🔒 fix: use timing-safe comparison for webhook authentication - #93
🔒 fix: use timing-safe comparison for webhook authentication#93Sparkier wants to merge 2 commits into
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Co-authored-by: Sparkier <5690524+Sparkier@users.noreply.github.com>
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Co-authored-by: Sparkier <5690524+Sparkier@users.noreply.github.com>
🎯 What: Fixed a timing attack vulnerability in webhook authentication checks by replacing the standard inequality operator (
!==) with a timing-safe string comparison function (timingSafeEqualfromnode:crypto).Authorizationheader against secret keys. Standard string comparison returnsfalseas soon as it encounters a mismatched character. An attacker could exploit this by repeatedly sending requests with slightly different tokens and measuring the response time. By observing which character guesses take slightly longer (because they match and the comparison proceeds to the next character), they could theoretically deduce the secret key character by character, leading to unauthorized access to the webhooks.🛡️ Solution:
safeCompareutility function insrc/lib/utils.tsthat safely handles string length differences and null values, and usesnode:crypto'stimingSafeEqualto perform the actual comparison in constant time.src/routes/api/newsletter/daily-digest/+server.ts,src/routes/api/webhooks/post/+server.ts, andsrc/routes/api/webhooks/google-sheets/+server.tsto use this newsafeComparefunction.📊 Coverage: All existing test suites pass.
✨ Result: Webhook endpoints are now secure against timing attacks.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 7334669684848365334 started by @Sparkier