ci: update actions to Node 24 runtimes#12
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Bump actions/cache v4 -> v5 and rust-lang/crates-io-auth-action v1 -> v1.0.4; both run on Node 24. Resolves the Node 20 deprecation warnings (Node 20 is forced to 24 on 2026-06-16 and removed 2026-09-16). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThree version pin updates across two GitHub Actions workflow files: ChangesCI Action Version Updates
Estimated code review effort🎯 1 (Trivial) | ⏱️ ~2 minutes Poem
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⚠️ Outside diff range comments (1)
.github/workflows/testing.yaml (1)
29-37:⚠️ Potential issue | 🟠 MajorHarden cache usage for PR-triggered workflow to reduce cache-poisoning risk.
Lines 28-37 cache build artifacts (
target) in a workflow that runs onpull_requestevents; this allows untrusted code to write to a repository-scoped, persistent cache that affects subsequent builds. Prevent cache writes on PRs by separating restore and save operations.Suggested hardening pattern
- - name: Cache cargo registry and build - uses: actions/cache@v5 + - name: Restore cargo cache + uses: actions/cache/restore@<full_commit_sha_for_v5> with: path: | ~/.cargo/registry ~/.cargo/git target key: ${{ runner.os }}-cargo-${{ matrix.rust }}-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }} restore-keys: | ${{ runner.os }}-cargo-${{ matrix.rust }}- + + - name: Save cargo cache (trusted events only) + if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' + uses: actions/cache/save@<full_commit_sha_for_v5> + with: + path: | + ~/.cargo/registry + ~/.cargo/git + target + key: ${{ runner.os }}-cargo-${{ matrix.rust }}-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate. In @.github/workflows/testing.yaml around lines 29 - 37, The current workflow configuration using actions/cache@v5 allows pull requests to write to the shared cache, creating a cache-poisoning risk. Replace the single cache action with separate restore and save operations: use actions/cache/restore@v5 to only read from the cache during PR runs, and add a separate actions/cache/save@v5 step that only executes on trusted branches (not on pull_request events) to write cache updates. This ensures untrusted PR code cannot pollute the cache that subsequent builds depend on.Source: Linters/SAST tools
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
Inline comments:
In @.github/workflows/release.yaml:
- Line 27: GitHub Actions across your workflows are using mutable version tags
which pose security risks. Replace all mutable action references with specific
commit SHAs: At `.github/workflows/release.yaml` lines 27 and 50, replace
`actions/cache@v5` and `rust-lang/crates-io-auth-action@v1.0.4` respectively
with their full commit SHAs. At `.github/workflows/testing.yaml` line 29,
replace `actions/cache@v5` with its commit SHA. Additionally, address the other
mutable references mentioned in the content: in `.github/workflows/testing.yaml`
at lines 25 and 29 replace `actions/checkout@v5` and `actions/cache@v5` with
commit SHAs, at line 28 replace `dtolnay/rust-toolchain@master` with a specific
commit SHA (this is critical since it uses a branch ref), and in
`.github/workflows/release.yaml` at lines 25 and 28 replace
`actions/checkout@v5` and `dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable` with commit SHAs. Look
up the latest commit SHA for each action version and pin each action to its
corresponding immutable commit hash to prevent supply chain attacks.
---
Outside diff comments:
In @.github/workflows/testing.yaml:
- Around line 29-37: The current workflow configuration using actions/cache@v5
allows pull requests to write to the shared cache, creating a cache-poisoning
risk. Replace the single cache action with separate restore and save operations:
use actions/cache/restore@v5 to only read from the cache during PR runs, and add
a separate actions/cache/save@v5 step that only executes on trusted branches
(not on pull_request events) to write cache updates. This ensures untrusted PR
code cannot pollute the cache that subsequent builds depend on.
