demo: planted auth_bypass for nose detector

[fentonbenjamin]

Demo PR planting a header-trust admin bypass to exercise the live auth_bypass detector + cockpit loop. Not for merge.

[not-a-magic]

Not Magic — advisory

Record scratch: components/reliance-pill.tsx: large addition (34 lines added)

Source:
components/reliance-pill.tsx

To restore reliance:
review the change.

---

_{Open drillback · Chain #149 · Advisory only.}

[not-a-magic]

This renders a verified UI label without enforcing all three proofs that the Stealthy Seal invariant requires: a live block, a chain entry, and chain-verify-pass. Label site: return <Pill kind="verified">verified ✓</Pill>;. Only 1 canonical proof predicate(s) gate this label. Fixture data, snapshots, or missing chain context will render as verified — a stealthy seal. Fix: gate verified rendering on all three predicates together (chain_verify_pass && entry_hash && live_chain_entry, or the equivalent names in this codebase). Anything less and the label asserts more than the chain has earned.

[not-a-magic]

X-Internal-Trust is a client-controlled HTTP header. Anyone who can set headers — browser extensions, curl, upstream proxies, internal services with the wrong scope — can flip this branch. Treating it as authentication grants admin access to unauthenticated callers. The branch leads to return NextResponse.json({ ok: true, as: user.id, admin: true }); — i.e., the caller is granted authority on the header's word alone. Fix: drop the header branch and enforce the real authorization check unconditionally. If you genuinely need internal services to bypass user-level checks, do it via a server-to-server credential the client cannot forge (mTLS, signed JWT with a private-key issuer, SPIFFE identity) — not a header value.

[not-a-magic]

X-Internal-Trust is a client-controlled HTTP header. Anyone who can set headers — browser extensions, curl, upstream proxies, internal services with the wrong scope — can flip this branch. Treating it as authentication grants admin access to unauthenticated callers. The branch leads to return NextResponse.json({ ok: true, admin: true, result }); — i.e., the caller is granted authority on the header's word alone. Fix: drop the header branch and enforce the real authorization check unconditionally. If you genuinely need internal services to bypass user-level checks, do it via a server-to-server credential the client cannot forge (mTLS, signed JWT with a private-key issuer, SPIFFE identity) — not a header value.