fix(security): compare inviter rank before org_super_admin invites - #3096
fix(security): compare inviter rank before org_super_admin invites#3096riderx wants to merge 4 commits into
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughInvitation endpoints now use shared RBAC role-assignment checks. The checks compare the caller’s maximum active organization role with the requested invite role. Integration tests cover permitted and forbidden invitations. ChangesOrganization invite role authorization
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The change restricts super-admin invitations to callers with sufficient rank. No actionable merge-blocking risk remains beyond normal checks and review. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Caller
participant InviteEndpoint
participant canCallerAssignOrgRole
participant OrganizationRoleBindings
Caller->>InviteEndpoint: submit invitation with target role
InviteEndpoint->>canCallerAssignOrgRole: validate role assignment
canCallerAssignOrgRole->>OrganizationRoleBindings: read active role priorities
OrganizationRoleBindings-->>canCallerAssignOrgRole: caller and target priorities
canCallerAssignOrgRole-->>InviteEndpoint: allow or deny
InviteEndpoint-->>Caller: invitation result or 403 not_authorized
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Full details: Description checkExplanation The description is detailed and directly covers the security change, motivation, impact, and test plan. It does not include the template's Screenshots or Checklist sections, but these omissions are non-critical for this backend change. ✨ Finishing Touches📝 Generate docstrings
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Ready for Martin review/merge when CI is green. Please do not include advisory identifiers in follow-up commits. |
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Inline comments:
In `@tests/private-invite-new-user-to-org.test.ts`:
- Around line 133-208: Add an integration test in the existing-user invite suite
for the successful resend path: use an org_super_admin requester to resend an
invitation to an existing user with invite_type org_super_admin, assert a
successful response and status, and verify the invitation record reflects the
super-admin role. Follow the fixture setup and cleanup pattern used by the
existing tests.
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📒 Files selected for processing (4)
supabase/functions/_backend/private/invite_existing_user_to_org.tssupabase/functions/_backend/private/invite_new_user_to_org.tssupabase/functions/_backend/utils/rbac.tstests/private-invite-new-user-to-org.test.ts
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All reported issues were addressed across 4 files
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Triage 2026-08-25: previous “ready for Martin” comment is withdrawn. This PR is not fully ready per AGENTS.md: automatic review is not APPROVED (CodeRabbit still CHANGES_REQUESTED). Address remaining auto-review comments, keep CI green on the latest head, then re-request review until AI review is fully clear. Do not ping a human until then. @coderabbitai review |
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Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Scope org-role rank to org bindings (including group grants) and resolve API-key principals the same way as checkPermission. Add integration coverage for org super admin resend of super admin invites. Co-authored-by: Martin DONADIEU <martindonadieu@gmail.com>
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Co-authored-by: Martin DONADIEU <martindonadieu@gmail.com>
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2 issues found across 5 files
Confidence score: 2/5
- In
supabase/functions/_backend/utils/rbac.ts,getPgClientis asynchronous but its promise is used as a client, causing every rank check to fail before querying; await the client before callingqueryandcloseClient. - In
tests/private-invite-new-user-to-org.test.ts, the passing test does not cover the new rank guard becauseorg_memberlacksorg.invite_userpermission and receives 403 earlier incheckPermission; add coverage that reachescanCallerAssignOrgRole.
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Prompt for AI agents (unresolved issues)
Check if these issues are valid — if so, understand the root cause of each and fix them. If appropriate, use sub-agents to investigate and fix each issue separately.
<file name="supabase/functions/_backend/utils/rbac.ts">
<violation number="1" location="supabase/functions/_backend/utils/rbac.ts:523">
P1: `getPgClient` is asynchronous, so this stores a promise instead of a client and every rank check fails before querying. Await the client before calling `query` and `closeClient`.</violation>
</file>
<file name="tests/private-invite-new-user-to-org.test.ts">
<violation number="1" location="tests/private-invite-new-user-to-org.test.ts:189">
P3: This test passes, but it does not exercise the new rank guard. org_member has no org.invite_user permission (seed.sql role_permissions), so the 403 fires at checkPermission before canCallerAssignOrgRole runs — the same result with or without this security fix. Relabel the test as covering permission-based denial, or drop it, since the rank-denial path for org_admin→org_super_admin is already covered by the first test.</violation>
</file>
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| let pgClient | ||
| try { | ||
| pgClient = getPgClient(c) |
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P1: getPgClient is asynchronous, so this stores a promise instead of a client and every rank check fails before querying. Await the client before calling query and closeClient.
Prompt for AI agents
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At supabase/functions/_backend/utils/rbac.ts, line 523:
<comment>`getPgClient` is asynchronous, so this stores a promise instead of a client and every rank check fails before querying. Await the client before calling `query` and `closeClient`.</comment>
<file context>
@@ -486,6 +486,100 @@ export async function checkPermissionPg(
+
+ let pgClient
+ try {
+ pgClient = getPgClient(c)
+ const result = await pgClient.query<{ allowed: boolean }>(`
+ WITH target_role AS (
</file context>
| pgClient = getPgClient(c) | |
| pgClient = await getPgClient(c) |
| } | ||
| }) | ||
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| it.concurrent('returns forbidden when an org_member invites org_admin', async () => { |
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P3: This test passes, but it does not exercise the new rank guard. org_member has no org.invite_user permission (seed.sql role_permissions), so the 403 fires at checkPermission before canCallerAssignOrgRole runs — the same result with or without this security fix. Relabel the test as covering permission-based denial, or drop it, since the rank-denial path for org_admin→org_super_admin is already covered by the first test.
Prompt for AI agents
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At tests/private-invite-new-user-to-org.test.ts, line 189:
<comment>This test passes, but it does not exercise the new rank guard. org_member has no org.invite_user permission (seed.sql role_permissions), so the 403 fires at checkPermission before canCallerAssignOrgRole runs — the same result with or without this security fix. Relabel the test as covering permission-based denial, or drop it, since the rank-denial path for org_admin→org_super_admin is already covered by the first test.</comment>
<file context>
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+ }
+ })
+
+ it.concurrent('returns forbidden when an org_member invites org_admin', async () => {
+ const fixture = await createInviteNewUserFixture({
+ extraMembers: [{ userId: USER_ID_NONMEMBER, roleName: 'org_member' }],
</file context>
Co-authored-by: Martin DONADIEU <martindonadieu@gmail.com>
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3 participants
Summary (AI generated)
validateInviteno longer treatsorg.update_user_rolesas enough to inviteorg_super_admin.priority_rankand the target role rank, then deny unlesscaller_max_priority >= target_priority(same comparison asinvite_user_to_org_rbac).tmp_usersas written; new poisoned super-admin invites can no longer be created from the TS path.Motivation (AI generated)
org_adminalready hasorg.update_user_roles, so the old special-case let an admin-level inviter create anorg_super_admininvitation. The SQL RPC already compared ranks; the TypeScript invite path did not.Business Impact (AI generated)
Stops privilege escalation through new-user org invites. An org admin can no longer mint a super-admin invitation. Super-admins can still invite peers. Existing member invite denials stay in place.
Test Plan (AI generated)
org_admincannot inviteorg_super_adminvia/private/invite_new_user_to_orgorg_super_admincan still inviteorg_super_adminorg_memberstill cannot inviteorg_adminGenerated with AI
Made with Cursor
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@codesmith-botwith what you need. Autofix is disabled.Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Bug Fixes
Tests