Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 48: Uncontrolled command line

[meraedit]

Potential fix for https://github.com/Servoy/servoy-eclipse/security/code-scanning/48

General fix approach: keep using ProcessBuilder with separated arguments, but enforce strict allowlisting of what executable/application path can be launched, and ensure untrusted values can only select among expected literals/paths.

Best single fix (without changing functionality): in StartNGDesktopClientHandler.java, before calling builder.command(...), add a strict validation that the resolved executable/app path filename is exactly the expected NG Desktop binary/app name for the current OS (servoyngdesktop or servoyngdesktop.app) and reject anything else. Then keep current execution logic. This complements existing path-boundary checks and addresses CodeQL’s taint concern by proving the launched target is fixed/allowlisted, not arbitrary user-controlled.

Needed changes:

• File: com.servoy.eclipse.debug/src/com/servoy/eclipse/debug/handlers/StartNGDesktopClientHandler.java
• Region: around lines 449–473 (path checks + process start)
• Add a small local validation block (or helper method if already shown; here local block is safest with given snippet constraints).
• No new dependency required; use existing JDK APIs already imported.

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