🔒 fix(security): address timing attack vulnerability in webhook auth - #95
🔒 fix(security): address timing attack vulnerability in webhook auth#95Sparkier wants to merge 1 commit into
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Replaces simple string comparisons (`!==`) with a `timingSafeStringEqual` utility that leverages `node:crypto`'s `timingSafeEqual`. This utility handles differing lengths without immediately returning, mitigating timing attacks on the `WEBHOOK_SECRET` and `DAILY_DIGEST_SECRET_KEY` tokens. Applies to `api/webhooks/post`, `api/webhooks/google-sheets`, and `api/newsletter/daily-digest`. Tests for the utility have been added. Co-authored-by: Sparkier <5690524+Sparkier@users.noreply.github.com>
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🎯 What:
Fixed a timing attack vulnerability in webhook authentication endpoints by replacing strict equality checks (
!==) with a new utilitytimingSafeStringEqualleveragingnode:crypto.timingSafeEqual.If left unfixed, an attacker could potentially brute-force the
WEBHOOK_SECRETorDAILY_DIGEST_SECRET_KEYover time by analyzing the microscopic differences in response times when guessing tokens character-by-character.🛡️ Solution:
Created a utility function in
src/lib/server/auth.tsthat compares header tokens usingcrypto.timingSafeEqual, ensuring the comparison takes a constant amount of time regardless of whether or where the mismatch occurs. Implemented length matching checks that safely prevent leakage. Applied this fix across three endpoints:api/webhooks/post/+server.tsapi/webhooks/google-sheets/+server.tsapi/newsletter/daily-digest/+server.tsAlso included robust tests for the new utility to ensure correctness.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 1574810632966151842 started by @Sparkier