fix: validate OAuth redirect URI against allowlist when strict#453
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- Summary
Part of splitting the Identity security hardening work into reviewable pieces. Stacked on the opt-in flag wiring (#451); depends on its
Security.Strictflag.The OAuth callback resolves its redirect from the request referrer with no validation, so a strict instance can be steered into redirecting (and leaking tokens) to an attacker-controlled URL. This validates the redirect candidate against
Security.AllowedRedirectURIswhenSecurity.Strictis set; with the flag off, behavior is unchanged. Entries match by exact scheme and case-insensitive host, with the path matched as a segment prefix (sohttps://app.example.com/authallows/authand/auth/cbbut not/authorize); subdomains are not implied. An empty allowlist accepts only the SiteURL host. When nothing matches, the fallback is the operator's first allowlisted entry rather than the raw SiteURL, which would otherwise leak to a non-allowlisted destination.- Test plan
go build ./...andgo vet ./...pass.go test -run 'TestIsAllowedRedirectURI|TestGetExternalRedirectURL_StrictFallbackUsesAllowlist|TestSecurityConfigurationDefaults' ./api/... ./conf/...passes.hack/mysqld.sh); rungo test ./api/...against it.- Description for the changelog
Validate OAuth redirect URIs against a per-instance allowlist on Identity instances that opt in to strict security.
Link EX-1884