Quire

Share AI coding-harness chat sessions (ZCode, Claude Code, Codex, Oh My Pi) over the web as read-only, password-protectable, expiring links — with secrets redacted on the server before anything is stored or sent.

Features

• Opt-in publishing. Nothing is shared until the owner runs quire publish.
• Password protection (optional per share) with argon2id hashing and a stateless, per-share unlock cookie (HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Strict, 30-minute TTL).
• Expiration. An expired share returns 410 and can never be read again.
• Server-side redaction. Ordered rules cover private keys, JWTs, provider API keys, authorization credentials, connection strings, secret assignments and CLI arguments, bare tokens, private IPs, local paths, and encoded or embedded secret-bearing content. Redaction is authoritative at ingestion: only redacted content is persisted, and the viewer's browser never receives a secret.
• Long-session friendly viewer. Vue 3 + Tailwind CSS v4, markdown + Shiki syntax highlighting, infinite-scroll lazy loading (50 messages per page), and automatic dark mode via prefers-color-scheme.
• No existence oracle. Unknown and revoked tokens return byte-identical 404s.
• Rate limiting. 5 failed unlocks → 15-minute lockout per token+IP; 120 requests/minute per IP across the public API.

Architecture

pnpm workspace monorepo:

Package	What it is
server/	Hono + Drizzle (Postgres) API, redaction engine, security layer
cli/	quire publisher CLI with adapters for ZCode, Claude Code, Codex, and OMP
plugin/	/share for Claude Code/ZCode plus a native Codex $share skill
web/	Vue 3 + Vite + Tailwind v4 read-only viewer
e2e/	Playwright full-stack tests (drives the Docker stack)

Data flow: harness session → adapter and CLI shape it → owner confirms (or the agent passes --yes) → the CLI generates an in-memory content key and uploads the raw shaped chunks over authenticated HTTPS → the server performs authoritative redaction and seals each chunk as an AES-256-GCM ciphertext envelope → the viewer's browser fetches the envelopes and decrypts them locally. The content key never reaches the server: it rides in the authenticated upload HTTP, then in the share URL's fragment (#<key>), which the CLI appends locally.

Shares live under /chats/<shareId>#<key> (viewer) and /api/v2/public/shares/:shareId/* (API). Share ids are 128-bit crypto-random; session ids never appear in URLs.

Security model

• Single QUIRE_API_KEY (Bearer, constant-time compare) guards owner routes.
• Unlock cookies are HMAC-SHA256 over <token>|<expiry>, signed with UNLOCK_SECRET — no server-side session state.
• Strict CSP, X-Frame-Options: DENY, Referrer-Policy: no-referrer, nosniff, HSTS. Uniform error bodies {error:{code,message}}.
• 20 MB request cap (413). No secrets in logs.
• See docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-23-zcode-session-sharing-design.md for the full design and threat reasoning.

Sealed shares

Sealed shares encrypt the redacted content with AES-256-GCM in the browser: the content key appears only in the authenticated upload HTTP and then in the share URL's fragment (#<key>), never in the server's storage, logs, or public HTTP. The server stores ciphertext envelopes in plain Postgres and serves them; only the browser holding the key can decrypt. The fragment is required — a link without it shows a missing-key error page and makes no network call. GET /metrics exposes the safe pipeline counters (counts/bytes/latency/status only).

Operational runbook — migration, metrics, rollback, backup/restore: docs/operations/sealed-shares.md.

Quick start (local dev)

pnpm install
pnpm db:test:up            # Postgres on :54329 for tests
pnpm typecheck
pnpm test                  # unit tests for all packages + E2E (needs Docker)

Run the server against a local Postgres:

cp .env.example .env       # fill in QUIRE_API_KEY / UNLOCK_SECRET
pnpm --filter @quire/web build
pnpm --filter @quire/server build
cd server
node --env-file=../.env dist/index.js

Run the built server from server/ so its ./drizzle migrations directory resolves correctly. DATABASE_URL, QUIRE_API_KEY, and UNLOCK_SECRET are required; PORT defaults to 8787.

CLI

quire setup                # prints the server .env block + a config example
quire publish --current    # shape session, confirm, publish
quire publish --current --password random --expires tomorrow --yes
                           # agent path: random password (printed once),
                           # expires at next midnight, no confirmation prompt
quire list                 # list shares (id, title, created, expires, state)
quire revoke <token> --yes # hard delete (rows gone immediately), no prompt
quire update <token> --expires 2026-09-01
quire setup omp            # installs the OMP /share handler (interactive TUI only)

--password random (or generate/auto) generates a random secret and prints it once. --expires accepts an ISO datetime, a duration (30m/24h/7d), or a keyword (tomorrow, today, week, month, year, or in <duration>). publish requires --current or a session id (there is no interactive picker). update only changes the expiry — a share's password is fixed at publish time (there is no update --password).

Environment: QUIRE_SERVER_URL, QUIRE_API_KEY (override the config file). Harness detection: --harness zcode|claude-code|codex|omp flag, else the active Codex/Claude Code/ZCode environment, else the most recently updated session store. Codex reads ~/.codex/state_5.sqlite plus the selected task's rollout JSONL, both read-only. Top-level tasks are discovered normally; a subagent task can be published by passing its explicit task ID. OMP is never auto-detected: publish an OMP HTML export by path with --harness omp.

Oh My Pi (OMP)

quire setup omp installs Quire's custom share handler into OMP's agent directory ($PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR, else ~/.omp/agent) as share.mjs. After restarting or reloading OMP, /share in an interactive, persisted OMP TUI session publishes the exact active conversation through Quire with strict redaction, no password, and no expiry. The installer never overwrites or chains an existing handler: if share.ts, share.js, or a different share.mjs is present, it refuses and says what to rename or remove; a re-run with matching bytes is a no-op. OMP does not fall back to its native share when an installed handler fails, so to revert, rename or remove the Quire-installed share.mjs and restart/reload OMP. Advanced options (password, expiry, preset) are not part of OMP's argumentless /share; publish the export directly with the desired flags instead. Headless and ACP sessions, and --no-session runs, keep OMP's native behavior.

Plugin

Install the plugin in Claude Code or ZCode and use /share. In Codex, install the native plugin and use $share. Both infer password/expiration/preset from what you ask and publish immediately (always --yes, no prompt), then report the link — e.g. $share random password, expire tomorrow.

Deployment (Docker)

cp .env.example .env       # set QUIRE_API_KEY, UNLOCK_SECRET, POSTGRES_PASSWORD
docker compose up -d --build

The server listens on 127.0.0.1:8787 inside the host; front it with your reverse proxy (Caddy/Nginx/Traefik) on your chosen host. Notes:

• Serve over HTTPS — the unlock cookie is Secure and will not be sent over plain HTTP (localhost is exempt).
• Forward X-Forwarded-For so rate limiting sees real client IPs.
• The server runs its migrations at startup; no separate migration step.

Testing

• Unit: pnpm --filter @quire/<server|cli|web|plugin> test (server tests need pnpm db:test:up first).
• E2E: pnpm --filter @quire/e2e test — builds and drives the compose stack on port 8790, then tears it down. Requires Docker.