Retarget OIDC / OAuth after DID and local-first - #1310
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#277 assumed server-hosted Agents and a public-key add-on flow. Identity is now did:ad:agent:{pubkey}; writes are client-signed. Record that OIDC belongs on the control-plane session (a better magic-link), not on atomic-server AUTH or commits. Connector OAuth stays a separate importer problem. Co-authored-by: joepmeindertsma <joepmeindertsma@gmail.com>
joepio
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August 27, 2026 05:31
SSO against the operator's IdP, connector refresh tokens, and a later OAuth AS all belong on always-on atomic-server. That is local config, not a control-plane client. Commits and resource AUTH stay Ed25519; OIDC only gates the envelope index. HostMode enrollment is unchanged until an explicit grant says otherwise. Co-authored-by: joepmeindertsma <joepmeindertsma@gmail.com>
Drop closed-product names, billing, and control-plane strategy from the OIDC/OAuth write-up. The feature is optional IdP config on this node. Co-authored-by: joepmeindertsma <joepmeindertsma@gmail.com>
Authorization-code flow with the node as confidential RP. Two cookies: OIDC session fetches the envelope; Ed25519 atomic_session is still resource AUTH. First visit mints locally; a returning device unwraps with passkey or recovery. Co-authored-by: joepmeindertsma <joepmeindertsma@gmail.com>
Sign in with the IdP must not also demand a passkey or recovery code. After a valid ID token the node unwraps with a node-held KEK and releases the Agent secret. Commits stay client-signed; the operator of this node is trusted with that identity. Co-authored-by: joepmeindertsma <joepmeindertsma@gmail.com>
Record the threat table. Prefer a short-lived issued/session agent behind the same button; GET /oidc/secret of the root Agent is the implementable fallback and a key-exfiltration API. Co-authored-by: joepmeindertsma <joepmeindertsma@gmail.com>
JWT-in-signature and node-as-signing-oracle fight forever-commits, peer verify, and offline. The Atomic-shaped version is a short-lived issued agent: same one-click OIDC UX, Ed25519 still on the wire. Co-authored-by: joepmeindertsma <joepmeindertsma@gmail.com>
OIDC-only login: node holds the root, browser generates a short-lived keypair, root signs a SessionCert. Commits stay Ed25519. write lists still name the root. Iroh AUTH must treat cert-chain as the person. Co-authored-by: joepmeindertsma <joepmeindertsma@gmail.com>
Authorization-code + PKCE against the operator IdP is unchanged. A valid id_token mints a SessionCert instead of becoming a Bearer header on /commit. Co-authored-by: joepmeindertsma <joepmeindertsma@gmail.com>
Leaving Google is a Settings action with step-up OIDC, not the login path. Unlink deletes the node's custodial wrap and must not mint a second identity if they click the button again. Co-authored-by: joepmeindertsma <joepmeindertsma@gmail.com>
SessionCert in validate_signature and AUTH is the hard part; the OIDC dance is ordinary. Absent config, nothing changes. Record Google and generic issuer setup for the operator, not the end user. Co-authored-by: joepmeindertsma <joepmeindertsma@gmail.com>
Spell out the verifier path: session Ed25519, then cert, then rights for the root via one effective_agent helper. Maps to validate_signature, AUTH, check_write, admit, and genesis write-list insert. Co-authored-by: joepmeindertsma <joepmeindertsma@gmail.com>
… develop Rewrite planning/oidc-oauth.md at about half its length and fix the issues found in review: - The cert window is checked against createdAt, which the signer picks, and no path rejects an old timestamp (utils::check_timestamp_in_past only rejects future stamps; replica ingest skips validate_timestamp). A stolen session key was therefore unbounded on the commit path. Add a live-ingest `now <= notAfter + skew` bound, state that replay and catch-up stay exposed, and point at auth-checkpoint receipts as the real fix. Drop the "bounded credential" claim where it did not hold. - Drop the claim that Iroh AUTH is byte-equal same-agent; sync::peer and sync::engine already gate on per-subject rights and the commit signature. Only own_agent_update_frame needs the root remap. - GenesisCert::private_drive_subject signs with the root private key, so the node must mint the personal Drive on first OIDC visit and return its subject; the browser cannot derive it. - State plainly that node disk + KEK theft is permanent identity theft for every OIDC user who never exported, since roots cannot rotate. - Name a TTL (24h, ATOMIC_OIDC_SESSION_TTL) and explain why sign-at-drain makes it harmless for offline editing. - Add "After login: what an OIDC user can and cannot do": sharing is by invite link in v1, deprovision lags to notAfter, identity is per node, Flutter later, no API bearer tokens, one IdP per node. - Always inline the cert on commits; no hash-only variant. User-facing docs (authentication.md, solid.md) now describe OIDC login as planned, not shipped. Collapse the duplicated changelog entries into one that says planning only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vjnz9exHsA8dKVi3aA9Jfj
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| GitGuardian id | GitGuardian status | Secret | Commit | Filename | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 26549932 | Triggered | Generic High Entropy Secret | aafebfb | browser/data-browser/src/helpers/managed/enrollment.test.ts | View secret |
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This was referenced Sep 3, 2026
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Related Issues
Related: #277 (retarget, do not close)
Checklist
What this is
A reconsideration of #277. Planning only, no protocol or server code.
Decision
OIDC-only login is a CA: root Agent on the node, browser-generated session Agent, compact SessionCert. Stock authorization-code OIDC; token-exchange into the cert, not Bearer on
/commit. Export + unlink so Google is reversible.How verifiers check session keys
Signature and rights split.
commit.signeris the session DID;effective_agentremaps to the root afterSessionCert::verify.check_rightsdoes not grow a cert case.validate_signature/check_auth_signature).tin[notBefore, notAfter](createdAton commits so history stays valid; AUTH timestamp on live requests).check_write/admit_drive_write/ genesiswriteinsert / AUTH's returnedForAgentuse the root DID.HTTP GET, WS, and Iroh inherit the remap from
get_agent_from_auth_values_and_check. No IdP at verify time. No cert means today's path.Known weakness, stated in the doc
createdAtis signer-chosen and no code path rejects an old timestamp, so a stolen session key is only bounded on live-ingest paths (HTTP, WS, Iroh COMMIT get anow <= notAfter + skewcheck). Replica and catch-up ingest stay exposed until auth-checkpoint receipts land. See "Revocation and thecreatedAtproblem".What an OIDC user gets
One click, nothing to save, new device with nothing to transfer. Sharing is by invite link in v1 (ACLs hold opaque root DIDs); email lookup is a follow-up. Deprovision lags to
notAfter(24h default). Identity is per node. Flutter later. See "After login: what an OIDC user can and cannot do".Impact
Absent IdP config, nothing changes. The costly work is SessionCert in
validate_signature+ AUTH, plus the node minting the personal Drive on first visit (derivation needs the root private key). The OIDC plugin is ordinary. Operator sets issuer/client/secret; end users only click the button.User-facing docs describe this as planned, not shipped.