🪄 Autofix (Beta)
Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
- Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
- Create a new PR with the fixes
ℹ️ Review info
⚙️ Run configuration
Configuration used: Organization UI
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro Plus
Run ID: bb43af29-e2a8-40cc-b231-c36950412c6e
📒 Files selected for processing (2)
.github/workflows/release.yaml.github/workflows/testing.yaml
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| - name: Cache cargo registry and build | ||
| uses: actions/cache@v4 | ||
| uses: actions/cache@v5 |
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🧩 Analysis chain
🏁 Script executed:
# Check the release.yaml workflow around lines 27 and 50
echo "=== release.yaml around line 27 ==="
sed -n '20,35p' .github/workflows/release.yaml
echo -e "\n=== release.yaml around line 50 ==="
sed -n '45,55p' .github/workflows/release.yaml
echo -e "\n=== testing.yaml around line 29 ==="
sed -n '20,35p' .github/workflows/testing.yamlRepository: gmr/libpgfmt
Length of output: 1451
🏁 Script executed:
# Search for any SHA-pinned actions in workflow files
echo "=== Looking for any SHA-pinned actions in workflows ==="
rg 'uses:.*@[a-f0-9]{40}' .github/workflows/
# Also check if there are any policy documents or security guidelines
echo -e "\n=== Checking for policy or security docs ==="
fd -e md -e txt | xargs rg -l "pin\|action\|security" | head -20
# Count total unpinned actions in all workflows
echo -e "\n=== All unpinned action references in workflows ==="
rg 'uses:\s*\w+/[\w-]+@(?!master|main)' .github/workflows/Repository: gmr/libpgfmt
Length of output: 486
🏁 Script executed:
# Find all action references more simply
echo "=== All 'uses:' lines in workflow files ==="
rg 'uses:' .github/workflows/ -A 0
# Check if there are YAML files with specific pattern
echo -e "\n=== Total count of unpinned actions ==="
rg 'uses: .*@(v[0-9]|[a-zA-Z])' .github/workflows/ | wc -lRepository: gmr/libpgfmt
Length of output: 631
Pin all GitHub Actions to immutable commit SHAs to prevent supply chain attacks through retaggable action versions.
All action references in the workflow files currently use mutable version tags (@v5, @v1.0.4, @master, @stable) instead of pinning to specific commit SHAs. Replace with full commit SHAs:
.github/workflows/testing.yaml#L25: Replaceactions/checkout@v5.github/workflows/testing.yaml#L28: Replacedtolnay/rust-toolchain@master(currently uses branch ref—most critical).github/workflows/testing.yaml#L29: Replaceactions/cache@v5.github/workflows/release.yaml#L25: Replaceactions/checkout@v5.github/workflows/release.yaml#L28: Replacedtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable.github/workflows/release.yaml#L27: Replaceactions/cache@v5.github/workflows/release.yaml#L50: Replacerust-lang/crates-io-auth-action@v1.0.4
🧰 Tools
🪛 zizmor (1.25.2)
[error] 27-27: unpinned action reference (unpinned-uses): action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
(unpinned-uses)
[error] 27-27: runtime artifacts potentially vulnerable to a cache poisoning attack (cache-poisoning): enables caching by default
(cache-poisoning)
📍 Affects 2 files
.github/workflows/release.yaml#L27-L27(this comment).github/workflows/release.yaml#L50-L50.github/workflows/testing.yaml#L29-L29
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
In @.github/workflows/release.yaml at line 27, GitHub Actions across your
workflows are using mutable version tags which pose security risks. Replace all
mutable action references with specific commit SHAs: At
`.github/workflows/release.yaml` lines 27 and 50, replace `actions/cache@v5` and
`rust-lang/crates-io-auth-action@v1.0.4` respectively with their full commit
SHAs. At `.github/workflows/testing.yaml` line 29, replace `actions/cache@v5`
with its commit SHA. Additionally, address the other mutable references
mentioned in the content: in `.github/workflows/testing.yaml` at lines 25 and 29
replace `actions/checkout@v5` and `actions/cache@v5` with commit SHAs, at line
28 replace `dtolnay/rust-toolchain@master` with a specific commit SHA (this is
critical since it uses a branch ref), and in `.github/workflows/release.yaml` at
lines 25 and 28 replace `actions/checkout@v5` and
`dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable` with commit SHAs. Look up the latest commit SHA
for each action version and pin each action to its corresponding immutable
commit hash to prevent supply chain attacks.
Source: Linters/SAST tools
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Summary
GitHub is forcing Node 20 JS actions to Node 24 on 2026-06-16 and removing Node 20 on 2026-09-16. Update the actions that still ran on Node 20:
actions/cachev4→v5(node24; inputs unchanged —path/key/restore-keys)rust-lang/crates-io-auth-actionv1→v1.0.4(node24)actions/checkout@v5anddtolnay/rust-toolchain(composite) were already fine.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
Summary by CodeRabbit