Fix CA-key-in-image (HackerOne #3764027) and root-cron privesc in simplerisk

.grype.yaml

@@ -22,3 +22,18 @@ ignore:
     package:
       name: curl
       type: binary
+  # Same binary-classifier false positive as above, newly published CVE IDs.
+  # Verified against simplerisk-minimal (php 8.3/8.4/8.5): the only "curl"
+  # match is /usr/local/lib/php/extensions/.../curl.so reporting the PHP
+  # version (e.g. 8.5.10) as its own. The real Debian curl package
+  # (8.14.1-2+deb13u5) is also affected but Debian's tracker marks both IDs
+  # "wont-fix", so --only-fixed already excludes that (legitimate) match on
+  # its own; only the misclassified binary match needs ignoring here.
+  - vulnerability: CVE-2026-19931
+    package:
+      name: curl
+      type: binary
+  - vulnerability: CVE-2026-18924
+    package:
+      name: curl
+      type: binary

simplerisk-minimal/Dockerfile

@@ -99,18 +99,15 @@ RUN echo 'upload_max_filesize = 5M' >> /usr/local/etc/php/conf.d/docker-php-uplo
 	echo 'log_errors = On' >> /usr/local/etc/php/conf.d/docker-php-error_logging.ini && \
 	echo 'error_log = /dev/stderr' >> /usr/local/etc/php/conf.d/docker-php-error_logging.ini && \
 	echo 'display_errors = Off' >> /usr/local/etc/php/conf.d/docker-php-error_logging.ini && \
-# Create SSL Certificates for Apache SSL
-	mkdir -p /etc/apache2/ssl/ca /etc/apache2/ssl/simplerisk && \
-# Generate CA
-	openssl genrsa -out /etc/apache2/ssl/ca/ca.key 4096 && \
-	openssl req -x509 -new -nodes -key /etc/apache2/ssl/ca/ca.key -sha256 -days 3650 -out /etc/apache2/ssl/ca/ca.crt -subj "/CN=SimpleRisk CA" && \
-# Generate certs
-	openssl genrsa -out /etc/apache2/ssl/simplerisk/simplerisk.key 2048 && \
-	openssl req -new -key /etc/apache2/ssl/simplerisk/simplerisk.key -out /etc/apache2/ssl/simplerisk/simplerisk.csr -subj "/CN=localhost" -addext "subjectAltName=DNS:localhost,DNS:simplerisk,IP:127.0.0.1,IP:0.0.0.0" && \
-	openssl x509 -req -days 365 -in /etc/apache2/ssl/simplerisk/simplerisk.csr -CA /etc/apache2/ssl/ca/ca.crt -CAkey /etc/apache2/ssl/ca/ca.key -CAcreateserial -out /etc/apache2/ssl/simplerisk/simplerisk.crt -copy_extensions copyall && \
-	cp /etc/apache2/ssl/ca/ca.crt /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/simplerisk.crt && \
-	chmod 644 /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/simplerisk.crt && \
-	update-ca-certificates && \
+# SSL certificate directory for Apache. The actual key pair is generated at
+# container startup by entrypoint.sh (see set_ssl_certificate), not here at
+# build time: a key baked into this RUN would be identical in every pulled
+# copy of the image and, combined with registering it as a trusted CA, would
+# let anyone who pulls the image forge certs the container trusts (HackerOne
+# #3764027). No custom CA is created or installed into the system trust
+# store -- Apache's cert is self-signed directly, matching the simplerisk
+# (non-minimal) image.
+	mkdir -p /etc/apache2/ssl/simplerisk && \
 # Activate Apache modules
 	a2enmod headers rewrite ssl && \
 	a2enconf security && \

simplerisk-minimal/common/entrypoint.sh

@@ -202,6 +202,33 @@ set_csrf_secret(){
 	[ -n "${SIMPLERISK_CSRF_SECRET:-}" ] && echo "<?php \$secret = \"${SIMPLERISK_CSRF_SECRET}\"; ?>" > "$CSRF_SECRET_PATH";
 }
 
