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docs(claude.md): refuse external PRs before pull, not after#212

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May 25, 2026
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docs(claude.md): refuse external PRs before pull, not after#212
luokerenx4 merged 1 commit into
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Summary

Add an explicit security policy section to CLAUDE.md ## Git Workflow: the main repo does not accept external PRs, and the agent must refuse to evaluate them before any pull / checkout / diff operation.

Two attack surfaces this closes:

  1. Toolchain poisoning at install timegh pr checkout followed by pnpm install runs postinstall scripts and resolves new deps. Malicious changes to package.json execute before any review eye reaches the diff.
  2. Prompt injection through diff contentgh pr diff renders the changed files into the agent's context. Code comments, README edits, or commit messages can be crafted to redirect the agent's behavior.

The mechanical check the agent must run first:

gh pr view <N> --json headRepositoryOwner,author,headRefName

If headRepositoryOwner.login != 'TraderAlice' → refuse. Surface the PR's existence (author + title) to the user, let them decide.

Ecosystem PRs still have a legal channel via satellite repos (see existing project_satellite_repo_ecosystem memory) — this rule locks the main-repo door only.

Test plan

  • No code changes — docs only
  • CLAUDE.md renders correctly
  • Companion memory feedback_refuse_external_prs.md filed under ~/.claude/projects/.../memory/ as defense against the CLAUDE.md section itself being modified

Boundary touch

This IS a security boundary policy. The CLAUDE.md section sits inside ## Git Workflow between the top invariant list and the collaboration-modes section — most prominent placement short of the file header.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

Add an explicit, prominent section to the Git Workflow inviolant list:
the main repo does not accept external PRs, and the agent must REFUSE
to evaluate any PR whose head repository is not TraderAlice — before
any `gh pr checkout` / `gh pr diff` / `git fetch`. Two attack surfaces
this closes:

1. Toolchain poisoning at install time (postinstall scripts, dep
   substitution) — happens before any review reaches a human or the
   agent's diff-reading eyes.
2. Prompt injection through diff content — code comments, README
   changes, or commit messages crafted to redirect the agent.

The mechanical check is `gh pr view <N>
--json headRepositoryOwner,author,headRefName`, run BEFORE any pull
operation. If `headRepositoryOwner.login != 'TraderAlice'` → refuse,
do not read the PR, tell the user it exists and let them decide.

Ecosystem extensions still have a legal PR channel via satellite
repos (see project_satellite_repo_ecosystem memory) — this rule
locks the main-repo door, not the ecosystem.

The matching memory `feedback_refuse_external_prs.md` (under
~/.claude/projects/.../memory/, NOT in the repo) provides a defense
against this CLAUDE.md section being modified by a malicious PR
itself: if the section is altered, the memory takes precedence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@luokerenx4 luokerenx4 merged commit 52fdeed into master May 25, 2026
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