. CI remains unchecked, an…

Full details: Docstring Coverage

Explanation

No functions found in the changed files to evaluate docstring coverage. Skipping docstring coverage check. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 0 functions across 1 files. (2 skipped: 2 unsupported.)

Full details: Description check

Explanation

The description includes the required Summary, Test plan, Screenshots, and Checklist sections. It explains the security issue, implementation, impact, and regression coverage. CI remains unchecked, and the manual test steps are brief, but the description is mostly complete.

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codspeed-hq · 2026-08-16T20:22:00Z

Merging this PR will not alter performance

✅ 43 untouched benchmarks
⏩ 2 skipped benchmarks¹

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2 benchmarks were skipped, so the baseline results were used instead. If they were deleted from the codebase, click here and archive them to remove them from the performance reports. ↩

TorichanCapgo · 2026-08-24T14:39:34Z

Ready for Martin review/merge when CI is green. Please do not include advisory identifiers in follow-up commits.

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TorichanCapgo · 2026-08-25T06:19:29Z

Triage 2026-08-25: previous “ready for Martin” comment is withdrawn.

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coderabbitai · 2026-08-25T06:19:43Z

@TorichanCapgo I will review pull request #3095.

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Actionable comments posted: 3

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Inline comments:
In
`@supabase/migrations/20260816201747_sso_providers_block_direct_active_insert.sql`:
- Around line 2-3: Resolve the SQLFluff LT05 line-length violations by wrapping
the comments, policy statement, function privilege statements, function comment
and trigger drop statement in
supabase/migrations/20260816201747_sso_providers_block_direct_active_insert.sql
at lines 2-3, 7, 65-67, and 70-72, and wrapping the introductory comment and
test-user setup call in
supabase/tests/71_test_sso_providers_block_direct_active_insert.sql at lines 2
and 8. Preserve all SQL values, function calls, and error text without other
behavioral changes.
- Around line 43-59: Update
supabase/migrations/20260816201747_sso_providers_block_direct_active_insert.sql
lines 43-59 to reject all status and enforce_sso changes from non-internal
roles, while allowing the trusted PATCH path used by
syncAuthUsersSsoOnlyByDomain through an internal database role. Update
supabase/tests/71_test_sso_providers_block_direct_active_insert.sql lines
127-147 to create the verified provider as service_role and assert authenticated
verified-to-active and active-row enforce_sso=true updates fail.
- Around line 24-28: Document the execution characteristics of
enforce_sso_provider_client_update_guard: state that it runs before every UPDATE
on public.sso_providers, identify executing roles and row cardinality, list
required indexes, and include the worst-case EXPLAIN (ANALYZE, BUFFERS) result;
explicitly mark any non-applicable item as not applicable.

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supabase/migrations/20260816201747_sso_providers_block_direct_active_insert.sql
supabase/tests/71_test_sso_providers_block_direct_active_insert.sql

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TorichanCapgo · 2026-08-25T10:56:10Z

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coderabbitai · 2026-08-25T10:57:00Z

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Inline comments:
In `@supabase/tests/71_test_sso_providers_block_direct_active_insert.sql`:
- Line 5: Update the pgTAP plan in this test to match the eleven assertions
emitted by its throws_ok and lives_ok calls: either add the missing assertion or
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📒 Files selected for processing (3)

supabase/functions/_backend/private/sso/providers.ts
supabase/migrations/20260816201747_sso_providers_block_direct_active_insert.sql
supabase/tests/71_test_sso_providers_block_direct_active_insert.sql

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TorichanCapgo · 2026-08-25T11:05:07Z

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