+set_ssl_certificate(){
+	# Generate Apache's self-signed TLS key pair at container startup rather
+	# than at image build time. A key baked into the image (the previous
+	# behavior) is identical in every copy of the image anyone pulls, and was
+	# additionally being registered as a trusted CA in the container's system
+	# trust store -- anyone who extracted that key could forge certs the
+	# container's own outbound curl calls would accept (HackerOne #3764027).
+	# Generating here means each deployment gets its own key, and idempotence
+	# (skip if already present) means an existing cert persisted in the
+	# /etc/apache2/ssl volume survives container restarts/recreation.
+	local ssl_dir='/etc/apache2/ssl/simplerisk'
+	local key="$ssl_dir/simplerisk.key"
+	local crt="$ssl_dir/simplerisk.crt"
+
+	if [ -f "$key" ] && [ -f "$crt" ]; then
+		return 0
+	fi
+
+	print_log "ssl_setup:info" "No Apache TLS certificate found; generating a self-signed one for this container."
+	exec_cmd "mkdir -p $ssl_dir" "Failed to create SSL certificate directory. Exiting."
+	# basicConstraints=CA:FALSE is explicit because openssl's own default
+	# x509 extensions otherwise mark a self-signed leaf cert as CA:TRUE,
+	# which Apache logs a warning about on every start.
+	exec_cmd "openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout $key -out $crt -days 365 -subj '/CN=localhost' -addext 'subjectAltName=DNS:localhost,DNS:simplerisk,IP:127.0.0.1,IP:0.0.0.0' -addext 'basicConstraints=critical,CA:FALSE' -addext 'keyUsage=critical,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment' -addext 'extendedKeyUsage=serverAuth'" "Failed to generate self-signed TLS certificate. Exiting."
+	exec_cmd "chmod 600 $key" "Failed to set permissions on TLS private key. Exiting."
+}
+
 set_cron(){
 	# If SIMPLERISK_CRON_SETUP was passed and it is set to disabled
 	if [[ -n "${SIMPLERISK_CRON_SETUP:-}" && "${SIMPLERISK_CRON_SETUP:-}" = disabled* ]]; then
@@ -443,6 +470,8 @@ unset_variables() {
 }
 
 _main() {
+	set_ssl_certificate
+
 	# Detect whether the operator has opted into Docker-managed config
 	# provisioning. If no DB env vars are set, leave config.php absent so
 	# SimpleRisk's web installer runs on first request.

simplerisk-minimal/common/etc/apache2/sites-enabled/default-ssl.conf

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ SSLStrictSNIVHostCheck Off
                 Options -Indexes
         </Directory>
         SSLEngine on
-        SSLCACertificateFile    /etc/apache2/ssl/ca/ca.crt
         SSLCertificateFile    /etc/apache2/ssl/simplerisk/simplerisk.crt
         SSLCertificateKeyFile /etc/apache2/ssl/simplerisk/simplerisk.key
         SSLProtocol -all +TLSv1.2 +TLSv1.3

