Memo type is silently auto-detected from text shape — numeric text memos are shipped as MEMO_ID instead of MEMO_TEXT - #69
Open
mrmoney10010-design wants to merge 2 commits into
Conversation
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
On Stellar, MEMO_ID and MEMO_TEXT are not interchangeable, and many custodial destinations (centralized exchanges, some custodial wallets) key deposits to a specific sub-account by memo, requiring one specific memo type. A very common real-world case is a numeric deposit/reference id that the destination expects as MEMO_TEXT (e.g. an exchange that says "enter your account ID as the memo, type: Text") — but because the value is all digits, this code silently ships it as MEMO_ID instead. The transaction still succeeds on-chain (Stellar doesn't care whether the sender's intent matched the receiver's expectation), so there is no error, no warning, and no way for the user to notice anything went wrong until the destination fails to credit the deposit — at which point recovering misrouted funds from a custodial destination is often difficult or impossible. This is exactly the class of bug that's invisible in testing (the transaction "succeeds") but has real financial consequences for real users.
closes #36