simplerisk-minimal/generate_dockerfile.sh

@@ -144,18 +144,15 @@ RUN echo 'upload_max_filesize = 5M' >> /usr/local/etc/php/conf.d/docker-php-uplo
 	echo 'log_errors = On' >> /usr/local/etc/php/conf.d/docker-php-error_logging.ini && \\
 	echo 'error_log = /dev/stderr' >> /usr/local/etc/php/conf.d/docker-php-error_logging.ini && \\
 	echo 'display_errors = Off' >> /usr/local/etc/php/conf.d/docker-php-error_logging.ini && \\
-# Create SSL Certificates for Apache SSL
-	mkdir -p /etc/apache2/ssl/ca /etc/apache2/ssl/simplerisk && \\
-# Generate CA
-	openssl genrsa -out /etc/apache2/ssl/ca/ca.key 4096 && \\
-	openssl req -x509 -new -nodes -key /etc/apache2/ssl/ca/ca.key -sha256 -days 3650 -out /etc/apache2/ssl/ca/ca.crt -subj "/CN=SimpleRisk CA" && \\
-# Generate certs
-	openssl genrsa -out /etc/apache2/ssl/simplerisk/simplerisk.key 2048 && \\
-	openssl req -new -key /etc/apache2/ssl/simplerisk/simplerisk.key -out /etc/apache2/ssl/simplerisk/simplerisk.csr -subj "/CN=localhost" -addext "subjectAltName=DNS:localhost,DNS:simplerisk,IP:127.0.0.1,IP:0.0.0.0" && \\
-	openssl x509 -req -days 365 -in /etc/apache2/ssl/simplerisk/simplerisk.csr -CA /etc/apache2/ssl/ca/ca.crt -CAkey /etc/apache2/ssl/ca/ca.key -CAcreateserial -out /etc/apache2/ssl/simplerisk/simplerisk.crt -copy_extensions copyall && \\
-	cp /etc/apache2/ssl/ca/ca.crt /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/simplerisk.crt && \\
-	chmod 644 /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/simplerisk.crt && \\
-	update-ca-certificates && \\
+# SSL certificate directory for Apache. The actual key pair is generated at
+# container startup by entrypoint.sh (see set_ssl_certificate), not here at
+# build time: a key baked into this RUN would be identical in every pulled
+# copy of the image and, combined with registering it as a trusted CA, would
+# let anyone who pulls the image forge certs the container trusts (HackerOne
+# #3764027). No custom CA is created or installed into the system trust
+# store -- Apache's cert is self-signed directly, matching the simplerisk
+# (non-minimal) image.
+	mkdir -p /etc/apache2/ssl/simplerisk && \\
 # Activate Apache modules
 	a2enmod headers rewrite ssl && \\
 	a2enconf security && \\

simplerisk/Dockerfile

@@ -110,7 +110,13 @@ RUN chown -R www-data: /var/www/simplerisk
 RUN chown -R www-data: /var/log/simplerisk
 
 # Setting up cronjob
-RUN echo "* * * * * root /usr/bin/php -f /var/www/simplerisk/cron/cron.php > /dev/null 2>&1" >> /etc/cron.d/simplerisk-cron && \
+# Runs as www-data, not root: /var/www/simplerisk (including cron.php) is
+# chowned to www-data above, so a root cron entry over a www-data-writable
+# file would let any web-tier compromise escalate to root on the next tick
+# (the same class of bug as CWE-732 / HackerOne #3761952). cron.php only runs
+# application-level jobs that already execute as www-data under Apache, so it
+# doesn't need root.
+RUN echo "* * * * * www-data /usr/bin/php -f /var/www/simplerisk/cron/cron.php > /dev/null 2>&1" >> /etc/cron.d/simplerisk-cron && \
     chmod 0644 /etc/cron.d/simplerisk-cron
 RUN echo "0 0 * * * root /usr/sbin/logrotate /etc/logrotate.d/simplerisk.conf > /dev/null 2>&1" >> /etc/cron.d/logrotate-cron && \
     chmod 0644 /etc/cron.d/logrotate-cron

simplerisk/generate_dockerfile.sh

@@ -159,7 +159,13 @@ RUN chown -R www-data: /var/www/simplerisk
 RUN chown -R www-data: /var/log/simplerisk
 
 # Setting up cronjob
-RUN echo "* * * * * root /usr/bin/php -f /var/www/simplerisk/cron/cron.php > /dev/null 2>&1" >> /etc/cron.d/simplerisk-cron && \\
+# Runs as www-data, not root: /var/www/simplerisk (including cron.php) is
+# chowned to www-data above, so a root cron entry over a www-data-writable
+# file would let any web-tier compromise escalate to root on the next tick
+# (the same class of bug as CWE-732 / HackerOne #3761952). cron.php only runs
+# application-level jobs that already execute as www-data under Apache, so it
+# doesn't need root.
+RUN echo "* * * * * www-data /usr/bin/php -f /var/www/simplerisk/cron/cron.php > /dev/null 2>&1" >> /etc/cron.d/simplerisk-cron && \\
     chmod 0644 /etc/cron.d/simplerisk-cron
 RUN echo "0 0 * * * root /usr/sbin/logrotate /etc/logrotate.d/simplerisk.conf > /dev/null 2>&1" >> /etc/cron.d/logrotate-cron && \\
     chmod 0644 /etc/cron.d/logrotate-cron